FOREIGN 

ASSISTANCE

Actions Needed to 

Help Ensure Quality 

and Sustainability of 

USAID Road in 

Indonesia

Report to the Subcommittee on Asia 

and the Pacific, Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, House of Representatives

July 2012

GAO-12-728

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-728, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 

Representatives 

July 2012

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Actions Needed to Help Ensure Quality and 

Sustainability of USAID Road in Indonesia

Why GAO Did This Study

In December 2004, an earthquake in 

the Indian Ocean caused a major 

tsunami that devastated several 

countries, affecting Indonesia most 

severely. In May 2005, Congress 

appropriated $908 million for aid to the 

affected countries. USAID budgeted 

$245 million of this amount to 

rehabilitate and construct a 150-mile 

paved coastal road in Aceh Province, 

Indonesia, with a planned completion

date of September 2009. After 

reducing the project’s scope, USAID

completed a 91-mile road in April 2012

at an estimated cost of $256 million.

GAO was asked to (1) describe 

USAID’s construction operations as 

well as factors that delayed the road’s

completion, (2) assess USAID’s efforts

to ensure the road’s quality, and (3) 

examine factors that could affect the 

road’s sustainability. GAO reviewed 

USAID documents, interviewed USAID 

and Indonesian officials, and traveled 

the entire length of the road.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that USAID (1) 

ensure that road sections still under a 

1-year warranty are inspected in a 

timely manner and require the

construction contractor to make any 

needed repairs and (2) work with the 

Indonesian government to develop and 

implement a process addressing

factors that could affect the road’s 

sustainability. USAID stated that it 

concurred with GAO’s first 

recommendation and concurred with 

the intent of GAO’s second 

recommendation. 

View a video of GAO’s March 2012

inspection of the road.

http://www.gao.gov/multimedia/video#v

ideo_id=592299

What GAO Found

From August 2005 to September 2010, the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) awarded five contracts to reconstruct a major coastal road 

in Aceh Province, Indonesia. Three of the contracts were for construction, one 

contract was for design and supervision, and one contract was for project 

management. Several factors delayed the road’s completion and increased 

costs. For example, according to USAID, when one contractor did not make

acceptable progress, the agency reduced the scope of work, terminated 

construction of an 8-mile road section, and hired another contractor to complete

the section. Other factors included the Indonesian government’s difficulty in 

acquiring land for the road and local opposition to the new road alignment. 

USAID took several actions to ensure quality in the road’s design and 

construction. For example, USAID hired an experienced, U.S.-registered 

professional engineer as Project Manager and hired a U.S.-based engineering

firm to design the road and supervise most construction. USAID also required

contractors to remain liable for any quality defects for 1 year after completing 

road sections. In addition, USAID required the Project Manager and the 

engineering firm to perform routine inspections, including final inspections when 

the warranties ended. Some inspections revealed poor-quality work that the 

contractors corrected. However, the engineering firm’s and Project Manager’s 

contracts ended in March 2012 and April 2012, respectively, leaving no qualified 

staff to inspect around 50 miles—more than half of the completed road—still 

under warranty. USAID told GAO it is considering rehiring the Project Manager 

on an intermittent basis, but USAID has not finalized this arrangement and has

no mechanism to ensure quality in these sections. 

USAID also took several actions to help ensure the road’s sustainability, such as

designing it to withstand heavy weights and providing a maintenance plan and 

equipment to the Indonesian Directorate General of Highways. However, various 

factors could affect the road’s sustainability for its intended 10-year design life. 

For example, according to USAID and Indonesian officials, the Directorate lacks 

resources needed to maintain the road. Also, according to USAID, the 

Indonesian government has not taken certain actions, such as using portable 

scales to prevent overweight vehicles that could cause pavement failure and

prohibiting construction in the road right-of-way that could obstruct drainage. 

Sections of Old Road Destroyed by Tsunami and New Road Built by USAID 

View GAO-12-728. For more information, 

contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or 

gootnickd@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Letter 1 

Background 3

USAID Constructed Road under Several Major Contracts, with 

Numerous Factors Delaying Completion 9

USAID Took Several Actions to Ensure Quality of Indonesia Road 

Design and Construction but Lacks Quality Assurance 

Mechanism for Sections Still under Warranty 17

USAID Took Actions to Enhance Indonesia Road’s Sustainability, 

but Several Factors Could Decrease Its Life Expectancy 24

Conclusions 29

Recommendations for Executive Action 30

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 32

Appendix II Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 35

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 38

Related GAO Products 39

Table

Table 1: Major USAID Contracts for Indonesia Road Construction, 

Design and Supervision, and Project Management, with 

Contractors’ Completed Activities 11

Figures

Figure 1: Tsunami-Affected Countries; Numbers of Dead, Missing, 

and Displaced Persons; and Estimated Damage, as of 

November 2005 4

Figure 2: Destroyed Road Sections in December 2005, One Year 

after the Tsunami 5

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Figure 3: USAID’s Initial and Revised Plans and Completed Results 

for the Indonesia Coastal Road 8

Figure 4: Indonesia Road Sections, Key Features, and Funding 

Levels for Three Construction Contractors 12

Figure 5: Timeline of Events Related to USAID’s Five Major 

Contracts for Indonesia Road 13

Figure 6: Community Opposition to Indonesia Road Realignment, 

Involving Protests and Burned Equipment 16

Figure 7: Flooding of Road Section Caused by Torrential Rains and 

Inaccurate Design 17

Figure 8: Sections of Completed Indonesia Coastal Road 20

Figure 9: Milling Machine Removing Faulty Pavement in Indonesia 

Road 21

Figure 10: Indonesia Road Sections with Unexpired Warranties, 

and Section Expiration Dates 23

Figure 11: Features Intended to Enhance Sustainability of 

Indonesia Coastal Road 25

Figure 12: Truck on Narrow Mountainous Section of Indonesia 

Coastal Road 26

Figure 13: Building Constructed in Right-of-Way (left) and 

Unauthorized Access Road and Removed Guardrail (right) 29
Page iii GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Abbreviations

the Directorate Indonesian Directorate General of Highways 

Parsons Parsons Global Services, Inc.

SsangYong SsangYong Engineering & Construction

SsangYong-Hutama SsangYong-Hutama Karya Joint 

 Association

State U.S. Department of State

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

WIKA PT Wijaya Karya

View GAO-12-728 Key Components

Foreign Assistance: Actions Needed to Help Ensure Quality and 

Sustainability of USAID Road in Indonesia

http://www.gao.gov/multimedia/video#video_id=592299, a multimedia 

video to GAO-12-728.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

July 19, 2012

The Honorable Donald A. Manzullo

Chairman

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

The tsunami of December 2004, caused by an earthquake in the Indian 

Ocean near Indonesia, widely devastated 12 Asian and East African 

countries. In May 2005, Congress appropriated approximately $908 

million in assistance for tsunami relief, reconstruction, and related 

programs.1

 

1

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and 

Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. A, Title IV (May 11, 2005). 

Using about $350 million of these funds, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) began its overall tsunami 

reconstruction program in Indonesia—which sustained the greatest 

estimated damage—later in fiscal year 2005 with activities such as 

constructing shelters and small-scale infrastructure. USAID also 

announced plans to further assist Indonesia by constructing a 150-mile 

coastal road in Aceh Province, on the island of Sumatra, with a planned 

completion date of September 2009 and an estimated cost of $245 

million. After encountering numerous obstacles, in fiscal year 2006 

USAID reduced the planned road length to 91 miles, extended the 

estimated completion date to February 2010, and increased the estimated 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

cost to $254 million.2 USAID completed the 91-mile road in April 2012 at 

an estimated cost of $256 million.3

In response to your request, this report (1) describes USAID’s 

construction operations as well as factors that delayed the road’s 

completion, (2) assesses USAID’s efforts to ensure the road’s quality, and 

(3) examines factors that could affect the road’s sustainability.

To address these objectives, we reviewed USAID and contractor 

documents and reports. We also interviewed USAID officials in 

Washington, D.C., and Indonesia as well as Indonesian government 

officials and contractors, including engineers and project managers, in 

Indonesia. In addition, we traveled the length of the 91-mile road with 

USAID officials in March 2012, when the construction was nearly 

completed.4

 

2

We previously reviewed USAID’s overall tsunami reconstruction activities, focusing on 

large infrastructure projects in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. We issued reports in 2006 and 

2007, before the bulk of road construction work had begun, that included 

recommendations to address reporting issues, identify potential risks that could affect 

costs and schedule, and identify ways to mitigate risks. The Department of State (State), 

with information provided by USAID, addressed our recommendations. See GAO, Foreign 

Assistance: USAID Has Begun Tsunami Reconstruction in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, but 

Key Projects May Exceed Cost and Schedule Estimates,

During our travel, we observed several ongoing activities, 

such as contractors removing a section of faulty pavement and building a 

retaining wall, as well as completed road sections, bridges, and other 

features. We based our assessment of the road’s quality on the use of 

established design and construction standards and practices by USAID 

and its contractors. For this report, we defined sustainability, based on the 

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s definition, as 

the ability of the Indonesian government to operate and maintain the 

USAID-constructed road in such a condition as is required to produce the 

GAO-06-488 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 14, 2006) and Foreign Assistance: USAID Signature Tsunami Reconstruction Efforts 

in Indonesia and Sri Lanka Exceed Initial Cost and Schedule Estimates, and Face Further 

Risks, GAO-07-357 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007).

3

As of July 2012, USAID reported that it could not yet determine the final cost of the road 

because, among other things, a pending claim of $2.3 million and a potential payment of 

value added tax of $4.4 million were still outstanding.

4

View a video of our March 2012 inspection of the road.

http://www.gao.gov/multimedia/video#video_id=592299
 

Page 3 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

projected benefits for the road’s intended 10-year life expectancy.5

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to July 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

See 

appendix I for a more detailed description of our scope and methodology.

The December 26, 2004, earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean 

near Indonesia left more than 200,000 dead and 40,000 reported missing 

and caused an estimated $10 billion in damages to property and 

infrastructure such as buildings, roads, and bridges. The Indonesian 

province of Aceh, about 150 miles from the epicenter of the earthquake, 

experienced the heaviest loss of lives and damage to property and 

infrastructure, largely along the west coast. Figure 1 shows the tsunamiaffected countries; numbers of dead, missing, and displaced persons; and 

estimated damage.

 

5

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development defines sustainability as 

the continuation of benefits from a development intervention (such as assets, skills, 

facilities, or improved services) after major development assistance has been completed. 

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Figure 1: Tsunami-Affected Countries; Numbers of Dead, Missing, and Displaced Persons; and Estimated Damage, as of 

November 2005

a

Sri Lanka was the second most affected country, with 35,322 dead or missing persons, 516,150 

displaced persons, and $1.5 billion in estimated damage.
 

Page 5 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

In Indonesia, the affected infrastructure included a major road and 

numerous bridges along the west coast—a key transportation artery in 

the region—that was destroyed in many locations and severely damaged 

in many others. Figure 2 shows two of the destroyed road sections in 

December 2005, 1 year after the tsunami.

Figure 2: Destroyed Road Sections in December 2005, One Year after the Tsunami

We began monitoring USAID’s delivery of assistance to the tsunamiaffected countries, including its reconstruction of the Indonesian coastal 

road, in May 2005,6 and issued reports on our work in 2006 and 2007.7

• In April 2006, we reported that USAID planned to construct and 

rehabilitate 150 miles of paved road between Banda Aceh and 

Meulaboh at an estimated cost of $245 million, or $1.6 million per 

mile, with an estimated completion date of September 2009. We 

noted that the initial plans and cost estimates for rehabilitating and 

constructing the road were based on limited site information because 

much of the road’s planned route was inaccessible. We also reported 

that costs and schedules for the road construction project might 

 

6

In March 2005, the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations requested 

that we review U.S. assistance to the countries affected by the December 2004 

earthquake and tsunami (H.R. Rep. 109-16, p. 49).

7

GAO-06-488 and GAO-07-357. 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

exceed initial estimates owing to several factors,8 including growing 

costs for materials and labor, long-standing civil conflict in the region, 

and difficulties that the Indonesian government might encounter in 

acquiring land parcels needed for the road right-of-way.9

• In February 2007, we reported that USAID had reduced the planned 

scope of the road construction to 91 miles between Banda Aceh and 

Calang;10 increased its cost estimate to $254 million, or $2.7 million 

per mile;11 and revised the project’s estimated completion date to 

February 2010. USAID took these steps after more accurately 

determining the project’s requirements and accounting for material 

and labor cost escalation.12

Of the $908 million that Congress appropriated in May 2005 for tsunami 

relief, reconstruction, and related programs for affected countries in the 

region, $349 million was budgeted to USAID for Indonesia reconstruction 

 

8

In our 2006 report, we recommended that, to help ensure the public availability of current 

information on the costs and schedules, the Secretary of State should provide updated 

cost and schedule estimates in the Department of State’s semiannual report to Congress, 

required by the law providing the assistance (Pub. L. No.109-13, §4102, May 11, 2005).

State agreed with, and later implemented, our recommendations. See GAO-06-488. 

9

Right-of-way denotes land or property acquired for transportation purposes. Obtaining 

land for right-of-way involves, among other activities, identifying the location of existing 

property boundaries, determining ownership, and acquiring parcels. 

10The Japanese government agreed to rehabilitate the coastal road from Calang to 

Meulaboh. 

11Our report cited several factors that led to the revised scope, cost, and time frames, 

including USAID’s receiving additional site information regarding the postdisaster 

environment and rising construction costs for materials and labor. See GAO-07-357. 

12In 2007, we also reported that, although State had included updated information in its 

periodic required reports to Congress, the reports did not clearly reflect USAID’s progress 

in the programs or risks that could affect its progress and did not indicate ongoing risks 

that might impact projects’ costs, schedules, and scopes of work. To ensure Congress’s 

access to information that it needed to oversee USAID, we recommended that State’s 

reports include certain funding information, identify factors that could impact USAID’s 

implementation of the projects, and provide strategies for mitigating any impact. State 

agreed with, and later implemented, our recommendations. We also noted that several 

factors had contributed to increased cost and might lead USAID to further extend the 

completion date: the delayed award of a large-scale construction contract and, owing to 

the postdisaster environment, limited initial information on site conditions, rising 

construction costs, and difficulties in acquiring land for the road right-of-way. See 

GAO-07-357. 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

activities. In 2005 USAID allocated $245 million of this amount for the 

coastal road, and in 2006 USAID increased its allocation to $254 million. 

USAID reported that the final estimated cost, as of July 2012, was $256

million, or $2.8 million per mile.13

Figure 3 shows USAID’s initial and revised plans and completed results 

for the Indonesia coastal road.

 

13As of July 2012, USAID reported that it could not yet determine the final cost of the road 

because, among other things, a pending claim of $2.3 million and a potential payment of 

value added tax of $4.4 million were still outstanding.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Figure 3: USAID’s Initial and Revised Plans and Completed Results for the Indonesia Coastal Road
 

Page 9 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

From August 2005 to September 2010, USAID awarded five contracts to 

reconstruct the coastal road in Aceh Province, Indonesia—three contracts 

for construction, one contract for design and supervision, and one 

contract for project management. Factors related to contractor 

performance as well as local conditions delayed USAID’s progress in 

designing and constructing the road and led to increased costs.

Construction of the 91 miles of road completed in April 2012 took place 

under two contracts—designated by USAID as the “priority” and “prime” 

contracts—for a combined estimated 83 miles of the road, and under a 

third “8-mile” contract for the remaining 8 miles. USAID also awarded two 

additional contracts for, respectively, the design and supervision of the 

road construction and the management of the project.

• Priority construction contract. In August 2005, USAID awarded a 

contract to an Indonesia firm, PT Wijaya Karya (WIKA).

14

• Design and supervision contract. In November 2005, USAID 

awarded a contract to Parsons Global Services (Parsons), a U.S.-

based multinational engineering firm, to design most of the road 

sections—about 88 miles—and supervise construction of 91 miles of 

road work.

Although 

initially expected to take place from August 2005 to August 2006,

WIKA’s construction work did not begin until October 2006. To 

expedite construction on certain “priority” sections of the road, USAID 

modified the contract to include, among other things, expanding the 

scope from 3 miles to 26 miles and extending the completion date 

from August 2006 to December 2007 for the 26 miles. In May 2008, 

USAID partially terminated the priority contract, removing 8 miles from 

the contract’s scope.

• Project management contract. In April 2006, approximately 6 

months after hiring its design and supervision contractor, USAID hired 

a U.S.-registered professional engineer as its overall Project 

 

14USAID initially awarded the contract to WIKA for repairing and maintaining 50 miles of 

existing road. Later, USAID amended the contract to also include designing and building a 

3-mile road segment.

USAID Constructed 

Road under Several 

Major Contracts, with 

Numerous Factors 

Delaying Completion

Road Construction, Design 

and Supervision, and 

Project Management Were 

Performed under Five 

Contracts 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Manager15

• Prime construction contract. In June 2007, USAID awarded the 

prime contract to SsangYong-Hutama Karya Joint Association 

(SsangYong-Hutama), a collaboration between a Korean firm and an 

Indonesian firm, for 65 miles of road construction in five 

noncontiguous sections. USAID had expected to award the prime 

construction contract in September 2006. However, its initial 

solicitation was restricted under USAID policy to U.S. firms, and 

USAID received only a single proposal, which the agency was unable 

to negotiate to an acceptable price.

for the road construction project. Parsons reported directly 

to the Project Manager. The Project Manager served as the project’s 

chief technical officer; was USAID’s principal interface with Indonesian 

government officials; advised in the development of the project’s 

design and, to ensure its conformance with design specifications, 

inspected construction work and directed changes as required prior to 

road sections being turned over to the Indonesian government.

16

• Eight-mile construction contract. In September 2010, USAID 

awarded a third construction contract to SsangYong Engineering & 

Construction (SsangYong) for the 8 contiguous miles removed from 

the priority contract, which was completed in January 2012.

In December 2006, USAID 

issued a second solicitation that, in an approved deviation from 

USAID policy, was opened to international firms. According to USAID 

officials, the second solicitation attracted interest from several 

prospective offerors and included a revised estimated completion date 

of March 2010, 6 months later than originally planned.

Table 1 shows the five major contracts that USAID awarded for the 

construction, design and supervision, and overall project management of 

the 91-mile road, as well as the contractors’ completed activities.

 

15USAID hired the Project Manager under a personal services contract in April 2006 but 

the Project Manager did not begin work until May 2006.

16USAID originally intended that the “prime” contract would be used to construct the 

majority of the originally planned 150-mile road. However, the inability to award the 

contract based on the initial solicitation caused USAID to both increase the scope of 

construction under the “priority” contract to 26 miles and reduce the scope of construction 

under the “prime” contract to 65 miles, reflecting the revised project goal of building a 91-

mile road. 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Table 1: Major USAID Contracts for Indonesia Road Construction, Design and Supervision, and Project Management, with 

Contractors’ Completed Activities

Legend: N/A = not applicable.

Source: GAO synthesis of USAID information.

a

WIKA designed the initial 3-mile “priority” road section; Parsons designed the remaining 88-mile road 

sections.

Figure 4 shows road sections, key features, and funding levels for each of 

the three road construction contractors.

Completed activity

Contract

(month and year contract began) 

contractor Comments

Overall project 

management

Design and 

supervision Construction

Priority contract

(August 2005)

PT Wijaya Karya (WIKA)

Contract scoped to design and 

construct 3 miles of road

Contract modified: 23 miles of 

road construction added.

Contract partially terminated: 8 

miles of road construction 

removed.

N/A 3 miles

(design)

a 3 miles

15 miles

Design and supervision contract

(November 2005)

Parsons Global Services 

Contract awarded to design 88 

miles of road and supervise 

construction of 91 miles of road.

N/A 88 miles

(design)

a

91 miles

(supervision)

N/A

USAID Project Manager contract

(April 2006)

Personal services contractor

Contract awarded to provide 

overall project management.

91 miles

Prime contract

(June 2007)

SsangYong-Hutama Joint 

Association

Contract awarded to construct 65 

miles of road.

N/A N/A 65 miles

8-mile contract

(September 2010)

SsangYong Engineering & 

Construction

Contract awarded to construct 8 

miles of road that were removed 

from the priority contract.

N/A N/A 8 miles

Total 91 miles 91 miles 91 miles
 

Page 12 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Figure 4: Indonesia Road Sections, Key Features, and Funding Levels for Three 

Construction Contractors

Figure 5 shows a timeline of events related to the five contracts.
 

Page 13 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Figure 5: Timeline of Events Related to USAID’s Five Major Contracts for Indonesia Road
 

Page 14 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Factors related to contractors’ performance delayed USAID’s progress in 

designing and constructing the road and led to increased costs.

• Priority construction contractor. Lack of acceptable progress by 

the priority contractor resulted in USAID’s reducing the scope of the 

work, partially terminating the contract, and hiring a third construction 

contractor to complete the unfinished work. According to USAID, the 

mission determined that WIKA was not making satisfactory progress, 

owing in part to financial constraints and lack of equipment as well as 

WIKA’s changing its project leader three times. WIKA’s limited 

progress was primarily evident in one of the sections that comprised 

the priority contract. By May 2008, this 8-mile section was about 20 

percent complete compared with other sections that were 

approximately 50 percent to 90 percent complete. Work in this section 

lagged in all areas of production including earthwork, concrete 

placement, and bridge and culvert construction. As a result, USAID 

eliminated this section from the scope of the priority contract through 

a termination action. USAID’s decision to eliminate this section from 

the priority contract enabled WIKA to concentrate resources on 

remaining sections and continue making progress. USAID later 

awarded the 8-mile section to another contractor, SsangYong. 

However, because of the lengthy processes involved in terminating its 

contract with WIKA and procuring a new contract, USAID did not 

award its contract with SsangYong until September 2010.

• Prime construction contractor. Slower-than-expected progress, as 

well as the correction of work that did not comply with specifications, 

contributed to delays in the prime contractor’s completion of the 65 

miles of road construction. In addition, SsangYong-Hutama’s project 

leader was changed five times, according to USAID, which may also 

have contributed to the contractor’s repeatedly missing key schedule 

milestones.

In addition, several local factors affected construction progress and costs.

• Delays in land acquisition. According to USAID, the Indonesian 

government had difficulty acquiring over 4,000 parcels of land needed 

for the new road alignment and right-of-way. The land was needed 

because, in many areas, the tsunami had changed the entire 

landscape such that parts of the road alignment, as it existed prior to 

the tsunami, were now underwater or otherwise inaccessible or 

unusable. In its efforts to acquire the land parcels, the Indonesian 

government experienced delays in determining ownership and 

locating owners because many owners had died in the tsunami. Also, 

Several Factors Delayed 

Completion of Road 

Construction 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

in some instances, ownership documents, which were the only 

existing ownership records, were destroyed by the tsunami. Delays 

also occurred because, in some instances, the land parcels that were 

acquired were not contiguous and, as a result, construction 

contractors did not have a sufficient amount of land on which to 

initiate construction and store equipment and materials. For example, 

initiation of work to construct the priority 3-mile segment was delayed 

for approximately a year because the Indonesian government had 

acquired less than a quarter mile of right-of-way, significantly less land 

than USAID had expected to be available.

• Community opposition. Community opposition to the new road 

alignment resulted in delays, according to USAID. For example, 

construction was delayed because of disagreement between the 

Indonesian government and individuals and communities about the 

prices for land parcels. Also, for example, the proposed new 

alignment involved laying pavement over more than 600 gravesites. 

Upon learning that gravesites would be affected, some individuals and 

communities erected roadblocks and conducted demonstrations in 

opposition. To resolve the situation, Indonesian government officials, 

with USAID coordination assistance, had to negotiate settlements and 

identify and acquire new sites for the graves.

• Security problems. According to USAID, delays occurred because of 

security concerns and violence. For example, security threats caused 

delays in areas with a 30-year history of civil conflict between an 

insurgency group and the Indonesian government. Also, delays 

occurred when contractors received security threats, equipment was 

intentionally damaged, and workers were assaulted in land-value 

disputes. Figure 6 shows examples of community opposition that 

involved community protests, in some cases resulting in damage to 

contractor equipment.
 

Page 16 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Figure 6: Community Opposition to Indonesia Road Realignment, Involving 

Protests and Burned Equipment 

• Flooding. During construction, delays resulted from flooding, caused 

by unusually heavy rains that destroyed temporary access to 

construction sites and to construction facilities where materials and 

equipment were located. In some instances, according to USAID, 

roads flooded even though drainage culverts had been built according 

to design specifications (see fig. 7). Subsequent to this flooding, the 

contractor corrected inaccurate design assumptions, caused by a lack 

of reliable historical climatological data for the area, and increased the 

capacities of some culverts.
 

Page 17 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Figure 7: Flooding of Road Section Caused by Torrential Rains and Inaccurate 

Design

USAID’s actions to ensure the Indonesia road’s quality included, among 

others, hiring an experienced project manager and requiring 1-year 

warranties for completed road sections. USAID also required that the 

road’s design adhere to established quality standards and required 

inspections of road sections during and after construction. However, as of 

July 2012, USAID had not arranged for final inspections to ensure the 

quality of around 50 miles—about 55 percent—of the completed road that 

are still under warranty.

USAID Took Several 

Actions to Ensure 

Quality of Indonesia 

Road Design and 

Construction but 

Lacks Quality 

Assurance Mechanism 

for Sections Still 

under Warranty
 

Page 18 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

To help ensure the quality of the road’s design and construction, USAID 

established organizational and operational controls by contracting with 

experienced personnel for key management positions and including a 1-

year warranty in each construction contract.

• Project Manager. In April 2006, USAID hired a U.S.-registered 

professional engineer as its Project Manager for the entire road 

construction project. The Project Manager had previous experience 

managing several USAID infrastructure projects overseas as well as 

managing regional operations with a U.S. state’s department of 

transportation. The Project Manager served as the project’s chief 

technical officer and USAID’s principal interface with 

design/construction supervision and construction contractors and 

Indonesian government officials.

• Design and supervision. Approximately 6 months before hiring its 

Project Manager, USAID contracted with Parsons as the project’s 

construction management contractor to complete the design of most 

of the road and manage the supervision of its construction.17

• One-year warranty. USAID included a 1-year warranty period in all of 

its contracts with construction firms. Specifically, for a period of 1 year 

after each road section is completed, the contractor is required to 

correct any poor-quality or faulty work that USAID or Parsons finds 

According to a Parsons official, USAID’s hiring of a single firm to 

complete the design and management of construction supervision 

facilitated communication between design engineers and construction 

supervision staff and promoted quality in construction. USAID 

required that key Parsons design personnel have appropriate 

qualifications. For example, geotechnical, pavement, and structural 

designers were all required to be registered professional engineers 

with a minimum of 5 years experience on projects of a similar scope. 

In addition, USAID required that key Parsons’ staff in Indonesia have 

certain qualifications, such as skills and experience in contract 

administration, inspection, and quality monitoring, to help ensure that 

the work complied with specifications and conformed to standard 

construction practices.

 

17USAID awarded the contract to Parsons in November 2005.

USAID Established 

Organizational and 

Operational Controls to 

Help Ensure Quality
 

Page 19 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

during inspections.18 These sections are not formally turned over to 

the Indonesian government until the contractor completes the 

corrective actions, and contractors are not released from their 

responsibilities until the Indonesian government formally accepts the 

section of road.

To promote quality in the road’s design, USAID required that Parsons 

adhere to established engineering standards.19 These standards define, 

among other things, key parameters such as lane and right-of-way 

widths, pavement structure, curve geometry, and weight-carrying 

capacity. To design pavement and bridge structures that would be 

capable of carrying anticipated vehicle loads, for example, design 

engineers used the widely accepted U.S. standards of the American 

Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) as 

well as regionally and locally applicable Indonesian standards, such as 

those of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Use of AASHTO 

pavement design standards enabled engineers to determine the 

thickness of the road’s layers (aggregate base layers covered with an 

asphalt surface) that would be needed to sustain anticipated traffic 

volumes and vehicle weights over its 10-year design life. In addition, use 

of AASHTO and Indonesian bridge standards allowed engineers to 

determine appropriate structural configurations for bridges in 

consideration of site-specific traffic, thermal, and seismic conditions.20

Parsons also included several safety features in the design—for example, 

guardrails, warning signs, pavement markings, and protected walkways 

on bridges—that contributed to the road’s quality. Figure 8 illustrates 

these features.

 

18Each of the road construction contracts consisted of multiple sections that were 

completed at different times. The warranty period for each of the sections is based on the 

time of its completion. 

19The road’s design was based on a combination of U.S., Asian, and country-specific 

Indonesian standards. 

20USAID also included planting mangrove trees, palms, ferns, and other native species to 

mitigate environmental impact.

