2021 IL App (4th) 190352-U 

NO. 4-19-0352 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

STESON L. CRIDER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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 Appeal from the 

 Circuit Court of

 Adams County 

 No. 15CF242 

 Honorable 

 Robert K. Adrian, 

 Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices DeArmond and Holder White concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in dismissing defendant’s postconviction petition at the 

first stage of postconviction proceedings as frivolous and patently without merit 

where defendant failed to present an arguably meritorious claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel.

¶ 2 Defendant, Steson L. Crider, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his

pro se postconviction petition filed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 

5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018). He contends the court’s dismissal was erroneous because the petition 

stated the gist of a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In May 2015, the State charged defendant with first degree murder (720 ILCS 

5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2014)) for the shooting death of Rayshone Humphrey Jr., a 12-year-old child. 

FILED

July 30, 2021

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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At defendant’s October 2015 jury trial, the State and the defense presented evidence from several

witnesses. The evidence relevant to the issue on appeal follows.

¶ 5 Defendant lived in Arizona but, on March 27, 2015, he was in Quincy, Illinois,

visiting family and friends. He was aware of a feud between two groups of men. His group included 

his brothers, Stefan Crider III and Justin Cartmill, and two friends, Ja’Chaun Parker and Anthony 

Runnels. Witnesses saw defendant with a gun on the day and night of the shooting. The other 

group of men often congregated near Barb Stemmons’s house, where the victim was planning to 

stay overnight with his friend.

¶ 6 Around midnight, a confrontation between some members of each group occurred 

at a local tavern. Witnesses said defendant was angry, presumably about this confrontation. Stefan, 

defendant, Shaine Thomas, Parker, and Runnels left the tavern in a vehicle. They drove to the area 

near Stemmons’s house to find the other group. Parker testified defendant exited the vehicle while 

stating he intended to “pop one of those niggas.” Parker saw defendant tuck a gun into his belt and 

head down an alley toward Stemmons’s house. 

¶ 7 Meanwhile, Humphrey was waiting in front of Stemmons’s house for his mother to 

pick him up. Parker testified he heard a gunshot and saw defendant run back to their car. When 

defendant got in, he said he had “just popped one of the niggas,” shooting him in the face. 

According to Runnels, defendant thought he had shot one of the members of the other group who 

had been wearing a red “hoodie.” As it turned out, Humphrey was wearing a red hoodie and had 

been fatally shot in the head.

¶ 8 One of the State’s witnesses, Helen Horton, who was Runnels’s sister, testified she 

was sitting on steps in the dark across the street from Stemmons’s house watching for her 

boyfriend, Clarence Braxton. She saw a person appear from the alley and shoot Humphrey. She 
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said she did not see the shooter’s face, but she saw that he was also wearing a red “hoodie” with 

chains around his neck and a blonde patch in his hair. Horton acknowledged she had been 

convicted of multiple felonies and was a longtime drug abuser, though she had been clean for six 

months at the time of trial.

¶ 9 After the eight-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and 

the trial court sentenced him to 65 years in prison. Defendant filed a direct appeal and this court 

affirmed. See People v. Crider, 2018 IL App (4th) 151023-U.

¶ 10 In February 2019, defendant filed the pro se postconviction petition at issue in this 

appeal. In it, defendant asserted he was denied his right to effective assistance of trial counsel

because counsel did not (1) secure an expert witness in eyewitness identifications to discredit 

Horton, (2) call Braxton, Horton’s boyfriend, as a witness to impeach Horton, and (3) call Tony 

Mclellan as a witness, who had supposedly overheard Horton and Runnels talking about falsely 

implicating defendant as the shooter. The only supporting document attached to his petition was 

his own affidavit, in which defendant stated he gave his attorney Mclellan’s name prior to the start 

of the trial.

¶ 11 On May 3, 2019, the trial court filed a written order, dismissing defendant’s petition 

at the first stage of the postconviction proceedings. The court found defendant’s claims had been 

forfeited for not being raised on direct appeal. As an alternative to and despite forfeiture, the court 

found defendant’s petition frivolous and patently without merit where defendant did not 

demonstrate prejudice. The court found there existed ample evidence, even without Horton’s 

testimony, to support the conviction. 

¶ 12 This appeal followed. 

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 14 The Act “provides a mechanism for criminal defendants to challenge their 

convictions or sentences based on a substantial violation of their rights under the federal or state 

constitutions.” People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 354 (2010). A proceeding under the Act is a 

collateral proceeding and not an appeal from the defendant’s conviction and sentence. People v. 

English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21. The defendant must show he or she suffered a substantial 

deprivation of his or her federal or state constitutional rights. People v. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d 79, 

83 (2008).

¶ 15 The Act establishes a three-stage process for adjudicating a postconviction petition. 

English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23. Here, defendant’s petition was dismissed at the first stage. At the 

first stage, the trial court must review the postconviction petition and determine whether “the 

petition is frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). To 

survive dismissal at this initial stage, the postconviction petition “need only present the gist of a 

constitutional claim,” which is “a low threshold” that requires the petition to contain only “a 

limited amount of detail.” People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). Our supreme court has 

held “a pro se petition seeking postconviction relief under the Act for a denial of constitutional 

rights may be summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit only if the petition has 

no arguable basis either in law or in fact.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2009). A petition 

lacks an arguable legal basis when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as 

one that is completely contradicted by the record. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16. A petition lacks an 

arguable factual basis when it is based on a fanciful factual allegation, such as one that is clearly 

baseless, fantastic, or delusional. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16-17. “In considering a petition pursuant 

to [section 122-2.1 of the Act], the court may examine the court file of the proceeding in which 

the petitioner was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding and any 
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transcripts of such proceeding.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(c) (West 2018); see also People v. Brown, 

236 Ill. 2d 175, 184 (2010). Our review of the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition is 

de novo. People v. Dunlap, 2011 IL App (4th) 100595, ¶ 20. 

¶ 16 On appeal, defendant does not argue in support of his claims set forth in his 

postconviction petition related to counsel’s failure to call as witnesses Mclellan or an expert in the 

field of eyewitness identification. Instead, he contends he stated the gist of a constitutional claim 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel’s failure to call Braxton as a witness to 

impeach or undermine Horton’s testimony. According to defendant, Braxton would have allegedly 

testified that Horton “fabricated a story” naming defendant as the shooter. Defendant claims 

counsel did not investigate this witness and therefore did not have all the facts necessary to make 

a reasonable strategic assessment on whether Braxton would have been useful as a defense witness 

for the purpose of undermining Horton’s credibility. Defendant claims there is arguably a 

reasonable probability the jury may have found defendant not guilty if the State’s witnesses were 

“thoroughly undermined” and had counsel not rendered ineffective assistance. 

¶ 17 This court analyzes ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the standard set 

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999). 

To obtain reversal under Strickland, a defendant must prove (1) counsel’s performance failed to 

meet an objective standard of competence and (2) counsel’s deficient performance resulted in 

prejudice to the defendant. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93. To satisfy the deficiency prong of Strickland, 

the defendant must demonstrate counsel made errors so serious and counsel’s performance was so 

deficient that counsel was not functioning as “counsel” guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Evans, 

186 Ill. 2d at 93. Further, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption the challenged 

action or inaction could have been the product of sound trial strategy. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93. To 
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satisfy the prejudice prong, the defendant must prove a reasonable probability exists that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different. Evans, 186 Ill. 

2d at 93. The Strickland Court noted a case should be decided on the ground of lack of sufficient 

prejudice rather than counsel’s constitutionally deficient representation if it is easier to do so. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

¶ 18 First, the State contends defendant did not comply with section 122-2 of the Act’s 

supporting-document requirement in his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To sustain an 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for counsel’s failure to investigate or present a witness, the 

defendant’s allegation must be supported by an affidavit from that witness that contains the 

witness’s proposed testimony. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2018); People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 380 

(2000); see also People v. Dean, 226 Ill. App. 3d 465, 468 (1992) (when defendant attacks 

competency of trial counsel in postconviction petition for failure to call or contact certain 

witnesses, defendant must attach affidavits from those witnesses). “In the absence of such an 

affidavit, a reviewing court cannot determine whether the proposed witness could have provided 

testimony or information favorable to the defendant, and further review of the claim is 

unnecessary.” Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 380. Thus, we agree with the State that generally, a reviewing 

court would be unable to evaluate the propriety of a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel without the aid of an affidavit from the potential witness that would set forth that person’s 

anticipated testimony. 

¶ 19 However, here, an affidavit from Braxton would be insignificant. Even if we were 

to accept defendant’s claim that counsel erred by failing to investigate and call Braxton as a 

witness, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice. For argument’s sake, we will assume Braxton 

would have testified that Horton told him she intended to identify defendant as the shooter to direct 
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the attention away from her brother, Runnels, as the shooter. The problem with that claim, as the 

State points out, is that Horton did not identify defendant as the shooter during her testimony. In 

fact, she testified she did not see the shooter’s face. She merely described what the shooter was 

wearing. That is, she testified she witnessed the shooting, but she did not identify defendant as the 

shooter. 

¶ 20 The jury heard overwhelming evidence from numerous witnesses suggesting 

defendant was the shooter. That is, it is unreasonable to believe the verdict would have been any 

different had Horton’s credibility been undermined by Braxton’s potential testimony. Horton’s 

testimony was already seriously undermined by evidence of her criminal history and regular drug 

use. Given the other evidence presented at trial, Horton provided nothing of value to the jury to 

identify defendant as the shooter. In fact, as Detective Adam Gibson testified, Horton’s 

information was insufficient to even make an arrest. In other words, evidence of defendant’s guilt 

was overwhelming and independent of Horton’s testimony. As such, defendant cannot demonstrate 

prejudice by counsel’s failure to investigate Braxton as a potential witness. 

¶ 21 Accordingly, we find the trial court properly dismissed defendant’s postconviction 

petition at the first stage of the proceedings. 

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 24 Affirmed.