GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

July 31, 2012

Congressional Committees

Subject: Strategic Weapons: Changes in the Nuclear Weapons Targeting Process 

Since 1991

Section 1047 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 

required us to update our September 1991 report on the nuclear weapons targeting 

process.

1 Since we last reported on this subject, the United States now faces a more 

complex security environment that potentially affects U.S. nuclear weapons 

employment policy and targeting. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2010 Nuclear 

Posture Review concluded that the United States could reduce the role of nuclear 

weapons in the U.S. security strategy. Although the threat of nuclear or conventional 

war with Russia has been reduced, DOD’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report

identified new threats and a small number of contingencies that may require the use 

of nuclear weapons, even as the United States has substantially reduced the size of 

its nuclear weapons stockpile.2 In particular, DOD stated that the United States 

would only consider employing nuclear weapons against states that possess nuclear 

weapons or are not in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. The 

United States and Russia also agreed to the New START Treaty,3 which would 

reduce the number of deployed weapons by February 2018.

 

1

Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1047(b)(1) (2011). Section 1047 contains several other mandates, which will 

be the subject of future work. For our 1991 report, see GAO, Strategic Weapons: Nuclear Weapons 

Targeting Process, GAO/NSIAD-91-319FS (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 1991). 

2

DOD, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C.: April 2010).

3

Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-

Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. No. 111-5 (2010).
Page 2 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

Our 1991 report described DOD's process for formulating its strategic nuclear 

weapons targeting policy and translating it into a plan for nuclear war. The 2011 

mandate required us to provide an update to the 1991 report, which addressed the 

relationship between the targeting process and the determination of requirements for 

nuclear weapons and related delivery systems; the level of civilian oversight; and the 

categories and types of targets. To address this mandate, we used our September 

1991 report as a basis for comparison, and described changes that have occurred 

since that time in the following areas:

• nuclear deterrence policy;

• strategic nuclear forces, including the stockpile, force posture, and 

modernization; 

• targeting and employment guidance from the President, Secretary of Defense, 

and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;

• nuclear weapons planning and targeting, including categories and types of 

targets;

• the level of civilian oversight; and

• the relationship between targeting and requirements.

In May 2012 we reported to congressional committees on the results of our work in a 

classified report. This is an unclassified version of that report. To prepare this 

unclassified version, we removed classified details such as references to stockpile 

quantities and operational requirements; examples of operational guidance; 

information about potential adversaries, target categories, and the number and types 

of targets; and specific information related to the nuclear weapons targeting process.

During our review, we relied on documentary and testimonial evidence obtained 

from across DOD. Although we obtained some key policy documents, stockpile data, 

and other documentary information, DOD did not provide us with the key guidance 

documents or the nuclear war plan. Instead, DOD provided us with information 

papers and briefings about the guidance and plan, which were prepared by the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and U.S. Strategic Command 

in response to our inquiries. We corroborated this information with testimonial 
Page 3 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

evidence. Through this approach we were able to achieve our objectives. Our scope 

and methodology are described in more detail in enclosure I.

We conducted our audit work from August 2011 to May 2012 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Results in Brief

The fundamental objectives of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy have remained largely 

consistent since 1991, even as the threat environment and the size of the nuclear 

weapons stockpile have changed. The current process for developing nuclear 

targeting and employment guidance has remained consistent. However, the 

structure of the nuclear war plan, and the categories and number of targets in the 

plan, have changed. DOD continues to exercise civilian oversight of the targeting 

process. The indirect relationship between the targeting process and DOD’s 

determination of requirements for nuclear weapons and delivery systems also 

continues. 

