N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT YESENIA EQUIHUA-EQUIHUA; e t a l.,

Pla i ntiffs-Appe lla

nts,
v. JEFFER SON B . SESSIONS III, Attorne y Ge ne ra l; e t a l.,

De fe nda n ts-Appe lle e s. No. 16-35125 D.C . No. 9:14-c v-00268-DW M
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of M o nta

na Dona ld W . M olloy , Distric t Judge , Pre s iding Argue d and Subm i tte d

Oc tobe r 5, 2017 Se attle , W a s hington B e fore : LIPEZ, * * W ARDLAW , a nd OW ENS, C i rc u it Judge s. Ye se nia Equihua -Equihua

(“ Equihua ” ) a

ppe a ls the distric t c o urt’ s de n ia l of
a ttorne y ’ s fe e s pursua

nt to theEqua l Ac c e ss to Justic e Ac t (“ EAJA” ), 28 U.S.C
. 

# FIL ED DEC 18 2017 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.

* * The Honora

ble Ke rm it V. Lipe z , Unite d State s C irc uit Judgefor the First C irc uit, sitting by

de signa tion.§ 2412(d). W e re v e rse and re fe r the c a se to the Appe lla te C om m issione r for the
c a lc ulat ion of a

ttorne y ’ s fe e s a

nd e xpe nse s. 1. Equihua

is a pre va iling pa

rty be c a use the distric t

c o urt’ s orde r holding the c a se in a

be y anc e wa s suffic ie nt to c onfe r judic ia l im prim atur on the m ate ria l
a lte ra tion of the pa

rtie s’ re lationship. Se e Li v . K e isle r , 505 F.3d 913, 917 (9th C ir. 2007). The orde r he ld the c a se in a be y a n c e “ p ursua

nt to the stipula

tion of the pa rtie s ,” whe re in the gove rnm e nt prom ise d tha t it would not de

ny Equihua ’ s I-485
a pplic a tion ba se d on he r Quilantan a dm i ssion. Thedistric t c ourt c om m itte d a n
e rror of la w by re quiring e xpre ss inc orporation of thestipula te d te rm s , whe n inc o rporation by

re fe re nc e is suffic ie nt. Se e C arbone l l v . I.N

.S. , 429 F.3d 894, 897, 901–02 (9th C ir. 2005) (holding tha t a distric t c ourt orde r stating only “ [i] t is so orde re d” c onfe rre d

judic ia l im

prim atur a

n d e nforc e a

b ility on a n a dja c e n t stipula tion); K lamath Sisk

iy ou W ildlands C

tr. v
. U.S. Bure au of Land Mgmt. , 589 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th C ir. 2009) (sa m e ). 2. The De pa

rtm e n t of Hom e la

nd Se c urity ’ s (“ DHS” ) position wa s not substa ntia lly justifie d, a

nd the distric t c o urt a

buse d its disc re tion in c onc luding othe rwise . A distric t c o urt a buse s its disc re tion, i nte r

alia , whe n its de c ision re sts on irre le va

nt c onside ra tions. Se e

, e .g. , La Quinta W

orldw ideLLC

v . Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C .V. , 762 F.3d 867, 879 (9th C ir. 2014) (sta ting tha t, unde r a buse of
2disc re tion sta nda rd, the a ppe lla te c ourt “ m

u st c onside r whe the r the distric t c ourt’ s de c ision wa s ba s e d

on a c onside ra tion of there le va nt fa c t ors” ); U

n ite d State

s v . Manc i nas-Flore

s , 588 F.3d 677, 683 (9th C ir. 2009) (c iting Ins. C o . of N . Am. v
. Moore , 783 F.2d 1326, 1328 (9th C ir. 1986) (de sc ribing a buse of disc re tion a s
re quiring de te rm inat ion “ that the distric t c ourt’ s e xe rc ise of disc re tion wa s ba se d
on c onside ra tion of there le va nt fa c tors” )); Horphag Re se arc h Ltd. v . Pe lle

grini , 337 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th C ir. 2003) (“ Unde r the a buse of disc re tion sta

nda rd, a
re vie wing c ourt c annot re ve rse a de c ision of thedistric t

c ourt unle ss the re vie wing
c ourt ha s a

de finite and firm

c onvic tion tha

t the distric t

c ourt c o m

m itte d a c le ar
e rror of judgm e n t in thec onc l usion it re a c he d upon a we ighing of the

re le va nt fa c t ors.” ); Unite d State

s v . Sc hle tte , 842 F.2d 1574, 1577 (9th C ir.), ame nde d , 854 F.2d 359 (9th C ir. 1988) (c iting with a pprova l Unite d State

s v . K rame r , 827 F.2d 1174, 1179 (8th C ir. 1987) (de fining a buse of disc re tion a s the c ourt fa iling to
c onside r a

