Report to the Congress:

Adequacy of Federal Sentencing Guideline Penalties

for Computer Fraud and Vandalism Offenses

(as directed by section 805 of Public Law 104-132)

United States Sentencing Commission

June 1996
 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 1

 Congress specifically directed that the Commission “. . . review the deterrent effect of 2

existing guideline levels as they apply to paragraphs (4) and (5) of section 1030 (a) of title 18,

United States Code.”

Report to the Congress:

Adequacy of Federal Sentencing Guideline Penalties 

for Computer Fraud and Vandalism Offenses

I. Introduction

A. The Statutory Directive

Congress has directed the Commission, pursuant to Section 805 of the Antiterrorism an d

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Antiterrorism Act) , to review the deterrent effect of existing 1

guidelines as they apply to computer crimes set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) and (5). This report 2

responds to that particular directive.

The computer crimes set forth at 18 U.S.C. §1030 (a)(4) and(5) prohibit unauthorized access

of a federal government data base for the purpose of obtaining information to perpetrate a frau d

(subsection (a)(4)) and the transmission of a program, information, code, or command to a computer

system used in interstate commerce or communication for the purpose of damaging such a system or

with reckless disregard for the possibility that such damage will occur (subsection (a)(5)).

The Commission is further instructed to amend its guidelines to the extent necessary to ensure

that any individual subsequently convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) or (5) will face a

minimum term of imprisonment of six months. The Commission is currently considering alternative

means of implementing this sentencing directive. The Commission is also considering other needed

changes in the guidelines applicable to computer crimes. This work continues a cooperative effort

with the Department of Justice begun several years ago and may result in the submission of guideline

amendments to Congress within the next amendment cycle (i.e., by May 1, 1997).
 The Commission’s data base of sentences imposed under the guidelines contains 174 3

cases of computer crime convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Thirty-eight (38) of the most

temporally remote of these files had not been received from outside storage at the time this report

was prepared. Forty (40) cases have been identified in which computer crime pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) or (5) was the primary offense of conviction and in which sentences were

established pursuant to the fraud guideline (USSG §2F1.1). Thus, even if all 38 of the files not

yet reviewed are for convictions under the pertinent statutory provisions, an unlikely result, no

more than 78 federal convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) or (5) will have been obtained in

a period of more than seven years. If the proportion of convictions under subsections (4) and (5)

to total computer crime convictions for cases already reviewed remains constant in the files to be

reviewed, the total result will be approximately 60 guideline sentences under subsections (4) and

(5).

 Id.

4

2

B. Summary of Findings

The following findings are based on the Commission’s review of approximately 80 percent o f

3

guideline convictions (1988 to present) under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) and (5):

• Federal “computer crime” cases sentenced under the pertinent provisions of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1030 are relatively uncommon at present. An estimated 60 defendants have been

successfully prosecuted and sentenced thereunder in the almost nine years since the

guidelines came into existence.4

• Overall, federal district judges historically have sentenced a higher percentage of those

convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) or (5) within the guideline range than has

been true of other “white collar” defendants or federal defendants generally.

• Computer crime defendants receive downward departures from guideline ranges more

frequently than do other “white collar” defendants or federal defendants generally.

• To date no person sentenced under the guidelines whose primary offense o f

conviction was a computer crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) or (5) has received

a sentence that departed upward from the guideline range.

• Defendants convicted under 18 U.S.C. §1030 (a)(4) or (5) tend to have more formal

education than other “white collar” defendants and much more formal education than

federal defendants generally.

• Individuals convicted under the pertinent statutes tend to have less serious criminal

histories than other “white collar” criminals and much less serious criminal histories

than federal defendants generally.
 Crimes pursuant to subsections (a)(4) and (5) are currently designated to the fraud 5

guideline despite the fact that subsection (a)(5) violations are not true fraud offenses. The

Commission is currently considering redesignating subsection (a)(5) violations to the trespass

guideline or, potentially, other alternatives.

3

• To date no person convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) or (5) an d

sentenced under the fraud guideline has been sentenced for a subsequent federa l

crime. 

• A review of the sentences imposed upon those who violated 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4)

or (5) prior to the enactment of the Antiterrorism Act indicates that the guidelin e

adjustments mandated by Congress generally will increase punishment for this class

of defendant. 

• Existing data do not permit the Commission to draw any firm conclusions regarding

the deterrent effect of existing guideline penalties for these computer-related crimes.

II. Operation of Relevant Sentencing Guidelines, Computer Fraud Crimes

The sentencing guidelines contain multiple, related mechanisms designed to achiev e

appropriate punishment for fraud offenses, including frauds perpetrated with the aid of a computer. 5

These provisions include: (1) the fraud offense guideline (§2F1.1); (2) related commentar y

identifying atypical offense characteristics that may justify a sentence above the applicable guideline

range (§5K2.0); (3) the vulnerable victim adjustment which provides enhanced sentences for those

who choose their victims mindful of some characteristic (e.g., youth, old age, mental infirmity, etc.)

which makes them particularly susceptible to the crime (§3A1.1); and (4) the adjustment for abuse

of a position of trust which provides for a two level enhancement to the offense score of a defendant

who, because of his status as a trusted managerial employee, is subject to significantly less supervision

than rank-and-file employees (§3B1.3).

A. Fraud Guideline

The Federal Criminal Code contains numerous fraud offenses which vary in their mode o f

perpetration (e.g., mail, telephone, computer, etc.), affected victims, and penalty structure. Th e

Sentencing Commission promulgated a single fraud guideline, §2F1.1, to govern sentencing of these

myriad fraud offenses. The fraud guideline is designed to measure the seriousness of a given offense

by requiring the district court to assess: (1) the amount of loss experienced by the victim or victims

of the offense; (2) the sophistication of the offense in terms of planning; (3) whether the offende r

claimed to be a representative of a charity or other especially trusted institution; (4) whether th e

criminal conduct violated a previously imposed judicial or administrative order; (5) whether th e

serious bodily injury occurred or was risked; and (6) whether significant harm was suffered by a

financial institution.

B. Departures
 See USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A 4(b). 6

 Along with the nature of the offense, guideline sentences are determined by criminal 7

history scores which assess an offender’s previous criminal record and provide incrementally

greater punishment in relation to the frequency, seriousness, and temporal proximity of the

offender’s previous criminal behavior. See USSG Ch. 4, Pts. A and B.

 See USSG §3B1.3, App. Note 1. 8

4

Guideline §5K2.0 (Grounds for Departure) is a policy statement exp laining circumstances that

may warrant a sentence outside the otherwise applicable guideline range. This departure authority

reflects Congressional intent promulgated under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b), which provides, in pertinent

part, that the district court may impose sentences outside the range established by the applicabl e

guideline when it finds “that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to

a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the

guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.”

The guidance afforded by §5K2.0 is augmented by the Commission’s general approach t o

departures as stated in Chapter One of the Guidelines Manual. Read together, these sections

6

articulate the Commission’s desire that applicable guideline provisions will result in sentence s

appropriate for typical (“heartland”) cases of particular offense types and offender categories. 7

C. Vulnerable Victim Adjustment

Where a defendant has exhibited predatory conduct which targeted victims because of their

unusually high vulnerability to the crime, the Commission has provided a general, two-leve l

enhancement (approximately a 25 percent increase in sentence length). This enhancement is

promulgated at §3A1.1 (b) and can apply to a wide range of criminal behavior, including computer

fraud. Section 3A1.1 (b) envisions an ad hoc determination by the district court focusing both o n

whether the victim was “unusually vulnerable” and on whether the defendant knew or should have

appreciated that vulnerability.

D. Abuse of Position of Trust

Where a defendant has held a position characterized by substanti al discretionary judgment and

in which he has been subject to significantly less supervision than employees whose tasks are nondiscretionary in nature, a violation of this trust can result in a two level enhancement an d

correspondingly harsher sentencing. This enhancement applies only when the position of trust

contributed in some way to the commission or concealment of the offense. This “abuse of trust”

8

enhancement is applied to computer fraud defendants at a much higher rate than to other federa l

defendants. See Table 2, post.

III. Data Analysis
 See supra note 3.

9

 In this context “white collar” crime means the aggregate number of federal convictions 10

from 1988 through 1995 for the following types of offenses: fraud, embezzlement, forgery,

counterfeiting, bribery, tax offenses and money laundering.

 Concomitantly, an increased rate of computer crime after implementation of the 11

guidelines would not permit the conclusion that the guidelines were not providing deterrent effect. 

The increase could be attributable to a steeply increasing rate of opportunity for commission of

computer crimes, economic conditions, etc.

5

A. General Approach

The Commission reviewed sentencing files of 136 of the 174 defendants who have bee n

convicted of any crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 since the guidelines became effective in 1987. Only

51 of the 136 files reviewed involve convictions under subsections (a)(4) or (5). Of these 51 cases, 9

only 40 were cases in which either subsection was the primary offense of conviction. These 40 cases

were coded for pertinent data. Using a variety of factors, discussed more fully infra, these computer

crime cases have been compared to all federal convictions (1988-95) and to all “white collar ”

convictions (1988-95). Unfortunately, this data affords a scant basis upon which to commen t

10

concerning the deterrent effect, specific or general, of the existing guidelines upon those who have

committed or would otherwise have committed crimes as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) or (5).

For this reason, the Commission attempted to establish a “profile” of the typical offender under the

pertinent statutes in the hope that this “profile,” in combination with research on the “deterrability”

of individuals sharing the characteristics of the “profile,” would permit a reasoned assessment of the

deterrent effect of the existing guidelines.

B. Methodology and Data Limitations

There are several reasons why the dataset available to the Commission is inadequate t o

evaluate the deterrent effect of existing guideline penalties for computer crime. Empirical assessment

of the deterrent effect of the guidelines is inhibited by two important factors: 1) the absence of case

information prior to the promulgation of the sentencing guidelines; and 2) the lack of information on

important additional variables (e.g., percentage of the public which knows the guidelines exist,

percentage of the public which knows the extent of penalties provided by the guidelines, extent to

which technological advances have increased the security of computer systems, allocation of la w

enforcement resources etc.) which could impact the rate of occurrence of computer crime. A n

assessment of the deterrent impact of the guidelines cannot be made without some knowledge of the

rate of occurrence of computer crime prior to the enactment of the guidelines. Even could it b e

demonstrated that the rate of computer crime has decreased since implementation of the guidelines,

this would not permit the conclusion that the guidelines were responsible for such a decrease. 11

Even if all the unknown variables discussed above could be accounted for, the smal l

population of computer crime defendants sentenced to date under the guidelines would be inadequate
 As indicated previously, 51 defendants are known to have been convicted under 12

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) or (5). However, the sentences of 11 of these defendants were

determined primarily under guidelines other than the fraud guideline because of more serious

related criminal conduct. The 40 whose sentences were determined under the fraud guideline are

the analytically significant portion of this population. Of these 40, 21 were sentenced to some

term of imprisonment. Thus, 47.5 percent (19 of 40) of the universe of offenders sentenced to

date primarily for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) or (5) drew sentences of probation. It

may readily be inferred that Congress’ direction to provide for six months imprisonment for these

crimes will dramatically affect sentencing practices in this context. 

 A name and social security number check of the Commission’s files was conducted to 13

verify that each of these 40 persons has been sentenced only once under the guidelines.

 Also, the cases thus far examined indicate that 77.5 percent of those convicted under the 14

pertinent statutory provisions committed their crimes in the workplace. Their criminal records

may well have precluded them from the occupations they formerly performed and deprived them

of the opportunity to repeat their crimes. Thus, their post-sentence conduct may be more

attributable to the fact that these individuals no longer function in an environment where

repetition of their crimes is possible than to the deterrent effect of the guidelines.

6

to permit any statistically valid generalizations about the ability of the existing guidelines to provide

specific deterrence (i.e., deter those already convicted from engaging once again in this crime) o r

general deterrence (i.e., the extent to which those who had the opportunity to commit such crimes

refrained from such behavior as a result of their knowledge and fear of punishment as prescribed by

the existing guidelines). Because only an estimated 60 persons have been convicted in the federa l

system of computer crime offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 in a time when the number of computers

and those with access to them has increased exponentially, one could hypothesize that the existing

guidelines have afforded effective general deterrence. Yet, a number of pertinent questions remain

unanswered. For example, how much criminal behavior that could have been successfully prosecuted

under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 was prosecuted under other fraud statutes or under state law, or no t

prosecuted at all, at the election of individual prosecutors? How much of this conduct has simpl y

gone undetected? The fact that the Commission does not have information to answer adequatel y

these and possibly other relevant questions necessarily limits the validity of any conclusions it may

draw concerning the general deterrence of the existing guidelines.

With respect to specific deterrence, the data reviewed indicate that 40 defendants convicted

under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4) or (5) have received a guideline sentence and, to date, none of these 12

40 individuals have been sentenced for other federal crimes. This may seem to indicate that the

13

existing guidelines provide adequate specific deterrence. However, most of the 40 individuals, 21

of whom have been subjected to some length of imprisonment, have been released from crimina l

justice control too recently to determine whether any of the 40 ultimately will recidivate. 14

Because of the inadequacy of the available statistical information, standing alone, to permit

any definitive response to Congress’ deterrence question, the Commission compiled additional data
 This “typical offender” has been delineated on the basis of those 40 individuals whose 15

sentences were calculated under the fraud guideline and who were convicted under 18 U.S.C. §

1030 (a)(4) or (5).

7

(Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 attached) from which a profile of a “typical offender” has been drawn. It was 15

hoped that this profile, in combination with the research social scientists have produced on th e

question of the “deterrability” of “white collar” crime, could be used to draw tentative conclusions

about the deterrent effect of the existing guidelines. The data presented in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4

provide a convenient reference for looking at the characteristic s of the “typical” computer crime case.

C. Findings

Table 1 compares all federal convictions, “white collar” convictions, and all convictions under

the pertinent statutory provisions from 1988 through 1996 for various “defendant characteristics ”

including citizenship, gender, race and level of education. For the most part, the comparisons ar e

unremarkable; however, with respect to educational level, the data indicate that the typical computer

crime defendant is better educated than other “white collar” defendants and much better educate d

than federal defendants generally. Specifically, 26.3 percent of computer crime defendants are college

graduates as opposed to 17.1 percent for “white collar” defendants and onl y 7.5 percent for all federal

defendants.

Table 2 illustrates the application of various guideline factors to the groups being compared.

In terms of average base offense levels, mode of conviction, and frequency of receipt of a downward

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility (USSG §3E1.1), the data in Table 2 is unremarkable.

Perhaps significantly, the typical computer crime defendant has no criminal history. Eighty (80 )

percent had no criminal history score (vis-a-vis 65.7 percent in “white collar” defendants and 50.6

percent in all federal defendants). Thus, from the sample the Commission could examine, it appears

that computer crime defendants have less significant criminal histories than other federal defendants.

It should be noted also that computer crime defendants receive enhanced sentences for “abuse o f

position” pursuant to §3B1.3 more frequently than “white collar” defendants (32.5 percent for the

former; 8.8 percent for the latter) and much more frequently than the class of all federal defendants

(32.5 percent vis-à-vis 3.0 percent).

Table 3 illustrates sentencing statistics for the groups being compared. Table 3 provide s

illustrative information with respect to departure rates and guideline ranges. Computer crim e

defendants were sentenced within guideline ranges at a rate of 86.1 percent; “white collar” defendants

at a rate of 80.4 percent; and the class of all federal defendants at 76.6 percent. Computer crim e

defendants received downward departures from guideline ranges more frequently than members of

the other two groups, and no computer fraud defendant has ever been subjected to an upwar d

departure. The data tends to suggest that sentencing judges are generally satisfied that guidelin e

sentences for computer crime defendants are realistically constructed to mirror the seriousness o f

these offenses.
8

Table 4 includes information on computer crime defendants only. The Commission reviewed

each available computer crime case file and collected information on the level of computer expertise

of these defendants, the motivation for their crimes, the way in which a computer was used in th e

crimes perpetrated and the environment where the crimes were committed. Data in Table 4 indicate

that the typical computer crime defendant has only a pedestrian level of computer expertise (76. 9

percent were neither computer professionals nor highly skilled “hackers”), is motivated to commit

his/her crime for financial reasons (87.5 percent of the time), and usually commits his/her crim e

through the use of a computer he/she is authorized to use in his/her workplace (77.5 percent of the

time). These findings tend to dispel the popular notion that the typical computer crime defendant is

a highly skilled computer “hacker” invading classified data bases with intent to sabotage or extort.

Yet, it must again be stated that the population examined is very small, and one cannot measure the

frequency or extent of criminal conduct which may go undetected or is detected without means of

identifying the offender. The Commission’s data obviously are the outcome of a process that is

contingent upon the detection, federal prosecution and conviction of computer crime offenders. The

limited data which the Commission does possess indicate that the typical computer crime defendant

commits his crime in the workplace, has only functional computer skills, and is motivated by hope of

illicit profit.

An additional, perhaps significant, fact is that none of the 40 computer crime defendants who

have been sentenced under the guidelines as a result of convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(4)

or (5) have been subsequently convicted of another federal crime. While this fact would tend t o

support the proposition that the existing guidelines provide adequate specific deterrent effect, other

considerations preclude such a definitive conclusion. For example, these offenders all have completed

their sentences fairly recently and, as such, some may very well yet recidivate. Moreover, it i s

possible that some have already been arrested for subsequent federal crimes which are not yet ripe

for disposition. It is possible, too, that some have committed subsequent offenses which wil l

generally not appear in the Commission’s data base (e.g., offenses under state law). These factors,

plus the small size of the population being examined, militate against drawing any strong conclusions

as to the deterrent effect of the existing guidelines.
 The Commission’s review of existing scholarship on the specific subject of factors which 16

would deter an individual from committing computer crime found no such studies in the criminal

justice literature. 

See, e.g., Jack P. Gibbs, Crime, Punishment and Deterrence, 5-11 (1975). 17

 Moreover, the “profile” of the typical computer crime defendant, when correlated to 18

existing scholarship on deterrence, still did not enable the Commission to conduct a definitive

analysis.

9

IV. Deterrence Studies

In addition to compiling the aforementioned data contained in Tables 1-4, the Commission

has conducted a limited review of scholarship on the subject of gener al deterrence and the factors that

specifically deter “white collar” criminals from repeating their offenses. Based on this limited

16

review, it appears generally that researchers who have studied general deterrence have found that

it is very difficult to say with certainty the extent to which a given criminal sanction discourage s

criminal conduct. However, some researchers who have studied deterrence believe that (1) there is

inherent deterrent effect in criminalizing a behavior, and (2) that the deterrent effect increases where

the perception exists that punishment will be certain, swift and severe. Conversely, to the extent that

any of these perceptions is lacking, deterrent effect diminishes. 17

V. Conclusion

The limited empirical data available to the Commission and other factors preclude a definitive

assessment of the deterrent effect of existing guidelines for computer fraud and computer vandalism.18

The relatively few convictions under these provisions are insufficient to permit generalize d

conclusions about their deterrent effect. As convictions increase, the Commission, in cooperation with

the Department of Justice, will continue to analyze the operation of the guidelines in the computer

crime context and expects to consider additional modifications in the current, 1996-97, amendment

cycle to improve their operation and effectiveness.
10

Table 1

DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTICS FOR ALL CASES, WHITE COLLAR CASES, 

AND COMPUTER FRAUD CASES 

All White Computer 

Cases Collar Cases Fraud Cases 1 2 3

DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTICS Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

CITIZENSHIP STATUS

U.S. Citizen 148,499 77.4 37,266 86.5 36 94.7

Non-U.S. Citizen 43,472 22.6 5,828 13.5 2 5.3

CRIMINAL HISTORY POINTS

No Points 117,191 50.6 28,166 65.7 32 80.0

One or More Points 114,324 49.4 14,702 34.3 8 20.0

GENDER

Male 166,391 84.3 32,040 73.0 27 71.1

Female 31,041 15.7 11,838 27.0 11 28.9

RACE

White 83,779 42.9 26,026 59.7 27 71.1

Black 56,454 28.9 11,052 25.4 8 21.1

Hispanic 47,596 24.4 4,504 10.3 2 5.3

Other 7,402 3.8 1,979 4.5 1 2.6

EDUCATION

Less than High School 75,553 39.9 8,885 20.8 2 5.3

H.S. Graduate 63,196 33.3 14,246 33.4 12 31.6

Some College 36,517 19.3 12,271 28.7 14 36.8

College Graduate 14,244 7.5 7,284 17.1 10 26.3

 ____________________

Of the 248,896 cases, the total for each characteristic may add up to less than the overall total due to missing information for all demographic variables prior to 1990. 1

White collar offenses encompass the following offense types: fraud, embezzlement, forgery/counterfeiting, bribery, tax offenses, and money laundering. The total for each 2

characteristic may add up to less than the overall total due to missing information for all demographic variables prior to 1990.

Of the 174 cases sentenced under §18:1030 from Monitoring’s Ongoing Production Files, 51 were convicted under §§18:1030(a)(4) and 18:1030(a)(5). Of those 51, 40 3

were sentenced under §2F1.1 as the highest guideline. The total for each characteristic may add up to less than the overall total due to missing information for that

variable.

SOURCE: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Ongoing Production Files, 1988 - 1996.
Table 2

GUIDELINE FACTORS FOR ALL CASES, WHITE COLLAR CASES, 

AND COMPUTER CRIME CASES

All White Computer 

 Cases Collar Cases Crime Cases 1 2 3

GUIDELINE FACTORS Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

ABUSE OF POSITION

Received Adjustment 6,890 3.0 3,776 8.8 13 32.5

No Adjustment 225,010 97.0 39,128 91.2 27 67.5

ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY

Received Adjustment 189,728 81.8 37,545 87.5 38 95.0

No Adjustment 42,169 18.2 5,361 12.5 2 5.0

CRIMINAL HISTORY 

No Points 117,191 50.5 28,166 65.6 32 80.0

One or More Points 114,324 49.3 14,702 34.3 8 20.0

MODE OF CONVICTION

Plea 203,610 88.3 40,694 92.9 38 97.4

Trial 27,031 11.7 3,118 7.1 1 2.6

AVERAGE SENTENCE RANGE4

Mean Sentence Range (Months) 41 - 51 6 - 12 0 - 6

Median Sentence Range (Months) 27 - 33 0 - 6 0 - 6

 ____________________

Of the 248,896 cases, the total for each characteristic may add up to less than the overall total due to missing information for abuse of position and acceptance of 1

responsibility prior to 1990. 

White collar offenses encompass the following offense types: fraud, embezzlement, forgery/counterfeiting, bribery, tax offenses, and money laundering. The total for each 2

characteristic may add up to less than the overall total due to missing information for abuse of position and acceptance of responsibility prior to 1990.

Of the 174 cases sentenced under §18:1030 from Monitoring’s Ongoing Production Files, 51 were convicted under §§18:1030(a)(4) and 18:1030(a)(5). Of those 51, 40 3

were sentenced under §2F1.1 as the highest guideline. The total for each characteristic may add up to less than the overall total due to missing information for that

variable.

Sentence ranges are derived from average base offense level and Criminal History Category I. 4

SOURCE: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Ongoing Production Files, 1988 - 1996.
Table 3

SENTENCING FACTORS FOR ALL CASES, WHITE COLLAR CASES, 

AND COMPUTER FRAUD CASES

All White Computer 

Cases Collar Cases Fraud Cases 1 2 3

SENTENCING FACTORS Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

DEPARTURE STATUS

Within Range 169,259 76.6 33,147 80.4 31 86.1

Upward Departure 3,072 1.4 409 1.0 0 0.0

Downward Departure 14,989 6.8 2,813 6.8 4 11.1

Substantial Assistance Departure 33,608 15.2 4,884 11.8 1 2.8

WITHIN-GUIDELINE RANGES 4

First Quartile 80,732 63.8 18,798 66.6 17 73.9

Second Quartile 19,415 15.3 4,275 15.1 4 17.4

Third Quartile 7,124 5.6 1,410 5.0 1 4.3

Fourth Quartile 19,307 15.3 3,750 13.3 1 4.3

SENTENCE IMPOSED

Prison Only 181,104 73.8 21,061 48.5 11 28.2

Prison + Confinement 8,888 3.6 3,577 8.2 5 12.8

Probation + Confinement 19,546 8.0 8,065 18.6 9 23.1

Probation Only 35,944 14.6 10,725 24.7 14 35.9

MEAN PRISON SENTENCE5

Mean 63.2 19.3 13.1

Median 33.0 12.0 9.0

 ____________________

Of the 248,896 cases, the total for each characteristic may add up to less than the overall total due to missing information on mandatory minimums prior to 1992. 1

White collar offenses encompass the following offense types: fraud, embezzlement, forgery/counterfeiting, bribery, tax offenses, and money laundering. The total for each 2

characteristic may add up to less than the overall total due to missing information for that variable.

Of the 174 cases sentenced under §18:1030 from Monitoring’s Ongoing Production Files, 51 were convicted under §§18:1030(a)(4) and 18:1030(a)(5). Of those 51, 40 3

were sentenced under §2F1.1 as the highest guideline. The total for each characteristic may add up to less than the overall total due to missing information for that

variable.

Only cases sentenced within the guideline ranges are included. Additionally, cases were excluded due to missing sentencing variables or various logical criteria. 4

Cases with zero months prison or conditions of confinement only (as defined in USSG §5C1.1) were excluded. 5

SOURCE: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Ongoing Production Files, 1988-1996.
Table 4

CHARACTERISTICS FOR 1989-1996 COMPUTER FRAUD CASES 1

Computer Fraud Cases

COMPUTER FRAUD CHARACTERISTICS Number Percent

LEVEL OF COMPUTER EXPERTISE

Professional 2 5.1

Hacker 7 17.9

Work Related/School 30 76.9

None 0 0.0

INTENT OF OFFENSE

Profit 35 87.5

Maliciousness 3 7.5

Other 2 5.0

ROLE OF COMPUTER IN OFFENSE

Input New Data 6 15.0

Change Existing Data 23 57.5

Access Secured Data/Services (No changes made) 10 25.0

Other 1 2.5

SETTING

Office 31 77.5

Home 7 17.5

Other 2 5.0

 ____________________

Of the 174 cases sentenced under §18:1030 from Monitoring’s Ongoing Production Files, 51 were convicted of §§18:1030(a)(4) and 18:1030(a)(5). Of those 51, 40 3

were sentenced under §2F1.1 as the highest guideline. The total for each characteristic may add up to less than the overall total due to missing information for that

variable.

SOURCE: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1995 Datafile, MONFY95 and Ongoing Production Files.