Page 1 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

August 1, 2012

The Honorable Claire McCaskill

Chairman

The Honorable Kelly Ayotte

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate 

The Honorable Jim Webb

United States Senate

Subject: Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations by the 

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan

Over the past decade, the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors to help 

carry out their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2011, 

these agencies reported combined obligations of approximately $159 billion for contracts with a 

principal place of performance in either country. Contractor personnel have provided a range of 

services related to supporting troops and civilian personnel and to overseeing and carrying out 

reconstruction efforts, such as interpretation, security, weapon systems maintenance, 

intelligence analysis, facility operations support, advice to Iraqi and Afghan ministries, and road 

and infrastructure construction. The use of contractors in contingency operations such as these

is not new, but the number of contractors and the type of work they are performing in Iraq and 

Afghanistan represent an increased reliance on contractors to support agency missions.

Congress established the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC) 

in 2008 to assess contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan and provide recommendations to 

Congress to improve the contracting process.1 The CWC was directed by Congress to assess 

contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan for reconstruction, logistics, and security functions; examine 

the extent of waste, fraud, and abuse; and provide recommendations to Congress to improve 

various aspects of contingency contracting, including defining requirements and identifying, 

addressing, and providing accountability for waste, fraud, and abuse.

Led by six commissioners appointed by congressional leadership and two commissioners 

appointed by the president, the CWC conducted its work between 2008 and 2011.2

 

1

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 841.

 In a series 

of interim and special reports and in a culminating final report, the CWC made multiple 

2

The CWC ceased operations on September 30, 2011, 30 days after issuing its final report.
Page 2 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

recommendations about contracting practices in current and future contingency environments.3

The recommendations in the final report were organized into 15 strategic areas related to 

improvements in contingency contracting. Some recommendations were made specifically to 

DOD, State, USAID; others were made to Congress; and the remaining recommendations were 

not made to a specific entity. Only one recommendation from the final report included a date by 

which implementation should be completed, with the CWC noting that some reforms will take 

many years for agencies to fully implement because of the complexity of the issues involved.

DOD, State, and USAID have taken different management approaches for addressing the 

CWC’s recommendations. For example, at DOD, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics) established a senior-level board that used a formal process for 

determining which recommendations DOD would address and assigning responsibility for 

addressing them to specific DOD offices. The board also monitors the status of efforts to 

implement the recommendations. At State, officials told us that the Office of the Under 

Secretary for Management has general responsibility for coordinating the department’s efforts to 

address the CWC’s recommendations. These officials explained that when the CWC’s final 

report was issued, the Office of the Under Secretary for Management assigned responsibility to 

bureaus and offices with related portfolios for determining and reporting on how the department 

was addressing the recommendations at a strategic level. They explained, however, that State 

does not have a formal process for assigning responsibility for or monitoring the implementation 

of the specific recommendations. USAID has taken a decentralized approach to the CWC 

recommendations. The agency does not have an office designated for addressing or monitoring 

the efforts to address the CWC’s recommendations. According to a senior USAID official, the 

Office of Acquisition and Assistance is responsible for addressing recommendations related to 

agencywide procurement policy. However, USAID officials explained that efforts to respond to 

other CWC recommendations are more appropriately addressed at the individual mission level, 

as each country has specific needs and circumstances. 

In response to your request, we determined whether DOD, State, and USAID have taken or 

planned actions that directly align with recommendations the CWC made in its final and last two 

special reports—including those recommendations directed to one or more of the agencies and 

those recommendations not directed to a specific entity but that one or more of the agencies 

considered applicable to them. We also described agency positions on recommendations the 

CWC made to Congress when the agencies provided their positions to us. 

For our review, we analyzed the CWC’s final report and last two special reports to identify the 

total number of recommendations made. That total comprises the (1) 48 recommendations that 

the CWC made in the August 2011 final report, some of which were based on recommendations 

the CWC made in its interim and special reports and (2) 3 recommendations that the CWC 

made in Special Report 4 (issued in March 2011) that related to the transition to a civilian-led 

 

3

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Interim Report—At What Cost? Contingency 

Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (June 10, 2009); Interim Report 2—At What Risk? Correcting Over-Reliance on 

Contractors in Contingency Operations (Feb. 24, 2011); Special Report 1: Defense Agencies Must Improve Their 

Oversight of Contractor Business Systems to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse (Sept. 21, 2009); Special Report 2: 

Lowest-Priced Security Not Good Enough for War-Zone Embassies (Oct. 1, 2009); Special Report 3: Better Planning 

for Defense-to-State Transition in Iraq Needed to Avoid Mistakes and Waste (July 12, 2010); Special Report 4: Iraq—

A Forgotten Mission? (Mar. 1, 2011); Special Report 5: Sustainability: Hidden Costs Risk New Waste (June 3, 2011); 

and Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, Final Report to Congress (Aug. 31, 

2011).
Page 3 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

presence in Iraq.4 Of these 51 total recommendations, 19 were directed to DOD, State, and/or 

USAID; 15 were directed to Congress; and 17 were not directed to a specific entity. For the 

recommendations not directed to a specific entity, we relied on each agency to identify which 

recommendations were applicable to it. In total, 30 recommendations were identified as 

applicable to DOD; 27 as applicable to State; and 25 as applicable to USAID. We did not 

evaluate the CWC’s recommendations; our focus was on the actions the agencies took related 

to the recommendations. Specifically, we categorized the agencies’ respective efforts to 

address each applicable recommendation as either (1) “actions taken or planned that directly 

align with the specific recommendation” or (2) “no actions taken or planned that directly align 

with the specific recommendation.” To determine whether each agency had taken or planned 

actions that directly aligned with each applicable recommendation, we collected the agencies’ 

self-reported information using a data collection template; corroborated reported actions with 

related documentation, when available; and conducted structured interviews with 

knowledgeable agency officials to clarify responses. We categorized the agencies’ efforts as 

“actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation” even when the 

agencies’ actions (1) were started or completed before the issuance of the CWC’s final or last 

two special reports or (2) only partially addressed the recommendation, such as when an 

agency took an action that directly aligned with the recommendation in either Iraq or 

Afghanistan but not agencywide, or when an agency took an action that directly aligned with a 

portion of a recommendation but did not address another portion of the recommendation. For 

instances in which agencies reported not having taken or planned actions that directly align with 

a specific recommendation, we documented the rationale for this course of action and reviewed 

available documentation. However, we did not assess the appropriateness or sufficiency of any 

actions taken or planned by the agencies. Finally, we did not assess the agencies’ positions on 

the CWC’s recommendations to Congress, although we included the agencies’ positions on 

those recommendations when the agencies provided them to us. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2012 to August 2012 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In summary, DOD reported having taken or planned actions that directly align with about half of 

the CWC recommendations applicable to it, and State and USAID each reported having taken 

or planned actions that directly align with about one-third of the recommendations applicable to 

each of them. Officials from the three agencies explained that for the remaining 

recommendations no actions were taken or planned that directly aligned with the specific 

recommendation. This was because, for example, the agencies had determined that existing 

policies or practices already meet the intent of the recommendations or had disagreed with the 

recommendations. The following are examples of actions that DOD, State, and USAID have 

taken or planned that directly align with specific CWC recommendations:

• DOD issued a final rule to amend the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 

(DFARS) in February 2012 to improve the oversight of contractor business systems, 

including the ability to withhold a percentage of payments on certain covered contracts when 

a contractor’s business systems contain significant deficiencies. This action aligns with the 

 

4

The recommendations from the CWC’s Special Report 5 were incorporated into the final report. Therefore, we have 

not counted recommendations from Special Report 5 separately.
Page 4 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

CWC’s recommendation to strengthen authority to withhold contract payments for 

inadequate business systems.5

• State issued guidance in October 2011 describing a process for drafting a determination 

memorandum each time the potential need to suspend or debar a contractor arises, 

including for those cases in which no action against the contractor is ultimately 

recommended. This guidance aligns with a CWC recommendation to strengthen 

enforcement tools by requiring a written rationale for not pursuing a proposed suspension 

and debarment.

