JUNE 18, 2010 

AUDIT REPORT

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 (ASSIGNMENT NO. S-09-008-01)

OFFICE OF AUDITS

REVIEW OF NASA’S MICROGRAVITY FLIGHT SERVICES

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

 
REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

Final report released by: 

Paul K. Martin 

Inspector General 

Acronyms 

CO Contracting Officer 

COTR Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FCOD Flight Crew Operations Directorate 

NPR NASA Procedural Requirements 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

SOMD Space Operations Mission Directorate 
JUNE 18, 2010 

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

OVERVIEW

REVIEW OF NASA’S MICROGRAVITY FLIGHT SERVICES

The Issue 

NASA began microgravity flight operations at Johnson Space Center in 1973 using 

Government-owned, Government-operated aircraft. Microgravity flight operations 

provide a short duration reduced gravity environment for NASA research, engineering, 

astronaut training, and education. NASA first used a modified Boeing KC-135A and 

later a McDonnell Douglas DC-9B (C-9) as the Agency’s microgravity flight services 

aircraft. In 1995, the House Committee on Science reported1

that Congress found no 

national security or mission-critical justification for NASA to maintain its own fleet of 

aircraft to provide a short duration microgravity environment via parabolic flight.2 

Accordingly, Congress directed that NASA privatize microgravity parabolic flight 

operations. However, at that time NASA could not find a viable domestic source for the 

services. In January 2008, NASA awarded the Zero Gravity Corporation (Zero G) a 

1-year, $4.8 million indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract,3for microgravity 

services after a competitive procurement.4

 

We initiated this audit to determine whether Zero G was providing adequate microgravity 

flight services and whether NASA was paying for microgravity services in accordance 

with the contract terms. In addition, we reviewed NASA’s efforts to disposition its C-9 

aircraft. Details of the audit’s scope and methodology are in Appendix A.

Results 

Zero G has provided inconsistent quality levels of microgravity flight services since it 

began providing NASA with reduced gravity flights in August 2008. We concluded that 

NASA should revise the contract’s performance-based payment structure to motivate 

 

1

 House Report 104-233, which commented on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1996. Available online at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong_reports&docid=f:hr233.104.pdf (accessed April 21, 2010). 

2

 Parabolic flights are achieved when an aircraft flies at altitudes between 24,000 and 34,000 feet 

conducting aerobatic maneuvers that resemble a series of gently rolling hills creating about 20 to 

30 seconds of weightlessness. 

3

 The contract consisted of a base year, 2008, and four option years. Maximum value of the contract is 

approximately $26 million if NASA exercises all options through 2012. 

4

 In November 2006, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) received an anonymous complaint alleging that 

the procurement for microgravity services may be improper, would waste Government funds, and would 

raise potential safety concerns. We did not find evidence to substantiate the complaint. 
OVERVIEW

ii REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

Zero G to provide more consistent, high-quality microgravity flights. We also found that 

NASA had not implemented a risk management plan that adequately identified and 

mitigated risks associated with the possibility of Zero G not providing microgravity flight 

services in the future. In addition, we found that NASA’s payments to Zero G of 

approximately $2 million over a two-year period were in accordance with the contract 

terms, with the exception of a $23,000 overpayment that was due to math errors. 

The Quality of Zero G’s Microgravity Flight Service Was Inconsistent. We 

determined that Zero G’s performance in providing microgravity flight services over the 

life of the contract has been inconsistent. During some of the period of performance,

Zero G’s performance was satisfactory. However, their performance during other periods 

was not. Specifically, the percentage of parabolas meeting contract specifications during 

the 9 flight weeks from August 2008 through August 2009 that Zero G provided 

microgravity flight services varied from a low of approximately 38 percent (April 2009) 

to a high of 84 percent (August 2009). NASA researchers stated that they have greater 

opportunity to successfully conduct their experiments when Zero G flies a high rate of 

parabolas that meet contract specifications. In that regard, Zero G improved its rate of 

successful parabolas5flown since contract inception. For example, during the first flight 

week in August 2008, Zero G flew just 54 percent successful parabolas. Following some 

aircraft modifications and parabolic flight training for its pilots, Zero G flew 84 percent 

successful parabolas during the flight week in August 2009 and 83 percent of the 

researchers we surveyed rated Zero G’s flight services for that week as good or excellent. 

We concluded that the contract NASA entered into with Zero G does not motivate 

consistent, high-quality performance on the part of the contractor. Specifically, the 

indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract provides for performance-based payments 

that allow Zero G to receive 100 percent of the negotiated hourly rate if the contractor 

flies only 60 percent successful parabolas, and 80 percent to 90 percent of the hourly rate 

when Zero G flies just 30 percent to 59 percent successful parabolas. This payment 

structure was originally designed to encourage bidding on the contract and motivate 

contractors to meet performance levels. However, Zero G was the sole bidder on the 

contract, and the structure of the agreement resulted in Zero G earning approximately 

94 percent of the value of the issued task orders even though Zero G exceeded an 

80 percent successful parabola rate during only 2 of its 9 flight weeks from August 2008 

through August 2009. Therefore, to provide incentive for Zero G to consistently deliver a 

higher parabola success rate, we recommend that NASA revise the contract’s

performance-based payment structure so that payments more accurately reflect the 

contractor’s performance.

NASA Has No Risk Management Plan for Loss of Zero G Services. The Flight Crew 

Operations Directorate (FCOD) at Johnson had not developed a written, approved plan to 

mitigate the risk if, for some reason, Zero G stopped providing microgravity flight 

 

5

 Reduced gravity aboard an aircraft is achieved through aerobatic maneuvers known as parabolas flown by 

specially trained pilots. Successful parabolas are parabolas that meet both the microgravity level and 

length of time established by the contract statement of work. 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 iii

services to NASA. NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8000.4A, “Agency Risk 

Management Procedural Requirements,” December 16, 2008, requires that the manager 

of each NASA organizational unit designate a risk manager and develop a risk 

management plan to address safety, technical, cost, and schedule risks. The Johnson 

FCOD stated that a risk management plan was not developed for the possible loss of 

microgravity flight capability because the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD) 

intends to use the C-9 aircraft, which is in flyable storage,6if Zero G withdraws from the 

contract or cannot perform. However, NASA management had not adequately 

considered the cost of maintaining the C-9 in an operational status nor analyzed the 

potential that using the C-9 may not meet its needs for microgravity flight services and 

had not developed a formal plan to mitigate that risk. 

NASA’s Reduced Gravity Program, which provides the simulated weightlessness of a 

zero gravity space flight environment for the development and verification of space 

hardware and experiments, crew training, and basic research could be adversely affected 

by schedule delays and cost increases if Zero G is unable or unwilling to provide flight 

services. Although Zero G stated that it is committed to fulfilling its NASA contract, 

which has options through 2012, Zero G is currently the sole domestic commercial 

provider of microgravity flight services. Therefore, NASA faces an unmitigated risk of 

interruption in microgravity flight services if Zero G is unable or unwilling to provide 

flight services in the future. 

NASA Overpaid Zero G Due to a Lack of Internal Controls. In examining the 

approximately $2 million in payments NASA made to Zero G in accordance with the 

terms of the contract, we determined that NASA overpaid Zero G by approximately 

$23,000. The contracting officer (CO) transposed numbers for the hourly flight rate that 

resulted in overpayments to Zero G, which went undetected by NASA and Zero G. The 

overpayment went undetected because the Glenn Research Center’s Procurement 

Division, which managed the contract, had not implemented adequate internal controls to 

validate that the CO’s calculations were accurate and the payments were consistent with 

the contract terms. After we brought the calculation errors to the CO’s attention, steps 

were taken to recover the overpayment by coordinating with the contractor and reducing 

the next disbursement to Zero G by the amount of the overpayment. We concluded that 

NASA needs to improve its internal controls to validate calculations and payments in its 

contract with Zero G. 

 

6

 The intent was to reduce costs to the minimal subsistence level while keeping the aircraft available should 

it be needed. During flyable storage, NASA generally flies the C-9 for one 2-hour flight every 6 weeks to 

maintain one flight crew at minimal currency levels. No operational flying (other than to maintain 

currency levels) occurs without specific approval of NASA Headquarters. 
OVERVIEW

iv REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

Management Action 

We recommended that the Johnson Director of Procurement negotiate a revised 

performance-based payment structure to provide incentives for Zero G to deliver more 

consistent, high-quality microgravity flight services. We also recommended that the 

Associate Administrator for SOMD direct the Johnson FCOD to develop a risk 

management plan for meeting NASA’s microgravity flight needs if Zero G is unwilling 

or unable to do so. In addition, we recommended that the Chief of Glenn’s Procurement 

Division implement additional controls to detect and prevent errors when calculating 

payments to contractors. 

In response to our May 19, 2010, draft of this report, the Associate Administrator for 

Space Operations generally concurred with our recommendations and stated that NASA 

will redefine the payment structure in the follow-on microgravity contract, will formally 

document a risk management plan in Johnson’s Integrated Risk Management 

Application, and will implement controls to avoid errors in payments to contractors (see 

NASA’s comments in Appendix D). 

We consider the Associate Administrator’s proposed actions to be responsive to our 

recommendations. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved and will be closed upon 

verification that management has completed the corrective actions. 
JUNE 18, 2010 

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Background _________________________________________ 1 

Objectives __________________________________________ 5 

RESULTS

The Quality of Zero G’s Microgravity Flight Service 

Was Inconsistent ___________________________________ 6 

NASA Had No Risk Management Plan for Loss of 

Zero G Services ___________________________________ 12

NASA Overpaid Zero G Due to a Lack of Internal Controls ____ 15

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology _______________________________ 19

Review of Internal Controls ____________________________ 20

Prior Coverage ______________________________________ 20

APPENDIX B 

Questionnaire _______________________________________ 21

APPENDIX C 

Johnson FCOD Response ______________________________ 23

APPENDIX D 

Management Comments ______________________________ 24

APPENDIX E 

Report Distribution ___________________________________ 26

JUNE 18, 2010 

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 1 

INTRODUCTION

Background 

Microgravity Flight. Microgravity flights provide a short duration reduced gravity 

environment for NASA research, engineering, astronaut training, and education. 

Reduced gravity aboard an aircraft is achieved through aerobatic maneuvers known as 

parabolas flown by specially trained pilots (as shown in the following figure). 

Before starting a parabola, the pilot flies level to the horizon at an altitude of around 

24,000 feet. The pilot begins to pull up, gradually increasing the angle of the aircraft to 

about 45 degrees above the horizon and reaching an altitude of approximately 34,000 

feet. During ascent, passengers feel the pull of 1.8 times the gravitational force of Earth. 

Next, the plane is “pushed over” to create the microgravity segment of the parabola.7 For 

the next 20 to 30 seconds, passengers in the plane experience varying degrees of 

weightlessness as the aircraft drops from approximately 34,000 to 24,000 feet. When the 

plane pulls out of the dive, it may resume level flight for a period of time before 

beginning the next parabola. 

Parabolic Flight 

Source: http://www.gozerog.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Experience.How_it_Works 

(accessed December 28, 2009; as of April 21, 2010, the link is to a video). 

In addition to simulating zero gravity, parabolic maneuvers also can simulate lunar 

gravity (one-sixth the gravity of Earth) or Martian gravity (one-third the gravity of Earth). 

These varying gravity levels are created by flying a larger arc at the top of the parabola. 

 

7

 As the plane goes over the top of the arc, the centrifugal force cancels out the gravitational force pulling 

downward. At this point, passengers experience microgravity because only negligible gravitational forces 

are present. The sense of weightlessness lasts for about 30 seconds. 
INTRODUCTION

2 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

A parabolic flight maneuver requires approximately 10 miles of airspace to perform. 

During a typical flight, the pilot flies 3 to 5 sets of 12 to 15 parabolic maneuvers with 

short periods of level flight between each set. 

History of NASA’s Microgravity Flight Services. The Flight Crew Operations 

Directorate (FCOD) at Johnson Space Center operates NASA’s Reduced Gravity 

Program under the direction of the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD). The 

Reduced Gravity Program provides the simulated weightlessness of a zero gravity space 

flight environment for test and training purposes – specifically, for the development and 

verification of space hardware and experiments, crew training, and basic research. 

Beginning about 1958, microgravity flight services were provided to NASA by the 

U.S. Air Force. In 1973, NASA personnel at Johnson began providing microgravity 

services using a modified Boeing KC-135A aircraft. In 2005, NASA began using a 

McDonnell Douglas DC-9B (C-9) aircraft obtained from the U.S. Navy for microgravity 

flights. From that point until 2008, the C-9 was the primary source for NASA’s 

microgravity flights. 

In an August 1995 U.S. House of Representatives Report,8the Committee on Science 

stated that Congress found no national security or mission-critical justification for NASA 

to maintain a fleet of aircraft to provide microgravity flight services. The House Report 

states that NASA “shall privatize all parabolic flight aircraft operations . . ..” However, 

NASA could not find a viable domestic source for microgravity flights at that time, and it 

was not until the fall of 2004 that the Zero Gravity Corporation (Zero G) commenced 

commercial microgravity flight operations. Subsequently, in September 2005 NASA’s 

Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation conducted a trade study to compare 

microgravity flight services costs and capabilities of NASA’s C-9 with Zero G’s Boeing 

727. Although the study showed that there would be an approximately 90 percent 

increase in direct cost per flight hour, it concluded that in light of decreasing demand for 

microgravity flight services, there would be little difference in the overall full cost to 

NASA. In a November 2005 letter to NASA’s Associate Administrator, the Associate 

Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation stated that “[Johnson Space Center] 

should begin the procurement process to acquire all other reduced gravity aircraft 

services from Zero G.”

In July 2006, Johnson initiated market research to determine commercial microgravity 

sources through a Request for Information on the Federal Business Opportunities portal.9 

Although four companies, including Zero G, expressed interest in providing NASA with 

microgravity flight services in response to the Request for Information, only Zero G 

could provide an aircraft. The other three companies were interested in a contract using a 

Government-furnished aircraft. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 45.102, 

“Government Property, Policy,” states that “[c]ontractors are ordinarily required to 

 

8

 House Report 104-233, which provided comments on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1996. Available online at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong_reports&docid=f:hr233.104.pdf (accessed April 21, 2010). 

9

https://www.fbo.gov/ (accessed April 21, 2010). 
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 3 

furnish all property necessary to perform Government contracts.” Further, NASA FAR 

Supplement, Part 1845.102-70, “Government Property, NASA policy,” states that 

“Government property shall not be provided to contractors unless all other alternatives 

are not feasible.” Accordingly, NASA’s procurement team required interested companies 

to provide their own aircraft as part of their proposal. 

On January 2, 2008, NASA awarded an indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract 

with 4 option years to Zero G for microgravity flight services through 2012. The 

maximum contract value is approximately $26 million if all options are exercised. Glenn 

Research Center’s Procurement Division managed the contract with Zero G from its 

inception through June 2009, when responsibility transferred to Johnson’s Office of 

Procurement. The contract provides that NASA will schedule a minimum of 1 but not 

more than 20 flight weeks10 (approximately 8.4 to 168 hours) each contract year and sets 

flight-hour rates ranging from $27,800 to $31,289 for flights from Johnson. From 

contract inception in January 2008 through March 2010, Zero G flew only about 70 flight 

hours during 9 flight weeks. According to NASA officials, the low number of 

microgravity flight hours was due in part to decreasing budgets, concern for the quality of 

Zero G’s flight services, and the full cost of the Zero G flight service being borne by the 

users of the services, such as NASA researchers and the Office of Education. 

Disposition of NASA’s C-9. During fiscal years 2006 and 2007, the last years the C-9 

was fully operational before NASA began removing it from active microgravity flight 

service, the C-9 flew an annual average of 168 microgravity flight hours. In 2008, the 

C-9 flight rate decreased in order to redirect some flights to the Zero G contract. In fiscal 

years 2008 and 2009, the C-9 flew approximately 107 and 39 microgravity flight hours, 

respectively. (See Table 1 for C-9 microgravity flights by year.) 

On November 19, 2008, NASA’s Strategic Management Council directed SOMD and 

Johnson to place the C-9 aircraft in flyable storage by January 2009 for transition or 

disposal upon completion of the Space Shuttle Program. Except for completing a series 

of previously approved physiological experiments, NASA stopped using the C-9 aircraft 

for microgravity flights in January 2009 and placed the aircraft in flyable storage at 

Ellington Field in Houston, Texas. Johnson officials said that flyable storage reduces 

costs to a minimum while keeping the aircraft available for microgravity flight should it 

be needed. Flyable storage costs for January through December 2009 totaled 

approximately $854,000. This compares to total operational costs of approximately 

$2.8 million in fiscal year 2007, the last year the C-9 was fully operational. In February 

2009, the Acting NASA Administrator issued a Program Decision Memorandum that 

directed SOMD to retain the C-9 in flyable storage through fiscal year 2011. 

 

10 A flight week begins on Monday with a test readiness review. Flights are conducted Tuesday through 

Friday. Each flight includes reduced gravity parabolic trajectories. Aircraft unloading is conducted on 

Friday after the flight is completed. Normal hours for flight week activities are 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. Flight 

weeks have only been conducted out of Ellington Field in Houston, Texas, although they can also be 

conducted out of Glenn Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio. 
INTRODUCTION

4 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

Table 1. C-9 Flights by Fiscal Year

Fiscal 

Year

Microgravity 

Flight Hours Flights Notes 

2005 6.6 4 C-9 was operational for only 1 month in 2005

2006 184.9 97

2007 151.1 72

2008 106.6 56 C-9 flights reduced because of Zero G contract

2009 39.0 16

All C-9 flights after January 1, 2009, required 

NASA Headquarters’ approval as exceptions. 

In addition, the Johnson Director can approve 

C-9 flights to support hurricane evacuation.

NASA generally flies the C-9 for one 2-hour flight every 6 weeks to maintain aircrew at 

minimum currency levels.11 No other use of the C-9 aircraft occurs without specific 

approval of NASA Headquarters.12

 Examples of other flights since January 2009 

included scouting a safe route for the Space Shuttle when it needed to be flown back to 

Kennedy Space Center in Florida from Edwards Air Force Base in California in June 

2009 and again in September 2009. 

Personnel in NASA’s Aircraft Management Division stated that the final disposition of 

the C-9 will depend on Zero G demonstrating sustained success in meeting NASA’s 

microgravity mission requirements. They also said that the Office of Infrastructure will 

make the decision concerning the C-9’s final disposition after reviewing aircraft 

requirements in accordance with NPR 7900.3B, “Aircraft Operations Management,” 

June 14, 2007. 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) Reviews. In November 2006, the OIG received an 

anonymous complaint alleging that the procurement for microgravity services may be 

improper, would result in a waste of Government funds, and raised potential safety 

concerns. An initial OIG review did not substantiate the complaint, but we conducted a 

follow-up review in June 2008 to determine (1) the status of the contract, (2) whether the 

task orders issued to Zero G exceeded NASA’s mission requirements, and (3) whether 

any NASA civil service positions were eliminated because of the contract. We 

determined that NASA had issued two task orders (as of June 2008) valued at 

approximately $467,000 to Zero G for approximately 17 microgravity flight hours. With 

just two task orders issued, we could not determine whether the contract had resulted in 

the acquisition of microgravity flight capability that exceeded the Agency’s mission 

 

11 Each aircraft crew position for each aircraft type has a minimum set of requirements, such as flight hours 

and landing approaches, which must be accomplished periodically so that the aircrew can fly the 

aircraft’s mission without an instructor present. 

12 The Director, Johnson Space Center, can authorize the use of the C-9 for hurricane evacuation. 
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 5 

requirements. Although we determined that the award of the Zero G contract did not 

eliminate any civil service positions, Johnson estimated that any Agency decision to 

discontinue the Reduced Gravity Program would result in reassigning the work of 

approximately two full-time equivalent employees. 

Objectives 

The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether Zero G provided adequate 

microgravity flight services to NASA and was paid in accordance with the contract terms. 

We also evaluated NASA’s efforts to disposition the C-9 aircraft it formerly used to 

conduct its own microgravity flights. See Appendix A for details of the audit’s scope and 

methodology, our review of internal controls, and prior coverage. 
RESULTS

6 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

THE QUALITY OF ZERO G’S 

MICROGRAVITY FLIGHT SERVICE 

WAS INCONSISTENT

We found that Zero G provided inconsistent levels of microgravity flight services to 

NASA. Specifically, the percentage of parabolas meeting contract specifications 

during the 9 flight weeks from August 2008 through August 2009 that Zero G 

provided microgravity flight services ranged from a low of approximately 38 percent 

(April 2009) to a high of 84 percent (August 2009), with a mean of 61 percent. 

NASA researchers stated that they have a greater opportunity to conduct experiments 

when parabolas consistently meet contract specifications. 

The lead NASA technician for the Reduced Gravity Program stated that the quality 

of Zero G’s parabolas had improved over time after modifications to Zero G’s 

Boeing 727 aircraft and completion of parabolic maneuver training by Zero G’s 

pilots. However, we believe that the performance-based payment structure in the 

indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract with Zero G does not provide 

sufficient financial incentives for Zero G to provide consistent, high-quality reduced 

gravity flights. For example, NASA pays 100 percent of the contract’s hourly rate 

even if only 60 percent of Zero G’s parabolas meet contract specifications on a given 

flight. When less than 60 percent of the parabolas meet the statement of work 

specifications, NASA pays Zero G a reduced percentage of the hourly rate. NASA 

established the performance-based payment structure to encourage the contractor to 

meet required performance levels yet keep penalties small enough to attract bidding 

on the contract. However, the payment structure has resulted in Zero G earning 

approximately 94 percent of the value of the issued task orders even though Zero G 

exceeded an 80 percent successful parabola rate in only 2 of its 9 flight weeks from 

August 2008 through August 2009. Moreover, only 5 of the 9 flight weeks 

(56 percent) from August 2008 through August 2009 averaged more than a 

60 percent success rate. 

Inconsistent Microgravity Flight Services 

The lead NASA technician for the Reduced Gravity Program stated that the quality of 

Zero G’s parabolas had improved over time after some modifications to Zero G’s 727 

aircraft and completion of parabolic maneuver training by Zero G’s pilots. Although 

Zero G’s parabola success rate rose from 54 percent for the August 2008 flight week to 

84 percent for the August 2009 flight week, Zero G’s performance was inconsistent 

during the first 12-month period, exceeding a 60 percent weekly success rate only five 

times and an 80 percent weekly parabola success rate only twice over the 9 flight weeks 

from August 2008 through August 2009. Chart 1 shows the weekly percentage of 

parabolas Zero G flew that met contract specifications. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 7 

53.86

60.5 59.75

80.75

42.75

63.75

37.77

66.43

84.05

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100 P

e

r

c

e

n

t

a

g

e

s

Chart 1. Parabolas Meeting Specifications

Parabolas Meeting Specifications

Flight Weeks

The Johnson FCOD and program managers stated that the historic parabola success rate 

with the C-9 had been over 90 percent. NASA program managers told us that Zero G’s 

performance has been an issue of concern for researchers, who now had to fund the full 

cost of the flight services. The program managers said they have a greater likelihood of 

successfully completing experiments when parabolas consistently meet contract 

specifications. A Zero G program manager conceded that the company has experienced 

performance challenges, but stated that the company had dedicated its own resources to 

improve the quality of microgravity flight services by installing better instrumentation on 

the aircraft and providing pilot training to increase proficiency. 

Zero G Provided Satisfactory Flight Services during the August 

2009 Flight Week 

We developed a questionnaire for NASA researchers conducting reduced gravity 

experiments to assess user satisfaction with Zero G’s microgravity flight services (see 

Appendix B). The questionnaire asked the researchers to rate safety, success of their 

experiment, quality and duration of the microgravity level, and overall satisfaction. 

We distributed the questionnaire to the 88 researchers who participated in Zero G’s 

August 11–14, 2009, flight week. The researchers conducted a variety of experiments 

that included microgravity fluid dynamics, Martian and lunar dust mitigation, modeling 

of cardiovascular dynamics, and measures to counter motion sickness. We received 
RESULTS

8 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

63 completed questionnaires (a 72 percent return rate). Overall, Zero G’s flight services 

ratings were mostly good or excellent, as shown in Chart 2.

Microgravity Flight Specifications and Payment Structure 

The Zero G contract establishes microgravity flight requirements and performance-based

payments based on the number of acceptable flight maneuvers performed by Zero G.13 

NASA evaluated each flight flown from August 2008 through August 2009 during the 

9 flight weeks14 purchased from Zero G under the contract. 

The original contracting officer’s technical representative (COTR) at Glenn stated that 

prior to release of the request for proposal, the acquisition team – which included subject 

matter experts with experience in microgravity flight services – developed the 

performance standards. These standards included safety, for which failure to meet NASA 

 

13 Payment rates established in the contract for years 2008 through 2012 range from $27,800 to $31,289 per 

flight hour for flights out of Johnson. Payments can be adjusted downward based on parabola success 

rates. 

14 NASA issued 12 task orders for 12 flight weeks, but subsequently terminated 3 flight weeks due to lack 

of funding. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Chart 2. Questionnaire Results for the Flight Week of

August 11–14, 2009 (63 respondents)

Safety

Success of experiment

Quality of requested microgravity level

Duration of microgravity level

Overall satisfaction

Performance

Evaluation

Areas
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 9 

requirements would result in zero payment; contractor-caused delays, which would result 

in downward price adjustments; and parabola quality. As of March 2010, there have 

been no payment adjustments due to safety or contractor-caused delays. 

The COTR stated that the objectives of the parabola quality standard were to encourage 

the contractor to have an aircraft guidance system capable of meeting the gravity level 

requirements and to motivate the contractor to use its best pilots over the life of the 

contract to achieve the highest percentage of required parabolas. The team based the 

gravity performance levels on their experience in providing microgravity services to the 

research community and established levels that NASA aircraft could routinely achieve,

but added some buffer for human factors and weather. 

Table 2 shows the flight specifications in the statement of work for microgravity or 

partial gravity levels and duration. 

Table 2. Flight Specifications

Microgravity/Partial 

Gravity Requirements

Time Requirements 

(continuous seconds)

0.00 g +/- 0.02 g 10

0.00 g +/- 0.05 g 17

0.10 g +/- 0.05 g 20

0.16 g +/- 0.05 g 20

0.20 g +/- 0.05 g 20

0.30 g +/- 0.05 g 20

0.38 g +/- 0.05 g 20

0.40 g +/- 0.05 g 20

0.50 g +/- 0.05 g 20

Although NASA payments to Zero G comply with contract terms, we do not believe that 

those terms motivated the contractor to consistently fly a high rate of successful 

parabolas. Specifically, the COTR evaluates the flights using an accelerometer mounted 

on board the Zero G aircraft. The accelerometer measures and records the duration and 

level of reduced gravity attained by Zero G during each flight.15 After each reduced 

gravity flight, NASA determines the parabola success rate, which is the percentage of 

parabolic trajectories flown that met the contract specifications (statement of work) for 

microgravity/partial gravity requirements and time requirements (continuous seconds). 

In accordance with the contract’s performance-based payment structure, NASA pays 

Zero G 100 percent of the hourly rate when a flight’s parabola success rate meets contract 

specifications 60 percent of the time or more. When the success rate is less than 

 

15 The COTR used an accelerometer on all but two flights to determine the amount earned by Zero G. 

Zero G flew one demonstration flight, and NASA terminated one flight due to weather conditions. In 

accordance with contract terms, the COTR did not evaluate those two flights, and the contractor received 

the full hourly rate established in the contract. 
RESULTS

10 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

60 percent, NASA pays the contractor a reduced rate for the flight hours during that flight 

week, as shown in Table 3. 

Table 3. Performance-Based Payment Rate

Percentage of Reduced Gravity Maneuvers 

that Meet the Statement of Work Payment Rate

60% or more 100%

46% to 59% 90%

30% to 45% 80%

16% to 29% 70%

0 to 15% 60%

According to the COTR at Glenn, NASA’s goal in establishing these performance-based 

payment rates was to make the penalties big enough to encourage the contractor to meet 

established performance levels, yet small enough that the contractor would bid on the 

contract and keep the price reasonable. Although there have been no payment 

adjustments based on safety or contractor-caused delays, payment for almost 80 percent 

of the task orders issued from August 2008 through August 2009 to Zero G have been 

decreased due to parabola quality.16

 Nevertheless, overall Zero G earned about 

94 percent of the value of issued task orders ($1,852,470 of $1,980,25017).

Recommendation, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of 

Management’s Response

Recommendation 1. The Johnson Director of Procurement should negotiate a revised 

performance-based payment structure to provide greater incentives for the contractor to 

deliver consistent, high-quality microgravity flight service.

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator for Space Operations concurred 

with the intent of the recommendation. He stated that NASA intends to redefine the 

payment structure during the development of the follow-on microgravity contract 

procurement strategy to ensure customers pay only for consistent, high-quality parabolas. 

