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******************************************************BRIERE v. GREATER HARTFORD ORTHOPEDIC GROUP, P.C.— CONCURRENCE ROBINSON, J., concurring. I reluctantly agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court holding that the trial court improperly denied the request of the plaintiff Donald Briere1 to amend his complaint to substitute a theory of medical malpracticepremisedonthenegligentuse ofaretractor blade, for the originally pleaded theory of negligent
use of a skull clamp during surgery. Briere v. Greater Hartford Orthopedic Group, P.C., 158 Conn. App. 66, 75–78, 83–84, 118 A.3d 596 (2015). My reluctance is based onmyconcernthatamendmentslate inthe litigationprocess maywell have the effect ofunfairly changing the theory of the case to the detriment of the defendants in the present case, David Kruger, an orthopedic surgeon, and the Greater Hartford Orthopedic Group, P.C. Nevertheless, I am constrainedto conclude thatthe majority’s reasoning is consistentwith ourpast
case law applying the relation back doctrine generally and, in particular, Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., 286 Conn. 789, 805–806, 945 A.2d 955 (2008), Alswanger v. Smego, 257 Conn. 58, 67–68, 776 A.2d444 (2001), and Gurliacciv. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 547–49, 590 A.2d 914 (1991).
I write separately, however, to address the standard of review under which an appellate court evaluates a trial court’s application of the relation back doctrine, particularly in light ofthe analytical framework articulated by the majority. The majority quotes Sherman v. Ronco, 294 Conn. 548, 554n.10, 985A.2d 1042 (2010), for thepropositionthat‘‘[t]he denovo standardofreviewis always the applicable standard ofreview for resolving whether subsequent amendments to a complaint relate back for purposes of the statute of limitations.’’ (Emphasis in original.) This statement of the standard of review appears to resolve, in a summary manner, what had been an unsettled point of law prior to the present case, Sherman notwithstanding.2 See AustinCasares v. Safeco Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 310 Conn. 640, 660 n.15, 81 A.3d 200 (2013); Grenierv. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 559, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). I suggest, however, that the relation back analysis articulated by the majority may require the trial court to considerfactors that go beyond the face ofthe pleadings. This would call forthe application ofa more deferential standard of review than the de novo standard articulated inSherman and adopted bythe majority. Accordingly, I write separately to expand on the proper standard of appellate review.
Prior to Sherman, there had been an apparent conflict in this court’s case law about whether the abuse of discretion or plenary standards of review applied tothe trial court’s relation back inquiry. Compare Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., supra, 286 Conn. 799 (discussing conflict in detail and noting that most decisions ‘‘[suggest] a de novo review’’ because theyinvolved comparison ofpleadings and did not state specific standard of review), with Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 180 Conn. 230, 240, 429A.2d486 (1980) (suggestingthatabuse ofdiscretion standard appliesto relationbackinquiry). InDimmock,
we observed that ‘‘[a]n abuse of discretion standard would be consistent with the general rule that [t]he trial court has wide discretion in granting or denying amendments before, during, or after trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., supra, 799. We then posited that, ‘‘[o]n the other hand, a de novo standard would be more consistent with the oft stated rule that [t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law forthe courtandthatourinterpretationofthepleadings therefore is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 799–800. We also noted that ‘‘[t]he majority of federal courts appl[y] a de novo standard to their relation back rule

. . . and their relation back rule is akin to our doctrine.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 800. Ultimately, we declined to resolve this question in Dimmock, because the appellant in that case could not ‘‘prevail even under de novo review.’’ Id.
Two years later, in Sherman, we observed that the relation back standard of review was ‘‘not at issue’’ in that case, but used dictum in a footnote ‘‘to clarify that the de novo standard ofreviewis always the applicable standard of review for resolving whether subsequent amendments to a complaint relate back for purposes of the statute of limitations.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Sherman v. Ronco, supra, 294 Conn. 554 n.10. We cited Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., supra, 286 Conn. 799–800, forthepropositionthat‘‘[t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sherman v. Ronco, supra, 554 n.10. The dictum in Sherman did not settle this matter, though, as our subsequent decisions indicate, consistent with Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., supra, 799–800, that the question is still open, although they declinedto decidethequestionasnotoutcome determinative.3 See Austin-Casares v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, supra, 310 Conn. 660 n.15; Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, supra, 306 Conn. 559.
I do not believe that the majority’s citation to our dictum in Sherman, without further qualification or elaboration, should be the final word on this issue. I submitthat additional clarification is requiredgiventhe
case sensitive analysis articulated by the majority to help guide the trial court’s relation back inquiries. To the extent that the majority’s analysis requires us to compare the original and proposed pleadings in orderto determine whether the specific allegations underlying the new cause ofaction ‘‘pertain to a specific transaction or occurrence between the parties that was identified in the original complaint,’’ I agree that this interpretation of the pleadings presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.
Themajority’sanalysisdoesnot, however, stopthere. The majority also requires the trial court to ‘‘determine whether the new allegations support and amplify the original cause of action or state a new cause of action entirely. Relevant factors for this inquiry include, but
are not limited to, whether the original and the new allegations involve the same actor or actors, allege events that occurred during the same period of time, occurred at the same location, resulted in the same injury, allege substantially similar types of behavior, and require the same types of evidence and experts.’’ Ibelievethatthese factors, whichrequire consideration of the unique ‘‘types of evidence and experts’’ present inthe case, call for amore deferential appellate review. Insofar as this portion ofthe majority’s approach implicates the fairness of the proposed amendment to the parties, Ibelievethatourappellatecourtsshouldreview trial court decisions applying it for the abuse ofdiscretion. Thus, Iemphasizethat, beyondsimplydetermining whether the allegations relate back as a question of interpreting the pleadings, courts should be cognizant that our ‘‘liberality [in permitting amendments to the pleadings] has limitations. Amendments should be made seasonably. Factors to be considered in passing
on a motion to amend are the length of the delay, fairness to the opposing parties and the negligence, ifany, of the party offering the amendment.

. . . The motion to amend is addressed to the trial court’s discretion which may be exercised to restrain the amendment of pleadings so far as necessary to prevent unreasonable delay ofthe trial.

. . . Whether to allow an amendment isamatterlefttothe sounddiscretionofthetrialcourt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Brookfield Development Corp., 266 Conn. 572, 583, 833 A.2d 908 (2003); see also, e.g., Motzer v. Haberli, 300 Conn. 733, 747, 15A.3d 1084 (2011);AirKaman, Inc. v. Groppo, 221 Conn. 751, 766–67, 607 A.2d 410 (1992).
These concerns of prejudice and delay are just as salient in the context of those aspects of the relation back analysis that concern the nature ofthe proof and fairnessto theparties. Thus, Irecognizethat, ‘‘[i]n exercising its discretion in granting or denying a request to amend a complaint during or after trial, the trial court has its unique vantage point in part because it is interpreting the plaintiff’s allegations not in a vacuum, but in the context of the development of the proceedings and the parties’ understanding ofthe meaning ofthose allegations. Similarly, priortotrial, inlight ofdiscovery, pretrial motions or conferences, a trial court may havea different context for the allegations than what is evident to an appellate court.’’ Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., supra, 286 Conn. 799 n.4. Particularly given the holistic approach articulated by the majority, this more nuanced approach to the standard of review in relation back cases is consistent with that ofthe United States Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit, which, inresolving an apparent conflict inits caselawonthispoint, electedto engage inplenary review of the district courts’ relation back determinations under rule 15 (c) (2) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Slayton v. American Express Co., 460 F.3d 215, 226–28 (2d Cir. 2006). In choosing de novo review, the Second Circuit described the relation back inquiry as aquestion oflaw involving the interpretation of the pleadings, akin to determining whether a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Id., 227. The court then contrasted the relation back determination with other amendment decisions that would remain subject to review for abuse of discretion because they involve fairnessconsiderations, suchas decisionstoaddaparty under rule 15 (c) (3).4 See id. Significantly, the court emphasized that ‘‘whether to allow amendment

. . . and whether an amended complaint relates back

. . . are often closelyrelated issues. A court may deny leave to amend based wholly or partially on its belief that any amendment would not relate back.

. . . If the district court committed an error of law in its relation back analysis and denied leave to amend on that basis,
we would reverse for abuse of discretion.

. . . Nevertheless, the standards ofreview for these types ofdecisions are distinct.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 226 n.11.
In the present case, I do not view the defendants’ claims on appeal as implicating any discretionary aspects ofthe relation back analysis articulated by the majority. Specifically, the defendants do not argue in their briefthat the timing ofthe proposed amendment,
orthenature oftheproofrequiredto supporttheretractor theory, supported the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to deny the amendment proposed by the plaintiff. Accordingly, I believe that the majority properly analyzes this pleadings based appeal as a pure question of law. I, therefore, concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

1 I note that Donald Briere’s wife, Nancy Briere, is also a plaintiff in the present action. See footnote 2 of the majority opinion. For the sake of simplicity, however, I refer to Donald Briere as the plaintiff.

2 Although the parties agree that the de novo standard of review applies, the defendants alert us to the potential conflict in our case law. The defendants argue that they would prevail even if we examine the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to amend de novo, rather than under the abuse of discretion standard, which is more advantageous to them.

3 I note that the Appellate Court has followed the plenary standard announced by the dictum in Sherman ‘‘absent some further clarification’’ from this court. DiMiceli v. Cheshire, 162 Conn. App. 216, 233–34 and n.9, 131 A.3d 771 (2016); see also Briere v. GreaterHartford Orthopedic Group,P.C., supra, 158 Conn. App. 74.

4 The SecondCircuitemphasizedthatabuseofdiscretionreviewissuitable for cases involving ‘‘equitable considerations ofmatters specific to the conduct of the particular action’’ because ‘‘[i]n such matters, a district court has a comparative advantage over an appellate court. A district court has

a familiarity with the whole case and a refined sense ofthe legitimate needs of the parties, and is therefore better able than an appellate tribunal to choose among multiple reasonable but incompatible results.’’ Slayton v. American Express Co., supra, 460 F.3d 227.