Deterrence Objectives Have Evolved to Cover a Wider Spectrum of Scenarios

 

U.S. deterrence objectives have remained largely consistent, although the policy has 

evolved to cover a wider spectrum of scenarios and potential adversaries. According 

to DOD, this evolution has occurred because successive administrations since 1991 

have viewed the threat environment as being more complex than the bipolar nuclear 

standoff during the Cold War. DOD officials added that through deterrence, potential 

adversaries view the gains of attacking the United States, its allies, and partners as 

outweighed and unacceptable in comparison to the costs of a U.S. response. DOD’s 

January 2012 strategic guidance stated that DOD will field nuclear forces that can, 
Page 4 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

under any circumstances, confront an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable 

damage.4

The United States Has Reduced Its Nuclear Weapons Stockpile since 1991 and 

Additional Reductions are Planned

The U.S. stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons has been significantly reduced since 

1991. According to DOD, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile has been reduced 

from 19,008 weapons in 1991, to 5,113 as of September 30, 2009, with a portion of 

these weapons deployed. As of April 2010, the United States had approximately 

2,200 deployed strategic nuclear weapons, according to the Nuclear Posture Review 

Report. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command determines how many of these 

deployed weapons are on alert on a day-to-day basis. Additionally, since the 1994 

Nuclear Posture Review the United States has retained a “hedge” stockpile of 

nondeployed weapons in order to mitigate risks posed by unforeseen technical 

problems with deployed weapons, or posed by changes in the international security 

environment. DOD determines the readiness levels of the weapons in the hedge by 

balancing U.S. Strategic Command’s preference to maximize operational flexibility 

against the resources available. Moving forward, the United States and Russia have 

agreed under the New START Treaty to further reduce the number of deployed 

weapons to 1,550 accountable warheads by February 2018. However, because of 

the treaty’s counting rules, which count bombers as one warhead, the United States 

projects to actually deploy more than 1,550 warheads when the treaty comes into 

effect. DOD has reported that it plans to modernize all three legs of the Triad—the 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles

(SLBM), and bombers that would deliver strategic nuclear bombs and warheads to 

their intended targets—but has not prepared complete cost estimates of these 

modernization efforts.

 

4

DOD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, D.C.: 

January 2012).
Page 5 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

Nuclear Weapons Guidance and Targeting Process Has Remained Virtually 

Unchanged 

The process for developing nuclear targeting and employment guidance, illustrated 

in figure 1, has remained virtually unchanged since 1991, according to OSD officials. 

Figure 1: Strategic Nuclear Weapons Targeting Process 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

Through this process, the president develops guidance that defines the fundamental 

role of nuclear weapons, deterrence strategy, and basic employment strategy, which 

typically includes a list of potential adversaries and target categories to hold at risk. 

According to DOD officials, the current presidential guidance was issued as National 

Security Presidential Directive-14 (NSPD-14) in 2002. According to OSD and Joint 

Staff officials, NSPD-14: 

 identifies potential adversaries, target categories, and scenarios requiring 

preplanned nuclear options; 

 emphasizes the need for survivable and flexible nuclear forces; 

 describes the type of nuclear options available to the President; 

 outlines a plan structure designed to avoid an “all-or-nothing” response to a 

nuclear attack; and 

 directs nuclear forces to hold at risk those critical assets and capabilities which a 

potential enemy leadership values most. 
Page 6 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

OSD officials told us that President Obama instructed DOD to complete a review of 

the U.S. deterrence strategy, which may lead to the issuance of new presidential 

guidance later in 2012.

The Secretary of Defense amplifies the president’s guidance. The Secretary of 

Defense typically updates the guidance in response to new Presidential guidance. 

However, DOD officials told us that the Secretary of Defense has discretion to 

update the guidance based on changes in the national security environment. 

According to OSD and Joint Staff officials, the Secretary of Defense’s May 2008 

Guidance for the Employment of the Force, Annex B: 

• reiterates presidential guidance on potential adversaries, and provides general 

and country-specific planning scenarios and objectives; 

• describes why the capability to rapidly develop new options is important; 

• provides high-level policy guidance for target selection and for the development 

of different types of attack options; and

• describes the required readiness levels for intercontinental ballistic missiles, 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers, and defines in general 

terms, the “operationally deployed” and “responsive” portions of the U.S. nuclear 

force.

Using the Secretary of Defense’s guidance, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, adds 

detail for military planners. According to Joint Staff and OSD officials, the 

Chairman’s guidance, the Nuclear Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities 

Plan:

• provides details on targeting constraints and restraints;5

• specifies damage criteria describing the extent to which a nuclear blast is 

required to render a target inoperable; and 

• identifies the “force generation timelines” for activating forces that are not on dayto-day alert.

 

5

A “constraint” is an operational limitation placed on a command by a higher commander that dictates

an action, whereas a “restraint” is an operational limitation that prohibits an action.
Page 7 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

Joint Staff officials told us the chairman’s guidance, last issued in 2004, should have 

been updated following the Secretary of Defense’s issuance of the May 2008 

Guidance for the Employment of the Force, Annex B. However, Joint Staff officials 

stated the revision was delayed pending the completion of the 2010 Nuclear Posture 

Review. The revision is now on hold pending the release of updated presidential 

guidance. 

Nuclear Weapons Employment Plan’s Structure and Content Have Changed 

since 1991

U.S. Strategic Command continues to follow a multistage process in developing the 

Nuclear Force Employment Plan, which is similar to the process followed in 1991, 

but the structure of the nuclear war plan, and the categories and number of targets, 

have changed significantly, according to DOD officials. As illustrated in figure 2, U.S. 

Strategic Command’s nuclear planning process includes: (1) identifying and 

designating targets, (2) allocating nuclear forces to carry out an attack on those

targets, and (3) developing an intricate execution plan for each attack option. 

Figure 2: Nuclear Planning Process

According to U.S. Strategic Command officials: 

• U.S. Strategic Command identifies targets by reviewing records from a Defense 

Intelligence Agency database, and for each selected record determines the 

critical installations that are to be held at risk in accordance with the attack 

objectives established in national guidance. 
Page 8 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

• Command planners then select weapon systems to achieve the best balance 

among national-level guidance, weapons planning factors, target characteristics, 

and the planner’s own analysis.

• Once weapons allocation is complete, planners then apply sortie-specific 

warheads to the intended targets. The resulting planning and execution data are

then sent to the Joint Staff and military services for review.

DOD and the President Exercise Civilian Oversight of the Planning Process

According to DOD officials, civilian oversight is exercised through several layers of 

review and approval during national guidance and Nuclear Force Employment Plan

development. For example, according to DOD officials, the Secretary of Defense’s 

guidance is formed in conjunction with the Joint Staff and the National Security Staff. 

OSD, Joint Staff, and U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that the president is 

made aware of significant changes to DOD guidance or the Nuclear Force 

Employment Plan. For example, according to a 2008 OSD memorandum, the U.S. 

Strategic Command, Joint Staff, and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy were directed to prepare a briefing for White House officials following a 

revision to the plan. 

An Indirect Relationship Exists between Targeting and Requirements

DOD officials stated that an indirect relationship exists between the targeting 

process and the determination of requirements for weapons and delivery systems, 

as we reported in 1991. DOD officials told us that DOD set requirements for strategic 

weapon systems in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, including an appropriate limit 

on nuclear weapons and on the size and structure of the Triad. U.S. Strategic 

Command has mechanisms to present its operational requirements for implementing 

the Nuclear Force Employment Plan, including making recommendations on the size 

and composition of the nuclear weapons stockpile and force structure, requirements 

for nuclear weapons life-extension programs, and capability and force structure 

requirements within integrated priorities lists. U.S. Strategic Command also was a 
Page 9 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

key participant in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and in the negotiations for the 

New START Treaty. 

Agency Comments

We provided DOD with a copy of our draft classified report for review and comment.

DOD did not provide written comments, but provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate. We also provided DOD a copy of our draft unclassified 

report for a security review. DOD has confirmed that the report is unclassified. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees 

and to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. This report is also available at no charge on 

the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in enclosure II. 

