07 March 2007

Multinational

Operations

Joint Publication 3-16
PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States when they

operate as part of a multinational force. It describes joint organizational structures essential to

coordinate air, land, maritime, space, and special operations and it addresses operational

considerations that the commander and staff should consider during the planning and execution

of multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces

of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination

and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for

the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs)

and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use

by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication

to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a

manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the

overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant

commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands,

and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed

except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.

If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications,

this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally

in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current

and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or

coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by
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Preface

JP 3-16

the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders

should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where

applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WALTER L. SHARP

Lieutenant General, USA

Director, Joint Staff
SUMMARY OF CHANGES

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-16

DATED 5 APRIL 2000

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Revises the discussion of range of multinational military operations

Adds coverage of security cooperation

Adds a discussion of the National Security Council

Eliminates coverage of foreign operational control

Reorganizes and clarifies the discussion of multinational command

structures

Explains civil-military relations and interagency, intergovernmental

organization, and nongovernmental organization coordination

Combines planning and execution considerations into one chapter

Adds a discussion of building and maintaining a multinational force

Expands coverage of the joint function of protection

Provides extensive guidance on information sharing

Adds a discussion of spectrum management

Adds an appendix covering the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team

Adds an appendix covering United Nations and Other Intergovernmental

Organizations Considerations

Removes the terms “affiliation training” and “coalition coordination cell”

from JP 1-02

Modifies the definitions of the terms “joint information bureau” and

“status-of-forces agreement”
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Summary of Changes

JP 3-16

Intentionally Blank
TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................................ ix

CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

• Multinational Operations Overview ........................................................................... I-1

• Strategic Context ....................................................................................................... I-1

• Range of Multinational Military Operations ............................................................... I-2

• Nature of Multinational Operations............................................................................ I-3

• Security Cooperation .................. .............................. ..................................... I-4

• Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability ................................................. I-5

CHAPTER II

COMMAND AND COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS

• National Security Structure ...................................................................................... II-1

• Command and Control of United States Forces in Multinational Operations............. II-3

• Multinational Force Commander ............................................................................. II-5

• Overview of Multinational Command Structures...................................................... II-5

• Alliance Command Structures.................................................................................. II-8

• Coalition Command Structures ................................................................................ II-9

• Coalition Coordination............................................................................................ II-10

• Control of Multinational Operations........................................................................ II-12

• Civil-Military Relations and Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and

 Nongovernmental Organization Coordination ....................................................... II-13

CHAPTER III

PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

SECTION A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS............................................................ III-1

• Political and Military Considerations ...................................................................... III-1

• Building and Maintaining a Multinational Force ..................................................... III-3

• Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks ............................................................. III-5

• Language, Culture, and Sovereignty........................................................................ III-5

• Legal Considerations .............................................................................................. III-6

• Doctrine, Training, and Resources........................................................................... III-7

• Protection ............................................................................................................... III-9

• Rules of Engagement ............................................................................................ III-11
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SECTION B. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................. III-12

• Unified Action ...................................................................................................... III-12

• Intelligence ........................................................................................................... III-13

• Information Sharing .............................................................................................. III-17

• Communications................................................................................................... III-18

• Land Operations ................................................................................................... III-19

• Maritime Operations............................................................................................. III-21

• Air Operations ...................................................................................................... III-23

• Space Operations .................................................................................................. III-25

• Special Operations................................................................................................ III-26

• Spectrum Management ......................................................................................... III-30

• Information Operations......................................................................................... III-30

SECTION C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS............................................................... III-31

• Multinational Logistics ......................................................................................... III-31

• Host-Nation Support ............................................................................................. III-36

• Health Service Support ......................................................................................... III-38

• Personnel Recovery .............................................................................................. III-40

• Administration and Personnel Support .................................................................. III-40

• Media Relations.................................................................................................... III-41

• Meteorology and Oceanography ........................................................................... III-42

• Environmental ...................................................................................................... III-42

APPENDIX

A Planning Considerations for Multinational Operations ........................................ A-1

B Multinational Planning Augmentation Team ....................................................... B-1

C United Nations and Other Intergovernmental Organizations Considerations........ C-1

D References ......................................................................................................... D-1

E Administrative Instructions ................................................................................. E-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................... GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions............................................................................... GL-5

FIGURE

I-1 Range of Military Operations .......................................................................... I-2

II-1 Notional Multinational Command Structure .................................................. II-3

II-2 Integrated Command Structure ...................................................................... II-6

II-3 Lead Nation Command Structure .................................................................. II-7

II-4 Parallel Command Structure.......................................................................... II-8

II-5 Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM ............ II-10
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III-1 Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations .................................. III-2

III-2 Notional Coalition Command and Control Structure ..................................... III-4

III-3 Multinational Unified Action...................................................................... III-13

III-4 Multinational Intelligence Principles .......................................................... III-14

III-5 Multinational Force Land Component Commander Notional

Responsibilities........................................................................................ III-20

III-6 Multinational Force Maritime Component Commander Notional

Responsibilities........................................................................................ III-22

III-7 Multinational Force Air Component Commander Notional

Responsibilities........................................................................................ III-24

III-8 Multinational Force Special Operations Component Commander

Notional Responsibilities.......................................................................... III-27

B-1 Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Augmentation Roles.................. B-3
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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ix

Covers the Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

Discusses Command and Coordination Relationships

Provides Guidance on Planning and Execution Considerations

Overview

Operations conducted by

forces of two or more

nations are termed

“multinational

operations.”

A nation’s decision to

employ military

capabilities is always a

political decision.

Respect

Rapport

Multinational operations are usually undertaken within the

structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements

include supervision by an intergovernmental organization such

as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe. An alliance is a relationship that results

of a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations

for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests

of the members. Operations conducted with units from two

or more allies are referred to as combined operations. A

coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations

for common action. Coalitions are formed by different nations

with different objectives, usually for a single occasion or for longer

cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Operations

conducted with units from two or more coalition members

are referred to as coalition operations.

Nations form partnerships in both regional and worldwide patterns

as they seek opportunities to promote their mutual national

interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats,

conduct foreign humanitarian assistance operations, and engage

in peace operations. Cultural, diplomatic, religious, psychological,

economic, technological, and informational factors all influence

and impact multinational operations and participation.

In assigning missions, the commander must consider that national

honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing nation

as combat capability. All partners must be included in the planning

process, and their opinions must be sought in mission assignment.

US commanders and staffs should establish rapport with their

counterparts from partner countries, as well as the multinational

Nature of Multinational Operations
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Executive Summary

JP 3-16

force commander (MNFC). This requires personal, direct relationships

that only they can develop.

US commanders and their staffs should have an understanding

of each member of the multinational force (MNF). Much time

and effort is expended in learning about the enemy; a similar

effort is required to understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic

goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values of each

partner.

Effective partnerships take time and attention to develop. Diligent

pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with

multinational partners requires untiring, even-handed patience.

This is easier to accomplish within alliances but is equally

necessary regarding prospective coalition partners.

Security cooperation refers to Department of Defense interactions

with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that

promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly

military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and

provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host

nation.

Based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense and Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders (CCDRs)

and designated executive agents develop plans and employ forces

and personnel in peacetime to protect and promote US interests

and regional objectives.

Security cooperation activities demonstrate US commitment, lend

credibility to its alliances, enhance regional stability, provide a crisis

response capability, and build capacities of potential coalition partners

while promoting US influence and access.

Forces participating in a multinational operation will always have

at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of

command and a multinational chain of command.

National Command. The President always retains and cannot

relinquish national command authority over US forces. National

command includes the authority and responsibility for organizing,

Knowledge of Partners

Patience

The security

cooperation plan is

primarily a strategic

planning document

intended to link planned

regional engagement

activities with national

strategic objectives.

Although nations will

often participate in

multinational operations,

they rarely, if ever,

relinquish national

command of their forces.

 Security Cooperation

Command and Control of United States Forces in Multinational Operations
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Executive Summary

directing, coordinating, controlling, planning employment, and protecting

military forces. The President also has the authority to terminate US

participation in multinational operations at any time.

Multinational Command. Command authority for a MNFC is

normally negotiated between the participating nations and can

vary from nation to nation. Command authority could range from

operational control (OPCON), to tactical control (TACON), to

designated support relationships, to coordinating authority.

Operational Control. While the President cannot relinquish

command authority, in some multinational environments it

might be prudent or advantageous to place appropriate US

forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve

specified military objectives. In making this decision, the

President carefully considers such factors as mission, size

of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration,

and rules of engagement.

Tactical Control. TACON is another form of command

authority exercised during multinational operations. It

provides for the detailed (and usually local) direction and

control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish

the missions or tasks assigned. The commander of the parent

unit continues to exercise OPCON and administrative control

over that unit unless otherwise specified in the establishing

directive.

Support. Supporting relationships may also be established

among participating forces in multinational operations.

Coordinating Authority. In many cases, coordinating

authority may be the only acceptable means of accomplishing

a multinational mission. Coordinating authority is a

consultation relationship between commanders, not an

authority by which command and control (C2) may be

exercised.
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MNFC is a generic term applied to a commander who exercises

command authority over a military force composed of elements from

two or more nations. The extent of the MNFC’s command

authority is determined by the participating nations or

elements. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. Due to

the often complex command relationships in a MNF, an operation

could have numerous MNFCs.

No single command structure meets the needs of every

multinational command but one absolute remains constant;

political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate

shape of the command structure. Organizational structures

include the following:

Integrated Command Structure. Multinational commands

organized under an integrated command structure provide

unity of effort in a multinational setting. A good example of

this command structure is found in the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization where a strategic commander is designated

from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and

the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of

multinational makeup.

Lead Nation Command Structure. A lead nation structure

exists when all member nations place their forces under the

control of one nation. The lead nation command can be

distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff

arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict

national integrity. A good example of the lead nation structure

is Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan wherein a USled headquarters provides the overall military C2 over the

two main subordinate commands: one predominately US

forces and the other predominately Afghan forces.

Parallel Command Structures. Under a parallel command

structure, no single force commander is designated. The

coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination

among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be

accomplished through the use of coordination centers.

Multinational Force Commander

The multinational force

commander’s primary

duty is to unify the efforts

of the multinational force

toward common

objectives.

The basic structures for

multinational operations

fall into one of three

types: integrated; lead

nation; or parallel

command.

Multinational Command Structures
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Executive Summary

Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the

use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if at all

possible.

In responding to situations requiring a multinational response, nations

pick and choose if, when and where they will expend their national

blood and treasure. Nations also choose the manner and extent of

their foreign involvement for reasons both known and unknown to

other nations. The only constant is that a decision to “join in” is,

in every case, a calculated political decision by each potential

member of a coalition or alliance. The nature of their national

decisions, in turn, influences the multinational task force’s (MNTF’s)

command structure.

Numerous factors influence the military capabilities of nations.

The operational level commander must be aware of the specific

constraints and capabilities of the forces of participating nations,

and consider these differences when assigning missions and

conducting operations. MNTF commanders (similar to joint task

force commanders) at all levels may be required to spend

considerable time consulting and negotiating with diplomats, host

nation officials, local leaders, and others; their role as diplomats

should not be underestimated. MNTF commanders will routinely

work directly with political authorities in the region.

The basic challenge in multinational operations is the effective

integration and synchronization of available assets toward the

achievement of common objectives. This goal may be achieved

through unity of effort despite disparate (and occasionally

incompatible) capabilities, rules of engagement, equipment, and

procedures. To reduce disparities among participating forces,

minimum capability standards should be established and a

certification process developed.

In most multinational operations, the differing degrees of national

interest results in varying levels of commitment by alliance and

coalition members. While some countries might authorize the

full range of employment, other countries may limit their country’s

forces to strictly defensive or combat service support roles.

However, no offer of national support should be declined outright.

Instead, every offer should be vetted through a CCDR or MNFC,

and the interagency process and recognized as support to the

campaign being held in reserve.

Any number of different

situations could generate

the need for a

multinational response,

from man-made actions

to natural disasters.

Political and Military Considerations
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Executive Summary

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Unified action is the synergistic application of all instruments

of national and multinational power; it includes the actions of

nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces. This concept

is applicable at all levels of command. In a multinational

environment, unified action synchronizes and/or integrates multinational

operations with the operations of intergovernmental and

nongovernmental agencies in an attempt to achieve unity of effort in

the operational area.

MNFCs must integrate and synchronize their operations directly

with the activities and operations of other military forces and

nonmilitary organizations in the operational area. All MNTF

commanders are responsible to plan and conduct unified actions

in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the

national commands, alliance or coalition leadership, and superior

commanders.

Training of forces within the MNTF command for specific mission

standards enhances unified action. The MNFC should consider

establishing common training modules or certification training

to ensure assigned forces are trained for the missions assigned.

Such training and certification of forces can occur prior to

deployment to the MNTF operational area or after deployment.

This publication provides doctrine for the Armed Forces of the

United States when they operate as part of a MNF. It describes

joint organizational structures essential to coordinate air, land,

maritime, space, and special operations and it addresses

operational considerations that the commander and staff should

consider during the planning and execution of multinational

operations.

Unified action is

applicable at all levels of

command.

Unified Action

CONCLUSION
CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

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“We are . . . guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world

alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedomloving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the

United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States,

and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can

augment these permanent institutions. In all cases, international obligations are

to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support

for an ideal without furthering its attainment.”

National Security Strategy 2002

1. Multinational Operations Overview

Multinational operations are operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually

undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include

supervision by an intergovernmental organization (IGO) such as the United Nations (UN) or the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Commonly used terms under the

multinational rubric include allied, bilateral, coalition, combined, combined/coalition or

multilateral. However, within this publication the term multinational will be the term used to

describe these actions.

a. An alliance is a relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between

two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the

members.

b. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

Coalitions are formed by different nations with different objectives, usually for a single occasion

or for a longer period while addressing a narrow sector of common interest. Operations

conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition

operations.

2. Strategic Context

a. Nations form partnerships in both regional and worldwide patterns as they seek

opportunities to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and

perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations, and engage in

peace operations (PO). Cultural, diplomatic, religious, psychological, economic, technological,

and informational factors all influence and impact multinational operations and participation.

However, a nation’s decision to employ military capabilities is always a political decision.

b. While the United States will retain the capability to act alone, the current US National

Security Strategy reflects that “America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions
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JP 3-16

— as broad as practicable — of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors

freedom.”

c. US commanders should expect to conduct military operations as part of a multinational

force (MNF). These operations could span the range of military operations and require

coordination with a variety of US Government (USG) agencies, military forces of other nations,

local authorities, IGOs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

d. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint operations

remains applicable to multinational operations. However, commanders and staffs must account

for differences in partners’ laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture,

politics, religion, and language. There is no “standard template” and each alliance or coalition

normally develops its own protocols and operation plans (OPLANs) to guide multinational

action. However, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) does have a significant

standardization process for doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

3. Range of Multinational Military Operations

Every multinational operation is unique. Key considerations (see Appendix A, “Planning

Considerations for Multinational Operations”) involved in planning and conducting multinational

operations are affected by the international situation, perspectives, motives, and values of the

organization’s members. Multinational operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity

across the range of military operations (see Figure I-1).

a. Many of the missions associated with crisis response and limited contingency

operations, such as disaster relief and FHA operations, will not require combat. Others, such as

Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, can be extremely dangerous and require a significant

effort to protect friendly forces while accomplishing the mission; therefore, US forces must be

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Crisis Response and

Limited Contingency Operations

Major Operations and

Campaigns

Military Engagement, Security

Cooperation, and Deterrence
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Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

prepared to conduct the full range of military operations in support of multinational military

operations.

b. Individual major operations and campaigns often contribute to a larger, long-term

effort (e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is part of the Global War on Terrorism [GWOT]).

Multinational actions supporting GWOT, for example, include significant efforts from all

instruments of national power coordinated and synchronized worldwide.

c. The prudent use of military capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation,

and deterrence activities often helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups

below the threshold of armed conflict.

For more detailed discussion on the range of military operations, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-0,

Joint Operations.

4. Nature of Multinational Operations

After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that “mutual confidence” is the

“one basic thing that will make allied commands work.” While the tenets discussed below

cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of

effort.

a. Respect. In assigning missions the commander must consider that national honor and

prestige may be as important to a contributing nation as combat capability. All partners must be

included in the planning process, and their opinions must be sought in mission assignment.

Understanding, consideration, and acceptance of partner ideas are essential to effective

communication, as are respect for each partner’s culture, religion, customs, history, and values.

Junior officers in command of small national contingents are the senior representatives of their

government within the MNFs and, as such, should be treated with special consideration beyond

their US equivalent rank. In many cultures they are given command at a junior age because of

direct blood links to their nation’s leadership. Without genuine respect of others, rapport and

mutual confidence cannot exist.

b. Rapport. US commanders and staffs should establish rapport with their counterparts

from partner countries, as well as the multinational force commander (MNFC). This requires

personal, direct relationships that only they can develop. Good rapport between leaders will

improve teamwork among their staffs and subordinate commanders and overall unity of effort.

c. Knowledge of Partners. US commanders and their staffs should have an understanding

of each member of the MNF. Much time and effort is expended in learning about the enemy; a

similar effort is required to understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion,

customs, history, and values of each partner. This will ensure the effective integration of MNF

partners into the operation and enhance the synergistic effect of the coalition forces.
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JP 3-16

d. Patience. Effective partnerships take time and attention to develop. Diligent pursuit of a

trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational partners requires untiring, evenhanded patience.

This is easier to accomplish within alliances but is equally necessary regarding prospective coalition

partners.

5. Security Cooperation

Security cooperation refers to Department of Defense (DOD) interactions with foreign defense

establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied

and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces

with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (HN).

a. Based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(CJCS), the combatant commanders (CCDRs) and designated executive agents (EAs) develop plans

and employ forces and personnel in peacetime to protect and promote US interests and regional

objectives. A security cooperation plan (TSCP) is primarily a strategic planning document intended to

link planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives.

For more information on the EA designation process and EA authorities, see Department of

Defense Directive (DODD) 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent.

(1) In formulating their SCP, geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and EAs evaluate

ongoing security cooperation activities, forecast current and future regional requirements and opportunities,

and justify fiscal requests to support their efforts. Since many of these activities involve the use of US

funds, commanders must understand and adhere to required procedures and restrictions on their use.

(2) Each SCP contains detailed regional information in six activity categories: multinational

exercises; nation assistance, including foreign internal defense (FID), security assistance programs, and

planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities; multinational training; multinational education for US

personnel and personnel from other nations; military contacts; and arms control and treaty monitoring

activities.

b. Security cooperation activities demonstrate US commitment, lend credibility to its alliances,

enhance regional stability, provide a crisis response capability, and build capacities of potential coalition

partners while promoting US influence and access.

(1) In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, security cooperation activities include

periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits,

freedom of navigation exercises, foreign military training, foreign community support, and military-tomilitary contacts including security assistance offices (SAOs), military assistance advisory groups, and a

Personnel Exchange Program.

(2) Strategic reconnaissance operations can enhance security cooperation by providing a

continuous worldwide presence that allows monitoring and quick reaction at all levels throughout the

range of military operations.
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Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

For additional guidance on security cooperstion, refer to Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff

Instruction (CJCSI) 3113.01A, Responsibilities for the Coordination and Review of Security

Cooperation Strategies.

6. Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability

a. International rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) with friendly

nations is important for achieving practical cooperation, efficient use of research, development,

procurement, support, and production resources; and effective multinational warfighting capability

without sacrificing US warfighting capabilities.

b. RSI should be directed at providing capabilities for multinational forces to:

(1) Efficiently integrate and synchronize operations using common or compatible

doctrine.

(2) Communicate and collaborate at anticipated levels of multinational force operations,

particularly to prevent fratricide and exchange data, information, and intelligence in accordance

with (IAW) appropriate security guidelines, either as printed, digital, or electronic media.

(3) Share consumables consistent with relevant agreements and applicable law.

(4) Care for casualties.

(5) Enhance military effectiveness by optimizing individual and combined capabilities

of military equipment.

(6) Increase military efficiency through common or compatible Service support and

logistics.

(7) Establish overflight and access to foreign territory through streamlined clearance

procedures for essential personnel.

(8) Assure technical compatibility by developing standards for equipment design,

employment, maintenance, and updating so that those nations that are likely to participate are

ready to go. Extra sets of equipment may be necessary so that non-equipped nations are not

excluded. Such compatibility must include secure and non-secure communications equipment

and should address other equipment areas to include: ammunition specifications, truck

components, supply parts, data transmission streams, etc.

Detailed guidance on RSI may be found in CJCSI 2700.01, International Military Agreements for

Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States, Its Allies and Other

Friendly Nations.
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JP 3-16

c. Rationalization. In the RSI construct, rationalization refers to any action that increases the

effectiveness of allied and/or coalition forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources

committed to the alliance and/or coalition. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national

priorities to higher alliance needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support or improved

interoperability, and greater cooperation. Rationalization applies to both weapons and materiel resources

and non-weapons military matters.

d. Standardization. Unity of effort is greatly enhanced through standardization. The

basic purpose of standardization programs is to achieve the closest practical cooperation among

alliance or coalition partners through the efficient use of resources and the reduction of operational,

logistic, communications, technical, and procedural obstacles in multinational military operations.