 

6

• USAID issued guidance in January 2012 that requires sustainability analysis for all projects

and developed a tool that contains questions, issues, and examples to help USAID project 

design teams think through project sustainability objectives and maximize sustainable 

outcomes. This guidance aligns with a CWC recommendation related to project 

sustainability (i.e., ensuring that host nations will be able to operate and maintain U.S.-

funded projects on their own).7

The following are examples of instances in which DOD, State, and USAID reported not having 

taken or planned actions that directly align with specific CWC recommendations:

• The three agencies generally have not and do not plan to elevate the positions and expand 

the authority of officials responsible for contingency contracting as recommended by the 

CWC. Officials from DOD, State, and USAID explained that they regard existing 

organizational structures as meeting the recommendations’ intent. For example, DOD 

officials stated that the CWC’s recommendation to create a new directorate for contingency 

contracting is not needed because DOD already has a significant amount of senior 

leadership involvement and support for operational contract support. Similarly, State officials 

stated that there were no plans to establish a separate bureau led by an Assistant Secretary 

for Acquisition as recommended by the CWC because their current organizational structure, 

in which contingency contracting is overseen by the Assistant Secretary for Administration in 

coordination with the Under Secretary for Management, is sufficient to meet the 

department’s needs. USAID officials stated that there were no plans to make the chief 

acquisition officer position a non-career appointment as recommended because they believe 

that having a career foreign service officer in that role provides the necessary knowledge of 

the agency’s unique mission and acquisition needs. 

• None of the three agencies agree with the recommendation requiring performance 

incentives and performance assessments as tools for preventing human trafficking by 

contractors. Officials from each agency explained that contractors should not need 

incentives to comply with anti-trafficking laws and other ongoing initiatives, such as training 

for contract administration personnel, were better tools to help combat human trafficking.

In enclosure I, we list the 51 CWC recommendations and describe and categorize DOD’s, 

State’s, and USAID’s specific efforts to address each applicable recommendation as either 

(1) “actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation” or (2) “no 

actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation.” We also 

 

5

DFARS; Business Systems-Definition and Administration (Case 2009-D038). 77 Fed. Reg. 11,355 (Feb. 24, 2012).

6

Department of State Office of the Procurement Executive, Procurement Information Bulletin 2012-01, Contractor 

Suspension and Debarment, October 3, 2011.

7

USAID Automated Directives System Section 200.3.1.5, Policy Directives and Required Procedures, Build in 

Sustainability from the Start (Feb. 10. 2012).
Page 5 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

summarize the positions provided by the agency for these recommendations and for the 

recommendations to Congress for which the agencies provided positions.

Agency Comments 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOD, State, and USAID. The three 

agencies informed us that they had no comments on the draft’s findings and provided us with 

technical comments that we incorporated into the final report as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and 

the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as interested 

congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions, please contact us at (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov 

or (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 

report are listed in enclosure II. 

John P. Hutton

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Cary B. Russell

Acting Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

Enclosures—2 
Page 6 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

Enclosure I: Summary of Agency Actions Related to Commission on Wartime 

Contracting Recommendations

Between March 2011 and August 2011 the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 

Afghanistan (CWC) issued two special reports and a culminating final report to Congress, 

making multiple recommendations about contracting practices in current and future contingency 

environments.8 In the March 2011 Special Report 4, the CWC addresses the transition to a 

civilian-led presence in Iraq and makes 3 recommendations. In August 2011, the CWC issued 

its final report in which it built on recommendations made in the interim and special reports it 

had issued since 2009, including recommendations made in Special Report 5, which it issued in 

June 2011.9

 In the final report, the CWC made 48 recommendations across 15 strategic areas. 

Of the 51 total recommendations that the CWC made in Special Report 4 and in the final report, 

19 were directed to the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (State), and/or 

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); 15 were directed to Congress; and the 

remaining 17 were not directed to a specific entity. For the recommendations not directed to a 

specific entity, we relied on each agency to identify which recommendations were applicable to 

it. In total, 30 recommendations were identified as applicable to DOD; 27 as applicable to State; 

and 25 as applicable to USAID. 

In this enclosure, we summarize the actions that DOD, State, and USAID took that are related 

to the CWC recommendations. We did not evaluate the CWC’s recommendations; our focus 

was on the actions the agencies took related to the recommendations. Specifically, we 

categorize the agencies’ efforts as either: (1) “actions taken or planned that directly align with 

the specific recommendation” or (2) “no actions taken or planned that directly align with the 

specific recommendation.” To determine whether each agency had taken or planned actions 

that directly aligned with each applicable recommendation, we collected the agencies’ selfreported information using a data collection template; corroborated reported actions with related 

documentation, when available; and conducted structured interviews with knowledgeable 

agency officials to clarify responses. We categorized the agencies’ efforts as “actions taken or 

planned that directly align with the specific recommendation” even when the agencies’ actions 

(1) were started or completed before the issuance of the CWC’s final or last two special reports 

or (2) only partially addressed the recommendation, such as when an agency took an action 

that directly aligned with the recommendation in either Iraq or Afghanistan but not agencywide, 

or when an agency took an action that directly aligned with a portion of a recommendation but 

did not address another portion of the recommendation. For instances in which agencies 

reported not having taken or planned actions that directly align with a specific recommendation, 

we documented the rationale for this course of action and reviewed available documentation. 

However, we did not assess the appropriateness or sufficiency of any actions taken or planned 

by the agencies. We also summarize any agency positions on recommendations the CWC 

made to Congress if they were provided to us, but we did not assess these positions. 

 

8

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Special Report 4: Iraq—A Forgotten Mission? (Mar. 1, 

2011); Special Report 5: Sustainability: Hidden Costs Risk New Waste (June 3, 2011); and Transforming Wartime 

Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, Final Report to Congress (Aug. 31, 2011).

9

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Interim Report—At What Cost? Contingency 

Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (June 10, 2009); Interim Report 2—At What Risk? Correcting Over-Reliance on 

Contractors in Contingency Operations (Feb. 24, 2011); Special Report 1: Defense Agencies Must Improve Their 

Oversight of Contractor Business Systems to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse (Sept. 21, 2009); Special Report 2: 

Lowest-Priced Security Not Good Enough for War-Zone Embassies (Oct. 1, 2009); Special Report 3: Better Planning 

for Defense-to-State Transition in Iraq Needed to Avoid Mistakes and Waste (July 12, 2010).
Page 7 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

In tables 1 through 15, below, we: 

• list the 48 recommendations the CWC made in its final report, grouped by the 

15 strategic areas identified by the CWC; 

• note the entity to which the recommendation is directed; 

• indicate when a recommendation is not applicable to a particular agency, either because 

the recommendation was directed to Congress, the recommendation was specifically 

directed to another agency, or the agency reported the recommendation was not 

applicable to it; and 

• summarize related information provided by the agencies. 

Table 1: CWC Strategic Area 1—Use Risk Factors in Deciding whether to Contract in Contingencies

Recommendation

directed to agency heads 

involved in a contingency

DOD State USAID

1a

Issue and ensure 

implementation of policy 

guidance for using risk 

factors such as those listed 

above, as well as those 

described in the Office of 

Federal Procurement Policy

(OFPP) draft policy letter of 

March 2010 and 

Department of Defense 

Instruction 1100.22 to 

provide guidance on what 

functions are appropriate to 

contract for in a 

contingency setting

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

a

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD has issued guidance for 

operational contract support 

planning applicable to 

contingency settings, 

providing for risk assessments 

as part of the operational 

planning process. Specifically,

considerations for contracting 

risks, such as proper vetting,

are included in joint doctrine 

and DOD instructions.b

State officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation but stated 

that existing guidance and 

practice meets the intent. 

State issued guidance in May 

2012 on inherently 

governmental functions that 

the department considers 

applicable to both noncontingency and contingency 

contracting, although the 

guidance does not directly 

address the risk factors cited 

by the CWC.

DOD 

also established the Joint 

Contingency Acquisition 

Support Office in part to assist 

combatant commands in 

planning for and assessing 

risk of contracted support.

c 

USAID officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation. According 

to USAID officials, the agency

is reviewing its policies on 

inherently governmental 

functions in light of the OFPP

policy letter. However, USAID 

officials stated that they do 

not expect any changes to 

their policies will be specific to 

contingency settings.

Department 

officials further noted that 

measures have been 

incorporated into contract 

terms and operating 

procedures that address risk 

factors. For example, State

officials noted that the 

department’s Worldwide 

Protective Services contract, 

awarded in September 2010, 

includes contract terms, such 

as standards of conduct and 

training, aimed at improving 

professionalism and lessening 

the risk of offending the 

sensibilities of the local 

population. 
Page 8 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

1b

Provide funding and 

direction for agencies 

involved in contingency 

operations to identify a 

trained, experienced, and 

deployable cadre for 

stabilization-andreconstruction functions in 

areas of contingency 

operations so that the 

government has an 

alternative to contracting for 

performance of critical or 

sensitive functions

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation 

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials stated that the 

department established a 

working group in February 

2012 to address deployable 

cadre manpower 

requirements using civilians in 

support of contingency 

operations. The goal is for this 

civilian workforce to be preidentified, trained, cleared, 

equipped, and ready to deploy 

to the extent practical in 

support of combat operations 

by the military; contingencies; 

emergency operations; 

humanitarian missions; 

disaster relief; restoration of 

order; drug interdiction; and 

stability operations. 

