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76–193 PDF 2012

SIGAR REPORT: DOCUMENT DESTRUCTION AND 

MILLIONS OF DOLLARS UNACCOUNTED FOR AT 

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 

HOMELAND DEFENSE AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 

Serial No. 112–179 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

RAU ́ L R. LABRADOR, Idaho 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

VACANCY 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

ROBERT BORDEN, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, HOMELAND DEFENSE AND FOREIGN

OPERATIONS

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

RAU ́ L R. LABRADOR, Idaho, Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Minority Member 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on September 13, 2012 ..................................................................... 1 

WITNESS 

Mr. John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General, Afghanistan Reconstruction 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 10 

APPENDIX 

The Honorable John F. Tierney, Member of Congress from the State of 

Massachusetts, Opening Statement ................................................................... 32 

(1) 

SIGAR REPORT: DOCUMENT DESTRUCTION 

AND MILLIONS OF DOLLARS UNACCOUNTED FOR AT THE DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Thursday, September 13, 2012, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, HOMELAND

DEFENSE, AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room 

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jason 

Chaffetz [chairman of the subcommittee], presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Labrador, Farenthold, Tierney 

and Lynch. 

Staff Present: Thomas A. Alexander, Majority Senior Counsel; 

Sharon Casey, Majority Senior Assistant Clerk; Mitchell S. 

Kominsky, Majority Counsel; Beverly Britton Fraser, Minority 

Counsel; Devon Hill, Minority Staff Assistant; Dave Rapallo, Minority Staff Director; Rory Sheehan, Minority New Media Press 

Secretary; Cecelia Thomas, Minority Counsel; and Carlos Uriarte, 

Minority Counsel. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The Committee will come to order. 

I would like to begin this hearing by stating the Oversight Committee Mission Statement. 

We exist to secure two fundamental principles. First, Americans 

have the right to know that the money Washington takes from 

them is well spent. Second, Americans deserve an efficient, effective government that works for them. 

Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee 

is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers because taxpayers have a right 

to know what they are getting from the government. 

We will work tirelessly in partnership with citizen watchdogs to 

deliver the facts to the American people and bring genuine reform 

to the Federal bureaucracy. This is the mission of the Oversight 

and Government Reform Committee. 

I want to welcome everyone to this hearing, the SIGAR Report: 

Document Destruction and Millions of Dollars Unaccounted for at 

the Department of Defense. 

Today’s proceedings will continue the subcommittee’s efforts to 

oversee the billions of taxpayer dollars spent in support of military 

and civilian operations in Afghanistan. On Monday, the Special InVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:12 Oct 12, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\76193.TXT APRIL
2 

spector General for Afghan Reconstruction released a report entitled, ‘‘Interim Report on Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil and 

Lubricants.’’ 

This report provided the Secretary of Defense with an update of 

an audit concerning the Afghan National Army’s logistics capability 

for petroleum, oil and lubricants, also known as POL. POL are the 

most valuable commodities in the Afghan society. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, led by the United States 

military, is responsible for training and equipping the Afghan National Army. 

This effort is funded by the U.S. taxpayer through the Afghan 

Security Force Fund, ASFF. From fiscal years 2007 to 2012, CSTC– 

A has provided approximately $1.1 billion in ASSF funding to purchase petroleum, oil or lubricants for the Afghan National Army. 

In fiscal year, 2013, the U.S. Government will purchase roughly 

$343 million more in POL. CSTC–A provides these commodities 

based on what it believes the Afghan National Army will need. 

In February of this year, SIGAR began conducting this audit program. SIGAR is Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Its overall objective was to assess U.S efforts to develop 

ANA’s capability to acquire, distribute and account for POL supplies to its forces. SIGAR’s findings are extremely troubling. 

According to the interim report, CSTC–A does not have accurate 

or supportable information on how much of the U.S. funds are 

needed for ANA fuel, where and how the fuel is actually used and 

how much fuel has been lost or stolen, some of the basic metrics 

we would need in order to understand the situation. Thus, the extent to which ANA fuel is stocked, consumed or lost at any given 

time remains unknown. 

SIGAR also found that ‘‘no single office within the U.S. or Afghan Government has complete records on ANA fuel purchased, ordered, delivered or consumed.’’ In fact, no records for fuel purchases exist prior to March 2011 because ‘‘ANA fuel financial 

records totaling nearly $475 million from fiscal year 2007 to February 2011 had been shredded in violation of Department of Defense and Department of Army policies.’’ This is totally unacceptable and fits a pattern of behavior from the Defense Department. 

As a subcommittee, we are also concerned with the pattern of 

abuse of documents and the lack of documents coming out of the 

Pentagon in general. For instance, on January 2, 2011, Colonel 

Amrein sent an email to Colonels Carozza and Andersen regarding 

a tasker to send information to the IG on Afghan General Yaftali’s 

suspected pilfering of Dawood Hospital supplies. 

In that email, Colonel Amrein stated that ‘‘Brigadier General 

Patton reviewed the summary and documentary evidence we intended to provide. He made changes and told us to reduce documentary evidence that we provide.’’ 

In the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan photo policy on September 12, 2011, a policy was issued instructing people to destroy 

documents they had regarding the abuses of what was happening 

at the National Military Hospital known as Dawood. 

We had Colonel Geller’s memorandum for the record that was requested. He submitted a 25 page memorandum for the record. Instead of providing that document to the committee, the Department 

3 

of Defense created a separate chart editing out some key parts before it presented it to the United States Congress. Colonel Geller 

was also prevented from speaking to the media. 

The committee is also looking at the Palantir System where the 

Department of Defense—and it is just stunning here—destroyed 

and replaced an independent assessment of an intelligence assessment tool, also known as Palantir, used and preferred by many soldiers in the field. We will continue to investigate that. That will 

probably constitute its own hearing in the future. 

Nevertheless, we have a pattern here. This is not just one sole 

instance. In this particular situation where we have the Inspector 

General trying to do an audit or a situation where they want to 

spend more money by the hundreds of millions of dollars and to 

find those documents had been shredded or lost and there is no accountability. I recognize that in the fog of war there are difficult 

situations, but this is totally unacceptable. 

Despite the lack of records and justification for fuel purchases, 

the Department of Defense proposes to increase funding. From fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2018, it plans to provide $555 million 

worth of POL per year. Instead of purchasing it for the Afghan National Army, this Administration plans to give two-thirds of that 

amount in cash directly to the Afghan Government. They might as 

well wire it directly to Dubai. This is an absolute atrocity that this 

government is going to take American taxpayer dollars and just 

wire it directly to the Afghan Government. 

We can’t even control the money. We don’t even know how much 

we are spending and what is going on. And now this government 

wants to send it directly to the Afghan Government? Again, send 

it to Dubai and don’t even bother. 

In the name of capacity building, the Afghans will be allowed to 

purchase POL for themselves. With that, the Afghan Government 

will be responsible for overseeing the expenditure of roughly $2.8 

billion of our taxpayer dollars, this to a government that I believe 

is perhaps the most corrupt government on the face of the planet. 

This begs one simple question. If the United States Government 

cannot track and verify these expenditures, then can we honestly 

expect the Afghan Government to do better? 

Yesterday, this subcommittee held a hearing to examine the mismanagement, theft and human suffering at the Dawood National 

Military Hospital in Afghanistan. For years, the Afghan officials 

pilfered nearly $175 million worth of cash and medical supplies. 

Legitimate pharmaceuticals were replaced with counterfeits, 

wounded Afghan soldiers were made to suffer and in some cases, 

died without proper medical care. This was a U.S. taxpayer funded 

program operated by the Afghan Government. This Administration 

must rethink its so-called ‘‘forward strategy.’’ 

I don’t make this up. It is pretty stunning to me. This is not related to the campaign but if you look at the documents coming out 

of, for instance, USAID right now, it is USAID forward. I cannot 

believe that a forward thinking government, a forward planning 

government would do such things as ‘‘to achieve capacity building 

objectives and using host country systems where it makes sense.’’ 

In other words, let’s just send them the money directly and bypass the accountability. We need more oversight, not less oversight. 

4 

We can’t even control the money ourselves and we are going to 

wire by the hundreds of millions of dollars, money to the Afghan 

Government. That is part of the reason we are here today. 

We are here today to discuss mechanisms needed to ensure accountability and to start looking for answers such as who ordered 

the destruction of these documents and how we can improve the internal controls. Without improvements, the ANA, POL funds will 

be even more vulnerable to theft and waste. 

I want to thank Mr. Sopko for being here on fairly short notice. 

They issued this report on Monday and we wanted to get on top 

of it as quickly as possible. We look forward to his testimony. 

I would like to now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney, for his opening statement. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Sopko for being here today and for your report. 

We have just marked the 11th anniversary of September 11. 

During nearly all that time, United States soldiers have been on 

the ground in Afghanistan. We entered the conflict for what was 

believed to be righteous reasons and our brave men and women in 

uniform have largely accomplished the mission of ridding Afghanistan of Al Qaeda and the international terrorists who threatened 

our homeland. 

I would like to take the opportunity to honor their sacrifices and 

state that I am amongst many who are proud of their service. 

This subcommittee has long been concerned with the issues of 

corruption and mismanagement of United States taxpayer dollars 

in Afghanistan for the obvious reason of the impact it has on the 

safety and security of our military forces and civilians in-theater 

but also with respect to the United States taxpayer dollars. 

Under my chairmanship, this subcommittee conducted multiple 

investigations into allegations of corruption in the United States 

contract related to the war in Afghanistan. In a bi-partisan manner, we investigated jet fuel contracts in Kurdistan and a host nation trucking contract in Afghanistan. Our investigation of the 

trucking contract found the contractors were making protection 

payments to our enemies with U.S. taxpayer dollars. 

I commend Chairman Chaffetz for calling this hearing today to 

examine the problem of contracting corruption continuing in Afghanistan. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction conducted an audit of the Afghan National Army’s logistics capability for petroleum, oil and lubricants. While conducting 

this audit, it was found an astounding lack of internal controls of 

records of fuel purchases, deliveries and consumption existed. 

SIGAR found that the Department of Defense’s Training Mission 

lacked a valid method for estimating fuel needs on which to base 

the funding requests as well as lacked complete records on the Afghan National Army’s fuel transactions. Ultimately, this means the 

fuel and the funds used to purchase it are highly vulnerable to 

theft and waste. 

Against this background, it is highly worrisome that the training 

mission intends to transfer to the Afghan Government direct control of the logistics and U.S. taxpayer funds for fuel on January 1, 

2013. I believe that before this transfer takes place, NATO and the 

5 

Department of Defense must work together to immediately establish clear guidelines to ensure this money is not misused. It is imperative that these egregious issues be fixed before hundreds of 

millions of dollars go directly into the hands of the Afghan Government. 

When the Chairman speaks of the quote that he was reading 

about money not going to the locals where it makes sense, from 

what I can see, it clearly does not make sense, at least certainly 

not at this period of time. We have to be careful and make sure 

that not unless and until it makes sense should that transfer take 

place. 

I appreciate Mr. Sopko’s testimony and the leadership he brings 

to SIGAR. I look forward to the discussion today and I thank you, 

Mr. Chairman, once again. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I thank the gentleman for truly approaching this in a bipartisan way. We want what is right for the 

country. This is not a partisan issue and I think you will see us 

very united on this issue. I do appreciate that. 

Does any other member have an opening statement? The gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the Ranking Member. 

I appreciate your holding this hearing. 

I want to thank you for focusing your attention on this. I realize 

this is about the fifth hearing that this subcommittee has had on 

oversight in Afghanistan funding. This committee, along with the 

full committee, has worked tirelessly to ensure oversight and accountability of U.S. taxpayer dollars being spent in Afghanistan. 

While it is a task we wish was not needed, the reality is that corruption in Afghanistan is rampant and endemic. 

The subject of today’s hearing demonstrates that there is still 

much more work to be done. Based on the Special Inspector General’s interim report, the Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan is not yet in a position to ensure that the Afghan National Army will be able to take over future procurement of petroleum, oil and lubricants, POL. 

The report’s findings are very disturbing. As the Chairman noted 

and the Ranking Member noted, nearly $475 million in fuel payments with no records, no documents, documents that have been 

shredded and a lack of accurate methodology for estimating ANA 

fuel requirements has been uncovered by the Special Inspector 

General. I agree with the Special Inspector General that the deficiencies must be addressed quickly and correctly, especially as the 

ANA is slated to take charge of these purchases in 2013. 

As the Coalition continues to transfer responsibility for security 

and operations to the Afghans, we must be certain that procedures 

and institutions are in place to ensure that U.S. taxpayer money 

is not expended where Afghan resources are available, number one, 

and if and when U.S. resources are necessary, to make sure that 

those resources are expended properly. 

I would like to thank Inspector General Sopko for your efforts to 

bring accountability to the continuing mission in Afghanistan and 

for taking the time to come and testify before this committee. I look 

forward to hearing your testimony on this matter and other investigations your office is conducting. 

6 

I want to reinforce a couple points the Chairman and Ranking 

Member have amplified. That is that nothing in our experience 

thus far in Afghanistan would lead us to believe that direct funding—just sending a check, sending resources directly to Afghan 

ministries—is in the best interest of the United States or the 

American taxpayer. 

Secondly, it is a case of no good deed goes unpunished. We are 

trying to help the Afghan people. Meanwhile, there are agents 

within their government that are robbing us blind. I just think we 

have to reassess—I realize the President some time ago set a timetable for the end of 2014 for withdrawal but I think in light of the 

continuing circumstances of corruption, the delay in the training 

exercises that are ongoing there, I think it is right and proper for 

us to reassess that timetable. 

Actually, I believe that if our mission is for training the Afghan 

National Army and getting these systems in place, we don’t need 

a massive military presence to accomplish that. I think it is entirely right and appropriate that we reassess and look at the possibility of getting out at the end of 2013 instead of 2014. 

With the green on blue so-called attacks that we are seeing 

where ANA personnel are attacking their NATO, largely U.S. 

trainers, I think there is every reason for us to reassess our timetable and look to the opportunity to get out of Afghanistan sooner. 

They are either going to take charge of this operation and run their 

country with the highest hopes for democratic ideals or they are 

not. 

This ball is in their court and they have to step up. I don’t see 

them stepping up and I don’t think us staying one more year and 

losing more American lives is going to change their level of commitment. Indeed, I think if we emphasize that we are not staying 

around, it might act as a stronger incentive for them to step up and 

do the right thing. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, I appreciate your courtesy 

and indulgence. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Members will have seven days to submit opening statements for 

the record. 

I will now recognize our panel. 

Mr. John F. Sopko is the Special Inspector General for Afghan 

Reconstruction. He was appointed by President Obama and was 

confirmed July 2, 2012. He spent more than 20 years on Capitol 

Hill, including as Chief Counsel for Oversight Investigations for the 

House Committee on Energy and Commerce, chaired by Representative John Dingell. 

He has a distinguished career and I appreciate your taking on 

this most difficult assignment. I know you are supported by a staff 

that is patriotic and committed to the betterment of this country. 

It is a difficult situation to say the least but we appreciate you and 

your staff and those that have joined you here today and those 

back at the office and certainly in Afghanistan for the great work 

that the do. I appreciate you being here. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. Please rise and raise your right hand. 

7 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

[Witness responds in the affirmative.] 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. You may be seated. 

Let the record reflect that the witness answered in the affirmative. 

Mr. Sopko, we would like to turn over some time to you for an 

opening statement which will be followed by questions from members on the panel. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN F. SOPKO, SPECIAL INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 

Mr. SOPKO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman Chaffetz, 

Ranking Member Tierney and the other members of the subcommittee. 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. efforts to help the 

Afghan National Army procure, deliver and account for fuel, which 

includes petroleum, oil and lubricants provided to its forces. 

For fiscal years 2007 to 2012, U.S. funding for Afghan Army fuel totaled almost $1.1 billion. Because fuel is a valuable commodity 

that is vulnerable to theft and because helping the Afghan Army 

develop a supportable and sustainable logistics capability is an essential part of transferring security responsibilities to the Afghan 

Army, SIGAR initiated an audit of efforts by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, commonly referred to as 

CSTC–A, to develop the Afghan Army’s capability to supply fuel to 

its forces. 

Based on our ongoing audit work, we have serious concerns 

about this program and CSTC–A’s method for estimating fuel 

needs on which to base funding requests. We are also concerned 

that CSTC–A has incomplete records of fuel purchased for, delivered to and consumed by the Afghan Army. 

In fact, CSTC–A was unable to provide us records on nearly $475 

million in fuel payments because, according to CSTC–A officials, 

those records had been shredded. Let me explain a bit about how 

the fuel ordering and delivery process is generally designed to 

work, as shown in this first chart with fuel procurement and distribution. I believe you do have an electronic record of that chart. 

In that chart, you will see that Afghan Army units at the bottom 

are supposed to submit a fuel request to the fuel depot which is Request No. 14 that we discuss in my longer statement. The depot is 

supposed to fill that order and when needed, request fuel through 

the Afghan Logistics Command to maintain its supply. The Afghan 

Logistics Command approves the depot’s request and is supposed 

to submit it to CSTC–A. CSTC–A is then supposed to review the 

order and submit it to one of four fuel contractors to deliver to the 

designated Afghan Army location. 

Once the fuel is delivered, the Afghan Army unit completes a receiving report showing the amount and quality of fuel received and 

submit that form to both the Logistics Command and CSTC–A. 

CSTC–A then will use this form along with the original fuel order, 

delivery ticket and other supporting records provided by the fuel 

8 

delivery contractor to approve payment. That is what is supposed 

to happen. 

CSTC–A’s ability to accurately protect itself from fraud and theft, 

as well as develop Afghan fuel logistics capability, depends on the 

effective implementation of these required processes to validate the 

accuracy of data related to fuel orders, receipts, payments and ultimately, overall Afghan Army fuel requirements. 

Unfortunately, SIGAR’s auditors have found that the process I 

just described is seriously broken. CSTC–A does not know the actual fuel funding levels needed to meet Afghan Army mission requirements. 

As you can see in the second chart, CSTC–A’s current method for 

estimating the amount of fuel the Afghan Army needs does not include basic information that any household here in the United 

States or a small business would want such as, how many vehicles 

are there that require fuel. That would be an obvious question to 

ask. How many generators are there that require fuel? How much 

fuel does each generator require? How many Afghan Army fuel 

storage locations are there? How much fuel can be stored at each 

location and ultimately, how much fuel has been consumed at each 

of the Afghan Army locations? 

We are also concerned that our audit found that there is no single office in the United States Army, Defense Department or the 

Afghan Ministry of Defense that has complete records on Army fuel 

ordered, purchased, delivered or consumed. Moreover, as mentioned by the Chairman in his opening, we found that CSTC–A did 

not have any records of fuel purchased and payment information 

prior to March 2011 because they had been mysteriously shredded. 

For the time period that they claim they had records, which is 

March 2011 to March 2012, CSTC–A could not provide more than 

half of the documents we requested and CSTC–A continued to pay 

vendors without independent verification of the quantity and quality of fuel delivered. As a matter of fact, we only received four complete sets of documents when we requested all the material from 

CSTC–A. 

These problems must be resolved quickly because CSTC–A plans 

to begin transferring responsibility for the procurement, tracking, 

delivery and accounting of fuel to the Afghan Government beginning January 2013, less than four months from now. At that time, 

CSTC–A intends to begin paying for the Afghan Army’s fuel 

through direct contributions to the Afghan Government. In addition, CSTC–A has proposed to increase annual funding for Afghan 

fuel for fiscal years 2014 to 2018 by $212 million per year. We believe there is no basis for that increase. 

To address the serious problems we identified, we issued this interim audit report and made two recommendations to the Commanding General of CSTC–A. First, reduce the fiscal 2013 and 

planned 2014 budget requests for fuel from the fiscal 2012 amount 

of $306 million and maintain that level until a better process for 

determining requirements is developed and secondly, to develop, 

approve and implement a comprehensive action plan to improve 

fuel accountability. 

I also took the following steps. I first alerted the senior leadership at DOD and the commanders in the field about the destruction 

9 

of documents and emphasized the importance of maintaining all financial records which are required by law. Second, I referred this 

matter to my investigative directorate which is conducting an inquiry right now to determine who destroyed the documents and for 

what reason. Thirdly, I just launched a new audit to assess CSTC– 

A’s efforts to develop the ability of the Afghan National Police to 

procure, deliver and account for fuel for its forces. 

Although CSTC–A agreed with our second recommendation that 

it needs to improve its process, it disagreed with our first recommendation and still intends to increase fuel funding for the Afghan Army and make direct contributions to the Afghan Ministry 

of Defense starting in January 2013. 

We continue to believe this is a mistake. It would be imprudent 

for CSTC–A to increase estimated fuel requirements and to proceed 

with writing a blank check to the Afghan Government without first 

ensuring it is obtaining and using basic information such as actual 

fuel consumption and usage data. To do so would be doubling down 

on a very, very risky bet. 

In summary, no single commodity is as important to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan as fuel. No commodity is at such 

risk of being stolen or wasted as fuel. In Afghanistan, fuel is like 

gold. As the United States withdraws and transfers security responsibility to Afghan forces, U.S.-funded fuel will become even 

more vulnerable to waste, fraud and abuse through corruption and 

theft. 

It is imperative that U.S. military and civilian authorities improve their efforts to protect the U.S. taxpayers’ continuing investment and to ensure that the Afghan Army is capable of assuming 

their responsibilities in the future. 

I want to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for holding 

this hearing and giving us the opportunity to discuss these findings. We believe they warrant immediate attention. 

Thank you and I am happy to answer any questions you may 

have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Sopko follows:] 

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Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I will now recognize myself for five minutes. 

The best estimate is that the documents were shredded sometime 

between October 2010 and March 2011. Do I have that right? 

Mr. SOPKO. What we know is that when we first found out, a fuel 

ordering officer advised us that some former fuel ordering officers 

had destroyed the records. The time period would be October 2006 

to March 2011. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The Commanding General of CSTC–A between 

November 2009 and November 2011 was I believe Lt. General 

Caldwell, correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. I believe you are correct, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. This is a pattern of destruction of documents 

under his command that I find personally to be of deep concern and 

something we should continue to look at. 

There certainly had to be some sort of electronic records. In this 

day and age, in the years of the 2000’s there had to be some sort 

of electronic record, was there not? 

Mr. SOPKO. Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned, we learned about this 

in April 12 and I believe the auditors kept looking for these 

records. We assumed there had to be some record saved in electronic format. It wasn’t until I believe late June or July that finally 

CSTC–A told us that if you haven’t gotten it, you are not going to 

get it. We couldn’t find any electronic records. 

There may be electronic records of the actual payment. We know 

how much we paid but that doesn’t tell us anything else. That just 

tells us how much we may have lost. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Tell me about debarment. Certainly there are 

some bad actors in this category of fuel consumption. Has anybody 

been debarred? How is that process working? 

Mr. SOPKO. We have a very aggressive—without sounding like I 

am tooting my horn—I think one of the more aggressive suspension 

and debarment programs, particularly in that field. The area in Afghanistan, of course, is where we are looking. We have referred 242 

companies and individuals for suspension and debarment. 

Unfortunately, a number of the companies and individuals that 

we have identified as subject to debarment and suspension have 

not been suspended and debarred by the Army. Despite the fact 

that we have provided thousands of pages of analysis, witness 

statements and submitted documents as part of multiple debarment proceedings of fuel contractors, we are basically forced to 

prove a negative. 

By that, I mean, Mr. Chairman, we have signed affidavits, we 

have statements from U.S. officers and employees who are saying 

that the records with their signatures are false, that they did not 

sign those documents, but the Army is saying, unless you prove the 

fuel didn’t actually go to the military base to the Afghans, we are 

not going to suspend and debar. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Are any of these suspected terrorists or known 

terrorists? 

Mr. SOPKO. Mr. Chairman, that is a very good question. We have 

identified 42 companies and individuals who have been listed by either the Department of Commerce on their entities list, which is 

published in the Code of Federal Regulations, and at least eight of 

23 

those who have been publicly listed pursuant to Section 841 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act which deals with contracting 

with the enemy, those individuals have been publicly identified, we 

have brought their names and the names of those companies to the 

Army and they haven’t been debarred. 

We view this as ridiculous. They should be debarred immediately. They are listed by the United States Government as terrorists but at the same time, they are able to contract with the United 

States Government right now in Afghanistan. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So of these hundreds of people and entities that 

you have identified as qualified for debarment, do you have any 

idea what percentage have actually been accomplished? Why is the 

Army not doing this? What is their justification for that? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, they just line us up in the queue with everyone 

else. In the queue now for the Army, it takes about a year. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do they have some intern sitting in some cubicle 

somewhere that doesn’t have enough time to get this done or what 

is the problem? 

Mr. SOPKO. My concern, Mr. Chairman, is that they don’t appreciate I think what you appreciate and what I do that time is of the 

essence. If we are going to make a difference and stop bad people 

from contracting with the U.S. Government, from stopping terrorists from contracting with the U.S. Government, now is the time, 

not two years or three years from now. 

I have told my staff since I started, the next two years, if we are 

going to make a difference for the U.S. Government, for the U.S. 

taxpayer, we have to redouble our efforts. I am not absolutely certain that everyone has that message. It is business as usual in a 

lot of government agencies. 

I know there are people such as General Allen, General Longo 

and the people in Task Force 2010 out in the field who realize now 

is the time, time is of the essence. I am not commenting on them 

but I think there are too many people here in Washington who 

think this is business as usual. It is not business as usual. We are 

in a war and if we are going to do something, we have to do it now. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. My time has expired but given that 

we have been there for more than ten years and we haven’t gotten 

this part right yet, with all due respect to General Allen and the 

great patriot that he is, if they didn’t take this seriously and can’t 

get these people on a list, and it takes years to get it done, it is 

just an atrocity. I appreciate you highlighting it. 

There is someone here who has done a lot of work on this particular topic and has been a champion in trying to get this thing 

fixed. I appreciate his part in this. Now, I recognize the gentleman 

from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Sopko. 

This is outrageous to say the least, but it is not new to us. When 

we looked into the contract, the oil coming through Kyrgyzstan one 

of the things we found out was that the Department of Defense 

didn’t even really know who they were contracting with. They had 

a corporation but didn’t know the principals, they didn’t know the 

stockholders, didn’t know the directors and I am afraid we are 

looking at more of that here. 

24 

Let me first deal with the shredding issue. We need resolution 

of that. You already have an investigation that is going on. You 

said 2009 through 2011, General Caldwell was in charge. Who was 

in charge from 2007 to 2009? 

Mr. SOPKO. I don’t have the name of the general at that time. 

I can check. Let me see if my staff has it. We can get back to you 

with that information. 

Mr. TIERNEY. The question is, was this an ongoing destruction of 

documents during that 2007 to 2011 period or did it all happen at 

one time? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is what we are trying to determine. We are also 

trying to determine who did it and was it ordered. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Was it policy or was it a personal decision? That 

is what we need to know. 

Mr. SOPKO. We don’t know that yet. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Those are things we have to find out. 

Mr. SOPKO. Absolutely. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Who destroyed it, was it done as a matter of policy 

or some personal decision? What is the status of the investigation, 

is it just beginning? 

Mr. SOPKO. It is just beginning, sir. 

Mr. TIERNEY. The second thing is I think we are all hesitant to 

start turning over millions and millions of dollars to the Afghan 

National Army if they don’t have a process of accountability. The 

Chairman and I are going to talk about what we do between now 

and the end of next week to stop something going in January. 

I agree with you, why are we giving them extra money if they 

can’t justify the need for it? What I am hearing from you is they 

have not shown us any justification for that substantial increase, 

is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct. 

Mr. TIERNEY. So it is some $212 million per year they want to 

give additionally without any documentation or substantiation? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct. I would say, Mr. Tierney, it is basically garbage in and garbage out. It is not based on anything credible. The current numbers—and we are even giving them that current number of $306 million because they don’t know how much is 

being used but definitely not going to the out years and increasing 

it. 

Mr. TIERNEY. So $306 million hasn’t been justified either? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct, sir, because they are basing it on 

order data, what they order as the basis for usage. They don’t have 

consumption data. It is basically like your teenager goes out and 

uses the car and says I need $60 to fill up the gas tank and I need 

another $100, $200 and nobody checks the gas tank. 

Mr. TIERNEY. We have seen this before. We have to act between 

now and January on that. The preconditions should be exactly 

what before we start releasing money to the ANA to distribute? We 

should have some system in place and you outlined the system over 

here but should we not have some period of time in which they are 

actually performing to that system before we feel comfortable that 

they have the capacity, independent of the United States, to actually carry out the system and implement it properly and also need 

25 

records to show the actual numbers before we give them the $306 

million? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct, Congressman. The thing you have to 

realize is CSTC–A is a U.S. and NATO organization. We are finding is, not only aren’t the Afghans living up to their own rules and 

procedures, but CSTC–A isn’t. How can we hold the Afghans, and 

assume the Afghans can do it, if CSTC–A doesn’t even do it? 

Mr. TIERNEY. We had problems with CSTC–A with regard to the 

training of the Afghan National Army and whether or not they 

were doing the job that should have been done there. We had 

issues with them with respect to the tracking of weapons. We had 

weapons coming into the airport and no tracking between getting 

unloaded from the plane getting to the warehouse, no tracking between the warehouse and getting the trucks that were delivering, 

no record of the trucks delivering to the final point of return and 

weapons were showing up in all sorts of places. CSTC–A, unfortunately, has a longstanding issue of accountability. 

I guess my question to you is what is reasonable to expect can 

be done between now and January 2013 or is just a fool’s errand 

that we ought not start delivering directly at all and find some 

other system until we can get enough of a record and enough proof 

of their capacity to perform? 

Mr. SOPKO. I am not certain that CSTC–A can remedy the problems in this short a time frame. They are making some attempts, 

but as we say in the audit, they still are not basing and grounding 

this on common sense. You have to have the records, you have to 

check what consumption is, and you have to check that the fuel is 

going to where it is being ordered. This is just reason and common 

sense. I am not absolutely certain they can do it. 

Mr. TIERNEY. As you read it, the directive to do all this by January 2013 is just something the Army has set as a date or is it some 

regulation that is, in fact, in place? 

Mr. SOPKO. It is our understanding, and I will check with my 

staff who are probably more knowledgeable about this, but it is our 

understanding that is the stated policy and it will occur, not just 

for CSTC–A, not just for petroleum, oil and fuel, it is going to be 

with a number of programs. 

Mr. TIERNEY. The Department of Defense policy, you are saying? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is my understanding. It is DOD planning policy. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. You have been liberal with the time. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The gentleman yields back. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, 

for five minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sopko, I want to thank you for your work on this. Can I ask 

you, in terms of what we are paying for fuel in Afghanistan 

through the vendor process, what are we paying a gallon for gas? 

Mr. SOPKO. I believe we are paying $4 per gallon, but again, I 

will double check—approximately $4 per gallon. 

Mr. LYNCH. Supposedly at the pump, right at the point of purchase? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. 

26 

Mr. LYNCH. I understand the challenges that CSTC–A has. From 

our previous trips and we have all made numerous trips to Afghanistan, the recruits that we are getting in training, candidates for 

training, are largely illiterate, they don’t know how to count so we 

are actually going through a program now where we put these 

trainees and put them through a program that takes them through 

a third grade level U.S. 

What troubles me greatly is that the people who are supposed to 

be teaching the Afghans, as you pointed out, CSTC–A, the proper 

methodology for accounting for the fuel, paying for it and running 

the system, CSTC–A is not using the system that we should be trying to teach these trainees, these candidates, these people running 

the operation who are supposed to be running it themselves beginning in 2013. There is a real gap in our mission. 

As I understand, most of the prior accounting is just a paper 

process. Is there any ability adopt to our own system or through 

DCAA, the Defense Contracting Auditing Agency, a system that 

might be able to put in place before January? 

Mr. SOPKO. I don’t believe so, sir. It is a paper process. I have 

seen the tickets. They are just like your old tickets. I remember 

working in the steel mills when I was a kid and there were these 

little tickets when you bought something and there would be four 

or five copies. You pull one off, you give it to the driver; the driver 

takes it, he pulls another off and fills it in. 

I think to institute in three months an electronic process would 

be extremely difficult. As you alluded, the problem is we should be 

leading by example and CSTC–A isn’t following their own rules. 

They are allowing the purchases to go directly to CSTC–A. They 

are supposed to go through that process. There are supposed to be 

forms. There should be a package together before CSTC–A makes 

the payment but they are not. 

Mr. LYNCH. We had similar problems with the banking system. 

It got so bad because of the theft largely by folks related to Hamid 

Karzai and related to the first Vice President, and they basically 

robbed Kabul Bank. It came to a point where we had to redirect 

our payments to vendors away from the Afghan banks so that they 

wouldn’t be stealing our money. This is a lot of the same problem. 

Yesterday at the hearing, I said corruption to Afghanistan is like 

wet is to water. We have some serious problems here and we can’t 

let this continue. We can’t let this go forward in January. We can’t 

just send them a check because we know they are going to steal 

it, we know they are overcharging us. I was reading in this report 

that they are even ordering fuel for trailers that don’t have engines, that don’t use fuel. They are basing their fuel consumption 

on trailers that don’t use fuel. That troubles me greatly. 

Again, we are trying to do the right thing. The American people 

have been very supportive of this operation. I think they are rightfully running out of patience. I am just trying to figure a way to 

minimize our losses and bring some accountability to this process. 

It does boggle the mind that we have been there 10 years, 10 years, 

and we don’t have a system in place to verify how much fuel they 

are using and whether or not they are using the resources we are 

giving them for that purpose. 

27 

It is disgraceful. We cannot afford this. We never could afford 

this but we certainly cannot afford it now. I think at some point, 

we are going to have to get over there and look into this more deeply, part of the committee, over in Afghanistan. 

How many auditors do you have on the ground through your operation? 

Mr. SOPKO. We have 49 positions totally and that includes criminal investigators and auditors and we have approximately 25. 

Since I came onboard, I have asked for approval from the State Department to increase the number by 8. You know, since you have 

been there, there is limited space but we feel if we are going to 

make a difference, we have to emphasize the next two years, so we 

are going to increase the total number to about 57 or 58 people. 

Mr. LYNCH. My last question, in closing, we have the vehicle requirements but don’t we have some power plants that are consuming large amounts of fuel? It would seem with a fixed facility 

as opposed to vehicles moving around and you can’t really track 

consumption on that end as well as you can with a fixed facility, 

can we at least put people in place at these power plants so that 

we can audit their fuel consumption? 

Mr. SOPKO. We do have some people in place, the auditors found, 

but the problem again is we are not collecting the data. 

Mr. LYNCH. It should be possible because 92 percent of the country has no electricity. Basically, it is 8 percent of the population 

right in and around Kabul that has electricity for some part of the 

day. We should be able to go in there and audit those limited facilities that are actually producing electricity. 

Mr. SOPKO. These facilities that are producing electricity are basically producing electricity for a military base. They are large diesel power generators. 

I wanted to clarify one thing. When you made reference to the 

trailers, that came up not so much in the ordering issue but when 

we asked CSTC–A to justify their budget. They gave us information 

and when we looked behind the information they gave us, they 

were counting trailers and other equipment that had no engines to 

justify it. 

We said that doesn’t fly. It was more in that context. We have 

not confirmed actual fuel going to non-working engines, but we 

don’t know where the fuel goes. All we really know is what we pay 

the vendor. 

Mr. LYNCH. I have exceeded my time. I appreciate your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The gentleman yields back. 

I recognize myself for five minutes. 

You mentioned in your report that the U.S. military is spending 

$20 million for firewood. Is there any justification for $20 million 

in Afghan firewood? 

Mr. SOPKO. Mr. Chairman, that was one of the more interesting 

comments my auditor told me. You are absolutely correct, CSTC– 

A’s paying approximately $20 million a year for firewood. When my 

auditors asked for documentation of what we spent on firewood, basically, we were told ‘‘we don’t have the records; we just spend the 

money.’’ That is the CSTC–A attitude. 

28 

That is a lot of firewood. Somebody joked that is like buying 

every stick of lumber in Maine. Again, it is an attitude, we just 

pay, and that is what is shocking. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Obviously there is some bribery going on here. 

We would be naive to think there wasn’t. Do you have any sense 

of how that happens, what the going rate is? How much are these 

people being paid off? 

Mr. SOPKO. Again, it is difficult for us to do criminal investigations in this arena because there are no records. It is going to be 

even more difficult if we just cut a blank check. In other programs 

that we have looked at, in programs related to some of the post nation trucking cases that I referred to that Mr. Tierney and you investigated before, we have records, we have done criminal investigations. We actually have 25 fuel-related investigations currently 

underway which has resulted in a number of indictments. The going rate we are seeing is about $5,000 per truck to make 

trucks disappear. We have one case in which approximately 200- 

some trucks just disappeared. By that, I mean somebody made up 

the records—there are actually paper records—just made them up, 

they were paid $5,000, so it is about $1,000 a gallon. The trucks 

went out the door never to be seen again. 

That is over 1,000,000 gallons in fuel and nobody noticed it until 

we opened the criminal investigation. I must say we have very 

strong support from the military in this matter. They have been 

very helpful and we have been working jointly with them and Task 

Force 2010 on these types of cases but those were cases where we 

actually have records. We don’t have records over at CSTC–A. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Can’t we just go down to OfficeMax and buy a few 

laptops, get a little software and be out the door by three o’clock? 

I have to tell you, I really appreciate after ten years and for CSTC– 

A, for the Pentagon to suggest that we should increase spending to 

$555 million per year and from 2014 to 2018, $2.8 billion they want 

to increase the funding and send the bulk of this directly to the Afghan Government with less control, less oversight, less accountability, it is absolutely stunning, the total lack of regard for the resources and the money the American people are spending. 

Then to spend $20 million on firewood with no accountability, I 

really appreciate you bringing this to our attention. We, in Congress, have to step up and do something about this because this is 

totally unacceptable. 

I have no further questions but I would be happy to yield to the 

gentleman from Massachusetts? 

Mr. TIERNEY. I suspect that we are beating a dead horse at this 

stage. You have made a very compelling and clear case and I thank 

you for that. 

I guess we need to define what the role of the Afghan National 

Army is versus the role of CSTC–A’s situation on that. Is the role 

of the contractors prominent in this documentation? They basically 

document the amount they pick up and the amount they deliver or 

where do they fit into this? 

Mr. SOPKO. They are supposed to but since we don’t have the 

records, we don’t know. We have some records that we have seen 

and it again shows they picked up so much fuel. What made us 

suspicious—again, I am a former federal prosecutor and got my 

29 

start looking at corrupt unions in Ohio where records disappeared 

all the time or were bogus records. I did banking investigations, 

but what you see here is sometimes these are pristine records. 

They are typed out. There is no spillage. Everything is perfect. 

That raises some concern and the fact that in most cases there are 

no records. 

Mr. TIERNEY. We don’t know the amount that wasn’t delivered, 

we don’t know the amount that was delivered but in insufficient 

amounts and what left the depot and we don’t know the grade or 

quality, whether it was doctored, altered, watered down or anything else? We are unable to indicate all that? 

Mr. SOPKO. The key point is we don’t know what was consumed, 

so how do we know what we should be buying? 

Mr. TIERNEY. The attitude of we don’t have the records, we just 

spend the money, that permeates unfortunately too much of what 

is going on, not just in CSTC–A but I think in the whole operation 

over there and how we intend to protect our troops and get to an 

end result of this with the level of corruption where the people 

from Afghanistan can’t even trust their own leadership on that or 

distinguish between what is happening to them at the hands of insurgents and other characters and their own government is not 

helping our operation at all. 

Thank you, Mr. Sopko. I suspect we may be talking to your office 

because I have started conversations with the Chairman about 

something maybe we could do between now and the end of this session to stop this from being implemented the way it looks like it 

is heading. 

Mr. SOPKO. We are happy to work with you and the Chairman 

and any other members on this issue or other issues. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, 

is recognized. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you, Mr. 

Sopko. 

Have you been invited to testify before Defense Appropriations? 

Mr. SOPKO. No, sir. I have only been on the job since July 1. 

Mr. LYNCH. We might want to cycle you through Defense Appropriations. If they had the benefit of your counsel, I think that 

would be great. 

We know none of these records are being established. They are 

not being created or they are being shredded. What is the situation 

now with CSTC–A based on your contact with them? Have they 

changed their behavior at all? Is there a statement of future compliance? What are they doing? 

Mr. SOPKO. They are starting, as you see in the report, their 

comments, to change. We don’t feel it is going fast enough. We 

don’t think it is focusing on the most critical records and those are 

usage records and we don’t feel, based upon our last request for 

records, in which they could only provide 50 percent of the records, 

that everybody is following the rules and regulations. 

I should say they told us, don’t worry, those records were shredded but now we are keeping records. We did a statistical sample 

and it came back that 50 percent of the records were gone and no 

30 

explanation of what happened. We don’t know if those were destroyed, lost or they didn’t collect them. 

We may go back in again. We are going to be spending time looking at how CSTC–A is doing the same program for the police and 

we may be able to report back to you on that, but I am not optimistic. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. We would like to work with you maybe even 

so far as to getting over to Afghanistan and doing a walk through 

with your folks just to drill down on this a little bit. 

Mr. SOPKO. We would love to do that. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Are there other categories or other major expenditures that 

should also be on our radar? You mentioned the police, but if are 

there other big major ticket items, even smaller ticket items like 

firewood and others on your radar, I would appreciate knowing 

that or if there is something else you would care to share with us? 

Otherwise, we will conclude the hearing. 

Mr. SOPKO. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for giving 

me this opportunity to talk about this really important issue. Since 

coming onboard, as I said I just started July 1, I have emphasized 

after talking to a number of policy people, that we are going to 

have to increase our audits and increase our investigations, we are 

going to have to do them faster and be smarter because we have 

a limited amount of time because of the security situation in Afghanistan. 

Accordingly, we are coordinated with the other IGs and we are 

looking at a number of very serious issues. We are going to be looking at how security is impacting our programs by USAID and the 

Defense Department, how we are going to monitor contracts when 

there are going to be fewer American troops there is a big issue for 

us. 

We are also going to do a number of capping reports looking at 

broader issues dealing with corruption, counter narcotics activities 

as well as looking at the food services that CSTC–A provides to the 

Afghan National Security Forces. 

Since approximately 50 percent of the reconstruction money now 

is going to the Afghan National Security Forces, that obviously is 

going to be a key place where we will emphasize our resources but 

we are open to suggestions from other interested parties. 

The last thing I want to mention in regard to this is we discussed suspension and debarment. I don’t want to leave the impression that the generals in the field have authority to suspend 

and debar. When I mentioned General Allen or General Longo, 

they would love to have the authority to suspend and debar, but 

they can’t either. 

If they find suspicious characters, they have to send it to Army 

here in Washington for suspension and debarments. There is no accusation against the generals and the people in the field. They are 

actually with us are probably the best people to know the bad guys 

and who we should suspend and debar but they don’t have that authority, nor do we, which is ironic because you have the National 

31 

Endowment for the Arts has suspension and debarment authority 

but the commander in the field does not. 

The Institute of Museum and Library Services—I have a whole 

list—they all have suspension and debarment authority. The Railroad Retirement Board, the National Endowment for Humanities, 

the Legal Services Corporation, the National Archives, they all 

have suspension and debarment authority but General Allen 

doesn’t, General Longo doesn’t and we don’t. 

I think it is something to consider particularly in a war. We are 

a temporary agency. We are disappearing at the end of this but a 

commander in the field should have authority to stop trading with 

the enemy and basically say, we are debarring you but he doesn’t 

have that authority or she doesn’t have that authority. 

I would ask you to consider that as you consider this very important issue on suspension and debarment. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Now I have a second piece of legislation I will be introducing. 

Great work. We appreciate the service that so many of the men 

and women in your organization are doing. It is very difficult. We 

all appreciate this and appreciate the report. 

At this time, the committee will stand in adjournment. 

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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