The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 

Weapons of Mass Destruction was established by Section 1405 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105–261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd 

Session) (October 17, 1998), as amended. That Act directed that a federally funded research 

and development center (FFRDC) provide research, analytical, and other support to the Advisory 

Panel during the course of its activities and deliberations. RAND has been providing that support 

under contract from the Department of Defense through one of its FFRDCs, the National 

Defense Research Institute, since the Advisory Panel’s inception. 

This Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress is a document of the Advisory Panel, 

not a RAND publication. It was prepared and edited by RAND professional staff and is being 

submitted for review and comment within the U.S. Government Interagency process. It is not 

copyrighted but does contain material from copyrighted sources. Copies of the report may also 

be obtained via the Internet at: http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel

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PHOTO CREDITS FROM FRONT COVER 

 

1 2 3 4 5

1—Policeman entering data into an enhanced communications terminal. Photo from Thinkstock 

2—A typical American street scene. Photo from Photodisc 

3—Admiring our national colors. Photo by David Buffington 

4—Walking home from the school bus stop with friends. Photo by Mark Andersen 

5—Firefighters, always vigilant. Photo from Thinkstock 

Images of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights from the U.S. Archives

Cover design by Stephen Bloodsworth 
James S. Gilmore III

Chairman

George Foresman 

Vice Chairman

Michael Freeman 

William Garrison 

Ellen M. Gordon 

James Greenleaf 

William Jenaway

William Dallas Jones 

Paul M. Maniscalco

John O. Marsh, Jr.

Kathleen O'Brien

M. Patricia Quinlisk

Patrick Ralston 

William Reno 

Kenneth Shine 

Alan D. Vickery

Hubert Williams

John Hathaway 

U.S. Department of

Defense Representative

Michael Wermuth 

RAND Executive 

Project Director

Jennifer Brower 

RAND Co-Project Director 

 December 15, 2003 

To Our Readers:

 

We deliver this Annual Report, our fifth and final, impelled by the urgency that 

America succeed in its efforts to secure the homeland and sustain our national 

values. In households and communities, State capitols and our nation’s capitol, in 

the workrooms and boardrooms of businesses, and on the battlefield, America seeks 

its destiny in the post 9-11 era. 

A little over 27 months ago, our nation was viciously attacked. Our enemies sought 

to undermine the resolve and indomitable spirit that have been the cornerstone of the 

United States since its founding. They failed. Today, we remain a nation united in a 

common purpose. We are committed to a global effort to defeat terrorism. We are 

committed to a national effort to make America safer and more secure. 

For 227 years the United States has followed the path established by our founding 

fathers. They provided us the roadmap. Generations since have navigated the 

journey, always mindful of where and why it began. It has not been easy— 

requiring sweat, intellect, and sacrifice. Americans have consistently met the 

challenges to fulfill, and not change, the vision of those who gave birth to our nation. 

America must not waver from the guiding principles established at its birth while 

simultaneously crafting and executing a national approach that counters the threats 

posed by terrorists. Progress is being made. The Panel wishes to be clear, however, 

that it believes there is more to be done and soon. Homeland security strategies—

whether developed by individuals, governments, or the private sector— 

are a beginning. But general strategies must be turned into specific roadmaps to 

direct local, State, Federal, and private sector actions. Turning vision into reality 

will require sustained commitment of human and financial capital over the longer 

term. It will require disciplined and consistent approaches balanced against midcourse adjustments when necessitated by real versus perceived shortcomings. 

The nation faces tangible dangers that demand our attention, and our response must 

rise above anyone’s or any group’s agenda. In our five years of service, panel 

members have observed the ebb and flow of national efforts. We have watched since 

September 11th the overwhelming desire for the nation to achieve some level of 

normalcy. It is our opinion, buoyed by fact and instinct, that we can forge a new 

normalcy that sustains the principles set forth by our founding fathers, while mindful 

that the threat requires some level of adjustment in our lives. We are convinced that, 

in forging America’s new normalcy, our nation will be better and stronger.

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Please address comments or questions to:

The RAND Corporation 

1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050 Telephone: 703-413-1100 FAX: 703-413-8111 

The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel 
2

In this final year of service, our members have attempted to look beyond the crisis of the 

moment with a view toward the future. The Panel has offered 144 recommendations since its 

inception; 125 have been adopted and are being implemented in whole or part. Many of 

these recommendations were made prior to the 2001 attacks. We remain resolute in our 

belief that securing the homeland and preserving our national values requires a two-pronged 

effort. Action must be taken to achieve the goals already set forth. Equally important is 

deliberately looking at the entire national enterprise of readiness to determine what work 

remains. All of this must be done in strict observance of our national values of individual 

freedom. 

There will never be an end point in America’s readiness. Enemies will change tactics, 

citizen’s attitudes about what adjustments in their lives they are willing to accept will evolve, 

and leaders will be confronted with legitimate competing priorities that will demand 

attention. These are simply characteristics of our society that must be factored into our 

national efforts. In the end, America’s response to the threat of terrorism will be measured in 

how we manage the risk. There will never be a 100% guarantee of security for our people, 

the economy, and our society. We must resist the urge to seek total security—it is not 

achievable and drains our attention from those things that can be accomplished. 

Managing the risk requires a continuum not subject to the ebb and flow that characterizes 

many of our national priorities. Assessing threats and applying an acceptable level of

resources to minimize vulnerabilities cannot occur only in the aftermath of an attack. It must 

become the steady state. This does not imply that America will have to remain at a 

heightened threat level. Rather the goal is to create an environment where current fears of 

terrorism are ameliorated by a future confidence derived from knowing that the nation is 

better prepared to counter the terrorist threat. This confidence, engendered through informed 

awareness for our citizens, will give the nation the tools necessary to adjust to the full range 

of 21st Century risks. 

Our new normalcy will involve better management of risks, ahead of time, of terrorism, 

naturally occurring diseases, and natural or technological disasters. All levels of 

government, the private sector, and our citizens must each do their part. Better managing our 

risks will lead to a safer and more secure America. It will allow us to return to a level of

normalcy, albeit one somewhat different than prior to the 2001attacks. Our enemies want us 

to be controlled by fear. Our panel members are confident the nation can instead control the 

fear and rob the enemy of their key strategy for undermining our national values. 

Together with others, we believe our work has contributed to the national debate and has 

been instrumental in advancing the homeland security dialogue beyond the Washington 

Beltway. We have accomplished the goals set forth nearly five years ago through the 

dedicated efforts of a group of Americans representing all levels of government and the 

private sector. Over five years we were able to look ahead, unconstrained by the crisis of the 

moment, at what was needed to advance the safety and security of the nation. Our findings 

have been reflected in our work and in the measurable advances of the United States in the 

aftermath of the evil and tragic attacks of 2001. We also believe that these attributes—a 
3

national approach, forward-looking, and based on measurable results—must be the 

cornerstones to our continuing efforts to secure our hometowns and the homeland. 

I am particularly appreciative of the exceptional Americans who have served on this panel 

during the past five years. None was more important than another and each has brought an 

unsurpassed level of commitment and dedication to our work. Throughout this project the 

RAND Corporation has provided invaluable support to the panel, especially the co-project 

directors Michael Wermuth and Jennifer Brower. I am honored to have had the opportunity 

to work with my fellow panel members, the RAND staff, and the many other fine Americans 

who have worked tirelessly to help us complete our tasks. Their efforts have made America 

stronger and more secure. 

We complete our work with a great sense of pride. Most important, we thank the many 

individuals who have informed our work during the past five years. We have produced a 

series of reports that are not the work of a few, but rather the commitment of many. In this 

work is the hope and desire of every American for a more secure homeland that preserves our 

liberty for all time.

Sincerely,

James S. Gilmore, III 

Chairman 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

CONTENTS 

Letter from the Chairman 

Contents 

Preface.............................................................................................................................................. i 

Executive Summary....................................................................................................................... iii 

Introduction......................................................................................................................................1 

Developing a Future Vision.............................................................................................................9 

America’s New Normalcy .............................................................................................................14 

A Roadmap to the Future...............................................................................................................22 

Table of Appendices......................................................................................................................41 

Appendices 

List of Key Recommendations.............................................................................Inside Back Cover 

i 
PREFACE 

The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons 

of Mass Destruction was established by Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for 1999, Public Law 105-261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Section, October 17, 1998). The 

panel was directed to submit, beginning in December 1999, three annual reports to the President 

and the Congress assessing how well the Federal government was supporting State and local 

efforts to combat catastrophic terrorism. The panel was also charged to recommend strategies 

for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities. As a result of the attacks on September 

11, 2001, the Congress extended the panel’s charter with the requirement to submit two 

additional annual reports on December 15 of 2002 and 2003, respectively. 

Because of the inextricable relationships between all components of the nation’s efforts to 

counter the risks of terrorism—awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery—

the panel felt it was critically important to look more broadly at all Federal support for 

combating terrorism. Thus, its work has reflected comprehensive analyses and 

recommendations across the full spectrum of efforts to combat terrorism. 

This document represents the fifth and final report of the panel. The strategic vision, themes, 

and recommendations of the Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the 

Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of 

Mass Destruction were motivated by the unanimous view of the panel that this report should 

attempt to define a future state of security against terrorism—one that the panel has chosen to 

call “America’s New Normalcy.” 

In developing this year’s report, panel members all agreed at the outset that it could not 

postulate, as part of its vision, a return to a pre-September 11 “normal.” The threats from

terrorism are now recognized to be a condition that we must face far into the future. It is our 

firm intention to articulate a vision of the future that subjects terrorism to a logical place in the 

array of threats from other sources that the American people face every day— from natural 

diseases and other illnesses, to crime, and traffic and other accidents, to mention a few. The 

panel firmly believes that terrorism must be put in the context of the other risks that we face, and 

that resources should be prioritized and allocated to that variety of risks in logical fashion. 

To accomplish that purpose, this report integrates and synthesizes both the earlier work of the 

panel, continuing extensive supporting research and analysis from RAND, and the experience 

and efforts of the country as a whole in the period before and since September 11—within 

governments at the local, State, and Federal level, in the private sector, and for the public at 

large. This report attempts to project a future—five year—equilibrium state of well-established 

and sustained measures to combat terrorism. It focuses on conceptualizing a strategic vision for 

the Nation that, in the future, has achieved in both appearance and reality an acceptable level of 

awareness, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery capabilities to cope with the 

uncertain and ambiguous threat of terrorism as part of dealing with all hazards. The report also 

makes specific findings and recommendations on process and structure that must be addressed to 

move from general strategies into specific accomplishments. 

i 
This report builds on almost five years of work by the panel. Initially the panel looked closely at 

the terrorist threat facing the nation, reflecting the view that it is impossible to know if we are 

prepared without understanding what we are preparing for. In the first report, the panel 

recommended a comprehensive national strategy for combating terrorism. That recommendation 

remains a cornerstone of the panel’s philosophy and is underscored by the belief that a national 

strategy is not a simply a Federal strategy but rather one that integrates and synchronizes local, 

State, and Federal government and privates sector efforts in a true nationwide effort. In the 

second report, the panel recommended specific actions to improve governmental structures and 

processes and to develop a national strategy in a number of areas including border control and 

health and medical issues. In the third year, the panel made additional specific recommendations 

for strategies and programs for combating terrorism in several functional areas. Last year the 

panel readdressed the overall terrorist threat, responded with a critique of the National Strategy 

for Homeland Security, and focused additional recommendations on key areas requiring specific 

improvements. 

At this writing, 125 of the 144 substantive recommendations made by the panel in its first four 

reports have been adopted in whole or in major part, in legislation, executive action, or other 

processes. In prior years, we have catalogued those recommendations cumulatively in the 

introductory material of each succeeding report. For this last report, we are providing a matrix 

(at Appendix K) that provides additional detail on the status of each recommendation and 

highlights those that have not been implemented that continue to require urgent attention. 

As we have clearly stated in prior reports, this panel cannot offer all the answers or necessarily 

the best answers for many of the difficult challenges ahead. Nevertheless, as we bring to a close 

this five-year undertaking—spanning more than two years on each side of September 2001—we 

are confident that we have fulfilled our Congressional mandate by contributing materially and 

significantly to this vital national effort by helping to shape and accelerate both the national 

debate and improvements in capabilities.

ii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons 

on Mass Destruction was created by the Congress in 1999 to assess Federal efforts to assist State 

and local responders in combating terrorism. The inextricable relationships between all 

components of the nation’s efforts—local, State, and Federal governments, the private sector, 

and the public at large—to counter terrorist threats caused the panel to look broadly at the issues. 

In our first four annual reports to the Congress and the President, the Panel has, among its 144 

recommendations, offered foundational perspectives on: 

• The nature of the threat 

• The need for and components of a successful national strategy 

• Attributes of effective structures to guide and empower the implementation of 

preparedness at the local, state and federal levels, in the private sector and across all key 

disciplines – especially local and State responders 

• America’s efforts to respond to the tragic attacks of 2001 in a deliberative manner to 

ensure they establish a solid foundation for future efforts to build a safer and more secure 

America – one that will allow us to control and manage our risks more effectively 

• Finally, and most importantly, the need to sustain the principles set forth by our founding 

fathers that preserve national values, among them important personal freedoms 

The panel completes its work by establishing a benchmark to fuel future debate and action and to 

regain the nation’s momentum to secure the homeland and preserve our liberty. 

We underscore in this report that America has made advances, especially since September 11th, 

on many fronts. The level of awareness and initiatives already undertaken by all levels of 

government, the private sector, and the general population constitute an important beginning. 

They offer a sound foundation for the future actions that we believe we must achieve—the New 

Normalcy—a condition that this report describes. 

Paramount to the panel’s work is the vitally important need for America to secure the homeland 

in a manner that is consistent with and further empowers the values set forth at the birth of our 

nation. We believe that the current debate, characterized by a suggestion of competing values 

between liberty and security, is misplaced. Rather, the panel is firmly committed to the precept 

that they are values that—just as the founding fathers intended—must be mutually reinforcing. 

The panel also notes that our readiness cannot be subject to the ebb and flow of other events or 

limited simply to the terrorist threat. To make additional, measurable advances built on

sustained commitment of human and financial capital, intellect and sacrifice, further changes are 

needed. Organizational changes that have occurred represent a first step. But these cannot be 

viewed as the end goal. There is a compelling need for additional institutional changes that bring 

balance to the requirement to implement those programs and policies already identified against 

the need to maintain a forward-looking approach that continuously anticipates future risks and 

develops national strategies and approaches continuously to mitigate our vulnerabilities. Recent 

history has reminded the United States that the threats we face are broad—from natural disasters 

iii 
to terrorism, from inside and outside our borders, and affecting not only our physical safety but 

our economic well being and societal stability. 

The panel has proffered a view of the future—five years hence—that we believe offers a 

reasonable, measurable, and attainable benchmark. We believe that in the current absence of 

longer-term measurable goals, this benchmark can provide government at all levels, the private 

sector, and our citizens a future set of objectives for readiness and preparedness. We do not 

claim that the objectives presented in this future view are all encompassing nor necessarily 

reflect the full continuum of advances that America may accomplish or the successes that its 

enemies may realize in the next five years. It is, however, a snapshot in time for the purpose of 

guiding the actions of today and a roadmap for the future. 

America’s new normalcy in January of 2009 should reflect: 

• Both the sustainment and further empowerment of individual freedoms in the context 

of measurable advances that secure the homeland. 

• Consistent commitment of resources that improve the ability of all levels of 

government, the private sector and our citizens to prevent terrorist attacks and, if 

warranted, to respond and recover effectively to the full range of threats faced by the 

nation. 

• A standardized and effective process for sharing information and intelligence among 

all stakeholders—one that is built on moving actionable information to the broadest 

possible audience rapidly, and that allows for heightened security with minimal 

undesirable economic and societal consequences. 

• Strong preparedness and readiness across State and local government and the 

private sector with corresponding processes that provide an enterprise wide national 

capacity to plan, equip, train, and exercise against measurable standards. 

• Clear definition about the roles, responsibilities, and acceptable uses of the military 

domestically—that strengthens the role of the National Guard and Federal Reserve 

Components for any domestic mission, and ensures that America’s leaders will never be 

confronted with competing choices of using the military to respond to a domestic 

emergency versus the need to project our strength globally to defeat those who would 

seek to do us harm. 

• Clear processes for engaging academia, business, all levels of government, and others in 

rapidly developing and implementing research, development and standards across 

technology, public policy, and other areas needed to secure the homeland—a process that 

focuses efforts on real versus perceived needs. 

• Well-understood and shared process, plans, and incentives for protecting the nation’s 

critical infrastructures of government and in the private sector—a unified approach to 

managing our risks. 

Forging a New Normalcy will require additional changes in the way the nation develops strategy 

and policy, and how it focuses on moving from concept to accomplishment. These are not major 

structural changes. They represent changes in attitude and culture as well as processes. These 

are formidable changes without any doubt. But they remain critically necessary if we are going 

to remain one step ahead of our enemies and achieve duality of purpose in this great American 

investment to secure the homeland. 

iv 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

INTRODUCTION 

Although the nation better understands the threats it faces and many of the measures necessary to

counter them, the panel is concerned that the momentum, which accelerated full force following 

the September 11 attacks, may have been interrupted, that scarce resources may not be 

prioritized and applied most effectively, that fragmentation continues to hamper efforts for better 

coordination across all levels of government and with the private sector. Terrorist attacks 

worldwide are increasing in both number and lethality.1

 It is from those concerns and out of an 

abundance of caution that we suggest a reinvigoration and refinement of certain efforts. To do 

this, we suggest a strategic vision for the future and the steps necessary to move us toward that 

steady state. 

In seeking to develop a strategic vision of the future of homeland security, the Advisory Panel 

has been guided by the recognition that the threat of terrorism can never be completely 

eliminated and that no level of resources can prevent the United States from being attacked in the 

future. At the same time, the panel believes that the Nation is achieving an important, critical 

understanding of the risks posed to America by terrorism, an understanding that derives from

America’s inherent strengths—the strength in our Constitutional form of government and 

particularly the strength of our people. 

As a group of American citizens with broad experience in government at all levels and in the 

private sector, the panel members see in those national strengths an ability to respond to the 

threat of terrorism with firm resolve and through concrete actions across the full spectrum of 

awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery—areas already familiar to a society 

that has successfully responded to a wide array of natural and manmade disasters. Our goal is to 

articulate a strategy to achieve a “steady state” in the next five years—a vision shaped by a broad 

and well-grounded American perspective on the threat of terrorism and supported by a profound 

increase and sustainment of our preparedness especially at the State and local levels. Our 

collective actions must be focused and forward thinking to deal effectively with this ambiguous 

and evolving threat. 

Critical to this uniquely American perspective on the threat posed by terrorism is the recognition 

that important civil liberties issues must be considered when evaluating measures for combating 

terrorism. As the President said recently when speaking about the war in Iraq, “stability cannot 

be purchased at the expense of liberty.” That same idea is firmly rooted in the American ethos 

and is reflected in one of the panel’s favorite quotes from Benjamin Franklin: 

They that would give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve 

neither liberty nor safety. 

In times of crisis, when the pressure for dramatic change is most intense, it is helpful to return to 

these fundamental principles that have guided this nation since its inception. As Thomas 

Jefferson advised in his first inaugural address: 

 

1

 For an overview of terrorism trends, see Appendix J. 

1 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

The essential principles of our Government form the bright constellation which has 

gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and 

reformation....[S]hould we wander from them in moments of error or of alarm, let us 

hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty 

and safety. 

Because of our national tendency to react—perhaps overreact—in times of crisis, it is crucial to 

have a well-defined vision of homeland security and a roadmap to achieve that goal. 

Nevertheless, because it is human nature to relax and refocus in the absence of an obvious threat 

we must use the roadmap to prevent us from letting our guard down too far, regardless of the 

timing or characteristics of the next terrorist attack. 

Imperatives for this report 

As recommended in the First and Second Annual Reports of the Advisory Panel, the President 

developed and published a National Strategy for Homeland Security—an important first step in 

leading the nation forward. The Department of Homeland Security and other governmental 

agencies at all levels are working diligently to prevent future terrorist attacks; analyze threats and 

vulnerabilities; guard borders and transportation; protect critical infrastructure; and coordinate 

response to and recovery from such attacks when they occur. Much is still required in order to 

achieve an effective, comprehensive, unified national strategy and to translate vision into action. 

Notably absent is a clear prioritization for the use of scarce resources against a diffuse, unclear 

threat as part of the spectrum of threats—some significantly more common than terrorism. The 

panel has serious concern about the current state of homeland security efforts along the full 

spectrum from awareness to recovery, worried that efforts by the government may provide the 

perception of enhanced security that causes the nation to become complacent about the many 

critical actions still required. 

In its previous report, the panel was hopeful that the momentum created by the attacks of 2001 

would result in the comprehensive articulation and timely implementation of a national strategy. 

Despite an encouraging start, the momentum appears to have waned as people, businesses, and 

governments react to the uncertainties in combating terrorism and to the challenge of creating a 

unified enterprise architecture for awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery 

among all of the differing components. While recognizing the inherent difficulty of such a 

complex undertaking, we suggest that adapting to these existing obstacles between the various 

levels of government and the private sector requires our attention and more comprehensive 

forward thinking. 

It is time to move beyond our traditional reactive behavior to a comprehensive process for 

constant forward thinking and strategic planning, one that continuously engages all stakeholders 

in defining and implementing the future vision. One part of our national effort must be dedicated 

to accomplishing what has already been defined; a second must be dedicated to defining and 

refining what has yet to be done. Otherwise the current efforts to enhance preparedness will be 

tenuous at best and subject to change after the next threat emerges or key Administration 

officials or Congressional leaders change. 

Moreover, the fragmentation of responsibilities and capabilities within the Federal structure, 

among governments at all levels, and with the private sector requires our urgent attention. 

2 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Continuing fragmentation is especially dangerous when our enemies are becoming more 

coordinated and sophisticated in their communications and tactics. Our approach must be the 

development of comprehensive, collaborative approach—an enterprise architecture—that can 

handle both the actions of the moment and planning for the future. 

