IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs February 23, 2017

MARY L. VAUGHN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hawkins County

No. 15CR0223 John F. Dugger, Jr., Judge

No. E2016-01309-CCA-R3-PC

The petitioner, Mary L. Vaughn, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction 

relief, which petition challenged her 2014 Hawkins County Criminal Court guiltypleaded convictions of second degree murder and aggravated child abuse, arguing that 

she was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that her guilty pleas were not 

knowingly or voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. KELLY 

THOMAS, JR., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY,JR., JJ., joined.

Nicholas Spring Davenport, V, Morristown, Tennessee, for the appellant, Mary L.

Vaughn.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Robert W. Wilson, Assistant 

Attorney General; James O. Phillips, District Attorney General; and M. Ryan Blackwell 

and Cecil C. Mills, Jr., Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

OPINION

The Hawkins County Grand Jury charged the petitioner with two counts of 

first degree felony murder, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of 

aggravated child neglect for her role in the death of the victim, Alexa Rae Linboom. 

Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, the petitioner entered a “best interests” guilty 

plea1to aggravated child neglect and a reduced charge of second degree murder. The 

 

1

In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held that 

04/13/2017
-2-

agreement provided for consecutive sentences of 20 years with a 100 percent release 

eligibility percentage for the petitioner’s conviction of second degree murder and 15 

years with a 60 percent release eligibility percentage for the petitioner’s conviction of 

aggravated child neglect. In exchange for the petitioner’s plea, the State agreed to 

dismiss those counts of the indictment charging the petitioner with aggravated child 

abuse and felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse.

The State offered the following detailed recitation of facts at the guilty plea 

submission hearing:

These cases concern the death of Alexa Rae Linboom, a fiveyear-old child at the time of her death. Alexa was the 

daughter of Randall Vaughn and the step-daughter of [the 

petitioner]. On December 31, 2011, [the petitioner] and 

Randall Vaughn were having a New Years Eve get-together 

at the residence of 319 Ridge Haven Drive in Surgoinsville, 

Tennessee. Present at the house that evening were [the 

petitioner], Randall Vaughn[,] and several family members 

including Alexa.

The following morning, January 1st, 2012, [the 

petitioner] and Randall Vaughn discovered two empty grape 

soda cans at their home. [The petitioner] asked Alexa if she 

had dr[u]nk the sodas without permission and that she was 

prohibited from doing [so]. Alexa responded affirmatively 

that she had in fact dr[u]nk the grape sodas. Randall Vaughn

and [the petitioner] then decided to attempt to break Alexa of 

this behavior. [The petitioner] and Randall proceeded to take 

Alexa into the bathroom of their home. There, as punishment 

for sneaking the grape sodas, Alexa was required to drink 

numerous additional grape sodas. During this punishment 

Alexa consumed an undetermined amount of grape soda and 

also ingested a substantial amount of water. The total amount 

of fluid ingested by Alexa as part of this disciplinary act was 

estimated to be approximately 2.4 liters. As a result of the 

extreme volume of liquid consumed Alexa began vomiting 

and having diarrhea. She also began clenching and posturing

in a decorticate manner, which can be signs of loss of brain 

activity. Alexa was taken to the Hawkins County Emergency 

 

a criminal defendant may enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt if the defendant intelligently 

concludes that his best interests would be served by a plea of guilty.
-3-

room by [the petitioner] and Randall Vaughn hours after the 

punishment began.

Alexa presented unresponsive at the Hawkins County 

Emergency Room. Alexa was then air-lifted to the Johnson 

City Medical Center where she was admitted to the 

Niswonger Children’s Hospital. Emergency medical 

intervention was initiated, however, unfortunately, their 

efforts proved unsuccessful. Alexa Linboom was pronounced 

dead on January 3rd, 2012. An autopsy examination was 

conducted on January 5th, 2012, at the East Tennessee State 

University Department of Forensic Pathology. The final 

autopsy revealed that the extreme volume of liquid which 

Alexa consumed caused the sodium level in her blood to drop 

and resulted in her brain swelling. Alexa’s brain proceeded to 

herniate through her skull[,] and she eventually died. In the 

autopsy report, Dr. Karen Cline-Parhamovich concluded the 

cause of death to be acute fluid water intoxication causing 

hyponatremic encephalopathy. The manner of death was 

concluded to be a homicide.

The petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, 

among other things, that she had been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and 

that, as a result of counsel’s deficient performance, her guilty pleas were not knowingly 

and voluntarily entered. She claimed that counsel performed deficiently by failing to 

fully explain the ramifications of her plea agreement, failing to seek a mental evaluation 

of the petitioner, and failing to “zealously defend the [p]etitioner to protect her rights.”

At the September 26, 2016 evidentiary hearing, the petitioner testified that 

she met with trial counsel “[a] little over 12 times” prior to the guilty plea hearing and 

that she also met with other members of trial counsel’s staff to discuss the case. She said 

that counsel discussed the witness statements and medical records with her but that she 

did not “remember a lot of the things.” She acknowledged that trial counsel discussed 

with her the evidence against her, the elements of the offenses, and the State’s burden of 

proof. She expressed that she remained dissatisfied with trial counsel’s work, explaining, 

“I think he should have done more on the outside to come and report to me that he was 

trying to find a way out of this for me.”

The petitioner testified that she wanted to go to trial but that trial counsel 

discouraged her from going to trial by telling her that they were likely to lose. She said 

that she agreed to plead guilty after counsel told her that her “husband was going to sign” 
-4-

the plea agreement and that “if we went to trial that it would be a he said/she said thing.” 

She claimed that she signed the plea documents because she believed “in [her] way of 

thinking” that “if [her] husband took the plea” that she “had to take the plea.” She 

claimed that counsel told her, “Your husband took it, you might as well take it.” She 

added that her husband, who “was in the next thing over there,” told her, “Just sign it, 

baby, sign it for the girls.” The petitioner explained that her husband did not want his 

other daughters to testify. She clarified that counsel did not tell her that she had to take it 

but that she “might as well take this plea.” The petitioner acknowledged that trial counsel 

told her that the State had made other offers but that the one she accepted “was the best.” 

She insisted that trial counsel and her husband worked together to convince her to accept 

the plea offer. The petitioner also said that she pleaded guilty because she “just wanted it 

done and over” and because she “was tired of everything.”

The petitioner testified that during the plea colloquy, trial counsel “had a 

piece of paper and when Randy Collier read out the thing, he pointed to the question and 

then [she would] say yes.” She explained, “Before we came that morning [counsel] told 

me that I was going to answer yes every time they asked a question.” Upon questioning 

by the post-conviction court, the petitioner acknowledged that it was, in fact, the trial 

judge who asked the questions during the plea colloquy and that she did not actually 

answer yes to every question that was asked.

The petitioner admitted that she told the trial court during the colloquy that 

she was satisfied with counsel’s representation but claimed that she did not know why 

she had said that, saying, “I’m scared now. I just want to go home.” She said that when 

she told the court that she was satisfied with counsel’s representation and that she 

believed the plea agreement to be in her best interest, she was not telling the truth “in 

[her] heart.” She added, “I lied because I just wanted it over.”

During cross-examination, the petitioner admitted that trial counsel met 

with her on a regular basis, visiting her some 30 times during the 10 months that she was 

incarcerated prior to pleading guilty. In addition to trial counsel, another attorney in his 

office and an investigator met with the petitioner at the jail. The petitioner acknowledged 

that trial counsel explained the charges “[a] couple of times,” that he reviewed the State’s 

evidence with her, that he reviewed the victim’s medical records with her, and that he 

provided her with a copy of the records from the juvenile court proceedings relative to 

the victim’s death. The petitioner agreed that trial counsel explained the elements of the 

offenses charged in the presentment, the State’s burden of proof, and the potential range 

of punishment. She recalled that trial counsel told her that the State could seek the death 

penalty for the first degree murder charges. She agreed that the plea agreement provided 

her with a much more favorable, albeit lengthy, sentence.
-5-

The petitioner identified her signature on the plea documents and admitted 

that trial counsel explained the plea agreement to her in detail. She said that she 

understood the terms of the plea agreement and those rights she was waiving by pleading 

guilty.

Trial counsel testified that he was appointed to represent the petitioner 

following the return of the presentment. Counsel said that either he or a member of his 

staff went through the discovery materials, which were voluminous, with the petitioner 

“page by page, word for word” in a series of meetings that lasted from an hour to an hour 

and a half. Counsel stated that he endeavored to “meet with her or have someone meet 

with her about every week” because he was concerned about the petitioner’s “relationship 

with her husband,” “worried that she would talk,” and “did not want her to feel 

abandoned.” He said that the petitioner “certainly wasn’t happy that [he] wasn’t coming 

back saying that the case was going away.” Counsel testified that he thoroughly 

explained the elements of each of the charged offenses and the potential punishments to 

the petitioner. Counsel recalled that a new district attorney general had just been elected 

and that “there had been some discussion thrown our way” that the new district attorney 

general might seek the death penalty. For that reason, he discussed the aggravating 

circumstances with the petitioner.

Counsel testified that he began plea negotiations “earlier on” and that the 

initial “offers ranged from outrageous things to life.” Counsel candidly acknowledged 

that he did not share every offer with the petitioner, explaining, “I’m not going to go to a 

client and tell them that someone offered them two life sentences and such, there’s no 

point to that in a case like this.” He said that the first offer he communicated to the 

petitioner provided for a 35-year sentence to be served at 100 percent. He recalled that 

“she was actually accepting of that.” Counsel stated that he did not communicate the 

petitioner’s acceptance at that point “because her husband was negotiating in e[a]rnest, 

too, and there’s something embarrassing about accepting something worse than a codefendant gets.” He said that he communicated the offer that the petitioner eventually 

accepted “[i]mmediately” because he was aware that if the petitioner did not accept it, the 

case was “going to be enhanced.” He also communicated to the petitioner that if the 

State filed notice seeking the death penalty, the State would not likely offer anything less 

than a life sentence. Counsel adamantly denied threatening the petitioner to force her to 

accept the offer.

Counsel testified that he was prepared to go to trial. During his 

preparation, he “looked at causation of death as seriously as [he] knew how.” He said 

that he spoke with consultants and other lawyers to see if he could “find another cause of 

death.” When that line of investigation proved unproductive, he changed his focus to 

whether he “could convince a jury that [the petitioner] . . . did not intend for the child to 
-6-

die and this could not even be interpreted as neglect.” He said that the petitioner “was 

not a primary mover in what happened to this child and that she behaved in a reasonable 

manner.” He said that the petitioner’s actions nevertheless “amounted to what he feared 

was neglect” and that he did not know whether such a defense could have worked.

Counsel stated that he talked to the petitioner about a psychological 

evaluation, as he does with clients “very often.” As the case proceeded, however, the 

petitioner “seemed to understand what was going on and was asking good questions” that 

“indicated she was listening.” He added that none of his staff who met with the petitioner 

expressed any concerns about her competence, and he saw none. As a result, he 

determined that an evaluation was unnecessary.

Counsel testified that he read “the plea sheet form” to the petitioner “word 

for word” before he added “in what the charge or the punishment is” and that he 

“explained it as we went through it, every section in some detail.” He explained that he 

did it that way because he wanted his clients to understand “the sheet” rather than focus 

on the offense or punishment. He said that he then “handed [the sheet] to her and said 

take this back and read it and” told her “if you have any questions mark them and we’ll 

go over it.” Counsel said that he “also got a blank of [the] judge’s checklist” so that he 

could help the petitioner understand “what it was like in court.” He recalled that the 

petitioner “was nervous and wanted to know” “how the court is going to proceed,” which, 

to him, “seemed like a reasonable thing.” Only after going over this information did 

counsel fill out the plea forms and go through them with the petitioner. He said that she 

had “[a] couple of days” to go over the form that she took back with her to the jail. He 

stated that the petitioner did not have any questions and “said she understood” the plea 

agreement. Counsel said that he could not recall “anything really special” about the day 

the petitioner entered her pleas. He said the petitioner appeared to be physically and 

mentally well on that day.

During cross-examination, counsel said that he had no qualms about taking 

the case to trial and would have gone to trial had the petitioner indicated that she wanted 

to do so. He said that, with regard to a desire to go to trial, the petitioner “was all over.” 

He recalled that she gave him authority to negotiate a plea agreement and eventually 

decided that “she wanted to plea.” He acknowledged that she “probably” asked his 

opinion on whether she should accept the plea agreement, but he said that he does not 

“give that.”

Counsel testified that he attempted to procure a medical expert but “was 

unsuccessful in finding any expert to help” the petitioner’s case. He added that the 

petitioner’s husband’s attorney “was having the same sort of results” in trying to procure 

the services of an expert. He recalled that the petitioner “wanted [him] to get the 
-7-

individuals who counseled her and her husband as to how to take care of children and get 

them pinned down on the fact that some forms of punishment they recommended . . . 

were all right by them.” He said that he spoke with a few of those individuals “and they 

denied the extent to which [the petitioner] was saying they said that.” He added that he 

“didn’t spend a lot of time on that because it really . . . didn’t mean too much in the case.” 

He said that he felt uncomfortable with that line of investigation because “that defense 

really boils down to” a claim that the petitioner was “abusive because someone told us it 

was okay to be abusive.” He tried to explain to the petitioner that such a defense “doesn’t 

set too well just as it doesn’t work to point out how perhaps a child really needed to be 

disciplined.” He said that it was his experience that “[t]hose things don’t work in this 

kind of case.” He explained, “I felt it would be very hard to go to trial and attack a child 

who had died in this manner in any way, as it being justified or warranted.” He said that 

the petitioner “always seemed to understand” that that could not be “the focus of the 

defense.”

Counsel testified that the petitioner and her husband “had influence on each 

other” to plead guilty but that he “would hope that” the petitioner “would make a 

decision for herself” because “that’s what [counsel] told her to do.” He said that he 

spoke with the petitioner just before she entered the plea and that she did not waver in her 

choice to plead guilty. Counsel reiterated that he did not tell the petitioner to answer 

“yes” to every question during the plea colloquy.

In its written order denying post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court 

accredited trial counsel’s testimony that “he explained the charges and potential 

punishments to” the petitioner; that she “understood everything including that the [S]tate 

could file an enhancement and give Notice of the Death Penalty”; and that counsel “did 

not pressure her to take the plea.” The court also accredited counsel’s testimony that the 

petitioner rejected two other plea offers and “wanted to know what her husband was 

going to do” before she accepted the State’s ultimate offer. The court found, based upon 

the petitioner’s testimony at the guilty plea submission hearing and trial counsel’s 

testimony at the evidentiary hearing, that the petitioner “entered her best interest plea 

freely, knowingly[,] and voluntarily.” The court found that trial counsel “investigated the 

case including trying to find an expert to rebut the [S]tate’s medical proof. [Counsel] 

obtained the best plea agreement that he could get for” the petitioner.

In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred 

by denying relief, reiterating her claim that she was denied the effective assistance of 

counsel and that, as a result of counsel’s ineffective assistance, her guilty pleas were not 

knowingly and voluntarily entered. The State asserts that the post-conviction court did 

not err.
-8-

We view the petitioner’s claim with a few well-settled principles in mind. 

Post-conviction relief is available only “when the conviction or sentence is void or 

voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of 

Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” T.C.A. § 40-30-103. A postconviction petitioner bears the burden of proving his or her factual allegations by clear 

and convincing evidence. Id. § 40-30-110(f). On appeal, the appellate court accords to 

the post-conviction court’s findings of fact the weight of a jury verdict, and these findings 

are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against them. Henley v. 

State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tenn. 1997); Bates v. State, 973 S.W.2d 615, 631 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1997). By contrast, the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law receive no 

deference or presumption of correctness on appeal. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 453 

(Tenn. 2001).

Before a petitioner will be granted post-conviction relief based upon a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the record must affirmatively establish, via 

facts clearly and convincingly established by the petitioner, that “the advice given, or the 

services rendered by the attorney, are [not] within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases,” see Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), and 

that counsel’s deficient performance “actually had an adverse effect on the defense,” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). In other words, the petitioner “must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. Should the petitioner fail to establish either deficient performance or prejudice, he is 

not entitled to relief. Id. at 697; Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996). 

Indeed, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a reviewing 

court “begins with the strong presumption that counsel provided adequate assistance and 

used reasonable professional judgment to make all significant decisions,” Kendrick v. 

State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689), and “[t]he 

petitioner bears the burden of overcoming this presumption,” id. (citations omitted). We 

will not grant the petitioner the benefit of hindsight, second-guess a reasonably based trial 

strategy, or provide relief on the basis of a sound, but unsuccessful, tactical decision 

made during the course of the proceedings. Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1994). Such deference to the tactical decisions of counsel, however, applies 

only if the choices are made after adequate preparation for the case. Cooper v. State, 847 

S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Apart from whether a guilty plea is the product of ineffective assistance of 
-9-

counsel, it is invalid if otherwise made unknowingly or involuntarily. “Whether a plea 

was knowing and voluntary is an issue of constitutional dimension because ‘[t]he due 

process provision of the federal constitution requires that pleas of guilty be knowing and 

voluntary.’” State v. Wilson, 31 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. State, 

834 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tenn. 1992)). A plea “may not be the product of ‘[i]gnorance, 

incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, [or] subtle or blatant threats.’” Wilson, 

31 S.W.3d at 195 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969)); see also 

State v. Mellon, 118 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Tenn. 2003) (citing Blankenship v. State, 858 

S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993)).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and 

fact. Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 457; Lane v. State, 316 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2010); 

State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762, 766-67 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 

461 (Tenn. 1999). When reviewing the application of law to the post-conviction court’s 

factual findings, our review is de novo, and the post-conviction court’s conclusions of 

law are given no presumption of correctness. Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 457; Fields, 40 

S.W.3d at 457-58; see also State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2000).

In our view, the record fully supports the denial of relief in this case. Trial 

counsel’s accredited testimony established that he performed a thorough investigation of 

the case and advised the petitioner of the nature of the charges, the potential punishments, 

and the consequences of pleading guilty. The petitioner candidly acknowledged that trial 

counsel had explained all the relevant information to her prior to her accepting the plea 

agreement. The record belies the petitioner’s testimony that counsel pressured her into 

accepting the plea agreement and pleading guilty in this case. Instead, the record 

supports the post-conviction court’s conclusion that the petitioner’s guilty pleas were 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.

Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

_________________________________ 

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE