COMBATING NUCLEAR 

SMUGGLING

DHS has Developed Plans 

for Its Global Nuclear 

Detection Architecture, but 

Challenges Remain in 

Deploying Equipment

Statement of David C. Maurer, Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice, and

Gene Aloise, Director, 

Natural Resources and Environment

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Security 

Technologies, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, July 26, 2012

GAO-12-941T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 

Page 1 GAO-12-941T 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the efforts of the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) 

to develop and deploy a global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA)—

an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction 

activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. 

border, and inside the United States—and to provide an update on the 

deployment of radiation detection equipment at U.S. borders. Preventing 

terrorists from using nuclear or radiological material to carry out an attack 

in the United States is a top national priority. DNDO is charged with, 

among other things, enhancing and coordinating the nuclear detection 

efforts of federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the private 

sector to ensure a managed, coordinated response.1

Even before DNDO’s inception in 2005, we were highlighting the need for 

a more comprehensive strategy for nuclear detection. In 2002, we 

reported on the need for a comprehensive plan for installing radiation 

detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors, at all U.S. border 

crossings and ports of entry.

Among other things, 

DNDO is required to coordinate with other federal agencies to develop an 

enhanced GNDA. It is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and 

deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and 

other federal agencies. While federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling 

have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and 

land border crossings, DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection 

strategies along other potential pathways in the architecture, including (1) 

land border areas between ports of entry into the United States, (2) 

international general aviation, and (3) small maritime craft, such as 

recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels.

2

 

1

National Security Presidential Directive 43 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14, 

Domestic Nuclear Detection, April 15, 2005. DNDO was established in statute by the 

Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port) Act, Pub. L. No. 109-

347, § 501, 120 Stat. 1884, 1932 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 591).

In July 2008, we testified that DNDO had 

not developed an overarching strategic plan to guide the development of 

a more comprehensive GNDA, and we recommended that DHS 

coordinate with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State to 

2

GAO, Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment, 

GAO-03-235T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2002). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-941T 

develop one.3 DHS agreed with our recommendation. In January 2009, 

we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a 

strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection 

strategy to help ensure the success of initiatives aimed at closing 

vulnerabilities in the United States.4

As we will discuss today, DHS has made meaningful progress in 

deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. border crossings and 

seaports; however, as deployed portal monitors begin to reach the end of 

their expected service lives, DHS will soon need to make decisions about 

whether to refurbish or replace them. DHS has also made progress in 

developing key planning documents to guide the GNDA. This testimony 

discusses: (1) DHS’s efforts to complete the deployment of radiation 

detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the 

United States at ports of entry, (2) observations from our past work that 

may help DHS as it considers options for deploying new technologies to 

refurbish or replace existing portal monitors when they reach the end of 

their expected service lives, and (3) our assessment of the extent to 

which DHS has addressed our prior recommendations.

We stated that this plan should focus 

on, among other things, establishing time frames and costs for the areas 

DNDO had identified—land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, 

and small maritime craft. DHS did not comment on this recommendation 

but noted that it aligned with DNDO’s past, present, and future actions. 

The status of these recommendations is discussed later in this testimony.

This testimony is primarily based on our prior work on federal efforts to 

detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, 

issued from October 2002 through July 2011. We have updated our prior 

work in this testimony to reflect DHS’s continuing efforts to deploy 

radiation detection equipment. To do so, we met with DHS, DNDO, and 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials and reviewed DHS 

documents including the GNDA strategic plan, the 2011 GNDA Joint 

Annual Interagency Review, and the GNDA implementation plan issued in 

April 2012. As part of our update, we asked for, and DHS provided, a 

 

3

GAO, Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office’s Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, GAO-08-999T 

(Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2008). 

4

GAO, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to 

Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities, GAO-09-257 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2009). 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-941T 

classified briefing that compared the GNDA capabilities with the expected 

capabilities of adversaries who may wish to smuggle nuclear material into 

the United States. Details on the scope and methodology for our prior 

reviews are available in our published reports. We conducted this work in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

In summary, over the past 10 years, DHS has made significant progress 

in deploying radiation detection equipment to scan for nuclear or 

radiological materials in nearly all trucks and containerized cargo coming 

into the United Stated through seaports and border crossings. However, 

challenges remain for the agency in developing a similar scanning 

capability for railcars entering this country from Canada and Mexico, as

well as for international air cargo and international commercial aviation. 