Consistent with Congressional direction and our previous work, the panel’s vision of a steady 

state five years in the future focuses on measures to combat terrorism as a key component of 

homeland security and also one that is fully consistent with an all-hazards approach. As our 

experience with SARS, West Nile Virus, monkeypox, the recent fires in California, and the 

current influenza epidemic have demonstrated vividly, we must be able to handle a wide variety 

of threats. 

Guiding Principles 

The strategic vision presented in this report reflects the firm and unanimous view of the 

Advisory Panel, and emerged only after deliberate, focused, often pointed debate. The panel 

recognizes that the United States is still in the early stages of a truly comprehensive national 

approach to the threat of terrorism and that there are difficult choices to be made at all levels of 

society, choices complicated by substantial uncertainty with respect to threats, vulnerabilities, 

and the future effectiveness of initiatives already undertaken. Facing these uncertainties, the 

concept of a strategic vision for a future state and an associated action plan seemed appropriate 

to these circumstances—and appropriately American. With this in mind, the strategic vision of 

the panel applies to all parts and all levels of society. It reflects both an assessment of what the 

panel believes America is capable of achieving over the next five years and the clear challenge to 

the nation to take the necessary and appropriate steps to accomplish that goal. This approach 

will provide a baseline from which to debate—within our governments and among the American 

public—difficult decisions on approaches and priorities. 

The strategic vision offered here reflects the guiding principles that Panel has enumerated in its 

past four reports as well as those reflected in this report: 

• It must be truly national in scope, not just Federal 

• It should build on the existing emergency response system within an all-hazards 

framework 

• It should be fully resourced with priorities based on risk 

• It should be based on measurable performance 

• It should be truly comprehensive, encompassing the full spectrum of awareness, 

prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery against domestic and international 

threats against our physical, economic and societal well being 

• It should include psychological preparedness 

• It should be institutionalized and sustained 

• It should be responsive to requirements from and fully coordinated with State and local 

officials and the private sector as partners throughout the development, implementation, 

and sustainment process 

• It should include a clear process for strategic communications and community 

involvement 

• It must preserve civil liberties 

3 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

This proffered vision presents a carefully balanced approach to the difficult question of whether 

to place more or less emphasis on reducing the terrorist threat versus lessening American 

vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks. The challenge in effective strategic planning is stark at all 

government levels and in the private sector. On the one hand, we face a situation where it is 

extremely difficult to assess the absolute magnitude and character of the present and potential 

terrorism threat. It is likewise difficult to develop measures of effectiveness that reflect whether 

the threat is genuinely being reduced in a strategically meaningful way. Due to the very nature 

of American society, we live in a potentially target-rich environment—our vulnerabilities are 

virtually limitless. Establishing strategic defensive priorities in such an environment poses 

formidable problems. In addition, the natural tendency of decisionmakers to fill specific needs in 

their own communities as opposed to national security needs makes allocating resources even 

more difficult, especially in the absence of clearly articulated requirements and measures for 

evaluating effectiveness.

In spite of these challenges and uncertainties, the need for strategic planning and risk assessment 

is inescapable. For that reason, the panel will describe a future state that attempts to chart a 

course for managing the risks of terrorism balanced against other threats and through acceptable 

measures of public policy. 

As this report goes to press, the panel recognizes that the level of awareness and initiatives 

already taken by government at all levels and increasingly by the private sector and the general 

population constitute an important beginning. As such, they offer the country a sound basis for 

building a solid foundation for those future conditions—the New Normalcy that we will 

describe—in which there is a level of acceptance of the actions to combat terrorism akin to the 

eternal vigilance that characterizes the national posture on other more traditional threats to 

American values and national well-being. 

Protecting Civil Liberties 

The attacks of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, led to new 

laws, policies, and practices designed to enhance the nation’s security against the terrorist threat. 

These security measures have prompted a debate about their effect on civil liberties, especially 

privacy. The panel believes that the debate should be reframed. Rather than the traditional 

portrayal of security and civil liberties as competing values that must be weighed on opposite 

ends of a balance, these values should be recognized as mutually reinforcing. Under this 

framework, counterterrorism initiatives would be evaluated in terms of how well they preserve

all of the unalienable rights that are essential to the strength and security of our nation: life, 

liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. While these fundamental rights are guaranteed by our 

Constitution they should not be confused with privileges, which may be imposed upon to protect 

national security. However, even privileges should not be imposed upon lightly; they are 

fundamental to our quality of life. For example, the opportunity to fly may be viewed as a 

privilege rather than a right, but overly stringent and arbitrary security measures can not only 

have an economic impact but could also increase public skepticism about security measures 

generally. 

As more terrorist attacks occur, the pressure will rise to lessen civil liberties, albeit perhaps with 

different labels. Governments must look ahead at the unintended consequences of policies in the 

quiet of the day instead of the crisis of the moment. One thing we have learned from Al Qaeda is 

4 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

that they pick the time and day that they will strike. They are ideologically patient. We are not. 

There is probably nothing more strategic that our nation must to do than ensure our civil 

liberties. 

Shortcomings in State and Local Empowerment

Every State and most localities in America have taken steps for combating terrorism, but it is 

time to ask ourselves: If local responders are in fact our first line of defense, have we succeeded 

in effectively empowering and enhancing State and local capabilities? 

The overall picture that emerged from the RAND survey is that State organizations tend to feel 

that the Federal government is giving them some of the support they need, although there are 

areas for improvement. By contrast, local organizations tend to feel less positive about Federal 

empowerment. This may reflect the fact that the State governments have more experience in 

working with Federal grant programs and understand the wide gap between “an announcement” 

and the reality of the time frame for funding to actually flow, once it has been appropriated by 

the Congress. Local organizations sound a consistent theme of the need for direct Federal 

support, and this may indicate that States need to do a better job of managing expectations and 

providing better education on grant-making processes. For example, more than 80% of “First 

Responder” funding has been dedicated to local governments, a much higher percentage than 

that available to States. 

A continuing problem is a lack of clear strategic guidance from the Federal level about the 

definition and objectives of preparedness and how States and localities will be evaluated in 

meeting those objectives. While some progress is being made, it is not happening at a pace 

commensurate with the flow of Federal funding to communities and States. By the time clear 

definition and objectives are provided, many communities and States may have embarked on 

paths that are measurably different from those adjacent to them and potentially inconsistent with 

a national approach. Moreover, deadlines should not be allowed to overtake deliberative 

approaches. Such actions further weaken our ability to establish the foundation for a unified 

national enterprise approach. 

A second problem is the deficit in intelligence and information sharing. The creation of the 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center may have increased intelligence and information sharing at 

the Federal level. Some increases have also occurred in actionable, sensitive (but unclassified) 

information shared with State and local decision makers, but it remains ad-hoc and diffuse 

among various Federal agencies. 

Further, to the lack of security clearances at the State and local levels continues to inhibit the 

widespread dissemination of more general strategic intelligence beyond a very limited number of 

individuals. 

The lack of a well defined process for two-way information sharing means that State and local 

officials are both not receiving the information they need to make strategic decisions and are not 

consistently providing Federal authorities with critical intelligence and information developed at

the local and State level that may have measurable implications for national security. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Finally the lack of a clear process for translating requirements at the State and local level into 

research and development at the Federal level means that the products being developed may not 

be tailored to meet the needs at all levels of government. To be fair, the Federal government has 

succeeded in providing some resources to localities, States and to a lesser degree the private 

sector, and also in providing a somewhat more unified point of contact for certain purposes 

within the Federal government. But those processes require further improvement. 

Effects of Other Events 

The political cycle of the United States results in cyclical responses, while national and world 

events often motivate us to respond reactively. In addition to the battles in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

in recent months we have had several major events: we have had a widespread blackout across 

the northeast; we have had a hurricane on the Atlantic Coast; we have had historic fires in 

California; and we have had a number of health and medical events such as the large outbreak of 

Hepatitis A and a current virulent flu strain. These events have affected the American psyche 

and may dilute the focus on domestic preparedness for terrorism. While other events such as the 

car and suicide bombings over the last several weeks in Turkey and Iraq remind the world of the 

potential for terrorism around the globe. There needs to be a sustained effort that is not subject 

to the ebb and flow of the national and international events or national debates. Based on our 

political history, this will be difficult to do, especially in an election year. 

The Criticality of Forward Planning 

The political cycle in the United States tends to focus decisionmakers on the near term. As the 

President has stated, the war on terrorism is going to be long and hard, and it is the view of the 

panel that efforts at combating terrorism must be institutionalized. The Department of Homeland 

Security is still hiring and moving personnel, organizing itself structurally, defining its mission 

more clearly, and often responding to the crisis of the day. This problem is not unique to DHS. 

In many ways, governments at all levels are still “fighting the last war,” reacting to September11. 

Although we must learn from history, terrorists and terrorism are dynamic, and we must consider 

the future as well as the past with regards to threats and countering those threats. We must be 

careful not to focus too heavily on the tactics and techniques September 11. We should consider 

collectively the changing nature of terrorism and other risks faced by the United States as a 

means to prioritize resource allocation. 

The panel attempts, in this its final report, to provide a future vision for homeland security to 

serve as a catalyst for debate about the direction for our long-term thinking and planning. 

Recognizing that a DHS-like entity would only be equal in position to each of the other cabinet 

agencies and would be focused on day-to-day operations, the panel recommended previously that 

an office in the White House coordinate the country’s efforts. DHS does not have overarching 

authority for directing all aspects of the homeland security mission. As examples, the 

Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of 

Defense are still major players. Our firm opinion is that an entity in the White House, currently 

the Homeland Security Council and its supporting staff, needs to provide the strategic vision and 

interagency policy coordination within the Federal Executive Branch. This process will also 

require direct and continuing integration of local, State and private sector players—not just with 

DHS as the go-between—in the HSC on-going efforts. Moreover, we repeat our strong view that 

6 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

an entity in the White House, to be truly effective, must have some clear authority over the 

homeland security budgets and programs throughout the Federal government. 

Focus Remains Federal-Centric 

The panel recognized initially that while there is a need for a national strategy, in almost every 

case the response to any attack is first and foremost by local and State authorities. The focus on 

a solution at the Federal level is too narrow and in some ways the easy part. There are 55 States 

and territories; with the lack of clear articulated vision from the Federal level, each has been 

moving to combat terrorism in its own way. In many ways, the fight now is at the State and local 

levels, and so the panel has refocused its vision to some extent on the State and local portion of 

how well the Federal government is supporting State and local efforts. 

The Federal government (the Executive and Legislative Branches) has initiated many types of 

programs, processes, systems, training, proficiency tests, grants, and other activities, without 

sufficient mechanisms in place at the State, and especially at the local level, to accomplish these 

tasks and to obtain meaningful input on their efficacy. The Federal government is moving 

forward in many areas and simply expects States and localities to catch up. This process cannot 

be effective without a coordinated system for the development, delivery, and administration of 

various program tasks that engages a broad range of stakeholders. Until a mechanism is in 

place—one that is more than a few meetings of advisory groups—to articulate requirements and 

develop priorities from the local level up to the national level, there will be continuing

fragmentation and potential misapplication of resources. 

An Enterprise Architecture for the Future 

To achieve a truly national strategy, the Federal government must empower States and locals by 

providing a clear definition of preparedness and a strategic plan and process to implement the 

objectives of a longer-term vision across the entire spectrum from awareness through recovery. 

While the vision will specify the strategic objectives, the Federal policies must allow the States’ 

flexibility in implementation to reflect the individual resources and communities within States. 

The Federal government should provide resources to States through a single source, based on 

risk and with measurable goals that encourage regional actions and integration. Let us be clear: 

Risk-based allocation of finite resources makes good practical sense. But the challenges of an 

uncertain threat environment first requires the development of a comprehensive national risk 

assessment that provides “apple to apple” comparisons among communities and States, and 

certain aspects of the private sector. Such a process does not currently exist. Officials at the 

Federal level should lead the development of an enterprise architecture to institutionalize 

intelligence and information sharing, risk assessments, better integrated planning and training, 

and effective requirements generation in close coordination with State and local governments 

and the private sector. Only through true cooperation will we achieve some sustainable measure 

of preparedness for the uncertain threat of terrorism. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Attempting to Define Preparedness 

The panel has noted time and again that preparedness cannot progress until it is defined. While 

many aspects of preparedness have been defined, there is not one accepted strategic definition. 

The panel offers its definition below. 

Preparedness for combating terrorism requires measurable demonstrated capacity by

communities, States, and private sector entities throughout the United States to 

respond to acute threats with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective efforts by 

all of the essential participants, including elected officials, police, fire, medical, 

public health, emergency managers, intelligence, community organizations, the 

media, and the public at large. At times, this may require support from the military, 

active and reserve. Such preparedness requires effective and well-coordinated 

preventative efforts by the components of the Intelligence Community, law 

enforcement entities, and a well-educated and informed public. These efforts must 

be sustainable over the foreseeable future while maintaining a free civil society. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

DEVELOPING A FUTURE VISION 

In deciding on its strategic vision, the panel assessed four alternatives—detailed later in this 

chapter—each of which has validity in its own right. They represent a future toward which the 

country could deliberately navigate or to which it could drift without a committed effort toward a 

particular end state. The goals that the panel sets forth are challenging, but we have specifically 

chosen objectives that can be addressed with varying levels of effort over time. 

In the material that follows, we will first describe the process of conceptualizing and fashioning a 

strategic vision of the character described above and then summarize and discuss the four 

alternative visions we evaluated. We then address in much greater detail a preferred strategic 

vision for the future. 

Conceptualizing a Specific Strategic Vision for Combating Terrorism 

In seeking to cast a useful strategic vision of the conditions that would characterize a sustainable 

level of national preparedness vis-à-vis the threat of terrorism, it was incumbent on the panel that 

such a vision be given a structure that is both comprehensive—not too simple considering the 

problem—and comprehendible—logical but not too complex considering the likely variety of 

audiences. 

It is also imperative that such a conceptualization of the future confront the difficult issue of 

priorities in the national plan of action to reduce the risk of terrorism vis-à-vis other risks. There 

is a particularly difficult challenge in assessing the potential return on investment of resources in 

the context of combating terrorism, a context characterized by such wide-ranging uncertainties. 

This is especially true in the balancing of efforts – and associated expectations – between the two 

components of risk mitigation, namely threat reduction and vulnerability reduction. 

The Time Frame for a Strategic Vision for Combating Terrorism 

Recognizing that the threat of terrorism is relatively new to the United States and that many 

dimensions of the initial response to this threat are only now being implemented – with 

accompanying uncertainties as to their acceptance and effectiveness – just how far in the future 

is it reasonable to anticipate achieving the favorable conditions worthy of a strategic vision with 

some measure of temporal stability? Five years? Ten years? Twenty years? For the purposes 

of this report, and in consideration of the nature of the terrorism problem and the still early state 

of development of the U.S. and the larger global response, the Advisory Panel concluded that 

casting a strategic vision roughly five years into the future was a reasonable objective. 

The Threat Assessment Dilemma 

It is now well recognized that it is in the nature of global and national affairs that a wide variety 

of terrorism threats already exist, that others will assuredly emerge and develop, and that the 

United States homeland will be among the targets of such threats for the foreseeable future. 

While ameliorating the political, social, and economic conditions that give rise to terrorism is a 

challenging undertaking that is clearly worthy of the expenditure of national and international 

time and treasure, it is an effort that is not likely to pay major dividends in the short term—the 

9 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

typical expectation of our citizens that we will immediately solve any problem. However, it is 

extremely difficult to assess the magnitude and character of the current threat, much less do a 

genuinely useful, specific, or actionable threat projection. This clearly will hamper any efforts to 

develop even crude metrics or measures of performance that reflect whether the threat is being 

reduced to a strategically meaningful degree. Fortunately, we have to this point, had few attacks 

against which to measure certain performance. It is likely that future attacks will provide the 

only meaningful measure of certain aspects of our preparedness. It can be argued, however, that 

the absence of attacks is one appropriate measure of how well we are doing in deterring and 

preventing attacks. 

With this perspective in mind, this report addresses the challenge in postulating a strategic vision 

with a healthy respect for the uncertainties in both the current and potential future terrorism

threat spectrum. These uncertainties include the prospect that the source of such threats might be 

not only independent or quasi-independent terrorist organizations—either international or of a 

“home-grown” variety—but also possibly state-sponsored terrorism. In this latter case, terrorist 

actions might be carried out anonymously without attribution, and possibly even without strong 

suspicion as to their source. In such state-sponsored terrorism circumstances, the magnitude of 

the potential terrorist threat would move well beyond (in both character and magnitude) the 

levels usually associated with independent terrorist organizations. 

In casting a strategic vision for U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, there are inevitable issues of 

priorities in setting goals and in the allocation of scarce resources to achieve those goals. In an 

environment where you can’t do it all, where will the nation get the greatest return on investment 

in its efforts to reduce the risk of terrorism? In threat reduction efforts? In improved hardening 

or other methods of reducing traditional vulnerabilities? In improved warning and associated 

planning to permit adequate time to take (presumed temporary) measures to reduce 

vulnerabilities? 

This dilemma is portrayed graphically in Figure 1, which emphasizes the three main areas of 

competition for resources in the effort to reduce the risk from terrorism: 

(1) Threat reduction through direct action to destroy or dismantle terrorist groups (“draining 

the swamp”) and deny such groups chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

weapons and other instruments of terror; 

(2) Vulnerability reduction through a wide variety of pre-attack terrorism-specific actions 

that would be effective independent of near-term strategic or tactical warning (a “fortress 

against terrorism”); and 

(3) Vulnerability reduction through terrorism-specific actions that would be implemented 

upon tactical warning of an imminent attack or that an attack is on the way but has not yet 

arrived. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

11 

Harden to

Terrorism

Day-to-Day

Harden to 

Terrorism 

Day-to-Day

Harden to

Terrorism on

Warning

Harden to 

Terrorism on

Warning

Reduce Risk from

Terrorism

Reduce Risk from

Terrorism 

Reduce Vulnerability to 

Terrorism

Reduce Terrorist 

Threat

Reduce Terrorist 

Threat

Figure 1. Terrorism Risk Reduction Components 

It can be inferred from Figure 1 that more than one legitimate strategic vision – i.e., a vision fully 

defensible in the light of terrorism-related uncertainties – is possible in this context through a 

mixing of priorities between the three main areas of competition for resources. In the simplest 

terms, any of the three main areas of risk reduction cited above could dominate a strategic vision. 

(A fourth simple and extreme alternative would be not to take any counter-terrorism actions and 

rely wholly on existing plans and programs for natural disasters and other hazards.) At the same

time any evaluation of alternative constellations of priorities requires a careful look at the 

individual domains of associated counter-terrorism activity – as discussed below. The challenge 

presented by this kind of prioritization process will be seen more clearly in the detailed 

consideration of alternative strategic visions. 

Careful consideration of the domains also makes clear that, at least in principle, there are 

potential responsibilities in each of the domains at virtually all levels of government and society. 

At the same time for some domains and activities it is clearly unrealistic to expect State and local 

governments to accept the same level of responsibility as the Federal government or for 

individual citizens and the private sector to take on the same level of responsibility as 

government. 

With this perspective in mind, and looking to fashion a strategic vision some five years in the 

future that is realistic in terms of the likely commitment of scarce resources to the terrorist threat 

versus other threats and problems faced by governments, the private sector, and individuals, the 

sections that follow—after consideration of the difficult terrorism threat assessment and 

projection problem—sequentially address each of the above domains with a particular eye to 

providing the building blocks for fashioning such a strategic vision. 

Constructing Alternative Strategic Visions 

As noted, there are inevitable issues of priority and emphasis in: 

• Identifying a finite set of key characteristics or dimensions by which to describe a 

meaningful strategic vision of the character contemplated here; 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

• For these key characteristics, setting meaningful goals or objectives against which progress 

and achievement can be measured in some qualitative or even quantitative fashion; and 

• The allocation of scarce resources to achieve such goals. 

With this perspective in mind, the panel believes that consideration of the following key 

dimensions can provide the basis for characterizing and drawing distinctions between alternative 

strategic futures for combating terrorism.

Four Specific Alternative Visions 

Terrorism is and will remain vague, ambiguous, unpredictable, and largely episodic. It will 

continue to require an approach unlike any other enemy with which we have had to deal. In 

considering alternative visions, we have postulated three somewhat different threat scenarios 

over the next five years, recognizing that reality may prove to be some combination or 

permutation of them. 

Very Infrequent Attacks. This scenario is characterized by the absence of significant

terrorist attacks in the United States. It assumes an eventual success in the Iraqi war 

and a reduction in Israeli- Palestinian tensions over the next five years. In retrospect, 

9/11 is seen as a unique event, highly unlikely ever to be repeated particularly as 

time goes by. It is also characterized by the absence of successful terrorist attacks on 

U.S. assets and bases overseas (akin to the African Embassy bombing or the attack 

on U.S.S. Cole. 

A Continuation of Post-9/11 Threats Levels. The country continues on basically the 

course it is on today, anticipating a long-term, slow motion, highly episodic strategic 

threat. The episodic incidents of terrorism might include some major incidents, 

albeit most likely not with the impact of 9/11. 

A Rise in Terrorist Attacks and Lethality. In spite of a U.S.-led international effort 

to combat terrorism, the overall terrorist threat stays ahead of national and 

international preparedness. Independent terrorist groups are increasingly in league 

with nations hostile to the United States. In this scenario, attacks continue be 

successful worldwide, and Americans are killed or injured in attacks at home and 

abroad. 

With that background and having considered the dimensions of the challenge, the four 

illustrative strategic visions considered by the panel were: 

• Complacence. The push for committing resources to combat terrorism is significantly

diminished with increased political pressure from those who want resources in other areas, 

and the country returns to a state of pre-9/11 focus on preparedness. But the terrorists’ 

interests in attacking the United States have not diminished and the country, in effect because 

of decreased vigilance, is potentially vulnerable to an attack with strategic impact akin to 

9/11. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

• Reactive. There would be steady funding but be no major increases in the level of assets 

(time, money, coordination, training, exercises, etc.) committed to homeland security and 

other dimensions of the terrorism problem. Organizational and other efforts that have been 

launched since 9/11 would be continued with some consolidation. The country will react 

strongly in the short term, but not fundamentally change its resource allocation priorities over 

the longer term. 

• Fortress America. Most observers express skepticism about the prospects of significantly 

curtailing the terrorist threat without draconian measures. The prospect of unforeseen severe 

terrorism-related financial and personal losses is acknowledged and addressed via insurance 

and government programs that compensate victims under procedures akin to the aid provided 

to victims of natural disasters. An ever-increasing level of resources is committed to 

combating terrorism with a focus on improved prevention and response, as well as hardening 

and reducing vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures. Significant resources are devoted to 

the “fortress” at the expense of other programs and initiatives and civil liberties are actually 

or perceived to be eroded. 

• The New Normalcy. The country navigates toward a new normalcy in its posture and 

approach to terrorism. The threat of terrorism is not eliminated but the threat is viewed in 

light of an aggressive and coordinated international effort to combat the threat. The 

destructive risks associated with terrorism are normalized at the personal, State, and local 

level vis-à-vis other destructive acts against U.S. society and interests both natural and 

manmade (“Take the terror out of terrorism”). Efforts to combat terrorism are substantial as 

compared to the period before 9-11 but prioritized, institutionalized, and sustained. 

Terrorism is essentially treated as criminal action of a hybrid intranational/international 

character, with attendant clear roles and responsibilities at the Federal, State, and local level 

and in the private sector, as well as among citizens. This approach provides duality of 

purpose so that we are better prepared for all emergencies and disasters, including terrorism. 

It is broad and considers not only the physical impact but economic and societal as well. 

Based on the panel’s conception of what is both possible and desirable, the first three of the 

above strategic visions are treated in summary fashion. The fourth, “Forging the New 

Normalcy,” is the panel’s conception of the strategic vision that it believes should guide U.S. 

decision-making and strategic planning for the foreseeable future. In taking the steps to ensure 

the New Normalcy, the country will likely avoid many of the pitfalls inherent in the first three 

potential futures. The New Normalcy is, therefore, treated subsequently in greater detail. (For a 

side-by-side comparison of components of each of the visions, see Appendix L.) 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

AMERICA’S NEW NORMALCY 

January 20, 2009—Washington, DC 

It is the morning of January 20, 2009. In a few hours the President will give his Inaugural 

Address, which will cover, among other things, the significant progress that has been made in 

combating terrorism both worldwide and in the homeland. The President will describe major 

improvements across the entire spectrum of capabilities to combat terrorism from awareness 

activities (intelligence and information sharing), to prevention, to preparedness, through 

response and recovery. 

The news has not all been good in the five years prior to New Year’s Day 2009. American 

interests have continued to be attacked around the world by those who hate freedom and the 

country that most epitomizes liberty and equality. Overseas, scores of Americans have died 

and many more have been injured. At home, while nothing on the scale of September 11 has 

recurred, the remnants of al Qaeda and others trying to imitate it have attacked a few soft 

targets with “conventional” type devices, and killed 21 more Americans on our own soil. 

Nevertheless, with vastly improved intelligence and cooperation from our allies—some very 

nontraditional—several attempts by terrorist groups to acquire a variety of chemical and 

biological weapons, and low yield radiological devices, have all seemingly been thwarted. 

On the home front, coordination at all levels of government and with the private sector has 

improved significantly and has been institutionalized and regularized. The public at large 

understands the nature of the terrorist threats, and has increasing confidence in government to 

be able to deals with those threats appropriately. There is a stronger sense among our citizens

of physical and economic security as well as societal stability, as a result of visible successes 

among governments and the private sector in developing and implementing strategies and 

plans that address the threats.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Future Vision 2009—State, Local, and Private Sector Empowerment 

States, localities, and appropriate entities in the private sector are fully and consistently integrated into 

planning and decisionmaking processes. The DHS regional structure and an integrated 

communications and information network provides for real time, day-to-day coordination across a broad 

spectrum of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery issues at all levels. The Homeland 

Security Council is engaged in continuous, sustained, and well-organized dialogue with all levels of 

government, the private sector, and academia to develop a forward looking vision of readiness efforts. 

The Federal government has developed and implemented a consistent program of financial support for 

State and local government efforts to combat terrorism, a program that has played a major role in 

sustaining State and local investment to combat terrorism and coordination in Federal, State, and local 

preparedness planning. Of particular significance has been the sustained funding to strengthen

preparedness and coordination within the public health system. Information on Federal support is 

available through a central clearinghouse managed by DHS. 

The Federal government, in coordination with the States, has developed grants and other forms of 

Federal assistance to fund programs that are based on continuing risk assessments where population 

is only one measure of vulnerability. Federal assistance is based on a fully developed system of 

priorities and requirements generation that flows up from the local level, is consolidated and 

coordinated at the State and territorial level, and then is rationalized against available Federal funding. 

DHS, in cooperation with other Federal agencies and State and local governments, has coordinated the 

development and implementation of a comprehensive process for State and localities, and appropriate 

entities in the private sector, to assess and articulate potential requirements for all-hazards Federal 

support. That process has vastly improved the allocation of Federal resources based on a prioritization 

of capabilities for potential support. 

Most important, the Federal government has incentivized through funding a nationwide system and has 

provided significant support to States for the implementation of a comprehensive, integrated, 

overlapping network of mutual aid for all-hazards response—a “matrix” of intrastate multijurisdictional 

and interstate supporting capabilities that has helped to ensure responsiveness anywhere in the 

country. Federal assistance in this system is based on various considerations, including localities and 

areas of higher threat, the efficiency of consolidating resources in highly trained and well equipped 

government response entities, and close coordination among all levels of government and the private 

sector.

State and local responders have been adequately funded, equipped and trained to meet nationally 

defined and accepted terrorism preparedness standards. Risk assessments have been developed and 

updated in line with national guidelines. There is a National Incident Management System (NIMS) 

adopted and used by all levels of government and the private sector. Significant progress has been 

made in communications interoperability for all response disciplines. Regular exercises are held to 

refine and practice in the effective response to potential terrorist attacks and other hazards. 

15 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

16 

Future Vision 2009—Intelligence 

The relationship between DHS, the intelligence community, the Department of Justice and the FBI, and 

the other Federal agencies involved in collection, analysis, and dissemination of terrorist threat

information is increasingly mature with strong and effective coordination responding to DHS leadership 

and DHS-levied intelligence requirements. 

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) is seen as increasingly successful in integrating 

overseas and domestic intelligence, including information from State, local and private sector sources, 

to provide a well-reasoned comprehensive strategic terrorism threat assessment covering potential 

perpetrators, capabilities, and objectives. The overseas and domestic intelligence assessments that 

are emerging acknowledge continued uncertainties in the current and projected terrorism threat, while 

at the same time placing bounds in a manner useful for planning purposes on the magnitude and 

character of that threat. All appropriate elements of other Federal agencies have been fully integrated

into the TTIC, and it has significant staff elements representing State and local government entities and 

the private sector. Executive Branch and Congressional oversight mechanisms have proven to be 

highly effective in preventing any abuses. 

The emphasis on combating terrorism within the intelligence community over the years has led to an 

unprecedented level of expertise and cooperation, including matters related to health and medical 

factors.

The broad national commitment to combating terrorism has led to vastly improved vulnerability 

assessments across the different elements of society (including in particular in the area of critical 

infrastructures) and a commensurate ongoing effort to reduce existing vulnerabilities and limit the 

emergence of new vulnerability problems. 

The improvements in both threat and vulnerability assessments have enabled DHS to produce overall 

national risk assessments for critical target sets (such as infrastructures and national icons) and to aid 

State and local governments in high-risk target areas in performing site- and community-specific risk 

assessments, including real-time risk assessments that respond to new actionable intelligence. These 

data are being used to guide the allocation of preparedness funding but not to the exclusion of those 

low threat areas. The national warning system has been refined to provide more geographic specific

information based on the actual or potential threats. 

While the availability of actionable warning cannot be guaranteed, there have been instances in which 

such warning has been available and has contributed substantially to reducing the impact of terrorist 

attacks. For planning purposes, however, it is still assumed that in many cases of terrorist attack, such 

warning will not be available. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

17 

Future Vision 2009—Information Sharing 

In addition to the information sharing within the Federal government that has enabled improved threat 

assessments, terrorism-related cooperation on sharing information on every aspect of combating terrorism—

from risk assessments to best practices for responding to specific threats—within the Federal government, 

between the Federal government and State and local entities, and between governments and the private 

sector, has vastly improved.

The Intelligence Community, in cooperation with other Federal agencies, with State and local governments, 

and with the private sector, has developed a new classification system and a series of products that are 

unclassified but limited in distribution to allow dissemination to those responsible for public and private sector

preparedness. Specific products with actionable guidance are designed to meet the needs of and available 

daily to public health officials, State and local law enforcement, and other responders. 

Most noteworthy is the improvement in information sharing between the government and among the owners 

and operators of critical infrastructures, made possible by major changes in previously existing laws and 

regulations regarding freedom of information and restraint of trade. 

The Federal government has led the development of a comprehensive risk communications strategy for 

educating the public on the threats from and consequences of terrorist attacks. The strategy covers both preevent communications and protocols for communications when an event occurs and during recovery. 

The Health Alert Network and other health-related secure communications systems that generate all-hazard

surveillance, epidemiological, and laboratory information have been substantially improved and strengthened

and are now being utilized with high reliability by all entities of the medical and health communities—public

and private. 

In the border control arena, there is now a well-established, comprehensive database and information 

technology systems internal to the border agencies under DHS and those of other Federal agencies, State 

and local entities, private sector operators, and cooperating foreign governments, who conduct activities

related to people or things moving across U.S. borders or are involved in border-related intelligence collection, 

analysis, and dissemination.
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 

Future Vision 2009—Training, Exercising, Equipping, and Standards 

Grant programs in DHS have been consolidated into a single entity that reports directly to the

Secretary. In addition, the President has established a Federal interagency coordinating entity for 

homeland security grants, headed by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Allocation criteria have 

been developed for all Federal grants that considers risk/threat, capabilities, progress towards 

achieving national standards in various disciplines, population and regional cooperative efforts. That 

entity has also streamlined the grant application and decision process throughout the government, 

and has been instrumental in eliminating unnecessary redundancies in programs. 

The insurance industry is basing rates on the level of preparedness of communities, States and 

businesses based on established nationwide standards, providing incentives for enhanced risk 

management. 

DHS has implemented a program that has established training standards for first responders that 

outlines the tasks, conditions, and standards of performance for individuals and units. 

In addition, a broad program of all-hazards exercises, with specific standards for conducting and 

evaluating them, and funded in part by DHS, continues to expand at the State and local level and with 

substantial private sector participation. Training specifically for responding to terrorist attacks is given 

a high priority. 

A joint combating terrorism exercise program for potential major terrorists involving CBRN has been 

institutionalized and implemented nationwide for Federal, State, and local officials and the private 

sector participants. It has steadily improved the ability of government and private entities to work 

together effectively. 

The sustained level of government funding for terrorism preparedness has facilitated the 

establishment of standards and proficiency tests associated. 

A successful national effort to improve communications interoperability (particularly at the local level)

through the promulgating of national equipment standards, facilitated by substantial Federal and 

private sector investment in RDT&E, has been a hallmark of progress in combating terrorism as a 

component of all hazards preparedness. 

Best practices in all aspects of combating terrorism, informed by lessons learned from exercises and 

actual events, is available through a significantly improved national database. This best practices 

database is seen as particularly useful in assisting States in meeting surge capacity requirements and

dealing with associated resource allocation issues. 

18 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

19 

Future Vision 2009—Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection 

There are major improvements in protective and defensive measures, especially for critical infrastructures. As 

appropriate, many programs have been implemented as old infrastructures and supporting systems are 

replaced. 

Improvements in the aviation industry include measures mandating the screening of all baggage and cargo for 

passenger and commercial aircraft and the implementation of a new set of comprehensive security guidelines 

for general aviation. In the shipping industry, U.S. seaports and many international air and seaports are now 

equipped with extensive suites of detection and monitoring equipment. In the energy, chemical, and 

telecommunications sectors, there are now well-established models and metrics for evaluating the vulnerability 

existing systems and facilities and additional protective measures. In the process of reducing vulnerability to 

natural disasters and providing redundancy in response to lessons learned from the power outages of 2003, the 

vulnerability of the energy supply sector has been reduced. 

For U.S. border crossings, there are stiff pre-entry identification requirements for people, and pre-shipping 

reporting requirements and other regulations for commercial shipments that have dramatically improved the 

prospects of detecting people or materials that terrorists might attempt to move into the United States. 

Technology has helped the private sector to adjust to new requirements at minimal economic impact. 

The country has a vigorous, comprehensive public health system infrastructure, with the capacity to respond 

around the clock to acute threats, while maintaining the capability to simultaneously respond to chronic public 

health issues. Public health officials institutionalized relationships with the public and private medical 

community and other response entities to deal with the full range of potential challenges. Other major 

improvements include an emphasis on an all hazards/dual use capabilities, and well defined health care 

requirements for bioterrorism. The national system of special response teams for medical/health contingencies 

has been unified and modernized with a special emphasis on preparedness for a broad range of bioterrorism

attacks, as well as chemical, radiological, and nuclear health effects. The Congress authorized several 

programs to encourage nursing, epidemiological, large animal veterinarian, environmental health, and 

pharmaceutical education and training; and workforce issues are fading. After the development of a strategic 

communications plan, a cooperative effort of Federal, State and local public health officials, the nation is in the 

middle a five-year campaign to improve the psychological readiness and resilience of the U.S. population. 

Cyber and physical threats to critical infrastructures have been addressed through a strategy that recognizes 

interdependencies and potential cascading effects. Programs to ensure that the latest in protective tools and 

practices are implemented have been increasingly successful in building confidence throughout the networked 

systems that are vulnerable to attack. 

The potential threat to the agriculture and food industries is continually being assessed in a cooperative effort 

between the intelligence community, DHS, DHHS, and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) that includes joint 

education and training programs. As a consequence of this continuing assessment, specific actions to protect 

the agriculture and food industries have been undertaken, to include specially designated laboratories to 

perform tests on foreign agricultural diseases. In addition, Federal support has substantially increased the level 

of research and funding for veterinary medicine education. USDA has an integrated network of Federal and 

State BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories for the detection and diagnosis for foreign animal and plant diseases. 

Through an integrated, voluntary effort, all food production, processing and transport and distribution facilities 

have achieved basic security guidelines described in Federal guidance. The inspection force is fully trained.

Response to an outbreak is clearly defined within a national strategy and a fair system of indemnity to 

compensate those affected by agricultural losses is available along the spectrum of food production and 

dissemination (which has helped to encourage rather than discourage the rapid disclosure of outbreaks). 

Aggressive R&D has produced vaccines for high-risk pathogens such as Foot and Mouth and the USDA 

research portfolio has been prioritized according to a comprehensive risk assessment matrix for both deliberate 

and natural outbreaks. In addition, the Federal Government has continued to expand its cooperation and 

surveillance presence overseas to prevent introduction of pathogens into the United States. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

20 

Future Vision 2009—Research and Development, and Related Standards 

The Federal government is providing sustained funding for a wide-ranging R&D program that is 

seeking major improvements in the ability to detect and analyze terrorism-related materials or devices 

both at the borders and in transit within the country. The Federal R&D agenda is coordinated and 

prioritized through a comprehensive interagency and intergovernmental process led by the Secretary 

of Homeland Security. 

The National Institute for Mental health has undertaken a long-term research program examining the 

most effective ways to both prepare people mentally for possible terrorist attacks and to treat people 

with mental and emotional problems following such attacks. 

The Congress has expanded incentives under Bioshield to encourage industrial production and 

development of biological and chemical defense pharmaceuticals. NIAID, in collaboration with

industry, has launched a major research effort in the area of vaccine development in anticipation of 

possibly facing threats from natural and genetically modified biological agents, and is building on its 

successes of rapid and reliable diagnostic tests for the full spectrum of biological agents. 

New approaches in epidemiologic surveillance are yielding dramatic results, and State and local 

public health departments are implementing the findings to reduce time in detection of disease

outbreaks. 

. 

The challenge of improving cybersecurity is being addressed through a comprehensive governmentindustry R&D partnership that has developed not only improved defensive tools and procedures but 

also industry standards for ensuring that improved protective techniques and tools are implemented 

on a continual basis. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

21 

Future Vision 2009—Role of the Military 

Statutory authority and implementing regulations for use of the military inside the homeland—for both 

homeland defense and civil support missions—have been clarified. Extensive public education—for 

State and local governments, for the private sector (especially critical infrastructure operators) and for 

the populace at large, has greatly improved the understanding about legal authority for using the 

military as well as its capabilities and limitations. Specific attention has been focused on defining the 

parameters of homeland defense and its distinctions from civil support. 

 

Clearly articulated Rules for the Use of Force exist to govern the military’s actions inside the United 

States in situations where it is unclear if the foe is a combatant or a criminal 

In recent years, the role of USNORTHCOM and USPACOM in enhanced civil-military integration for 

homeland security has been clarified and institutionalized within the Department of Defense. A 

critically important part of this process has been, as noted, the development of a comprehensive 

requirements identification process by DHS, and tested through extensive exercises involving 

USNORTHCOM and State and local emergency response officials. 

The potential role and responsibilities of the military in supporting civilian authorities in the event of a 

terrorist attack has been refined largely through a continued program of training and exercises 

involving USNORTHCOM, other military entities, and State and local partners with preparedness 

responsibilities. 

USNORTHCOM now maintains dedicated rapid-reaction units with a wide range of response

capabilities relating to attack assessment, emergency medical support, isolation and quarantine, and 

communications support. Capabilities are intended for military homeland defense missions but have 

been implemented in a way to be applicable to civil support missions as well. 

The National Guard has been given new homeland security mission with a comparable increase in 

funds for civil support planning, training, exercises, and operations. Some Guard units are trained for 

and assigned homeland security missions as their primary or exclusive missions. With authorizing 

legislation, the Department of Defense has established a collaborative process for deploying National 

Guard units including authority to employ the Guard on a multi-state basis for homeland security 

missions. The National Guard remains a strong component of the military for the war-fighting

mission, but enhanced resources are maintained for military assistance to States and communities for

all types of emergencies. Use of Reserve Component forces for extended homeland security

missions has been structured in a manner that does not detract from recruiting and retention efforts. 

Military missions in the homeland are consistent with traditional military missions. Specialized State 

and local responder capabilities have been enhanced through a sharing of military technology and 

realignment of funding. State and local responders have more effectively funded, trained, and 

equipped to address the impacts of a terrorist attack and the military (including the National Guard)

have funded and trained for missions distinctively different than those of State and local responders. 

With this substantial empowerment of State and local civilian response organizations, the potential 

reliance on any part of the military—active forces and the reserve components (including the National 

Guard in its non-Federal status)—for military support to civil authorities has diminished. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

A ROADMAP TO THE FUTURE 

We have outlined an ambitious vision for the near future not only to counter the threat of

terrorism but to advance America’s ability to prepare more effectively for the full range of 

threats to our nation. We stress that the vision is not likely to become reality without a firm

commitment and sustained effort among all levels of government and in the private sector. Nor 

are we suggesting that we should accept taking five years to reach all or most of the components 

of the vision. Even with current programs and resource, the nation must achieve real and 

measurable improvements soon. Clearly, however, additional steps are needed to bring the 

United States from its current state of preparedness to the panel’s view of America’s New 

Normalcy. Below, we describe where we are and what, in the opinion of the panel, are some of 

the key steps to achieving the vision. Some recommendations have been made before; they are 

worth repeating until they have been implemented. The panel does not suggest that these are the 

only actions required to achieve an acceptable future state of security, nor that implementing all 

of these steps exactly as we recommend will ensure attainment of the future state. They are, 

nevertheless, the best judgment of individual panel members within their own discipline and the 

collective view of the full panel as an opportunity for translating resolve and policy into action 

and accomplishment. 

Civil Liberties at the Foundation 

There is an on-going debate in the United States about the tradeoffs between security and civil 

liberties. History teaches that the debate about finding the right “balance” between security and 

civil liberties is misleading. This traditional debate implies that security and liberty are 

competing values and are mutually exclusive. It assumes that our liberties make us vulnerable 

and if we will give up some of these liberties, at least temporarily, we will be more secure. Yet, 

consider the context in which civil liberties were first firmly established. The framers of the 

Constitution had just survived a truly existential threat and were acutely aware of the fragility of

their nascent nation. In this uncertain and insecure environment, the framers chose not to 

consolidate power and restrict freedoms but to devolve power to the people and protect civil 

liberties from encroachment. They recognized that civil liberties and security are mutually 

reinforcing.

The Declaration of Independence has at its core the premise that there are certain “unalienable 

rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” What terrorists seek to 

destroy requires a comprehensive strategy to defeat their objectives, while seeking to preserve

not just life, but also liberty and our uniquely American way of life. 

We must, therefore, evaluate each initiative as well as the combined effect of all initiatives to 

combat terrorism in terms of how well they preserve all of the “unalienable rights” that the 

founders believed were essential to the strength and security of our nation—rights that have no 

become so imbedded in our society and ingrained in our psyche that we must make special 

precautions, take extra steps, to ensure that we do not cross the line. It is more than the clearly 

defined protections in the Constitution—protections against unreasonable search and seizure; and

against self-incrimination. It is that less well-defined but nevertheless exceptionally important 

“right to privacy” that we have come to expect, and that our judicial system has come

increasingly to recognize. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

As an example, we should not move away from the traditional requirement for a criminal 

predicate to justify law enforcement activity. As a Nation, our most significant concerns with 

broadening law enforcement powers should be 

 the potential chilling effect of allowing the monitoring of First Amendment activities, 

such as freedom to peaceably assemble, the free exercise of religion, and freedom of 

speech, to the point where it discourages the exercise of or directly impinges upon such 

fundamental rights; and 

 the increasing reliance on more sophisticated technology that has vast potential for 

invading our privacy. 

