This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0584

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Julian Sanchez-Sanchez, 

Appellant.

Filed April 27, 2015

Affirmed

Smith, Judge

Concurring specially, Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-13-9468

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Public Defender, Peter W. Gorman, Assistant Public 

Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and 

Smith, Judge. 
2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

SMITH, Judge

We affirm appellant’s sentence because the greater-than-double upward durational 

departure is supported by severe aggravating circumstances based on the facts admitted 

and evidence in the record.

FACTS

After a lengthy FBI investigation into a methamphetamine distribution network, 

the state charged appellant Julian Sanchez-Sanchez with conspiracy to commit a firstdegree controlled substance crime. Sanchez-Sanchez pleaded guilty to the charge and 

admitted his participation in the conspiracy.

The state gave notice that it intended to seek an upward sentencing departure 

because the offense was a major controlled substance offense, a large number of people 

were put at risk by the offense, and the offense involved three or more active participants. 

Sanchez-Sanchez waived his right to a sentencing jury.

At a court sentencing trial, the district court concluded that three reasons existed 

for an upward departure and made corresponding factual findings. First, the district court 

found that the offense was a major controlled substance offense because SanchezSanchez occupied a high-level position within the distribution network and a high degree 

of sophistication and planning was involved. Second, the district court found that the 

offense involved three or more active participants because the conspiracy involved at 

least 20 people and a “significant number” were active participants. And third, the 

district court found that a large number of people were put at risk by the offense because 
3

methamphetamine is a “particularly dangerous” neurotoxin and the conspiracy was 

distributing the drug in vast amounts. After giving consideration to mitigating factors as 

well, the district court sentenced Sanchez-Sanchez to 240 months’ incarceration, an 

upward durational departure of 279% from the 86-month guidelines sentence.

D E C I S I O N

Sanchez-Sanchez argues that the district court erred in its decision to depart 

upwardly from a guidelines sentence for five reasons. We review an upward departure 

from a guidelines sentence for an abuse of discretion. Tucker v. State, 799 N.W.2d 583, 

585-86 (Minn. 2011). The district court may only depart upwardly from a guidelines 

sentence if “substantial and compelling circumstances based on aggravating factors” are 

present. Dillon v. State, 781 N.W.2d 588, 595 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted), 

review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). To impose a sentence that is more than double the 

guidelines sentence, there must be severe aggravating circumstances. Id. at 596. We 

review de novo “whether a valid reason to depart exists” and whether a departure 

reason’s severity justifies a sentence that is more than double the presumptive sentence. 

Id. at 598. An upward departure will be reversed if the reasons for departing are 

“improper or inadequate” or the record does not support the reasons. Tucker, 799 

N.W.2d at 586 (quotation omitted).

A.

Sanchez-Sanchez argues that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing

him to 240 months when his codefendants received shorter sentences. The guidelines are 

designed to impose proportionate sentences because “convicted felons similar with 
4

respect to relevant sentencing criteria ought to receive similar sanctions.” Minn. Sent. 

Guidelines 1 (Supp. 2011). While we acknowledge that many of Sanchez-Sanchez’s 

codefendants received shorter sentences, the district court did not impose a 

disproportionate sentence or abuse its discretion. First, only one codefendant alleged to 

be at the top level of the conspiracy had been sentenced at the time, and he received the 

statutory maximum sentence. State v. Ayala-Leyva, 848 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Minn. App. 

2014) (reversing the sentence because the sentencing jury did not make proper factual 

findings), review granted (Minn. Aug. 5, 2014). Moreover, the sentencing criteria were 

not the same due to variations in criminal history scores, mitigating and aggravating

factors, and plea agreements. The district court appropriately considered factors that may 

not have been present for the codefendants, including Sanchez-Sanchez’s position in the 

hierarchy of the conspiracy and his role in facilitating the interstate movement of drugs 

and money. See State v. Starnes, 396 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn. App. 1986) (“A defendant 

is not entitled to a reduction in his sentence merely because a co-defendant or accomplice 

has . . . received a lesser sentence.”).

B.