(1) Standardization is a four-level process beginning with efforts for compatibility,

continuing with interoperability and interchangeability measures, and culminating with

commonality (see glossary definitions). The DOD is actively involved in several multinational

standardization programs, including NATO’s main standardization fora, the five-nation (United

States, Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand) Air and Space Interoperability

Council, the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ Program (ABCA), and the sevennation (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and United States)

Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC). The United States also participates in the Combined

Communications-Electronics Board, an Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, United Kingdom,

United States Naval command, control, communications, and computers organization working

to achieve standardization and interoperability in communications systems.

(2) Alliances provide a forum to work towards standardization of national equipment,

doctrine, and TTP. Standardization is not an end in itself, but it does provide a framework for

commanders and their staffs to use. Coalitions, however, are by definition created for a single

purpose and usually (but not always) for a finite length of time and, as such, are ad hoc

arrangements. They may not provide commanders with the same commonality of aim or degree

of organizational maturity as alliances.

(3) Alliances usually have developed a degree of standardization with regard to

administrative, logistic, and operational procedures. The mechanisms for this standardization

are international standardization agreements (ISAs). ISAs can be materiel or non-materiel in

nature. Non-materiel related ISAs should already be incorporated into US joint and Service

doctrine and TTP. The five paragraph operation order is one common example. However, in the

case of maritime doctrine and TTP, allied publications (APs) often govern US forces. Materiel

ISAs are implemented into the equipment design, development, or adaptation processes to facilitate

standardization. In NATO, ISAs are known as standardization agreements (STANAGs) and

APs and are instruments that must be used to establish commonality in procedures and equipment.

The quadripartite standing agreements (QSTAGs) agreed to within the ABCA are another type

of ISA. The existence of these ISAs does not mean that they will be automatically used during an

alliance’s multinational operation. Their use should be clearly specified in the OPLAN or operation

order. In addition, these ISAs cannot be used as vehicles for obligating financial resources or transferring

resources.
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Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

(4) Multinational publications (MPs) are a series of unclassified ISAs (maritime

operational and procedural publications) specifically developed by NATO. MPs provide signatory

nations with common doctrine, techniques, training, procedures, and information for planning

and conducting operations and exercises. These publications are available through a NATO

sponsor to all nations.

(5) Standardization agreements like APs, MPs, STANAGs and QSTAGs provide a

baseline for cooperation within a coalition. In many parts of the world, these multilateral and

other bilateral agreements for standardization between potential coalition members may be in

place prior to the formation of the coalition. However, participants may not be immediately

familiar with such agreements. The MNFC must disseminate ISAs among the MNF or rely on

existing standing operating procedures (SOPs) and clearly written, uncomplicated orders. MNFCs

should identify where they can best standardize the force and achieve interoperability within the

force; in communications, logistics, or administration, for example. This is more difficult to

accomplish in coalition operations since participants have not normally been associated together

prior to the particular contingency. The same considerations apply when non-alliance members

participate in an alliance operation. However, ISAs should be used where possible to standardize

procedures and processes.

e. Interoperability. Interoperability is an essential requirement for multinational operations.

Nations whose forces are interoperable can operate together effectively in numerous ways. Less

interoperable forces have correspondingly fewer ways to work together. Although frequently

identified with technology, important areas of interoperability may include doctrine, procedures,

communications, and training.

(1) Factors that enhance interoperability start with understanding and applying the

nature of multinational operations in paragraph 4. Additional factors include planning for

interoperability and sharing information, the personalities of the commander and staff, visits to

assess multinational capabilities, a command atmosphere permitting positive criticism and

rewarding the sharing of information, liaison teams, multinational training exercises, and a constant

effort to eliminate sources of confusion and misunderstanding. The establishment of standards

for assessing the logistic capability of expected participants in a multinational operation should

be the first step in achieving logistic interoperability among participants. Such standards should

already be established for alliance members.

(2) Factors that inhibit interoperability include restricted access to national proprietary

defense information; time available; any refusal to cooperate with partners; differences in military

organization, security, language, doctrine, and equipment; level of experience; and conflicting

personalities.
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Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER II

COMMAND AND COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS

II-1

“Even the soldiers of a Democracy cannot always understand the reasons back

of strategic situations. Political and military reasons are worked out in cabinets

and general staffs and soldiers obey orders.”

Newton D. Baker, Secretary of State under

President Woodrow Wilson

1. National Security Structure

Under the US Constitution, the President is the commander and chief. He has broad authority

to direct both the movement of US personnel and the initiation of military action by US forces.

However, advice from several key individuals and organizations help determine the overall

level of US military involvement in multinational operations.

a. The National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is the President’s principal forum for

considering national security and foreign policy matters with senior national security advisors

and cabinet officials. The NSC also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating

these policies among various government agencies. The NSC is chaired by the President.

For additional information, see National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1, Organization

of the National Security Council System.

b. Military. The DOD is organized to conduct military actions throughout the range of

military operations as directed by the President to support national or international objectives.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the military advisers to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of

Defense.

(1) The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to

the DOD. Subject to the direction of the President and US law, he has authority, direction, and control

over the DOD.

(2) The CJCS acts as the principal military advisor to the President, the NSC, and the

Secretary of Defense.

(3) CCDRs lead one of the geographic or functional combatant commands established

by Title 10, United States Code (USC), section 161 (or as directed by the President in the Unified

Command Plan). CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned

forces. To effectively bring all instruments of national power to theater and regional strategies

as well as campaign and OPLANs, CCDRs are augmented with representatives from other USG

agencies.

(a) A joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) participates in contingency, crisis

action, and transition planning. Representing USG agencies at the headquarters (HQs) of the geographic
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JP 3-16

and selected functional combatant commands, each JIACG is a multifunctional, advisory element that

represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency

community, IGOs, NGOs, and the combatant commands. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative

day-to-day support for planning, coordination, preparation, and implementation of interagency activities.

For more information on JIACGs, see JP 3-08, Vol I, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization,

and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

(b) The political advisor (POLAD) uses knowledge of US alliance, coalition,

and regional matters to assist military commanders in translating political objectives into military

strategy. Each GCC is assigned a foreign service officer (FSO) by the Department of State

(DOS) to act as the POLAD. By exception, the DOS may assign a POLAD to component or

subordinate command levels. Those not assigned a FSO may be assigned a civil service POLAD.

The POLAD coordinates with the primary political and military personnel (either US or MNF,

as appropriate).

c. Diplomatic. DOS is structured to support US relations with other countries and IGOs.

Through the DOS, the United States maintains over 272 diplomatic and consular posts around

the world. As the principal foreign policy advisor to the President, the Secretary of State is

responsible for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of US foreign relations. Unless

otherwise directed by the President, the Secretary of State is also responsible for coordination of

interagency activities of the USG both outside the United States and with US missions to IGOs.

Other key personnel and agencies within DOS include:

(1) DOS Geographic Bureaus. Six geographic bureaus within DOS are the focal

point for the formulation and implementation of regional foreign policy strategies requiring

interagency coordination. The geographic bureaus’ focus is similar to the GCCs’ regional focus

(although the geographic borders differ). GCCs proposing military activity in a region must

coordinate with the appropriate geographic bureau.

(2) Chief of Mission (COM). The COM, with the title of ambassador, minister, or

charge d’affaires, is the senior US official at diplomatic missions. The US diplomatic mission to

a HN includes the representatives of all in-country USG departments and agencies. US missions

to multinational organizations and alliances such as the Organization of American States, NATO,

and the UN include representatives of USG departments and agencies routinely engaged in

activities with those organizations.

(3) Country Team. The country team is a council of the senior officials representing each

USG agency or activity operating in a host country. The country team works together under COM

direction to identify their problems and pool their skills and resources to best serve US national interests.

The country team has no legal standing or formal structure. When appropriate, the GCC and US

military area commander may send representatives to the country team meetings, or may choose to

work through the United States defense representative to coordinate combatant command-related

issues. The GCC also coordinates directly with the COM on policy and strategy issues. Through the
II-3

Command and Coordination Relationships

country team, the COM ensures that all USG activities in the country are coordinated and in harmony

with each other.

For detailed information on interagency coordination, see JP 3-08, Volumes I and II, Interagency,

Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint

Operations.

2. Command and Control of United States Forces in Multinational Operations

Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever,

relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational

operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command

and a multinational chain of command (see Figure II-1).

a. National Command. As Commander and Chief the President always retains and cannot

relinquish national command authority over US forces. National command includes the authority

and responsibility for organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, planning employment,

Figure II-1. Notional Multinational Command Structure

Nation to Nation Communication

Command Authority Delegated to

Multinational Force Commander by

Participating Nations

National Command

NOTIONAL MULTINATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

UNITED STATES

PRESIDENT

AND

SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE

NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT

COMBATANT

COMMANDERS

LEGITIMIZING

AUTHORITY*

NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT

*Examples include United

Nations, Alliances, Treaties,

or Coalition Agreements

MULTINATIONAL

FORCE

COMMANDER

US NATIONAL

FORCE NATIONAL FORCE NATIONAL FORCE
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JP 3-16

and protecting military forces. The President also has the authority to terminate US participation in

multinational operations at any time.

b. Multinational Command. Command authority for a MNFC is normally negotiated

between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. Command authority could

range from operational control (OPCON), to tactical control (TACON), to designated support

relationships, to coordinating authority.

(1) Operational Control. While the President cannot relinquish national command

authority, in some multinational environments it might be prudent or advantageous to place

appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified military

objectives. In making this decision, the President carefully considers such factors as mission,

size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement

(ROE).

(a) Normally, OPCON of attached US forces is exercised only for a specific time

frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already deployed by the

President and to US units led by US officers. US commanders will maintain the capability to

report to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. For matters perceived

as illegal under US or international law, or outside the mandate of the mission to which the

President has agreed, US commanders will first attempt resolution with the appropriate foreign

commander. If issues remain unresolved, the US commanders refer the matters to higher US

authorities.

(b) Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign commander cannot change the mission

or deploy US forces outside the operational area agreed to by the President. Nor may the foreign

commander separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change

the US force’s internal organization.

(c) Other MNF participants will normally exercise constraints similar to those

described in (a) and (b) above over their own forces on behalf of their governments.

(2) Tactical Control. TACON is another form of command authority exercised during

multinational operations. It provides for the detailed (and usually local) direction and control of

movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish the missions or tasks assigned. The commander

of the parent unit continues to exercise OPCON and administrative control over that unit unless

otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

(3) Support. Supporting relationships may also be established among participating

forces in multinational operations. It is important to ensure that both the supported and supporting

commander understand:

(a) The degree of authority that the supported commander is granted.

(b) The responsibilities of the supporting commander.
II-5

Command and Coordination Relationships

(c) The opportunities for establishing mutual support arrangements among participating

forces.

(d) The opportunities, limitations, and/or conditions under which logistic support

may be provided to forces of other nations.

(4) Coordinating Authority. In many cases, coordinating authority may be the only

acceptable means of accomplishing a multinational mission. Coordinating authority is a

consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which command and control

(C2) may be exercised. Normally, it is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to

operations. Use of coordinating authority requires agreement among participants, as the

commander exercising coordinating authority does not have the authority to resolve disputes.

For this reason, its use during operations should be limited.

3. Multinational Force Commander

a. MNFC is a generic term applied to a commander who exercises command authority

over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the

MNFC’s command authority is determined by the participating nations or elements. This

authority could range in degree from OPCON or TACON, to directing support relationships, or

to being the coordinating authority between the various nations. Such authority, however, is

seldom absolute. The MNFC’s primary duty is to unify the efforts of the MNF toward

common objectives. Due to the often complex command relationships in a MNF, an operation

could have numerous MNFCs.

(1) MNFCs at the strategic level are analogous to the US GCC level.

(2) MNFCs at the operational level may be referred to as subordinate MNFCs. This

level of command is roughly equivalent to the US commander of a subordinate unified command

or joint task force (JTF).

b. Nations do not relinquish their national interests by participating in multinational

operations. This is one of the major distinguishing characteristics of operating in the multinational

environment. Commanders must be prepared to address issues related to legality, mission mandate,

and prudence early in the planning process. In multinational operations, consensus often

stems from compromise.

4. Overview of Multinational Command Structures

No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command but

one absolute remains constant; political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate

shape of the command structure. However, participating nations should strive to achieve

unity of command for the operation to the maximum extent possible, with missions, tasks,

responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants. While command
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JP 3-16

relationships are fairly well defined in US doctrine, they are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon

of nations with which the United States may operate in coalition or combined operations.

a. Organizational Structure. The basic structures for multinational operations fall into

one of three types: integrated, lead nation, or parallel command.

(1) Integrated Command Structure. Multinational commands organized under an

integrated command structure provide unity of effort in a multinational setting (see Figure II-2).

A good example of this command structure is found in NATO where a strategic commander is

designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and

staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup. The key factors in an integrated

combined command are:

(a) A designated single commander.

(b) The staff is composed of representatives from all member nations.

(c) Subordinate commands and staffs are integrated into the lowest echelon

necessary to accomplish the mission.

(2) Lead Nation Command Structure. A lead nation structure exists when all member

nations place their forces under the control of one nation (see Figure II-3). The lead nation

command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with

subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. A good example of the lead nation structure

Figure II-2. Integrated Command Structure

INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE

Integrated

Headquarters Staff

Integrated

Component

Multinational

Forces

Integrated

Component

Multinational

Forces

Integrated

Component

Multinational

Forces

Combined

Commander
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Command and Coordination Relationships

is Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan wherein a US-led HQ provides the overall military C2

over the main subordinate commands: one predominately US forces and the other predominately Afghan

forces.

(a) A lead nation command may also be characterized by an integrated staff and

multinational subordinate forces. Integrating the staff allows the commander to draw upon the

expertise of allied or coalition partners in areas where the lead nation may have less experience.

(b) Rotational command, a variation of lead nation command sometimes found

in combined commands, allows each participating nation to be the lead nation in turn. To be

effective, command tour lengths should be adjusted so that participating nations may alternate

exercising the authority of the lead nation. However, command tours should not be so short to

be operationally meaningless. An example of this type command is the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) which has 12-month command tours that rotate between the participants.

(3) Parallel Command Structures. Under a parallel command structure, no single

force commander is designated (see Figure II-4). The coalition leadership must develop a means

for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished

through the use of coordination centers (see paragraph 7b). Nonetheless, because of the absence

of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if at all

possible.

b. Regardless of how the MNF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces

normally establishes a national component, often called a national command element, to ensure

effective administration of its forces. The national component provides a means to administer

Figure II-3. Lead Nation Command Structure

LEAD NATION COMMAND STRUCTURE

NATIONAL

FORCES

COMMANDER

NATIONAL

FORCES

NATIONAL

FORCES US FORCES

NATIONAL

FORCES

COMMANDER

US FORCES

COMMANDER

LEAD NATION

HEADQUARTERS
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and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military

views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and

reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations. In an administrative

role, these national components are similar to a Service component command at the unified command

level in a US joint organization. The logistic support element of this component is referred to as the

national support element.

For additional information on multinational logistic support, see JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for

Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

5. Alliance Command Structures

a. In combined commands, national political objectives are addressed and generally

subsumed within MNF objectives at the alliance treaty level. Typically, alliance command

structures have been carefully developed over extended periods of time and have a high degree

of stability and consensus; doctrine and standardization characterize alliances. Established

command structures may be modified or tailored for particular operations, especially when

combined operations include non-allied members. However, using an alliance’s structures for

purposes other than those for which their integrated structures were designed, or in operations

for which they have not had the lead time necessary to develop integrated plans and structures,

may result in behavior that more closely approximates that of a coalition.

Figure II-4. Parallel Command Structure

Coordination Command

PARALLEL COMMAND STRUCTURE

National

Command

Nation #1

Coalition

Headquarters

Nation #1

Forces from

Nation #1

Coordination

Center

National

Command

Nation #2

Coalition

Headquarters

Nation #2

Forces from

Nation #2
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Command and Coordination Relationships

b. Combined command relationships often reflect either an integrated command structure or a

lead nation command structure. Alliances typically have established command structures, support systems,

and standardized procedures. In combined operations, such structures should be used to the maximum

practical extent. Combined command and force structures often mirror the degree of allied member

participation. Subordinate commands are often led by senior military officers from member nations.

Effective operations within an alliance require that the senior political and military authorities be in agreement

on the type of command relationships that will govern the operations of the forces. Notwithstanding

peacetime command relationships, the political sensitivities associated with actual operations will impact

command relationships and operating procedures.

6. Coalition Command Structures

Coalitions often form in response to unforeseen crises that occur outside the area or scope

of an established alliance or when the response requires more than an alliance can handle.

Interestingly, coalition command relationships routinely evolve as a coalition develops. Coalitions

are most often characterized by one of two basic structures: lead nation or parallel. In coalition

operations, member nations may initially desire to retain even more control of their own national

forces than is generally associated with combined operations. At the outset of a coalition, nations

are often reluctant to grant extensive control over their forces to one lead nation. Coalition

counterparts are also sensitive to actions that might be construed as preferential to the lead

nation’s interests.

a. One means of ensuring that the HQ is representative of the entire coalition is to augment

the HQ staff with representatives from the participating coalition members, such as designated

deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This provides the coalition

commander with representative leadership, a ready source of expertise on the capabilities of the

respective coalition members, and facilitates the planning process.

b. During formation of the coalition, the early integration of the multinational national

command elements into the coalition planning process can greatly accelerate building of unity

of effort and reinforce the tenets of multinational operations. National command elements

represent the national command channels from each individual nation within the multinational

command. Meetings with the MNFC provide the setting for open, candid input from participating

nations.

c. Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition.

This situation occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of

international forces. The command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition (see Figure

II-5) provides a good example of the intricate web of command structures possible. In that case,

the US performed as the lead nation for a coalition of non-Arab countries while Saudi Arabia

functioned as the lead nation for the Arab coalition members. A friendly forces coordinating

council (since renamed to coalition coordination center [CCC]) provided the coordination conduit

between the non-Arab (US-led) forces and the Arab/Islamic (Saudi-led) command structures.

Terms in the figure reflect the terminology in use during the operation.
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7. Coalition Coordination

There are two key structural enhancements that should improve the coordination of MNFs: a

liaison network and coordination centers.

Figure II-5. Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM

COALITION COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR

OPERATION DESERT STORM

NATIONAL LDRS

OF UNITED

KINGDOM

NATIONAL COMMAND

AUTHORITIES OF

UNITED STATES

NATIONAL

LDRS OF

FRANCE

NATIONAL LDRS

OF ARAB/ISLAMIC

NATIONS

NATIONAL OPERATIONAL

COMMAND

TACTICAL CONTROL

COORDINATION

BRITISH

FORCE

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES

FORCE

COMMANDER

(CINCCENT)

JOINT

FORCE/THEATER

OF OPS

COMMANDER

(SAUDI)

FRENCH FORCE

COMMANDER

GROUND

COMMANDER

GROUND

COMMANDER

AIR

COMMANDER

AIR

COMMANDER

AIR FORCE

COMMANDER

(CENTAF)

(JFACC)

ARMY

COMMANDER

(ARCENT)

MARINE

COMMANDER

(MARCENT)

NAVY

COMMANDER

(NAVCENT)

SPECIAL OPERATION

FORCES COMMANDER

(SOCCENT)

CCC

KEY (terms used during DESERT STORM)

ARCENT

CCC

CENTAF

CINCCENT

JFACC

MARCENT

NAVCENT

SOCCENT

US Army Forces, US Central Command

coalition coordination center

US Central Command Air Forces

Commander in Chief, US Central Command

joint force air component commander

US Marine Component, US Central Command

US Navy Forces, US Central Command

Special Operations Component, US Central Command

JOINT FORCE

GROUND

COMMANDER

(SAUDI)

JOINT FORCE

AIR

COMMANDER

(SAUDI)
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Command and Coordination Relationships

a. Liaison Network. The need for effective liaison is vital in any MNF. Differences in doctrine,

organization, equipment, training, and national law demand a robust liaison structure to facilitate operations.

Not only is the use of liaison an invaluable confidence-building tool between the MNFC and lower

levels of different nationalities, but it is also a significant source of information for the MNFC. During

multinational operations, US forces will establish liaison early with forces of each nation, fostering a

better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitating the ability to integrate and synchronize operations,

assisting in the transfer of vital information, enhancing mutual trust, and developing an increased level of

teamwork.

(1) Liaison is often accomplished through the use of liaison teams. These teams must

be knowledgeable about the structure, capabilities, weapons systems, logistics, communication

systems, and planning methods that are employed within their commands. Liaison requirements

for US forces participating in multinational operations are usually greater than anticipated or

staffed. Personnel liaison requirements must be identified early during the planning process and

staffed accordingly. Team members should be language qualified or provided interpreter support.

Although understanding language and culture are key factors to successful liaison operations,

professional knowledge and functional expertise are far more important and influential.

(2) Special operations forces (SOF) have proven particularly effective in integrating

MNFs. Their language capabilities, cultural awareness, and experience in working and training

with other countries’ militaries typically allow them to improve coordination and minimize

misunderstanding during MNF operations. Specifically, SOF can assist the MNFC by:

(a) Assessing foreign military capabilities.

(b) Training foreign military forces.

(c) Advising foreign military forces and governmental agencies.

(d) Assisting foreign forces in executing specific missions or contingency

operations.

(e) Facilitating force integration for multinational operations.

For additional information on FID, see JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

b. Coordination Centers. Another means of increasing MNF coordination is the use of a

multinational coordination center (MNCC). US commanders should routinely advocate creation

of such a center in the early stages of any coalition effort, especially one that is operating under

a parallel command structure. It is a proven means of integrating the participating nations

military forces into the coalition planning and operations processes, enhancing coordination and

cooperation, and supporting an open and full interaction within the coalition structure. Normally,

the MNCC is focused upon coordination of coalition force operations, which will most likely

involve classified information. The addition of a civil-military operations center (CMOC) is
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recommended for coordination with the International Humanitarian Community (IHC). Additional

coordination centers may be established to coordinate multinational logistics, functional areas, and media

affairs.

(1) Initially, a coordination center can be the focal point for support issues such as

force sustainment, alert and warning, host-nation support (HNS), movement control, and training.

However, as a coalition matures, the role of the coordination center can be expanded to include

command activities.

(2) When a coordination center is activated, member nations provide a staff element

to the center that is comprised of action officers who are familiar with support activities such as

those listed above. Coalition nations should be encouraged to augment this staff with linguists

and requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with their parent HQ. Apart from

a central CCC such as the MNCC, a number of functional coordination centers may also be

established within an overall combined logistics coordination or support command for either an

alliance or coalition operation. Activities centrally coordinated or controlled by such centers

would include movement control, centralized contracting, theater-level logistic support operations,

overall medical support, and infrastructure engineering. One key to the success of such centers

is the early establishment and staffing with functionally skilled personnel to exercise appropriate

control of designated activities.

8. Control of Multinational Operations

The degree of control exercised in an MNF is dictated by the MNF structure and the command

relationships between members of the MNF. In general, the more centralized the command

structure, the greater the MNF’s ability to achieve unity of effort. Integrated command structures,

operating within their alliance framework, afford the greatest degree of control. A parallel

structure, with its separate lines of command, typically offers the least control and ability to

achieve unity of effort. Lead nation structures can exhibit a wide range of control depending on

the command relationships assigned.

a. Under normal circumstances, more control over the MNF is available during multinational

operations within the framework of an alliance. Command relationships within the alliance are

likely to be well defined and nations are also more likely to relinquish greater control over their

forces.

b. Coalition structures tend to have less control than those associated with alliances. This

is not unexpected since coalitions are, by definition, ad hoc arrangements, normally formed in

response to a specific event or crisis. Coalition partners, at least at the outset of the coalition, are

unlikely to yield much of their national control to a lead nation.
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9. Civil-Military Relations and Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and

Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

a. In many operating environments, the MNF interacts with a variety of entities requiring

unified actions by the MNFC, including nonmilitary governmental agencies, IGOs, and NGOs.

These groups play an important role in providing support to HNs. Additionally the MNF should

be aware of private sector firms (e.g., businesses, contractors working for the military) operating

in the area of operations (AO). Though differences may exist between military forces and

civilian agencies, short-term objectives are frequently very similar.

b. Relationships. The MNFC’s relationship with these organizations will vary depending

on the nature of the contingency and the particular type of organization involved.

(1) Relationships with other governmental agencies (US and those of other nations)

and IGOs (UN and alliance structures) will often be marked by a degree of formality that may

duplicate or at least resemble a supported and/or supporting command relationship. It is important

that any interagency structure relationships be clearly defined with respect to military support

before commencement of operations, if possible. In some cases, other agencies may be lead

agent for operations with military forces providing support. In some cases, the lead agency is

prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between allied and coalition forces and the

agencies involved. The President, normally through the Secretary of Defense, should provide

clear guidance regarding the relationships between US military commanders and USG agencies.

(2) To achieve the greatest unity of effort, the roles, missions, efforts, and activities of

the IHC must be factored into the commander’s mission analysis within the coalition AO.

Acknowledgement, respect, and mutual cooperative leveraging of capabilities among all parties

is critical to achieve operational end states. A cooperative, as well as coordinated, atmosphere

with the IHC should be established. The CCDR should use the various interagency coordination

tools, such as the JIACG, POLAD, and appropriate agency/command representatives to enhance

planning. Every effort should be made to formally include interagency coordination factors and

requirements in annex V to the appropriate concept plans (CONPLANs) and OPLANs.

(3) In addition, the OPLAN should provide guidance to the MNFC regarding

relationships with and support to NGOs and IGOs operating within the operational area. Because

many of these organizations do not operate within the military or governmental hierarchy, the

relationship between an MNFC, NGOs, and IGOs is neither supported nor supporting. An

association or partnership may more accurately describe the relationship that exists between

them. Communicating clearly, recognizing each other’s limitations, and building consensus and

cooperation are critical stepping stones to achieving a unified effort. A transition plan is essential

when relieving, replacing, or relinquishing control to NGOs and IGOs. This must begin as early

as possible in the planning cycle for such operations.

c. Coordination Centers. MNFCs can achieve significant positive results in accomplishing their

missions and shaping better conditions by finding positive ways to interact with these organizations. One

means of enhancing the working relationship between NGOs/IGOs when there is no command relationship
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is through their integration with existing coordination centers, as described in subparagraph 7b. While

the MNFC cannot always exert command influence over these entities, it is possible to operate through

a process of cooperation, communication, consensus, collaboration, and coordination to achieve mutual

interests. The CMOC can be useful in deconflicting and coordinating operations among these groups,

ensuring unity of effort.

For additional information, see JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

d. Agreements. The DOS leads USG negotiations with IGOs and other nations’ agencies.

Although Congress has tightly restricted the delegation of authority to negotiate and sign

agreements with foreign nations, forces, and agencies to DOS, the interagency environment

permits establishing formal agreements between the military and civilian government agencies.

Such agreements can take the form of memoranda of understanding or terms of reference. When

appropriate, heads of agencies and military commanders negotiate and cosign plans. Concluding

these negotiations prior to the commencement of operations offers the best chance for success.

There are regulatory and statutory fiscal constraints involving agreements between the Armed

Forces of the United States and other US governmental and nongovernmental agencies. A staff

judge advocate should be consulted before negotiating or entering into any agreements outside

DOD.

For more detail on interagency coordination and on agencies expected to be involved, see JP

3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization

Coordination During Joint Operations.

NSPD-1, Organization of the National Security Council System, provides that the management

of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the

USG shall usually be accomplished by National Security Council Policy Coordination

Committees.

NSPD-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,

establishes that the Secretary of State “shall coordinate and lead integrated United States

Government efforts, involving all US departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to

prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction efforts.”
CHAPTER III

PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

III-1

“Effectively planned and executed multinational operations should, in addition to

achieving common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom

of action and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support.”

FM3-31/MCWP 3-40.7

SECTION A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Political and Military Considerations

a. Any number of different situations could generate the need for a multinational response,

from man-made actions (such as interstate aggression) to natural disasters (like an earthquake).

In responding to such situations, nations pick and choose if, when, and where they will expend

their national blood and treasure. Nations also choose the manner and extent of their foreign

involvement for reasons both known and unknown to other nations. The only constant is that

a decision to “join in” is, in every case, a calculated political decision by each potential

member of a coalition or alliance. The nature of their national decisions, in turn, influences

the multinational task force’s command structure. In a parallel command structure, national

forces essentially operate under their own doctrine and procedures within the guidelines

determined by the strategic national guidance and are not significantly impacted by multinational

influences. Under the integrated and lead nation command structures, more multinational

involvement and interaction occurs. As such, this chapter will primarily focus on issues affecting

those two structures.

b. Capabilities. As shown in Figure III-1, numerous factors influence the military

capabilities of nations. The operational level commander must be aware of the specific constraints

and capabilities of the forces of participating nations, and consider these differences when

assigning missions and conducting operations. Multinational task force (MNTF) commanders

(similar to JTF commanders) at all levels may be required to spend considerable time consulting

and negotiating with diplomats, HN officials, local leaders, and others; their role as diplomats

should not be underestimated. MNTF commanders will routinely work directly with political

authorities in the region. Even within their own command, political limitations and constraints

on the employment of the forces can significantly influence daily operations.

c. Integration. The basic challenge in multinational operations is the effective integration

and synchronization of available assets toward the achievement of common objectives. This

goal may be achieved through unity of effort despite disparate (and occasionally incompatible)

capabilities, ROE, equipment, and procedures. To reduce disparities among participating forces,

minimum capability standards should be established and a certification process developed.

Identified shortcomings should be satisfied by either bilateral or multilateral support agreements

(formal or informal) prior to the deployment of forces to the operational area. This process

relies heavily upon detailed coordination between national leadership, prospective forces, and

the MNFC. The degree of involvement of each participant is likely to be primarily a political
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decision and commanders at all levels must be cognizant of national mandates placed on individual

units.

d. Employment. In most multinational operations, the differing degrees of national interest

results in varying levels of commitment by alliance and coalition members. While some countries

might authorize the full range of employment, other countries may limit their country’s forces to

strictly defensive or combat service support roles. However, no offer of national support should

be declined outright. Instead, every offer should be vetted through a CCDR or MNFC, and the

interagency process and recognized as support to the campaign being held in reserve. This

process helps maintain the allies, friends, and coalition partners’ support and enhances the

relationship. Additionally, multinational support will help increase the perceived legitimacy of

operations domestically as well as internationally.

For additional information regarding legitimacy, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

Figure III-1. Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations

FACTORS AFFECTING THE MILITARY

CAPABILITIES OF NATIONS

National Interests

Objectives

Arms Control Limitations

Doctrine

Organization

Training

Leader Development

Equipment

History

Defense Budget

Domestic Politics
III-3

Planning and Execution Considerations

2. Building and Maintaining a Multinational Force

a. Building a multinational force starts with the political decisions and diplomatic efforts to

create a coalition or spur an alliance into action. Discussion and coordination between potential

participants will initially seek to sort out basic questions at the national strategic level. These

senior level discussions could include organizations like the UN or NATO, existing coalitions or

alliances, or individual nations. The result of these discussions should:

(1) Determine the nature and limits of the response.

(2) Determine the command structure of the response force.

(3) Determine the essential strategic guidance for the response force to include military

objectives and the desired end state.

b. Command Issues. When the response force is resident within an alliance, the procedures

and structure of the alliance will normally determine the strategic and operational level leadership

for the response force. When the response force is based in a coalition (or a lead nation structure

in an alliance), the designated lead nation will normally select both the strategic and operational

level leadership.

c. These designated strategic level military leaders will coordinate strategic level military

requirements and actions between participating nations. In an alliance such as NATO, this

would normally be the alliance’s military commander. In a coalition, the US equivalent of the

strategic level commander is normally the appropriate GCC. The MNFC will also promulgate

the essential strategic guidance to all members and provide initial guidance to the operational

commander. Essential guidance should contain the following information:

(1) The purpose of the operation.

(2) A mission statement for the MNTF.

(3) Broad objectives and tasks for the MNTF.

(4) Desired end state and guidance on termination or transition.

(5) Participating nations and expected initial contributions.

(6) Common security interests.

(7) Specific national limitations, concerns, or sensitivities.

d. The MNFC, in coordination with member nations, will normally name the subordinate

MNFC. The subordinate MNFC is the operational level commander assigned to direct MNTF

operations. The MNTF is similar to a subordinate command or JTF and is the operational level
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portion of the respective MNF. Integrated MNTFs, such as the NATO-led ISAF will have

embedded MNTF personnel throughout the HQ. Lead nation MNTF HQ, like Multinational

Forces-Iraq, will be manned primarily by lead nation personnel and augmented by liaison

personnel from other MNTF countries. Some integration in staff functions is possible but the

bulk of the work will be handled within the lead nation structure. Figure III-2 illustrates an

example of the various command levels.

e. Once formed, efforts to maintain a MNF will routinely task the MNF leadership at all

levels. In nearly every action or event, military and political interests will compete for primacy.

National interests and restrictions may clash with military plans before, during, and after

operations. In some cases, national restrictions may seem wholly out of line with national

contributions. This tension between national elements is not new, but commanders at all levels

must be prepared to deal with it. As discussed earlier, nations join multinational efforts for a

variety of reasons, both known and unknown. Their continued participation has similar known

and unknown elements. National will, popular support, and the perceived achievement of stated

objectives are just some of the factors that might influence continued national participation.

Figure III-2. Notional Coalition Command and Control Structure

NOTIONAL COALITION

COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE

Collaboration Consultation National Command Strategic Guidance

and Support

National

Component

Commander

Operational Level National

Component

Commander

Commander

Multinational

Task Force

National

Strategic

Commander

Multinational

Force

Commander

National

Strategic

Commander

Theater Strategic

Nation #2

National

Authorities

Nation #1

National

Authorities

(Lead Nation)

Nation #3

National

Authorities

National Strategic

Government

and Military
III-5

Planning and Execution Considerations

However, prudent mission analysis and planning can significantly ease the MNFC’s job and

provide a more stable multinational force.

3. Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks

a. The MNFC’s staff should conduct a detailed mission analysis. This is one of the most

important tasks in planning multinational operations and should result in a revised mission

statement, commander’s intent, and the MNFC’s planning guidance. As part of the mission

analysis, force requirements should be identified; standards for participation published (e.g.,

training level competence and logistics, including deployment, sustainment, and redeployment

capabilities); and funding requests, certification procedures, and force commitments solicited

from an alliance or likely coalition partners.

b. Before the MNTF staff can develop proposed courses of action (COAs), the MNFC

must conduct an estimate of the situation. This will allow the MNFC to analyze, in an organized

manner, the many factors that will affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission(s). This

estimate should address the respective capabilities, political will, and national interests of the

MNTF components. Additionally, expected interagency contributions and involvement of each

nation should be addressed. This is a critical step as each nation determines its contribution to

the operation. National force commitments, even in an established alliance, are not automatic.

Based upon these national contributions, and after determining the tasks necessary to achieve

the objectives that support mission accomplishment, the MNFC should assign specific tasks to

the elements of the MNTF most capable of completing those tasks. If there are several elements

that can complete a particular task, the MNFC should consider assigning that task in a manner

that ensures that all elements can make meaningful contributions to the end state.

4. Language, Culture, and Sovereignty

a. Language. Differing languages within an MNF can present a real challenge to

unity of effort. US forces cannot assume that the predominant language will automatically be

English, and specifying an official language for the MNF can be a sensitive issue. Language

content is conveyed by word choice, mannerisms, and other means, with information loss,

miscommunications, and misunderstandings having a negative effect on operations. The time

required to receive information, process it, develop plans from it, translate the plans, and distribute

them to multinational partners can adversely impact the speed and tempo of operations.

Commanders may lessen these difficulties by early identification of translator support and the

use of multilingual liaison personnel. Contractor support for interpreters and translators should

be addressed during the planning phase. HN resources may be very important and may serve an

especially important role if available during the initial stages of the deployment. In addition, the

importance of staffing HQ with qualified liaison personnel cannot be minimized. This will

usually place additional demands upon US commanders for liaison personnel, but they are critical

to the success of any multinational mission.

b. Culture. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity

— the result of language, values, religious systems, societal norms, history, and economic and
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social outlooks. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great

impact. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, and other

unique cultural traditions important to allies and coalition members, consistent with the situation.

c. Linguists and Area Experts. To assist with cultural and language challenges, the MNTF

employs linguists and area experts, often available within and through the Service components

or from other governmental agencies. In some instances, members of Service forces may be

especially familiar with the operational area, its cultures, and languages as a result of special

training (e.g., foreign area officers), previous assignments, or heritage. The use of such abilities

should be maximized to facilitate understanding and communications. Appropriate security

measures should be taken to ensure that contracted linguists or area experts recruited to assist the

commander are not able to jeopardize the operation through espionage or subversion.

d. Sovereignty Issues. Sovereignty issues will be among the most difficult problems the

MNFC must resolve or mitigate. Often, the MNFC will be required to accomplish the mission

through coordination, communication, and consensus, in addition to traditional command

concepts. Political sensitivities must be recognized and acknowledged.

(1) MNFCs should coordinate with the DOS, country teams, ambassador/COM to the

respective HN, if available, on any sovereignty issues which cannot be resolved at the MNFC

level. Examples of sovereignty issues include: collecting and sharing information, basing,

overflight rights, aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, location and access, railheads,

border crossings, and operations in the territorial sea. Normally, such issues will be formally

resolved with HNs through the development of appropriate technical agreements to augment

existing or recently developed status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) or status of mission

agreements.

(2) The commander may also create structures such as committees to address

sovereignty issues. These committees may be chaired by military or nonmilitary representatives

of the HN to facilitate cooperation and build trust. These organizations could facilitate operations

by reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings and removing impediments. In many cases

SAOs, NGOs, and IGOs resident in the HN can help establish good will with the HN. In some

cases, these organizations may also be called upon to assist in the conduct of operations or

establishing a congenial relationship in the HN.

5. Legal Considerations

a. Commanders must ensure that MNTF forces comply with applicable national and

international laws during the conduct of all military operations. Participating nations should

provide commanders with access to legal advice throughout the operation to ensure there is a

comprehensive understanding of any national differences.

b. US forces will comply with the law of war during all military operations. US commanders

will ensure that the DOD Law of War Program is implemented IAW DOD and Service directives,
III-7

Planning and Execution Considerations

and that adequate procedures are in place to ensure that all violations of the law of war are

promptly reported and thoroughly investigated IAW those directives.

c. Treatment of Detainees. During the conduct of modern military operations, MNTF

personnel must be prepared to detain a wide variety of individuals who fall into different categories

under the law of war. Regardless of the category or status of a detainee, MNTF forces are

required to properly control, maintain, protect, and account for all detainees IAW applicable

domestic law, international law, and policy. For this reason, and because the excessive use of

force or the perceived mistreatment of detainees can also seriously undermine public confidence

in MNTF operations, it is imperative that MNFCs provide clear guidance for detainee operations

in a joint environment.

For additional information, see JP 3-63, Detainee Operations.

d. Military Justice. Jurisdiction over US forces suspected of committing a criminal offense

will be decided on a case by case basis IAW applicable international agreements with HN civil

authorities. It is US policy to retain jurisdiction in all criminal cases to the fullest extent possible.

Foreign military commanders exercising OPCON or TACON over US forces will not administer

discipline.

6. Doctrine, Training, and Resources

a. Doctrine. Some nations possess doctrine and training programs with a full treatment of

strategic, operational, and tactical issues. Other nations have doctrine and training programs

smaller in both scope and capability to match their national goals and objectives. When the

Armed Forces of the United States participate in multinational operations, US commanders

should follow multinational doctrine and procedures that have been ratified by the United States.

For multinational doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should

evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures where applicable and

consistent with US law, policy, and guidance. An example is the MNF SOPs developed by 33

nations within the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) in the Asia - Pacific

region. It seeks to identify common starting points for the rapid activation and forming of a

MNTF for crisis response situations and is based upon US doctrine, other nations’ doctrines, UN

concepts, and NATO doctrines (see Appendix C, “United Nations and Other Intergovernmental

Organizations Considerations”).

“Doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and

fundamentally shapes the way military forces think about, train for, plan, and

execute operations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied

Administrative Publication-6, ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’ (English

and French), defines doctrine as the ‘Fundamental principles by which the military

forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires

judgement in application.’ The principles and tenets of doctrine take into account

all of the basic elements of a military force: weapons and other systems; skill
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JP 3-16

levels; experience and training; deployment and sustainment capabilities;

organizational issues; C2 philosophy and issues; and command arrangements.

Doctrine deals primarily with extant capabilities. Doctrine is not about what is to

be done, but about how it is to be accomplished. Doctrine is neither strategy nor

policy, though it often influences and is influenced by both.

Coalition partners using very different national doctrines will obviously have

problems harmonizing their efforts, even if they enjoy a high degree of technical

interoperability. Forces operating on different fundamental principles will lack

unity of effort, and could even work at cross-purposes. Areas where commonality

of doctrinal approach is particularly critical include intelligence, command and

control, operations and planning, logistics, and communications. Subsidiary

functions of force protection, deployment, coalition combat identification rules of

engagement, and civil-military cooperation are also key. Finding ways to harmonize

doctrine is therefore an important means to ensure improved coalition operations.

Multinational Interoperability Council

Coalition Building Guide, Change 1, 17 April 2006

b. Training and Resources. When the situation permits, MNFCs at all levels should seek

opportunities to improve the contributions of member nation forces through training assistance

and resource sharing consistent with agreements between alliance and/or coalition members.

This could include the sale or loan of equipment; consistent and shared doctrine; common TTP;

and participation in multinational exercises. GCCs will include this information in their SCP.

(1) The sale or loan of equipment and the sharing of logistic resources are normally

covered under either the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) or the NATO Mutual Support Act

and require a negotiated acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) or foreign military

sales (FMS) agreement.

For more information on ACSA, see CJCSI 2120.01, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements,

and DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.

(2) Multinational exercises are key components of training, future collaboration, and doctrine

refinement. GCCs should ensure all exercises (and other security cooperation opportunities) are fully

annotated on their annual SCP and supported to the maximum extent possible. Interagency support

and participation is also highly desirable. Exercise types may include command post exercises, battlestaff

exercises, and field exercises. Simulation support can complement most exercises. Exercises can also

assist in training potential core elements for future operations. NATO’s multinational library includes a

series of multinational exercise publications used for training multinational maritime forces.
III-9

Planning and Execution Considerations

US PACIFIC COMMAND’S MULTINATIONAL PLANNING

AUGMENTATION TEAM

The climate of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region is very conducive to

multilateral dialogue and the development of effective strategic, operational,

and tactical planning and execution skills to meet on-going and emergent

security challenges. Many of the necessary planning skills and personal

relationships used to form effective multilateral partnerships can be found

within the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program.

The MPAT is made up of a cadre of experienced military planners, capable

of rapidly augmenting a multinational force headquarters, to plan and

execute coalition military operations primarily at the lower end of the

spectrum of conflict. The primary focus of MPAT is to improve multinational

interoperability at the operational level of command.

MPAT is not a program with formal participatory agreements. The key factor

in program success to date has been the informal ad hoc nature of the

program. Without memorandums of agreement, terms of reference, or other

more formal arrangements, the program has been able to share information

and all participants have been able to jointly develop concepts and

procedures without formal policy constraints – a key inhibitor to

multinational interoperability when working with other nations.

The MPAT program includes military planners from all interested nations

and also incorporates expertise from international & nongovernmental

organizations and the United Nations. The MPAT program belongs to all

interested nations.

SOURCE: www.mnfsop.com –

MPAT Portal and MNF SOP Portal

For more information on MPAT, see Appendix B, “Multinational Planning Augmentation Team.”

7. Protection

a. Protection focuses on conserving the joint force’s fighting potential in three primary

ways — active offensive and defensive measures (such as air defense) that protect the joint

force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and lines of communications (LOCs)

from an enemy’s attack; passive measures (such as concealment) that make friendly forces,

systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy; and applying technology and

procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide. As the MNFC’s mission requires, the protection

function may also extend beyond force protection to encompass protection of MNF

noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and IGOs/NGOs.

b. The protection function encompasses a number of tasks, including:
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(1) Collecting information for indications and warning.

(2) Providing air, space, and missile defense.

(3) Protecting noncombatants, including conducting noncombatant evacuation

operations (NEOs) when required.

(4) Providing physical security for forces and means.

(5) Conducting defensive countermeasure operations, including counter-deception and

counterpropaganda operations.

(6) Providing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives

(CBRNE) defense.

(7) Conducting information operations (IO).

(8) Securing and protecting flanks and LOCs.

(9) Conducting CBRNE consequence management.

(10) Conducting antiterrorism operations.

(11) Establishing capabilities and measures to prevent fratricide.

c. There are protection considerations that affect planning in every joint operation. The

greatest risk — and therefore the greatest need for protection — is during campaigns and

major operations that involve large-scale combat against a capable enemy. These typically

will require the full range of protection tasks, thereby complicating both planning and execution.

Although the operational area and joint force may be smaller for crisis response or limited

contingency operations, the mission can still be complex and dangerous, with a variety of

protection considerations. Permissive operating environments associated with military

engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence still require that commanders consider

protection measures commensurate with potential risks. These risks may include a wide range

of threats such as terrorism, criminal enterprises, environmental threats/hazards, and computer

hackers. Thorough research and detailed information about the operational environment, training,

and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment can ensure adequate protection

measures.

d. Force protection includes measures taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against

DODpersonnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These

actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place

and incorporate the integrated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the

effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the adversary. Force

protection measures span the entire breadth of operations from home station to deployed locations
III-11

Planning and Execution Considerations

because threats to deployed forces are found in all of those locations. It does not include actions to

defeat the adversary or protect against accidents or weather. Force protection is achieved through the

tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures, within the operational

area, across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 4-02, Health Service Support, for information on planning

force protection and an expanded discussion of protection.

(1) Commanders must understand that other nations do not necessarily execute force

protection in the same way as the US Military. Some nations’ armed forces may or may not be

willing or able to assume more risk than US forces. US commanders, whether under US control

or under a command relationship to a multinational force, must continuously assess threats and

vulnerabilities while implementing appropriate force protection countermeasures IAW published

GCC directives.

(2) Special consideration must be given to personnel with duties that require interaction

with local populations, such as civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), human

intelligence, counterintelligence, and local contract liaison. Separate assessments should be

conducted to determine the appropriate protection requirement in order to facilitate the

accomplishment of their tasks.

(3) Throughout multinational operations, risk management should be used to reduce

or offset risk by systematically identifying, assessing, and controlling risk. The risk management

process helps commanders make decisions that weigh risk against mission accomplishment.

(4) Another significant problem facing the multinational force is the potential for

fratricide. Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common language, and differing operational terms

of reference can increase this risk. MNF support or liaison teams can greatly assist in assessing

and reducing the fratricide risk to the multinational force by recommending operational

coordination measures and technological solutions.

(5) Finally, commanders must understand that US forces, as part of a multinational

force, can potentially be a greater target. As a result of US global leadership, adversaries may

view attacks against US Service members as attractive. Commanders must maintain security

programs to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information,

and equipment under their responsibility.

8. Rules of Engagement

a. Obtaining concurrence for ROE from national authorities is a time consuming but essential

process and should begin early in the planning process. Even though the participants may have

similar political mandates, ROE may differ among the nations represented. In many cases,

commanders of deployed member forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their

nation in the ROE development process. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE should

be sought, but may not be achievable. In any event, the MNFC should reconcile differences as
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JP 3-16

much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their

national policies.

b. It is essential that adjacent or mutually supporting formations and forces understand

each others’ ROE, as it cannot be assumed that each will react in an identical fashion to a given

situation. Without this understanding, events could result in misperceptions, confusion, and

even fratricide.

c. US forces assigned OPCON to a MNTF will follow the ROE of the MNTF unless

otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. US forces will be assigned and

remain OPCON to a foreign MNFC only if the CCDR and higher authority determine that the

ROE for that MNTF are consistent with US policy guidance on individual and unit self-defense

as contained in the standing rules of engagement (SROE). The SROE serve as the default ROE

and are applicable at all times during multinational operations. US forces assigned to the OPCON

or TACON of a multinational force will additionally follow ROE of the multinational force for

mission accomplishment if authorized by a Secretary of Defense order.

For additional information on SROE, see CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/

Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

9. Unified Action

a. Unified action is the synergistic application of all instruments of national and

multinational power; it includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military

forces. This concept is applicable at all levels of command. In a multinational environment,

unified action synchronizes and/or integrates multinational operations with the operations of

intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies in an attempt to achieve unity of effort in the

operational area (see Figure III-3).

b. MNFCs must integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and

operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the operational area. All

MNTF commanders are responsible to plan and conduct unified actions IAW the guidance and

direction received from the national commands, alliance or coalition leadership, and superior

commanders.

c. Training of forces within the MNTF command for specific mission standards enhances

unified action. The MNFC should consider establishing common training modules or certification

training to ensure assigned forces are trained for the missions assigned. Such training and

certification of forces can occur prior to deployment to the MNTF operational area or after

deployment. Certification of forces should be accomplished by a team composed of members

from all nations providing military forces to the MNFC.
III-13

Planning and Execution Considerations

10. Intelligence

a. Every interrelated intelligence operation of the intelligence process — planning and

direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and

integration, and evaluation and feedback — is substantively affected in multinational operations.

In some international operations or campaigns, JFCs will be able to use ISAs (e.g., NATO

STANAG) as a basis for establishing rules and policies for conducting joint intelligence operations.

Since each multinational operation will be unique, such agreements may have to be modified or

amended based on the situation. The following general principles provide a starting point for

creating the necessary policy and procedures (see Figure III-4).

(1) Maintain Unity of Effort. Each nation’s intelligence personnel need to view the

threat from multinational as well as national perspectives. A threat to one element of an alliance

or coalition by the common adversary must be considered a threat to all alliance or coalition

elements.

Figure III-3. Multinational Unified Action

MULTINATIONAL UNIFIED ACTION

*Generic term describing the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization

of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within

multinational commands

Multinational

Operations

UNIFIED

ACTION*

Intergovernmental

Operations

Nongovernmental

Operations
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(2) Make Adjustments. There will be differences in intelligence doctrine and procedures

among the coalition partners. A key to effective multinational intelligence is the readiness to make the

adjustments required to resolve significant differences such as:

(a) How intelligence is provided to the commander, the commander’s staff, and

forces.

(b) Procedures for sharing information among intelligence agencies.

(c) The degree of security afforded by different communications systems and

procedures.

(d) Administrative requirements.

(3) Plan Early and Plan Concurrently. National command channels need to

determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning

process. NATO and the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command have

developed and exercised intelligence policies and procedures that provide examples of how

multinational planning can be done in advance.

Figure III-4. Multinational Intelligence Principles

MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRINCIPLES

Maintain Unity of Effort

Conduct Complementary Operations

Share All Necessary Information

Plan Early and Plan Concurrently

Make Adjustments
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Planning and Execution Considerations

US CENTRAL COMMAND COALITION INTELLIGENCE CENTER

“We were established in 2001 at the beginning of Operation ENDURING

FREEDOM. Under J-2 we were established for the purpose of facilitating

and sharing of intelligence. In the beginning there was some operational

tactical intelligence that we shared with our coalition members and that

information was limited to just Afghanistan. But as the mission expanded

into Iraq, we also had to expand our purpose of sharing and discussing

information while establishing analytical teams to address specific questions

from both the Coalition and the US. Our Center is the forum where most of

those discussions take place.

The Coalition countries are all invited to have membership in the Intelligence

Center. We put in perspective the nation’s involvement with operations.

Not every country has an intelligence interest and not every country has an

intelligence officer assigned to US Central Command (USCENTCOM). Those

that do have an intelligence officer assigned at USCENTCOM will participate

with us on a daily basis. Those that do not have an intelligence officer, but

do have intelligence interests, usually go through their country’s senior

national representative or through the operations officer to consult with us

and discuss with us issues of common interest.”

Colonel Evilio Otero, Jr

Chief, Coalition Intelligence Center

USCENTCOM Coalition Village

(4) Share All Necessary Information

(a) Coalition members should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about

the situation and adversary consistent with national disclosure policy (NDP) and theater guidance.

However, information about intelligence sources and methods should not be shared with coalition

members until approved by the appropriate authority.

(b) Force protection is a mission inherent to any commander, and intelligence

support to that mission is critical. Every effort must be made to share any data that could impact

on the commander’s force protection mission.

(c) When information relating to a particular source cannot be shared, the

intelligence derived from that source should still be provided to other multinational partners.

The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) must establish procedures for separating

intelligence from sources and methods. Intelligence agencies often produce highly classified

reports that contain compartmented information. To the greatest extend possible, this information

should be disseminated using a tear line. A tear line enables the J-2, G-2, and/or S-2 to keep

information above the tear line (compartmented data) and disseminate the intelligence below.

Having intelligence production agencies use such tear lines will greatly facilitate intelligence

sharing.
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(d) The joint force J-2 must obtain the necessary authorizations for foreign disclosure

officers (FDOs) and designated intelligence disclosure officials (DIDOs) from the Defense Intelligence

Agency as soon as possible. J-2 personnel must be knowledgeable of the specific foreign disclosure

policy, procedures, and regulations for the operation. The assignment and use of qualified and certified

FDOs and DIDOs will enhance the efficient flow of intelligence.

(5) Conduct Complementary Operations

(a) Intelligence efforts of the nations must be complementary. Each nation will

have intelligence system strengths and limitations and unique and valuable capabilities. HN

security services’ capabilities, for example, will contribute significantly to force protection.

Furthermore, planning with friendly nations to fill shortfalls, especially linguists requirements,

may help overcome such limitations.

(b) All intelligence resources and capabilities should be made available for

application to the whole of the intelligence problem. Establishing a multinational collection

management element is essential for planning and coordinating multinational collection

operations.

See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, for further details.

b. Other Considerations. It is important to consider the ramifications of labeling

information about an operational area as intelligence, especially when interacting with nonmilitary

organizations. In many cultures, the perception of intelligence connotes information gathered

on a nation’s citizenry to exploit it. Further, attempts to exchange information with many NGOs/

IGOs would likely be stifled as they strive to maintain political neutrality throughout the world

and would not associate in any perceived intelligence gathering attempts. Therefore, unclassified

facts and/or data should be referred to as information in order to facilitate its exchange throughout

the operational area for the purpose of fostering mutual interests in resolving or deterring conflict

or providing support.

c. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). Multinational operations require interoperable

GEOINT data, applications, and data exchange capabilities. Whenever possible, participants

should agree to work on a standard datum and ensure that all products utilize that datum. A

multinational GEOINT plan must coordinate all products for use by member forces, including

access approval procedures and blending assets into a cohesive production program.

See JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, for further details.
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Planning and Execution Considerations

11. Information Sharing

“Coalition forces continue to play a vital role in current, and likely all future

operations in the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility

(AOR). The information sharing challenge is extremely complicated with multiple

coalitions, international organizations, and alliances participating in different

operations. Many nations participate in multiple communities. These include the

66-nation Global Counterterrorism Forces, the 51-nation Multinational Coalition

Forces-Iraq, the 11-nation Combined Naval Forces Central Command, the 33-

nation International Security Assistance Forces for Afghanistan, the 26-member

nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the traditional 6 Gulf

Cooperation Council member states and our 25 regional AOR countries.

USCENTCOM needs to be able to electronically share information with these

various communities of interests quickly and efficiently to successfully conduct

coalition operations.”

Jill L. Boardman/Donald W. Shuey

“CENTRIXS; Supporting Coalition Warfare World-Wide”

April 2004

a. National Disclosure Policy. The release of classified information to multinational

partners is governed by NDP. Detailed guidance must be provided to the senior US commander

by the chain of command IAW National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 119,

“Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and

International Organizations” and NDP-1, “National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of

Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.”

Detailed written guidance may be supplemented with limited delegation of disclosure authority

where appropriate (e.g., combined force protection purposes). However, the senior US officer

needs to become personally concerned with the issues of intelligence sharing and releasing of

information early in the process to ensure that the commander’s requirements have been clearly

stated and understood; that the guidance issued is supportive of those requirements; and that the

procedures to be followed are supportable by the MNFC.

JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Appendix E, “Security,”

contains a detailed discussion of sanitization and foreign disclosure procedures.

b. Communications and Processing Architectures. Due to the perishable nature of

pertinent, releasable intelligence, it is imperative that a system be devised for and by the MNF

members that is capable of transmitting the most important intelligence rapidly to units. Frequently

this system relies on the distribution of standardized equipment by one country’s forces to ensure

commonality. The system must also be firmly rooted in a network of coalition liaison officers

(LNOs) at major intelligence production or communication centers, to provide redundant

intelligence communications channels to their parent nation, and to determine and obtain

intelligence uniquely suited for that nation’s mission in time to exploit it.
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(1) Several nations maintain separate classified internet and communications systems. For

US forces, the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) is the primary classified

architecture.

(2) Unclassified Networks are an Operational Imperative. In addition to classified

networks, an unclassified network using the Internet (commercially encrypted if available) for

multinational operations is a communications backbone. In Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE,

in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, the use of the Asia Pacific Network (APAN)

unclassified internet network was an operational imperative to rapidly collaborate and coordinate

with participating nations, IHC, and affected nations’ governments and militaries. Because of

multilevel security issues, classified networks can rarely provide the necessary collaborative

communications required.

c. Coordination. Within alliances, it is common for intelligence procedures, practices,

and standardized agreements to be established and tested prior to actual use. Coalitions, however,

are frequently created and disbanded relatively quickly. Coalition participants typically

compensate for the lack of standardization through coordination between national leadership

and prospective forces. As mentioned above, coordinating the elements of communications

architectures is essential. Additional areas requiring extensive coordination include the friendly

use of the electromagnetic spectrum, use of space and/or space assets, geographical location of

intelligence collection assets, and targets of intelligence collection. Intelligence processing centers

should be multinational in character, serving the MNFC but also recognizing intelligence that

has value in support of national missions. However, establishment of these multinational

processing centers, particularly in the case of ad hoc coalitions, will require extensive personal

involvement and support from the MNFC and the corresponding nation in order to make this a

functioning reality. Again, the MNFC priority intelligence requirements should serve as the

milestones to fully focus the intelligence effort. The answers can only be gained through effective

coordination at all levels.

12. Communications

a. Communications are fundamental to successful multinational operations. Planning

considerations include frequency management, equipment compatibility, procedural compatibility,

cryptographic and information security, identification friend or foe, and data-link protocols.

MNFC should anticipate that some forces from MNTF will have direct and near immediate

communications capability from the operational area to their respective national political

leaderships. This capability can facilitate coordination of issues, but it can also be a source of

frustration as leaders external to the operational area may be issuing guidance directly to their

deployed national forces. Many communications issues can be resolved through equipment

exchange and liaison teams. When exchanging equipment, special consideration must be paid

to the release of communications security devices as well as the level of classification released

to individual countries per NDP and any applicable exemptions.

b. Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition, geography,

and location of the MNTF. It is critical that operations and communications planners begin the
III-19

Planning and Execution Considerations

coordination process early to ensure both US and MNF communication requirements are identified and

sourced prior to operations. Interoperability is often constrained by the least technologically proficient

participant. Effective communications support must be established to enable control over diverse,

widely dispersed air, maritime, ground, and space elements. Access to both military and commercial

satellites should be an early planning requirement to support widely dispersed elements. The MNFC

should address the need for integrated communications among all participating forces early in the planning

phase of the operation. MNTF planning and technical communications systems control centers should

be established as soon as possible to coordinate all communications.

c. In all multinational operations a broadband, unclassified network will be a critical

requirement for multinational coordination with all actors and stakeholders within the MNTF

operational area. The IHC and affected nations’ governments and militaries will use unclassified,

commercially encrypted networks as their primary collaboration and coordination tool. Satellite

access to broad band Internet capability must be planned as an operational necessity, if not

currently available within the MNTF operational area.

d. LNO teams should be sent to other MNF HQs to facilitate integration of operations.

These LNO teams should deploy with sufficient communications equipment to conduct operations

with their respective HQs. Consideration should also be given to possible degradation of

communications due to the extended distances over which the MNTF must operate and the

impact of enemy exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum. Urban operations present other

difficulties due to interference from physical structures or frequency overlaps. Planning for

communications support must also include provisions which allow execution of required

communications under adverse conditions. Additionally, US law requires prior international

and implementing agreements defining quid pro quo payments for allied use of the Defense

Information Systems Network and military satellite communications assets.

13. Land Operations

In most multinational operations, land forces are an integral, and central, part of the military

effort. The level and extent of land operations in a multinational environment is largely a function

of the overall military objectives, any national caveats to employment, and the forces available

within the MNTF.

a. National doctrine and training will normally dictate employment options within the MNTF.

Nations with common TTP will also experience far greater interoperability. Effective use of

TSCP events may significantly reduce interoperability problems even for countries with widely

disparate weapons systems.

b. The MNFC may assign the responsibility for land operations to an overall multinational

force land component commander (MNFLCC) or a task force (TF) within the MNTF command

structure (for example: TF South, TF North). Such TFs may include elements from a single

nation or multiple nations depending on the situation and the interoperability factors of the

nations involved. In addition, the MNFC may also assign an AO to the MNFLCC or TF based

upon concept of the operations. Figure III-5 contains a representative sample of MNFLCC

responsibilities.
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JP 3-16

c. The MNFC will also establish supported and supporting relationships between the land

component command or TF and other MNTF components (maritime, air, and special operations)

Figure III-5. Multinational Force Land Component Commander Notional Responsibilities

MULTINATIONAL FORCE LAND COMPONENT

COMMANDER NOTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Advising the multinational force commander (MNFC) on the proper employment of

forces and capabilities of forces made available for tasking.

Developing the multinational force land component commander’s land operation plan

(OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD) in support of the MNFC’s concept of operations

and optimizing the operations of task-organized land forces. The

issues planning guidance to all subordinate and

supporting elements and analyzes proposed courses of action. The intent is to

concentrate combat power at critical times and places to accomplish operational and

strategic goals.

Directing the execution of land OPLANs/OPORDs as specified by the FC, which

includes making timely adjustments to the tasking of forces/capabilities made

available. The coordinates changes

with affected component commanders as appropriate.

Coordinating the planning and execution of land operations with the other

components, and other supporting agencies.

Evaluating the results of land operations to include the effectiveness of joint

interdiction operations and forwarding these results to the MNFC to support the

combat assessment effort.

Synchronizing and integrating movement and maneuver, fires, and joint interdiction

in support of land operations.

Designating the target priorities, effects, and timing for operations within the assigned

operational area.

Providing mutual support to other components by conducting operations within the

land area of operations, such as the suppression of enemy air defenses or

suppression of threats to maritime operations.

Supporting the MNFC’s information operations (IO) by developing the IO requirements

that support land control operations and synchronizing the operations of land force IO

assets when directed.

Integrating the communications

systems and resources into the supported combatant commander’s communications

system architecture and synchronizing the

Establishing standing operating procedures and other directives based on MNFC

guidance.

multinational force

land component commander

MN

multinational force land component commander

multinational force land component commander

multinational force land component

commander communication system in the joint planning and execution process.
III-21

Planning and Execution Considerations

based upon mission requirements to assist in prioritizing actions, assist in establishing the main effort, and

to establish formal command/coordination channels between the components for a specific operation,

mission, or phase.

d. A key aspect of land operations will be sustainability. The following factors will impact

the sustainability of land operations:

(1) Manpower requirements.

(2) Medical requirements and capabilities.

(3) Maintenance.

(4) Supply.

(5) Storage facilities.

(6) Transportation.

(7) Technical support and requirements.

(8) Common sourcing of support.

e. Land operations provide the MNFC with a multifunctional force that can transition from

support operations to combat operations quickly based upon the mission requirements.

See JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, for more details.

14. Maritime Operations

In a multinational environment, the operational aim for maritime forces is to exercise sea

control or project power ashore, to ensure maritime operations are integrated with the other

major MNTF operational functions of land, air, and SOF, and to support the MNFC’s intent and

guidance in achieving the MNTF mission. Maritime forces are primarily navies, however, they

may include maritime-focused air forces, amphibious forces, or other government agencies

charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea.

a. As with land forces, maritime operation responsibility will normally be assigned to a

multinational force maritime component commander (MNFMCC) or a designated TF. Figure

III-6 contains a representative sample of MNFMCC responsibilities.

b. The MNFC can also assign a maritime AO to the MNFMCC or naval TF within the MNTF

operational area, based upon the concept of operations (CONOPS). The MNFC will also establish

supported and supporting relationships between the MNFMCC (or TF) and other MNTF components

(land, air, special operations forces) based upon mission requirements to assist in prioritizing actions,
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JP 3-16

assist in establishing the main effort, and to establish formal command/coordination channels between

the components for a specific operation/mission or phase.

c. A key aspect of maritime operations will be sustainability. The following factors will

impact the sustainability of maritime operations:

(1) Available surface ships (combat and amphibious).

(2) Available submarine assets.

(3) Maintenance.

(4) Supply.

(5) Storage facilities.

(6) Weather.

Figure III-6. Multinational Force Maritime Component Commander

Notional Responsibilities

MULTINATIONAL FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT

COMMANDER NOTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Recommending to the multinational force commander (MNFC) the apportionment

of the joint maritime effort (after consultation with other component commanders).

Providing maritime forces to other component commanders in accordance with

MNFC apportionment decisions.

Controlling the execution of joint maritime operations, as specified by the MNFC, to

include adjusting targets and tasks for available joint capabilities/forces. The MNFC

and affected component commanders will be notified, as appropriate, if the

multinational force maritime component commander changes the planned joint

maritime operations during execution.

Supporting MNFC information operations with assigned assets, when directed.

Functioning as the supported/supporting commander, as directed by the MNFC.

Providing centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of forces/

capabilities made available.

Assigning and coordinating target priorities within the maritime area of operations

(AO) and integrating maneuver, mobility and movement, fires, and interdiction. The

multinational force maritime component commander nominates targets located

within the maritime AO to the joint targeting process that may potentially require

action by another component commander’s assigned forces.
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Planning and Execution Considerations

d. Maritime operations provides the MNFC with a multifunctional force that can transition from

“support operations” to “combat operations” fairly quickly based upon the mission requirements.

15. Air Operations

a. Air operations provide the MNFC with a responsive and flexible means of operational

reach. The MNFC can execute deep operations rapidly, striking at decisive points and attacking

centers of gravity. Further, transportation and support requirements can be greatly extended in

response to emerging crisis and operational needs. Multinational air operations are focused on

supporting the MNFC’s intent and guidance in achieving the MNTF mission and at the same

time, ensuring air operations are integrated with the other major MNTF operational functions

(land, maritime, and special operations forces).

b. Overall MNTF air operations will normally be assigned to a multinational force air

component commander (MNFACC). MNFACC responsibilities include the planning,

coordinating, allocating, and tasking of air capabilities/force made available based on the MNFC’s

air apportionment decision (see Figure III-7). The MNFC will also establish supported and

supporting relationships between the MNFACC or TF and other MNTF components based on

MNTF mission requirements, to assist in prioritizing actions and to establish formal command/

coordination channels between the components for a specific operation/mission or phase.

c. Air Operations Planning. An integral part of the MNFC’s planning efforts is the concept

of air operations. The MNFACC is responsible for air operations planning, and develops the

concept for air operations describing how the multinational assets made available are envisioned

to be employed in support of the MNFC’s overall objectives. Both US component commanders

and MNFCs must provide highly trained liaison staffs to ensure integration, coordination, and

synchronization of their operations. Air planning should also include the use of logistic air

assets and airfields. This is especially important for the coordination of tactical air operations

with logistic operations, especially the air movement of supplies, their unloading, and rapid

clearance from aerial ports. In the event that no established multinational guidance is available,

planning considerations for multinational air operations should resemble those for joint air

operations.

See JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, for details on the air planning

process.

d. Airspace Control. The primary purpose of airspace control is to increase combat

effectiveness by promoting the safe, effective, and flexible use of airspace with minimal restraint

imposed on the users. International agreements, enemy and friendly force structures, deployments

and resupply operations, commanders’ concepts and operations, and operating environments

such as foreign countries, the high seas, and amphibious objective areas will necessitate different

specific arrangements for airspace control.

(1) Responsibility. The responsibility for airspace control rests with the MNFC, who

normally designates an airspace control authority (ACA) to coordinate the airspace control
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JP 3-16

activities for multinational operations. The broad responsibilities of the ACA include establishing,

coordinating, and integrating the use of the airspace control area. Subject to the authority and approval

of the MNFC, the ACA develops broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for the

coordination required among nations’ forces.

(2) When operating outside of a combat environment and within the borders of another

sovereign nation, the ACA may perform coordination rather than control over the airspace. In

those situations, the ACA must establish an effective relationship with the HN airspace authority.

Also, in addition to increasing effectiveness, the HN interests are likely to include safe domestic

civil aviation, efficient commercial aviation, and international overflight rights. Integrating

airspace control efforts will have a positive impact in the overall relationship between the HN

and the MNF.

(3) The ACA establishes an airspace control system that is responsive to the needs of

the MNFC, integrates the MNTF airspace control system with that of the HN, and coordinates

and deconflicts user requirements. Centralized direction by the ACA does not imply assumption

of OPCON over any assets. Matters on which the ACA is unable to obtain agreement shall be

referred to the MNFC for resolution. The responsibilities of ACA and MNFACC are interrelated and

Figure III-7. Multinational Force Air Component Commander Notional Responsibilities

MULTINATIONAL FORCE AIR COMPONENT

COMMANDER NOTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Developing a multinational air operations plan to support the multinational force

commander’s (MNFC’s) objectives.

Recommending to the MNFC apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting

with other component commanders.

Allocating and tasking of air capabilities/forces made available based on the

MNFC’s air apportionment decision.

Providing oversight and guidance during execution of multinational air operations.

Coordinating multinational air operations with other component commanders and

forces assigned to or supporting the MNFC.

Assessing the results of multinational air operations.

Supporting MNFC information operations with assigned assets, when directed.

Functioning as the supported/supporting commander, as directed by the MNFC.

Performing the duties of the airspace control authority (ACA) and/or performing the

duties of the area air defense commander (AADC), unless a separate ACA and/or

AADC is designated.
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Planning and Execution Considerations

should normally be assigned to one individual. If this is not possible, the ACA staff should be collocated

with the MNFACC staff.

e. Air Defense. Air defense operations must be coordinated with other operations, both on and

over land and sea. The MNFC normally designates an area air defense commander (AADC) to ensure

an integrated defensive effort by the MNTF. The responsibilities of the MNFACC, AADC, and ACA

are interrelated and are normally assigned to one individual. When the situation dictates, the MNFC

may designate a separate AADC and/or ACA. In those combined operations where separate

commanders are required and designated, close coordination is essential for unity of effort, prevention

of fratricide, and deconfliction of combined air operations.

f. Sustainment. The following factors will significantly influence sustainability during

air operations:

(1) Available air frames (fixed- and rotary-wing).

(2) Landing fields/air base support infrastructure.

(3) Weather.

(4) Maintenance.

(5) Supply.

(6) Storage facilities.

(7) Transportation.

(8) Technical support and requirements.

(9) Common sourcing of support.

(10) Secure LOCs.

(11) Medical support requirements and capabilities.

16. Space Operations

a. MNFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages of space-based capabilities. During this

phase, space capabilities are limited to already deployed assets and established priorities for service.

Space systems offer global coverage and the potential for real time and near real time support to military

operations. As a point of contact for military space operations, United States Strategic Command

(USSTRATCOM) enables commands to have access to space capabilities and systems. As situations

develop, priorities for space services may change to aid the MNFC in assessing the changing environment.
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JP 3-16

Most importantly, MNFCs and their components need to anticipate “surge” space-based capabilities

needed for future phases due to the long lead times to reprioritize or acquire additional capability.

b. Space Integration into MNF Operations. Allied or coalition forces will have many of the

same requirements for space support as do US forces. Sharing of intelligence products is controlled

according to intelligence guidelines. Multispectral imagery products are normally unclassified and will be

of great benefit to other MNFs. Weather data is also readily available to share, as is global positioning

system navigation support. Of special importance is providing warning and defense against attack from

theater ballistic missiles. USSTRATCOM is responsible for assisting in development of missile warning

architectures and providing this information to MNFs in a process called “shared early warning.”

c. Space Coordinating Authority (SCA). During campaigns or major operations, it is

important to have a SCA for space operations and support within the MNF structure to

appropriately represent the space requirements of the MNFC. With each MNF component and

many allies having their own organic space capability, there is the possibility of redundancy

among, and interference between, space operations, as well as conflicting support requests

reaching USSTRATCOM. To prevent such occurrences, the MNFC should appoint a MNF

SCA. The MNFC should consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation,

preponderance of space force capabilities, and the C2 (including reach-back) in selecting the

appropriate individual/agency. MNF coordinating authority is normally retained at the MNF

level, but may be delegated to a component.

For additional information on space operations, see JP 3-14, Space Operations.

17. Special Operations

a. SOF provide the MNTF with a wide range of specialized military capabilities and

responses. SOF can provide specific assistance in the area of assessment, liaison, and training of

host country forces within the MNTF operational area. Special operations responsibility will

normally be assigned to a multinational forces special operations component commander

(MNFSOCC) or to a TF within the MNTF command structure. The TF may be made up of SOF

from one nation or multiple nations depending on the situation and the interoperability factors of

the nations involved. Figure III-8 contains a representative sample of MNFSOCC responsibilities.

b. SOF may deploy teams ahead of the multinational operations to evaluate capability of

non-US units and identify training necessary to integrate them into the overall plan. This capability

is enhanced by routine interaction of SOF with non-US military units as a regular function, such

as the FID mission, to include combat aviation advisory support functions. SOF can conduct

liaison to multinational surface and air units, taking advantage of their language and cultural

capabilities. SOF can provide training to HN or multinational forces to overcome existing

shortfalls identified during the assessment.

For specific details on special operations, see JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and

JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense.
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Planning and Execution Considerations

c. Psychological Operations Support. PSYOP should be incorporated into all multinational

operations. The MNFC must ensure that all PSYOP activities, regardless of national origin, are

coordinated. PSYOP planning must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a population

for the arrival of multinational forces and develop communication channels that can be used from day

one of the operation. PSYOP provides the commander with the ability to convey selected information

and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately

the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is

to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. A detailed

analysis of a country’s culture, political climate, and military organization can help the MNFC to effectively

apply PSYOP to communicate policy, provide information, and persuade groups to cooperate with

friendly forces. US PSYOP are approved in US channels regardless of the composition of the MNTF

chain of command.

Figure III-8. Multinational Force Special Operations Component

Commander Notional Responsibilities

MULTINATIONAL FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT

COMMANDER NOTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Advising the multinational force commander (MNFC) on the proper

employment of special operations forces (SOF) and assets.

Planning and coordinating special operations (SO) and employing

designated SOF in support of the MNFC’s concept of operations.

Issuing planning guidance.

Analyzing various courses of action.

Coordinating the conduct of SO with other component commanders

and forces assigned to or supporting the MNFC.

Evaluating the results of SO.

Synchronizing sustainment for SOF.

Establishing a combat identification standing operating procedure and

other directives based on MNFC guidance.

Functioning as a supported/supporting commander, as directed by

the MNFC.

Focusing of operational-level functions and their span of control.

Develop and support selected information operations efforts.
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See JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, for additional information.

d. Civil Affairs Support. CA provides the military commander with expertise on the civil

component of the operational environment. The commander uses CA capabilities to analyze

and influence the local populace through specific processes and dedicated resources and personnel.

As part of the commander’s civil-military operations (CMO), CA conducts operations nested

within the overall mission and intent. CA contributes significantly to ensuring the legitimacy

and credibility of the mission. The key to understanding the role of CA is recognizing the

importance of leveraging each relationship between the command and every individual, group,

and organization in the operational environment to create a desired effect and achieve the overall

objectives. CA units can provide support to non-US units in multinational operations. Planners

coordinating CA support must factor in the fact that the majority of US CA units are in the

Reserve Component.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS —DISTRICT-LEVEL

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

In early 2003 Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) deployed

provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to Gardez, Bamian, and Kunduz in

order to establish a permanent presence in urban centers other than in

Kabul. A United Kingdom (UK)-led PRT deployed to Mazar-e Sharif on 10

July 2003 within the CFC-A military structure. A second deployed to Maimana

in June 2004. Soon after, a total of 16 PRTs had been established across

Afghanistan. The teams led by the US, and the New Zealand-led PRT in

Bamian, operate within CFC-A. Those led by the UK (Mazar, Maimana),

Germany (Kunduz, Feyzebad) and The Netherlands (Pol-e Khumri) within

International Security Assistance Force assigned territory.

Although operating within different military command structures, and

emphasizing different aspects of activity and composition as determined

by the local conditions and terrain, the core tasks of each of the PRTs are

consistent across the network, and with North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Operation Plan 10302: a PRT is a combination of international military and

civilian personnel based in provincial areas of Afghanistan with the aim of

extending the authority of the Afghan central government and helping to

facilitate development and reconstruction, primarily by contributing to an

improved security environment. PRTs also aim to support reform of the

Afghan security sector (security sector reform) – the demobilization and

disarmament of militias; building an accountable national army and national

police force under democratic control; stamping out the drugs trade; and

building a legal system.
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Planning and Execution Considerations

Originally, the Mazar-e Sharif PRT’s area of responsibility covered five

provinces: Jawzjan, Balkh, Samagan, Sar-e Pol, and Faryab, although direct

control of the last was subsequently passed to the new UK-led PRT based

at Meymana. The military component of the PRT is around 110 strong,

including Danish, Swedish, and Romanian troops. There are also civilian

representatives from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department

for International Development, the Afghan Transitional Administration, the

US State Department, United States Agency for International Development,

and the Government of Afghanistan. While the core structure of the PRT

remains constant, the make-up of the PRT may change as it responds to

changing circumstances and its evolving role.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

(1) CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit

relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations

and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in

order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve US objectives. CMO may

include performance by military forces of activities and functions which are normally the

responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur before,

during, or after other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other

military operations. CMO may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by

a combination of CA and other forces. As with so many other areas, CMO must be coordinated

to accomplish the MNFC’s mission. The activities of multinational CA resources should be

prioritized through the MNTF’s CMO plan to maximize the benefit of these resources.

Commanders should liaison with civil authorities, local populace, NGOs, and IGOs. Additionally,

coordination with the country team and other DOS organizations such as the coordinator for

reconstruction and stabilization and associated local humanitarian reconstruction and stabilization

teams, advance civilian teams, and/or provincial reconstruction teams provide a unique “force

multiplier” capability to overall MNTF CMO.

(2) Incorporating liaison and coordination procedures into CONPLANs and OPLANs

(especially annex G and annex V) will facilitate proper education, training, and exercising between

military and civilian personnel and assist the commander in transitioning responsibility, when

directed, to the appropriate organizations upon mission completion. One method to facilitate

unified action and conduct on-site interagency coordination for CMO is to establish a CMOC.

The CMOC serves as the primary coordination interface for the Armed Forces of the United

States and humanitarian organizations, IGOs, NGOs, multinational military forces, and other

civilian agencies of the USG. The CMOC facilitates continuous coordination among the key

participants with regard to CMO and CA operations from local levels to international levels

within a given AO, and develops, manages, and analyzes the civil inputs to the common operational

picture. Army CA units have a standing CMOC capability and can form the core of the MNF

CMOC.

See JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, for further information.
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18. Spectrum Management

Effective spectrum management is essential to integrate and deconflict multinational force use of the

spectrum for communications, C2, sensor operations, IO, electronic warfare, and force protection.

The varieties of systems which partner nations may depend upon, the number of suppliers, indigenous

systems that use the spectrum, and fidelity of use and interference data make spectrum management far

more demanding in multinational operations than in joint operations.

19. Information Operations

a. The development of capabilities, tactics, techniques, procedures, plans, intelligence, and

communications support applicable to IO requires coordination with the responsible DOD

components and allied/coalition nations. Coordination with allies above the joint force commander

(JFC)/MNFC level is normally affected within existing defense arrangements, including bilateral

arrangements. DOD, with the support of USSTRATCOM and through the Joint Staff, coordinates

US positions on all IO matters discussed bilaterally or in multinational organizations to encourage

interoperability and compatibility in fulfilling common requirements. Direct discussions regarding

multinational operations in a specific theater are the responsibility of the GCC.

b. The Multinational IO Cell

(1) When the JFC is also the MNFC, the joint force staff should be augmented by

planners and subject matter experts from the MNTF. All MNTF member nations should be

represented in the IO cell in positions to contribute, when possible, to each of the elements of IO.

IO planners should seek to accommodate the requirements of the MNTF with the goal of using

all the available IO resources. Direct representation enables multinational IO assets to be used

efficiently and ensures that the multinational IO plan is coordinated with all other aspects of the

multinational operation.

See JP 3-13, Information Operations.

(2) In the case where the JFC is not the MNFC, it may be necessary for the JFC to

brief the MNFC and staff on the advantages of IO as a part of military strategy to achieve US and

MNF goals. The JFC should propose organizing a multinational IO cell. If this is not acceptable

to the MNFC, the JFC should assume responsibility for using IO as a part of military strategy

within the joint force to support US and MNF objectives.

c. Multinational IO Planning. Planning IO to support multinational operations is more

difficult because of complex approval and security issues, differences in the level of training of

involved forces, interoperability of equipment, and language barriers.

(1) How to plan multinational IO is the prerogative of the MNFC. The size,

composition, and mission of the MNF, as well as diplomatic considerations, may influence how

multinational IO is planned. Coordination at the IO cell level with detailed planning at the
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Planning and Execution Considerations

individual element level would give multinational IO planning the most consistency with US IO planning

procedures.

(2) The multinational IO plan should directly and demonstrably support the objectives of the

MNFC. This is particularly important when joint force planners are attempting to acquaint a non-US

MNFC with the advantages of IO as a part of military strategy.

(3) The subordinate JFC may undertake planning and execution of independent IO in

support of multinational objectives.

See CJCSI 6510.01D, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND).

SECTION C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

20. Multinational Logistics

a. Logistic support for multinational operations differs fundamentally from single nation

joint operations. Participating MNTF forces each represent different sovereign nations with

different cultures and approaches to logistic support. This has profound implications for how

the US should organize, prepare, and execute the logistic support of US elements within the

MNF and presents unique challenges for GCCs, subordinate JFCs, Services, and DOD agencies.

Although many of the principles of logistics for joint and multinational operations are the same,

multinational logistics involves distinctive C2 principles.

(1) The United States is a member of various alliances and multinational forums —

such as NATO and the ABCA Armies Program — that have developed doctrine and procedures

for supporting multinational logistic operations. When participating in NATO or other

multinational operations, US forces will conform to previously approved international agreements,

where applicable.

(2) However, US GCCs also face unique challenges arising from regionally specific

coalition structures, capabilities, and operational requirements. Although each MNTF nation is

responsible for logistic support of its national forces, the execution of multinational logistics

must be a collective responsibility of the nations comprising the MNTF. This collective

responsibility is critical and cannot be overstressed.

(3) Multinational logistics must be flexible, responsive, predictive, and should provide

timely sustainment throughout the entire MNTF. The multinational logistic plan should

incorporate the logistic requirements and capabilities of the entire MNTF to ensure sustained

and synchronized execution. The intent is to provide the MNFC with the timely introduction

and proper mix of support units and resources into the operational area. Achieving this goal will

require considerable cooperation and continuous coordination between the logistic support and

operational elements and it must begin during the initial planning phase and continue through

the operation’s termination.
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b. Responsibility. The responsibility for providing logistic support to national component forces

ultimately resides with their nations, unless previously agreed to IAW alliance implementing arrangements

(IAs) or ISAs. Varying degrees of mutual logistic support exist in multinational operations and must be

planned to complement partners’ capabilities and minimize weaknesses. To require each MNTF nation

to perform all logistic functions separately would be inefficient, expensive, and logistically hinder the

MNFC’s ability to influence operations. The synergy required for successful multinational logistics is

centralized control and coordination of common services and common funding for logistic services

where appropriate (e.g., transportation, billeting) to reduce overall costs.

c. Differences. Among the participating nations, there will be differences in logistic doctrine,

organizational capabilities, SOPs, terminology and definitions, methods for computing

requirements, organizational policies, and automated data processing (ADP) support systems.

These differences must be understood by all, harmonized where realistically possible, and

accounted for during planning and execution. IAs and ISAs should be clearly specified in

OPLANs to ensure their use by multinational formations. Multinational logistic planning must

occur simultaneously and concurrently with operation planning. Such plans should be developed

in consonance with prospective participating nations to achieve logistic efficiencies. The challenge

of planning is in simultaneously supporting an ongoing operation while developing the support

organization, bilateral and multilateral agreements and associated C2 mechanisms to achieve

unity of effort. To the extent that concurrent planning occurs, many of these challenges may be

avoided or minimized.

d. Authority. In multinational operations, the MNFC must be given sufficient authority

over logistic resources to ensure that operational priorities can be effectively supported. Sovereign

nations are reluctant to give MNFCs directive authority for logistics. However, the MNFC

should have the authority to redistribute logistic assets as a temporary expedient to meet

unanticipated or emergency situations. In some cases, the MNFC may exercise control over the

various national logistic units. In other cases, the MNFC may have only coordinating authority.

The degree of authority will depend upon existing agreements and ad hoc arrangements negotiated

with participating nations and/or as identified in the campaign plan and/or OPLAN. The MNFC

may delegate to component commanders (land, maritime, air) only the level of coordinating

authority granted by the individual nations. The MNFC may establish a logistic coordination or

control center headed by a senior logistic coordinator to control or coordinate common or theaterlevel logistic support within the operational area. Some of the major support issues that must be

resolved include the following:

(1) Consistent with the principle that no property or supplies may be transferred to

another nation without explicit legal authority, ensure that the mutual logistic support for US

forces is IAW existing statutory authority. The Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control

Act, ACSA authority, the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (as amended),

the Fly America Act, and the Cargo Preference Acts all address the degree of support that the

United States can provide to or receive from other nations. In addition, specific legislative

language contained in DOD authorization or appropriation acts may limit US ability to receive

and/or provide logistic support from and/or to allies.
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Planning and Execution Considerations

(2) Identification of common supplies and services that might be provided by one nation or a

multinational organization.

(3) Establishing if, when, and how a MNFC will be provided authority over national logistic

assets (to include authority for redistribution of national supplies under emergency conditions). This

requires a national decision by participating nations.

(4) Availability and use of common and/or up-front funding for establishing cost

effective contracts, establishing multinational HQ, and general and/or common support.

(5) Development of policies and procedures to account and reimburse for logistic

services and supplies exchanged between the United States and other nations under existing

ACSA.

(6) Establishment of responsibility and release procedures for national assets, as

authorized.

(7) Development of the means to maintain national asset accountability (from the

national sustaining base to the front line units).

(8) Ensuring compatibility and interoperability of communications networks to include

tactical communications, tactical data links, joint data network, and ADP interfaces between

national logistic organizations of the MNTF and national support systems, and how to integrate

information classification requirements.

(9) Prioritization, C2, allocation, and use of common infrastructure capabilities (e.g.,

ports, airfields, roads) to support military and civil operations.

(10) Identification and distribution of those ISAs (STANAGs, QSTAGSs) that can

facilitate the provision of multinational logistic support.

e. Planning. Often, little planning time is available prior to a multinational operation.

However, to the extent that planning time is available, logistic support planning should be

conducted concurrently with operational planning. Since such planning is critical, it will be

frequently necessary to share partial or incomplete planning data (or data not fully approved)

with prospective partners. Staffs should evaluate the level of standardization and interoperability

among participating nations and, where situations permit, come to agreement on which nations

will be responsible for providing logistic support functions for the MNTF, the task organization

of the logistic units to support the MNTF, and the procedures and methods for how the support

will be provided. At the MNTF HQ, the focus should be on measuring the requirements of

executing the campaign plan, providing advance estimates of these requirements to national

units, and ensuring that proper controls are in place to deconflict and permit movement and

processing. Frequently, planning HQ, especially logistic planning HQ, are staffed with temporarily

assigned personnel. To facilitate early planning, such personnel must be identified and made

available in a timely manner.
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(1) There are three generally accepted methods of executing cooperative logistics in a MNTF.

These can be used singularly or in combination.

(a) In the lead nation construct, a nation accepts responsibility to provide one or more

logistic functions within a specified geographic area in support of the MNTF.

(b) Using pooled assets and resources, two or more nations form an integrated

logistic support structure to provide supply or support functions to the MNTF.

(c) In a role specialization agreement, a nation accepts responsibility to provide a

particular class of supply or service for all or most of the MNTF.

(2) Regardless of the mutual support method(s) used, it is imperative that national

decisions and commitments to lead or participate in such arrangements be provided early during

the planning cycle. Assuming a lead nation or role specialization nation status does not grant the

US forces any additional legal authority to provide support to coalition partners on a

nonreimbursable basis.

(3) The role specialist nation (RSN) mission in NATO can be implemented for a NATO

operation that includes member and nonmember nations. Specific planning considerations should

address the US military role as the RSN for a specific logistic commodity and the on-demand

support level available when another nation provides a specified commodity as the RSN.

(a) During the planning process, components and DOD agencies should prepare,

develop, and disseminate specific policies and procedures for potential RSN applications in

NATO and other multinational operations.

(b) US participation as an RSN often is constrained by legal authorities. This

factor must be considered early in the planning process so that any required agreements or

arrangements can be put in place prior to the operation.

f. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements Authority. Normally, USG acquisitions must

be accomplished by means of a Federal Acquisition Regulation contract. Transfers of defense goods

and services to foreign nations must generally be done through a FMS case. Often, in coalition operations,

these methods may prove to be cumbersome, time consuming, and inefficient. Under ACSA authority

(Title 10 USC Section 2341), the Secretary of Defense can enter into agreements for the acquisition of

or cross servicing of logistic support, supplies, and services on a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or

exchange for equal value basis. These agreements can be with eligible nations and international organizations

of which the United States is a member. The ACSA is a broad overall agreement which is generally

supplemented by an IA. The IA contains points of contact and specific details of the transaction and

payment procedures under which orders for logistic support supplies and services are placed. Neither

party is obligated until the order is accepted.

Significant restrictions for ACSA use exist. For additional information, see JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine

for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.
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Planning and Execution Considerations

g. Arms Export Control Act Title 22 US Code. An AECA FMS agreement negotiated between

the United States and an allied and/or coalition country or organization is the preferred agreement for

operations other than short-term emergent emergency operations. The primary instruments are the

letter of request from the country or organization requesting logistic support and the letter of offer and

acceptance (LOA) from the United States. Within this agreement, the basic ordering agreement (BOA)

may be included to establish an account for ordering a wide range of undefined materiel requirements,

unknown at the signing of the LOA. A BOA is particularly useful for food, fuel, medical materiel,

ammunition, unscheduled repairs, and repair parts. Using a BOA, the full range of logistic support from

routine through emergency requirements may be provided, including weapon systems and major end

items if necessary. The LOA provides a formal contractual agreement and includes the use of established

logistic systems in the FMS community. Many of the countries interface directly with US logistic systems.

US logistic systems, procedures, and methods of financial accounting are institutionalized and documented

by DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual, to support eligible country’s armed

forces today. For the purposes of training and standardization the emergency operation’s systems

should be the same as those used for the routine peacetime operations. Many countries are already

trained and use the familiar FMS process.

(1) The two basic elements are a signed LOA and funded accounts to support the

country’s requirements. The full range of materiel, supplies, and services, including weapon

systems and major end items, may be provided under the AECA.

(2) Benefits of the AECA and/or FMS system include the following:

(a) Use of standard logistic systems.

(b) Complete financial accountability.

(c) Control of materiel IAW the country and/or organization’s assigned force

activity designator and the priority assigned individual requests.

(d) Handling of “nonstandard” item requisitions. Existing FMS logistic systems

are set up to support these requirements.

(e) May prevent an excessive drawdown on US forces’ logistic support and/or

unit organic supplies and equipment.

(f) Transportation of materiel to the operational area, particularly ammunition,

may be provided utilizing the country’s assets and handling system, thereby reducing the

transportation requirements on the Defense Transportation System during a crisis situation.

h. Contingency Contracting. Contracting is another essential source of logistic support. In

respect to multinational logistics, the most important type of contracting will be theater support contracting.

Theater support contracting is the process of contracting for locally available supplies, services, and

construction in immediate support of deployed units, either at staging locations, interim support bases, or
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JP 3-16

forward operating locations. It can be especially applicable to support of reception, staging, and onward

movement of forces. Properly used, contracting is an effective force multiplier for deployed forces

during a contingency. It can serve to reduce dependence on the continental United States based logistic

system. Contracting can have a potential positive effect in dealing with imposed force structure and

personnel ceiling requirements, allow more nations to participate, and enhance infrastructure recovery.

Satisfying requirements for supplies and services through theater support contracting can improve response

time and reduce logistic footprints. Contracting can augment the existing logistic support capability,

providing an additional source for critically required supplies and services. However, as indicated for

HNS, the contractor resources available in theater are to be prioritized by the MNFC or the designated

logistic coordinator. In doing so, consideration must be given to the impact of local contracting upon the

HN’s economy and infrastructure. In most operations, the use of theater support contracts will have a

positive economic effect that can help lead to the attainment of the eventual end state within the operational

area and timing of withdrawal. External support contractors such as one of the Services civil augmentation

programs may also be used as an alternative source of support; however, their use in theater must be

addressed in a SOFA or other international agreement, where applicable, for such issues as taxes, cross

border fees, and landing fees.

(1) Contingency contracting will not replace HNS or the existing supply systems where

these systems are available or operational. However, deployments most likely to require

employment of contingency contracting are those occurring in areas of the world where there

are few, if any, HNS agreements.

(2) Most recent deployments of US forces have been to multinational operations

supporting contingencies in remote areas of the world. The trend of world events suggests that

such operations will become more probable in the future. Whether for FHA, PO, NEO, war, or

other contingencies, such operations may require the creation of multinational contracting

coordination centers staffed by personnel from all forces operating in the theater.

(3) Contingency contracting warrants special treatment because of the complex nature

of the acquisition process and the need to support operational forces. This necessitates that the

CCDRs formulate comprehensive implementation plans and operation specific policies, to include

a deliberate risk assessment, that will support this essential element of the logistic chain. This

will ensure that proper contracting methods are employed in the procurement of supplies and

services and military forces receive the required logistic resources to perform their mission. It

will also ensure that the associated risks in utilizing contingency contracting support (force

protection, health issues, environmental considerations, potential loss of critical support, etc.)

are properly analyzed and addressed in the operational plan.

21. Host-Nation Support

a. HNS will often be critical to the success of a multinational operation. In general,

centralized coordination of HNS planning and execution will help ensure that HNS resources
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Planning and Execution Considerations

are allocated most effectively to support the MNTF’s priorities. The more limited HNS resources are in

the operational area, the greater the requirement for centralized management.

b. NATO doctrine recognizes the importance of centralized HNS coordination and gives NATO

commanders the authority to:

(1) Prioritize HNS requirements.

(2) Negotiate HNS agreements, on behalf of nations, with a HN.

(3) Coordinate HNS allocation with “sending” nations and a HN.

c. In US-led multinational operations, nations typically negotiate their own HNS agreements.

Nevertheless, participating nations should coordinate their HNS arrangements with the MNFC,

who in turn should coordinate HNS allocation with the HN.

d. Host-Nation Support Coordination Cell (HNSCC). To assist the MNFC in HNS

coordination activities, a HNSCC may be established. One of the most important functions of

the HNSCC is to assist the MNFC and legal counsel in developing technical arrangements

(TAs) that involve logistic matters such as: infrastructure, financial management, purchasing

and contracting, engineering, environment, hazardous material storage, landing and port fees,

medical operations and support, border customs, tariffs, and real estate.

(1) In US-led multinational operations, the MNFC needs to involve participating nations

in the negotiation of either commonly worded separate bilateral TAs or a single set of agreements

applicable to the entire MNTF.

(2) Staffing. The HNSCC should be staffed with specialists familiar with developing

and executing HNS agreements. In addition, consideration should be given to including

representatives of the HN within the HNSCC to:

(a) Facilitate coordination and identification of resources for potential use by the

MNTF.

(b) Provide interpretation and translation services to the HNSCC staff.

(3) Information Requirements. In order to effectively plan and coordinate HNS

allocation, the HNSCC needs up-to-date information on HNS logistic capabilities and on-going

HNS allocation to MNTF contingents throughout the operation. To ensure that it receives such

information, the HNSCC must maintain close contact with the HN and with MNTF contingents.

(4) Coordinating Activities. In conducting its operations, the HNSCC coordinates closely

with appropriate CMOC organizations, the multinational joint logistics center, and the HN’s

representatives.
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JP 3-16

e. HNS is generally furnished IAW an agreement negotiated prior to the start of an operation.

HNS agreements are normally established in diplomatic channels between a nation or a MNTF

and a receiving nation. These are normally umbrella-type agreements that are augmented by TAs

detailing the specific support to be provided and the type/amount of reimbursement.

f. During crises, it may be necessary for the US GCC to request authority to negotiate

bilateral HNS agreements for the purpose of providing logistic assistance to other nations. Such

negotiations must be conducted expeditiously in coordination with the Joint Staff, the Office of

the Secretary of Defense, and the State Department, and in compliance with applicable DODDs.

Alternatively, the MNFC may be authorized to negotiate HNS agreements on behalf of force

contributing nations, with their prior concurrence. This approach, which NATO doctrine endorses,

simplifies and streamlines the process and reduces the amount of time required to put such

agreements into place.

g. Available HNS Infrastructure. Analysis of the physical infrastructure in the HN is

critical to understanding force sustainability. MNTF logistic planners should evaluate what

facilities and services (such as government, law enforcement, sanitation, power, fuel, and medical

support) exist as viable support for local consumption and support of coalition forces.

(1) First, assess the ability of the HN to receive MNTF personnel and equipment (e.g.,

ports and airfields).

(2) Second, determine the capability of transportation systems to move forces once

they arrive in theater.

(3) Third, evaluate availability of logistic support.

(4) The impact of obtaining HNS upon the host country’s national economy must also

be considered, along with possible environmental impacts upon HNs. These must be recognized

and addressed during the planning process.

(5) In addition, specific technical agreements in many areas (e.g., environmental

cleanup, levying of customs duties and taxes, hazardous material and/or waste storage, transit

and disposal) must be developed to augment SOFAs that may have been concluded with HNs.

22. Health Service Support

a. Multinational support operations are complicated by a number of characteristics that

impact fundamentally upon the provision of health service support (HSS).

(1) Unique nature of every individual operation.

(2) Geographic, topographic, and climatic variations of the operational area.

(3) Numbers of individual nations involved in each operation.
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Planning and Execution Considerations

(4) Variations in national standards of HSS and equipment.

(5) Language and communications differences.

(6) Political complexity and dynamic nature of each operational scenario.

(7) Mission of medical support forces.

(8) Differences in individual national objectives and/or restrictions for participation

in operations and integration of overall mission goals.

(9) Medical staffs face unique problems affecting the health of multinational personnel

deployed on operations. Therefore, operational HSS requires clearly defined and distinctive

guidance.

(10) HSS plans must be tailored to each operation and meet the demands of geography,

individual national needs, language, and communication difficulties. Plans must be capable of

rapid implementation, but at the same time be flexible enough to manage rapidly changing

operational demands.

(11) Every deployed multinational force must have a surgeon and/or chief medical

officer who has direct access to the MNFC. Working in coordination with the MNTF staff, they

should recommend guidance and/or standards to follow in multinational operations.

(12) Each deployed national contingent that has HSS personnel must have a single

designated individual who has the clinical responsibility for all national HSS matters.

b. HSS Standards for Multinational Operations. To qualify to participate in the MNF

(and for subsequent multinational resourced medical treatment, patient movement, and personal

disability compensation), national contingents and individuals allocated or contracted to

multinational operations must meet the basic standards of individual health and physical fitness

laid down by the staff chief medical officer.

(1) Contributing nations bear ultimate responsibility for ensuring the provision of HSS

to their forces allocated to multinational operations. This may be discharged in a number of

ways, including agreements with other nations or the appropriate multinational planning staffs

and MNFCs.

(2) International Conventions for the Treatment of the Sick and Wounded. HSS for

operations will comply with provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Persons, to include detainees,

entitled under the terms of the Conventions shall, without discrimination, receive medical treatment on

the basis of their clinical needs and the availability of HSS resources.

(3) Standards of HSS. Operational HSS to multinational forces must meet standards that

are acceptable to all participating nations. Care provided to US forces participating in a multinational
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JP 3-16

operation must meet US standards.

(4) Estimation of Medical Risk. Estimation of medical risk and the associated casualty rates

is the responsibility of the individual nation with HSS advice of the multinational operational staffs.

See JP 4-02, Health Service Support, for further details.

23. Personnel Recovery

a. Personnel recovery (PR) is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare

for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. PR may occur through

diplomatic initiatives, NGOs, coalition actions, or through any combination of these options.

PR operations include the inherent capabilities of recovering equipment. In coalition operations,

PR does not include NEO, peacetime search and rescue (SAR), or salvage operations.

b. The MNFC must make a careful assessment of each MNTF nation’s PR capability and

procedures. Normally, each nation and/or component is responsible for conducting its own PR

missions. However, participants may possess a variety of PR capabilities ranging from civil PR

to dedicated combat PR. Therefore, the MNFC may designate an individual or establish an

organization and procedures to coordinate this mission among all participants.

c. Coalition Personnel Recovery Center (CPRC). The MNFC may create a CPRC to

act as the MNTF point-of-coordination for all actions associated with the recovery of personnel

and associated equipment within the MNTF operational area. Functions of the CPRC include:

(1) Coordinate PR operations both within the MNTF and with external organizations.

(2) Advise the MNFC or designated component commander on PR incidents and

requests.

(3) Coordinate requests for augmentation to support recovery operations as required.

d. PR operations may extend across national lines of responsibility. Operational flexibility,

interoperability, and multisystem redundancy are the primary factors in successful PR operations.

See JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, for information on how to organize a comprehensive joint/

combined PR network.

24. Administration and Personnel Support

Regardless of how the MNTF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces

normally establishes a national component to ensure effective administration of its forces. These

national components are similar in function to the US Service component at the combatant

commands. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national
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Planning and Execution Considerations

forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations

directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces

to subordinate operational multinational organizations.

25. Media Relations

a. Commanders at all levels should expect regular encounters with journalists who show

up in their assigned operational areas. In general, open and independent reporting are the principal

means of coverage of military operations. Some reporters will embed with the units and stay

with them for an extended period of time. Some embedded reporters will be registered by the

joint force and will carry identifying credentials issued by the MNTF or, as appropriate, Geneva

Convention cards.

“Fewer than 30 reporters accompanied the entire invasion force to Normandy,

France, on 6 June 1944. In contrast, more than 500 journalists appeared within

hours to cover combat operations in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. At

the beginning of Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, more than 1,600 news

media and support personnel were present, and some 1,500 reported on hurricane

relief operations in Florida in 1992. Reporters provided live television and radio

coverage of the night amphibious landing that marked the beginning of Operation

RESTORE HOPE in Somalia in 1992 and the end of the United Nations operation

during Operation UNITED SHIELD in 1995. More than 1,700 media

representatives covered the initial phases of peacekeeping operations in the

American sector of Bosnia in 1996.”

Maj Barry Veneble, USA

Military Review

January-February 2002

(1) The criteria for credentialing journalists are established within the MNTF.

Credentialing is not intended to be a control measure or means to restrict certain media outlets

from access. It is primarily a method of validating individuals as journalists and providing them with

information that enhances their ability to report on activities within the operational area.

(2) Additionally, media must be credentialed to ensure they have official status under

the Geneva Conventions in the event of capture. Others may be covering military operations

without such credentials. Commanders should not provide information to noncredentialed,

unregistered journalists without guidance from the MNTF public affairs officer or the MNTF

information bureau director, as appropriate.

b. In multinational operations, responsibilities for establishing media ground rules, credentialing

media, and, if necessary, expulsion of media, are developed and implemented through appropriate

multinational command and staff channels. Reporters should be encouraged to register at the press

information centers (PICs), allied PICs, joint information bureau, or equivalent organization. Planning

should facilitate the interaction between the military and the national and international press organizations.

Each nation has its own viewpoint on media freedom and access, and the MNFC should consider this
III-42

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JP 3-16

during planning. Respect for the viewpoints of other nations must be demonstrated even if they are

contrary to that of the United States.

See JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for additional details.

26. Meteorology and Oceanography

The effective understanding of meteorology and oceanography and the application of that

knowledge during mission execution could significantly contribute to the success of a

multinational operation. The state of the atmosphere and oceans can be a force multiplier or

detractor. Successful commanders use the environment to their advantage. In multinational

operations, early planning is critical. Differences in language, techniques, data formats, and

communications must be overcome prior to any operation. To ensure that meteorological and

oceanographic (METOC) forces of all participating nations operate together, the MNFC should

designate a senior METOC officer to coordinate METOC support. This officer will ensure that

all METOC forces operate from a coordinated planning forecast, and that all METOC

requirements are met. The senior METOC officer should also consider using multinational

resources of data when available.

 “From the harsh winter at Valley Forge during the Revolutionary War to the raging

sandstorm in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, weather has played an important role

in war. Historically, atmospheric conditions invariably would favor one side over

the other, but weather’s capricious nature quickly could reverse the advantage,

sometimes during the course of a single battle. Often the combatants with a

better understanding of the weather would emerge victorious. Today, advances

in technology have allowed the military to provide commanders on the battlefield

sophisticated weather forecasts, which they use to their advantage as they deploy

ground troops or target precision-guided munitions...

Military forecasters met an immediate challenge in the first week of Operation

IRAQI FREEDOM, when “the mother of all dust storms” descended on the country.

‘It was the largest sandstorm in the geographical area and the most severe in

terms of wind speed and low visibility in over a decade. Fortunately, military

forecasters predicted this major storm five days before it occurred. That was

particularly impressive, because the storm didn’t exist in advance and then move

into the region, but developed in the war zone.’”

Mark Canton

“Weather and War”

March 2004

27. Environmental

a. Environmental considerations should be integrated in multinational operations. To the

extent practicable and consistent with mission accomplishment, commanders should take

environmental factors into account during planning, execution, and conclusion of a multinational

operation. Commanders should also clearly identify guidance that may be different from the
III-43

Planning and Execution Considerations

normal practices of the member nations and obtain agreement from participating nations. Besides

agreeing on common goals and objectives for the operation, commanders of participating MNF should

reach some understanding on environmental protection measures during the operation. Failure to

accomplish this may result in misunderstandings, decreased interoperability, and a failure to develop and

implement a successful environmental annex and plan for the operation. Additionally the failure to

consider environmental impacts on the HN could result in an erosion of support or acceptance for the

MNF within the HN.

b. Environmental considerations include the following:

(1) Air pollution from ships, vehicles, aircraft, and construction machinery.

(2) Cleanup of base camps and other occupied areas to an appropriate level.

(3) Protection of endangered species and marine mammals in the operational area.

(4) Environmental safety and health.

(5) Hazardous material management.

(6) Hazardous waste disposal.

(7) Medical and infectious wastes management and disposal.

(8) Natural and cultural resources protection.

(9) Noise abatement, including noise from aircraft operations.

(10) Pesticide, insecticide, and herbicide management to control non-point pollution.

(11) Resource and energy conservation through pollution prevention practices.

(12) Solid waste management and disposal.

(13) Oil and hazardous substance spills prevention and controls.

(14) Water pollution from sewage, food service, and other operations.

For a further discussion of environmental considerations refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.
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JP 3-16

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX A

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

A-1

Multinational operations as described in this publication cover a wide spectrum of subjects. The

checklist below provides an MNFC with a planning tool for multinational operations directed

through either an integrated or lead nation scenario. Operations conducted in a parallel command

relationship will normally follow national planning guidance and doctrine (JP 3-33). Where

possible, this checklist will attempt to highlight only those items unique to multinational

operations.

Detailed planning checklists for JTF directorates can be found in JP 3-33, Joint Task Force

Headquarters. Most material contained in those checklists is applicable to MNTF directorates

as well.

Strategic Level Considerations:

_____ Has the political-military estimate been completed and coordinated with national-level

coalition/combined partners? Have the coalition/combined partners reached agreement

on the appropriate response?

_____ Has the lead nation, in coordination with other coalition/combined partners, developed

the strategic military guidance for the operation? Does this strategic guidance contain:

_____ A clear description of political objectives?

_____ A broad outline of any military activity envisioned?

_____ The desired end-state?

_____ Key planning assumptions?

_____ Any constraints or restraints on military operations or actions?

_____ Has a mission analysis been accomplished?

_____ Has the commander’s mission statement been provided?

_____ Has an analysis of the situation, opposition forces, friendly forces, and

restrictions been conducted?

_____ Have COAs been developed?

_____ Has a preferred COA been selected?

_____ Has the commander’s intent been provided/developed?
A-2

Appendix A

JP 3-16

_____ Have ROE been agreed upon by military commanders and national policy

makers?

_____ Has a CONOPS been developed and approved by the national and interagency

partners?

_____ Has a confirmation of capabilities and/or forces to be contributed been obtained

from our national and interagency partners, to include government capabilities/

forces and likely IGO, NGO, and/or private sector contributors?

_____ Has an OPLAN been developed based on the approved CONOPS?

_____ Have annexes to OPLANs/CONPLANs (annexes G and V) been developed to

effectively support multinational and/or interagency coordination and operations?

_____ Has the OPLAN been approved by national and interagency partners?

_____ Has the operational-level commander been appointed?

_____ Has strategic communication guidance been included in the OPLAN?

_____ Has the appropriate coordination been conducted with the DOS Office of the Coordinator

for Stability and Reconstruction, their associated local humanitarian reconstruction

and stabilization teams, United States Agency for International Development, and/or

the US embassy country team(s) in the specific operational area?

Operational Level Considerations

_____ Have command relationships been established between the MNFC and national forces?

_____ Has a MNTF HQ been established?

_____ Have critical billet requirements been identified?

_____ Has a theater foreign disclosure authority been identified? Has a policy and a plan for

the control, release, and dissemination of sensitive information been promulgated?

_____ Have the personnel for the multinational staff been chosen to reflect the required

functional skills, training level, language skill and avoidance of historic animosities?

_____ Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?

_____ Do liaison elements have appropriate linguistic, communications, logistic,

and office support capabilities in place?
A-3

Planning Considerations for Multinational Operations

_____ Has the command structure been designed to minimize layers to a more

horizontal organization?

_____ Have 24-hour command centers been provided for if required?

_____ Have C2 arrangements been made to include appropriate IGO and NGO

officials in coordinating functions?

_____ Have multinational legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?

_____ Have the multinational partners with a lesser C2 capability been provided

appropriate liaison personnel and interpreters (if necessary), operators, and

maintainers to enable interaction with the commander and other multinational

members?

_____ Have arrangements been made for intra- and inter-staff communication among

same nation staff members?

_____ Have the strategic and military end-states been identified? Are the conditions tangible

in military terms? Are they contained in the mission statement?

_____ Has the end state and exit strategy been articulated as part of the commander’s vision

for subordinates?

_____ What is the exit strategy?

_____ What constitutes mission success?

_____ Has a mission analysis been conducted?

_____ Has planning guidance been developed and issued?

_____ Does it contain the commander’s intent?

_____ Are the ROE established? Do they require adjustment?

_____ Have COAs been developed?

_____ Has a preferred COA been selected?

_____ Has the commander’s intent been provided/developed?

_____ Has the deployment time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) been completed

and validated?
A-4

Appendix A

JP 3-16

_____ Have the non-US forces relying on strategic mobility for deployment and/or

redeployment been included in the TPFDD?

_____ Has the deployment plan been deconflicted with NGO and contractor

transportation requirements in order to avoid competition for limited

transportation infrastructure?

_____ Has the probable cost of the multinational operations been determined and are there

mechanisms in place to track the cost?

_____ Have logisticians assessed the feasibility and/or supportability and risks of the mission?

_____ Is the MNFC aware of existing agreements among participating nations in the form of

bilateral or multilateral arrangements, funding, and training?

_____ Have SOFAs been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations? Who has been

designated to negotiate technical agreements to implement SOFAs?

_____ Do the resources allocated to the force protection component of the mission balance

with the potential political ramifications of failure to protect the force?

_____ Have the cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics of the operational area

been fused with the traditional study of geographic and military considerations to form

an intelligence estimate that identifies threat centers of gravity, as well as high-value

and high-payoff targets? Does the plan consider these issues in a way that facilitates

operations and end state?

_____ Have determined efforts been made to pool information with applicable NGOs, to

increase efficiency of operations through coordination and eliminate redundancy in

operations?

_____ To what extent are riot control agents authorized for use?

_____ Are forces, communication system capabilities, and logistic support robust enough to

respond to increased levels of operational intensity?

_____ Has coordination been accomplished with multinational members regarding

communication equipment capability?

_____ Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment?

_____ Has the terrain and environment been considered while planning for the

communication system network?

_____ Have common databases been provided for?
A-5

Planning Considerations for Multinational Operations

_____ Has the nation most capable of providing an integrated, interoperable

communication system network been selected to serve as network manager

for the multinational communication system infrastructure?

_____ Have agreements on cryptographic, communications and/or ADP security

issues, and other planning factors been reached among all multinational

components? Are compatible materials available?

_____ Have arrangements been made and/or established to allow contract

multinational foreign nation employees to work on C2 staffs without exposure

to ADP and classified information used in daily operations?

_____ Have the nations agreed to work on a standard datum and produce all products to that

datum?

_____ Has a multinational geospatial information and services (GI&S) plan been produced

and disseminated which designates all GI&S products for use?

_____ Have special, adequate, and supportable intelligence sharing and foreign disclosure

procedures been established?

_____ Have the intelligence requirements been clearly stated to focus the collection

effort?

_____ Has the adversary’s use of space assets been analyzed and have requests for

denying militarily useful space information to the adversary been considered?

_____ Have efforts been made to place sufficient intelligence collection resources under the

control of (or at least immediately responsive to) the MNFC?

_____ Have efforts been made to assign intelligence gathering tasks IAW the MNFC’s

intelligence requirements and according to the capability of the multinational

equipment under MNTF control?

_____ Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information into

multinational centralized processing and exploitation centers?

_____ Can targeting materials be disseminated rapidly?

_____ Has the MNFC’s authority to redistribute logistic assets and services been defined and

agreed to?

_____ What, if any, ACSA exist between participating nations?
A-6

Appendix A

JP 3-16

_____ Does principal logistics civil augmentation program structure have an overall

officer in charge or main point of contact for C2 of contract personnel?

_____ Do other legal authorities permit the provision of logistic support to participating nations?

_____ Have reimbursement or replacement-in-kind procedures been developed and

agreed to?

_____ Have contractor procedures been established?

_____ Is there a means in place which authorizes exchange of mutual logistic support

of goods and services between the MNTF countries and accounts for the

amounts received?

_____ Has a logistic determination been made, (i.e., what countries will provide

what piece of the logistics system, health services to include ground and air

evacuation and health service logistics)?

_____ Have logistic reporting procedures been established and promulgated throughout the

force?

_____ Can the HN provide support and, if so, have negotiations to secure support either been

established or completed?

_____ Are the mission economic and infrastructure repair plans known and being

complied with by all nations, Services, and units?

_____ Has HNS been evaluated in the deployed location(s) to determine the logistic

requirements?

_____ Has an assessment of HN medical capabilities and a determination of

availability to support MNF HSS requirements been accomplished?

_____ Have coordinating centers been established for personnel movement, medical support,

ground and air evacuation, contracting, infrastructure engineering, and logistic

operations?

_____ Is a transitional plan available to facilitate deployment and operational assumption of

in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency or

alliance?

_____ Has funding been identified to support operations and/or to provide reimbursement of

expenditures from existing budgets?
A-7

Planning Considerations for Multinational Operations

_____ Will common funding be available to support multinational common costs

and expenditures?

_____ Has it been determined if or to what extent operational-related expenses will

be reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding

by the participating nations?

_____ Are medical facilities identified to support the operation? Are evacuation plans, both

intra- and inter-theater, in place?

_____ Are CBRNE weapon threats known and are troops and medical facilities

prepared to cope with their possible use?

_____ Are graves registration and mortuary procedures in place to service multinational

casualties, to include recognition of cultural differences in dealing with casualties?

_____ Have IO activities been planned to support the operation?

_____ Have IO assets been requested?

_____ Have procedures been established for coordination and approval of IO

activities?

_____ Have PSYOP personnel been integrated into analysis, targeting, and planning?

_____ Have population and resource control measures and the subordinate commander’s

authority to impose them been included in the MNTF plan?

_____ Are there adequate CA personnel on hand to assist planners?

_____ Are there special operations personnel available to develop and execute unconventional

military options for the commander?

_____ Has a public affairs plan been promulgated that:

_____ Provides a contingency statement to use in response to media queries before

initial public release of information concerning the MNF and its mission?

_____ States who (from which nation and when, or all nations simultaneously) makes

the initial public release concerning the MNTF and its mission?

_____ States agreed-upon procedures for the subsequent release of information

concerning the MNF and its national components?
A-8

Appendix A

JP 3-16

_____ Is predeployment media training complete?

_____ Is the relationship between the inevitable media coverage of tactical operations and

future strategic decisions understood by all commanders?

_____ Have requirements for combat camera support been arranged?

_____ Has an operation historian been designated and staff authorized?

_____ Is a mechanism in place for the collection, assessment, and reporting of lessons learned?

_____ Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?

_____ What are the redeployment and/or withdrawal plans for multinational forces? Is the

departure of forces to be accomplished under tactical conditions?

_____ What are the environmental standards to be met by withdrawal in humanitarian

or other peaceful operations?

_____ What forces, equipment, and supplies will remain behind? Has disposal of

equipment and supplies been properly planned?

_____ What are the C2 and command arrangements for departure?

_____ Who will support forces that remain behind?

_____ Have the C2 systems support required for the diminishing MNTF presence

been identified?
APPENDIX B

MULTINATIONAL PLANNING AUGMENTATION TEAM

B-1

1. Overview

a. The MPAT program is a rapidly maturing multinational program established in the

aftermath of the events surrounding East Timor’s drive for independence. MPAT was established

by the Commander, US Pacific Command (USPACOM), in consultation with the chiefs of

defense of various nations in the Asia-Pacific region in early 2000. The impetus for the program

is to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment and/or augmentation of MNTF HQ.

b. MPAT is not a program with formal participatory agreements. The key factor in program

success to date has been the informal ad hoc nature of the program. Without memorandums of

agreement, terms of reference, or other more formal arrangements, the program has been able to

share information, and all participants have been able to jointly develop concepts and procedures

without the normal formal policy constraints – a key inhibitor to multinational interoperability

when working with other nations.

2. Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Composition

a. MPAT is an international cadre of military planners from nations with interests in the

Asia-Pacific region. Participation has grown from 5 nations in 2000 to 33 nations in 2005.

b. Members are capable of augmenting a MNF HQ established to plan and execute coalition

operations in response to military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations

and small scale contingencies. Planners learn from each other the common procedures for

activating, forming, and employing a coalition task force HQ and associated planning processes.

This is done through a series of multinational workshops – called MPAT TEMPEST EXPRESS

staff planning workshops. The MPAT cadre also participates in USPACOM and other nations’

multinational exercises.

c. Participation also includes representation from UN organizations, IGOs, and NGOs.

d. The MPAT Secretariat resides with Pacific Command Exercises Directorate.

3. Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures

a. One of the first actions in the MPAT initiative was the development of procedures for the

operation of a MNTF HQ. The MNF SOP recognizes the existence of shared national interests

in the region and seeks to standardize some basic concepts and processes that will promote

habits of cooperation, increased dialogue, and provide for baseline MNTF operational concepts.

Further, this SOP serves as a centerpiece for the MPAT workshops and exercises aimed at

improving interoperability and MNTF operational readiness within the Asia-Pacific region. The

purpose of the SOP is straight forward:
B-2

Appendix B

JP 3-16

(1) Increase the speed of a MNF initial response.

(2) Improve interoperability among the participating forces.

(3) Enhance overall mission effectiveness.

(4) Support unity of effort.

b. The MNF SOP is not a USPACOM document, nor is it signed by any of the participants.

It has been developed by the combined efforts of all the MPAT nations as a multinational document

to provide the foundation of multinational crisis response. The SOP is also unclassified and

available for use by any nation in combined or coalition operations.

c. The procedures contained in the MNF SOP are primarily focused for use by a MNTF

HQ for use at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. These include numerous missions such as

PO (which includes peacekeeping & peace enforcement), humanitarian assistance/disaster relief,

military assisted NEO, SAR/PR, combating terrorism and FID.

4. Organization

The MPAT is not a standing, billeted organization or TF. It is a cadre or pool of trained

planners with MNF operations planning expertise that have developed relationships from

participation in MPAT events. Outlined below (see Figure B-1) is a list of potential key MNTF

staff billets or functional areas that can be filled with MPAT personnel from the various MNF

participating nations.

For additional information on the MPAT concept refer to the unclassified MPAT web site. URL:

< www.mnfsop.com >. This web site acts as the portal for the MPAT program, MNF SOP, and

the APAN network home page. The updated MNF SOP can be obtained via this portal and the

latest MPAT information can be found through this site.
B-3

Multinational Planning Augmentation Team

Figure B-1. Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Augmentation Roles

MULTINATIONAL PLANNING AUGMENTATION

TEAM AUGMENTATION ROLES

Civil-Military

Medical

Legal

Public Affairs

Psychological Operations

Operational Planners

Personnel

Intelligence

Logistics

Communications

Engineer

Force Movement and

Deployment

Force Protection

Ground Operations

Maritime Operations

Air Operations

Special Operations

Marine Operations

Sealift

Airlift

Information Operations

Air Logistics

Network/Collaboration

Space Operations
B-4

Appendix B

JP 3-16

Intentionally Blank
“Despite growing global interdependence, war remains a common feature of the

international landscape, occurring among different national, ethnic, and religious

communities unwilling to live together and settle their disputes peacefully. Although

today’s conflicts are often cloaked in the rhetoric of ethnic, religious and cultural

dissent, for the most part, wars erupt over political power. The international

community today faces some 40 unresolved conflicts, about average for the postCold War era...The conflicts are widely distributed, and the level of hostilities

varies considerably. Most are smoldering conflicts, but at any one time intense

fighting typically characterizes 5-10 cases. Although the vast majority of these

conflicts primarily involve groups fighting within states, the distinction between

internal and external conflict is becoming blurred: the loss of life and impact on

neighboring states requires that the international community consider intervention

in both cases.

Outside military forces alone are unlikely to achieve lasting results in most of

these conflicts...The purpose of multinational forces is to stop the fighting and

assist in bringing about a fair and lasting resolution of conflict, not to achieve a

military victory. Therefore, multilateral military efforts should be a subordinate

part of an overall campaign that includes diplomacy and humanitarian activities.

The multinational forces must be prepared for combat, but their use must be

designed to create conditions for a lasting peace. In most cases, they will need to

support political and humanitarian efforts effectively. For these reasons, the

subordination of multinational military operations to international political guidance

is essential.”

General Andrew Goodpaster, USA

“When Diplomacy Isn’t Enough”

1. General

a. There are over 30 IGOs throughout the globe. These organizations represent a variety of

global and regional issues and concerns. Unlike NGOs, IGOs represent political entities (e.g.,

the European Union, African Union); however both can have a significant impact on multinational

military-related operations. US military participation in multinational efforts directed or supported

by IGOs is primarily an Executive Branch decision subject to numerous constraints and

restrictions.

b. Besides interoperability, which allows operational efficiency, political consensus is a

necessary condition for multinational success. Political consensus depends on at least three

conditions.

(1) Legitimacy. Multinational operations must be based on a defined end state,

international law and a clear mandate. Normally a recognized IGO such as the UN would act to

initiate or endorse the multinational activity under consideration. This organization would also

APPENDIX C

UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERGOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

C-1
C-2

Appendix C

JP 3-16

provide political guidance, endorsement of coalition strategic goals, and endorse the desired end state.

Additionally, this same organization would either designate or accept the offered services of a lead

nation.

(a) UN Sponsored and led Operation (Blue Helmet). Based upon Chapter 6, UN

Charter. UN establishes a UN mission with a UN designated military component and force commander

(FC) who reports to the special representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) and, in turn, to the UN

Security Council. Forces are funded by the UN for UN sponsored operations.

(b) UN Authorized Lead Nation Operation. Used when requirements exceed

the capabilities of the UN. Uses the lead nation construct (as outlined previously in this JP). It

is referred to as a “coalition of the willing” and is normally based upon Chapter 7, UN Charter

(can have Chapter 6 also as authority in some situations). The lead nation appoints the MNFC

and the lead nation reports to the UN Security Council. The lead nation, in conjunction with

participating nations agreements, funds the operations.

(c) UN Authorized Regional Organization Operation. Used when requirements

exceed UN capabilities and a regional organization (e.g., NATO) is available for executing the

multinational mission. The regional organization appoints the FC and the regional organization

reports to the UN Security Council. It is based upon Chapter 8, UN Charter. The regional

organization, in conjunction with participating nations agreements, funds the operations.

(2) Open Political Consultation. Open political consultation allows all participating

nations to be part of the decision-making process. With a firm legal basis and a designated lead

nation, in-depth political consultation is made possible through the creation of a political authority

in which each participating nation will be represented at an appropriate level (e.g., ambassador).

Military participation in this process should be provided by a corresponding military authority.

(3) Political Control. Through all phases of the operation, political direction of the

operation will be carried out through the political, not military, authority. The lead nation should

coordinate these political and military activities, implement decisions, and report to the

international community.

(a) Functional links between the political and military authority should be

established as appropriate. In particular, the political authority would be responsible for selecting

or endorsing a strategic military option and for providing the initial military direction to the

multinational commander.

(b) In the conduct of operations, political control would be exercised by providing

directives to the coalition commander IAW each nations’ intent and ROE. These directives may

be guided by periodic reports on the progress of the operation and situation assessments from

the coalition commander.
C-3

United Nations and Other Intergovernmental Organizations Considerations

2. Considerations

a. According to the UN, a complex emergency refers to “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region

or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external

conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any

single and/or ongoing UN country programme.” US doctrine may refer to this situation as a crisis and

complex contingency operation.

b. Due to a number of factors, complex emergencies have become much more frequent

since the end of the Cold War. However, they seemingly share similar characteristics, including:

(1) Reappearance of nationalistic, territorial, religious, or ethnic ambitions or frictions

such as occurred in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Africa.

(2) Mass population movements as people are internally displaced or become refugees

in another country while searching for security, food, water, and other essentials.

(3) Severe disruption of the national economic system and destruction of vital

infrastructure. In some cases, the disruption is caused by one faction to cause further deterioration

of national services when they are most needed. Such efforts are often intended to incite or

further foment public dissatisfaction and weaken the central government or authority.

(4) General decline in food security resulting from political decisions, discriminatory

policies, food shortages, disruption of agriculture, droughts, floods, inflation, and lack of finances.

Malnutrition can quickly ensue in local areas and may degenerate into widespread starvation.

c. Humanitarian crises can result from a combination of man-made and natural disasters,

such as large numbers of people experiencing droughts, cyclones, crop failures, or floods even

as they are engulfed in civil war, are invaded, or as their governments fail. Natural disasters

alone can overwhelm the resources of already severely stressed governments, with sadly

predictable effect on the people.

3. Humanitarian Assistance Organizations

a. Some IGOs are specifically targeted at humanitarian assistance missions and operations

to provide relief and response during/following complex emergencies and disasters. US FHA

programs are conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other

endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious

threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by US forces

is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or

complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary

responsibility for providing FHA. In general, humanitarian assistance must be provided IAW

the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality.
C-4

Appendix C

JP 3-16

b. Two IGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International

Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), perform specific, internationally-recognized

functions.

(1) The ICRC, a unique humanitarian organization based in Geneva, is the civilian

organization designated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to ensure that prisoners of war and

civilians in war are treated IAW the law of war.

(2) The IFRC, also headquartered in Geneva, has 178 national Red Cross or Red

Crescent Society affiliates, one of which is the American Red Cross. IFRC affiliates provide a

number of diverse services which may include:

(a) Response to local, national, and international disasters.

(b) Support for military personnel and their families.

(c) Extensive training in disaster assistance, shelter management, mass feeding,

damage assessment, first aid, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and mother and baby care.

c. UN agencies and organizations primarily focused on humanitarian assistance include:

(1) The United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs or the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is often chosen as the lead agency

to assist and coordinate humanitarian assistance organizations’ planning and operations in a

complex emergency. UNHCR is the organization charged with the responsibility for refugees

and internally displaced persons.

(2) The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights was created in 1994 to

provide human rights monitors to investigate and to prevent abuses of human rights; to support

UN special prosecutors by collecting and verifying evidence of crimes against humanity; to

provide education about international human rights and practice; and to support host countries

in administering justice.

(3) The United Nations Children’s Fund provides long-term expert consultation and

material support in collaboration with the host government and key host country nationals for

projects to strengthen health services, especially for children and women; water purification and

distribution; and sanitation.

(4) The World Food Program (WFP) obtains, transports, and stockpiles food. Direct

assistance, the face-to-face distribution of WFP food at household or camp level, is done by

NGOs or other civilian organizations.

(5) The World Health Organization (WHO) is the UN agency charged with promoting

and protecting the health of the world’s population. WHO’s Department of Emergency and

Humanitarian Action responds to complex emergencies and natural disasters.
C-5

United Nations and Other Intergovernmental Organizations Considerations

4. United States Perspective

a. The Political-Military Environment. Within the Executive Branch, DOS is the lead

foreign affairs agency, assisting the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. As

such, DOS oversees the coordination of DOD external political-military (POLMIL) relationships

with overall US foreign policy. External POLMIL relationships of DOD include:

(1) Bilateral military relationships.

(2) Coalition military forces.

(3) Multilateral mutual defense alliances.

(4) Treaties and agreements involving DOD activities or interests, such as technology

transfer, armaments cooperation and control, international aviation, law of the sea, nuclear

regulation, and environmental pollution.

(5) Use of US military assets for humanitarian or peace operations (including those

conducted under UN auspices).

b. Theater Focus. The GCC implements DOD external POLMIL relationships within the

area of responsibility. The CCDR’s regional focus is similar to the regional focus of DOS’s

geographic bureaus, though the geographic boundaries differ. Most other USG foreign affairs

agencies are regionally organized as well, again with varying geographic boundaries. Within a

theater, the GCC is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional and theater

military strategies that require interagency coordination. In contrast, the DOS focal point

for formulation and implementation of regional foreign policy strategies requiring interagency

coordination is the geographic bureau at DOS HQ in Washington, DC. Although the GCC will

often find it more expeditious to approach the US COM for coordination of an activity in a HN,

often the political effect of the proposed US military activity goes far beyond the boundaries of

the HN. In such cases, the GCC should not assume that the approval of the COM corresponds

to region-wide approval of DOS, but instead should ascertain that the COM has received

instructions from DOS.

c. During contingency operations, coordination between DOD and other USG agencies

will normally occur within the National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees and,

if directed, during development of the POLMIL plan. During lesser operations and operations

not involving armed conflict, the CCDR’s staff may deal directly with a COM or members of

the country team regarding issues that do not transcend the boundaries of the HN. In some

operations, a special envoy of the President or a SRSG may be involved.

d. The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working

relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military

experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the

JIACG provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG
C-6

Appendix C

JP 3-16

civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place

at the strategic level through the National Security Council System. Members participate in contingency,

crisis action, and transition planning, and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help

synchronize JTF operations with civilian agencies.
APPENDIX D

REFERENCES

D-1

The development of JP 3-16 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Executive Branch Documents

a. NSPD-1, Organization of the National Security Council System.

b. NSPD-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and

Stabilization.

c. NDP-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military

Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.

d. NSDM 119, Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign

Governments and International Organizations.

e. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/7, National Disclosure Policy.

2. Department of Defense Documents

a. DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.

b. DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program.

c. DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction

(SSTR) Operations.

d. DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.

e. DODD 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent.

f. DOD 5105.38M, Security Assistance Management Manual.

g. DODD 5530.3, International Agreements.

h. Department of Defense Instruction 8110.1, Multinational Information Sharing Networks

Implementation.

3. Joint Policy, Doctrine, and Other Publications

a. CJCSI 2120. 01, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.
D-2

Appendix D

JP 3-16

b. CJCSI 2700.01B, International Military Agreements for Rationalization, Standardization,

and Interoperability (RSI) Between the United States, Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations.

c. CJCSI 3113.01A, Responsibilities for the Coordination and Review of Security Cooperation

Strategies.

d. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force

for US Forces.

e. CJCSI 5120.02, Joint Doctrine Development System.

f. CJCSI 5715.01B, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

g. CJCSI 6510.01D, Informational Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND).

h. CJCSI 6510.06, Communication Security Releases to Foreign Nations.

i. CJCSI 6610.01B, Tactical Data Link Standardization Implementation Plan.

j. CJCSI 6711.01A, Exchange of Communications.

k. CJCSI 6740.01A, Military Telecommunications Agreements and Arrangements Between

the United States and Regional Defense Organizations or Friendly Foreign Nations.

l. CJCS Manual 6120.01D, Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link Operating Procedures.

m. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.

n. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

o. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

p. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

q. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

r. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

s. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

t. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

u. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

v. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.
D-3

References

w. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

x. JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense.

y. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

z. JP 3-07.5, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

aa. JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian

Assistance.

bb. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

cc. JP 3-09, Joint Fires Support.

dd. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

ee. JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations.

ff. JP 3-18, Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations.

gg. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

hh. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.

ii. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

jj. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

kk. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

ll. JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.

mm. JP 3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations.

nn. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

oo. JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Support.

pp. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

qq. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.
D-4

Appendix D

JP 3-16

rr. JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

ss. JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

tt. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

uu. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

vv. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy 43, Military

Telecommunications Agreements and Arrangements Between the United States and Regional

Defense Organizations or Friendly Foreign Nations.

ww. Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT), Multinational Force Standing

Operating Procedures (MNF-SOP), 6 February 2006. [www.mnfsop.com]

xx. MIC, Coalition Building Guide, Change 1, 17 April 2006.
APPENDIX E

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

E-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint

Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should

address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for

Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-16, 5 April 2000, Joint Doctrine for Multinational

Operations.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//*

CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10//

*Use when Joint Staff J-7 is not the lead agent

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint

Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force

Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include

a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other

organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in

this publication are initiated.
E-2

Appendix E

JP 3-16

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted.

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in

accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available

at www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET), and http://nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/dj9j7ead/doctrine/

(SIPRNET), or on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil

(SIPRNET).

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to

foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense

Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington,

DC 20301-7400.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not

less than semiannually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant

commands and Services.
GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AADC area air defense commander

ABCA American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Program

ACA airspace control authority

ACSA acquisition and cross-servicing agreement

ADP automated data processing

AECA Arms Export Control Act

AO area of operations

AP allied publication

APAN Asia Pacific Network

BOA basic ordering agreement

C2 command and control

CA civil affairs

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield

explosives

CCC coalition coordination center

CCDR combatant commander

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual

CMO civil-military operations

CMOC civil-military operations center

COA course of action

COM chief of mission

CONOPS concept of operations

CONPLAN concept plan

CPRC coalition personnel recovery center

DIDO designated intelligence disclosure official

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense directive

DOS Department of State

EA executive agent

FC force commander

FDO foreign disclosure officer

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance

FID foreign internal defense

FMS foreign military sales

FSO foreign service officer
GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-16

GCC geographic combatant commander

GEOINT geospatial intelligence

GI&S geospatial information and services

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

HN host nation

HNS host-nation support

HNSCC host-nation support coordination cell

HQ headquarters

HSS health service support

IA implementing arrangement

IAW in accordance with

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent

Societies

IGO intergovernmental organization

IHC International Humanitarian Community

IO information operations

ISA international standardization agreement

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

JFC joint force commander

JIACG joint interagency coordination group

JP joint publication

JTF joint task force

LNO liaison officer

LOA letter of offer and acceptance

LOC line of communications

METOC meteorological and oceanographic

MIC Multinational Interoperability Council

MNCC multinational coordination center

MNF multinational force

MNFACC multinational force air component commander

MNFC multinational force commander

MNFLCC multinational force land component commander

MNFMCC multinational force maritime component commander

MNFSOCC multinational force special operations component commander

MNTF multinational task force

MP multinational publication

MPAT Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
GL-3

Glossary

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDP national disclosure policy

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation

NGO nongovernmental organization

NSC National Security Council

NSDM national security decision memorandum

NSPD national security Presidential directive

OPCON operational control

OPLAN operation plan

PIC press information center (NATO)

PO peace operations

POLAD political advisor

POLMIL political-military

PR personnel recovery

PSYOP psychological operations

QSTAG quadripartite standardization agreement

ROE rules of engagement

RSI rationalization, standardization, and interoperability

RSN role specialist nation

SAO security assistance office

SAR search and rescue

SCA space coordinating authority

SOF special operations forces

SOFA status-of-forces agreement

SOP standing operating procedure

SROE standing rules of engagement

SRSG special representative to the Secretary-General

STANAG standardization agreement (NATO)

TA technical arrangement

TACON tactical control

TF task force

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

TSCP theater security cooperation plan

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UN United Nations

UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USC United States Code

USG United States Government
USPACOM United States Pacific Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

WHO World Health Organization

WPF World Food Program

GL-4

Glossary

JP 3-16
acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis with US

allies or coalition partners that allow US forces to exchange most common types of support,

including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. Authority to negotiate these

agreements is usually delegated to the combatant commander by the Secretary of Defense. Authority

to execute these agreements lies with the Secretary of Defense, and may or may not be delegated.

Governed by legal guidelines, these agreements are used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations,

unforeseen emergencies, or exercises to correct logistic deficiencies that cannot be adequately

corrected by national means. The support received or given is reimbursed under the conditions of

the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Also called ASCA. (JP 1-02)

affiliation training. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

airspace control in the combat zone. A process used to increase combat effectiveness by

promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. Airspace control is provided in

order to reduce the risk of friendly fire, enhance air defense operations, and permit greater

flexibility of operations. Airspace control does not infringe on the authority vested in

commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations. Also called airspace control;

combat airspace control. (JP 1-02)

alliance. The relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or

more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the

members. (JP 1-02)

area of influence. A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing

operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command

or control. (JP 1-02)

area of interest. That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas

adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned

operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize

the accomplishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and

maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area

of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to

accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. See also area of

responsibility. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within

which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called

AOR. (JP 1-02)

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-5
GL-6

Glossary

JP 3-16

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and

equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also

called CA. See also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the

relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are

present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally

the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. See

also civil affairs; civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or

exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian

organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile

operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve

operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military

forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national

government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military

actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civilmilitary operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces,

or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. See also civil

affairs; operation. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations center. An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic

combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination

of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies,

nongovernmental organizations, and regional and intergovernmental organizations. There

is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also

called CMOC. See also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations; operation. (JP

1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also

alliance. (JP 1-02)

coalition action. Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for

single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. See also

alliance; coalition; multinational operations. (JP 1-02)

coalition coordination cell. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established

by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders

of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or

the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated

and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command

over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning
GL-7

Glossary

tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations,

joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.

Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force

commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command

(command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the

combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control

is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or

services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g.,

combined navies.) (JP 1-02)

commonality. A quality that applies to materiel or systems: a. possessing like and interchangeable

characteristics enabling each to be utilized, or operated and maintained, by personnel trained

on the others without additional specialized training; b. having interchangeable repair

parts and/or components; and c. applying to consumable items interchangeably equivalent

without adjustment. (JP 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating

specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two

or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander

or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but

does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement

cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating

authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be

exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than

to operations. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of

Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information.

Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents,

weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of

forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of

military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration

or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

geospatial intelligence. The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to

describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities

on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial

information. Also called GEOINT. (This term and its definition are provided for information and

are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 2-03.)
GL-8

Glossary

JP 3-16

Global Information Grid. The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities,

associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing

information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The Global

Information Grid includes owned and leased communications and computing systems and services,

software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services and National

Security Systems. Also called GIG. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners,

and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.

Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces

within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements

mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. See also host nation. (JP 1-02)

information assurance. Measures that protect and defend information and information systems

by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.

This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection,

detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (JP 1-02)

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic

warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and

operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence,

disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting

our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

interagency. United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department

of Defense. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the

coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US

Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02)

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty)

between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional

basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national

interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (JP 1-02)

interoperability. 1. The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. 2. The

condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communicationselectronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and

satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be

defined when referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02)
GL-9

Glossary

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military

Departments participate. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified

commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command

(command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint information bureau. Facility established by the joint force commander to serve as the

focal point for the interface between the military and the media during the conduct of joint

operations. When operated in support of multinational operations, a joint information bureau

is called a “multinational information bureau.” Also called JIB. See also public affairs.

(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for

inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint interagency coordination group. An interagency staff group that establishes regular,

timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational

planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the

combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant

commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander

with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian

agencies and departments. Also called JIACG. (JP 1-02)

lead nation. One nation assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum

of logistic support for all or a part of the multinational force and/or headquarters.

Compensation and/or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties

involved. The lead nation may also assume the responsibility to coordinate logistics of the

other nations within its functional and regional area of responsibility. (JP 1-02)

military capability. The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle,

destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization,

readiness, and sustainability. a. force structure — Numbers, size, and composition of the

units that comprise US defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, air wings. b. modernization

— Technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipments. c. unit

readiness — The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to

execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the

outputs for which it was designed. d. sustainability — The ability to maintain the necessary

level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a

function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and

consumables necessary to support military effort. (JP 1-02)

mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the

reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty

assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish

one particular task. (JP 1-02)
GL-10

Glossary

JP 3-16

multinational. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners.

(JP 1-02)

multinational doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or

more nations in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is ratified by participating

nations. (JP 1-02)

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an

alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. See also multinational

force commander; multinational operations. (JP 1-02)

multinational force commander. A general term applied to a commander who exercises

command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations.

The extent of the multinational force commander’s command authority is determined by

the participating nations. Also called MNFC. (JP 1-02)

multinational integrated logistic support. Two or more nations agree to provide logistic

assets to a multinational force under operational control of a multinational force commander

for the logistic support of a multinational force. (JP 1-02)

multinational logistics. Any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations

supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an

alliance or coalition, including those conducted under United Nations mandate. Multinational

logistics includes activities involving both logistic units provided by participating nations

designated for use by the multinational force commander as well as a variety of multinational

logistic support arrangements that may be developed and used by participating forces. (JP

1-02)

multinational logistic support arrangement. Any arrangement involving two or more nations

that facilitates the logistic support of a force (either the forces of the countries participating

in the arrangement or other countries). (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces

of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

See also alliance; coalition; coalition action. (JP 1-02)

multinational staff. A staff composed of personnel of two or more nations within the structure

of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

multinational warfare. Warfare conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken

within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

national support element. Any national organization or activity that supports national forces

that are a part of a multinational force. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and

common support that is retained by the nation. Also called NSE. (JP 1-02)
GL-11

Glossary

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to

alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development,

environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment

of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02)

operation. 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service,

training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including

movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any

battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon

at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant

command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces

are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining

commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces

must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to

perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving

authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes

authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to

accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised

through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised

through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component

commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands

and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers

necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative

direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit

training. Also called OPCON. See also combatant command (command authority); tactical

control. (JP 1-02)

protection. 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military

and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed

or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. 2. Measures that are

taken to keep nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards from having an adverse effect on

personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities. Protection consists of five groups of

activities: hardening of positions; protecting personnel; assuming mission-oriented protective

posture; using physical defense measures; and reacting to attack. 3. In space usage, active

and passive defensive measures to ensure that United States and friendly space systems

perform as designed by seeking to overcome an adversary’s attempts to negate them and to

minimize damage if negation is attempted. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign

audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of

foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations
GL-12

Glossary

JP 3-16

is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.

Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations

activities directed toward both external and internal publics with interest in the Department

of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)

rationalization. Any action that increases the effectiveness of allied forces through more efficient

or effective use of defense resources committed to the alliance. Rationalization includes

consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher alliance needs, standardization,

specialization, mutual support or improved interoperability, and greater cooperation.

Rationalization applies to both weapons and/or materiel resources and non-weapons military

matters. (JP 1-02)

role specialist nation. A nation that has agreed to assume responsibility for providing a particular

class of supply or service for all or part of the multinational force. Also called RSN. (JP

1-02)

security cooperation. All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense

establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests,

develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations,

and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 1-02)

security cooperation activity. Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to

shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises

that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and

improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed

to support a combatant commander’s theater strategy as articulated in the theater security

cooperation plan. (JP 1-02)

standardization. The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable

cooperation among the Services and Department of Defense agencies for the most efficient use of

research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible

basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b.

common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable

supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine

with corresponding organizational compatibility. (JP 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military

force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of

visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting

forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive

agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members

of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of
GL-13

Glossary

local officials. Also called SOFA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its

definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in

accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle.

3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP

1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a

task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning

authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who

prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the

commander who receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and

who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance

required. See also support; supporting commander. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support

to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. This includes the designated

combatant commands and Department of Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context

of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or

sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance

required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

sustainability. See military capability. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military

capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and

control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish

missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical

control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant

command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command

relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over

these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient

authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support

assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)
GL-14

Glossary

JP 3-16

Intentionally Blank
Assessments/

Revision

CJCS

Approval

Two

Drafts

Program

Directive

Project

Proposal

J-7 formally staffs with

Services and combatant

commands

Includes scope of project,

references, milestones, and

who will develop drafts

J-7 releases Program

Directive to Lead Agent.

Lead Agent can be Service,

combatant command or

STEP #2

Program Directive

The combatant commands receive

the JP and begin to assess it during

use

18 to 24 months following

publication, the Director J-7, will

solicit a written report from the

combatant commands and

Services on the utility and quality of

each JP and the need for any

urgent changes or earlier-thanscheduled revisions

No later than 5 years after

development, each JP is revised

STEP #5

Assessments/Revision



ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, combatant commands, or

Joint Staff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services and

combatant commands

J-7 initiates Program Directive

STEP #1

Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as

shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine

publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEMS PLANS

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes

required changes and prepares pub for

coordination with Services and combatant

commands

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval

as a JP

STEP #4

CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority

(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with combatant

commands, Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3

Two Drafts





























JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE