[Cite as State v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-337.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 112481

v. :

HAROLD WILLIAMS, III, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 1, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-20-654135-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Kristin M. Karkutt, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee.

Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

Harold Williams III appeals his convictions stemming from two 

incidents, the murder of Angelo Catala and the shooting of a convenience store 
employee three days later. Williams was sentenced to an indefinite life sentence

with the possibility of parole after 27 years. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts

In late October 2020, Williams sideswiped Catala’s vehicle as 

Williams attempted to back out of the parking lot of a pizzeria. Catala’s cousin 

worked at the pizzeria, and Catala had come to visit him. Williams was in the car 

with an acquaintance, Tammy Bostic, whom he had just met in person. They 

previously knew each other only through social media. Williams had intended to 

meet a friend who lived above the pizzeria, but his friend was not responding to 

messages. The couple sat in the car for a while before Williams attempted to back 

out of the parking spot. Both Williams and Bostic were under the influence of 

cocaine, although Williams stated he also had marijuana in his possession at the 

time. The incident was recorded on the pizzeria’s video surveillance cameras. After 

the collision, Catala approached Williams’s vehicle.

For about 20 minutes, Williams and Catala discussed the accident 

while the video recorded both Williams and Bostic walking around Williams’s car at 

various times throughout the encounter. Catala’s friend was also present. He is the 

named victim with respect to the felonious assault conviction arising from this 

encounter. According to both Bostic and Williams, Catala was brandishing a firearm 

during most of their discussion and would not let either of them leave. Bostic claims 

she sat in the car the entire time and slid into the driver’s seat when Williams 

stepped out a second time to review the damage to the vehicles. The video differs a 
bit from her testimony. Despite Williams’s claims otherwise, there is no indication 

that Catala brandished a weapon — his arms remained by his side when visible in 

the surveillance footage. After Catala was shot, he pulled something from his pocket 

and tossed it out of the video camera’s field of view. It is not clear what was tossed, 

but Williams claims it was a semiautomatic handgun. No firearm was found at the 

scene during the investigation. Williams and Bostic both testified to being in fear 

for their lives by Catala’s actions despite the depiction of events from the video

played during their cross-examinations.

At one point, Catala’s cousin, who was preparing to deliver pizzas and 

knew Williams, noticed the discussion. He approached, and according to him, 

Williams smelled of alcohol and stated that “[y]our cousin said I hit his car, but I got 

him, I’m going to give him $50 or $100 or whatever it was.” It did not appear to the 

cousin that Williams was upset or under any duress. He also did not see any 

firearms. He left to make his delivery but returned a short time later while the 

discussion between Williams and Catala was ongoing. After the shooting, Williams 

told Catala’s cousin, “He had to get it, Lou. He had to get it.”

The surveillance video from the pizzeria depicted the following scene. 

Initially, most of the conversation between Catala and Williams occurred with 

Williams in the driver’s seat of his vehicle and Catala standing in the open door. 

About 15 minutes into the encounter, Catala placed both his hands on the roof of 

Williams’s vehicle, leaning down to continue the conversation. Catala was also

smoking a cigarette, alternating it between hands as he smoked it.
After approximately 20 minutes, Catala moved his vehicle from next 

to Williams’s, to slightly behind it. The discussion continued, and Bostic exited the 

car, walking around it apparently surveying the damage. Williams stepped out of 

the car, and Bostic walked to and sat in the driver’s seat. Right after that, Catala and 

Williams were walking around the car appearing to survey the damage themselves.

Catala walked away from Williams. Williams immediately pulled a handgun from 

his pocket and shot Catala, who was still walking away but started to turn back 

toward Williams. There was no visible weapon in Catala’s possession at the time. 

Williams then went after Catala’s friend, who was backing away from the shooting 

(that is not depicted in the pizzeria’s surveillance footage but is visible in nearby car 

lot’s surveillance video). Catala crouched in front of Williams’s vehicle. Bostic was 

still in the driver’s seat. Catala stood up and checked himself, evidently to see if he 

was wounded, and then he went inside the pizzeria. 

Bostic exited Williams’s car at that point and looked around. She 

walked across the street (evidently looking for Williams, who had run off after the 

shooting). The other victim in this incident, the friend of Catala, claims Williams 

chased him and fired more shots. Surveillance footage from the car lot depicts the 

victim backing away from Williams with his hands in the air. When Williams walked

back to his car, Bostic turned and followed him, this time running because Williams 

appeared to have fired a shot down the street. 