Next, Sanchez-Sanchez contends that the district court failed to make factual 

findings in support of its stated departure reasons. We have held that aggravating factors 

must be supported by adequate factual findings. Id. at 557-58. For example, if the 

district court departs because the crime is a “major controlled substance crime,” it must 

specifically name which of the required circumstances existed. Id. at 558. Here, the 

district court departed for a major controlled substance offense and made corresponding 
5

findings that Sanchez-Sanchez occupied “a high position within the conspiracy” and that 

the offense “involved a high degree of sophistication and planning.” See Minn. Sent. 

Guidelines 2.D.2.b.5.e-f (Supp. 2011). The district court properly named two specific 

circumstances as required by the guidelines. In addition, the district court found that the 

crime involved “at least . . . 20 people” and that “a significant number of those persons” 

were active participants to support departing for a conspiracy with three or more active 

participants. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.2.b.10 (Supp. 2011). Finally, the district 

court found that the drugs involved were “particularly dangerous” neurotoxins and that 

the amounts at issue put “many thousands of people in danger” to support departing on 

the basis of the number of people at risk. See State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 230 (Minn. 

1995) (including conduct that “put a number of people at risk” among reasons to justify 

departure). Therefore, each departure reason is supported by sufficient factual findings.

C.

Sanchez-Sanchez also argues that the district court’s decision “was based 

exclusively upon hearsay.” Because Sanchez-Sanchez did not object at trial on the basis 

of hearsay, we review for plain error. See State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 

1998). To grant relief, “there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects 

substantial rights.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). An error is plain 

“when it contravenes a rule, case law, or a standard of conduct, or when it disregards 

well-established and longstanding legal principles.” State v. Brown, 792 N.W.2d 815, 

823 (Minn. 2011). An error affects substantial rights if “there is a reasonable likelihood 

that the error substantially affected the verdict.” Id. at 824 (quotation omitted).
6

The rules of evidence do not apply at a sentencing proceeding without a jury.1 

Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3). Indeed, district courts routinely consider presentence 

investigation reports and victim-impact statements, both of which generally include 

hearsay statements, before making a sentencing decision. See, e.g., State v. Alexander, 

855 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2014) (presentence investigation report); Wells v. 

State, 839 N.W.2d 775, 777 (Minn. App. 2013) (victim-impact statement), review denied

(Minn. Feb. 18, 2014). Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err by admitting 

hearsay testimony.

D.

Next, Sanchez-Sanchez contends that the district court’s reasons for departing are 

inconsistent with the law. Because the guidelines and caselaw permit the district court to 

consider each of the stated departure reasons, this argument fails.

Sanchez-Sanchez cites State v. McIntosh, 641 N.W.2d 3, 11-12 (Minn. 2002), in 

support of the contention that the “major controlled substance crime” factor 

impermissibly duplicates the offense’s Category 9 ranking in the guidelines. However, 

McIntosh merely cautions that the factor “could . . . implicate” the quantity of drugs 

required to commit the offense. 641 N.W.2d at 11. In this case, the district court appears 

to have relied not on the quantity of drugs but on evidence demonstrating that Sanchez-

 

1 Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3) excludes application of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence 

from “proceedings.” But, under Blakely v. Washington, a jury trial is required to 

determine if aggravating factors are present. 542 U.S. 296, 313-14, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 

2543 (2004). The Minnesota Supreme Court held in State v. Rodriguez that the 

Minnesota Rules of Evidence apply in a jury determination of aggravating factors. 754 

N.W.2d 672, 683-84 (Minn. 2008). In this case, however, Sanchez-Sanchez waived his 

right to a jury determination.
7

Sanchez orchestrated sophisticated transportation methods to move drugs from California 

to Minnesota and rented a house for sale and storage of drugs as opposed to operating as 

a street-level dealer.