Implementation of this civilian 

program model is set to begin 

in fiscal year 2013.

State officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation but stated 

that the department’s existing 

organizational structure meets 

the intent. State identified its 

establishment of the Bureau 

of Conflict and Stabilization 

Operations in November 2011 

to focus on conflict 

prevention, crisis response, 

and stabilization activities as 

responsive to the 

recommendation, although 

officials noted that State does 

not plan to formally establish 

a deployable cadre as 

recommended by the CWC. 

State officials added that they 

do not believe that the 

department’s contracting for 

support in Iraq or Afghanistan 

has resulted in a loss of 

organic capability.

USAID officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation but stated 

that the agency’s existing 

organizational structure meets 

the intent. Specifically, a 

senior official noted that

USAID’s Bureau for 

Democracy and Humanitarian 

Assistance’s Office of Civilian 

Response provides for 

reconstruction and 

stabilization support.
Page 9 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

1c

Provide a strategic plan for 

deploying these cadres that 

includes provisions for 

mandatory deployability of 

civilian members, and is 

supported by a back-up 

capability for rapidly making 

temporary hires for largescale or long-term 

contingency operations

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials stated that the 

development of this strategic 

plan would be considered as 

part of the related effort 

identified above in 1b.

State officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation but stated 

that the department’s existing 

practices meet the intent. 

State officials noted that while 

the department is not 

developing a specific strategic 

plan, all foreign service 

personnel can be deployed to 

contingency locations.

USAID officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation but stated 

that the agency’s existing 

organizational structure meets 

the intent. Specifically, a 

senior official noted that 

USAID’s Bureau for 

Democracy and Humanitarian 

Assistance’s Office of Civilian 

Response provides for 

reconstruction and 

stabilization support.

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.

a

In its final report, the CWC outlined characteristics of risk in contracting for a contingency, focusing on the broad 

areas of operational, political, and financial risk. According to the CWC, operational, political, and financial risk factors 

include risks to: (1) maintaining agencies’ critical organic or core capabilities; (2) U.S. goals and objectives, such as 

from behavior that injures innocent members of the local population or outrages their sensibilities; (3) the 

government’s ability to control costs, waste, fraud, abuse, and conflicts of interest, among others. In its final report, 

the CWC also outlined situational risks, which it described as factors that could affect risk assessment and should be 

considered by the government along with operational, political, and financial risks. Situational risks include: 

(1) operating in a combat zone or insurgent-threat area; (2) lack of effective federal oversight in the area of 

operations; and (3) inadequate accounting, financial, and business systems among contractors and subcontractors, 

among others. See also, OFPP Policy Letter 11-01: Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 

76 Fed. Reg. 56,227 (Sept. 12, 2011). Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22, Guidance for Determining 

Workforce Mix, April 6, 2007.

b

International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Operations in Afghanistan, Construction Contracting 

Guidelines for Afghanistan (Oct. 9, 2010); Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-10, Operational 

Contract Support (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2008); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice 4130.01, Guidance 

for Combatant Commander Employment of Operational Contract Support Enabler—Joint Contingency Acquisition 

Support Office (Dec. 20, 2011). 

c

Department of State Office of the Procurement Executive, Procurement Information Bulletin No. 2012-11, Preventing 

Contractor Performance of Inherently Governmental Functions, May 9, 2012.
Page 10 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

Table 2: CWC Strategic Area 2—Develop Deployable Cadres for Acquisition Management and Contractor 

Oversight

Recommendation

directed to agency heads

DOD State USAID

2a

Provide funding and 

direction to establish a 

trained, experienced, and 

deployable cadre for 

acquisition-management 

and contractor-oversight 

functions in areas of 

contingency operations so 

that the government has an 

alternative to relying on 

contractors for acquisition 

management and oversight

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials stated that 

resourcing and direction to 

establish a deployable cadre 

for acquisition-management 

and contractor-oversight 

functions is currently being 

considered as part of the 

related effort identified in 1b 

above and will be addressed 

in a comprehensive 

operational contract support 

action plan, scheduled for 

completion in September 

2012, to guide capital 

planning and budget 

preparation. 

State officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. A State 

official testified in September 

2011 that the department 

does not see a separate 

contingency contracting 

acquisition cadre as an 

efficient or necessary model

and the department’s existing 

acquisition structure and 

working capital fund provide 

sufficient expertise and 

funding for contingency 

operations.

USAID officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation but stated 

that the agency’s existing 

organizational structure meets 

the intent. USAID officials 

stated that the agency’s 

contracting and agreement 

officers currently have the 

capability to be deployed and 

work in contingency 

environments. The Office of 

Acquisition and Assistance 

maintains a foreign operations 

unit responsible for supporting 

overseas contracting efforts, 

and USAID’s preference is to 

strengthen this unit rather 

than direct resources 

elsewhere. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.

Table 3: CWC Strategic Area 3—Phase out the Use of Private Security Contractors for Certain Functions

Recommendation not 

directed to specific entity 

DOD State USAID

3a

Phase out the use of hostnation private security 

contractors in Afghanistan 

for the convoys on highvolume roads that the 

insurgency controls or 

contests

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Not applicable Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Pursuant to Afghan 

government requirements, the 

department is in the process 

of transitioning selected 

private convoy security 

contracts to the Afghan Public 

Protection Force.a

State officials stated that this 

recommendation is not 

applicable because they 

interpreted it being directed 

towards DOD. 

Additionally, DOD officials 

stated that U.S. Central 

Command and U.S. ForcesAfghanistan policies and 

guidance require 

consideration of the likelihood 

of private security contractors

becoming involved in combat 

or situations likely to escalate 

into combat when determining 

the appropriateness of using 

contractors. 

Officials from the Office of 

Acquisition and 

Assistance/Afghanistan 

reported that as of March 20, 

2012, all USAID awardees are 

required to use the Afghan 

Public Protection Force for all 

security services.a
Page 11 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

3b

Evaluate each staticsecurity site to assess the 

risk associated with the use 

of contractors. Where the 

military commander 

determines there is a high 

risk, use military forces. 

Where the commander 

determines the high risk is 

specifically the result of 

using local-national 

contractors, use military 

forces or third-country 

national private security 

contractors for security

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Not applicable Not applicable

DOD officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation. While DOD 

officials stated that the 

department expects contract 

static security guards to 

transition to the Afghan Public 

Protection Force in 2013 and 

that U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 

is monitoring the transition 

effort, officials did not identify 

specific efforts to evaluate 

each static security site to 

determine whether military 

forces should provide security 

at specific, high-risk sites.

State officials stated that this 

recommendation is not 

applicable because they 

interpreted it being directed 

towards DOD.

USAID officials stated that this 

recommendation is not 

applicable. They explained 

that the protection of USAID 

personnel and facilities is 

managed by State’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security, and the 

agency does not directly 

contract for security services.

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.

a

In August 2010, the President of Afghanistan issued Presidential Decree 62 (PD 62), which directed the dissolution 

of private security contractors. In the wake of the decree, a bridging strategy was developed to facilitate the transition 

away from private security contractors in Afghanistan to the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), which existed 

within the Ministry of Interior prior to PD 62. The APPF is a Ministry of Interior security force organized under the 

Deputy Minister and consists of a national headquarters and seven zone headquarters. As a fee-for-service 

government owned and operated security force, it secures international, governmental, and non-governmental 

operations, sites, and facilities.

Table 4: CWC Strategic Area 4—Improve Interagency Coordination and Guidance for Using Security 

Contractors in Contingency Operations

Recommendation

directed to entity 

specified

DOD State USAID

4a

Hold the ambassador, 

USAID mission director, 

and military commanders 

responsible for making, 

publicizing, and revising 

their determinations of 

security-contracting 

appropriateness as 

conditions change, giving 

particular consideration to 

the geographic, temporal, 

and organizational 

proximity to armed conflict

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

In July 2009, DOD published 

guidance for all U.S. 

government private security 

contractors working in 

contingency operations. The 

guidance, updated in August 

2011, requires Geographic 

Combatant Commanders in 

contingency environments to 

issue guidance and 

procedures for the selection, 

training, accountability, and 

equipping of private security 

personnel.

State officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. Department 

officials explained that

contracting decisions are 

made with input from across 

the department, including the 

ambassador and the Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security. 

a 

USAID officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation. Officials 

explained that security issues 

at the mission level are the 

responsibility of State’s 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
Page 12 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

4b

When private security or 

other contractors are to be 

armed, they should be 

overseen by government 

employees and tracked in a 

centralized system, as is 

done in Iraq

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Not applicable

In 2007, DOD designated the 

Synchronized Predeployment 

and Operational Tracker 

system as its primary system 

for collecting data on 

contractor personnel deployed 

with U.S. forces. Currently, 

DOD requires the use of the 

system for all personnel 

performing private security 

functions in Iraq or 

Afghanistan. Additionally, 

DOD policies generally 

discuss the oversight of 

private security and other 

contractors by military or DOD 

civilian personnel. 

Under State policy, all 

applicable contracts for 

private security in Iraq and 

Afghanistan are required to 

include a clause requiring 

personnel to be entered into 

the Synchronized 

Predeployment and 

Operational Tracker system.

b

USAID officials stated that this 

recommendation is not 

applicable because the 

agency does not directly 

contract for security services.

State contract oversight 

planning documents also call 

for these contractors to be 

operationally supervised by 

direct hire government 

personnel.

4c

Reliance on private security 

contractors should be 

accompanied by greater 

use and emphasis on 

vetting, training, authorizing 

arms, and weapons control; 

post-convoy debriefing, 

locational tracking, and 

video monitoring; and more 

thorough and 

comprehensive 

management

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Not applicable

DOD has issued and updated

DOD Instruction 3020.50, 

which provides instructions to 

geographic combatant 

commanders on their 

requirements to address

some of the issues specified 

in the recommendation.

a

Additionally, DOD directed 

use of a new quality 

management standard for 

private security contractor 

operations that includes 

specific measurable elements 

for vetting, training, and 

procurement and 

management of weapons. 

Further, in June 2012, DOD

finalized a regulation that 

establishes minimum 

processes and requirements 

for the selection, 

accountability, training, 

equipping and conduct of 

personnel performing private 

security functions under DOD 

contracts.

Officials from State’s Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security stated

that all of State’s private 

security contractor personnel 

working under its Worldwide 

Protective Services contract 

are vetted and must be 

trained in accordance with the 

terms of the contract. 

According to the department, 

operational control and 

monitoring exceeds the CWC 

recommendation.

c 

USAID officials stated that this 

recommendation is not 

applicable because the 

agency does not directly 

contract for security services.
Page 13 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

4d

Execute an interagency 

agreement to provide 

guidance on security 

contracting

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation. However, 

DOD officials stated that the 

recommendation has been 

addressed through Section 

159 of Title 32 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations, which 

requires coordination between 

DOD and State to establish 

processes for the selection, 

training, equipping, and 

conduct of private security 

personnel in combat 

operations or other significant 

military operations.

d

State officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. Officials 

explained that State does not 

concur that an interagency 

agreement is necessary to 

provide guidance on security 

contracting. Department 

officials stated that the 

Overseas Security Policy 

Board, which State chairs and 

of which both DOD and 

USAID are members, was a 

more appropriate forum for 

addressing the use of security 

contractors in future 

contingencies. 

 These 

provisions are applicable to all 

future areas of operations that

require enhanced 

coordination of private 

security contactor personnel.

USAID officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation.

4e

DOD, State, and USAID 

should develop and enter 

into a standing interagency 

memorandum of 

agreement, incorporating 

lessons and best practices 

learned in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, to provide 

guidance in use of private 

security contractors in 

future contingencies

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation. However, 

DOD officials stated that the 

recommendation has been 

addressed through Section 

159 of Title 32 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations, which 

requires coordination between 

DOD and State to establish 

processes for the selection, 

training, equipping, and 

conduct of private security 

personnel in combat 

operations or other significant 

military operations.d

State officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. According 

to officials, a specific 

memorandum of agreement is 

not necessary to share best 

practices, lessons learned, or 

other information between 

agencies colocated overseas. 

The department stated that 

existing mechanisms, such as 

the Overseas Security Policy 

Board, and standing working 

groups integral to overseas 

missions, such as the Country 

Team and Emergency Action 

Committees, provide effective 

forums for the sharing of 

information, best practices, 

and lessons learned.

 These 

provisions are applicable to all 

future areas of operations that

require enhanced 

coordination of private 

security contactor personnel.

USAID officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation.
Page 14 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

4f

This standing memorandum 

of agreement should be 

modified within 90 days of a 

declared combat operation 

or other contingency to 

specifically address the 

needs and circumstances 

of that operation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation. However, 

DOD officials stated that the 

recommendation has been 

addressed through Section 

159 of Title 32 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations, which 

requires coordination between 

DOD and State to establish 

processes for the selection, 

training, equipping, and 

conduct of private security 

personnel in combat 

operations or other significant 

military operations.d

State officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. As noted 

above, department officials 

stated that a specific 

memorandum of agreement is 

not necessary to share best 

practices, lessons learned, or 

other information between 

agencies colocated overseas 

and that existing mechanisms 

for sharing of information, 

best practices, and lessons 

learned are sufficient. 

 These 

provisions are applicable to all 

future areas of operations that

require enhanced 

coordination of private 

security contactor personnel.

USAID officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation.

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.

a

DOD Instruction 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian 

or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises, July 22, 2009. The regulation was updated in August 

2011 to incorporate changes made in the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, 

Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 853 (2008) and the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. 

L. No. 111-383, § 832.

b

Department of State Office of the Procurement Executive, Procurement Information Bulletin No. 2008-15, Use of 

Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) for Contractors Supporting and Diplomatic or 

Consular Mission Outside the United States, March 25, 2008. 

c

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS); Contractors Performing Private Security Functions 

(Case 2011-D023). Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 35,883 (June 15, 2012).

d

32 C.F.R. § 159.
Page 15 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

Table 5: CWC Strategic Area 5—Take Actions to Mitigate the Threat of Additional Waste from 

Unsustainability

Recommendation

directed to officials at 

DOD, State, and USAID

DOD State USAID

5a 

Examine both completed 

and current projects for 

risk of sustainment failure 

and take appropriate 

action to cancel or 

redesign programs and 

projects that have no 

credible prospect of 

being sustained

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation but stated 

that existing policies meet the 

intent. For example, while it 

has not examined completed 

or current projects, DOD has 

addressed sustainability 

considerations in joint doctrine 

published between 2009 and 

2011 on stability operations, 

counterinsurgency, and foreign 

humanitarian assistance.a

Although State did not identify 

any departmentwide efforts

that directly align with this 

recommendation, the Embassy 

in Kabul has taken such

actions. Specifically, the 

Embassy has taken steps to 

identify projects that need to 

be sustained in order to 

position itself to make 

decisions about which projects 

will be sustained and how they 

will be sustained going 

forward. Department officials 

stated that State does not 

generally have large 

construction or infrastructure 

projects that would lend 

themselves to an analysis of 

sustainability.

 

According to a senior 

development official at the 

Embassy in Kabul, in response 

to Afghan-specific 

sustainability guidance issued 

in June 2011, USAID 

conducted an analysis of 

67 different projects for 

sustainability in Afghanistan, 

which should be finalized by 

the summer of 2012.b

 For this 

sustainability analysis, officials 

from USAID’s Office of 

Afghanistan and Pakistan 

Affairs reported that the 

agency identified operating 

and maintenance costs, 

prospects for sustainability by 

the Afghan government, and 

options for cost recovery. 

These officials stated that if 

projects did not appear 

sustainable, USAID 

considered options to cancel 

or provide additional 

assistance. Officials from the 

Office of Iraq and Arabian 

Peninsula Affairs reported on a 

recent analysis the Iraq 

Mission completed for

Congress that highlights 

Government of Iraq 

contributions to ongoing 

USAID projects.
Page 16 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

5b

Ensure that any new 

requirements and 

acquisition strategies for 

projects or services to be 

handed over to a host 

nation include a detailed 

assessment of long-term 

costs and of host nations’ 

ability and willingness to 

meet those costs

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials stated that by 

early 2013 the department 

plans to establish clarifying 

policy and guidance for setting 

acquisition strategies that must 

include long-term project 

sustainability for the host 

nation. Additionally, DOD 

officials stated that the 

department follows 

International Security 

Assistance Force Contracting 

Guidelines issued in October 

2010 that require Afghan 

National Security Forces 

facilities to be sustainable in 

accordance with Afghan 

construction and maintenance 

capabilities. 