As portal monitors approach the end of their expected service lives, 

observations from our past work may help DHS as it considers options to 

refurbish or replace such monitors. Among other things, we have 

previously reported that DHS should (1) test new equipment rigorously 

prior to acquisition and deployment, (2) obtain the full concurrence of the 

end user to ensure that new equipment meets operational needs, and (3) 

conduct a cost-benefit analysis to inform any acquisition decisions. In our 

past work on the GNDA, we recommended that DHS develop an 

overarching strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA, as well 

as a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection 

strategy. DHS took action on these recommendations and, in December 

2010, it issued the interagency GNDA strategic plan.5

 

5

The GNDA strategic plan was an interagency effort jointly developed by the Departments 

of Homeland Security, Energy, Defense, Justice, and State; the intelligence community; 

and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

We reported, in 

July 2011, that the GNDA strategic plan addressed several of the aspects 

of our prior recommendations but did not (1) identify funding necessary to 

achieve plan objectives or (2) employ monitoring mechanisms to 

determine progress and identify needed improvements. In April 2012, 

DHS issued its GNDA implementation plan, which addresses the 

remaining aspects of our recommendations by identifying funding 

dedicated to plan objectives and employing monitoring mechanisms to 

assess progress in meeting those objectives. However, in both the GNDA 

strategic plan and the implementation plan, it remains difficult to identify

priorities from among various components of the domestic part of the 

GNDA.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-941T 

Over the past decade, DHS has made significant progress in deploying 

radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo 

and conveyances entering the United States through land and sea ports 

of entry for nuclear and radiological materials, but it has made less 

progress with other pathways. In 2010, we reported that DHS initially 

planned to deploy more than 2,100 portal monitors to U.S. ports of entry. 

Due to funding constraints and challenges in developing new 

technologies, DHS is updating its portal monitor deployment plan by 

reducing the number of portal monitors it planned to deploy and 

increasing its reliance on portable systems. Specifically, according to 

DHS officials, DHS has deployed about 1,465 of the approximately 1,537, 

or 95 percent, of radiation portal monitors that it now plans to deploy; the 

agency expects to complete this deployment by December 2014.6 As we 

reported in 2011, since 2009, DHS has scanned nearly all of the 

containerized cargo and conveyances entering the United States through 

land borders and major seaports for nuclear and radiological materials.7

However, as we reported in 2010 and 2011, DHS has made less progress 

scanning: (1) railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico 

and (2) international air cargo and commercial aviation aircraft, 

passengers, and baggage.8

As we reported in 2011, according to DHS officials, since November 

2009, almost all nonrail land ports of entry have been equipped with one 

or more radiation portal monitors. Of the about 1,465 portal monitors 

deployed, as of July 2012, 917, or about 63 percent, have been deployed 

along the northern and southern borders of the lower 48 states to all but a 

few nonrail ports of entry. According to DHS officials, 100 percent of all 

containerized cargo, conveyances, drivers, and passengers entering the 

United States through commercial lanes at land borders are scanned for 

radiation, as are more than 99 percent of all personally operated vehicles 

 

 

6

Radiation portal monitors are large stationary detectors through which cargo containers 

and vehicles pass as they enter the United States.

7

GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global 

Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain, GAO-11-869T (Washington D.C.: July 

26, 2011).

8

GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not Yet 

Completed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or Closed Identified 

Gaps, GAO-10-883T (Washington D.C.: June 30, 2010) and GAO-11-869T. 

DHS Has Made 

Progress Deploying 

Radiation Detection 

Equipment at Land 

Borders and Major 

Seaports, but 

Challenges Remain

Land Ports of Entry
 

Page 5 GAO-12-941T 

(noncommercial passenger cars and light trucks), drivers, and 

passengers.

According to DHS officials, the department scans nearly all containerized 

cargo entering U.S. seaports for nuclear and radiological materials. 