Catala died from his wounds. The other victim, Catala’s friend, was 

physically unharmed.
The convenience store shooting is relatively straightforward, and at 

trial, Williams conceded that he shot at the clerks — claiming he was not in the right 

state of mind after murdering Catala days earlier. That incident, occurring three 

days after Catala’s murder, was also captured on surveillance cameras. That footage 

captured audio. Williams entered the store and engaged in conversation with the 

two employees about the shooting at the pizzeria. The employees were concerned 

with the manner in which Williams asked the questions and his behavior. They 

asked him to leave, and he refused. A discussion ensued. One of the employees 

called 911 and was on the phone with the dispatcher relaying her information and a 

description of Williams. When Williams heard that, he brandished his handgun, the 

same one used to murder Catala, and threatened to rob the store. One of the 

employees ran back to the office, and Williams started shooting at the other 

employee, hitting her twice. She survived.

Williams was indicted for felonious assault and two counts of murder 

for the killing of Catala, felonious assault for attempting to cause physical harm by 

means of a deadly weapon to Catala’s friend, and for having weapons while under 

disability for possession and use of the firearm, along with several associated threeyear firearm specifications. Williams was indicted for attempted murder and 

felonious assault with respect to the employee he wounded, two counts each of 

robbery pertaining to each victim at the convenience store, and for having weapons 

while under disability. Williams filed a pretrial motion seeking separate trials for 

the charges arising in the two incidents, but the trial court denied the motion. 
Williams then elected to waive his right to a jury trial on the charges arising from 

the convenience store shooting, in effect bifurcating the trial.

Williams was convicted of all charges. The multiple offenses 

committed against Catala merged into the murder conviction, and the offenses 

committed against the wounded convenience store employee also merged into one 

count of attempted murder. Williams was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life for 

the murder of Catala, with all other sentences on the underlying offenses being 

concurrently imposed. He was also found guilty of four, three-year firearm 

specifications, resulting in a 27-years-to-life aggregate term of imprisonment.

II. Law

In this appeal, Williams advances eight assignments of error. Each 

will be addressed, but where appropriate, the various arguments will be combined 

and realigned for ease of reading.

a. Joinder of Offenses

In the second assignment of error, Williams claims that the trial court 

erred by denying appellant’s motion for separate trials. Williams’s sole claim is that 

the charges pertaining to each event arose from “totally separate incidents, that 

occurred on different days” and should have been tried before separate juries. 

According to Williams, he was prejudiced by a “bootstrapping effect” of introducing 

evidence of both crimes at trial. 

Williams also claims that his election to have the crimes arising from 

the convenience store shooting tried to the bench, to in effect bifurcate the 
proceedings, should not be deemed to impact his argument. Neither party has 

addressed whether Williams waived any argument with respect to the denial of relief 

from the joinder through waiving his right to a jury to resolve the charges relating to 

the convenience store shooting. The ensuing discussion, therefore, will solely focus 

on the standard as it relates to relief from joinder under Crim.R. 14 as the parties 

have presented it.

“Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment, 

information or complaint in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged 

* * * are of the same or similar character * * *.” Crim.R. 8(A). Further, the joinder 

of offenses is permitted if those offenses “are based on the same act or transaction, 

or are based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting 

parts of a common scheme or plan, or are part of a course of criminal conduct.” Id. 

Joinder “conserves resources by avoiding duplication inherent in multiple trials and 

minimizes the possibility of incongruous results that can occur in successive trials 

before different juries.” State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 158, 524 N.E.2d 476 

(1988). Crim.R. 14 allows the bifurcation of counts if the defendant is prejudiced by 

the joinder. State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, 

¶ 49. Under Crim.R. 14, in pertinent part, “[i]f it appears that a defendant or the 

state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment, 

information, or complaint, * * * the court shall order an election or separate trial of 

counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide such other relief as justice 

requires.” 
Generally, joinder is disfavored where the jury could potentially 

confuse the issues and the facts essential to the elements of the distinct crimes. “To 

succeed on a motion to sever, a defendant ‘must furnish the trial court with sufficient 

information so that it can weigh the considerations favoring joinder against the 

defendant’s right to a fair trial.’” State v. Lytle, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 15AP-748 

and 15AP-754, 2016-Ohio-3532, ¶ 64, quoting State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 

555 N.E.2d 293 (1990); State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 343, 421 N.E.2d 1288 

(1981), syllabus. 

In Lott, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a conviction for murder after 

unrelated charges were joined at trial. It was held that the defendant has the burden 

to affirmatively demonstrate prejudice from the joinder, and only then does the state 

bear any burden to negate such claims. Id. at 163. The prosecutor can use two 

methods to dispel the demonstrated prejudice caused by the joinder. Id. Under the 

first method, the “other acts” test, the state may argue that it could have introduced 

evidence of previous crimes under Evid.R. 404(B) even if the previous and current 

offenses had been severed for trial. Id. Even if Evid.R. 404(B) does not apply, the 

state may also demonstrate that the “evidence of each crime joined at trial is simple 

and direct.” Id. at 163. The two methods under the Lott analysis are independent 

of each other. 

Williams does not present any argument pertaining to his burden to 

demonstrate prejudice from the joinder as required under Crim.R. 14. He simply 

presumes prejudice from the fact that the jury heard evidence demonstrating his 
commission of the separate crimes. Williams has presented no authority to support 

the existence of a presumption of prejudice. App.R. 16(A)(7); see also State v. Davis, 

38 Ohio St.3d 361, 364, 528 N.E.2d 925 (1988) (Waiving a right to a jury trial 

because of the possibility that a jury hears evidence of prior convictions does not 

give rise to a violation of the defendant’s right to a jury trial; “A jury is believed 

capable of segregating the proof on multiple charges when the evidence as to each 

of the charges is uncomplicated.”). His arguments instead focus on negating the 

state’s burden to demonstrate the applicability of Evid.R. 404(B) or that the 

evidence of each incident is “separate and direct.” Because Williams has not 

demonstrated the existence of prejudice, the burden never shifted to the state to 

demonstrate that the evidence would be admissible regardless of whether separate 

trials were conducted or that the evidence was simple and direct. Lott at 163.

Before addressing the state’s burden, the defendant must 

demonstrate the existence of prejudice caused by the joinder of counts for trial. 

Williams has not presented an argument upon which this conclusion could be 

reached. Without this panel impermissibly crafting an argument on Williams’s 

behalf or through the establishment of a presumption of prejudice from the jury 

hearing evidence of interrelated crimes stemming from events occurring days apart, 

no relief can be afforded. See State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 

2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19.

The second assignment of error is overruled.
b. Evidentiary Rulings

In the fourth, fifth, and seventh assignments of error, Williams claims

that (1) the trial court erred in permitting a police officer to testify about statements 

made by nontestifying witnesses in violation of Ohio Rules of Evidence and the 

Confrontation Clause; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the surveillance videos, 

which were not properly authenticated; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing the 

state to introduce “other acts” evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) to the jury in the 

bifurcated proceeding.

i. Nontestifying Witnesses

At trial, one of the investigating officers interviewed Catala’s friend, 

the second victim in the pizzeria shooting, immediately after the shooting. Williams 

chased after and at least threatened that victim with a firearm, an event 

memorialized on the surveillance video obtained from the car lot. In addition, an

officer testified to the photo-array identification of Williams by the two employees

of the convenience store. Only one of the employees testified at trial.

On this point, Williams first argues that the officer was permitted to 

testify that the victim of the felonious assault during the pizzeria incident told the 

officer that he was shot at, which according to Williams is a violation of the 

Confrontation Clause. Williams cites two recent decisions from this court: State v. 

Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110942, 2023-Ohio-445, and State v. Smith, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111274, 2023-Ohio-603, in support of his argument.
The Confrontation Clause generally precludes the introduction of 

testimonial statements at trial. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 

124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Although the Supreme Court has not 

defined what constitutes a “testimonial” statement, it has been held to apply to 

“‘prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, 

and responses to police interrogations.’” State v. Dixon, 2016-Ohio-1491, 

63 N.E.3d 591, ¶ 45 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Mills, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 21146, 2006-Ohio-2128, ¶ 17. There are two overriding notions to be 

considered: (1) “not all those questioned by the police are witnesses and not all 

‘interrogations by law enforcement officers’ * * * are subject to the Confrontation 

Clause.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 355, 131 S.Ct. 1143 179 L.Ed.2d 93 

(2011), quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 

(2006); and (2), “[a] 911 call * * * and at least the initial interrogation conducted in 

connection with a 911 call, is ordinarily not designed primarily to ‘establish or prove’ 

some past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.” 

Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. 

Whether statements to police officers are testimonial depends on the 

primary purpose of the interrogation. “[S]tatements are nontestimonial when made 

in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that 

the primary purpose of interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 

ongoing emergency.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. Further, police interrogations of 

witnesses and victims can be deemed nontestimonial after the initial encounter if an 
ongoing emergency exists. Id. An ongoing emergency can exist after the original 

threat to the victim has ceased to exist if there is a potential threat to the victim, 

police, or the public, or the victim needs emergency medical services. Bryant at 376. 

“[T]he Supreme Court has never defined the scope or weight of the ‘ongoing 

emergency.’” Woods v. Smith, 660 Fed.Appx. 414, 428 (6th Cir.2016). The outer 

bounds of what is considered an “ongoing emergency” is purposely not defined and 

is instead based on a “highly context-dependent inquiry.” Bryant at 363. 

Notwithstanding, any conclusion determining that there is no 

ongoing emergency is not dispositive of the Confrontation Clause question. 

Cleveland v. Merritt, 2016-Ohio-4693, 69 N.E.3d 102, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). There is 

another step under the primary purpose test that reviewing courts must consider. 

“[I]n addition to whether there is an ongoing emergency, other relevant 

considerations to the primary purpose test include the formality versus informality 

of the encounter, and the statements and actions of both the declarant and the 

interrogators, in light of the circumstances in which the interrogation occurs.”

(Emphasis added.) Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 245, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 192 L.Ed.2d 

306 (2015), citing Bryant at 360.” 

Neither Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111274, 2023-Ohio-603, nor 

Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110942, 2023-Ohio-445, followed the totality of 

the black-letter law pertaining to the Confrontation Clause, and in fact, relied on the 

dissent’s analysis from Merritt, which is controlling authority in this district. Smith 

did not discuss Merritt, despite their factual similarity and Smith’s tacit reliance on 
the dissenting viewpoint’s analysis. Merritt determined that the initial questioning 

of a domestic abuse victim by an officer responding to an emergency call for help 

was not testimonial despite the fact the officers determined that the scene was 

secured upon their arrival through the initial questioning. See generally Merritt.

Smith, on the other hand, concluded that because the victim of abuse was separated 

from the attacker, she was “safe” because emergency responders arrived, although 

the victim was being treated for her injuries during the questioning. See generally 

Smith. According to Smith, any and all questioning by the first officer to respond 

to the emergency call was testimonial. See id.

In Smith, the victim was receiving medical care from emergency 

medical technicians before police officers were able to respond to the initial call for 

an assault that had just occurred, with the suspect still at large. Id. The majority 

made no distinction as to any differences between the first questions posed by the 

responding officer (who had no information as to why he was responding) and any 

later questions posed by the officer or the EMT. Id. The black-letter law is 

unambiguous; “[a] 911 call * * * and at least the initial interrogation conducted in 

connection with a 911 call, is ordinarily not designed primarily to ‘establish or prove’ 

some past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.”

Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224. Although that rule is not 

entirely without exception, the law generally favors the admissibility of the 

witnesses’ or victim’s initial interaction with either a police officer responding to 

emergency calls for assistance or an EMT providing emergency medical treatment. 
This, at the least, permits officers to obtain basic information to enable the 

appropriate level of response and ensure everyone’s safety and it also recognizes that 

the primary purpose of a victim’s seeking medical care for undisputed injuries is not 

to memorialize formal trial testimony. 

According to the Smith majority, admissibility of the victim’s initial 

statements to the responding police officer was an all-or-nothing proposition. At a 

minimum, however, statements made to emergency responders are considered on a 

continuum. Merritt recognized that although at some point an emergency 

responder could veer into investigatory questioning, statements made at different 

points of the interrogation must be reviewed independently. Merritt, 2016-Ohio4693, 69 N.E.3d 102. Smith simply declared that the first question posed by a police 

officer responding to an emergency call for assistance was testimonial because the 

emergency had already ended based on the victim’s subsequent answers to the 

officer’s initial questions. 