Although State did not identify 

any departmentwide efforts 

that directly align with this 

recommendation, the 

department has taken such 

actions in Iraq. Specifically, 

guidance was implemented in 

Iraq in 2009 that generally 

required cost-sharing with the 

Government of Iraq for new 

projects. The guidance also 

generally required the 

development of advance 

agreements with the 

Government of Iraq to ensure 

the host nation is able and 

willing to contribute financially 

to projects and to establish 

plans for transitioning 

responsibility for projects to the 

Government of Iraq or other 

Iraqi entities. Embassy officials 

in Afghanistan stated that they 

do not have such guidance.

USAID updated its agencywide 

project design guidance in 

January 2012 to require 

sustainability analysis for all 

projects.

c

5c

It also developed a 

tool that contains questions, 

issues, and examples to help 

USAID project design teams 

think through project 

sustainability objectives and 

maximize sustainable 

outcomes. 

Report to Congress by 

December 31, 2011, and 

annually thereafter, on 

analysis and proposed 

actions for mitigating 

sustainability risks

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation unless 

directed to do so by Congress, 

citing concern over the number 

of existing reporting 

requirements and 

congressional inquiries.

State officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation unless 

directed to do so by Congress. 

Department officials stated that 

State does not generally have 

large construction or 

infrastructure projects that 

would lend themselves to an 

analysis of sustainability.

USAID is currently required to 

certify to the Committees on 

Appropriations before certain 

funds appropriated in the 

Consolidated Appropriations 

Act, 2012 may be obligated for 

assistance to Afghanistan.

d

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.

Also, according to officials, 

USAID briefed its committees 

of jurisdiction on analysis and 

proposed actions for mitigating 

sustainability risks in its 

Afghanistan programs in 2011 

and in its Iraq programs in May 

2012. 

Note: The CWC’s Special Report 5, Sustainability: Hidden Costs Risk New Waste included the same 

recommendations. Therefore, we have not listed recommendations from Special Report 5 separately. 

a

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2011); Joint 

Publication 3-24, Counter-insurgency Operations (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5, 2009); Joint Publication 3-29, Foreign 

Humanitarian Assistance (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2009). 

b

USAID, Administrator’s Sustainability Guidance for USAID in Afghanistan (June 2011). 

c

USAID Automated Directives System Section 200.3.1.5, Policy Directives and Required Procedures, Build in 

Sustainability from the Start (Feb. 10. 2012).

d

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74 § 7046 (2011).
Page 17 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

Table 6: CWC Strategic Area 6—Elevate the Positions and Expand the Authority of Civilian Officials 

Responsible for Contingency Contracting at DOD, State, and USAID

Recommendation

directed to entities as 

specified below

DOD State USAID

6a

The CWC endorsed the 

House version of the 

National Defense 

Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012, which 

would have amended 

section 138(b) of Title 10 

U.S.C, in part by (1) 

establishing an Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for 

Contingency Contracting; 

and (2) establishing an 

Office for Contingency 

Contracting headed by 

the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Contingency 

Contracting

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

While this recommendation 

relates to a congressional 

action, DOD officials stated 

they do not believe that 

consolidation of operational 

contract support responsibility

in an Office for Contingency 

Contracting or an Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for 

Contingency Contracting is 

necessary because each DOD 

organization brings unique 

subject matter expertise to the 

oversight of contingency 

contracting. Additionally, DOD 

officials stated that senior 

leadership acknowledge the 

importance of operational 

contract support and are taking 

steps to communicate that 

message throughout the 

organization, with the 

Undersecretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics) monitoring progress. 

6b

State should:

(1) establish a separate 

Bureau of Acquisition led 

by an assistant secretary

for acquisition who has a 

background as a qualified 

acquisition professional 

and who would be 

designated as the 

agency’s chief acquisition 

officer, (2) ensure that 

the new bureau would 

have acquisition as its 

singular focus and 

primary mission, and (3) 

establish additional 

Senior Executive Service 

positions to support the 

bureau’s work.

Not applicable No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Not applicable

State officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. Officials 

explained that the 

department’s current structure, 

in which contingency 

contracting is overseen by the 

Assistant Secretary for 

Administration in coordination 

with the Under Secretary for 

Management, is sufficient to 

meet the department’s needs.
Page 18 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

6c

The chief acquisition 

officer within USAID 

should be a non-career 

appointment at an 

organizational level so as 

to facilitate advising and 

assisting the agency 

head

Not applicable Not applicable No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

USAID officials stated the 

agency does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. The USAID 

chief acquisition officer is a 

career appointment, and 

officials reported on no plans 

to change this arrangement, 

citing the institutional 

expertise, overseas 

experience, and organizational 

continuity provided by a senior 

foreign service career 

designation.

6d

Congress should amend 

41 USC 1702 to provide 

that the chief acquisition 

officer’s duties include 

managing policy and 

monitoring contingency 

contracting

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

While this recommendation is 

directed to Congress, USAID 

officials noted that the chief 

acquisition officer currently 

manages policy and monitors 

contingency contracting in 

practice. A senior USAID 

official disagreed with codifying 

the acquisition organization of 

USAID in statute, explaining 

that doing so would reduce the 

agency’s flexibility to make 

future adjustments.

6e

To elevate the role of 

contingency contracting 

within USAID, the chief 

acquisition officer

should be identified as a 

“direct adviser” to the 

Administrator, a similar

position to that of the 

chief financial officer and 

the chief information

officer

Not applicable Not applicable Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

According to officials, USAID 

plans to update its 

organizational chart to formally 

reflect the “dotted line” 

reporting relationship in which 

the chief acquisition officer is a 

direct advisor to the USAID 

Administrator, similar to the 

reporting relationships for the 

chief financial officer and chief 

information officer. Officials

noted, however, that the chief 

acquisition officer will continue 

to formally report to the 

Assistant Administrator for 

Management.

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.
Page 19 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

Table 7: CWC Strategic Area 7—Elevate and Expand the Authority of Military Officials Responsible for 

Contingency Contracting on the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders’ Staffs, and in the Military Services

Recommendation

directed to DOD

DOD State USAID

7a

Extract operational 

contract support and 

other contract-support 

duties and 

responsibilities from J4 

(Logistics) and create a 

J10 Directorate of 

Contingency 

Contracting at the Joint 

Staff in order to better 

support contracting in 

other directorates and 

missions such as 

intelligence, 

communications, 

linguistic support, and 

security

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Not applicable Not applicable

DOD officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation but stated 

that the department’s existing

organizational structure meets 

the intent. The department 

stated it does not believe 

additional staff structure is 

needed due to already having 

a significant amount of senior 

leadership involvement and 

support for operational 

contract support. According to 

DOD, this leadership and 

support has resulted in 

guidance on operational 

planning, doctrine, policy, and 

resources being applied to 

institutionalization of 

operational contract support.

7b

Create functional 

alignment by 

establishing similar J10 

organizations at the

combatant commands 

and in the four military 

services

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Not applicable Not applicable

DOD officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation.

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.

Table 8: CWC Strategic Area 8—Establish a New, Dual-Hatted Senior Position at the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) and the National Security Council (NSC) Staff to Provide Oversight and Strategic Direction 

Recommendation

directed to Congress

DOD State USAID

8a

Congress should create 

a position in the 

Administration for a 

single dual-hatted 

official to serve at OMB 

and on the NSC staff

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Page 20 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

8b

Congress should create 

a position in the 

Administration for a 

single dual-hatted 

official to ensure that 

each relevant agency 

has the necessary 

financial resources and 

policy oversight, as 

appropriate, to carry out 

its contingency-related 

mission, and that 

agencies' budgets are 

complementary rather 

than duplicative or 

conflicting. In OMB, this 

official should be a 

deputy director and thus 

a presidential appointee 

confirmed by the Senate

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

8c

Congress should create 

a position in the 

Administration for a 

single dual-hatted 

official to oversee and 

ensure coordination of 

interagency contingency 

operations, including 

contracting-related 

matters. At NSC, this 

senior official shall 

attend and participate in 

the meetings of the NSC 

as the principal advisor 

to the NSC on 

interagency contingency 

operations. This official 

should be a deputy 

national security adviser 

and deputy assistant to 

the President

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.
Page 21 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

Table 9: CWC Strategic Area 9—Create a Permanent Office of Inspector General for Contingency Operations

Recommendation

directed to Congress

DOD State USAID

9a

Congress should 

establish and fund a 

permanent inspector 

general for contingency 

operations to operate 

with a small staff in 

collaboration with 

agency inspectors 

general to regularly 

assess the adequacy of 

agency planning and 

readiness for 

contingencies, to be 

ready to deploy at the 

outset of a new 

contingency, and to 

expand as necessary

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

While this recommendation is 

directed to Congress, State 

officials reported that they have 

concerns about the 

establishment of a new 

inspector general with 

responsibilities that overlap 

existing oversight entities 

because the same functions 

can be performed more 

effectively and efficiently 

through the coordinated efforts 

of existing agency inspectors 

general.