Military intelligence gathering as an aid to law enforcement or as part of military “homeland 

defense” missions was not fully anticipated by our existing system of laws and safeguards. It 

now becomes essential for the Congress to legislate and for the Department of Defense to 

implement through clear procedures the limitations on the use of satellite imagery and other 

advanced technology monitoring inside the United States. Such limitations, we suggest, should 

be similar to those governing electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes inside the United 

States under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978.

2

 

To enhance both our security and our liberty, we recommend that the President establish an 

independent, bipartisan civil liberties oversight board to provide advice on any change to 

statutory or regulatory authority or implementing procedures for combating terrorism 

that has or may have civil liberties implications (even from unintended consequences). 

Strategy and Structure

The process of creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been one of the most 

significant and challenging United States government restructuring efforts since World War II. 

The aim of establishing DHS and integrating a wide range of agencies and offices has been to 

increase the security of the U.S. homeland and to improve the governments’ ability to prevent 

and prepare for terrorist attacks and other major disasters. Indeed, the challenge of integrating 22 

separate agencies into a single, effective department has been substantial. Anecdotal evidence 

suggests that many of the agencies and employees subsumed by the integration continue to have 

no identity with or “buy-in” to their parent organization. Overcoming these factors is critical to 

the success not only of DHS but to the national effort. 

Clearly, there has been a strong focus on ensuring that the structure of DHS is right to achieve 

programmatic and operational level coordination and execution. The fact remains that the 

homeland security dilemma facing the United States is broader and more complex than a single 

agency. The Department of Homeland Security, as a Secretariat within the Federal government, 

now competes with other Federal entities for funding and policy attention. Its primary focus is 

that of “physical” protection, which leaves the broader issue of economic and societal security 

potentially lacking for attention. 

 

2 50 USC 1801 et seq.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

There remains, especially at the policy level, the continuing need for Federal cross department 

and agency coordination, and regular continuing dialogue with local and State elected leaders. In 

addition, the need for forward thinking, strategy development, and planning can best be 

accomplished in a forum free from the day-to-day crisis and reactive environment that has 

characterized DHS—an understandable situation, given its mission. Internal DHS strategy and 

planning can and will occur, but there remains a compelling need for higher-level policy 

coordination at the White House that rises above the inevitable turf wars among Federal 

agencies. Ostensibly, the Homeland Security Council will accomplish this task, but that entity 

has little structure for engagement of local and State elected leaders now that the Homeland 

Security Advisory Council and its advisory groups have been transferred to DHS. 

State and local officials across all responder organization expect a lot from DHS. For example, 

70-80 percent of State and local organizations expected DHS to improve coordination, 

information-sharing, and communication among governments at all levels, according to the 

RAND survey. Where there were differences in views, the pattern reflected a particular 

organization’s mission or primary Federal agency partner. For example, fewer State public 

health departments (33 percent) expected DHS to streamline the grant application process as 

compared to 60-70 percent of other organizations. This difference makes sense, given that 

DHHS (not DHS) is the primary Federal agency providing support to public health departments. 

State OEMs were in agreement with other organizations, but in several cases expressed the 

opinion more strongly. Overall, 50-60% of organizations expect DHS to standardize the grant 

application process across Federal agencies and consolidate multiple grant application 

requirements; however, 80 percent of State OEMs expressed this view. 

The stronger desire by State OEMs for DHS support in these areas is consistent with the mission 

of the State OEMs and their role in helping to distribute Federal preparedness funding and 

support to local entities. Table 1 lists other areas where responders expect empowerment from

DHS. 

 Table 1. In What Ways Do Local/State Responders Expect the DHS to Impact Them? 

 Activities 

70-80% expect DHS to...  Improve coordination, information-sharing, and communication between 

Federal/State/local levels 

60-70% expect DHS to...  Streamline grant application process across Federal grant programs

50-60% expect DHS to...  Standardize the grant application process across Federal agencies and consolidate 

multiple grant application requirements 

40-60% expect DHS to...  Establish single point of contact at Federal level for information on available 

programs 

 Provide primary contact at Federal level instead of many on training, equipment, 

planning and other critical needs 

 [Health organizations not asked this question] 

45-60% expect DHS to...  Provide intelligence information and more detailed guidance on terrorist threat 

40-60% expect DHS to...  Consolidate numerous training courses/ programs and numerous equipment 

programs 

 [Health organizations not asked about equipment programs]

40-60% expect DHS to...  Provide better/standardized templates and/or guidance to help with planning 

30-40% expect DHS to...  Improve integration between public/private sectors’ efforts to improve terrorism and 

protect critical infrastructure 

DHS is still relatively new; time will be required for it to be come fully effective and operational. 

Yet, there are apparent areas for concern, including intelligence analysis and dissemination;

duplication of efforts; lack of standards; and the continuing ability of DHS component agencies 

to fulfill traditional—and important—day-to-day missions. DHS has largely been sidelined in 

24 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

the evolving process of terrorist-related intelligence. Despite legislative mandates, it has 

developed little analytical capacity and has insufficiently developed capabilities to disseminate 

information to State, local, and private actors. Numerous reports have pointed out that 

cooperation between departments of the Federal government, State and local government 

agencies, and private sector entities has clearly been inadequate.3

 Interviews with State and local 

officials (conducted by RAND for the panel) have indicated that DHS has not yet effectively 

shared threat information with appropriate State and local entities. Indeed, DHS has had 

significant competition from other Federal agencies in disseminating information to State and 

local authorities, and the private sector despite President Bush’s July 2003 Executive Order 

giving the Secretary of Homeland Security primary authority for sharing homeland security 

information.4

 

DHS is an operational entity. As such it executes policy. It does not own all of the Federal 

capability for combating terrorism and cannot, therefore, be expected to develop even a Federal 

government-wide policy, much less a national one, for addressing all aspects of awareness, 

prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. On the other hand, entities in the Executive 

Office of the President do have that broad mandate to develop policy applicable to those affected 

entities of the Executive Branch. In this case, the entity is the Homeland Security Council (HSC) 

and its supporting staff (the HSC staff—the successor to the Office of Homeland Security). That 

entity should have the responsibility for developing the longer-range vision and the strategic 

policies for implementation. It should not be involved in planning or conducting operations, 

except as observers to help inform future policy development. 

Current DHS structure suffers from a duplication of emergency preparedness and response 

efforts. In particular, the location of the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response 

(EP&R) and the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) in separate directorates has created 

internal and external problems. In the April 2003 Semiannual Report to the Congress on the 

Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Inspector General argued that placing planning, 

training, and equipment purchases for emergency management personnel in different DHS 

directorates creates problems with interdepartmental coordination, performance accountability, 

and fiscal accountability.5

 It also leads to confusion among State and local officials for 

identifying available Federal preparedness resources. 

Since September 11, 2001, State organizations have participated more than local organizations in 

federally-sponsored training, equipment, and funding programs.6

 In addition, while State 

organizations tended to participate across a variety of programs, local organizations participated 

 

3 Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001

(Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence, December 2002); Ivo H. Daalder et al, Assessing the Department of Homeland Security (Washington, 

DC: The Brookings Institution, July 2002), pp. 17-21; Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, America – Still 

Unprepared, Still in Danger (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), pp. 1-5; Protecting America’s 

Freedom in the Information Age: A Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force (New York: The Markle

Foundation, October 2002), pp. 69-78. 4

 George W. Bush, Executive Order: Homeland Security Information Sharing (Washington: White House Office of

the Press Secretary, July 29, 2003). 5

 Department of Homeland Security: Semiannual Report to the Congress (Washington, DC: Office of Inspector 

General, April 2003), pp. 3-4. 6

 For a detailed summary of the survey results regarding organizations participation in federally-sponsored 

programs, see Tab 3 to Appendix D. 

25 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

in a more limited number of programs specific to their professional community. Further, State 

organizations tended to have much higher participation rates than local organizations. In 

general, State organizations that had participated in federally-sponsored programs since the 9/11 

attacks also shared those resources with other organizations within their State (commensurate 

with their mission and role as a pass-through for Federal support to local communities and 

response organizations). In addition, those local organizations that had received Federal support 

also tended to share it with other organizations within their jurisdiction. 

State and local organizations differed in their views about whether Federal funding was reaching 

the right communities and organizations. State OEMs and State public health departments (those

organizations responsible for distributing Federal funding and/or resources within their State for 

emergency and bioterrorism preparedness) tended to believe that Federal support was reaching 

those communities and organizations with the greatest need. Local organizations, on the other 

hand, were more likely to believe that Federal funding was not reaching the communities and 

organizations with the greatest need, regardless of whether the funding was distributed through 

the State governments or directly to local communities and response organizations. (For more 

detailed survey information, see Appendix D.) This highlights the need for Governors to drive 

comprehensive state-wide strategies (that reflect composites of local, interjurisdictional, and 

State agency needs within each State) that address the full range of readiness and cross the 

continuum of State and Federal funding programs as a precursor to managing national 

expectations. In the absence of a measurable end-goal, everyone—States and localities—will 

likely believe and insist that their agency should get everything. 

State and local governments should have a one-stop clearinghouse for grants, training programs, 

and other types of terrorist and disaster preparedness assistance. Perhaps more seriously, the 

absence of coordinated preparedness efforts makes it difficult to develop training and exercised 

standards that are agreed upon and utilized by all relevant training centers. Some current funding 

processes have DHS and other agencies awarding preparedness grants directly to public and 

private recipient organizations with no pre-award coordination with the States. Recognizing that 

there inevitably will be some of the current programs that do not “flow through” the States, there 

should, at a minimum, be vertical coordination requirements among Federal agencies and local 

governments with States on all funding allocations, to ensure consistency with statewide 

strategies. DHS and other Federal agencies may be required to make some awards directly, but 

that does not negate the need and appropriateness of engaging States in the process. 

In addition, there are at least six Federal departments and a number of interagency and 

independent organizations that are involved in developing standards for communication systems 

and equipment. This situation makes it difficult for States and local entities to know what to buy, 

and increases the possibility of incompatible equipment. 

Finally, current DHS efforts have diminished and compromised important “traditional” day-today missions of some component agencies. For example, the Coast Guard has put substantial 

resources into patrolling ports and assisting in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

but it has seen decreased resources for important missions such as drug interdiction. Recent 

disasters across the nation have identified issues between the DHS parent organization and 

FEMA in terms of roles and responsibilities. While these types of challenges are not unexpected 

with a reorganization of this magnitude they, nonetheless raise the concern that momentum

across a broad spectrum of activities is being interrupted. 

26 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Based on the foregoing, we recommend that DHS combine all departmental grant making 

programs into a single entity in DHS. Currently, grant programs are scattered through several 

departmental units. One alternative is an expansion of ODP (renamed) with that office reporting 

directly to the Secretary. We also recommend that the President establish an interagency 

mechanism for homeland security grants, led by the Secretary of DHS, to streamline and 

consolidate the grant application and decision process throughout the Federal government. 