Specifically, of the about 1,465 portal monitors, DHS has deployed 453, 

or about 31 percent, of radiation portal monitors to major American 

seaports––including the largest seaports accounting for the majority of 

cargo. However, some smaller seaports that receive cargo may not be 

equipped with portal monitors. DHS officials told us they will know how 

many more portal monitors will be deployed to these smaller seaports 

when the agency completes its updated deployment plan in September 

2012. Furthermore, in July 2012, these officials told us that, due to 

increased cargo volume at some major seaports, additional portal 

monitors may be needed to avoid delays in moving cargo through larger 

ports. In such cases, DHS officials told us that they are considering costsharing arrangements with seaport operators, whereby DHS and seaport 

operators would share the cost of additional portal monitor deployments. 

Under such arrangements, DHS would continue to purchase, maintain, 

and operate these additional portal monitors, but the seaport operators 

would share in the cost of deploying them.

As we reported over the last 2 years, DHS has made limited progress 

with regard to radiation scanning of the roughly 4,800 loaded railcars in 

approximately 120 trains entering the United States each day from 

Canada and Mexico through 31 rail ports of entry.9

 

9

Although, most 

international rail crossings have radiography systems to scan the majority 

of cargo, much of the scanning for nuclear and radiological materials that 

takes place at these ports of entry is conducted with portable, handheld 

radioactive isotope identification devices. This scanning is triggered 

when, for example, anomalous readings are detected from imaging scans 

of railcar contents. According to DHS officials, international rail traffic 

represents one of the most difficult challenges for radiation detection 

systems. Specifically, in June 2010, they told us that rail traffic poses 

unique operational challenges due to the length of the trains (up to 2 

miles), the distance required to stop moving trains, and the difficulties in 

separating individual cars for further examination. Furthermore, DHS 

officials told us that rail companies typically own the land where DHS 

GAO-10-883T and GAO-11-869T. 

Seaports

International Rail
 

Page 6 GAO-12-941T 

would need to establish stations for screening, and these companies 

often resist doing things that might slow down rail traffic. Moreover, DHS 

officials told us that an effective solution would require scanning of at 

least some rail traffic on Mexican or Canadian soil, and they said that it 

will take time to develop the close cooperation with officials in Mexico and 

Canada necessary to do so. Accordingly, in 2010, DHS undertook an 

International Rail Threat and Gap Study to determine the most promising 

radiation detection approach. In July 2012, DHS officials said that the 

agency is presently in the final stages of completing a second study 

analyzing technological and operational options. DHS officials told us that 

decisions about additional enhancement of radiation detection capabilities 

at international rail ports of entry are pending the results of this analysis 

and the department’s broader consideration of the needs and priorities of

the GNDA. The second study is due to be completed in September 2012, 

according to DHS officials.

DHS has made less progress scanning air cargo and commercial aviation 

for nuclear and radiological materials. As of July 2012, DHS was 

scanning for nuclear and radiological materials at certain major 

international airports in the United States using some portal monitors. 

CBP also utilizes radioactive isotope identification devices and personal 

radiation detectors to alert the agency to the presence of such materials.

DHS officials told us in June 2010 that they were studying options for 

effectively deploying portal monitors to increase their capacity to scan for 

nuclear and radiological materials in international air cargo conveyed on 

commercial airlines. According to these DHS officials, their experience 

scanning air cargo at a few major international airports in the United 

States has led them to conclude that the deployment of radiation portal 

monitors is not feasible at many locations due to the lack of natural choke 

points, where scanning would take place. Furthermore, these officials 

stated that scanning 100 percent of air cargo would be technically and 

logistically challenging and would require significant investment in 

equipment, staffing, and maintenance resources. Moreover, further DHS 

analysis since June 2010 has shown that there are no procedural or 

operational changes that can easily overcome the logistical and resource 

challenges associated with airports. Until solutions to these challenges 

can be found, DHS officials told us that the scanning for radioactive 

materials that occurs at airports will continue to be conducted primarily 

with handheld detectors where portal monitors are not deployed.

Similarly, DHS does not scan all commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, 

or baggage for radioactive materials with portal monitors. However, 

International Air Cargo and 

Commercial Aviation 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-941T 

passengers are scanned for radioactive materials with radioactive isotope 

identification devices when DHS is alerted to the presence of radiation by 

CBP officers’ personal radiation detectors, and some baggage is scanned 

by radiation portal monitors at selected overseas airports.

As deployed portal monitors reach the end of their expected service lives, 

observations from our past work may help DHS as it considers options for 

deploying new technologies as to whether to refurbish or replace them. 