While this recommendation is 

directed to Congress, USAID 

officials stated that other 

agencies can provide the 

necessary oversight, and as 

such, a new inspector general 

office would serve a redundant 

function.

9b

Congress should 

establish and fund a 

permanent inspector 

general for contingency 

operations to exercise 

audit and investigative 

authority over all 

functions (such as 

logistics, security, and 

reconstruction) and 

across DOD, State, 

USAID, and other 

agencies participating in 

contingency operations

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

9c

Congress should 

establish and fund a 

permanent inspector 

general for contingency 

operations to develop, 

plan, and, as 

appropriate, deliver 

investigative and 

oversight training 

targeted to contingency 

operations

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.
Page 22 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

Table 10: CWC Strategic Area 10—Set and Meet Annual Increases in Competition Goals for Contingency 

Contracts

Recommendation

directed to agency heads

DOD State USAID

10a

Require competition 

reporting and goals for 

contingency contracts

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

In February 2012, DOD 

established the contingency 

competition goals as required 

by Section 844 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012.

a

Pursuant to a requirement in 

Section 835 of the Ike Skelton 

National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2011, State reports 

jointly with DOD and USAID 

on the extent of competition 

for its Iraq and Afghanistan 

contracts.

 To 

facilitate the tracking of 

contingency contracts and 

ability to report on 

competition, DOD recently 

established a unique code in 

the Federal Procurement Data 

System-Next Generation for

capturing contractual actions 

in support of DOD’s efforts in 

Afghanistan. According to 

DOD officials, the department

also has an interagency 

memorandum of agreement 

that enables it to create other 

such unique codes for any 

future contingencies.

b

Pursuant to a requirement in 

Section 835 of the Ike Skelton 

National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2011, USAID reports 

jointly with DOD and State on 

the extent of competition for 

its Iraq and Afghanistan 

State officials contracts.

stated the department does 

not plan to implement the 

section of the

recommendation that pertains 

to competition goals. Officials 

stated they have and track 

competition goals throughout 

the department but do not 

think a specific breakout for 

contingency contracts is 

necessary.

b

10b

USAID officials 

stated the agency does not

have or plan to establish 

separate competition goals for 

contingency contracts since

the agency’s existing policy 

on exceptions to competition 

applies across the majority of 

USAID’s operating 

environments, including 

Critical Priority Countries such 

as Iraq and Afghanistan, with 

limited exceptions.

Break out and compete 

major subcontract 

requirements from omnibus 

support contracts

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Not applicable No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

In February 2012, DOD 

mandated a review of 

omnibus contingency 

contracts in support of 

Operation Enduring Freedom 

as required by Section 844 of 

the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2012.

State officials stated that this 

recommendation is not 

applicable because the 

department does not have 

large omnibus support 

contracts. Department officials 

noted, however, that 

contingency operations 

require the flexibility to craft a 

contracting strategy that fits 

the existing environment 

rather than mandating a 

single solution such as 

“compete major 

subcontracts.”

a 

USAID officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation but stated 

that the agency’s existing 

policies meet the intent. 

Officials reported that the 

agency’s current acquisition 

planning policies and 

practices are sufficient to 

guide decisions related to 

contract scope. Officials 

further explained that the 

agency does not regularly use 

omnibus support contracts in 

practice.
Page 23 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

10c

Limit contingency taskorder performance periods

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. Officials 

explained that a statutory limit 

of 10 years for task order 

contracts with defined 

exceptions already exists.

State officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. Officials 

explained that State awards 

task order contracts with 

option periods and 

determinations are made to 

exercise contract options 

based on the best interests of 

the government. According to 

department officials, 

mandating shorter periods 

than required would increase 

the amount of contracting 

effort in contingency 

operations when resources 

are most constrained, 

resulting in a continuous cycle 

of solicitation and award.

c

USAID officials stated the 

agency does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. USAID 

acquisition officials reported 

task order performance 

periods are generally 

determined on a case-by-case 

basis based on the conditions 

of the specific situation in 

conjunction with longer-term 

development goals. 

10d

Reduce one-offer 

competitions

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation. While DOD 

recently revised regulations to 

address acquisitions using 

competitive procedures in 

which only one offer is 

received, exemptions to this 

regulation include acquisitions 

in support of contingency 

operations.d

State officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation. According 

to State officials, State’s 

Bureau of Administration is 

still discussing the best 

approach on this issue. 

Officials stated 

they plan to assess the impact 

that the revised regulatory 

coverage has on competition 

in fiscal year 2012 to 

determine if additional 

changes are needed for 

contingency operations or 

otherwise.

USAID developed a Vendor 

Communication Plan in 2012 

that establishes greater 

outreach efforts to the partner 

community to, in part, 

increase the number of 

potential offerors and build in 

competition at the early 

stages of designing 

requirements and 

solicitations.e
Page 24 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

10e

Expand competitions when 

only one task-order offer is 

received

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation. While DOD 

recently revised regulations to 

address acquisitions using 

competitive procedures in 

which only one offer is 

received, exemptions to this 

regulation include acquisitions 

in support of contingency 

operations.d

State officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. State 

reported in its June 2011 

response to the CWC’s 

interim report that the 

determination to award a task 

order should be left to the 

contracting officer. The 

department noted that when 

all task order contract holders 

have been offered a fair 

opportunity to bid on a task 

order and only a single offer is 

received, re-solicitation of the 

task order is unlikely to result 

in additional offers.

Officials stated 

they were unaware of any 

forthcoming guidance that 

would address contingencies.

USAID officials stated the 

agency does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. Officials 

reported that such a policy 

would be disruptive in a 

contingency environment and 

is unnecessary in fair and 

open competitions.

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.

a

Pub. L. No. 112-81 (2011). Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) 

Contingency Competition Goals and Competition Reviews of Certain Omnibus Contracts, February 17, 2012.

b

Pub. L. No. 111-383.

c

10 U.S.C. § 2304a(f).

 

d

DFARS; Only One Offer (Case 2011-D013). 77 Fed. Reg. 39,126 (June 29, 2012).

e

USAID, USAID Partner Community Outreach Plan, September 2011 to September 2012. 

Table 11: CWC Strategic Area 11—Improve Contractor Performance-Data Recording and Use

Recommendation for 

Congress to direct 

agency heads to

DOD State USAID

11a

Allow contractors to 

respond to, but not 

appeal, agency 

performance 

assessments

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

While this recommendation is 

directed to Congress, DOD 

officials stated that a 

contractor should have some 

right of appeal to a past 

performance assessment at a 

level above the contracting 

officer, especially to protect 

against an erroneous

assessment.

While this recommendation is 

directed to Congress, State 

officials noted that they agreed 

with the recommendation but 

suggested that any change to 

the performance assessment 

appeal process should be 

governmentwide.

While this recommendation is 

directed to Congress, USAID 

officials stated that they 

agreed with the 

recommendation but that 

implementation would require 

a governmentwide change.
Page 25 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

11b

Align past-performance 

assessments with 

contractor proposals

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

While this recommendation is 

directed to Congress, DOD 

officials stated they are 

concerned that the CWC’s 

intent to limit the consideration 

of contractors’ pastperformance references to 

only those contracts that have 

been recorded in the 

government’s past 

performance database would 

disadvantage certain groups of 

contractors, such as nonincumbent contractors, and 

prevent consideration of all 

relevant past performance 

information.

While this recommendation is 

directed to Congress, State 

officials noted that they were 

concerned that the CWC’s 

intent to limit the consideration 

of contractors’ pastperformance references to 

only those contracts that have 

been recorded in the 

government’s past 

performance database may 

prevent consideration of 

relevant past performance, 

such as work conducted by 

contractors for foreign 

governments.

While this recommendation is 

directed to Congress, USAID 

officials noted that they have 

concerns that implementation 

of this recommendation may 

negatively affect the ability of 

contractors without past 

performance on U.S. 

government contracts to 

compete for new contract 

awards.

11c

Require agencies to 

certify use of pastperformance database

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

While this recommendation is 

directed to Congress, DOD 

noted that it is unclear who 

would certify the use of this 

data or the value that 

certification would provide. 

However, officials agreed that 

contractor past performance 

data need substantial 

improvement and plan to 

measure compliance with 

existing past performance 

reporting requirements.

While this recommendation is

directed to Congress, State 

officials noted that contractor 

past performance reporting 

must first be improved so the 

database is usable. State 

officials added that the 

department has taken steps to 

improve data inputs by 

centralizing its past 

performance reporting 

process.

While this recommendation is 

directed to Congress, USAID 

officials stated that they were 

not certain who would certify 

use of the past performance 

database or the benefits that 

certification would provide. 

They noted that overall, they 

agreed with the need to 

improve the past performance 

assessment process and data.

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.
Page 26 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

Table 12: CWC Strategic Area 12—Strengthen Enforcement Tools

Recommendation not 

directed to specific 

entity 

DOD State USAID

12a

(1) Revise regulations to 

lower procedural barriers 

to suspensions and 

debarments and (2) 

require a written rationale 

for not pursing proposed 

suspensions and 

debarments

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this

recommendation. While DOD 

reported it supports 

strengthened enforcement 

tools, officials stated that they 

disagreed with the CWC’s 

specific recommendation. 

DOD officials noted that they 

have concerns about requiring 

a written rationale for not 

pursuing proposed suspension 

and debarments, stating this 

provision might have a 

negative effect on the 

suspension and debarment 

official’s discretion or result in 

de facto debarments, thereby 

potentially increasing the risk 

of litigation.

State issued guidance in 

October 2011 describing a 

process for drafting a 

determination memorandum 

each time the potential need to 

suspend or debar a contractor 

arises, including for those 

cases in which no action 

against the contractor is 

ultimately recommended.a

Officials reported that in 

February 2011, USAID 

established the Compliance 

Division within its Office of 

Acquisition and Assistance to 

handle suspensions and 

debarments and work with 

USAID’s Inspector General to 

address procedural barriers 

the agency had identified 

related to evidence gathering

for potential suspensions or 

debarments. Officials reported 

that USAID’s practice is to 

prepare a memo for all 

administrative actions, 

including for decisions not to 

pursue suspensions, proposed 

debarments, and debarments 

but did not cite a specific policy 

that required documenting 

such decisions. 

State reported it disagrees that 

procedural barriers are an 

issue but suggested any 

related actions should be 

taken through the Interagency 

Suspension and Debarment 

Committee to ensure 

consistency across agencies. 

12b

Make consent to U.S. 

civil jurisdiction a 

condition of contract 

award

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Not applicable

DOD officials stated that due 

to the complexity of the legal 

issues related to this 

recommendation, they have 

tasked a team to consider the 

recommendation. They also 

noted that Section 834 of the 

Ike Skelton National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2011 provided the 

Secretary of Defense authority 

to apply contract remedies in 

certain cases where 

contractors are not subject to 

U.S. jurisdiction.

State has not taken or planned 

actions that directly align with 

this recommendation and 

officials stated a 

governmentwide change would 

be required. The officials 

added that they are not sure 

how this recommendation, 

which the CWC noted would 

allow for private parties to 

recover on certain claims 

arising out of conduct related 

to government contracts, 

would be enforced if 

implemented. b

USAID officials stated that they 

interpret this recommendation 

as being directed to Congress 

based on the direction of the 

same recommendation to 

Congress in the CWC’s 

second interim report. USAID 

officials added that, assuming 

the intent of the 

recommendation is to establish 

jurisdiction beyond what is 

currently in place for 

contractors and subcontractors, implementing it 

will require governmentwide 

changes.
Page 27 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

12c

Expand the power of 

inspectors general

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

DOD officials stated that this 

recommendation is not 

applicable because they 

interpret it as being directed to 

Congress.

State officials stated that this 

recommendation is not 

applicable because they 

interpret it as being directed to 

Congress.

USAID Office of Inspector 

General officials stated that 

this recommendation is not 

applicable because a formal 

expansion of the inspectors’ 

general powers would require 

congressional action. They 

explained their office has 

engaged both USAID and 

congressional staff on issues 

related to suspension and 

debarment and trafficking in 

persons and proposed ways to 

enhance oversight by the 

inspector general when 

necessary.

12d

Amend acquisition 

regulations to require 

contracting officer 

consent for the award of

subcontracts valued at or 

above $300,000 to 

foreign companies when 

performance will 

predominately be 

conducted overseas in 

support of contingency 

operations

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. Officials 

reported that DOD has 

considered the topic of 

subcontracting limits and 

concluded such limits would 

not be workable and have the 

potential to increase 

contracting actions, which 

could negatively impact the 

workload of the contracting 

and oversight workforce.

State has not taken or planned 

actions that directly align with 

this recommendation as State 

officials stated a 

governmentwide change would 

be required. The officials 

explained that they agree that 

contracting officers should 

require that a contractor obtain 

consent to subcontract under 

certain conditions and a 

change to the governmentwide 

Federal Acquisition Regulation 

should be made.

USAID officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation but stated 

that the agency’s existing 

practices meet the intent. 

Officials reported the agency 

adheres to relevant Federal 

Acquisition Regulation

provisions related to consent 

to subcontract. In addition, as 

part of the Accountable 

Assistance for Afghanistan 

initiative, contracting officers in 

Afghanistan may restrict 

implementing partners from 

having more than two 

subcontract tiers without 

USAID approval.
Page 28 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

12e

Incentivize contingency 

contractors to end 

trafficking in persons by

labor brokers and 

subcontractors by

requiring prime contracts 

to include performance 

incentives and mandate 

that performance 

assessments include 

management of 

trafficking in persons

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. Officials 

stated that the department is 

committed to combating 

trafficking in persons and 

implementing the department’s 

“zero tolerance” policy but 

does not intend to incentivize 

contractors to do so. DOD 

identified numerous initiatives 

underway in this area, 

including policy mandates and 

awareness initiatives. For 

example, in November 2011, 

DOD published additional 

contract administration duties 

to maintain surveillance over 

contractor compliance with 

trafficking in persons 

requirements for all DOD 

contracts.

State officials stated the 

department does not plan to 

implement this 

recommendation. Officials 

stated that State does not 

agree that incentivizing 

contractors with additional 

payments is the best way to 

accomplish the goals of the 

recommendation. Instead, 

State issued additional 

guidance and took action to 

strengthen anti-trafficking 

efforts. For example,

c

State issued detailed contract 

administration guidance and 

developed training for 

contracting officer 

representatives on how to 

monitor contractor compliance

with countering trafficking in 

persons requirements.d

State also collaborated on the 

development of

governmentwide training on 

trafficking in persons 

prevention responsibilities for

acquisition professionals.

Further, State created and 

issued a new contract clause 

on recruitment and housing of 

non-professional third country 

nationals.

 

e

USAID officials stated the 

agency does not plan to

implement this 

recommendation. Officials 

explained that while they 

would support assessing 

contractor performance as it 

pertains to management of 

trafficking in persons, there is 

no need to incentivize 

contractors to comply with the 

law. They explained that all 

USAID contracts and grants 

already contain the standard 

Federal Acquisition Regulation

provisions related to human 

trafficking and that the agency 

has issued additional guidance 

and directives. Also, USAID 

established a working group 

for continued oversight of 

trafficking issues and 

enforcement, which is 

developing updated training for 

contracting officers and 

contracting officer 

representatives. 

The clause requires 

recruitment plans, fair 

recruitment practices, and, as 

appropriate, a plan to provide

adequate housing conditions 

for workers.

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.

a

Department of State Office of the Procurement Executive, Procurement Information Bulletin 2012-01, Contractor 

Suspension and Debarment, October 3, 2011.

b

Pub. L. No. 111-383.

c

DFARS § 242.302. 

d

Department of State Office of the Procurement Executive, Procurement Information Bulletin 2011-09, Combating 

Trafficking in Persons, March 24, 2011.

e

Department of State Office of the Procurement Executive, Procurement Information Bulletin 2012-10, Contractor 

Recruitment of Third Country Nationals, February 28, 2012.
Page 29 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

Table 13: CWC Strategic Area 13—Provide Adequate Staffing and Resources, and Establish Procedures to 

Protect the Government’s Interests

Recommendation not 

directed to specific entity 

DOD State USAID

13a

Strengthen authority to 

withhold contract payments 

for inadequate business 

systems

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

In February 2012, DOD

issued a final rule to amend

the DFARS to improve the 

oversight of contractor 

business systems, including 

the ability to withhold a 

percentage of payments on 

certain covered contracts 

when a contractor’s business 

systems contain significant 

deficiencies.a 

State has not taken or 

planned actions that directly 

align with this 

recommendation, and officials 

stated a governmentwide 

change would be required. 

According to State officials, 

consistent governmentwide 

rules are required in this area 

since, unlike DOD, other 

agencies lack specific 

authority to withhold 

payments for inadequate 

business systems. 

Additionally, 

DOD reported that Defense 

Contract Audit Agency 

business system audits have 

identified deficiencies that 

have been or are in the 

process of being corrected. 

USAID officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation. According 

to officials, they are reviewing

USAID’s current authority to 

withhold contract payments 

for inadequate business 

systems.

13b

Amend access-to-records 

authority to permit broader 

government access to 

contractor records

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

No actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Section 842 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012 provides a 

mechanism for the 

department to obtain access 

to certain contractor and 

subcontractor records in the 

U.S. Central Command’s 

theater of operations.

b

State has not taken or 

planned actions that directly 

align with this 

recommendation, and officials 

stated a governmentwide 

change would be required. 

Officials stated that the 

government should be 

consistent in this area, since 

standards need to be clear for 

agencies to deal with multiple 

layers of subcontractors in 

overseas environments.

According to DOD officials, 

the department worked with 

Congress to obtain this

statutory provision. 

USAID officials did not identify 

actions taken or planned that 

directly align with this 

recommendation. According 

to officials, they are reviewing 

specific limitations on 

USAID’s current authority to 

access contractors’ records. 
Page 30 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

13c

Increase agencies' staff 

and resources to enable 

adequate management of 

all aspects of contingency 

contracting: financial 

management, acquisition 

planning, business-system 

reviews, source selection, 

incurred-cost audits, 

performance management, 

property management, 

contract payment, and 

contract close-outs

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

DOD officials stated in 

February 2012 that the 

department was establishing 

a working group to address 

staffing and resource 

challenges related to 

contingency contracting. 

Officials noted that staffing 

and resourcing continue to be 

the department’s biggest 

challenges and they are 

concerned that future budget 

cuts could affect progress 

made to date.

State is using resources from 

the Defense Contract 

Management Agency and the 

Defense Contract Audit 

Agency to augment its 

contract management and 

administration capabilities. 

Officials also stated that since 

its working capital fund was 

established in February 2008, 

in part to fund the hiring of 

contracting personnel, State 

has hired 66 direct-hire 

employees and was in the 

process of hiring another 

19 government employees as 

of June 2012.

USAID officials stated that the 

agency will have added 

95 contracting officers by the 

summer of 2012, more than 

doubling the number of field 

contracting officers in the last 

3 years under the 

Development Leadership 

Initiative program.

c

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.

a

DFARS; Business Systems-Definition and Administration (Case 2009-D038). 77 Fed. Reg. 11,355 (Feb. 24, 2012).

b

Pub. L. No. 112-81 (2011). 

c

22 U.S.C. § 2684.

Table 14: CWC Strategic Area 14—Congress Should Provide or Reallocate Resources for Contingency 

Contracting Reform to Cure or Mitigate the Numerous Defects Described by the Commission

Recommendation

directed to Congress

DOD State USAID

14a

Congress should provide or 

reallocate resources for 

contingency contracting 

reform to cure or mitigate 

the numerous defects 

described by the CWC

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.
Page 31 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

Table 15: CWC Strategic Area 15—Congress Should Enact Legislation Requiring Regular Assessment and 

Reporting of Agencies’ Progress in Implementing Reform Recommendations

Recommendation 

directed to Congress

DOD State USAID

15a

This legislation should 

require the Secretaries of 

Defense and State and the 

Administrator of USAID to 

submit reports detailing 

their plans for 

implementation of CWC 

recommendations, 

commencing 180 days from 

enactment of the 

legislation, with annual 

reporting thereafter

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

While this recommendation is 

directed to Congress, DOD 

reported that it does not 

intend to submit a report to 

Congress but plans to 

integrate applicable 

recommendations into a 

comprehensive operational 

contract support action plan 

and continue to track 

implementation progress and 

have working groups and 

forums to further address 

contracting issues in current 

and future contingency 

operations.

15b

This legislation should 

require that agencies'

reports shall be submitted 

to congressional 

committees of jurisdiction; 

to the inspectors general of 

the Departments of 

Defense and State, and of 

USAID; and to the officials 

holding the proposed new 

positions at OMB/NSC and 

the permanent inspector 

general for contingency 

operations, all of whom 

would be required to review 

and validate the reports

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Page 32 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

15c

This legislation should 

require reporting 

requirements that 

include: (1) actions taken or 

planned to implement 

recommendations, 

including an implementation 

schedule with milestones 

and assignments of 

responsibility; (2) 

explanations for nonimplementation of 

recommendations, 

including counter-measures 

for barriers to 

implementation; and (3) 

evaluation within 120 days 

by the Comptroller General 

and agency inspectors 

general (and the permanent 

contingency IG when 

available) of the agencies' 

reports and their 

compliance with 

requirements

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.

In table 16, we list the recommendations that the CWC made to Congress, State, and DOD in 

Special Report 4, which related to the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, and 

summarize agency positions on them if the agencies provided their position to us. 

Table 16: CWC’s Recommendations in Special Report 4

Recommendation

directed to entity 

specified

DOD State USAID

1

Congress ensure adequate 

funding to sustain State 

operations in critical areas 

of Iraq, including its greatly 

increased needs for 

operational contract support

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Page 33 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

2 

State expand its organic 

capability to meet 

heightened 

needs for acquisition 

personnel, contract 

management, and 

contractor oversight

Not applicable Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Not applicable

In 2008, State began using a

working capital fund to fund 

increases in the acquisition 

workforce.a Officials stated

that since February 2008 

when the fund was 

established, the department

has hired 66 direct-hire 

employees, and was in the 

process of hiring another 

19 government employees as 

of June 2012. The department 

also noted that its Bureaus of 

International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs and 

Diplomatic Security, the two 

bureaus most heavily involved 

in overseas contingency 

contracting, have both 

significantly increased 

resources to support contract 

administration.

3

The Secretaries of State 

and Defense extend and 

intensify their collaborative 

planning for the transition, 

including executing an 

agreement to establish a 

single, senior-level 

coordinator and decisionmaker to guide progress 

and promptly address major 

issues whose resolution 

may exceed the authorities

of departmental working 

groups

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Actions taken or planned 

that directly align with the 

specific recommendation

Not applicable

According to DOD officials, 

the Secretary of Defense 

appointed a senior-level Iraq 

Transition Coordinator and 

the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff also appointed a senior 

military officer as his Iraq 

Transition Coordinator. For 

the Iraq transition effort, in 

September 2010 DOD and 

State established a Senior 

Executive Steering Group 

focused on coordinating the 

materiel and support aspects 

of the transition. According to 

DOD officials, this group 

reported to the Under 

Secretary of State for 

Management and the Acting 

Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics) on a regular basis 

to ensure that milestones 

were met and address any 

issues that may impact the 

transition. The officials noted 

that this group also 

established working groups as 

necessary.

In February 2011, the 

Secretary of State appointed 

an Iraq Transition 

Coordinator. According to the 

department, the Iraq 

Transition Coordinator has 

been responsible for 

coordinating all State-related 

aspects of the U.S. transition 

from military to civilian 

operations in Iraq, working 

closely with the U.S. 

Ambassador to Iraq, the U.S. 

military, and other U.S. 

departments and agencies. 

DOD and State also 

established a Senior 

Executive Steering Group to 

focus on coordinating and 

synchronizing the materiel 

and support aspects of the 

transition. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials. a

22 U.S.C. § 2684.
Page 34 GAO-12-854R Contingency Contracting

Enclosure II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts 

John P. Hutton, (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov 

Cary B. Russell, (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contacts named above, Johana R. Ayers, Assistant Director; Alissa Czyz, 

Assistant Director; Jacob Leon Beier; Carole Coffey; Jennifer Dougherty; David Hancock; 

Melissa L. Hermes; Mae Jones; Hynek Kalkus; Julia Kennon; Anne McDonough-Hughes; 

Christopher J. Mulkins; Alyssa Weir; and Natasha Wilder made key contributions to this report. 

(121042)
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