Filed 1/18/24 P. v. Allegheny Casualty Co. CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALLEGHENY CASUALTY 

COMPANY,

Defendant and Appellant.

B320719;

B320481

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. Nos. OSJ2579; OSJ2580)

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Natalie P. Stone, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of John Rorabaugh and John Mark Rorabaugh 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Richard P. Chastang, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Michael J. Gordon, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Allegheny Casualty Company (Allegheny) appeals from two

orders denying its motions to vacate forfeiture and exonerate two

bail bonds and from the subsequent summary judgments entered 

against it. Allegheny contends the trial court lost jurisdiction 

over the bonds by failing to declare a forfeiture pursuant to Penal 

Code section 1305, subdivision (a),

1 when defendant Sharon 

Denise Huff failed to appear at a hearing in her criminal case on 

February 24, 2021. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in concluding that Huff was not ordered to personally 

appear on that date. Accordingly, we affirm the orders denying 

Allegheny’s motions to vacate forfeiture and exonerate the bail 

bonds, and the orders entering summary judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Allegheny Posts a Bond to Secure Huff’s Release from 

Custody for Two Separate Incidents

In July 2018 Huff was charged by complaint in case 

No. 8LB0765001 with one count of misdemeanor willful infliction 

of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a 

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise noted.
3

victim2 (§ 273.5, subd. (a).)3 Huff pleaded no contest, and the 

trial court placed her on three years’ probation, including the 

condition that she obey all laws.

In April 2020 Huff was charged by complaint in case 

No. NA114285 with one felony count of willful infliction of 

corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a victim 

(§ 273.5, subd. (a)), one felony count of assault upon the person of 

another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm 

(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and one misdemeanor count of a willful and 

knowing violation of a protective order or stay-away court order

(§ 166, subd. (c)(1).) The trial court set bail at $120,000.

As a result of the new allegations against Huff, the trial 

court revoked probation in case No. 8LB0765001 and set Huff’s 

bail at $50,000. In June 2020 Allegheny, by and through its 

agent Sunrise Bail Bonds, posted bond No. ASIM-1801 in the 

amount of $120,000 for the release of Huff from custody in case

No. NA114285, and posted bond No. AS50K-96045 in the amount 

of $50,000 in case No. 8LB0765001. Accordingly, there are two 

bonds in this case involving Huff totaling $170,000.

Both cases were considered together by the trial court. 

Following several continuances, counsel for Huff informed the 

trial court4 on January 21, 2021 that the “case is ready to resolve”

but that “it’s just been difficult bringing Ms. Huff into court due 

2 We grant the People’s request to augment the record to 

include the complaint in case No. 8LB0765001. (Rules of Court, 

rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

3 Section 273.5, subdivision (a), is a wobbler, and is 

punishable as either a felony or misdemeanor. (People v. Villalba

(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 659, 667.)

4 Judge Chet L. Taylor.
4

to her age and high risk. My request would be to return for 

preliminary setting [i.e., the date for setting the preliminary 

hearing] on February 24th with the necessary time waiver. I’m 

going to try my very best to have her before the court.” The trial 

court confirmed that counsel was appearing under section 977, 

subdivision (b), and continued the hearing. The reporter’s 

transcript does not reflect the trial court ordered in open court 

that Huff was to appear at the next hearing date. But its minute 

order entered on January 21, 2021 states, “[t]he court orders the 

defendant to appear on the next court date,” which was 

February 24, 2021.

On February 24, 2021 counsel for Huff appeared, stated 

that he filed a section 977, subdivision (b) waiver, and requested 

the hearing be continued to April 13, 2021 because he was “just 

trying to get Ms. Huff in the building so she can take the people’s 

offer.” The trial court5 indicated on the record that “I think under 

Emergency Rule 5(c)6 I can allow you to waive the 60-day rule 

today based on the fact that you’re 977(b),” and continued the 

matter to April 13, 2021.

On April 13, 2021 counsel for Huff advised the court that 

“we’re ready to resolve this case. We have been for a very long 

time, but Ms. Huff’s medical needs have prevented her from 

coming into court along with the risk of COVID. . . . At this point, 

I would ask for another setting date so I can try to get her in. . . . 

5 Judge Debra A. Cole.

6 Under Emergency Rule 5(c)(3) the court was required to 

“accept defense counsel’s representation that the defendant 

understands and agrees with waiving any right to appear unless 

the court has specific concerns in a particular matter about the 

validity of the waiver.”
5

This case has been ready to resolve for a long time. It’s just 

getting her into court. She lives in Vegas right now because she’s 

getting medical attention there.” In response, the People argued 

that “the People do want a [preliminary hearing] because we 

want her to come to court. . . . So at this point we either need to 

set it for prelim or I’d ask for a bench warrant or something 

because she’s not coming to court even though we do want to 

resolve the case.”

The trial court agreed with the People and set May 26, 

2021 as the preliminary hearing date. The trial court advised 

Huff’s counsel that “there is not going to be more time, 

counsel. . . . The defendant must be present on that court 

date. . . . Probation remains revoked. Bond to stand on that. 

We’ll set it for probation violation hearing setting on that same 

day, May 26, 2021.”

B. After Huff Fails To Appear, the Trial Court Orders Bail 

Forfeited, Denies the Motions to Discharge the Forfeiture 

Order and Exonerate Bail, and Enters Summary Judgment

On May 26, 2021 counsel for Huff appeared and notified 

the trial court that he “lost contact with her.” The trial court 

ordered bail forfeited in both cases because Huff did not appear

despite the court’s April 13, 2021 order directing her to appear on 

May 26. The court clerk mailed notice of the forfeiture orders to 

Allegheny and Sunrise Bail Bonds on June 4, 2021.

On November 5, 2021 Allegheny moved to discharge the 

forfeiture orders and exonerate bail. In its motions, Allegheny 

argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction over each bond when 

it failed to declare a forfeiture on February 24, 2021. (See § 1305, 

subd. (a)(1)(D) [“A court shall in open court declare forfeited the 
6

undertaking of bail or the money or property deposited as bail if, 

without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to appear” on “[a]ny 

other occasion prior to the pronouncement of judgment if the 

defendant’s presence in court is lawfully required”].) Allegheny 

filed supplemental briefs on January 25, 2022 arguing that “[t]he 

mere presence of a 977 waiver is not an excuse for the 

defendant’s failure to appear” where the trial court ordered a 

defendant to appear. The record does not reflect the People filed 

an opposition brief to either motion, but the People were present 

at the hearing on Allegheny’s motions.

7

On March 11, 2022 the trial court8 heard argument and 

denied the motions to vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail, and 

then subsequently entered summary judgment against 

Allegheny. (See § 1306, subd. (a) [“When any bond is forfeited 

and the period of time specified in Section 1305 has elapsed 

without the forfeiture having been set aside, the court which has 

declared the forfeiture shall enter a summary judgment against 

each bondsman named in the bond in the amount for which the 

bondsman is bound.”].)

9 The clerk’s notice of entry of judgments

7 The People’s failure to file a written opposition did not 

relieve Allegheny of its burden as the moving party to show it 

was entitled to relief. “Burden is upon the bonding company 

seeking to set aside the forfeiture to establish by competent 

evidence that its case falls within the four corners of these 

statutory requirements.” (People v. American Bankers Ins. Co.

(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 348, 354; accord, People v. American Surety

Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 719, 726.)

8 Judge Natalie P. Stone.

9 “‘Summary judgment following a declaration of forfeiture is 

a consent judgment entered without a hearing pursuant to the 

terms of the bail bond.’” (People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, 
7

on the forfeited bonds and demand for payment were entered on 

March 15, 2022 (case Nos. OSJ2579 and OSJ2580).

10

Allegheny timely appealed. Because both appeals raise the 

identical issue, although as to two different bonds involving the 

same person, we consider the appeals together.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review

A bail bond “‘“‘is a contract between the surety and the 

government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the 

defendant’s appearance in court under the risk of forfeiture of the 

bond.’”’” (People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2016) 

2 Cal.5th 35, 42.) When a person for whom a bail bond has been 

posted and against whom a criminal complaint has been filed 

fails to appear as required by law, the court must declare the bail 

forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a); see County of Los Angeles v. 

Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 309, 312; 

People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 

653, 657.)

Inc. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 33, 37, quoting People v. The North 

River Ins. Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 559, 567.) “The only issue in 

a challenge to the summary judgment is whether it was entered 

pursuant to the terms of the consent, which requires compliance 

with Penal Code sections 1305 and 1306.” (People v. American 

Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 238 Cal.App.4th 653, 1047.)