DHS has been procuring portal monitors for about 10 years, and DHS 

officials estimate that the expected service life of many of these portal 

monitors is about 10 to 20 years. Their service lives can be extended by 

refurbishing their key components but doing so also requires some 

additional investment. In July 2012, DNDO and CBP officials told us they 

are working on a portal monitor replacement strategy that is due to be 

completed in 2013. As DHS considers options to refurbish existing 

systems, or replace them with new systems, observations from our past 

work may help the agency make the most informed decisions, mitigate 

risks, and produce expected outcomes. Specifically, we believe it is 

important that DHS consider the following:

• Taking into account the overall priorities of the domestic side of the 

GNDA before making investments or reinvestments in ports and 

border crossings. Ports and border crossings have received most of 

the investment of radiation detection technologies because these are 

the areas through which a significant amount of cargo must pass, and 

federal law requires certain scanning at seaports.10 However, as 

discussed earlier, other pathways also pose risks. As we reported in 

2011, any additional investment in radiation detection equipment 

needs to be consistent with the highest priority needs of the domestic 

side of the GNDA, including examining and balancing the needs and 

risks of all smuggling pathways into the United States.11 In July 2012, 

DHS officials told us they agreed that further investment in detecting 

radiation in ports and border crossings needs to be consistent with the 

overall needs of the GNDA.

 

106 U.S.C. §921 (2006).

11GAO-11-869T. 

Observations from 

Our Past Work for 

DHS to Consider 

When Replacing 

Portal Monitors
 

Page 8 GAO-12-941T 

• Testing new equipment rigorously prior to acquisition and deployment. 

One of the principal findings of our past work reviewing DNDO’s 

efforts to develop and procure the advanced spectroscopic portal––a 

more advanced radiation portal monitor––was that initial testing was 

not rigorous enough.12

• Obtaining full concurrence of the end user––CBP––to ensure that any 

new equipment meets CBP’s operational needs. Our past work on the 

advanced spectroscopic portal and DNDO efforts to develop a system 

to use radiography to scan cargo for nuclear materials found that 

DNDO did not fully understand (1) how CBP used existing radiation 

detection equipment in a port environment or (2) the extent of the 

space limitations in port environments.

Once the testing became more rigorous, these 

portals did not perform well enough to warrant deployment, and the 

program was subsequently cancelled, after DNDO had spent more 

than $280 million on development and testing costs. Consistent with 

our past recommendations, any investment in new equipment should 

include sufficient and rigorous testing to ensure that any new selected 

equipment performs well enough to meet mission needs. DNDO 

officials told us that DNDO is currently working on a collaborative 

effort with the radiation detection agencies of the European Union to 

test the capabilities of currently available radiation detection 

equipment, including portal monitors, from multiple vendors. This 

testing is part of the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program 

and is not connected to any planned acquisition; instead, it will 

provide performance information on a variety of radiation detection 

equipment. According to DHS officials, the final report from this testing 

is expected in 2013, and DNDO could use the results as part of its 

basis for considering whether to replace currently deployed portal 

monitors with other devices.

13

 

12For further information regarding our work on the advanced spectroscopic portal, see 

GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate 

Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment, 

Consistent with our past 

GAO-07-1247T (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007); and GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing 

of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits of 

the New Technology, GAO-09-655 (Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2009).

13GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Recent Testing Raises Issues About the Potential 

Effectiveness of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, GAO-10-252T 

(Washington D.C.: Nov. 17, 2010) and GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate 

Communication and Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced 

Radiography System to Detect Nuclear Materials, GAO-10-1041T (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 15, 2010).
 

Page 9 GAO-12-941T 

findings, decisions to rehabilitate or replace currently deployed portal 

monitors need to be made with the full buy-in of CBP—particularly if 

the decision involves new equipment or technologies. Obtaining early 

buy-in from CBP will help ensure any new equipment is consistent 

with CBP’s operational needs.

• Conducting a cost-benefit analysis to inform acquisition decisions. A 

key part of deciding whether to refurbish or replace currently deployed 

portal monitors is conducting a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis 

that can be used to compare the relative costs and expected benefits 

of existing versus new equipment. Consistent with our past 

recommendations in 2006 on portal monitors, such an analysis should 

articulate what enhanced performance could be expected of new 

equipment and whether this benefit is worth its cost.14

In our past work on the GNDA, we made recommendations about the 

need for a strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA. Among 

other things, in July 2008, we recommended that DHS develop an 

overarching strategic plan for the GNDA that (1) clearly defines the 

objectives to be accomplished, (2) identifies the roles and responsibilities 

for meeting each objective, (3) identifies the funding necessary to achieve 

those objectives, and (4) employs monitoring mechanisms to determine 

programmatic progress and identify needed improvements.15 DHS agreed 

with our recommendation. In January 2009, we recommended that DHS 

develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear 

detection strategy and that this plan focus on establishing time frames 

and costs for addressing previously identified pathways within the 

architecture—land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and 

small maritime vessels.16 DHS did not comment on this recommendation 

but noted that it aligned with DNDO’s past, present, and future actions.

 

14GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation 

Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389 

(Washington D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006).

15GAO-08-999T. 

16GAO-09-257. 

DHS’s GNDA 

Strategic and 

Implementation Plans 

Address Our Past 

Recommendations 

but Do Not Yet Clearly 

Define Priorities
 

Page 10 GAO-12-941T 

DHS has taken action on these recommendations. In December 2010, 

DHS issued the interagency GNDA strategic plan and in April 2012, it 

issued its GNDA implementation plan for domestic aspects of the GNDA. 

As we reported in July 2011, the 2010 GNDA strategic plan addresses 

several aspects of our prior recommendations—including defining 

program objectives and assigning roles and responsibilities.17

Our review of the April 2012 GNDA implementation plan found that DHS 

had made progress in both identifying funding dedicated to plan 

objectives and in employing monitoring mechanisms to assess progress 

in meeting plan objectives. Furthermore, the plan has established specific 

milestones for completing many of DHS’s activities—allowing a further 

assessment of whether progress is being made according to plan time 

frames. In our view, these actions address the intent of our 2008 

recommendations to identify necessary funding and employ monitoring 

mechanisms. The plan also discusses strategies for addressing 

previously identified pathways in the domestic portion of the GNDA, 

including timeframes and costs for key elements of DHS’ approach. While 

these pathways remain an area of concern, the strategies discussed in 

the plan address our 2009 recommendations and lay out an approach to 

making nuclear smuggling through these pathways more difficult and thus 

less likely to succeed. As DHS updates the implementation plan in the 

future, providing additional details and discussion about how the strategy 

will address the pathways in the domestic GNDA could better position 

DHS to make decisions regarding resource allocations.

However, it 

did not (1) identify funding necessary to achieve plan objectives or (2) 

establish monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify 

needed improvements. DHS officials stated at that time that they intended

to include these aspects of our recommendations in an upcoming 

implementation plan.

However, in both the GNDA strategic plan and the implementation plan, it 

remains difficult to identify priorities from among various components of 

the domestic part of the GNDA. As we reported in July 2011, one of the 

key benefits of a strategic plan is that it is a comprehensive means of 

establishing priorities and using these priorities to allocate resources so 

that the greatest needs are being addressed.18

 

17

In times of tight budgets, 

GAO-11-869T. 

18GAO-11-869T. 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-941T 

allocating resources to address the highest priorities becomes even more 

important. Identifying priorities would help inform DHS’s decisions to 

refurbish or replace portal monitors or invest in radiation detection 

equipment for other potential pathways. DHS has done a comprehensive 

analysis of GNDA capabilities and compared its capabilities with the 

expected capabilities of adversaries who may wish to smuggle nuclear 

material into the United States. This classified analysis provides data that 

DHS could use as a basis to set priorities within the GNDA.

DHS officials told us they agreed that the implementation plan did not yet 

articulate specific priorities for GNDA program areas with the greatest 

need for development and resources and that the DHS classified analysis 

of GNDA capabilities could help inform those priorities. These officials 

told us the implementation plan was an iterative document that was 

designed to be periodically updated and that future versions of the plan 

would provide a greater discussion of priorities.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer 

any questions that you may have at this time.

For questions about this testimony, please contact David C. Maurer at 

(202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov or Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 

or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

testimony. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include 

Ned Woodward, Kiki Theodoropoulos, Kevin Tarmann, Alisa Beyninson, 

and Alison O’Neill.

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

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