Next, Sanchez-Sanchez contends that “there is no direct evidence” tying him to 

the sophisticated planning of the conspiracy because he was living in California, while 

the street-level drug transactions were taking place in Minnesota. But there is ample 

direct evidence. Sanchez-Sanchez admitted that he was part of the conspiracy and that he 

rented the house and knew that it was being used to sell and store drugs, and the recorded 

conversations indicate that he orchestrated transportation of the drugs that originated in 

California. Furthermore, the FBI agent testified that Sanchez-Sanchez arranged 

transportation that used sophisticated concealment techniques. The fact that SanchezSanchez was in California did not hinder his ability to actively participate in the planning 

and logistics of the conspiracy.

Sanchez-Sanchez also argues that it was inappropriate to consider the “three or 

more persons” factor because the crime charged required two or more persons. However, 

we have concluded that this factor is not duplicative of an element of conspiracy because 

it requires at least one additional person. See Ayala-Leyva, 848 N.W.2d at 558. 

Sanchez-Sanchez also asserts that the number of people put at risk is an improper 

factor because it is not listed in the sentencing guidelines. The sentencing guidelines 

clearly state that they provide a nonexclusive list of factors. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 

2.D.2 (Supp. 2011). Moreover, the supreme court has applied this factor in other cases. 

See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 607 (Minn. 2009); State v. Ford, 539 
8

N.W.2d 214, 230 (Minn. 1995). It was not improper for the district court to consider this 

factor.

E.

Finally, Sanchez-Sanchez alleges that the district court judge implied that “the 

sentencing decision was not his, but lay elsewhere.” The departure from a guidelines 

sentence “is an exercise of judicial discretion constrained by case law and appellate 

review.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D (Supp. 2011).

At sentencing, the district court judge said:

The decisions that you made Mr. Sanchez-Sanchez to 

participate in this conspiracy, to the extent that you did, those 

were the things that have put you where you are today, and 

they will place you where you will go for the next few years. 

Not my decision, I want you to understand that.

The district court’s statement explains that its sentencing decision was based on SanchezSanchez’s participation in the charged crime, not the judge’s whims. The district court 

did not fail to exercise proper discretion.

Affirmed.
CS-1

RODENBERG, Judge (concurring specially)

I concur in affirming appellant’s sentence and see no abuse of the district court’s 

discretion in sentencing on this record, but I write separately to observe that the 

compression of a wide variety of dissimilar criminal activity into the definition of 

controlled substance crime in the first degree under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) 

(2014),2necessarily results in outcomes at odds with the stated purpose of the Minnesota 

Sentencing Guidelines. 

“The purpose of the [Minnesota] Sentencing Guidelines is to establish rational and 

consistent sentencing standards that reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that the 

sanctions imposed for felony convictions are proportional to the severity of the 

conviction offense and the offender’s criminal history.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.A. 

(2014).3The presumptive guidelines sentence is determined by a grid that lists the 

offense of conviction on the vertical axis and the offender’s criminal history on the 

horizontal axis. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2, 4.A (2014). Offense severity is determined 

by the statutory definition of the conviction offense, and increases with the seriousness of 

the offense, as determined by the offense ranks established in the sentencing guidelines. 

See State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 359 n.2 (Minn. 2008); see also Minn. Sent. 

Guidelines 5 (2014). 

 

2

The current statute proscribing drug sale crimes is identical to the statute in effect at the 

time of the offense.

3

 Although the offense dates in this case span 2010 to 2013, the most current sentencing 

guidelines are referenced because the guidelines have not changed substantially. 
CS-2

“As a general rule, the guidelines contemplate that offenders with similar criminal 

backgrounds who are convicted of similar crimes receive similar sentences; and offenders 

with more extensive criminal records who commit the most serious and violent offenses 

receive the greater sentences.” Taylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d 584, 586 (Minn. 2003).

First-degree controlled substance crime is defined as a severity level 9 offense under the 

guidelines. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 5 (2014). While appellant pleaded guilty to having 

occupied a central role in a massive methamphetamine-distribution conspiracy, he had a 

zero criminal history score at sentencing. With a zero criminal history score, this offense 

has a presumptive sentencing range of 74 to103 months, with 86 months as the 

presumptive sentence in the middle of this range. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A; see 

Jackson, 749 N.W.2d at 359 n.2 (“All three numbers in any given cell constitute an 

acceptable sentence based solely on the offense at issue and the offender’s criminal 

history score—the lowest is not a downward durational departure, nor is the highest an 

upward departure.”) 

Over the years the range and duration of the numbers in the cells have increased. 

Taylor, 670 N.W.2d at 586-87. In 2005, for example, the legislature “substantially 

broadened the sentencing ranges” to 20% above and 15% below the presumptive middle

sentence. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d at 360. The purpose of this change “was to reduce 

aggravated durational departures.” Id. The underlying purpose of the guidelines “will 

not be served if the trial courts generally fail to apply the presumptive sentences found in 

the guidelines.” State v. Leja, 684 N.W.2d 442, 448 (Minn. 2004) (quoting State v. 

Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn. 1999)). 
CS-3

The statutory definition of a first-degree controlled substance crime includes all 

sales of methamphetamine occurring within a 90-day period amounting to a total of ten 

grams or more. Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1).4 And “sale” is broadly defined to 

include a wide variety of actions, including to “give away” the drugs. Minn. § 152.01, 

subd. 15a (2014). Therefore, a seller of multiple pounds of methamphetamine for tens of 

thousands of dollars commits the same crime as a drug user who, on multiple occasions 

over a 90-day period, shares ten grams of methamphetamine with other addicts. The 

Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that “typical does not mean minimal” and that 

the “typical offense” may be “more extreme than the minimum conduct required to 

violate the applicable statute.” Leja, 684 N.W.2d at 450. But the broad range of conduct

included within the definition of a first-degree controlled substance sale crime 

undermines the goal of proportionality that is the foundation of the guidelines: the 

presumptive guidelines sentencing range for an offender with no criminal history is the 

same for one who sells multiple pounds of methamphetamine over several years, and 

another who over a 90-day period shares ten grams of methamphetamine with others. 

That the statutory definition has compressed dissimilar behaviors into a single 

defined criminal offense is evidenced not only by the range of sentences given to actors 

in the methamphetamine-distribution network of which appellant was a part, but also by 

the large number of departures from the presumed guidelines range in other first-degree 

cases. Even after the guidelines ranges were increased in 2005, the departure rates for 

 

4

This concurrence refers to methamphetamine because it is the drug at issue in this 

appeal. The same analysis, however, would apply to cocaine or heroin. Minn. Stat. 

§ 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2014). 
CS-4

drug crimes suggest that there is no typical first-degree controlled substance sale crime. 

For example, there is a high departure rate among defendants convicted of first-degree 

controlled substance offenses, with 36% receiving the presumptive sentence, 34% 

receiving a mitigated durational departure, and 30% receiving a mitigated dispositional 

departure. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Report to the Legislature, 

January 15, 2015, available at http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/ Figures 11 at pg. 19,

and 12 at pg. 20. Some, as in the case now before us on appeal, are aggravated durational 

departures.5Less than half of all first- and second-degree drug offenders receive a 

presumptive sentence under the guidelines. Id., Figure 13. This rate of departure does 

not indicate any error by the district judge in this case. Nor does it indicate any error by 

the judges who have imposed mitigated dispositional and durational departures in other 

first-degree cases. What it strongly indicates is that the definition of first-degree 

controlled substance offense includes a wide array of fundamentally different criminal 

behaviors.

The current weight-based classification scheme for controlled substance offenses 

was adopted in 1986 and 1989. See Beverly J. Wolfe, Constitutional and Policy 

Concerns Pertaining to Weight-Based Statutory Classifications for Minnesota Controlled 

Substance Offenses, 15 Hamline J. Publ. L. & Pol’y 81, 83-84 (1994). Since these 

weights were adopted, there have been conversations about lowering the severity level of 

various drug offenses under the sentencing guidelines. See John Stuart and Robert 

 

5

There can be no aggravated dispositional departure for first-degree offenses, as the 

guidelines sentence is an executed sentence for all criminal history scores.
CS-5

Sykora, Minnesota’s Failed Experience with Sentencing Guidelines and the Future of 

Evidence-Based Sentencing, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 426, 438-443 (2011) (discussing, 

generally, failed efforts to lower the levels for controlled substance possession offenses 

or re-rank controlled substance offenses). But, as demonstrated by this case and others 

involving this same methamphetamine-distribution conspiracy, not all first-degree 

controlled substance crimes should be ranked lower than a severity-level 9. See State v. 

Ayala-Leyva, 848 N.W.2d 546 (Minn. App. 2014) (reversing and remanding 360-month 

sentence, a greater-than-quadruple upward departure from presumptive 86-month 

sentence for first-degree controlled substance crime, with instructions concerning a 

greater-than-double durational departure), review granted on other grounds (Minn. 

Aug. 5, 2014); State v. Hernandez-Espinoza, A13-1081, 2014 WL 2441129 (Minn. App. 

June 2, 2014) (affirming 172-month sentence, a double-upward departure from the 

presumptive sentence), review denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2014); State v. Lopez-Martinez, 

A13-0253, 2014 WL 902662 (Minn. App. Mar. 10, 2014) (affirming 172-month 

sentence, a double-upward departure from the presumptive sentence), review denied 

(Minn. May 20, 2014). 

If the legislature wishes to promote the stated purposes of the guidelines of 

reducing sentencing disparity and ensuring that sentences are proportional, perhaps a 

statutory framework similar to the theft statutes should be considered. There is a broad 

range of behavior that constitutes “theft,” but available sentences for theft offenses range

from misdemeanors to 20-year felonies. See Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2 (2014) 

(defining variety of acts constituting theft). Most of the differences between levels of 
CS-6

offenses are based on the value of the property taken. See id., subd. 3 (2014). But the 

legislature also has included a number of other factors bearing on the severity of the 

offense, including whether the property was taken from public funds, from a grave or 

coffin, from a motor vehicle, or from a building after a civil disaster. See id. The 

legislature also has separated identity theft as a specific type of theft that is punishable 

based on consideration of the number of victims and the total of direct and indirect 

monetary loss. Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subds. 1, 3 (2014). The legislature’s careful 

identification of specific attributes of theft offenses as distinguishing one from another 

for sentencing purposes results in theft offenses under the sentencing guidelines ranging 

from severity level 1 (theft from an abandoned building, for example) to severity level 8 

(identity theft). Minn. Sent. Guidelines 5.A. In theft cases, a sentencing judge has little 

occasion to depart from the sentencing guidelines as the definition of the crime of 

conviction is narrowly tailored to the minimum conduct proscribed.

District court judges have considerable discretion in sentencing, but may depart 

from the sentencing guidelines only when substantial and compelling reasons for 

departure are shown. See, e.g., Taylor, 670 N.W.2d at 587. We review sentencing 

departures for abuse of discretion. State v. Geller, 665 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Minn. 2003). 

If the reasons for an upward departure are legally permissible and supported by the 

record, we will affirm the departure. State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. 

2009). Because the district court has broad discretion in sentencing, “we generally will 

not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.” State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 

(Minn. 1981) (noting that it is a rare case wherein reversal of a refusal to depart from the 
CS-7

presumptive guidelines sentence is warranted because, even when substantial and 

compelling circumstances are present, the district court has discretion). 

Here, applying this deferential standard of review, the majority correctly 

determines that the district court did not err in its findings, nor did it abuse its discretion, 

in sentencing appellant as it did. But, as appellant rightly notes, the resulting sentence is

inconsistent with other first-degree controlled substance crime offenders, including some 

others prosecuted in this conspiracy who received less severe sentences for criminal 

conduct apparently as serious, and perhaps more serious, than appellant’s conduct. This 

is at odds with the principal purpose of the sentencing guidelines, which is to achieve 

consistent sentences for the same offenses committed by similarly situated offenders. As 

long as the definition of first-degree drug crimes includes significantly different criminal 

behavior, there will be departures from the guidelines by judges properly exercising their 

judicial discretion. But the resulting sentences will not conform to the ideals expressed 

by the sentencing guidelines.