However, the Associate Administrator’s response stated that restructuring the current 

contract for option years 2011 and 2012 is not feasible for a variety of reasons described 

in his response. Although NASA did not provide an estimated date to redefine the 

 

16 The CO issues a task order for each flight week that typically contains four flight days. The CO 

decrements each task order whenever Zero G flies less than 60 percent successful parabolas during a 

flight day. 

17 These amounts do not include $150,000 for insurance or $64,559 fuel credits that NASA paid to Zero G. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 11

payment structure for future microgravity flight services, we expect NASA to take this 

action no later than December 31, 2012, the end of the final option period for the Zero G 

contract.

Evaluation of Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator’s response and 

planned actions are responsive to the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation 

is resolved. Although NASA requested that we close this recommendation upon issuance 

of our report, we will close the recommendation after verifying that management has 

taken corrective action by redefining the payment structure in the follow-on microgravity 

contract.
RESULTS

12 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

NASA HAD NO RISK 

MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR LOSS 

OF ZERO G SERVICES

The Johnson FCOD had not developed a risk management plan to address the 

possibility that Zero G might be unable to perform future microgravity flight 

services, which would leave NASA with no commercial option to obtain 

microgravity flights. NASA policy requires that NASA risk managers develop a risk 

management plan to identify and mitigate risks to their programs. FCOD personnel 

stated that they had not developed a plan to address the possibility of Zero G’s 

inability to provide microgravity flights because if that occurred they expect NASA 

to use its C-9 aircraft. However, NASA management had not adequately analyzed 

the potential for performance shortfalls, which could occur in the future with respect 

to meeting NASA’s needs for microgravity flight services. Specifically, NASA had

not developed a systematic process that identifies, analyzes, and documents risks that 

Zero G might not provide future microgravity flight services. As a result, NASA’s 

Reduced Gravity Program could experience schedule delays and cost increases if 

Zero G, the only current commercial provider of microgravity flight services in the 

United States, is unable or unwilling to continue providing those services. 

Risk Management Plan Required 

NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8000.4A, “Agency Risk Management Procedural 

Requirements,” December 16, 2008, requires that the manager of each NASA 

organizational unit designate a risk manager and develop a risk management plan to 

address safety, technical, cost, and schedule risks associated with major programs in their 

area of responsibility. The NPR states that risk managers should manage risks using a 

Continuous Risk Management process, which is defined as “a systematic and iterative 

process that efficiently identifies, analyzes, plans, tracks, controls, and communicates and 

documents risks associated with implementation of designs, plans, and processes.” The 

NPR also states that organizational unit managers should ensure that acquisition-related 

risks are continuously managed and that documentation is maintained in accordance with 

NASA Policy Directive 1440.6H, “NASA Records Management,” March 24, 2008, and 

NPR 1441.1D, “NASA Records Retention Schedule,” February 24, 2003. Mission 

Directorates are responsible for management of programmatic risks within the 

Directorate, and program and project managers are responsible for program and project 

risks within their respective programs and projects. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 13

Significant Risks for Microgravity Flight Services Had Not Been 

Adequately Identified and Mitigated 

The Johnson FCOD had not developed a formal risk management plan to identify and 

mitigate risks associated with the microgravity flight services. One significant risk is the 

potential that Zero G might be unable or unwilling to provide future microgravity flight 

services. We interviewed Zero G management personnel and asked whether the 

relatively small number of microgravity flights flown since contract award in 2008 had 

affected their interest in continuing to provide parabolic flight services to NASA. Zero G 

management stated that it was disappointed in the reduction in the number of flight 

weeks, but said they were committed to providing NASA with future flights. 

Specifically, Zero G pointed out that it had made significant investments in configuring 

its plane to NASA specifications and training pilots to conduct reduced gravity flights. 

However, because Zero G is currently the only commercial provider of microgravity 

flight services in the United States, we see this as a significant risk that should be 

assessed by FCOD and, in keeping with NASA risk management policy, specific 

alternatives developed. 

In November 2008, NASA’s Strategic Management Council directed that SOMD retain 

the C-9 in flyable storage through fiscal year 2011. Following the Council’s direction, 

except for completing a series of previously approved physiological experiments, 

Johnson FCOD stopped using the NASA C-9 aircraft for microgravity flights in January 

200918 and placed the aircraft in flyable storage at Ellington Field in Houston (see 

FCOD’s response to the Program Decision Memorandum in Appendix C). However, 

SOMD personnel noted that FCOD had not incorporated the cost of maintaining the C-9 

aircraft for operational use into a risk management plan addressing the risk of Zero G not 

providing the Agency’s microgravity flight services needs. The cost of maintaining the 

C-9 for operational use is likely to be a significant factor and FCOD should evaluate its 

impact as part of a risk management plan. 

NASA’s Reduced Gravity Program Will Be Adversely Affected if 

Zero G Does Not Perform 

NASA’s Reduced Gravity Program could experience schedule delays and cost increases 

if Zero G is unwilling or unable to provide future microgravity flight services. Delays in 

the availability of microgravity flights would negatively affect NASA research of 

materials and life sciences, engineering development for the next generation of space 

flight vehicles and the International Space Station, and for astronaut training and 

education. Because Zero G is currently the only commercial, domestic provider of 

 

18 Johnson flew 51 microgravity flights (97.2 flight hours) with its C-9 in fiscal year 2008 after the contract 

was awarded to Zero G. According to the Johnson COTR, after contract award on January 2, 2008, Zero 

G was modifying its aircraft through July 2008 to better fly microgravity missions. Zero G flew its first 

microgravity contract flight in August 2008. 
RESULTS

14 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

microgravity flight services, a systematic process that identifies, analyzes, and documents 

risk mitigation strategies, to include an analysis of cost and schedule impacts, can help 

reduce the potentially negative consequences associated with a disruption of microgravity 

flight services. Moreover, identifying another commercial microgravity provider would 

involve additional procurement costs and potential contract cost increases. 

Recommendation, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of 

Management’s Response

Recommendation 2. The Associate Administrator for SOMD should direct the Johnson 

FCOD to develop a formal risk management plan that identifies specific options to maintain 

NASA’s access to microgravity flights if Zero G ceases providing microgravity flight 

services. Such analyses should include the cost of identifying another commercial 

contractor as well as the cost of maintaining the C-9 aircraft for operational use.

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator for Space Operations concurred 

with the intent of the recommendation and stated that FCOD will formally document a 

risk management plan in Johnson’s Integrated Risk Management Application and identify 

specific options, as well as costs, safety, and schedule considerations to maintain access 

to microgravity flights, in the event Zero G ceases to provide those services to NASA. 

The estimated completion date for this action is October 1, 2010. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator’s planned 

actions are responsive to the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is 

resolved. We will close the recommendation upon verifying that management has taken 

the corrective action.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 15

NASA OVERPAID ZERO G DUE TO 

A LACK OF INTERNAL 

CONTROLS

NASA’s payments to Zero G of approximately $2 million over a two-year period 

were in accordance with the contract terms, with the exception of a $23,000 

overpayment caused by math errors. We found that the Glenn contracting officer 

(CO) transposed numbers for the hourly flight rate in calculating payments due 

Zero G on three task orders and made a minor math error on one. The errors resulted 

in overpayments of approximately $23,000 that were not detected by NASA or 

Zero G. NASA overpaid Zero G because Glenn’s Procurement Division had not 

implemented adequate internal controls to validate that the CO’s calculations were 

accurate and the payments were consistent with the contract terms. After we brought 

the payment calculation errors to the CO’s attention, Glenn’s Procurement Division 

recovered the overpayments by reducing a subsequent disbursement to Zero G by the 

amount of the overpayment. 

NASA’s Contract with Zero G 

We determined that NASA generally paid Zero G in accordance with contract terms; 

however, a lack of internal controls resulted in NASA overpaying Zero G on 4 out of 10 

paid task orders. The contract requires the CO to calculate payments for each task order 

based on a specific hourly flight rate, the number of hours flown, and an objective 

performance factor for each flight. At the end of each flight week, the CO obtains the 

flight hours and the performance factors for each flight from the COTR. The CO 

calculates the amount owed to the contractor by multiplying the hourly flight rate, the 

number of hours flown, and the performance factor for each flight. The CO provides the 

contractor with the calculations, and Zero G then submits an invoice for that amount. 

During 2008 and 2009, the CO issued 12 task orders and NASA paid Zero G almost 

$2 million for approximately 70 flight hours, insurance, and fuel credits (see Table 4). 
RESULTS

16 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

Table 4. 2008 and 2009 Zero G Task Orders

Task Order Disbursed Notation

NNC08TA78T $ 307,394.89 9.2 flight hours plus $75,000 insurance

NNC08TA79T* 278,861.40 10.4 flight hours

NNC08TA85T* 125,132.00 4.8 flight hours

NNC08TA86T* 323,729.54 11.4 flight hours

NNC08TA89T 191,337.42 8.1 flight hours

NNC08TB05T 75,000.00 insurance only; flights terminated for lack of funding

NNC08TB06T 0.00 terminated for lack of funding

NNC08TB07T 0.00 terminated for lack of funding

NNC09TA28T 188,782.40 6.9 flight hours

NNC09TA34T* 168,356.36 7.5 flight hours

NNC09TA42T 135,707.62 5.8 flight hours

NNC08TB11T 143,608.60 6.1 flight hours 

 Total $1,937,910.23 70.2 flight hours and insurance

*Included payment errors (see Table 5). The overpayments were recovered by an adjustment on task 

order NNC08TB11T.

CO Overpaid Zero G 

As stated previously, the CO made errors that resulted in overpayments to Zero G of 

approximately $23,000. The contract defines a maximum hourly flight rate of $27,800 in 

2008 for flights originating from Johnson. However, the CO transposed numbers for the 

hourly flight rate and used $28,700 instead of $27,800 in calculating payments due 

Zero G on three task orders and made an extremely small math error ($0.80) on a fourth 

task order (see Table 5). 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 17

Table 5. Overpaid Task Orders

Task Order Overpayment Reason

NNC08TA79T $ 8,874.00 CO used $28,700 vice $27,800 contract flight rate

NNC08TA85T 3,924.00 CO used $28,700 vice $27,800 contract flight rate

NNC08TA86T 10,260.00 CO used $28,700 vice $27,800 contract flight rate

NNC09TA34T .80 CO math error

 Total $23,058.80

Internal Controls Were Inadequate to Ensure Proper Contract 

Payments Were Made 

Glenn’s Procurement Division did not have an adequate internal control process to detect 

and prevent payment calculation errors. NPR 9010.3, “Financial Management Internal 

Control,” September 30, 2008, requires that internal controls be implemented to provide 

reasonable assurance that all recorded transactions are valid to prevent errors from being 

introduced into official accounting records. However, no other Glenn employees 

reviewed the Glenn CO’s calculations for Zero G payments. To address this control 

weakness, the Procurement Division could assign an independent person to validate that 

the CO’s calculations are accurate and in accordance with the contract terms. 

Recovery of Overpayment 

After we made the CO aware of the overpayments, the CO and Zero G signed a contract 

modification that described the transposition errors and documented an agreement to 

reduce NASA’s obligation on task order NNC08TB11T by $23,058.80. This adjustment 

fully recovered the overpayment. 
RESULTS

18 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

Recommendation, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of 

Management’s Response

Recommendation 3. The Chief of Glenn’s Procurement Division should review its internal 

controls for payments to contractors and modify its controls and procedures to detect and 

prevent errors like those to Zero G when calculating payments to contractors. 

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator for Space Operations concurred 

with the recommendation and stated that NASA management will instruct contracting 

officers with similarly complex pricing arrangements to have the contractor 

independently price the required services. The contracting officer will then verify the 

contractor’s pricing against contract terms and conditions before issuing approval for 

payment. Although NASA’s formal response did not provide a specific completion date, 

Glenn’s Procurement Division stated in a subsequent e-mail that these actions will be 

completed by July 30, 2010.

Evaluation of Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator’s planned 

actions are responsive to our recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is 

resolved. However, the recommendation will remain open until Glenn’s Procurement 

Division issues formal policy that describes the specific contract pricing arrangements 

and directs contracting officers to obtain and verify the contractors’ price invoices prior 

to approval for payment. We will close the recommendation after verifying completion 

of management’s corrective actions.
APPENDIXES

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 19

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology 

We performed this audit at Johnson from June 2009 through May 2010 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on the objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our objectives. 

During our audit work, we reviewed NASA internal controls over the contract payments 

to Zero G. We reviewed the contract payment terms, performance requirements, and the 

amounts earned by Zero G and disbursed by NASA. 

To become familiar with relevant criteria, we reviewed the Zero G contract 

(NNC08BA01B, January 2, 2008). We also reviewed applicable laws and NASA 

guidance, to include the following: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, Fiscal 

Year 1996, Section 212, “Privatization of Microgravity Parabolic Flight 

Operations.” 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, Fiscal 

Year 2005, Section 108, “Commercialization Plan.” 

NPR 7900.3B, “Aircraft Operations Management,” June 14, 2007, Chapter 8, 

“Aircraft Acquisitions and Dispositions.” 

the Acting NASA Administrator’s Program Decision Memorandum, February 19, 

2009. 

NPR 8000.4A, “Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements,” 

December 16, 2008. 

NPR 9010.3, “Financial Management Internal Control,” September 30, 2008. 

We interviewed Johnson FCOD and Headquarters Office of Infrastructure personnel to 

obtain an understanding of the microgravity flight services contract, issues regarding the 

disposition of the C-9 aircraft, and perspectives about experiment success. 

To determine whether Zero G was paid in accordance with the contract terms, we 

interviewed the NASA CO and COTRs responsible for Zero G contract oversight 

to obtain their evaluation of contractor performance and 
APPENDIX A 

20 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

validated that the amounts billed and paid the contractor were accurate (the errors 

we identified are addressed in this report).

We validated that steps had been taken to recover the amount NASA overpaid the 

contractor. In addition, we interviewed Zero G management personnel to assess their 

concerns regarding the decline in NASA’s microgravity flight services needs. We also 

inquired as to the likelihood and impact that a pilots’ strike could have on Zero G’s 

ability to provide microgravity flight services. 

To determine whether Zero G was providing adequate microgravity flight services to 

researchers, we developed a questionnaire for researchers to evaluate satisfaction with 

Zero G’s microgravity flight services during the August 2009 flight week (see 

Appendix B) and tabulated and evaluated the results of the questionnaire. Also, we met 

and interviewed several NASA program managers to determine whether Zero G’s

microgravity flights adequately met their researchers’ test requirements.

To determine the C-9 aircraft’s disposition status, we obtained various documentation, 

including the Acting NASA Administrator’s Program Decision Memorandum directing 

SOMD and Johnson to place the C-9 aircraft in flyable storage; the Johnson FCOD 

response (Appendix C), implementing a plan to place the C-9 in flyable storage; and the 

maintenance scheduled to retain the C-9 in flight status. We also observed the C-9 in the 

hangar at Ellington Field and reviewed the C-9’s flight history to determine whether its 

use was consistent with policy direction while the aircraft was in flyable storage status. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform 

this audit. 

Review of Internal Controls. We reviewed internal controls associated with Zero G 

contract administration. We found that Glenn did not have adequate controls and 

procedures in place to detect and prevent errors when calculating payments to the 

contractor for microgravity flight services. We identified errors in the CO’s payment 

calculations, as discussed earlier in this report. Our recommendation, if implemented, 

will improve Glenn’s controls over contract administration.

Prior Coverage. Neither the Government Accountability Office nor the NASA OIG has 

issued a report during the last 5 years that is relevant to the subject of our report. 

However, in 2006, the NASA OIG conducted a preliminary review in response to an 

anonymous complaint about NASA’s planned procurement of commercial microgravity 

services and determined that the complainant’s allegations did not have merit; we did not 

issue a report. We also did not issue a report on our June 2008 follow-up review of 

NASA’s microgravity flight operations. 
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 21

QUESTIONNAIRE
APPENDIX B 

22 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 
APPENDIX C 

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 23

JOHNSON FCOD RESPONSE
APPENDIX D 

24 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS
APPENDIX D 

REPORT NO. IG-10-015 25
APPENDIX E 

26 REPORT NO. IG-10-015 

REPORT DISTRIBUTION

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Administrator 

Deputy Administrator 

Chief of Staff 

Associate Administrator for Space Operations Mission Directorate 

Director, Glenn Research Center 

Chief, Procurement Division, Glenn Research Center 

Director, Johnson Space Center 

Director, Office of Procurement, Johnson Space Center 

Director, Flight Crew Operations Directorate, Johnson Space Center 

Non-NASA Organizations and Individuals 

Office of Management and Budget 

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division 

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch 

Government Accountability Office 

Director, NASA Financial Management, Office of Financial Management and 

Assurance 

Director, NASA Issues, Office of Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Member 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Subcommittee on Science and Space 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement 

House Committee on Science and Technology 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 
REPORT NO. IG-10-015 27

Major Contributors to the Report: 

Raymond Tolomeo, Acting Director, Space Operations Directorate 

Kenneth Sidney, Project Manager 

Connia Webb, Team Lead 

Dennis Clay, Auditor 

Ellis Lee, Auditor 

Lawrence Neu, Aerospace Technologist 
JUNE 18, 2010 

REPORT No. IG-10-015 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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