NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

QUEBELL L. MINNS,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________

2020-1131

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 18-1135, Judge Joseph L. Toth.

______________________

Decided: November 20, 2020

______________________

MARK RYAN LIPPMAN, The Veterans Law Group, 

Poway, CA, for claimant-appellant. 

 ERIC LAUFGRABEN, Commercial Litigation Branch,

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

JEFFREY B. CLARK, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

LOREN MISHA PREHEIM; MARTIE ADELMAN, Y. KEN LEE, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

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2 MINNS v. WILKIE

 ______________________

Before REYNA, SCHALL, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant, Quebell L. Minns, appeals a decision of the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans 

Court”) affirming a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) finding that Mr. Minns was capable of substantially gainful employment and denying entitlement to 

a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (“TDIU”). Minns v. Wilkie, No. 18-1135, 2019 WL

4741726, at *1–2 (Vet. App. Sept. 30, 2019); see J.A. 10 

(Judgment), 15–32 (2017 Board Decision). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Minns served on active duty in the U.S. Air Force 

from 1973 to 1975. J.A. 88; see J.A. 88–90 (2015 Regional 

Office Rating Decision). In 1993, the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) assigned Mr. Minns a combined disability rating of 10 percent for lumbosacral spine strain with 

degenerative disk disease and associated residuals. 

J.A. 88. Effective in 2000, the VA assigned Mr. Minns a 

combined disability rating of 40 percent, increasing his 

lumbosacral spine rating to 20 percent and assigning 10 

percent each for peripheral neuropathy of the right and left 

lower extremities. J.A. 88–89. Effective in 2013, the VA 

assigned Mr. Minns a combined disability rating of 60 percent, increasing his lumbosacral spine rating to 40 percent. 

J.A. 88–89. 

Since 2012, Mr. Minns has alleged that he is unable to 

“procure or maintain employment” because of his serviceCase: 20-1131 Document: 37 Page: 2 Filed: 11/20/2020
MINNS v. WILKIE 3

related conditions and sought a TDIU. J.A. 93.1 In 2015 

and 2017, the Board issued decisions denying Mr. Minns

entitlement to a TDIU. J.A. 16. In the 2017 Board Decision, the Board noted consistent record evidence that 

Mr. Minns was capable of performing “sedentary employment.” J.A. 29; see J.A. 22 (listing a 2000 VA examination 

that assessed Mr. Minns as “generally capable of performing work through the sedentary, light and medium work 

categories”), 23 (listing a 2002 VA assessment that “stated 

[Mr. Minns] was capable of clerical/sedentary activity”), 24 

(listing a 2006 Social Security Administration (“SSA”) assessment that “determined [Mr. Minns] to be physically capable of performing many occupational tasks”), 26

(recounting Mr. Minns’s statement in a 2011 VA examination that he “could walk [one to three] miles”). The Board 

found that “[t]he preponderance of the evidence is against 

a finding that [Mr. Minns]’s service-connected disabilities 

preclude him from obtaining and retaining substantially 

gainful employment” and concluded that the “requirements 

1 The VA may assign a TDIU “where the schedular 

rating is less than total, when the disabled person is, in the 

judgment of the rating agency, unable to secure or follow a 

substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected disabilities[,]” provided that if there is only one service-connected disability, “this disability shall be ratable 

at 60 percent or more, and that, if there are two or more 

disabilities, there shall be at least one disability ratable 

at 40 percent or more, and sufficient additional disability 

to bring the combined rating to 70 percent or more.” 38 

C.F.R. § 4.16(a). VA rating boards may also submit “all 

cases of veterans who are unemployable by reason of service-connected disabilities, but who fail to meet the percentage standards set forth in” § 4.16(a) “for extraschedular [TDIU] consideration[.]” Id. § 4.16(b). 

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4 MINNS v. WILKIE

to establish entitlement to a TDIU ha[d] not been met.” 

J.A. 16. 

Mr. Minns appealed to the Veterans Court, arguing, inter alia, that the Veterans Court “must decide the meaning 

of the term ‘sedentary employment.’” Minns, 2019 WL

4741726, at *1. The Veterans Court affirmed, and declined 

to define the term. Id. at *1–2. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review and Legal Standard

“The jurisdiction of this court to review decisions of the 

Veterans Court is limited by statute.” Gazelle v. 

Shulkin, 868 F.3d 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We may review a Veterans Court decision “with respect to the validity 

of a decision of the [Veterans] Court on a rule of law or of 

any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation 

thereof . . . that was relied on by the [Veterans] Court in 

making the decision.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). “Except to the 

extent an appeal . . . presents a constitutional issue,” we 

“may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, 

or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the 

facts of a particular case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2). “We review 

statutory and regulatory interpretations of the Veterans

Court de novo.” Gazelle, 868 F.3d at 1009 (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). 

II. The Veterans Court Was Not Required to Define 

“Sedentary Employment” Under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1)

The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s denial of 

Mr. Minns’s entitlement to a TDIU. Minns, 2019 WL

4741726, at *2. The Veterans Court rejected Mr. Minns’s 

argument that it was required to define the term “sedentary employment” used in the 2017 Board Decision. Id. at

*1. The Veterans Court explained that it could not define

the term because it “did not appear in any relevant statute 

or regulation and so lacked ‘independent legal significance[.]’” Id. at *1 (citing Withers v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.

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MINNS v. WILKIE 5

App. 139, 142 (2018)).2 The Veterans Court concluded that 

the 2017 Board Decision sufficiently explained “what [the 

Board] meant by sedentary employment” and sufficiently 

supported the Board’s finding that Mr. Minns could perform sedentary work and maintain “substantially gainful 

employment.” Id. at *2. Mr. Minns argues that 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7261(a)(1) requires the Veterans Court to define the term 

“sedentary employment” used in the 2017 Board Decision.

Appellant’s Br. 14. We disagree with Mr. Minns. 

Section 7261(a)(1) did not require the Veterans Court 

to define the term “sedentary employment.” Section 7261(a) to (a)(1) provides that “[i]n any action brought 

under [chapter 72 of part V of title 38 of the United States 

Code],” the Veterans Court, “to the extent necessary to its 

decision and when presented, shall . . . determine the 

meaning or applicability of the terms of an action of the 

Secretary [of Veterans Affairs.]” 38 U.S.C § 7261(a)–(a)(1). 

Thus, the Veterans Court must only “determine the 

2 In Withers, the Veterans Court declined to define 

the term “sedentary employment” used in a Board decision 

denying entitlement to a TDIU. 30 Vet. App. at 142. The 

Veterans Court explained that the term was not “mentioned, much less defined, in any relevant VA statute or 

regulation,” id., and thus “ha[d] no independent legal significance,” id. at 145. The Veterans Court concluded that 

“the meaning and relevance of the term w[ould] have to be 

discerned on a case-by-case basis,” id. at 149, and that 

“where a veteran’s ability to perform sedentary work is a

basis for the Board’s decision,” the Board must explain the 

term’s meaning “to the extent that it is not apparent from 

the Board’s overall discussion of the opinion—as well as 

how the concept of sedentary work factors into the veteran’s overall disability picture and vocational history, and 

the veteran’s ability to secure or follow a substantially 

gainful occupation,” id. at 147. 

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6 MINNS v. WILKIE

meaning” of a term if such definition is “necessary to its 

decision.” Id. Here, the Veterans Court concluded that 

the 2017 Board Decision sufficiently explained “what it 

meant by sedentary employment,” such that defining the 

term was not necessary to the Veterans Court’s decision. 

Minns, 2019 WL 4741726, at *2. The Board detailed 

Mr. Minns’s statements that he “experiences acute shooting pain to both legs while sitting down or walking,”

J.A. 20, and acknowledged “statements throughout the record indicat[ing] [Mr. Minns] had difficulty with prolonged 

walking and standing and used assistive devices,” J.A. 29, 

but also observed that he had completed college courses 

“with the intention of obtaining a degree in electrical engineering, a field containing sedentary jobs,” J.A. 30. The 

Board concluded that “the preponderance of the evidence . . . indicates [that Mr. Minns] can still perform sedentary work,” J.A. 29, as he “could still perform jobs that 

would allow [him] to sit or stand at will, or take breaks to 

sit or stand as needed,” J.A. 30. As the Veterans Court 

found, this discussion sufficiently expressed what the 

Board meant by “sedentary employment.” Minns, 2019 WL

4741726, at *2. Thus, it was not necessary for the Veterans 

Court to define the term in order to reach its decision to 

affirm the 2017 Board Decision. Id. Accordingly, 

§ 7261(a)(1) did not require the Veterans Court to define 

the term “sedentary employment.”3 

3 Alternatively, the VA argues that the Veterans 

Court was not required to define “sedentary employment” 

because a Board decision is not an “action of the Secretary” 

under § 7261(a)(1). See Appellee’s Br. 21–25. In light of 

our conclusion that § 7261(a)(1) did not require the Veterans Court to define the term “sedentary employment,” we 

need not reach the issue of whether a Board decision is an 

“action of the Secretary” under § 7261(a)(1). Cf. Burris v. 

Wilkie, 888 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that 

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MINNS v. WILKIE 7

Mr. Minns’s primary counterargument is unpersuasive. Mr. Minns argues that allowing VA adjudicators to 

consider the meaning of “sedentary employment” on a 

“case-by-case basis from the medical and lay evidence presented and in light of each veteran’s education, training, 

and work history,” Appellant’s Br. 20–21 (citing Withers, 30 Vet. App. 149–50), “is a sure recipe for decisional

anarchy,” id. at 21. Mr. Minns’s argument is without 

merit. Application of the controlling rules or precedent to 

the individual facts of each case is the hallmark of our common-law adjudicatory system. See Bettencourt v. Bd. of 

Registration in Med. of Mass., 904 F.2d 772, 783 (1st 

Cir. 1990) (describing how a judge performing “traditional 

adjudicatory functions . . . decides facts, applies law, and 

otherwise resolves disputes on the merits”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (explaining that 

the judiciary has the duty of “interpreting and applying” 

governing law and rules “in cases properly brought before 

the courts”). Additionally, alternative means exist to 

achieve a uniform definition of “sedentary employment.” 

For example, veterans may petition the VA for rulemaking 

under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) to add a formal definition of the 

term to 38 C.F.R. § 4.16, and may seek review in this court 

should the VA deny the petition. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 859 F.3d 1072, 1075 (Fed. 

Cir. 2017) (stating that this court has jurisdiction to review 

VA actions under 5 U.S.C. § 553).4 

“[h]aving resolved [the] . . . particular challenge” on appeal, “we need not” address the appellant’s alternative argument regarding the Veterans Court’s equitable powers).

4 Mr. Minns also appears to argue that we should order the VA to adopt the SSA’s definition of “sedentary 

work.” See Appellant’s Br. 24–26 (citing 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1567(a)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (defining 

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8 MINNS v. WILKIE

CONCLUSION

We have considered Mr. Minns’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. The Final Judgment of the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is

AFFIRMED

“[s]edentary work” for SSA purposes as “involv[ing] lifting 

no more than [ten] pounds at a time and occasionally lifting 

or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small 

tools”). This argument is misplaced. “[G]iven the comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme for the award of 

veterans’ benefits, it would be not be appropriate for [us] to 

impose” an SSA definition on the VA. White v. Principi, 243 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Further, “Congress left it to the VA, and not this court, to determine how 

best to weigh evidence in veterans’ benefits cases[,]” and 

“[o]ur limited role in this area is further reinforced by our 

general inability to review [Veterans Court] decisions on 

factual issues.” Id. 

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