1

Filed 5/20/14 In re J.C. CA1/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

In re J.C., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

J.C., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 A136774, A137952 

 (Sonoma County 

 Super. Ct. No. 36196-J) 

 J.C., a minor, appeals the juvenile court’s orders entered after a contested 

jurisdictional hearing. The juvenile court found that appellant committed one count of 

assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,1

 § 245, subd. (a)(1) (count 1)), and two counts 

of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4) 

(counts 2 and 3)). The juvenile court found true the corresponding gang enhancement. 

Appellant contends he cannot be convicted of two assaults (counts 1 and 2) against the 

same victim2

 because he engaged in a single, continuous course of conduct. 

Alternatively, he claims remand for resentencing is required because the juvenile court 

erroneously failed to stay the sentence imposed on count 1 under section 654. We affirm. 

 1

 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 

2

 Count 3 relates to assaultive conduct committed against a different victim. 
2

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. Charged Offenses 

 On June 16, 2012, about 12:00 or 1:00 p.m., a family consisting of a couple 

(Father and Mother, also sometimes referred to as husband and wife) and their two 

daughters, ages 14 and 18,3

 attended a family birthday party at a park in Santa Rosa. The 

birthday party took place at the same time and in the same general area as a car show. 

The car show included a beer drinking contest, Aztec dancers, and musical performances 

by various rappers. Some car show attendees smoked marijuana, wore red, and yelled 

“VSRN” throughout the day. Rap songs also mentioned “VSRN.” VSRN is the acronym 

for Varrio Santa Rosa Norte, which is a subset of the Norteno criminal street gang. 

 Many of the car show attendees were gang members who were familiar or friendly 

with the father. Father was not a gang member, but had associated with gangs when he 

was young. Members of his and his wife’s family had been involved in gangs. 

 Sometime between 4:30 and 5:30 p.m., the older daughter left the birthday party to 

go to a Quinceanera. She walked to the front of the park with her sister, the younger 

daughter, and her sister’s boyfriend. Father joined the young people on the walk because 

he was concerned for his daughters’ safety. 

 Approximately 30 minutes before escorting the older daughter to meet her friend, 

Father noticed that appellant, appellant’s father Guadalupe C., and a group of other males 

had been watching him intently. Some of the members of the group wore red clothing; 

appellant wore a black t-shirt and khaki shorts. Father, both daughters, and the younger 

daughter’s boyfriend walked by the group on their way to the front of the park. 

Appellant was standing in front of Guadalupe, when Guadalupe called out to Father using 

Father’s nickname. 

 Father thought someone in the group knew him, so he, along with his daughters 

and the boyfriend, walked toward the group. As they approached the group, Father 

 3

 For privacy protection, we shall refer to the victims in their familial capacities 

only. 
3

asked Guadalupe, “Do I know you?” Guadalupe said, “Hey [nickname] . . . you’re 

[nickname] . . . I heard you’re a snitch.” Appellant then walked up to Father and said, 

“Who are you?” Father answered by stating his nickname. Appellant repeatedly called 

Father a “snitch” and clenched his fists as if he was about to hit Father. The older 

daughter tried to protect Father by stepping between appellant and Father. Mother soon 

joined in once she saw the verbal altercation between appellant and her family. 

 Based on the group’s hostile demeanor and the fact that he was being called a 

snitch, Father thought some sort of physical altercation was about to occur. He said to 

Guadalupe, “So this is what you’re about? You do this when I am walking with my kids 

and at a family function? . . . And you got youngsters putting your work in for you? . . . 

You got something to do with me? You should be conducting that with me. Why you 

got a youngster in front of you?” Guadalupe responded, “I heard you were a snitch,” as 

18 to 20 more people gathered around him. Guadalupe then gestured to a heavyset man 

with a ponytail and the number “415” tattooed on his arm. The man punched the older 

daughter in the face, knocking her to the ground. Father was enraged and attacked the 

man who had hit his daughter. 

 Meanwhile, appellant moved as if he was preparing to hit someone. His arms 

were clenched; he was two to three feet away from Father. As Father fought on the 

ground with his daughter’s attacker, several people set upon Father, hitting and kicking 

him. The older daughter then got up from the ground and fought against Father’s 

assailants. Father heard several people say, “VSRN” during the attack. The younger 

daughter saw appellant hit Father. 

 At some point, the crowd began to disperse. Father stopped hitting the older 

daughter’s assailant and stood up unsteadily. Six or seven seconds later, someone came 

up behind Father, said, “Are you okay, homey,” and hit him on the back of the head with 

a glass beer bottle. Father fell motionless on his back. The back of his head was 

bleeding and he was unable to get up or defend himself. As Father fell, about 15 

individuals jumped him and beat him in concert. Many of the individuals wore red, and 
4

some of them shouted, “VSRN.” The younger daughter said, “That’s my dad. Leave 

him alone.” Someone said, “fuck your dad.” 

 The younger daughter threw herself on top of Father and protected his head. The 

group kicked and punched the younger daughter in the head, arms, and the sides of her 

ribs as she shielded Father with her body. Someone said, “VSRN will fight anybody.” 

Appellant hit Father and tried to hit Mother as she attempted to pull him off her husband. 

 The younger daughter spoke to Father as he lay on the ground, but he did not 

move or respond. Someone yelled, “call the cops,” and the assailants dispersed. The 

man who had hit Father with the bottle said, “This is Doc Holliday” (one of the rappers), 

and he drove away in a white truck. The beating had lasted about 10 minutes. 

 After the assailants left, police and paramedics arrived. Father and both daughters 

were taken to the hospital. Father had swelling and cuts on his face and received stitches 

on his nose. He could not focus his eyes, had blood on his lip, cheek, and forehead, and 

his verbal responses were delayed. His body, forearms, chest, forehead, and stomach 

were bruised. The cut on the back of his head was an inch long and about an eighth of an 

inch deep. His knees were scraped from fighting on gravel and asphalt, he had cuts on 

his hands, and he had to wear a neck brace. At the time of the jurisdictional hearing, 

Father was experiencing dizzy spells every morning, had problems maintaining his 

balance, and was suffering from depression brought on by the attacks. 

 As a result of being punched, the older daughter’s jaw swelled and she could not 

open it. Her legs were scraped from being thrown onto gravel and her ribs were bruised. 

She also had a laceration behind one of her ears and bruises on her shoulder and the back 

of her neck. The younger daughter had lumps on her head and bruises on her arms. At 

the time of the jurisdictional hearing, she still experienced intermittent pain in her head. 

 Father knew Guadalupe, but did not recognize him on June 16, 2012. The first 

time they met, Guadalupe had overheard Father’s cousin call Father a snitch because he 

had spoken with the police regarding a narcotics investigation. Father had also testified 

against Norteno gang participants in a trial. 
5

B. Gang Evidence 

 Detective John Cretan of the Santa Rosa Police Department testified as a gang 

expert and the investigating officer in the case. According to Cregan, Carl Hasty, Robert 

Flett, also known as “Doc Holliday,” Rubin Tovar, Juan Tovar, and Tavo Collazo, also 

known as “Little Conner,” were active participants in the assaults on Father. All of those 

individuals were members of the Norteno gang. Tovar was a registered gang member 

who spoke openly about his affiliation with VSRN. Hasty was involved in a Norteno 

gang, had numerous gang-related tattoos, and had served a prison sentence for a gangrelated drive-by shooting. Collazo, or “Little Conner,” had dozens of gang-specific 

tattoos, was open about his gang affiliation, and had gang-related convictions. Flett, or 

“Doc Holliday,” also was a well-known VSRN member. 

 Cregan opined that the assaults on Father and the younger daughter were gangrelated because some of the perpetrators wore red clothing, a red flag with a bird symbol 

was hoisted nearby, and some perpetrators called Father a “snitch.” According to 

Cregan, one of the “cardinal rules” in the gang community is that one cannot assist police 

investigations, even if one is the victim of a crime at the hands of a rival gang member. 

An individual who has provided information to law enforcement or cooperated with law 

enforcement on a case is considered to be a “rat” or “snitch” by gang members. The term 

“snitch” is one of the most derogatory terms that can be used in the gang world. 

Someone who is labeled a snitch is likely to be violently assaulted. Someone who is not 

a gang member, but who associates with gangs, may become a snitch by communicating 

with law enforcement. Cregan opined that Father was assaulted because he had testified 

against Norteno gang members in a trial. 

 Cregan testified that once a gang fight begins, other gang members in the vicinity 

are obligated to join in the altercation whether they started it or not. If a gang member 

does not join in the fight, he will lose status in the gang. Active participation in an 

assault benefits a gang member’s status and the gang as a whole because gang members 

wish to be feared and respected in the community and by other gangs. 
6

 Cregan opined that appellant was an active gang participant who was closely 

associated with VSRN. According to Cregan, appellant was involved in several gangrelated assaults prior to the assaults on Father. In 2009, appellant and several other 

known Nortenos participated in a fight against rival Sureno gang members that involved 

over 15 juveniles. One of the Sureno gang members was stabbed repeatedly during the 

incident. Then, in March 2010, appellant and two other Norteno gang participants, one of 

whom was appellant’s younger brother, repeatedly kicked and punched a rival Sureno 

gang participant while shouting gang challenges. Appellant admitted his involvement in 

the crime. Also, in December 2010, appellant witnessed rival Sureno gang members stab 

his older brother, a member of VSRN. Appellant refused to speak to police about the 

incident. He explained, “I can’t be a snitch. I won’t talk.” 

C. Juvenile Court Proceedings 

 On July 23, 2012, the Sonoma County District Attorney filed an amended 

wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)), alleging that appellant 

committed assault with a deadly weapon—a bottle—upon Father. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1) 

(count 1)), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury upon Father 

(§ 245, subd. (a)(4) (count 2)), and assault by means of force likely to produce great 

bodily injury upon the younger daughter (§ 245, subd. (a)(4) (count 3)). The petition 

further alleged a great bodily injury enhancement, a five-year gang enhancement, and a 

10-year gang enhancement for count 1, a great bodily injury enhancement, a four-year 

gang enhancement, and a 10-year gang enhancement for count 2, and a four-year gang 

enhancement for count 3. 

 On August 1, 2012, the juvenile court dismissed the great bodily injury 

enhancement for count 1 at the prosecutor’s request. On August 9, 2012, following a 

contested jurisdictional hearing, the court found counts 1, 2, and 3 true. Despite 

previously dismissing the great bodily injury enhancement for count 1, the court also 

found the great bodily injury and the 10-year gang enhancements true for counts 1 and 2, 

and the four-year gang enhancement true for count 3. On September 10 and 13, 2012, the 

juvenile court corrected its findings with regard to count 1 by deleting the great bodily 
7

injury and the 10-year gang enhancements and imposing the five-year gang enhancement. 

The court committed appellant to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for 90 days for a 

diagnostic evaluation. 

 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 3, 2012. 

 On February 5, 2013, after appellant completed his DJJ commitment, the juvenile 

court declared wardship and placed appellant in probation camp. The court set the 

maximum time of confinement at 293 months. The court awarded a total of 328 days of 

precommitment custody credit. Appellant filed a second notice of appeal on February 19, 

2013. On March 4, 2013, we consolidated the appeals. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Conviction on Two Counts 

 Appellant contends the prosecution impermissibly split a single assault into two 

counts because the charged offenses involved a single course of conduct. (See, e.g., 

People v. Oppenheimer (1909) 156 Cal. 733, 740 (Oppenheimer).) We disagree. 

1. Applicable Law 

Section 245, subdivision (a)(1), criminalizes “an assault upon the person of another 

with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm . . . .” Section 245, 

subdivision (a)(4), criminalizes “assault upon the person of another by any means of force 

likely to produce great bodily injury . . . .” Section 240 defines assault as “an unlawful 

attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of 

another.” “[A]ctual causation of injury . . . is not a required element for assault” and “[n]o 

actual touching is necessary” for conviction. (People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 

101, 122; People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 702.) To be found guilty of assault, all 

the defendant has to do is perform “an act likely to result in a touching, however slight, of 

another, in a harmful or offensive manner. [Citation.]” (People v. Wyatt, at p. 702.) 

“Where the assault is committed with a deadly weapon, or with force likely to produce 

great bodily injury, the . . . assault is complete upon the attempted use of the force.” 

(People v. Yeats (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 874, 878.) 
8

 A defendant may be convicted of assault with a deadly weapon on an aiding and 

abetting theory of liability. (See, e.g., In re Jose D. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 582, 584-

585.) “ ‘[A]n aider and abettor is a person who, “acting with (1) knowledge of the 

unlawful purpose of the perpetrator[,] and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, 

encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, 

promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 136.) Further, “ ‘[a] person who knowingly aids and abets 

criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime [target offense] but also of any 

other crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget offense] that is a natural and 

probable consequence of the intended crime. The latter question is not whether the aider 

and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was 

reasonably foreseeable. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 

913, 920 (Medina), italics omitted.) 

 Section 954 provides that “ ‘[a]n accusatory pleading may charge . . . different 

statements of the same offense’ and ‘the defendant may be convicted of any number of 

the offenses charged.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1474 

(Johnson), quoting § 954.) “Unless one offense is necessarily included in the other 

[citation], multiple convictions can be based upon a single criminal act or an indivisible 

course of criminal conduct . . . .” (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 97, citing 

§ 954.) 

Whether a defendant may receive multiple convictions where they are based upon 

multiple blows during a single continuous assault is a question of law subject to 

independent review. (See, e.g., Johnson, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1474 [issue of 

whether the defendant could receive multiple convictions of corporal injury to a 

cohabitant based on multiple blows in the course of a single continuous assault subject to 

independent review].) “[T]he proper analysis involves a determination of when the 

charged crime is completed.” (Ibid.) 

 Once a court determines when the charged crime is completed, it “review[s] the 

record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses 
9

substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid 

value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [the] defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt of the . . . crimes he challenges . . . . [Citation.]” (Johnson, supra, 150 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1477.) 

2. Analysis 

 Section 954 generally permits multiple convictions, although section 654 prohibits 

multiple punishments for the same act or omission. In People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 

110, our Supreme Court explained the distinction between multiple convictions arising 

out of the same act (which are permissible) and multiple punishments for the same act 

(which are prohibited). (Id. at p. 116.) “ ‘When section 954 permits multiple 

convictions, but section 654 prohibits multiple punishment, the trial court must stay 

execution of sentence on the convictions for which multiple punishment is prohibited. 

[Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sloan, at p. 116.) 

 In Johnson, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, the defendant was convicted of three 

counts of corporal injury on a cohabitant arising from a single incident in which he hit a 

woman with whom he was living on the nose, eyes, and mouth; choked her and held her 

by her throat against the wall and struck her on the neck, arm, lower back and leg; and 

stabbed her in the left arm. (Id. at p. 1471.) Johnson rejected the defendant’s claim that 

multiple convictions were improper under section 954 because his conduct constituted a 

single continuous assault. Johnson found that “the crime described by section 273.5 is 

complete upon the willful and direct application of physical force upon the victim, 

resulting in wound or injury. It follows that where multiple applications of physical force 

result in separate injuries, the perpetrator has completed multiple violations of section 

273.5.” (Johnson, at p. 1477.) As a result, Johnson concluded that the evidence 

supported three separate convictions for a violation of section 273.5 consisting of one 

offense when defendant beat the victim, another when he held her by the throat, and a 

third when he stabbed her arm. (Johnson, at p. 1477.) 
10

 Here, as Johnson illustrates, under section 954, appellant’s charge and conviction 

of two counts of assault (one with a deadly weapon, one with force likely to produce 

great bodily injury) is permissible. 

Nonetheless, appellant, relying on various inapposite authority, claims he could be 

convicted of only one assault. Appellant claims this case is controlled by Oppenheimer, 

supra, 156 Cal. 733 and People v. Mitchell (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 204 (Mitchell). We 

disagree. Preliminarily, both Oppenheimer and Mitchell were decided long before the 

rules regarding continuous course of conduct and independent objectives were formulated 

and, as such, neither case had occasion to discuss these rules. 

 In Oppenheimer, supra, 156 Cal. 733, the defendant took an iron window weight 

from his cell and escaped from it. (Id. at pp. 736-737.) He then went to the prison dining 

room and attacked another inmate who was cutting bread by hitting the inmate on the 

head with the window weight, grabbing the knife from the inmate, and stabbing him 

several times. (Ibid.) Oppenheimer observed, “We think it is manifest that there was but 

a single assault shown by this evidence . . . . The mere fact that two weapons are used 

does not necessarily show two assaults. . . . The evidence . . . in this case tended to show 

one continuous transaction, one assault in which two weapons were used.” (Id. at 

p. 740.) The defendant in Oppenheimer was charged with and convicted of a single 

count of assault, and the issue on appeal was whether the evidence supported the crime as 

charged and proved. (Id. at pp. 739-740.) The Supreme Court answered that question 

affirmatively. (Id. at p. 740.) Here, by contrast, appellant was charged with and 

convicted of two assaults, and substantial evidence supports both convictions. (See § B.2 

post.) The fact that two closely related attacks can be characterized a single assault does 

not support the conclusion that two more separate and distinct attacks must be 

characterized as a single assault. 

 Similarly, in Mitchell the defendant attacked the victim by hitting him on the head, 

and a very short time later attacked the victim again, using a beer bottle to strike the 

victim on the side of the head. (Mitchell, supra, 40 Cal.App.2d at p. 207.) The defendant 

complained his conviction for two assaults violated the double jeopardy clause of the 
11

California Constitution. (Id. at p. 210.) Mitchell, citing Oppenheimer, rejected this 

contention, finding “there was in fact but a single assault.” (Mitchell, supra, 40 

Cal.App.2d at p. 211.) “The evidence concerning the blow struck by [the defendant] with 

his fist was merely testimony regarding a portion of a transaction which culminated in the 

assault with the bottle. . . . . There was but one assault, although two blows, one with the 

fist and one with a bottle, were struck.” (Ibid.) 

 Mitchell is not controlling here because we are not faced with a double jeopardy 

issue. Furthermore, as we have explained, the fact that a defendant who inflicts more 

than one blow can be charged with and convicted of a single assault does not compel the 

conclusion that a series of blows must be characterized as a single assault.

Equally unavailing is appellant’s reliance on Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th 913. In 

Medina, two defendants were involved in a gang assault that culminated in the shooting 

of the victim. (Id. at pp. 916-917.) A jury found the defendants guilty of first degree 

murder as aiders and abettors. (Id. at pp. 917, 919.) The Court of Appeal reversed their 

convictions “on the ground there was insufficient evidence that the nontarget crimes of 

murder and attempted murder were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of simple 

assault, the target offense they had aided and abetted.” (Id. at p. 919.) Our Supreme 

Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 928.) The court reasoned that the 

gun violence was foreseeable because “although [one defendant] argue[d] that the 

fistfight and shooting were not one uninterrupted event, but rather two separate 

incidents, the evidence showed that [the defendants] did not consider the fight to be 

over and that the shooting resulted directly from that fight. Eyewitnesses testified that 

the events happened very quickly, in a matter of seconds, not minutes. After [a third 

party] had broken up the fight, someone yelled, ‘get the heat,’ just before the shooting.” 

(Id. at pp. 923-924.) 

 Appellant appears to rely on the Medina court’s reasoning regarding the 

foreseeability of gun violence for the proposition that he committed only one assault. 

Medina, however, does not address the propriety of multiple convictions for multiple acts 

of violence committed during the course of a continuous assault. Rather, the issue before 
12

the court was whether substantial evidence supported the murder and attempted murder 

convictions based on aider and abettor liability. (Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 919-

921.) Accordingly, Medina is inapposite. (See People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 

616, 684 [“ ‘It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not 

considered’ ”].) 

 Finally, appellant also relies on State v. McDonald (1877) 67 Mo. 13. In 

McDonald, the defendant struck the victim with tongs, a hammer, and an axe handle 

during an altercation and was indicted for one count of assault with intent to kill using all 

three weapons. (Id. at pp. 15, 17-18.) He sought to quash the indictment, arguing that he 

could not have committed the offense as charged because “three weapons were charged 

to have been used at the same time.” (Id. at pp. 15-16.) The court upheld the validity of 

the indictment, finding that it charged one continuous assault with multiple weapons 

rather than two or more assaults in one count. (Id. at p. 18.) 

 Obviously, McDonald is not controlling here as we “are not bound by cases from 

other states. [Citation.]” (People v. Mays (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 156, 167.) Further, 

McDonald is inapposite because, like Oppenheimer and Mitchell, it does not address the 

issue of whether multiple acts of violence may support multiple assault convictions and 

predates the relevant California case law. (Johnson, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 1467; see 

also People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 334.) 

 None of the cases appellant cites stands for the proposition that only one theory of 

conviction can be charged for one or more acts that are part of a single violent encounter. 

To the contrary, section 954 permits such charging schemes. Instead, the cases appellant 

relies on illustrate that whether more than one attack is to be viewed as one assault rests 

upon the factual circumstances of each case. Thus, although appellant’s attack upon the 

victim was carried out over a very short period of time, there were two separate assaults 

with different instrumentalities, one with appellant’s fist and one with the bottle, resulting 

in numerous injuries to the victim. 
13

B. Sentencing 

Alternately, appellant argues that he cannot be sentenced for the two assaults 

against Father because they were part of an indivisible course of conduct. Thus, 

according to appellant, the juvenile court should have stayed the term of confinement 

pertaining to the assault with a deadly weapon finding. We disagree. 

1. Applicable Law 

 Section 654 states, in part: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways 

by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the 

longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be 

punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) 

 Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment not only for an “act or omission” but 

also for a single, indivisible course of criminal conduct. (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 

Cal.4th 1203, 1207-1208.) “ ‘It is defendant’s intent and objective, not the temporal 

proximity of his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible. 

[Citations.] . . . [I]f all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of 

accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a 

single intent and therefore may be punished only once. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People 

v. Hicks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 784, 789.) “On the other hand, if the evidence discloses that a 

defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not 

merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for the independent violations 

committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations were parts of an 

otherwise indivisible course of conduct. [Citations.]” (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 

545, 551, fn. omitted.) 

 Section 654 applies to consecutive or aggregated terms calculated by a juvenile 

court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c). (In re 

Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 474.) “The question whether section 654 is 

factually applicable to a given series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives 

the trial court broad latitude in making this determination. Its findings on this question 

must be upheld on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them. 
14

[Citations.] ‘We must “view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent and 

presume in support of the [sentencing] order the existence of every fact the trier could 

reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312-1313.) Here, the juvenile court made no 

express factual findings with respect to the application of section 654. Nonetheless, on 

appeal we will sustain the court’s implied factual determination if supported by 

substantial evidence. (See People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730.) 

2. Analysis 

Appellant contends his sentence for assault with a deadly weapon (count one) 

should have been stayed because that offense and the assaultive conduct that formed the 

basis of the count two conviction were part of an indivisible course of criminal conduct. 

 Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implicit finding that appellant 

committed two distinct offenses of assault—one by aiding and abetting an assault with a 

deadly weapon, and the other by engaging in conduct with force likely to produce great 

bodily injury. During the incident at the park, appellant instigated the attack on Father by 

yelling to gang members that Father was a snitch. In this charged atmosphere, fueled by 

alcohol, it was reasonably foreseeable that violence would erupt. (See Medina, supra, 46 

Cal.4th at p. 920.) First, a man punched Father’s older daughter in the face. Then, as 

Father was on the ground fighting her attacker, several people started hitting and kicking 

him. Father’s younger daughter saw appellant hit her father. Father and the older 

daughter’s attacker eventually stopped fighting. Six or seven seconds after Father stood 

up, someone came up behind him and hit him on the back of his head with a glass bottle. 

As Father lay motionless on the ground, appellant, along with numerous individuals, hit 

Father. By calling Father a snitch, appellant aided and abetted the assault with a deadly 

weapon (count 1). Appellant also personally engaged in assaultive conduct when he hit 

Father (count 2). Thus, although the assault with a deadly weapon (count 1) and the 

assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (count 2), were committed during the 

same incident, evidence that each offense furthered separate criminal objectives 

permitted the juvenile court to impose separate sentences. (See People v. Latimer, supra, 
15

5 Cal.4th at pp. 1212, 1216 [approving rule that § 654 authorized punishment in cases 

finding “separate, although sometimes simultaneous objectives under the facts”].) 

 Appellant maintains that he was involved in a group attack, in which he and others 

used fists to assault Father, while one man used a bottle. According to appellant, “they 

all . . . had the single intent of striking [Father] so as to cause him physical harm.” 

Criminal behavior, however, may be punished separately where the criminal acts are the 

products of separate acts of force. (Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 338; People v. 

Trotter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 363, 368.) In the present case, appellant not only incited 

the attack on Father, he also participated in the beating. In other words, appellant was not 

content to merely assault Father, he also wanted others to attack Father. Thus, the 

separate punishments that the juvenile court imposed do not offend section 654. 

III. DISPOSITION 

 Judgment affirmed. 

 _________________________ 

 REARDON, J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

RUVOLO, P. J. 

_________________________ 

HUMES, J.