There is no precedent supporting that form of analysis. On the 

contrary, according to Merritt, which relied on generally accepted applications of 

black-letter law, the initial interaction with police officers responding to emergency 

calls for assistance are not testimonial because “‘officers called to investigate need 

to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to 

their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.’” Merritt at ¶ 24, 

quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 832, and Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 

177, 186, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004). Thus, the initial questions of the 
first officer responding to an emergency call for help are ordinarily not testimonial 

when the officer is simply obtaining the information necessary to determine the 

appropriate response. See id. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110942, 2023-Ohio445, included the same truncated analysis that declined to apply the totality of the

analysis as required under Merritt. 

Moreover, the Smith majority adopted the dissent’s analysis from

Merritt. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111274, 2002-Ohio-603. The dissent in

Merritt would have found that introducing the initial statements made to 

responding officers at trial violated the Confrontation Clause because there was no 

ongoing emergency. Merritt, at ¶ 41, 43-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting). That 

conclusion was based on the victim’s answers to the officer’s initial questions 

revealing that (1) the dispute was largely private between two individuals; (2) the 

assailant was known to the victim; (3) nothing in the record indicated that the 

assailant posed a threat to the public because the assailant was already detained and 

there was no weapon involved; and (4) the victim was safe due to the police presence

and the separation from the aggressor. Id.

Despite the fact that the majority in Merritt, 2016-Ohio-4693, 69

N.E.3d 102, rejected that narrow focus under the ongoing emergency inquiry, the 

Smith majority used the same analysis, concluding that use at trial of the initial 

questioning by the first responding police officer violated the Confrontation Clause 

because the victim’s answers to those initial questions arguably revealed that (1) the 

dispute was only between two individuals; (2) the assailant was known to the victim; 
(3) nothing in the record demonstrated that the assailant posed a threat to anyone 

because police officers did not ask the victim about any weapons during the initial 

discussion; and (4) the victim was safe due to the arrival of the police and medical 

responders. Smith at ¶ 91-92. Thus, Smith tacitly treated the dissenting analysis as 

controlling over the analysis provided by the majority in Merritt. 

We cannot rely on Smith or Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110942, 

2023-Ohio-445. Doing so would further the precedential rift caused by Smith and 

Johnson. 

In this case, however, it is not clear that Williams even preserved an 

objection to the officer’s testimony with respect to the pizzeria incident based on the 

Confrontation Clause. This defines the scope of appellate review. When the officer 

initially testified as to the victim’s statement at issue, the trial court sustained the 

defense’s objection, which then prompted the state to elicit testimony regarding the 

excited utterance exception to Ohio’s hearsay rule. No specific objections were 

included within this record. After obtaining testimony that the victim was still under 

the stress of excitement caused by the shooting, the court permitted the officer to 

testify as follows: “Q. Officer Miranda, what did [the victim] tell you? A. [The 

victim] stated that he was shot at.” 

The state’s evidentiary rules, however, are only applicable if the 

statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause: “Whenever the state seeks to 

introduce hearsay into a criminal proceeding, the court must determine not only 

whether the evidence fits within an exception, but also whether the introduction of 
such evidence offends an accused’s right to confront witnesses against him.” State v. 

Powell, 2019-Ohio-4345, 134 N.E.3d 1270, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Kilbane, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99485, 2014-Ohio-1228, ¶ 29; see also State v. Issa, 93 Ohio 

St.3d 49, 60, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001). The excited utterance doctrine is not an 

exception to the Confrontation Clause.

“‘It is hornbook law that a defendant may not on appeal urge a new 

ground for his objection.’” State v. Hernandez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106577, 

2018-Ohio-5031, ¶ 4, quoting State v. Milo, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 81AP-746, 1982 

Ohio App. LEXIS 12440, 15 (Sept. 30, 1982), and Yuin v. Hilton, 165 Ohio St. 164, 

134 N.E.2d 719 (1956); State v. Deadwiley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108488, 2020-

Ohio-1605, ¶ 23. In Hernandez, the panel recognized that the specificity of the 

evidentiary objection defines the scope of appellate review. Id. at ¶ 5. In that case, 

the defendant objected to certain evidence on relevancy grounds. Id. In the appeal, 

the defendant attempted to claim that the evidence also violated Evid.R. 404(B), 

evidence of other acts. Id. The panel concluded that the defendant “forfeited the 

right to argue Evid.R. 404(B) as a ground for appeal.” 

Because no specific objection based on the Confrontation Clause was 

preserved at the trial, appellant forfeited all but plain error. Evid.R. 103(A). Had 

Williams intended his objection to be based on the Confrontation Clause and not the 

state evidentiary rule, he would have been expected to proffer that specific objection 

to the trial court after the ruling was rendered based on the excited utterance 

exception to hearsay. State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, 
9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 103, citing Evid.R. 103(A) (although trial counsel objected to the 

evidence, the objection was based on a different rationale than advanced on appeal, 

and therefore, the assignment of error was reviewed for plain error). In order to 

establish plain error, an appellant “must show that an error occurred, that the error 

was plain (i.e., the error was an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial proceedings), and that 

but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.” 

State v. Whitaker, 169 Ohio St.3d 647, 2022-Ohio-2840, 207 N.E.3d 677, ¶ 39, 

citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 2002-Ohio-68, 759 N.E.2d 1240. 

“[P]lain error should be found only in exceptional circumstances and only to prevent 

a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 203, 749 N.E.2d 

274 (2001), citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph 

three of the syllabus. In this case, the officer’s testimony did not implicate 

Williams — the victim merely told the officer that he was shot at. That statement 

could be deemed superfluous in light of the video evidence demonstrating the victim 

being threatened by Williams with the firearm. 

This is not the extraordinary case warranting appellate intervention

even if the admission of the testimony was deemed to have been in error. 

With respect to the two employees of the convenience store, although 

Williams broadly claims that the officer’s testimony violated his right to confront the 

witnesses, his sole argument pertains to whether the statements are inadmissible

hearsay. Accordingly, our focus is on whether the statements were admissible under 

Evid.R. 801 or an exception to hearsay in light of the argument presented. On this 
point, Williams’s sole claim is that the statements were hearsay as defined under 

Evid.R. 801(C) and, thus, the trial court should have excluded the statements. 

Williams, however, failed to object to the officer’s statements regarding the 

witnesses’ photo-array identification of Williams at trial.

As previously mentioned, under Evid.R. 103(A) “[e]rror may not be 

predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial 

right of the party is affected, and * * * [when] the ruling is one admitting evidence, 

[a] timely objection or motion to strike appears of record stating the specific ground 

of objection.” Williams largely ignores the fact that he failed to timely object to the 

employees’ identification statements made to the police officer testifying at trial. 

Because Williams has not presented an argument pertaining to the plain error 

standard of review, we cannot offer relief with respect to the photo-array 

identification by the two employees. We cannot substitute our own analysis on 

Willliams’s behalf. See Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 

N.E.3d 900, at ¶ 19.

The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

ii. Authenticity of Surveillance Video

In the fifth assignment of error, Williams claims the trial court erred 

by admitting the surveillance videos from the car lot into the trial record based on 

the lack of testimony authenticating the recordings. Williams never objected to the 

videos being introduced at trial. His first objection as to the authenticity of the 

videos obtained from the car lot’s surveillance system came at the close of all 
evidence when the state moved to admit its exhibits into the record. He did not 

object to the admissibility of the pizzeria’s surveillance videos during trial, and in 

fact, during his own testimony Williams asked for the videos to be played for the 

jury’s benefit. In this appeal, it is unclear which videos are being challenged.

Because Williams failed to object to the admissibility of the 

surveillance videos obtained from the pizzeria and relied on those videos during his 

trial testimony, he has waived any error as to the authenticity of the recordings

admitted into the record.

Further, as it pertains to all the car lot videos introduced at trial, 

Williams conceded at trial that the videos displayed the encounter as it unfolded. 

Tr. 595:10-11 (explaining that he fired his weapon in the vicinity of the victim who 

was standing by Williams’s car after the shooting as “captured” on the car lot’s video 

surveillance cameras). Williams waived any authenticity concerns but, more to the 

point, arguably authenticated the car lot surveillance videos through his own 

testimony. In light of the limited arguments presented on the authentication issue, 

we conclude that this is not the exceptional case in which to exercise our discretion 

to grant relief on plain error review. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d at 203, 749 N.E.2d 274, 

citing Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804, at paragraph three of the syllabus. 

The fifth assignment of error is overruled.

iii. Evid.R. 404(B)

In the seventh assignment of error, Williams claims the trial court 

erred by admitting videographic evidence of the convenience store shooting during 
the jury portion of his bifurcated trial in violation of Evid.R. 404(B), which provides 

in pertinent part that “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong or act is not admissible 

to prove the person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the 

person acted in accordance with the character.” According to Williams, 

If the evidence was used to show the jury Williams still had his gun on 

October 24, 2020 — he already admitted that fact. The evidence was 

likely introduced to undermine the fact that he was defending himself 

on October 21, 2020, by implying he had a propensity to fire a gun. 

(Emphasis added.) Disregarding the speculative nature of the argument presented, 

all of the statements at issue under this assignment of error were elicited during the 

state’s cross-examination of Williams. The state did not seek to introduce evidence 

of the convenience store shooting in its case in chief as presented to the jury. This 

is an important distinction.

It has been generally noted that “[t]he introduction of evidence of 

other bad acts can be prejudicial and is generally prohibited by Evid.R. 404(B).”

State v. Patton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 62020, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2677, 11 

(May 27, 1993), citing State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 68-69, 330 N.E.2d 720

(1975). Notwithstanding, if the defendant “opens the door” to this type of evidence, 

he cannot succeed in demonstrating prejudice. Id., citing State v. Greer, 39 Ohio 

St.3d 236, 243, 530 N.E.2d 382 (1988), and State v. Hartford, 21 Ohio App.3d 29, 

31, 486 N.E.2d 131 (8th Dist.1984).

The video recording of the convenience store shooting was first 

discussed in front of the jury after Williams initially claimed selective amnesia as to 
the whereabouts of the handgun he used to murder Catala during the state’s crossexamination. Tr. 600:6-15. He eventually disclosed that he sold the firearm after 

the convenience store shooting but not until after the state presented the video 

recording depicting Williams using the weapon at the convenience store to refresh 

his recollection as to his continued possession of the firearm. At no point in time 

did the state rely on Evid.R. 404(B) as a basis to discuss the convenience store 

shooting during its cross-examination of Williams. The state contends that the 

introduction of the convenience store shooting during the jury phase of trial was 

based on attacking Williams’s character for truthfulness based on his evasive 

answers regarding the firearm that he supposedly used in self-defense. 

During the pretrial proceedings in which the trial court concluded 

that the convenience store shooting evidence would not be presented to the jury, the 

trial court expressly cautioned that although not generally admissible in the state’s 

case to the jury, it would be admissible if the defense “opened the door” during its 

presentation of evidence. Tr. 207:9-208:11. During the state’s cross-examination of 

Williams, the trial court sustained several objections when the state’s questioning 

veered too far from the limited door opened by Williams’s testimony. 

Tr. 604:8, 605:22, 606:3. 

Williams did not file a reply brief to offer any further clarification in 

response to the state’s arguments or the procedural posture of when the evidence 

was presented to the jury and in what context. See App.R. 16(A)(7).
The sole question, left unaddressed in this appeal, is whether 

Williams “opened the door” to the state’s line of questioning during his testimony

by failing to disclose when he disposed of the weapon he used to murder Catala. 

Because he has not addressed the procedural foundation of the challenged evidence, 

we cannot offer relief. It is not this panel’s obligation to develop or hone arguments. 

See Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, at ¶ 19. In 

light of the broad nature of Williams’s argument, one that does not account for his 

opening the door to the video during his cross-examination, the seventh assignment 

of error is overruled.

c. Weight of the Evidence

In the first and third assignments of error, Williams claims that his 

convictions are against the weight of the evidence based on his testimony

establishing the elements of self-defense. According to Williams, the record 

conclusively demonstrates that he acted in self-defense when his testimony is 

considered to the exclusion of the state’s evidence rebutting the assertion of selfdefense. In the alternative, Williams claims that his convictions for killing Catala 

are not supported by sufficient evidence or are against the weight of the evidence

because the state failed to prove that Williams purposefully acted in the murder of 

Catala. 

When evaluating a claim that a jury verdict is against the weight of 

the evidence, appellate courts “review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether 
in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created 

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order 

a new trial.” State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, 114 N.E.3d 1092, 

¶ 168, citing State v. Thompkins 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). 

Reversing a conviction based upon the weight of the evidence should occur “‘only in 

the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” 

Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 

485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

The act of asserting self-defense is a concession that the defendant 

“had the purpose to commit the act, but * * * was justified in his actions.” State v. 

Talley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87143, 2006-Ohio-5322, ¶ 45. Self-defense, thus 

“presumes intentional, willful use of force to repel force or escape force.” State v. 

Champion, 109 Ohio St. 281, 286-287, 142 N.E. 141 (1924). In this regard, 

Williams’s arguments with respect to lack of evidence demonstrating his 

purposefully shooting Catala are without merit. The fact he claimed to be acting in 

self-defense demonstrates the requisite mens rea for the commission of the murder. 

Self-defense offers a justification for the action but necessarily concedes that the act 

was purposely committed.

Williams’s arguments that the jury lost its way in rejecting his 

assertion of self-defense is solely focused on his evidence to the exclusion of the 

state’s evidence. It is well-settled that “‘a conviction is not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence simply because the jury rejected the defendant’s version of 
the facts and believed the testimony presented by the state.’” State v. Jallah, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101773, 2015-Ohio-1950, ¶ 71, quoting State v. Hall, 4th Dist. 

Ross No. 13CA3391, 2014-Ohio-2959, ¶ 28; see also State v. Kouame, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 108559, 2020-Ohio-3118, ¶ 53. Without a more developed analysis 

provided by Williams, we cannot conclude that the jury lost its way on this factual 

question. We agree that his evidence, Bostic’s and his own testimony, demonstrated

a basis to assert self-defense, which is why the trial court instructed the jury on selfdefense and the state’s burden of proof. The state, however, presented some 

evidence that Catala was not armed or brandishing a firearm during his interaction 

with Williams and that Catala was shot as he walked away from Williams and 

appeared to be no threat to Williams or Bostic. Further, Williams conceded that he 

was under the influence of cocaine and his perception of the events may have been 

impacted. In short, the jury was free to reject Williams’s version of events and he 

has not demonstrated this to be the exceptional case warranting appellate 

intervention.

The first and third assignments of error are overruled.1

d. Miscellaneous Assignments of Error

In the sixth and eighth assignments of error, Williams claims that the 

1 Williams also claims that the convictions based on the crimes committed against 

the nontestifying victims, Catala’s friend and the store clerk who was present but not shot, 

must be vacated since they did not testify at trial. Williams provides no citation to 

authority to support that broad proposition that a victim must testify in order for a 

conviction to be sustained on appeal as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). That argument is 

summarily overruled.
trial court improperly denied a lesser-included offense jury instruction on the felony 

murder count, with Catala being the named victim, and the trial court erred by 

denying a motion for mistrial because a police officer revealed to the jury that 

Williams was in jail. These assignments of error are devoid of merit or not developed 

enough to warrant further discussion.

The felony murder conviction, based on a violation of 

R.C. 2903.02(B), merged into the murder conviction that was a violation of 

R.C. 2903.02(A). Any error with respect to the jury instructions as to the merged 

felony-murder offense, which is not a final conviction based on that merger, is 

necessarily harmless because his murder conviction has been affirmed in this 

appeal. See, e.g., State v. Hawkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109452, 

2021-Ohio-1484, ¶ 38, citing State v. Ramos, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103596, 

2016-Ohio-7685, ¶ 14, and State v. Powell, 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 263, 552 N.E.2d 191 

(1990). Even if we found error in failing to give the requested jury instruction, which 

would be purely advisory, the sufficiency of the felony-murder conviction would not 

result in any relief being afforded since there is no final conviction on that count and 

a new trial would not be necessary. 

And finally, in three paragraphs of explanation and analysis, Williams 

claims that the trial court erred by failing to provide the jury with a curative 

instruction after a police officer referenced jail calls made by Williams. Williams, 

however, expressly refused the trial court’s invitation to provide that curative 

instruction. Tr. 556:6-10. Any error with regard to the lack of an instruction was 
invited. See Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. Lincoln-Mercury 

Div., 28 Ohio St.3d 20, 502 N.E.2d 590 (1986), paragraph one of the syllabus (the 

invited doctrine error provides that a defendant may not “take advantage of an error 

which he himself invited or induced”). The sixth and eighth assignments of error 

are overruled.

III. Conclusion

The defendant’s convictions are affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case 

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_____________________

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCURS;

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY