NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

JEFFREY ALLEN WIGGS, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0579 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-002728-001

The Honorable Jerry Bernstein, Judge Pro Tempore

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By David R. Cole

Counsel for Respondent

Jeffrey Allen Wiggs, Buckeye

Petitioner
STATE v. WIGGS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge James P. Beene joined.

T H U M M A, Chief Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Jeffrey Allen Wiggs seeks review of the superior 

court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant 

to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 (2017).1 Absent an abuse of 

discretion or error of law, this court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling 

on a petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577 

¶ 19 (2012). Because Wiggs has shown no such error, this court grants 

review but denies relief.

¶2 A jury convicted Wiggs of two counts of aggravated driving 

or actual physical control while under the influence. Wiggs admitted he had 

two prior historical felonies and the court sentenced him to concurrent 

terms of 10 years in prison. This court affirmed the convictions and 

sentences on direct appeal. State v. Wiggs, 1 CA-CR 14-0294, 2015 WL 

1455201 (Ariz. App. Mar. 31, 2015) (mem. dec.).

¶3 Wiggs timely filed a notice of post-conviction relief. After 

appointed counsel filed a notice that he had found no claims, Wiggs filed a 

pro se petition. Wiggs reasserted claims that had been raised on direct 

appeal and rejected on the merits, but presented them in the context of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to: (1) challenge or expose perjured testimony; (2) 

move to suppress pretrial and trial identifications; (3) challenge the State’s 

suppression of evidence; (4) more effectively cross examine witnesses; and

(5) present trial evidence favorable to Wiggs.

¶4 The State responded that although the claims were presented

as ineffective assistance claims, some were actually argued as “stand alone”

claims and thus were precluded. The State also argued that Wiggs had not 

set forth any colorable claim. Finding no colorable claim, the superior court

 

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
STATE v. WIGGS

Decision of the Court

3

summarily dismissed. Wiggs filed a motion for rehearing that was denied 

the day after he filed his petition for review with this court.

¶5 Wiggs’ petition for review is deficient. Wiggs has improperly 

incorporated by reference superior court filings, which is insufficient to 

press an argument. State v. Bortz, 169 Ariz. 575, 578 (App. 1991). The only 

issue properly presented is his claim that trial counsel failed to adequately 

challenge a witness who had identified Wiggs as the driver of the vehicle 

before the collision. He claims counsel should have moved to suppress the

pretrial identification, more “aggressively cross examine[d]” the witness at 

trial and impeached the witness with a transcript of a 9-1-1 call. 

¶6 To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below objectively 

reasonable standards and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Nash, 143 

Ariz. 392 (1985). If a defendant fails to make a sufficient showing on either 

prong of the Strickland test, the court need not determine whether the other 

prong was satisfied. State v. Salazar, 146 Ariz. 540 (1985).

¶7 To succeed on this claim, Wiggs must show that there is a 

“reasonable probability,” that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. Wiggs has not met this burden. Although he asserts that the witness’s

identification was unreliable, he has not shown that, but for counsel’s 

failure to more fully discredit the identification, the result of his trial 

probably would have been different. As reflected by the record and the facts 

set forth in this court’s memorandum decision on direct appeal, ample 

circumstantial evidence was presented to the jury that Wiggs was driving 

the vehicle at the time of the collision.

¶8 For these reasons, this court grants review but denies relief.