signific ant fa c tor, or “ an irre le v an t or im prope r fa c t or is c onside re d a nd give n signific ant we ight” )). He re , the distric t c ourt re lie d on two irre le va nt c onside ra tions. First, the distric t c o urt a

na ly z e d le ga l ba se s tha

t the Unite d State s C itiz e nship a nd Im m i gration Se rvic e (“ USC IS” ) c ould ha ve re l ie d upon to c onc lude it wa s not bound by a de c ision from an Im

m igration Judge(“ IJ” ), ra the r tha n USC IS’ a c tua l
3position, which wa s to ignorethe IJ e n tire l y . Se c ond, a fte r e xte nsive disc ussion

c onc luding tha

t the re wa s le ga l unc e rta inty around whe the r an IJ’ s de c ision ha d pre c lusive e ffe c t on USC IS, the distric t c ourt c o nside re d whe the r USC IS’ a dve rse
c re d ibility

de te rm inat ion wa s supporte d by substa ntia l e vide nc e . B ut whe the r or not the re is a

n e v i de ntia

ry ba sis for a

n a d ve rse c re dibility

de te rm inat ion is irre le va nt to the que stion of whe the r USC IS’ de c ision to c onduc t a de novo
c re d ibility

ana ly sis wa s substa

ntia lly justifie d. And there le va nc e of a ny
e vide ntia ry ba s is to ove ra l l substa

ntia l justific ation depe nds on thepre c lusive
e ffe c t of the IJ’ s ruling. Inste a d, the distric t c ourt should ha ve c onside re d “ whe the r the position of the g ove rnm e nt wa s, as a w hole , substa ntia lly justifie d.” Gutie rre

z v . Barnhart , 274 F.3d 1255, 1258–59 (9th C ir. 2001) (quota tion omitte d ). DHS’ c onduc t a nd position wa s ne ithe r satisfa c tory or justifie d. First, one a ge nc y of DHS, Im m i gration a

n d C ustom s Enforc e m e n t (“ IC E” ) subje c te d Equihua to de porta

tion proc e e dings. Se c ond, a fte r the IJ rule d a ga inst it, finding tha t Equihua c re dibly de m onstra

te d a Quilantan a dm i ssion, IC E volunta rily te rm inate d those proc e e dings. Third, IC E’ s sibling age nc y within DHS, USC IS, ignore d the IJ’ s ruling a nd de nie d Equihua ’ s I-485 on the ba sis tha t she did not c re dibly de m onstra

te a Quilantan a dm ission (re ly ing on minor inc o nsiste nc ie s tha t we re a ll
4a lso be fore the IJ). And fourth, a s soon a s Equihua file d this m a

nda m us a c tion, DHS re ve rse d c o urse a g a in a n d stipula te d that USC IS would a c t a s though the IJ’ s de c ision pre c lude d it from de ny ing Equihua ’ s I-485 on theba sis of he r Quilantan
a dm ission. 3. As Equihua

is the pre va iling pa

rty and the gove rnm e nt’ s position wa s not substa ntia lly justifie d, she is e ntitle d to a ttorne y ’ s fe e s a

nd e xpe n se s. 28 U.S.C . § 2412(d)(1)(A). The m a tte r is re fe rre d to the Appe lla

te C om m issione r, who sha ll c onduc t proc e e dings to c a lc ulat e the prope r am ount of fe e s a nd e xpe nse s
and who sha ll ha

ve the a uthority to e nte r an orde r awarding fe e s and e xpe nse s to Equihua
. Se e Ninth C i r. R . 39-1.9. 1 RE V E RSE D; RE FE RRE D T O T H E APPE L L AT E CO M M ISSIO NE R.

1 The gove rnm e nt’ s atte m pt to c irc um

ve nt our c ourt’ s orde r de ny ing its m otion to file

a surre ply via its m o tion to strike

unspe c ifie d portions of Equihua ’ s re ply brie f is DENIED. 5Equihua

- Equihua v. Sessions , No. 16

- 35125 OWENS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In my view, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that its own abeyance order was not “ an enforceable, judicia lly sanctioned award” in the plaintiffs’ favor. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt. , 589 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009). Nor did the court abuse its discretion in concluding that the government’s litigating position was substant ially justified

— an analysis to which the state of the law governing an IJ decision’s preclu sive effect , as well as the government’s reasons for questioning Equihua

- Equihua and Diaz’s credibility, were surely relevant. Citizens f or Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agr ic
. , 567 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2009) (“ We review for abuse o f discretion the district court’ s decision to award fees under the EAJA .”); Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini , 337 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2003) (“An abuse of discretion is a p lain error, discretion exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic and ef f

ect of the facts as are found.
. . . Under the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court cannot reverse a decision of the di strict court unless the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a w eighing of the relevant factors
. ” (internal quotation marks omitted) ). 

# FILED DEC 18 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S