ELECTRONIC 

WARFARE

DOD Actions Needed 

to Strengthen 

Management and 

Oversight

Report to the Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

July 2012

GAO-12-479

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-479, a report to the 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

July 2012 

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and 

Oversight 

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD has committed billions of dollars 

to developing, maintaining, and 

employing warfighting capabilities that 

rely on access to the electromagnetic 

spectrum. According to DOD, 

electronic warfare capabilities play a 

critical and potentially growing role in 

ensuring the U.S. military’s access to 

and use of the electromagnetic 

spectrum. GAO was asked to assess 

the extent to which DOD (1) developed 

a strategy to manage electronic 

warfare and (2) planned, organized, 

and implemented an effective 

governance structure to oversee its 

electronic warfare policy and programs 

and their relationship to cyberspace 

operations. GAO analyzed policies, 

plans, and studies related to electronic 

warfare and cyberspace operations 

and interviewed cognizant DOD 

officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD should 

(1) include in its future electronic 

warfare strategy reports to Congress 

certain key characteristics, including 

performance measures, key 

investments and resources, and 

organizational roles and 

responsibilities; (2) define objectives 

and issue an implementation plan for 

the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum 

Control Center; and (3) update key 

departmental guidance to clearly 

define oversight roles, responsibilities, 

and coordination for electronic warfare 

management, and the relationship 

between electronic warfare and 

cyberspace operations. DOD generally 

concurred with these 

recommendations, except that the 

strategy should include performance 

measures. GAO continues to believe 

this recommendation has merit.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) developed an electronic warfare strategy, but 

it only partially addressed key characteristics that GAO identified in prior work as 

desirable for a national or defense strategy. The National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires DOD to submit to the congressional defense 

committees an annual report on DOD’s electronic warfare strategy for each of 

fiscal years 2011 through 2015. DOD issued its fiscal year 2011 and 2012 

strategy reports to Congress in October 2010 and November 2011, respectively. 

GAO found that DOD’s reports addressed two key characteristics: (1) purpose, 

scope, and methodology and (2) problem definition and risk assessment. 

However, DOD only partially addressed four other key characteristics of a 

strategy, including (1) resources, investments, and risk management and (2) 

organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination. For example, the reports 

identified mechanisms that could foster coordination across the department and 

identified some investment areas, but did not fully identify implementing parties, 

delineate roles and responsibilities for managing electronic warfare across the 

department, or link resources and investments to key activities. Such 

characteristics can help shape policies, programs, priorities, resource allocation, 

and standards in a manner that is conducive to achieving intended results and 

can help ensure that the department is effectively managing electronic warfare.

DOD has taken steps to address a critical electronic warfare management gap, 

but it has not established a departmentwide governance framework for electronic 

warfare. GAO previously reported that effective and efficient organizations 

establish objectives and outline major implementation tasks. In response to a 

leadership gap for electronic warfare, DOD is establishing the Joint 

Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center under U.S. Strategic Command as the 

focal point for joint electronic warfare. However, because DOD has yet to define 

specific objectives for the center, outline major implementation tasks, and define 

metrics and timelines to measure progress, it is unclear whether or when the 

center will provide effective departmentwide leadership and advocacy for joint 

electronic warfare. In addition, key DOD directives providing some guidance for 

departmentwide oversight of electronic warfare have not been updated to reflect 

recent changes. For example, DOD’s primary directive concerning electronic 

warfare oversight was last updated in 1994 and identifies the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as the focal point for 

electronic warfare. The directive does not define the center’s responsibilities in 

relation to the office, including those related to the development of the electronic 

warfare strategy and prioritizing investments. In addition, DOD’s directive for 

information operations, which is being updated, allocates electronic warfare 

responsibilities based on the department’s previous definition of information 

operations, which had included electronic warfare as a core capability. DOD’s 

oversight of electronic warfare capabilities may be further complicated by its 

evolving relationship with computer network operations, which is also an 

information operations-related capability. Without clearly defined roles and 

responsibilities and updated guidance regarding oversight responsibilities, DOD 

does not have reasonable assurance that its management structures will provide 

effective departmentwide leadership for electronic warfare activities and 

capabilities development and ensure effective and efficient use of its resources.

View GAO-12-479. For more information, 

contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

Letter 1 

Background 4

DOD Developed an Electronic Warfare Strategy, but Only Partially 

Addressed Key Desirable Strategy Characteristics 8

DOD Has Not Established an Effective Departmentwide 

Governance Framework for Managing and Overseeing 

Electronic Warfare 14

Conclusions 29

Recommendations for Executive Action 31

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 32

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 34

Appendix II Desirable Strategy Characteristics 38

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 39

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 40

Related GAO Products 41

Tables

Table 1: Department of Defense Electronic Warfare 

Responsibilities 25

Table 2: Summary of Desirable Characteristics for a Strategy, Their 

Description, and Benefit 38

Figures

Figure 1: Electromagnetic Spectrum and Uses 5

Figure 2: Examples of Electronic Warfare Capabilities 6

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

Figure 3: Extent to Which DOD’s Fiscal Year 2011 Electronic 

Warfare Strategy Report Addressed Key Desirable 

Strategy Characteristics Identified by GAO 10

Figure 4: Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center under 

Strategic Command 18

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

JEMSCC Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center

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Page 1 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

July 9, 2012

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Department of Defense (DOD) is increasingly dependent on access 

to the electromagnetic spectrum—the full range of all possible 

frequencies of electromagnetic radiation, including frequency ranges such 

as radio, microwave, infrared, visible, ultraviolet, X-rays, and gamma 

rays—for a variety of military uses, such as communicating, navigating, 

information gathering and sensing, and targeting. DOD has committed 

billions of dollars developing, maintaining, and employing warfighting 

capabilities that rely on access to the electromagnetic spectrum—

including precision-guided munitions and command, control, and 

communications systems. DOD ensures control of the electromagnetic 

spectrum through the coordinated implementation of joint electromagnetic 

spectrum operations, which includes electronic warfare and spectrum 

management activities, with other lethal and nonlethal operations that 

enable freedom of action in the electromagnetic operational environment. 

Electronic warfare, which is the use of electromagnetic energy and 

directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the 

enemy, is essential for protection of friendly operations and denying 

adversary operations within the electromagnetic spectrum throughout the 

operational environment. As we previously reported, DOD’s investments 

are projected to total more than $17.6 billion from fiscal years 2007 

through 2016 for the development and procurement of new and updated 

fixed-wing airborne electronic attack systems alone, which are one 

element of electronic warfare.1

According to DOD, the U.S. military’s access to and use of the 

electromagnetic spectrum is facing rapidly evolving challenges and 

increased vulnerabilities due to the increasing quality and availability of 

 

1 GAO, Airborne Electronic Attack: Achieving Mission Objectives Depends on Overcoming 

Acquisition Challenges, GAO-12-175 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2012).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

electronic warfare capabilities to both state and non-state actors. Also, 

DOD has reported that electronic warfare capabilities, which play a critical 

and potentially growing role as an enabler for military operations, are 

currently stressed and will remain so in the future. Moreover, according to 

DOD, near-peer competitors, primarily Russia and China, have fully 

recognized the critical nature of electromagnetic spectrum control in 

military operations.2 There also has been recognition among near-peer 

competitors of the relationship between electronic warfare and 

cyberspace operations, which includes computer network operations.3

DOD has identified persistent electronic warfare capability gaps, and 

these shortfalls have been consistently highlighted by the combatant 

commands as some of their highest warfighting priorities. According to a 

Center for Strategic and International Studies report, the U.S. Strategic 

Command identified 34 capability gaps affecting electronic warfare, 

including a lack of leadership across the department.

For example, as noted in the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission’s 2009 report to Congress, China’s Integrated Network 

Electronic Warfare concept incorporates elements of cyberspace 

operations in tandem with elements of traditional electronic warfare, and 

advocates for the employment of traditional electronic warfare 

operations—such as the jamming of radars and communications 

systems—in coordination with cyberspace attack operations.

4

 

2 Potential near-peer adversaries include countries capable of waging large-scale 

conventional war on the United States. These nation-states are characterized as having 

nearly comparable diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capacity to the United 

States.

This lack of 

leadership was identified as the most critical gap. In our recent report on 

DOD’s airborne electronic attack capabilities, we found that DOD is 

3 DOD defines cyberspace operations, which includes computer network operations, as 

the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve 

military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. DOD documents that discuss the 

relationship between electronic warfare and cyberspace operations use several different 

cyber-related terms, including cyberspace, cyber operations, computer network 

operations, and computer network attack. In addition, according to DOD, the definition of 

information operations includes the term computer network operations because it is an 

information operations-related capability. To provide clarity in this report, we generally use 

the term cyberspace operations in our discussion of the relationship between electronic 

warfare and cyberspace operations and computer network operations in our discussions 

concerning information operations-related capabilities. 

4 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Organizing for Electro-Magnetic Spectrum 

Control (Washington, D.C.: May 2010). 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

developing multiple systems which provide similar capabilities, and that 

the lack of leadership may undermine DOD’s ability to consolidate these 

systems.5

You requested that we examine several issues related to DOD’s 

electronic warfare capabilities. In March 2012, we issued a report on 

DOD’s current and planned airborne electronic attack capabilities and 

investment strategies.

Specifically, we found that all four military services within the 

Department of Defense are separately acquiring new airborne electronic 

attack systems, but that opportunities may exist to consolidate some 

current service-specific acquisition efforts. With the prospect of slowly 

growing or flat defense budgets for years to come, the department must 

get better returns on its weapon system investments and find ways to 

deliver more capability to the warfighter for less than it has in the past. 

Therefore, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense conduct 

program reviews for certain new, key systems; determine the extent to 

which the most pressing capability gaps can be met and take steps to fill 

them; align service investments in science and technology with the 

departmentwide electronic warfare priority; and review the capabilities 

provided by certain existing and planned systems to ensure investments 

do not overlap. DOD generally concurred with our recommendations.

6

To assess the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy to manage 

electronic warfare, we compared information found in DOD’s two 

electronic warfare strategy reports to Congress with key characteristics of 

strategies identified by GAO in prior work, and interviewed relevant 

officials. To assess the extent to which DOD has planned, organized, and 

implemented an effective governance structure to oversee its electronic 

warfare policy and programs and their relationship to cyberspace 

In this current review, we examined DOD’s 

approach to governing electronic warfare and the relationship between 

electronic warfare and cyberspace operations. Specifically, we examined 

the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a strategy to manage 

electronic warfare and (2) planned, organized, and implemented an 

effective governance structure to oversee its electronic warfare policy and 

programs, and their relationship to cyberspace operations.

 

5 GAO-12-175. For additional information, see GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to 

Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance 

Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012).

6 GAO-12-175. 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

operations, we reviewed DOD directives and policies, and the roles and 

responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and U.S. 

Strategic Command. Additionally, we reviewed and analyzed information 

found in policy documents along with information from relevant meetings 

with DOD officials against DOD’s directives regarding electronic warfare. 

We also interviewed cognizant officials and reviewed DOD policies, 

doctrine, reports, plans, and concepts of operation, and outside studies 

that discuss the relationship between electronic warfare and cyberspace 

operations. See Appendix I for details on our scope and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to July 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In modern warfare, military forces are heavily dependent upon access to 

the electromagnetic spectrum for successful operations. Communications 

with friendly forces and detection, identification, and targeting of enemy 

forces, among other tasks, are all reliant upon the ability to operate 

unhindered in the spectrum. For this reason, control of the 

electromagnetic spectrum is considered essential to carrying out military 

operations.7

 

7 According to DOD, electromagnetic spectrum control is freedom of action in the 

electromagnetic operational environment, which is achieved through the coordinated 

implementation of joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, which includes electronic 

warfare, with other lethal and nonlethal operations impacting the electromagnetic 

operational environment. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13.1, Electronic 

Warfare (Feb. 8, 2012).

Figure 1 illustrates the electromagnetic spectrum and some 

examples of military uses at various frequencies. For example, infrared or 

thermal imaging technology senses heat emitted by a person or an object 

and creates an image. Sensor systems utilize this technology to provide 

Background

Control and Use of the 

Electromagnetic Spectrum
 

Page 5 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

the advantage of seeing not only at night but also through smoke, fog, 

and other obscured battlefield conditions.

Figure 1: Electromagnetic Spectrum and Uses

DOD defines electronic warfare as any military action involving the use of 

electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic 

spectrum or to attack the enemy. The purpose of electronic warfare is to 

secure and maintain freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum 

for friendly forces and to deny the same for the adversary. Traditionally, 

electronic warfare has been composed of three primary activities:

• Electronic attack: use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or 

antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with 

the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat 

capability. Electronic attack can be used offensively, such as jamming 

enemy communications or jamming enemy radar to suppress its air 

defenses, and defensively, such as deploying flares.

• Electronic protection: actions to protect personnel, facilities, and 

equipment from any effects of friendly, neutral, or enemy use of the 

electromagnetic spectrum, as well as naturally occurring phenomena 

that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.

• Electronic warfare support: actions directed by an operational 

commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of 

radiated electromagnetic energy for the purposes of immediate threat 

recognition, targeting, and planning; and conduct of future operations.

Electronic Warfare
 

Page 6 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

Figure 2: Examples of Electronic Warfare Capabilities

Electronic warfare is employed to create decisive stand-alone effects or to 

support military operations, such as information operations and 

cyberspace operations. According to DOD, information operations are the 

integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related 

capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, 

corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential 

adversaries while protecting our own. Information-related capabilities can 

include, among others, electronic warfare, computer network operations, 

military deception, operations security, and military information support 

operations (formerly psychological operations). Electronic warfare 

Information Operations
 

Page 7 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

contributes to the success of information operations by using offensive 

and defensive tactics and techniques in a variety of combinations to 

shape, disrupt, and exploit adversarial use of the electromagnetic 

spectrum while protecting U.S. and allied freedom of action.

Since cyberspace requires both wired and wireless links to transport 

information, both offensive and defensive cyberspace operations may 

require use of the electromagnetic spectrum. According to DOD, 

cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities 

where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects 

through cyberspace, which include computer network operations, among 

others. Computer network operations include computer network attack, 

computer network defense, and related computer network exploitationenabling operations. Electronic warfare and cyberspace operations are 

complementary and have potentially synergistic effects. For example, an 

electronic warfare platform may be used to enable or deter access to a 

computer network.

U.S. Strategic Command (Strategic Command) has been designated 

since 2008 as the advocate for joint electronic warfare. Strategic 

Command officials stated that, in the past, the primary office for electronic 

warfare expertise—the Joint Electronic Warfare Center—had several 

different names and was aligned under several different organizations, 

such as the Joint Forces Command and the U.S. Space Command.

According to Strategic Command officials, in addition to the Joint 

Electronic Warfare Center, the command employs electronic warfare 

experts in its non-kinetic operations staff and in the Joint Electromagnetic 

Preparedness for Advanced Combat organization. According to Strategic 

Command officials, the Joint Electronic Warfare Center is the largest of 

the three organizations and employs approximately 60 military and civilian 

electronic warfare personnel and between 15 and 20 contractors. 

Strategic Command officials stated that the Joint Electronic Warfare 

Center was created as a DOD center of excellence for electronic warfare 

and has electronic warfare subject matter experts. The center provides 

planning and technical support not only to Strategic Command but to 

other combatant commands and organizations, such as U.S. Central 

Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and the 

Department of Homeland Security. The Joint Electronic Warfare Center 

also provides assistance with requirements generation to the military 

services.

Cyberspace Operations

U.S. Strategic Command 

Joint Electronic Warfare 

Activities
 

Page 8 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

DOD developed an electronic warfare strategy, but only partially 

addressed key strategy characteristics identified as desirable in prior work 

by GAO. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 

requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense 

committees an annual report on DOD’s electronic warfare strategy for 

each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015.8 Each annual report is to be 

submitted at the same time the President submits the budget to Congress 

and is to contain, among other things, a description and overview of 

DOD’s electronic warfare strategy and the organizational structure 

assigned to oversee the development of the department’s electronic 

warfare strategy, requirements, capabilities, programs, and projects.9 In 

response to this legislative requirement, the Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued DOD’s 2011 

and 2012 fiscal year strategy reports to Congress in October 2010 and 

November 2011, respectively.10

We previously reported that it is desirable for strategies to delineate six 

key characteristics, including organizational roles and responsibilities for 

implementing parties as well as performance measures to gauge

 

8 Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1053 (a). 

9 Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1053 (b) delineates several other requirements for the strategy, 

including a list of electronic warfare acquisition programs and research and development 

projects with associated program or project information.

10 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

Report to the Congressional Defense Committees. Electronic Warfare Strategy of the 

Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: October 2010). The fiscal year 2012 report is 

classified. As of July 2012, the fiscal year 2013 electronic warfare strategy report was still 

being drafted, according to officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

DOD Developed an 

Electronic Warfare 

Strategy, but Only 

Partially Addressed 

Key Desirable 

Strategy

Characteristics
 

Page 9 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

results.11

As illustrated in Figure 3, we found that DOD’s reports addressed two key 

characteristics, but only partially addressed four other key characteristics 

of a strategy. For example, the strategy reports to Congress included 

elements of characteristics, such as a goal and objectives, but did not 

fully identify implementing parties, delineate roles and responsibilities for 

managing electronic warfare across the department, or identify outcomerelated performance measures that could guide the implementation of 

electronic warfare efforts and help ensure accountability. Similarly, the 

reports provided acquisition program and research and development 

project data, but did not target resources and investments at some key 

activities associated with implementing the strategy. When investments 

are not tied to strategic goals and priorities, resources may not be used 

effectively and efficiently. Our past work has shown that such 

characteristics can help shape policies, programs, priorities, resource 

The key characteristics of an effective strategy can aid 

responsible parties in further developing and implementing the strategy, 

enhance the strategy’s usefulness in resource and policy decisions, and 

better ensure accountability. The six characteristics are: (1) purpose, 

scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; 

(3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; 

(4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) organizational 

roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration and 

implementation.

 

11 See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). This 

testimony identified six characteristics of an effective strategy. While these characteristics 

were identified in our past work as desirable components of national-level strategies, we 

determined that they also are relevant to strategies of varying scopes, including defense 

strategies involving complex issues. For example, identifying organizational roles, 

responsibilities and coordination mechanisms is key to allocating authority and 

responsibility for implementing a strategy. Further, goals, objectives, and performance 

measures provide concrete guidance for implementing a strategy, allowing implementing 

parties to establish priorities and milestones, and providing them with the flexibility 

necessary to pursue and achieve those results within a reasonable timeframe. Full 

descriptions of these characteristics are contained in appendix II. See also GAO, Influenza 

Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but Accountability, Funding, 

and Communications Need to be Clearer and Focused Departmentwide, GAO-06-1042 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006) ; GAO, Defense Space Activities: National Security 

Space Strategy Needed to Guide Future DOD Space Efforts, GAO-08-431R (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 27, 2008); and GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD 

Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness, 

GAO-11-621 (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2011).
 

Page 10 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

allocations, and standards in a manner that is conducive to achieving 

intended results.12

Figure 3: Extent to Which DOD’s Fiscal Year 2011 Electronic Warfare Strategy Report Addressed Key Desirable Strategy 

Characteristics Identified by GAO

Notes: Summary analysis information is provided only in cases where we have determined the 

strategy partially addressed a characteristic. The strategy “addressed” a characteristic when the 

strategy explicitly cited all elements of a characteristic, even if it lacked specificity and details and 

thus could be improved upon. The strategy “partially addressed” a characteristic when the strategy 

explicitly cited some, but not all, elements of a characteristic. Within our designation of “partially 

addressed,” there may be wide variation between a characteristic for which most of the elements 

were addressed and a characteristic for which few of the elements of the characteristic were 

addressed. The strategy “did not address” a characteristic when the strategy did not explicitly cite or 

discuss any elements of a characteristic, and/or any implicit references were either too vague or 

general. 

 

12 GAO-04-408T. 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

DOD’s fiscal year 2011 report is described here because the fiscal year 

2012 report, issued in November 2011, is classified. However, 

unclassified portions of this document note that the fiscal year 2011 report 

remains valid as the base DOD strategy and that the fiscal year 2012 

report updates its predecessor primarily to identify ongoing efforts to 

improve DOD’s electronic warfare capabilities and to provide greater 

specificity to current threats. The fiscal year 2011 Electronic Warfare 

Strategy of the Department of Defense report (electronic warfare strategy 

report)—the base electronic warfare strategy—addressed two and 

partially addressed four of six desirable characteristics of a strategy 

identified by GAO. There may be considerable variation in the extent to 

which the strategy addressed specific elements of those characteristics 

that were determined by GAO to be partially addressed. Our analysis of 

the fiscal year 2011 report’s characteristics is as follows.

• Purpose, scope and methodology: Addressed. The fiscal year 

2011 electronic warfare strategy report identifies the purpose of the 

strategy, citing as its impetus section 1053 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, and articulates a maturing, 

twofold strategy focused on integrating electronic warfare capabilities 

into all phases and at all levels of military operations, as well as 

developing, maintaining, and protecting the maneuver space within 

the electromagnetic spectrum necessary to enable military 

capabilities. The report’s scope also encompasses data on acquisition 

programs and research and development projects. Additionally, the 

report includes some methodological information by citing a principle 

that guided its development. Specifically the report states that a key 

aspect of the strategy is the concept of the electromagnetic spectrum 

as maneuver space.

• Problem definition and risk assessment: Addressed. The fiscal 

year 2011 electronic warfare strategy report defines the problem the 

strategy intends to address, citing the challenges posed to U.S. forces 

by potential adversaries’ increasingly sophisticated technologies, the 

military’s increased dependence on the electromagnetic spectrum, 

and the urgent need to retain and expand remaining U.S. advantages. 

The report also assesses risk by identifying threats to, and 

vulnerabilities of critical operations, such as Airborne Electronic Attack 

and self-protection countermeasures.

• Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance 

measures: Partially Addressed. The fiscal year 2011 electronic 

warfare strategy report communicates an overarching goal of enabling 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

electromagnetic spectrum maneuverability and cites specific 

objectives, such as selectively denying an adversary’s use of the 

spectrum and preserving U.S. and allied forces’ ability to maneuver 

within the spectrum. The report also identifies key activities 

associated with the strategy, including developing (1) coherent 

electronic warfare organizational structures and leadership, (2) an 

enduring and sustainable approach to continuing education, and (3) 

capabilities to implement into electronic warfare systems. The report 

does not identify performance measures that could be used to gauge 

results and help ensure accountability.

• Resources, investments, and risk management: Partially 

Addressed. The fiscal year 2011 electronic warfare strategy report 

broadly targets resources and investments by emphasizing the 

importance of continued investment in electronic attack, electronic 

protection, and electronic support capabilities. The report also notes 

some of the associated risks in these areas, calling for new methods 

of ensuring U.S. control over the electromagnetic spectrum in light of 

the adversary’s advances in weapons and the decreasing 

effectiveness of traditional lines of defense, such as airborne 

electronic attack and self-protection countermeasures. The report 

identifies some of the costs associated with the strategy by providing 

acquisition program and research and development project and cost 

data, and notes that part of the strategy is to identify and track 

investments in electronic warfare systems, which often are obscured 

within the development of the larger weapons platforms they typically 

support. However, the strategy does not target investments by 

balancing risk against costs, or discuss other costs associated with 

implementing the strategy by, for example, targeting resources and 

investments at key activities, such as developing electronic warfare 

organizational structures and leadership and developing an enduring 

and sustainable approach to continuing education.

• Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination: Partially 

Addressed. The fiscal year 2011 electronic warfare strategy report 

provides an overview of past and ongoing electronic warfare activities 

within the military services and DOD, and identifies several 

mechanisms that have or could be used to foster coordination across

the department. For example, it outlines the Army’s efforts to create a 

new career field for electronic warfare officers and the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics’ 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

electronic warfare integrated planning team.13 However, the report 

does not fully identify the departmental entities responsible for 

implementing the strategy, discuss the roles and responsibilities of 

implementing parties, or specify implementing entities’ relationships in 

terms of leading, supporting, and partnering.14

• Integration and implementation: Partially Addressed. The fiscal 

year 2011 electronic warfare strategy report describes the 

department’s approach to ensuring maneuverability within the 

electromagnetic spectrum, thus supporting National Defense Strategy

objectives that rely on use and control of the spectrum. The strategy’s 

overarching aim of ensuring electromagnetic spectrum 

maneuverability also is consistent with concepts contained in the 

department’s electromagnetic spectrum strategy documents—which 

collectively emphasize the importance of assured spectrum access.15

DOD’s electronic warfare strategy reports were issued in response to the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 and were not 

specifically required to address all the characteristics we consider to be 

desirable for an effective strategy. Additionally, DOD’s fiscal year 2011 

report states that the strategy is still maturing and that subsequent reports 

to Congress will refine the department’s vision. Nonetheless, we consider 

it useful for DOD’s electronic warfare strategy to address each of the 

characteristics we have identified in order to provide guidance to the 

entities responsible for implementing DOD’s strategy and to enhance the 

strategy’s utility in resource and policy decisions—particularly in light of 

the diffuse nature of DOD’s electronic warfare programs and activities, as 

well as the range of emerging technical, conceptual, and organizational 

challenges and changes in this area. Further, in the absence of clearly 

The strategy does not, however, discuss the department’s plans for 

implementing the strategy.

 

13 According to DOD officials, the electronic warfare integrated planning team was 

established by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics to develop guidelines for electronic warfare investment strategy.

14 By “partnering,” we refer to shared, or joint, responsibilities among implementing parties 

where there is otherwise no clear or established hierarchy of lead and support functions. 

15 See Department of Defense, Strategic Spectrum Plan (February 2008); and Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration) Department of Defense Chief 

Information Officer, Department of Defense Net-Centric Spectrum Management Strategy 

(Aug. 3, 2006). 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

defined roles and responsibilities, and other elements of key 

characteristics, such as measures of performance in meeting goals and 

objectives, entities responsible for implementing DOD’s strategy may lack 

the guidance necessary to establish priorities and milestones, thereby 

impeding their ability to achieve intended results within a reasonable time 

frame. As a result, DOD lacks assurance that its electronic warfare 

programs and activities are aligned with strategic priorities and are 

managed effectively. For example, without an effective strategy, DOD is 

limited in its ability to reduce the potential for unnecessary overlap in the 

airborne electronic attack acquisition activities on which we have 

previously reported.

DOD has taken some steps to address a critical leadership gap identified 

in 2009, but it has not established a departmentwide governance 

framework for planning, directing, and controlling electronic warfare 

activities. DOD is establishing a Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control 

Center (JEMSCC) under Strategic Command in response to the 

leadership gap for electronic warfare. However, DOD has not 

documented the objectives or implementation tasks and timeline for the 

JEMSCC. In addition, DOD has not updated key guidance to reflect 

recent policy changes regarding electronic warfare management and 

oversight roles and responsibilities. For example, it is unclear what the 

JEMSCC’s role is in relation to other DOD organizations involved in the 

management of electronic warfare, such as the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Moreover, we found that DOD may face challenges in its oversight of 

electronic warfare as a result of the evolving relationship between 

electronic warfare and cyberspace operations.

DOD has taken some steps to address a critical leadership gap by 

establishing the JEMSCC under Strategic Command. However, because 

DOD has yet to define specific objectives for the center, outline major 

implementation tasks, and define metrics and timelines to measure 

progress, it is unclear to what extent the center will address the identified 

existing leadership deficiencies. The Center for Strategic and 

International Studies reported insufficient leadership as the most critical 

among 34 capability gaps affecting electronic warfare. As a result of the 

absence of leadership, the department was significantly impeded from 

both identifying departmentwide needs and solutions and eliminating 

potentially unnecessary overlap among the military services’ electronic 

warfare acquisitions. Specifically, the department lacked a joint leader 

DOD Has Not 

Established an 

Effective 

Departmentwide 

Governance 

Framework for 

Managing and 

Overseeing Electronic 

Warfare

DOD Actions Have Not 

Fully Addressed a Critical 

Leadership Gap
 

Page 15 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

and advocate with the authority to integrate and influence electronic 

warfare capabilities development, to coordinate internal activities, and to 

represent those activities and interests to outside organizations. 

Mitigating the leadership gap was identified not only as the highest 

priority, but also a prerequisite to addressing the other 33 gaps.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies report was one of two 

parallel studies commissioned by the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council16 to assess potential organizational and management solutions to 

the leadership gap.

17 These studies considered a number of options, 

including an organization under the Deputy Secretary of Defense, an 

activity controlled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and an 

organization at Strategic Command. As a result of these studies, in 

January 2011, DOD initiated efforts to establish the JEMSCC under 

Strategic Command as the focal point of joint electronic warfare 

advocacy. This solution was chosen, in part, in recognition of Strategic 

Command’s resident electronic warfare expertise as well as its already 

assigned role as an electronic warfare advocate.18

In January 2011, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council directed 

Strategic Command to develop an implementation plan for the electronic 

 

16 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council, among other things, assists the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in (1) identifying, assessing, establishing priority levels for, and 

validating joint military requirements, including existing systems and equipment, to meet 

the National Military Strategy; (2) considering trade-offs among cost, schedule, and 

performance objectives for joint military requirements; and (3) reviewing the estimated 

level of resources required to fulfill each joint military requirement, and establishing an 

objective for the overall period of time within which an initial operational capability should 

be delivered to meet each joint military requirement.

17 Specifically, in October 2009, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council tasked 

Strategic Command and the now disestablished U.S. Joint Forces Command to assess 

both the technical issues related to the electronic warfare problem and the organizational 

structure and management approach required to respond to emerging electromagnetic 

spectrum threats. In response, Strategic Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command 

produced a classified report providing potential organizational solutions. As part of this 

process, the Center for Strategic and International Studies conducted its review as an

independent analysis that also provided organizational alternatives. See Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, Organizing for Electro-Magnetic Spectrum Control 

(Washington, D.C.: May 2010). 

18 See DOD, Unified Command Plan (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2008), which 

establishes the missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibility among 

the combatant commanders. This plan also tasks the Commander of Strategic Command 

with advocating for electronic warfare capabilities.
 

Page 16 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

warfare center to be submitted for council approval no later than May 

2011. The plan was to delineate (1) the center’s mission, roles, and 

responsibilities; (2) command and control, reporting, and support 

relationships with combatant commands, military services, and U.S. 

Government departments and agencies; and (3) minimum requirements 

to achieve initial operational capability and full operational capability. The 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council subsequently approved an 

extension of the center’s implementation plan submission to August 2011. 

Subsequently, in December 2011, the oversight council issued a 

memorandum that closed the requirement to submit an implementation 

plan to the council and stated that Strategic Command had conducted an 

internal reorganization and developed a center to perform the functions 

identified in the internal DOD study.

In December 2011, Strategic Command issued an operations order that 

defined the JEMSCC as the primary focal point for electronic warfare, 

supporting DOD advocacy for joint electronic warfare capability 

requirements, resources, strategy, doctrine, planning, training, and 

operational support. This order provided 22 activities that the center is to 

perform. Federal internal control standards require that organizations 

establish objectives and clearly define key areas of authority and 

responsibility.19 In addition, best practices for strategic planning have 

shown that effective and efficient operations require detailed plans 

outlining major implementation tasks and defined metrics and timelines to 

measure progress.20

 

19 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

Moreover, the independent study prepared for DOD 

similarly emphasized the importance of clearly defining the center’s 

authorities and responsibilities, noting that the center’s success would 

hinge, in part, on specifying how it is expected to relate to the department 

as a whole as well as its expected organizational outcomes. However, as 

of March 2012, Strategic Command had not issued an implementation 

plan or other documentation that defines the center’s objectives and 

outlines major implementation tasks, metrics, and timelines to measure 

progress. Strategic Command officials told us in February 2012 that an 

implementation plan had been drafted, but that there were no timelines 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).

20 For example, see GAO, Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation 

Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force, GAO-09-898 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009). 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

for the completion of the implementation plan or a projection for when the 

center would reach its full operational capability. As a result, it remains 

unclear whether or when the JEMSCC will provide effective 

departmentwide leadership and advocacy for electronic warfare, and 

influence resource decisions related to capability development.

According to officials from Strategic Command, the JEMSCC will consist 

of staff from Strategic Command’s Joint Electronic Warfare Center at 

Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, and the Joint Electromagnetic 

Preparedness for Advanced Combat organization, at Nellis Air Force 

Base, Nevada.21

 

21 The Joint Electronic Warfare Center, prior to incorporation in the JEMSCC, was tasked 

with integrating current and emerging joint electronic warfare effects to ensure spectrum 

control for global military operations. The center provided near-term operational solutions 

and advocated for long-term electromagnetic capabilities. The Joint Electromagnetic 

Preparedness for Advanced Combat organization was charged with advancing and 

improving joint warfighter effectiveness and combat capability by conducting vulnerability 

assessments of electromagnetic spectrum dependent capabilities, architectures, 

technologies, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

These officials stated that while each of JEMSCC’s 

component groups’ missions will likely evolve as the center matures, the 

JEMSCC components would continue prior support activities, such as the 

Joint Electronic Warfare Center’s support to other combatant commands 

through its Electronic Warfare Planning and Coordination Cell—a rapid 

deployment team that provides electronic warfare expertise and support 

to build electronic warfare capacity. Figure 4 depicts the JEMSCC’s 

organizational construct.
 

Page 18 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

Figure 4: Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center under Strategic Command

DOD has yet to define objectives and issue an implementation plan for 

the JEMSCC; however, officials from Strategic Command stated that they 

anticipated continuity between the command’s previous role as an 

electronic warfare advocate and its new leadership role, noting that 

advocacy was, and remains, necessary because electronic warfare 

capabilities are sometimes undervalued in comparison to other, kinetic 

capabilities.22

 

22 Kinetic capabilities focus on destroying forces through the application of physical 

effects.

For example, the JEMSCC will likely build off Strategic 

Command’s previously assigned advocacy role, in part, by continuing to 

advocate for electronic warfare via the Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System process—DOD’s process for identifying and 

developing capabilities needed by combatant commanders—and by 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

providing electronic warfare expertise.23 Specifically, Strategic Command 

officials stated that the JEMSCC, through Strategic Command, would 

likely provide input to the development of joint electronic warfare 

requirements during the joint capabilities development process. However, 

combatant commands, such as Strategic Command, provide one of many 

inputs to this process. Further, as we have previously reported, council 

decisions, while influential, are advisory to acquisition and budget 

processes driven by military service investment priorities.24

Officials we spoke with across DOD, including those from the military 

services and Strategic Command, recognized this challenge. Specifically, 

Strategic Command officials told us that for JEMSCC to influence servicelevel resource decisions and advocate effectively for joint electronic 

warfare capabilities, the JEMSCC would need to not only participate in 

the joint capabilities development process, but would also need 

authorities beyond those provided by the Unified Command Plan, such as 

the authority to negotiate with the military services regarding resource 

decisions. Similarly, we found that while the officials we spoke with from 

several DOD offices that manage electronic warfare, including offices 

within the military services, were unaware of the center’s operational 

status and unclear regarding its mission, roles, and responsibilities, many 

also thought it to be unlikely that the JEMSCC—as a subordinate center 

of Strategic Command—would possess the requisite authority to 

advocate effectively for electronic warfare resource decisions. These 

As a result, 

the JEMSCC’s ability to affect resource decisions via this process is likely 

to be limited.

 

23 In 2003, DOD created the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to 

guide the development of capabilities from a joint perspective. This system was 

established to provide the department with an integrated, collaborative process to identify 

and guide development of new capabilities that address the current and emerging security 

environment. DOD’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council oversees the joint capabilities 

development process and participates in the development of joint requirements, which 

includes the identification and analysis and synthesis of capability gaps and the council’s 

subsequent validation of capability needs. The council makes recommendations to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who advises the Secretary of Defense about what

capabilities to invest in as part of DOD’s budget process. Before making investment 

decisions, the military services consider the validated capabilities during their planning, 

programming, and budgeting processes and make decisions among competing 

investments.

24 See GAO, Defense Management: Perspectives on the Involvement of the Combatant 

Commands in the Development of Joint Requirements, GAO-11-527R (Washington, D.C.: 

May 20, 2011).
 

Page 20 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

concerns were echoed by the independent study, which noted that the 

center would require strong authorities to substantially influence the 

allocation of other DOD elements’ resources.25

Additionally, limited visibility across the department’s electronic warfare 

programs and activities may impede the center’s ability to advocate for 

electronic warfare capabilities development. Specifically, Strategic 

Command officials told us that they do not have access to information 

regarding all of the military services’ electronic warfare programs and 

activities, particularly those that are highly classified or otherwise have 

special access restrictions. In addition, Strategic Command officials told 

us that they do not have visibility over or participate in rapid acquisitions 

conducted through the joint capabilities development process. In our 

March 2012 report on DOD’s airborne electronic attack strategy and 

acquisitions, we reported that certain airborne electronic attack systems 

in development may offer capabilities that unnecessarily overlap with one 

another—a condition that appears most prevalent with irregular warfare 

systems that the services are acquiring under DOD’s rapid acquisitions 

process.26

DOD issued two primary directives that provide some guidance for 

departmentwide oversight of electronic warfare. However, neither of these 

two directives has been updated to reflect changes in DOD’s leadership 

structures that manage electronic warfare. Federal internal control 

standards require that organizations establish objectives, clearly define 

key areas of authority and responsibility, and establish appropriate lines 

of reporting to aid in the effective and efficient use of resources.

The JEMSCC’s exclusion from this process is likely to limit its 

ability to develop the departmentwide perspective necessary for effective 

advocacy. Moreover, in the absence of clearly defined objectives and an 

implementation plan outlining major implementation tasks and timelines to 

measure progress, these potential challenges reduce DOD’s level of 

assurance that the JEMSCC will provide effective departmentwide 

leadership for electronic warfare capabilities development.

27

 

25 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Organizing for Electro-Magnetic 

Spectrum Control (Washington, D.C.: May 2010). 

Additionally, those standards state that management must continually 

26 GAO-12-175 and GAO-12-342SP. 

27 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

DOD Policy Documents 

Have Not Been Updated to 

Include All Oversight Roles 

and Responsibilities for 

Electronic Warfare
 

Page 21 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

assess and evaluate its internal control to assure that the actions in place 

are effective and updated when necessary.

DOD’s two primary directives that provide some guidance for 

departmentwide oversight of electronic warfare are:

• DOD Directive 3222.4 (Electronic Warfare and Command and Control 

Warfare Countermeasures)—Designates the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition (now Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) 

as the focal point for electronic warfare within the department. 

However, the directive was issued in 1992 and updated in 1994, and 

does not reflect subsequent changes in policy or organizational 

structures. For example, the directive does not reflect the 

establishment of the JEMSCC under Strategic Command.

• DOD Directive 3600.01 (Information Operations)—Issued in 2006 and 

revised in May 2011, this directive provides the department with a 

framework for oversight of information operations, which was defined 

as the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic 

warfare, computer network operations, military information support 

operations (formerly referred to as psychological operations), military 

deception, and operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp 

adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting 

that of the United States. However, the definition of oversight 

responsibilities for information operations has changed, and these 

changes have not yet been reflected in DOD Directive 3600.01.28

DOD Directive 3222.4 has not been updated to reflect the responsibilities

for electronic warfare assigned to Strategic Command. Both the 

December 2008 and April 2011 versions of the Unified Command Plan

assigned Strategic Command responsibility for advocating for joint 

electronic warfare capabilities.29

 

28 Secretary of Defense, Memorandum: Strategic Communication and Information 

Operations in the DOD (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2011).

Similarly, the directive has not been 

updated to reflect the establishment of the JEMSCC and its associated 

electronic warfare responsibilities. Specifically, the directive does not 

acknowledge that JEMSCC has been tasked by Strategic Command as 

the primary focal point for electronic warfare; rather, the directive 

29 Department of Defense, Unified Command Plan (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2008) and 

Department of Defense, Unified Command Plan (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2011).
 

Page 22 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

designates the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics as the focal point for electronic warfare within DOD. As a 

result, it is unclear what JEMSCC’s roles and responsibilities are in 

relation to those of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics. For example, it’s unclear what JEMSCC’s role 

will be regarding development of future iterations of the DOD’s electronic 

warfare strategy report to Congress, which is currently produced by the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics. Also it is unclear what role, if any, the JEMSCC will have in 

prioritizing electronic warfare investments. Moreover, the directive has not 

been updated to reflect the Secretary of Defense’s memorandum issued 

in January 2011, which assigned individual capability responsibility for 

electronic warfare and computer network operations to Strategic 

Command.

DOD Directive 3600.01 provides both the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence with responsibilities that aid in the oversight of 

electronic warfare within DOD. However, pursuant to the Defense 

Secretary’s January 2011 memo, the directive is under revision to 

accommodate changes in roles and responsibilities. Under the current 

version of DOD Directive 3600.01, the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence is charged with the role of Principal Staff Advisor to the 

Secretary of Defense for information operations. The Principal Staff 

Advisor is responsible for, among other things, the development and 

oversight of information operations policy and integration activities as well 

as the coordination, oversight, and assessment of the efforts of DOD 

components to plan, program, develop, and execute capabilities in 

support of information operations requirements.30

Under the requirements of DOD acquisition policy, the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics regularly collects cost, 

Additionally, the current 

Directive 3600.01 identifies the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as responsible for establishing 

specific policies for the development of electronic warfare as a core 

capability of information operations.

 

30 DOD Directive 3600.01 refers to the Principal Staff Assistant position while the 

Secretary’s January 2011 memorandum refers to the Principal Staff Advisor position. 

According to DOD officials, these terms refer to the same position. We use the term 

Principal Staff Advisor in this report.
 

Page 23 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

schedule, and performance data for major programs.31

The Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum in January 2011 that 

prompted DOD officials to begin revising DOD Directive 3600.01. The 

memorandum redefined information operations as “the integrated 

employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities 

in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or 

usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while 

protecting our own.” Previously, DOD defined information operations as 

the “integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, 

computer network operations, psychological operations, military 

deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting 

and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial 

human and automated decision making while protecting our own.” 

According to DOD officials, the revised definition removed the term core 

capabilities because it put too much emphasis on the individual core 

capabilities and too little emphasis on the integration of these capabilities.

In some cases, 

the cost information of electronic warfare systems are reported as distinct 

programs, while in other cases, some electronic warfare systems are 

subcomponents of larger programs, and cost information is not regularly 

collected for these separate subsystems. Additionally, the Under 

Secretary—in coordination with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force—is 

developing an implementation road map for electronic warfare science 

and technology. The road map is supposed to coordinate investments 

across DOD to accelerate the development and delivery of capabilities. 

The road map is expected to be completed in late summer of 2012.

Additionally, the memorandum noted that the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy began serving as the Principal Staff Advisor for information 

operations as of October 1, 2010, and charged the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy with revising DOD Directive 3600.01 to reflect these 

responsibilities. According to the memorandum, the Principal Staff 

Advisor is to serve as the single point of fiscal and program accountability 

for information operations. However, according to DOD officials, this 

accountability oversight covers only the integration of information 

operations-related capabilities and does not cover the formerly defined 

core capabilities of information operations, including electronic warfare 

 

31 See DOD Directive 5000.01The Defense Acquisition System (Washington, D.C.: 

certified current as of Nov. 20, 2007) and DOD Instruction 5000.02 Operation of the 

Defense Acquisition System (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 8, 2008).
 

Page 24 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

and computer network operations. For example, DOD officials stated that 

the Principal Staff Advisor for information operations would maintain 

program accountability where information operations-related capabilities 

were integrated but would not maintain program accountability for all 

information-related capabilities. However, the memorandum does not 

clearly describe the specific responsibilities of the Principal Staff Advisor 

for information operations.

The Secretary’s memorandum directed the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, together with the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) and 

Director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, to continue to work to 

develop standardized budget methodologies for information operationsrelated capabilities and activities. However, these budget methodologies 

would capture only data related to information operations. For example, 

according to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy officials, they do not 

collect or review electronic warfare financial data, but may review this 

data in the future to determine if it relates to integrated information 

operations efforts. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy stated that DOD Directive 3600.01 was under revision 

to reflect these and other changes as directed by the Secretary’s 

memorandum. Until the underlying directive is revised, there may be 

uncertainty regarding which office has the authority to manage and 

oversee which programs. Moreover, until this directive is updated, it is not 

clear where the boundaries are for oversight of electronic warfare 

between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Table 1 compares the oversight roles and responsibilities for electronic 

warfare as described in the two DOD directives and the Secretary’s 2011 

policy memorandum.
 

Page 25 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

Table 1: Department of Defense Electronic Warfare Responsibilities

Organizations assigned 

electronic warfare 

responsibilitiesa

DOD Directive 3222.4, 

Electronic Warfare, July 31, 

1992 (Incorporating Change 2, 

 January 28, 1994)

DOD Directive 3600.01, 

Information Operations, August 

14, 2006 (Incorporating Change 

1, May 23, 2011)

(Electronic warfare defined as one 

of the core capabilities of 

information operations)

Secretary of Defense, 

Memorandum: Strategic 

Communication and 

Information Operations in the 

DOD, January 25, 2011

(Electronic warfare defined as 

an information operationsrelated capability)

Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for 

Policy

• No responsibility assigned. • Provide oversight of 

information operations 

planning, execution, and 

related policy guidance, 

including the establishment of 

an Office of the Secretary of 

Defense review process to 

assess information operations 

plans and programs submitted 

by combatant commanders.

• Assigned the Principal Staff 

Advisor function and 

responsibility for 

information operations 

oversight and 

management.

• Tasked to revise DOD 

Directive 3600.01 and DOD 

Directive 5111.1, and other 

relevant policy and doctrine 

documents to reflect a new 

definition of information 

operations.

• Assigned as the single 

point of fiscal and program 

accountability for 

information operations.

Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics

• Focal point for electronic 

warfare within DOD.

• Provide guidance on 

electronic warfare policy.

• Provide oversight for 

development and acquisition 

of tactical land, sea, air, 

space, or undersea 

electronic warfare systems.

• Review electronic warfare 

programs for duplication and 

maximum multi-service 

applications.

• Provide matrix electronic 

warfare technical and/or 

management support within 

the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense on request.

• Ensure that adequate 

science and technology 

programs exist for 

development and acquisition 

of electronic warfare 

systems. 

• Establish specific policies for 

the development and 

integration of electronic 

warfare.

• Develop and maintain a 

technology investment 

strategy to support the 

development, acquisition, and 

integration of electronic 

warfare capabilities.

• Invest in and develop the 

science and technologies 

needed to support information 

operations capabilities.

• No responsibility assigned.. 
 

Page 26 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

Organizations assigned 

electronic warfare 

responsibilitiesa

DOD Directive 3222.4, 

Electronic Warfare, July 31, 

1992 (Incorporating Change 2, 

 January 28, 1994)

DOD Directive 3600.01, 

Information Operations, August 

14, 2006 (Incorporating Change 

1, May 23, 2011)

(Electronic warfare defined as one 

of the core capabilities of 

information operations)

Secretary of Defense, 

Memorandum: Strategic 

Communication and 

Information Operations in the 

DOD, January 25, 2011

(Electronic warfare defined as 

an information operationsrelated capability)

Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence

• No responsibility assigned. • Serve as the Principal Staff 

Advisor for information 

operations.

• Develop and oversee DOD 

information operations policy 

and integration activities.

• Coordinate, oversee, and 

assess the efforts of the DOD 

components to plan, program, 

develop, and execute 

capabilities in support of 

information operations 

requirements.

• Establish specific policies for 

the development and 

integration of computer 

network operations, military 

deception and operational 

security. 

• Relieved of role as the 

Principal Staff Advisor 

function and responsibility 

for information operations 

oversight and 

management.

Strategic Commandb NA • Shall integrate and coordinate 

DOD information operations 

core capabilities (including 

electronic warfare and 

computer network operations) 

that cross geographic areas of 

responsibility or across the 

core information operations 

areas.

c • Assigned individual 

capability responsibilities 

for electronic warfare and 

computer network 

operations.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents.

Note: This table presents only those responsibilities that pertain to electronic warfare management 

and oversight within DOD, including those that relate to electronic warfare as a core or related 

capability of information operations. The table excludes, for example, responsibilities related to 

electronic warfare training and intergovernmental coordination, and the entities assigned such 

responsibilities. 

a

These organizations may be assigned non-electronic warfare capabilities in the listed documents. 

Here we only include those responsibilities that are related to electronic warfare, including electronic 

warfare as a core capability or related capability of information operations. 

b

Figure only provides Strategic Command responsibilities unique from those assigned to all 

combatant commands. 

c

DOD Directive 3222.4 predates the creation of Strategic Command in 2002. 
 

Page 27 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

DOD may face challenges in its oversight of electronic warfare because 

of the evolving relationship between electronic warfare and cyberspace 

operations, specifically computer network operations; both are information 

operations-related capabilities. According to DOD, to ensure all aspects 

of electronic warfare can be developed and integrated to achieve 

electromagnetic spectrum control, electronic warfare must be clearly and 

distinctly defined in its relationship to information operations (to include 

computer network operations) and the emerging domain of cyberspace. 

In the previous section, we noted that DOD’s directives do not clearly

define the roles and responsibilities for the oversight of electronic warfare 

in relation to the roles and responsibilities for information operations. The 

current DOD Directive 3600.01 does not clearly specify what 

responsibilities the Principal Staff Advisor has regarding the integration of 

information operations-related capabilities—specifically the integration of 

electronic warfare capabilities with computer network operations.32

Further, DOD’s fiscal year 2011 electronic warfare strategy report to 

Congress, which delineated its electronic warfare strategy, stated that the 

strategy has two, often co-dependent capabilities: traditional electronic 

warfare and computer network attack, which is part of cyberspace 

operations. Moreover, according to DOD officials, the relationship 

between electronic warfare and cyberspace operations—including 

computer network attack—is still evolving, which is creating both new 

opportunities and challenges. There will be operations and capabilities 

that blur the lines between cyberspace operations and electronic warfare 

because of the continued expansion of wireless networking and the 

integration of computers and radio frequency communications. According 

to cognizant DOD officials, electronic warfare capabilities may permit use 

of the electromagnetic spectrum as a maneuver space for cyberspace 

operations. For example, electronic warfare capabilities may serve as a 

means of accessing otherwise inaccessible networks to conduct 

cyberspace operations; presenting new opportunities for offensive action 

as well as the need for defensive preparations.

Current DOD doctrine partially describes the relationship between 

electronic warfare and cyberspace operations. Specifically, current joint 

doctrine for electronic warfare, which was last updated in February 2012, 

 

32 DOD Directive 5143.01 Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 23, 2005) provides the responsibilities of the Under Secretary and restates the 

Principal Staff Advisor duties stated in DOD Directive 3600.01. 

DOD May Face Challenges 

in Its Oversight of the 

Evolving Relationship of 

Electronic Warfare and 

Cyberspace Operations
 

Page 28 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

states that since cyberspace requires both wired and wireless links to 

transport information, both offensive and defensive cyberspace 

operations may require use of the electromagnetic spectrum for the 

enabling of effects in cyberspace. Due to the complementary nature and 

potential synergistic effects of electronic warfare and computer network 

operations, they must be coordinated to ensure they are applied to 

maximize effectiveness.33

DOD has not yet published specific joint doctrine for cyberspace 

operations, as we previously reported.

When wired access to a computer system is 

limited, electromagnetic access may be able to successfully penetrate the 

computer system. For example, use of an airborne weapons system to 

deliver malicious code into cyberspace via a wireless connection would 

be characterized as “electronic warfare-delivered computer network 

attack.” In addition, the doctrine mentions that electronic warfare 

applications in support of homeland defense are critical to deter, detect, 

prevent, and defeat external threats such as cyberspace threats.

34 We recommended, among other 

things, that DOD establish a time frame for deciding whether to proceed 

with a dedicated joint doctrine publication on cyberspace operations and 

update existing cyber-related joint doctrine.35

The military services also have recognized the evolving relationship 

between electronic warfare and cyberspace operations. For example, to 

address future challenges, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command conducted an assessment on how the Army’s future force will 

leverage cyberspace operations and found that the Army’s current 

vocabulary—including terms such as computer network operations, 

electronic warfare, and information operations—will become increasingly 

inadequate. According to the Army, these terms are becoming outdated 

as the operational environment rapidly changes due to factors such as 

technologic convergence of computer and telecommunication networks, 

astonishing rates of technologic advancements, and the global 

DOD agreed and has 

drafted, but not yet issued, the joint doctrine for cyberspace operations. 

According to U.S. Cyber Command officials, it is unclear when the 

doctrine for cyberspace operations will be issued.

 

33 Joint Publication 3-13.1.

34 See GAO, Defense Department Cyber Efforts, DOD Faces Challenges in Its Cyber 

Activities, GAO-11-75 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2011).

35 GAO-11-75. 
 

Page 29 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

proliferation of information and communications technology. According to 

a Navy official, the Navy recognizes the evolving relationship between 

electronic warfare and cyberspace operations and is moving toward 

defining that relationship. However, the Navy first is working to define the 

relationship between electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum 

operations. In addition, Air Force Instruction 10-706, Electronic Warfare 

Operations,

36

According to U.S. Cyber Command officials, it is important to understand 

how electronic warfare and cyberspace operations capabilities might be 

used in an operational setting. Such information could then inform the 

further development of doctrine. U.S. Cyber Command officials stated 

that they have participated in regular meetings with representatives from 

the military services, the National Security Agency, defense research 

laboratories, and others, to discuss the relationship of electronic warfare 

and cyberspace operations. Moreover, the Under Secretary for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, has established steering 

committees that are developing road maps for the Secretary of Defense’s 

seven designated science and technology priority areas—one of which is 

cyberspace operations and another is electronic warfare.

states that traditional electronic warfare capabilities are 

beginning to overlap with cyberspace areas, which is resulting in an 

increased number of emerging targets such as non-military leadership 

networks and positioning, navigation, and timing networks.

DOD faces significant challenges in operating in an increasingly complex 

electromagnetic environment. Therefore, it is important that DOD develop 

a comprehensive strategy to ensure departmental components are able 

to integrate electronic warfare capabilities into all phases of military

operations and maintain electromagnetic spectrum access and 

maneuverability. DOD would benefit from a strategy that includes 

implementing parties, roles, responsibilities, and performance measures, 

which can help ensure that entities are effectively supporting such 

objectives, and linking resources and investments to key activities 

necessary to meet strategic goals and priorities. In the absence of a 

strategy that fully addresses these and other key elements, the DOD 

components and military services responsible for implementing this 

 

36Air Force Instruction, 10-706, Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 3, 

2010).

Conclusions
 

Page 30 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

strategy, evaluating progress, and ensuring accountability may lack the 

guidance necessary to prioritize their activities and establish milestones 

that are necessary to achieve intended results within a reasonable time 

frame. Moreover, as a result, DOD may not be effectively managing its 

electronic warfare programs and activities or using its resources 

efficiently. For example, an effective strategy could help DOD reduce the 

potential for unnecessary overlap in the airborne electronic attack 

acquisition activities on which we have previously reported.

The military’s increasing reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum—

coupled with a fiscally constrained environment and critical gaps in 

electronic warfare management—highlights the need for an effective 

governance framework for managing and conducting oversight of the 

department’s electronic warfare activities. The absence of such a 

framework can exacerbate management challenges, including those 

related to developing and implementing an effective strategy and 

coordinating activities among stakeholders. Without additional steps to 

define the purpose and activities of the JEMSCC, DOD lacks reasonable 

assurance that this center will provide effective departmentwide 

leadership for electronic warfare capabilities development and ensure the 

effective and efficient use of its resources. As we previously reported, 

DOD acknowledges a leadership void that makes it difficult to ascertain 

whether the current level of investment is optimally matched with the 

existing capability gaps. Leveraging resources and acquisition efforts 

across DOD—not just by sharing information, but through shared 

partnerships and investments—can simplify developmental efforts, 

improve interoperability among systems and combat forces, and could 

decrease future operating and support costs. Such successful outcomes 

can position the department to maximize the returns it gets on its 

electronic warfare investments. In addition, multiple organizations are 

involved with electronic warfare and outdated guidance regarding 

management and oversight may limit the effectiveness of their activities.

Both the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics and the JEMSCC have been identified as the focal point for 

electronic warfare within the department, yet it is unclear what each 

organization’s roles and responsibilities are in relation to one another. 

Further, each organization’s management responsibilities related to future 

iterations of the electronic warfare strategy report to Congress and 

working with the military services to prioritize investments remain unclear. 

Updating electronic warfare directives and policy documents to clearly 

define oversight roles and responsibilities for electronic warfare—

including any roles and responsibilities related to managing the 

relationship between electronic warfare and information operations or 
 

Page 31 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

electronic warfare and cyberspace operations, specifically computer 

network operations—would help ensure that all aspects of electronic

warfare can be developed and integrated to achieve electromagnetic 

spectrum control.

To improve DOD’s management, oversight, and coordination of electronic 

warfare policy and programs, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense take the following three actions:

• Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy and Strategic Command, and others, as appropriate, to include 

at a minimum the following information in the fiscal years 2013 

through 2015 strategy reports for electronic warfare:

• Performance measures to guide implementation of the strategy 

and help ensure accountability. These could include milestones to 

track progress toward closing the 34 capability gaps identified by 

DOD studies.

• Resources and investments necessary to implement the strategy, 

including those related to key activities, such as developing 

electronic warfare organizational structures and leadership.

• The parties responsible for implementing the department’s 

strategy, including specific roles and responsibilities.

• Direct the Commander of Strategic Command to define the objectives 

of the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center and issue an 

implementation plan outlining major implementation tasks and 

timelines to measure progress.

• Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in concert with the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, as appropriate, to update key departmental guidance 

regarding electronic warfare—including DOD Directives 3222.4 

(Electronic Warfare and Command and Control Warfare 

Countermeasures) and 3600.01 (Information Operations)—to clearly 

define oversight roles and responsibilities of and coordination among 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Joint 

Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center. Additionally, the directives 

should clarify, as appropriate, the oversight roles and responsibilities 

for the integration of electronic warfare and cyberspace operations, 

specifically computer network operations.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 32 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with 

our first recommendation and concurred with our other two 

recommendations. Regarding our recommendation that DOD include in 

future strategy reports for electronic warfare, at a minimum, information 

on (1) performance measures to guide implementation of the strategy, (2) 

resources and investments necessary to implement the strategy, and (3) 

parties responsible for implementing the strategy, the department stated 

that it continues to refine the annual strategy reports for electronic warfare 

and will expand upon resourcing plans and organization roles; however, 

the department stated that the strategy was not intended to be 

prescriptive with performance measures. As we have previously stated, 

the inclusion of performance measures can aid entities responsible for 

implementing DOD’s electronic warfare strategy in establishing priorities 

and milestones to aid in achieving intended results within reasonable time 

frames. We also have noted that performance measures can enable more 

effective oversight and accountability as progress toward meeting a 

strategy’s goals may be measured, thus helping to ensure the strategy’s 

successful implementation. We therefore continue to believe this 

recommendation has merit.

DOD concurred with our remaining two recommendations that (1) the

Commander of Strategic Command define the objectives of the JEMSCC 

and issue an implementation plan for the center and (2) DOD update key 

departmental guidance regarding electronic warfare. These steps, if 

implemented, will help to clarify the roles and responsibilities of electronic 

warfare management within the department and aid in the efficient and 

effective use of resources. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in their 

entirety appendix III.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Commander, U.S. 

Strategic Command. In addition, this report will be available at no charge 

on GAO’s web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 33 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix 

IV. 

Brian J. Lepore 

Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

To assess the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy to manage 

electronic warfare we evaluated DOD’s fiscal year 2011 and 2012 

electronic warfare strategy reports to Congress1 against prior GAO work 

on strategic planning, that indentified six desirable characteristics of a 

strategy.2

We determined that the strategy “addressed” a characteristic when it 

explicitly cited all elements of a characteristic, even if it lacked specificity 

and details and could thus be improved upon. The strategy “partially 

addressed” a characteristic when it explicitly cited some, but not all, 

elements of a characteristic. Within our designation of “partially 

addressed,” there may be wide variation between a characteristic for 

which most of the elements were addressed and a characteristic for 

which few of the elements of the characteristic were addressed. The 

strategy “did not address” a characteristic when it did not explicitly cite or 

discuss any elements of a characteristic, and/or any implicit references 

were either too vague or general. To supplement this analysis and gain 

further insight into issues of strategic import, we also reviewed other 

The characteristics GAO previously identified are: (1) purpose, 

scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; 

(3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; 

(4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) organizational 

roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration and 

implementation. While these characteristics were identified in our past 

work as desirable components of national-level strategies, we determined 

that they also are relevant to strategies of varying scopes, including 

defense strategies involving complex issues. For example, identifying 

organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms is key 

to allocating authority and responsibility for implementing a strategy. 

Further, goals, objectives, and performance measures provide concrete 

guidance for implementing a strategy, allowing implementing parties to 

establish priorities and milestones, and providing them with the flexibility 

necessary to pursue and achieve those results within a reasonable time 

frame. Full descriptions of these characteristics are contained in appendix 

II.

 

1 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

Report to the Congressional Defense Committees. Electronic Warfare Strategy of the 

Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: October 2010). The fiscal year 2012 report is 

classified.

2 GAO-04-408T. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

relevant strategic planning documents—such DOD’s National Defense 

Strategy,

3 Strategic Spectrum Plan,4 and Net-Centric Spectrum 

Management Strategy5

To determine the extent to which DOD has planned, organized, and 

implemented an effective governance structure to oversee its electronic 

warfare policy and programs and their relationship with cyberspace 

operations, we reviewed and analyzed relevant DOD policies, doctrine, 

plans, briefings, and studies. Specifically, to determine how DOD has 

allocated electronic warfare authorities and responsibilities across the 

department, we reviewed and analyzed DOD policy, including DOD 

Directive 3222.4, Electronic Warfare and Command and Control Warfare 

Countermeasures; 

—and interviewed cognizant officials from 

organizations across the department, including the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; U.S. 

Strategic Command; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6 DOD Directive 3600.01, Information Operations;7

and the Secretary of Defense’s Memorandum: Strategic Communication 

and Information Operations in the DOD.

8 We also reviewed relevant joint 

doctrine publications, such as Joint Publications 3-13, Information 

Operations9 and 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare;

10 plans, including the 2008 

and 2011 Unified Command Plans;

11

 

3 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (Washington, D.C.: June 2008). 

strategic documents, such as DOD’s 

4 Department of Defense, Strategic Spectrum Plan (Washington, D.C.: February 2008).

5 Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, Department of Defense Net-Centric 

Spectrum Management Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3, 2006).

6 DOD Directive 3222.4, Electronic Warfare and Command and Control Warfare 

Countermeasures (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1992, Incorporating Change 2, Jan. 28, 

1994).

7 DOD Directive 3600.01, Information Operations (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2006, 

Incorporating Change 1, May 23, 2011).

8 Secretary of Defense, Memorandum: Strategic Communication and Information 

Operations in the DOD (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2011).

9 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2006).

10 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2012).

11 Department of Defense, Unified Command Plan (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2008) and 

Department of Defense, Unified Command Plan (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2011).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

fiscal year 2011 and 2012 electronic warfare strategy reports to 

Congress;12 and classified and unclassified briefings, and studies related 

to DOD’s identification of and efforts to address electronic warfare 

capability gaps, including DOD’s 2009 Electronic Warfare Initial 

Capabilities Document.

13

In addressing both of our objectives, we obtained relevant documentation 

from and/or interviewed officials from the following DOD offices, 

combatant commands, military services, and combat support agencies:

We also reviewed DOD and military service 

reports, plans, concepts of operation, and outside studies that discuss 

DOD’s definitions of electronic warfare and cyberspace operations. In 

addition, we interviewed cognizant DOD officials to obtain information and 

perspectives regarding policy, management, and technical issues related 

to electronic warfare, information operations, electromagnetic spectrum 

control, and cyberspace operations.

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer

• Joint Chiefs of Staff

• Combatant Commands

• U.S. Cyber Command, Fort Meade, Maryland

• U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii

• U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

• Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center, Offutt Air 

Force Base, Nebraska

• Joint Electronic Warfare Center, Lackland Air Force Base, 

Texas

• U.S. Army

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations, 

Plans, and Training, Electronic Warfare Division

 

12 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

Report to the Congressional Defense Committees. Electronic Warfare Strategy of the 

Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: October 2010). The fiscal year 2012 report is 

classified.

13 Department of Defense, Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document Unclassified 

Extract (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2009). The full version of this report is classified.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 37 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

• Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center 

Electronic Warfare Proponent Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

• U.S. Air Force—Electronic Warfare Division

• U.S. Marines Corps—Headquarters, Electronic Warfare Branch

• U.S. Navy

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information 

Dominance Electronic and Cyber Warfare Division

• Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Crane, Indiana

• Naval Sea Systems Command, Program Executive Office for 

Integrated Warfare Systems

• Navy Fleet Forces Cyber Command, Fleet Electronic Warfare 

Center, Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia

• Combat Support Agencies

• Defense Information Systems Agency—Defense Spectrum 

Organization

• National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland

We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to July 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Desirable Strategy Characteristics 

Page 38 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

We previously identified a set of desirable strategy characteristics to aid 

responsible parties in implementation, enhance the strategies’ usefulness 

in resource and policy decisions, and to better ensure accountability.1

Table 2: Summary of Desirable Characteristics for a Strategy, Their Description, and Benefit

Table 2 provides a brief description of each characteristic and its benefit.

Characteristic Summary description Benefit

Purpose, scope, and 

methodology

Addresses why the strategy was 

produced, the scope of its coverage, 

and the process by which it was 

developed.

A complete description of the purpose, scope, and 

methodology in a strategy could make the document more 

useful to the entities it is intended to guide, as well as to 

oversight organizations, such as Congress.

Problem definition and risk 

assessment 

Addresses the particular problems 

and threats the strategy is directed 

toward.

Use of common definitions promotes more effective 

intergovernmental operations and more accurate monitoring of 

expenditures, thereby eliminating problematic concerns. 

Comprehensive assessments of vulnerabilities, including risk 

assessments, can help identify key factors external to an 

organization that can significantly affect that organization’s 

attainment of its goals and objectives and can help identify risk 

potential if such problem areas are not effectively addressed.

Goals, subordinate 

objectives, activities, and 

performance measures

Addresses what the strategy is trying 

to achieve, steps to achieve those 

results, as well as the priorities, 

milestones, and performance 

measures to gauge results.

Better identification of priorities, milestones, and performance 

measures can aid implementing entities in achieving results in 

specific time frames—and could enable more effective 

oversight and accountability.

Resources, investments, and 

risk management

Addresses what the strategy will cost, 

the sources and types of resources 

and investments needed, and where 

resources and investments should be 

targeted based on balancing risk 

reductions with costs.

Guidance on resource, investment, and risk management 

could help implementing entities allocate resources and 

investments according to priorities and constraints, track costs 

and performance, and shift such investments and resources as 

appropriate. Such guidance could also assist organizations in 

developing more effective programs to stimulate desired 

investments and leverage finite resources.

Organizational roles, 

responsibilities, and 

coordination

Addresses who will be implementing 

the strategy, what their roles will be 

compared to others, and mechanisms 

for them to coordinate their efforts.

Inclusion of this characteristic in a strategy could be useful to 

organizations and other stakeholders in fostering coordination 

and clarifying specific roles, particularly where there is overlap, 

and thus enhancing both implementation and accountability.

Integration and 

implementation

Addresses how a strategy relates to 

other strategies’ goals, objectives and 

activities, and to subordinate levels of 

government and their plans to 

implement the strategy.

Information on this characteristic in a strategy could build on 

the aforementioned organizational roles and responsibilities—

and thus further clarify the relationships between various 

implementing entities. This, in turn, could foster effective 

implementation and accountability.

Source: GAO.

 

1

 GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).

Appendix II: Desirable Strategy 

Characteristics 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 39 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 40 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

Brian J. Lepore, Director, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 

were Davi M. D’Agostino, Director (retired); Mark A. Pross, Assistant 

Director; Carolynn Cavanaugh; Ryan D’Amore; Brent Helt; and Richard 

Powelson.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
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Page 41 GAO-12-479 Electronic Warfare 

Airborne Electronic Attack: Achieving Mission Objectives Depends on 

Overcoming Acquisition Challenges. GAO-12-175. Washington, D.C.: 

March 29, 2012.

2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. 

GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

Defense Department Cyber Efforts: Definitions, Focal Point, and 

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Budget Estimates. GAO-11-695R. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2011.

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Defense Department Cyber Efforts: More Detailed Guidance Needed to 

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Electronic Warfare: Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs Could Reduce 

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