John H. Pendleton

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Enclosures - 2 
Page 10 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon 

Chairman 

The Honorable Adam Smith 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives
Page 11 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

Enclosure I

Scope and Methodology

To address this mandate we used classified and unclassified versions of our 1991 

report as a basis for comparison in order to describe changes in:

• nuclear deterrence policy;

• strategic nuclear forces, including the stockpile, force posture, and modernization 

plans;

• targeting and employment guidance from the President, Secretary of Defense, 

and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;

• nuclear weapons planning and targeting, including categories and types of 

targets;

• the level of civilian oversight; and

• the relationship between the strategic nuclear targeting process and the 

determination of strategic nuclear force requirements.

We obtained information about nuclear weapons policy and key employment 

guidance, stockpile data, other key documentation, and testimonial evidence from 

across the Department of Defense (DOD) for evidence to compare against our 1991 

reports, specifically, the following: 

• To address changes in U.S. deterrence policy and in strategic nuclear forces 

since 1991, we obtained, reviewed, and assessed the reports from the 1994, 

2001, and 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews, key reports to Congress from 2003, 

2004, 2010, and 2011 describing DOD's plans for the nuclear weapons stockpile 

and force structure, stockpile data from the 2011 Requirements and Planning

Document, and other key DOD documents and reports. We also obtained and 

reviewed congressional testimonies from current and former commanders of U.S. 

Strategic Command and senior officials from the Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD). We reviewed the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, New 

START Treaty, New START Treaty hearing transcripts, DOD reports to 

Congress, and other documentation to describe planned reductions to the 
Page 12 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

stockpile and plans for modernizing strategic delivery systems as the New 

START Treaty takes effect. 

• To address the changes in the content and process for establishing nuclear 

weapons targeting and employment guidance, including DOD's plan for nuclear 

war and the categories and types of targets, we requested from DOD key 

guidance from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. This guidance included National Security Presidential Directive-14, 

published in 2002;6 Annex B to the Secretary of Defense's Guidance for 

Employment of the Force, published in 2008;7 and Nuclear Supplement to the 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, published in 2004.8

• To address the changes in DOD's process for civilian oversight of the strategic 

targeting process, we reviewed memoranda from OSD that approved changes to 

the guidance or plan. We also reviewed materials prepared for us in response to 

our inquiries, and interviewed officials from OSD, Joint Staff, and U.S. Strategic 

Command. 

DOD did not provide these 

documents but did provide us with information papers and briefings prepared by 

OSD and Joint Staff officials in response to our inquiries, and we corroborated 

this information with testimonial evidence. We also obtained briefings on U.S. 

Strategic Command’s nuclear planning process and on the structure and content 

of the Nuclear Force Employment Plan, which we used to corroborate testimonial 

information about the plan. We interviewed officials from those organizations and 

the Defense Intelligence Agency to corroborate their contents. Through this 

approach we were able to achieve our objectives.

• To address the relationship between the strategic nuclear targeting process and 

DOD's requirements for nuclear weapons and related delivery systems, we 

obtained and reviewed U.S. Strategic Command documentation identifying 

requirements for the size and composition of the nuclear weapons stockpile, and 

 

6

White House, Nuclear Weapons Planning Guidance, NSPD-14 (Washington, D.C.: June 2002).

7

OSD, Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, Annex B to the Guidance for 

Employment of the Force, 2008-2010 (Washington, D.C.: May 2008).

8

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nuclear Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, CJCSI 

3110.04B (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 31, 2004).
Page 13 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

assessments of the safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile. We 

corroborated this information by interviewing officials from OSD, Joint Staff, and 

U.S. Strategic Command.

We conducted our audit work from August 2011 to May 2012 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Page 14 GAO-12-786R Strategic Weapons

Enclosure II

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

John H. Pendleton (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report included 

Penney Harwell Caramia, Assistant Director; David M. Adams; Colin L. Chambers; 

Grace A. Coleman; Robert Scott Fletcher; Kevin L. O’Neill; Michael C. 

Shaughnessy; and Amie Steele.

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