10 “While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with 

criminal prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral 

to the prosecutions and are civil in nature.” (People v. American 

Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 657.)
8

Section 1305, one of the provisions governing bail 

forfeiture, provides: “(a)(1) A court shall in open court declare 

forfeited the undertaking of bail or the money or property 

deposited as bail if, without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to 

appear for any of the following: [¶] (A) Arraignment.

[¶] (B) Trial. [¶] (C) Judgment. [¶] (D) Any other occasion 

prior to the pronouncement of judgment if the defendant’s 

presence in court is lawfully required. [¶] (E) To surrender 

himself or herself in execution of the judgment after appeal.”

Once the court declares forfeiture as provided in 

section 1305 the surety that posted the bond has 180 days (plus 

five days for mailing) after the clerk of court mails a notice of 

forfeiture to move to vacate forfeiture and exonerate the bond.

(§ 1305, subd. (c)(1); People v. Lexington National Ins. Co. (2007) 

147 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1198 [“‘When the bail has served its 

purpose, the surety will be “exonerated,” i.e., released from the 

obligation. Exoneration normally occurs on termination of the 

proceedings in some manner or on return of the defendant to 

custody.’”].) Upon a showing of good cause, the court may extend 

this appearance period by no more than 180 days from the date 

the trial court orders the extension. (§ 1305.4; People v. 

Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 44.)

If the forfeiture has not been set aside by the end of the 

appearance period, including any extension, “the court which has 

declared the forfeiture shall enter a summary judgment against 

each bondsman named in the bond in the amount for which the 

bondsman is bound.” (§ 1306, subd. (a); People v. American 

Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 657 [“The 

surety that posted the bond . . . has a statutory ‘appearance’

period in which either to produce the accused in court and have 
9

the forfeiture set aside, or to demonstrate other circumstances 

requiring the court to vacate the forfeiture. If the forfeiture is not 

set aside by the end of the appearance period, the court is 

required to enter summary judgment against the surety.”].)

If the trial court does not declare a forfeiture when required 

by section 1305, it loses jurisdiction over the bail bond and lacks 

authority to enter summary judgment against the bail bond 

company. (See People v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co. (2004) 

125 Cal.App.4th 547, 550 [“We conclude the trial court’s failure to 

declare a forfeiture in open court, as mandated by section 1305, 

subdivision (a), resulted in the court’s loss of jurisdiction over the 

bail bond. Because the court did not have fundamental 

jurisdiction when it entered the summary judgment, the 

judgment was necessarily void, and subject to collateral attack at 

any time.”]; accord, People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. (1971) 

5 Cal.3d 898, 907 [“It follows from the foregoing that the court’s 

failure to declare a forfeiture upon a nonappearance without 

sufficient excuse, either where no excuse is offered or where the 

finding of an excuse constitutes an abuse of discretion, deprives 

the court of jurisdiction to later declare a forfeiture.”]; see also 

§ 1305, subd. (a)(1)(D).) We strictly construe the applicable 

forfeiture statutes in favor of the surety in order to avoid the 

“harsh results” of forfeiture. (People v. International Fidelity Ins. 

Co. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 345, 354; People v. The North River 

Ins. Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 797, 804.)

A trial court’s order granting or denying a motion to vacate 

the forfeiture of a bail bond is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

(See People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 582, 586-

588 [applying abuse of discretion standard to “a record in conflict” 
10

where reporter’s transcript and clerk’s minutes differed on 

whether forfeiture was ordered in open court].)

B. The Trial Court Properly Denied Allegheny’s Motions 

Because Huff Was Not Required to Personally Appear on 

February 24, 2021

Allegheny argues Huff was ordered to appear personally in 

court on February 24, 2021 by the trial court’s January 21, 2021 

minute order. In Allegheny’s view, the trial court’s failure to 

declare a forfeiture on February 24, 2021 resulted in the court’s 

loss of jurisdiction over the bail bond and the summary judgment

against it on March 11, 2022. We are unpersuaded. The trial 

court did not err in ruling that, notwithstanding the January 21, 

2021 minute order, Huff had not been ordered to appear 

personally at the preliminary hearing setting date on

February 24, 2021.

1. Huff Was Not Required By Statute To Be Present for 

the Preliminary Hearing Setting Date and Appeared 

Through Counsel

“‘[S]ection 977 requires a defendant to be present at the five 

fundamental proceedings and entitles [her] to be present at all 

others.’” (People v. Gutierrez (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1196, 1203, 

quoting People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 435.) Section 977, 

subdivision (b)(1), provides: “Except as provided in 

subdivision (c), in all cases in which a felony is charged, the 

accused shall be physically present at the [1] arraignment, [2] at 

the time of plea, [3] during the preliminary hearing, [4] during 

those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier 

of fact, and [5] at the time of the imposition of sentence. The 
11

accused shall be physically or remotely present at all other 

proceedings unless they waive their right to be physically or 

remotely present, with leave of court and with approval by 

defendant’s counsel.”

Subdivision (b)(2) of section 977 further provides that,

“[t]he waiver of a defendant’s right to be physically or remotely 

present may be in writing and filed with the court or, with the 

court’s consent, may be entered personally by the defendant or by 

the defendant’s counsel of record.” (People v. Safety National 

Casualty Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 703, 716 [“with respect to ‘all 

other proceedings’ at which the defendant seeks to be absent, the 

standard waiver form set out in section 977, subdivision (b)(2) 

contemplates a situation where a defendant is absent from

court”].) 

In this case, February 24, 2021 was the date for the setting 

of the preliminary hearing. A preliminary hearing setting date is 

not one of the five mandatory hearings where a defendant is 

required to be present. (See § 977, subd. (a); People v. Safety 

National Casualty Corp., supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 716 [“The five 

mandatory proceedings described in the preceding sentence of 

section 977(b)(1) (arraignment, plea, preliminary hearing, trial, 

sentencing) reflect the Legislature’s concern that the felony 

defendant be present at case-related proceedings that occur in

open court.”].) Further, there is no dispute that Huff’s counsel 

had entered a valid section 977 waiver excusing Huff’s absence at 

that hearing.

Huff’s appearance could only be mandatory if she had been

ordered to appear personally in court on February 24, 2021. As 

explained in People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1301, 

1304: “A defendant’s presence is ‘lawfully required’ when there is 
12

‘a specific court order commanding his appearance at a date and 

time certain’ [citation] or when a defendant has notice because he 

or she is present when the date and time for a mandatory 

appearance are set, even though the court did not specifically 

order his or her personal presence.” Accordingly, we turn to 

whether Huff had been ordered to appear at the preliminary 

hearing setting date.

2. Under the Circumstances Presented, the Reporter’s 

Transcript Was Entitled to “Greater Credence” Than 

the January 21, 2021 Minute Order

The minute order of January 21, 2021 states that, “[t]he 

court orders the defendant to appear on the next court date.” But 

that is not the end of the analysis. As further explained below, in 

determining whether the minute order accurately reflected the 

proceedings for purposes of a bail forfeiture motion, the trial 

court could properly examine the reporter’s transcript (which 

does not order Huff’s personal appearance) to determine whether 

Huff was ordered to appear in court on the date in question.

In this context, a trial court is entitled to resolve a conflict 

between the clerk’s minute order and the court reporter’s 

transcript to determine which is “entitled to greater credence.” 

(People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 582, 586; id. at 

p. 588 [“We have a record in conflict on that issue, with a 

reporter’s transcript, which does not indicate any bail forfeiture 

and clerk’s minutes, which do”; resolving conflict in favor of 

reporter’s transcript]; see People v. Thompson (2009) 

180 Cal.App.4th 974, 978 [“When the record is in conflict and 

cannot be harmonized, “‘. . . that part of the record will prevail, 

which, because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is entitled to 
13

greater credence.”’”]; In re Evans (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 213, 216 

[“whether the recitals in the clerk’s minutes should prevail as 

against contrary statements in the reporter’s transcript, must 

depend upon the circumstances of each particular case”]; 

People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 [same].)

The trial court’s order denying Allegheny’s motions to 

vacate forfeiture and exonerate the bail bonds does not explain 

its reasoning. But when the trial court denied Allegheny’s 

motions, it necessarily determined Huff had not been ordered to 

appear on February 24, 2021. The trial court did not err. Aside 

from the January 2021 minute order, there was nothing in the 

record before the trial court indicating that Huff had been

ordered to appear at the February 24, 2021 preliminary hearing 

setting date. The reporter’s transcript for January 21, 2021 does 

not indicate the trial court verbally ordered Huff to appear 

personally at the next hearing date; that is, the trial court did not 

make such an order in open court with counsel present. Further, 

as noted by the People, the January 21, 2021 transcript “includes 

what appears to be the entirety of the hearing . . . including the 

court calling the matter, the initial[] stated appearances by the 

parties, a short discussion about the status of the case, a request 

to continue the setting hearing to the next month, the court 

continuing the hearing to February 24, 2021, and farewell 

statements.” As in People v. Bankers Ins. Co., supra,

182 Cal.App.4th at p. 587, “There is nothing which suggests the 

reporter’s transcript is in any way incomplete.” And Allegheny 

does not dispute the reporter’s transcript is complete.

Under this scenario, the trial court reasonably concluded 

that where there is a conflict between the minute order and the 

reporter’s transcript, that “the reporter’s transcript [was] entitled 
14

to greater credence” than the clerk’s minute order. (People v. 

Bankers Ins. Co., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 586; see In re P.A. 

(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 23, 30, fn. 4 [“‘[c]onflicts between the 

reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts are generally presumed to be 

clerical in nature and resolved in favor of the reporter’s transcript 

unless the particular circumstances dictate otherwise’”]; see also 

In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 298 fn. 20 [“Throughout our 

review of the record in these appeals, however, we have 

encountered minute orders that include findings that were not 

made or, on occasion, are in direct conflict with the statements as 

reported in the hearing transcripts. Even under better 

circumstances the record of the court’s oral pronouncements 

prevails over conflicting minute orders.”].)

Allegheny contends “the record is not in conflict,” and that 

“[n]othing in the record conflicts with th[e] order to appear,” but 

it does not persuasively explain why the trial court abused its 

discretion in ruling otherwise in light of the reporter’s transcript. 

Allegheny further contends that “the minutes are ‘no less a part 

of the record than the transcript of the oral proceedings,’ and . . .

are generally more accessible than a reporter’s transcript.” 

(People v. Allegheny Casualty Co. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 704, 713 

fn. 3.) But as People v. Bankers Ins. Co. at page 587 to 588 

observed, “the court in Allegheny was faced with a situation in 

which there was no reporter’s transcript because no court 

reporter was present at the forfeiture of bail proceeding. The 

clerk’s minutes reflected bail had been declared forfeited, but not 

that the declaration had been made in open court. . . . Thus, our 

case is distinguishable from Allegheny. We do not have a record 

silent on the issue of whether the declaration was made in open 

court. We have a record in conflict on that issue, with a 
15

reporter’s transcript, which does not indicate bail forfeiture and 

clerk’s minutes, which do.” As we explained above, the trial court 

here was entitled to resolve the conflict in the record between the 

reporter’s transcript and the minute order on the issue of 

whether Huff was ordered on January 21, 2021 to appear at the 

February 26 hearing and determine the reporter’s transcript was 

entitled to greater credence.

Indeed, the trial court could reasonably have concluded the 

January 21, 2021 minute order was simply incorrect.

11 By way of 

contrast, the trial court on April 13, 2021 unequivocally stated on 

the record that “[t]he defendant must be present” at the next 

hearing on May 26, 2021. This affirmative statement, which is 

consistent with the April 13, 2021 minute order requiring her to 

appear, was sufficient to “lawfully require” Huff’s presence at the 

next hearing date. (See People v. Lexington National Ins. Corp.

(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1149.) Thus, when Huff failed to 

appear on May 26, 2021 only then did the trial court order 

forfeiture of the bonds.

C. The Trial Court Properly Entered the Summary Judgments 

Against Allegheny

As outlined above, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in concluding Huff was not ordered to personally 

11 The record before us reflects that at least one other minute 

order was erroneous. The February 24, 2021 minute order states

that, “Defendant is present in court.” But the reporter’s 

transcript clearly indicates Huff was not present and her counsel 

was “appearing 977(b) for defendant.” In deciding the underlying 

motions, the trial court was entitled to resolve such conflicts in 

favor of the reporter’s transcript.
16

appear at the preliminary hearing setting date on February 24, 

2021. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Allegheny’s 

motions to discharge forfeiture and exonerate bail, and properly 

entered summary judgment against Allegheny in each matter. 

(See § 1306, subd. (a); People v. American Contractors Indemnity 

Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 657; People v. American Contractors 

Indemnity Co., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047; People v. 

Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 369, 378 

[“If the forfeiture is not vacated, the trial court must then enter 

summary judgment against the surety for ‘the amount of the 

bond plus costs.’”].)

DISPOSITION

We affirm the orders of summary judgment and the trial 

court’s orders denying Allegheny’s motions to discharge forfeiture 

and exonerate bail. The People are awarded their costs on 

appeal.

MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J. EVENSON, J.*

* Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.