USAID Required That 

Road Design Adhere to 

Established Quality 

Standards 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Figure 8: Sections of Completed Indonesia Coastal Road 

During construction, USAID’s Project Manager and Parsons took actions 

to help ensure quality by observing ongoing work, witnessing tests by 

construction contractors, conducting their own inspections, and requiring 

that the contractor correct any deficiencies or substandard work. For 

example, after determining that use of improper materials had resulted in 

the deterioration of approximately 6 miles of paved lanes, USAID directed 

the prime contractor to remove and replace these sections of the road.21

USAID’s Project Manager and Parsons inspected road sections during 

construction, when construction was completed, and when the completed 

sections were handed over to the Indonesian government following the 1-

year warranty period. Key project stakeholders—USAID’s Project 

Manager, Parsons, the construction contractor, and Indonesian 

government officials—attended these inspections. When an inspection 

identified deficiencies, USAID and Parsons ensured that they were 

corrected before the road section was formally turned over to the 

Indonesian government. For example, during our March 2012 visit to 

Parsons’ staff were involved in performing daily quality tests and 

conducting inspections. Parsons provided information to USAID’s Project 

Manager through frequent communication, correspondence, joint site 

reviews, and periodic reporting.

 

21The contractor replaced pavement in either one or both lanes along the road segment 

where USAID identified the use of improper materials.

USAID Provided Quality 

Assurance Oversight 

during and after 

Construction 
 

Page 21 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Aceh Province, Indonesia, we observed one of the construction 

contractors repairing defective pavement that USAID’s Project Manager 

had identified during an inspection near the end of the 1-year warranty for 

the affected section. Figure 9 shows a contractor using a milling machine 

to remove pavement on this section in preparation for corrective repaving.

Figure 9: Milling Machine Removing Faulty Pavement in Indonesia Road
 

Page 22 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

USAID currently lacks the capacity to ensure the quality of several 

sections of recently completed road that are still within the 1-year 

warranty period. Several sections totaling approximately 50 miles in 

length, or about 55 percent of the recently completed road, are currently 

under warranty—about 25 miles with warranties expiring at various times 

through the end of 2012 and about 25 miles with warranties expiring from 

January 2013 through April 2013. Figure 10 shows the locations of road 

sections with unexpired warranties, as of June 2012, and section 

expiration dates.

USAID Lacks Mechanism 

to Ensure Quality of Road 

Sections Still under OneYear Warranty
 

Page 23 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Figure 10: Indonesia Road Sections with Unexpired Warranties, and Section 

Expiration Dates

Note: Distances of road segments comprising 37-mile prime contract section do not add to total due 

to rounding.

USAID officials in Jakarta told us in April 2012 that USAID was 

considering rehiring the former Project Manager on an intermittent basis 

to perform inspections of the approximately 50 miles of road sections 
 

Page 24 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

prior to expiration of the sections’ 1-year warranties. However, as of July

2012, USAID had not yet reached an agreement with the Project 

Manager or made other arrangements to inspect the sections.

To enhance the Indonesia road’s sustainability, USAID designed and 

constructed it to withstand heavy weights, included in the design several 

features intended to minimize environmental impact, and provided 

assistance to the Indonesian Directorate General of Highways (the 

Directorate). However, several factors, such as the Directorate’s limited 

capacity and resources and failure to restrict overweight vehicles, could 

lessen the road’s sustainability during its intended 10-year life 

expectancy.

USAID took several actions intended to enhance the road’s sustainability 

for the intended 10-year life expectancy. For example, in designing and 

constructing the road, USAID anticipated the effects of heavy trucks—the 

most significant factor affecting the rate of pavement deterioration.22

• rock placement, known as armoring, along the shoreline to protect 

road from storm surges;

USAID also included in the road’s design the following features intended 

to enhance sustainability and minimize environmental impact:

• shaped slopes and rock-fall retaining walls in mountainous areas to 

protect the road from damage;

• retainer and drainage systems to protect the road from rock falls and 

prevent flooding;

• concrete lining of drainage channels to prevent erosion;

 

22According to AASHTO design standards, the amount of road deterioration caused by 

one 80,000-pound truck is equivalent to 24,000 cars. USAID’s design contractor 

determined that the road would need to carry trucks weighing up to 100,000 pounds, a 

level that exceeds the 80,000-pound vehicle weight limit on the U.S. Interstate Highway 

System.

USAID Took Actions 

to Enhance Indonesia 

Road’s Sustainability, 

but Several Factors 

Could Decrease Its 

Life Expectancy

USAID Took Numerous 

Actions Intended to 

Enhance Road’s 

Sustainability 
 

Page 25 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

• slope stabilization using Gabion baskets;23

• galvanized steel bridge structures that do not require periodic 

painting.

and

Figure 11 illustrates these features intended to enhance the road’s 

sustainability.

Figure 11: Features Intended to Enhance Sustainability of Indonesia Coastal Road

Note: The slope stabilization shown was not included in USAID’s contract but was done in 

cooperation with the Indonesian government.

In addition, USAID’s Project Manager developed an operations and 

maintenance plan for the Directorate. The plan included recommended 

practices such as establishing road maintenance facilities and placing 

 

23Gabion baskets are rectangular containers fabricated of thick galvanized wire that are 

filled with stone and stacked on one another, usually in tiers that step back with the slope 

rather than vertically.
 

Page 26 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

equipment at three locations to maintain the road, with specific 

maintenance responsibilities for each site. The plan also outlined 

necessary maintenance tasks, such as patching pavement, repairing 

guardrails, and cleaning culverts and drains, and it provided a checklist of 

equipment needed by the Directorate. Further, USAID’s Project Manager 

suggested, among other things, that the Directorate limit the width and 

size of vehicles permitted to pass through narrow mountainous road 

sections. Figure 12 shows a truck passing through a narrow mountainous 

section of road that was repaved.

Figure 12: Truck on Narrow Mountainous Section of Indonesia Coastal Road

USAID also took other actions, such as employing local workers and 

donating used vehicles, that could enhance the road’s sustainability. 

USAID encouraged contractors to employ Indonesian workers from Aceh 

Province during the construction work to enhance local skills and 

experience. For example, construction contractors employed Indonesian 

heavy equipment operators and truck drivers, and Parsons trained

Indonesians to fill several key positions such as Finance Manager and 
 

Page 27 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Public Information/Media Specialist. Also, according to USAID officials, 

after the construction work was completed, USAID and Parsons provided 

the Directorate with used vehicles for use in maintaining the road.

Several factors—the Directorate’s limited capacity and resources, failure 

to restrict overweight vehicles, construction in the road right-of-way, and 

unauthorized access roads—could lessen the road’s sustainability for its 

intended 10-year life expectancy.

• Limited capacity and resources. Although the Directorate has 

provided a 5-year funding plan for the road and taken some actions to 

replace missing guardrails, the Directorate lacks some equipment as 

well as a sufficient number of staff for maintenance and repairs, 

according to USAID and Directorate officials. For example, USAID 

recommended in its checklist that the Directorate keep a jackhammer, 

compressor, and four vibrator rollers at each of three proposed 

maintenance facilities, but as of May 2012, the Directorate had not 

established the maintenance facilities and had not provided the 

equipment. Also, according to Directorate officials in Banda Aceh, the 

Directorate has a limited number of staff to maintain existing roads 

throughout Aceh Province.

• Overweight vehicles. The Directorate has not taken action to restrict 

the use of overweight vehicles on the road, which could reduce the 

road’s life expectancy. USAID’s design of the road with a 10-year life 

expectancy is based on certain assumptions concerning the impact of 

the number and weight of vehicles on the road’s deterioration. For 

example, USAID’s design assumes that the heaviest trucks 

anticipated (100,000-pound, 3-axle trucks) on the road will comprise 

less than 1 percent of total traffic; however, this low volume of heavy 

truck traffic will cause more than 60 percent of the road’s deterioration 

over its 10-year design life. A greater than expected volume of heavy 

truck traffic, or use of the road by trucks that exceed 100,000 pounds, 

will lead to a higher amount of deterioration and reduced life for the 

road. To thwart acceleration of pavement damage resulting from 

overweight vehicles using the road, USAID recommended that the 

Directorate use portable scales to weigh suspected overweight 

vehicles. However, as of May 2012, the Directorate had not taken any 

actions to weigh vehicles. During our March 2012 inspection of the 

road, we observed several heavily loaded trucks but saw no 

permanent weigh stations and saw no vehicles being weighed with 

portable scales.

Several Factors Could 

Affect Road’s 

Sustainability during 

Intended 10-Year Life 

Expectancy 
 

Page 28 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

• Construction in right-of-way. The road’s intended 10-year life 

expectancy is also based on keeping drainage culverts in the right-ofway clear of blockage, according to USAID’s Project Manager. 

However, the Directorate has not taken action to prevent the 

construction of buildings and has not removed existing buildings that 

have been constructed in the right-of-way. Such construction could 

obstruct drainage channels and cause erosion and flooding. 

According to USAID officials, USAID informed the Directorate of 

numerous instances where buildings had been or were being 

constructed in the right-of-way, but as of May 2012, the Indonesian

government had not taken any actions to remove or prevent such 

construction. When we traveled the length of the road in March 2012, 

we observed a completed building that had been constructed in the 

right-of-way over the drainage channel.

• Unauthorized access roads. As of March 2012, according to 

USAID’s Project Manager, the Directorate had not taken action to 

prevent the creation of unauthorized access roads, which also can 

prevent proper drainage and cause erosion and flooding. These 

unauthorized access roads have been constructed by removing 

guardrail or moving soil, rocks, and other materials; in some 

instances, these access roads may obstruct drainage channels and 

cause erosion and flooding. During our March 2012 inspection of the 

road, we saw several access roads that had been built by removing 

guardrails and moving soil and other materials.

Figure 13 shows a building that was constructed in the right-of-way and 

an unauthorized access road where the guardrail was removed.
 

Page 29 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Figure 13: Building Constructed in Right-of-Way (left) and Unauthorized Access 

Road and Removed Guardrail (right)

USAID has completed the construction of a major 91-mile road in a 

coastal area of northern Indonesia that was heavily affected by the 

December 2004 tsunami and, in doing so, has helped to provide an 

opportunity for economic growth in the region. Although USAID 

completed the road construction more than 2 years later than planned, 

the agency finished the work by confronting and overcoming significant 

obstacles while working in a challenging environment. However, despite 

taking several actions to help ensure the road’s quality, USAID currently 

lacks the capacity to ensure that approximately 50 miles of recently 

completed road sections—55 percent of the entire road—still under 

warranty perform as intended through the 1-year warranty period, as 

stipulated in USAID’s contracts with construction firms. Specifically, 

although USAID officials in Jakarta told us that they are considering 

rehiring the Project Manager on an interim contract, the agency has not 

finalized this arrangement. Without qualified personnel inspecting these 

road sections before their warranties expire, USAID cannot ensure that 

the quality standards are met and that the contractor corrects any 

deficiencies as required within the 1-year warranty period.

To help ensure that the road will reach its intended 10-year life 

expectancy, USAID took actions such as designing the road in 

accordance with established standards and supporting the Indonesian 

government’s Directorate for Highways. However, the road may not 

achieve its 10-year life expectancy unless the Indonesian government 

properly maintains the road, restricts usage by overweight vehicles, and 

prevents construction in the road right-of-way and creation of 

unauthorized access roads.

Conclusions 
 

Page 30 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

We recommend that the Administrator of USAID take the following two 

actions:

• To help ensure that recently completed sections of the Indonesia road 

meet quality standards as required during the 1-year warranty period, 

ensure that the road sections are inspected in a timely manner and, if 

deficiencies are found, require that the construction contractor repair 

the sections before they are formally turned over to the Indonesian 

government.

• To help ensure that the constructed road remains sustainable for 10 

years as intended, direct the USAID Mission in Indonesia to work with 

the Indonesian government to develop and implement a process 

addressing factors that could affect the road’s sustainability.

We provided a draft of this report, as well as a video of our March 2012 

inspection of the road, to USAID and State for their review. USAID 

provided written comments about the draft report, which are reprinted in

appendix II, and provided technical comments about the draft report and 

the video that we incorporated as appropriate. State did not provide 

comments on either the draft report or the video. 

In its written comments, USAID stated that our report presented an 

accurate assessment of its construction operations and its efforts to 

ensure the road’s quality and sustainability. In addition, USAID concurred 

with our recommendation that it ensure that road sections still under 

warranty are inspected in a timely manner and that it require the 

contractor to repair any defective sections. The agency stated that it will 

retain qualified personnel who can perform inspections before the 

warranties expire. USAID concurred with the intent of our 

recommendation that, to help ensure the road’s sustainability for the 

intended 10 years, it should work with the Indonesian government to 

develop and implement a process addressing factors that could affect the 

road’s sustainability. USAID noted that many of the factors that could 

affect the road’s sustainability are outside the agency’s managerial 

control and that, apart from the road sections still under warranty, the 

road is under the Indonesian government’s administration. USAID 

indicated that any additional technical assistance it might offer the 

Indonesian government would be contingent on the government’s 

receptiveness as well as the availability of USAID resources. We maintain 

that it is essential that USAID work proactively with the Indonesian 

government to develop and implement a process that addresses certain 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 31 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

factors, such as the use of overweight vehicles, construction in the rightof-way, and the creation of unauthorized access roads, that could affect 

the road’s sustainability.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator. We will 

also provide copies to others on request. In addition, the report is 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix III.

David Gootnick

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 32 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

We reviewed the 91-mile road constructed by the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) in Aceh Province, Indonesia, 

following the December 2004 tsunami. This is the third report we have 

conducted on USAID’s post-tsunami reconstruction efforts. Our objectives 

in this report were to (1) describe USAID’s road construction operations 

as well as factors that delayed the road’s completion, (2) assess USAID 

efforts to ensure the road’s quality, and (3) examine factors that could 

affect the road’s sustainability.

To determine the status and funding of USAID’s road reconstruction 

activities in Aceh Province, Indonesia, we reviewed documents and 

interviewed officials from USAID’s Bureau for Asia and the Near East and 

the Department of State’s (State) Office of Foreign Assistance Resources 

in Washington, D.C.; and USAID’s Office of Financial Management at its 

mission in Jakarta, Indonesia. We obtained information from USAID 

officials on internal controls for collection of data, reviewed consolidated 

reports and mission-specific reports, and interviewed cognizant officials at 

USAID and State about data reliability. In addition, we interviewed 

knowledgeable USAID officials about the systems and methodology they 

use to verify the completeness and accuracy of the data. We determined 

that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.

To assess the reliability of USAID and State funding and expenditure 

data, we reviewed USAID Office of the Inspector General and previous 

GAO reports on USAID disaster reconstruction programs and funding 

since 2002; we found that none of these sources noted any discrepancies 

or concerns about the reliability of USAID’s data. Based on our 

comparison of data generated from various USAID and State sources, we 

found that the sources generally corroborated each other. We determined 

that USAID and State funding and expenditure data were sufficiently 

reliable for our report.

To assess the quality, construction features, and sustainability of the road 

construction, we traveled the full 91-mile length of the road from Banda 

Aceh to Calang, Indonesia, with USAID’s Project Manager for the road 

construction project. We also traveled the road from Calang to Meulaboh, 

Indonesia, for comparative purposes. During our trip between Banda 

Aceh and Calang, we photographed and recorded video of several road 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 33 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

construction features and activities, and recorded testimony1

To identify obstacles that USAID encountered, we examined USAID 

Office of Inspector General and State reports which provide information 

on construction status as well as summarize major construction 

accomplishments and challenges. In Jakarta, Indonesia, we met with 

representatives from the Directorate. We also reviewed USAID road 

construction files to better understand the obstacles that led to delays and 

cost increases; this review included reviewing status reports, contracts, 

and correspondence.

from 

USAID’s Project Manager on construction features, obstacles, 

challenges, quality, and potential impediments to sustainability. In Banda 

Aceh, we met with representatives from the Indonesian Directorate 

General of Highways (the Directorate), which is responsible for 

maintaining the road. To better understand construction, quality, potential 

obstacles to sustainability, and general construction challenges, we met 

with representatives of both SsangYong and Hutama, the two firms that 

constitute the SsangYong-Hutama Joint Association.

To examine the extent to which USAID ensured quality, we reviewed 

USAID road construction contracts and met with USAID’s Project 

Manager to discuss oversight procedures. We also discussed USAID’s 

road quality inspections and procedures for ensuring that construction 

contractors make repairs to damaged sections of road within the 1-year 

warranty period, as required. Members of our staff, including a U.S.-

registered professional engineer, traveled the road and examined road 

quality through direct observation of road conditions, construction 

features, and repair work being performed.

To examine the extent to which USAID helped ensure sustainability, we 

examined road operations and maintenance plans developed by USAID 

for the Directorate, which included practices that the USAID Project 

Manager recommended that the Directorate adopt and implement. We 

also examined the checklist of equipment developed by USAID’s Project 

Manager and needed by the Directorate to maintain the road. Members of 

our staff, including a U.S.-registered professional engineer, made direct 

 

1

View a video of our March 2012 inspection of the road. 

http://www.gao.gov/multimedia/video#video_id=592299. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

observations of road features that were designed and constructed for 

road sustainability.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to July 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 35 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Note: GAO received 

USAID’s letter on July 9, 

2012.
Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 36 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance
Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 37 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance
Appendix III: GAO Contact and 

Staff Acknowledgments

Page 38 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Emil Friberg, Jr. (Assistant 

Director), Michael Armes (Assistant Director, registered Professional 

Engineer), Ryan Barlow, Mason Calhoun, Reid Lowe, and George Taylor 

made key contributions to this report. Ashley Alley, Martin De Alteriis,

Theresa Perkins, Jeremy Sebest, Jena Sinkfield, and Cynthia Taylor

provided technical assistance.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
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Page 39 GAO-12-728 Foreign Assistance

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