The creation of such a process will reduce confusion among grant applicants, and relieve them of 

some of the burden of multiple—and different—application processes. 

We further recommend (again) that DHS develop a comprehensive process for establishing 

training and exercise standards for responders. That process must be involved in the 

development of training and exercise curricula and materials. It must include State and local 

response organization representation on a continuous, full-time basis. 

The Homeland Security Advisory System has become largely marginalized. This may be 

attributed to a lack of understanding of its intended use as well as the absence of a wellorchestrated plan to guide its implementation at all levels of government. The Governor of 

Hawaii chose to maintain a blue level in February 2003 when the Federal government raised the 

level to orange, and the Governor of Arizona announced that his State might do the same based 

on the particular threat or lack thereof to Arizona.7

 Organizations surveyed by RAND for the 

panel had a number of suggestions for improving the Homeland Advisory System. Between 60-

70 percent of State and local organizations suggested providing additional information about the 

threat (type of incident likely to occur, where the threat is likely to occur, and during what time 

period) to help guide them in responding to changes in the threat level. 

We recommend that DHS revise the Homeland Advisory System to include (1) using a 

regional alert system to notify emergency responders about threats specific to their 

jurisdiction/State; (2) providing training to emergency responders about what preventive

actions are necessary at different threat levels; and (3) a process for providing specific 

guidance to potentially affected regions when threat levels are changed. 

Prehospital care—emergency medical services (EMS)—plays a crucial role in the response to 

and recovery natural and manmade disasters, including terrorism. The Emergency Medical 

Technicians and Paramedics who comprise EMS in the United States, unlike there fellow 

responders in fire services and law enforcement, have no designated "EMS" Federal funds and 

no one single Federal agency for coordination on State and local EMS operational matters. As 

was cited in earlier panel reports, the lack of any fiscal assistance to enhance EMS response 

capacity, especially for combating terrorism, must be addressed. In order to reduce mortality and 

morbidity, especially in the aftermath of a CBRNE terrorist attack, investment in the response 

component that is tasked with turning victims into patients is critical. Concurrent with the lack 

of specific funding is the continuing absence a Federal entity that provides guidance and 

assistance on a daily basis to EMS responders nationwide.

 

 

7 http://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2003/02/24/story4.html, February 7, 2003;

http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/0601homeland01.html 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

We recommend: 

 

• That the Congress establish sustained funding to enhance EMS response capacity 

for acts of terrorism. Such funding must address personal protective equipment, 

training, antidotes, technology transfer, EMS interoperability issues, threat assessments, 

and other operational and training doctrine issues.

• That Congress reestablish a Federal office specifically to support EMS operational 

and systems issues. 

State and Local Empowerment 

There continues to be a lack of understanding about the roles of State and local government in a 

national strategy. As discussed in more detail, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) is 

a pointed example. It is essentially an entity created by and for the Federal government, not (yet) 

for State and local government. National strategy and concomitant resources need to be 

designed and executed in a way most likely to empower State and local governments to maintain 

awareness, and to deter, prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist events. 

Conversely, State and particularly local organizations and officials may not be fully aware of the 

“big picture,” and simply do not have the resources to equip and train every locality to perform

every mission across the spectrum of preparedness. Moreover, as salutary as many efforts by 

States and localities have been, absent a standard system and processes for activities nationwide, 

the potential for significant incompatibility and lack of interoperability looms large. 

Therefore, we recommend the development of a system of a:

 “Matrix” of Mutual Aid. In coordination with local, State, and other Federal agencies, 

DHS must develop a plan for a nationwide system of mutually supporting capabilities to 

respond to and recover from the full spectrum of hazards. Unlike the suggestion of other 

entities that have addressed the issue, the system does not have to be built on the premise that 

every community in America must have the same type and same level, based almost exclusively 

on population considerations, of response capabilities. The panel firmly believes that one size 

does not fit all. The panel envisions a much more comprehensive system of mutual aid than that 

which generally exists. This expanded system would catalog and display, at any point in time, 

the capabilities resident anywhere in the country to respond to various types of emergency. It 

would be built, at its foundations, on capabilities that already exist. Capabilities would 

constantly be mapped geographically in order to identify gaps in coverage. The goal is not to 

know the location of every piece of equipment or trained personnel but rather the types and 

scope of actions that can be undertaken. Every level of government would be required, as a 

condition of Federal assistance, to participate in the system. Mutual aid would run in multiple 

directions—from large cities to small towns in the same State and vice versa; from small towns 

to other small towns in the same State, and from large cities to other large cities in the same State 

and in other States; from State to State; from the Federal level to States and localities. Such a 

system would significantly enhance capabilities while making the most of limited resources. 

28 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Private Sector Engagement 

The important role of the private sector in homeland security has not been fully recognized and 

articulated. As noted by the panel in its 2002 report to Congress:8 

The private sector controls approximately 85 percent of the infrastructure in this 

country and employs approximately 85 percent of the national workforce. It is also 

critical to innovations to protect and defend against terrorism. 

Enhancing coordination with the private sector is obviously critical for ensuring the preparedness 

of States and localities and for protecting vital physical and economic infrastructure. In the third 

wave of the survey, we asked State and local organizations about their coordination activities 

with the private sector. 

Following the 9/11 attacks, nearly all the State organizations and between a third to threequarters of the local organizations created new organizational structures to address preparedness 

for terrorism-related incidents. Of those that created new structures, about half (except for public 

health) indicated that the duties of these new positions or units included liaison with the private 

sector. For virtually all local and State public health departments, this probably refers to 

coordination activities with hospitals, managed care organizations, or other individual healthcare 

providers, many of which belong to the private sector.9 However, when we compare these results 

to whether organizations say they have any formal agreements in place with the private sector

about emergency planning or response, many fewer organizations indicated this to be the case. 

Only about one out of three local and State OEMs and one out of five of the other organizations 

said they had formal agreements with private companies, businesses, or labor unions to share 

information or resources in the event of an emergency or disaster. Further, few local 

organizations and only about twenty percent of State organizations and local OEMs indicated 

that they would contact the private sector if they had any threat information to pass on about 

suspected terrorist activities within their jurisdiction or region. 

State organizations, in particular, recognize there is room for improvement in strengthening 

coordination with the private sector. Between half to two-thirds of State organizations expect 

DHS to help improve integration between the public/private sectors’ efforts to improve terrorism

preparedness and to protect critical infrastructure. The primary linkage for private sector 

engagement must occur at the local and State levels; that is where the interaction is going to be 

most effective in preventing or responding to an event. 

The business community believes that it has an obligation and wants to be better integrated into 

planning and preparedness activities than it has been. (See testimony of C. Michael Armstrong, 

 

8

 Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 

Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 16, 2001, pp. 30-31.

www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/ 9

 The CDC cooperative agreements for public health preparedness encourage establishing public/private 

partnerships, with one of the enhanced capacities calling for the strengthening of relationships between the health

department and emergency responders, the business community, and other key individuals or organizations involved

in healthcare, public health, or law enforcement. Source: CDC Continuation Guidance for Cooperative Agreement 

on Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism--Budget Year Four Program Announcement 99051,

May 2, 2003. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

The Business Roundtable, at Appendix N.) We recommend the adoption and full 

implementation of the security component of the Business Roundtable’s Principles of 

Corporate Governance. An executive summary of those principles is included at 

Appendix N.10

Intelligence and Information Sharing 

In the two years following the September 2001 terrorist strikes, governmental bodies, journalists, 

and policy analysts have advocated a variety of measures intended to improve domestic 

counterterrorism intelligence. Most of these critics focused on shortfalls within the FBI. This 

panel and others have recommended the establishment of a new domestic security service that 

some have likened to the United Kingdom’s MI-5. Such an organization, according to its 

supporters, would focus on prevention, rather than simply investigating terrorist acts once they 

occur.11 Critics of the concept charge that it would add needless complexity to the system, slow 

down rather than promote information flows among agencies, and threaten civil liberties.12

Ultimately, the Bush administration rejected calls for the creation of an “American MI-5,” 

choosing instead to press for reforms within the FBI and new bureaucratic arrangements within 

other parts of the Federal government. The FBI’s leadership has outlined a comprehensive 

program of internal changes that are intended to make the prevention of terrorism the bureau’s 

paramount mission. 

In some ways, these steps will provide the country with a more robust, comprehensive, and 

rationalized structure for the analysis and dissemination of terrorism information. Steps have 

been taken to overhaul the intelligence function of the FBI, including a common analysis of 

business practices regarding how information is gathered, shared, analyzed, and distributed. This 

is a potentially useful business-process approach that DHS could adopt in bringing together all of 

the Federal agencies and State and local government entities to develop of an overarching 

national plan for the sharing of information and intelligence among all levels of government and 

with the private sector. Principal elements of this realignment effort should include: 

(1) investments in communications and information management technology and integration; (2) 

emphasis on developing rigorous, discretely focused analytical capabilities; (3) establishing a 

cadre of specifically assigned, professional counterterrorism specialists; (4) increased 

coordination of dispersed field office operations within the context of a singularly developed 

(and enforced) national strategy; and (5) a clear set rules that establishes product dissemination 

to specific entities and the communication links for moving intelligence and other information. 

This being said, several facets of the reform process either remain questionable or raise 

additional issues of concern. These variously relate to: (1) the efficacy of changes enacted within 

the FBI; (2) the development of viable structures of accountability and oversight to balance more 

intrusive domestic information gathering; (3) the incorporation of local law enforcement in 

 

10 The entire document is available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/984.pdf. 11 See for example the panel’s Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress, pp. 41-44; and “Senator 

Edwards Proposes Homeland Intelligence Agency,” accessed at 

http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030213edwards_pr.html. 12 See for example David Johnston, “F.B.I. Director Rejects Agency for Intelligence in the United States,” 

Washington Post, 20 December 2002, p. A22; Larry M. Wortzel, “Americans Do Not Need a New Domestic Spy 

Agency to Improve Intelligence and Homeland Security,” Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum no. 848, 10

January 2003; and Ronald Kessler, “No to an American MI5,” Washington Post, 5 January 2003, p. B07.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal efforts to combat terrorism; (4) the coordination of national intelligence structures; and 

(5) the unintended consequence that much of the enforcement for certain types of criminal 

activity—for example, bank robberies and organized crime enterprises—has been shifted from

the FBI back to State and local law enforcement.

As a partial solution to several of these problems, the panel repeats its support for an independent 

agency with certain domestic collection responsibilities. A separate domestic intelligence 

collection agency might allow the FBI to return to a context in which a criminal predicate is once 

again a pre-requisite for law enforcement activity. It could also provide a clearer context in 

which to evaluate and address concerns that relate specifically to the collection of intelligence 

inside the Unites States, separate and apart from the issues related to what enforcement actions 

the government can take based on that information. Clarifying the distinction between 

intelligence collection authority and law enforcement power could also clarify oversight 

responsibility. Despite arguments to the contrary,13 the panel continues to believe—as it 

articulated in 4th Report—that it important to separate the intelligence collection function from

the law enforcement function to avoid the impression that the U.S. is establishing a kind of 

“secret police.” The “sanction” authority of law enforcement agencies—the threat of 

prosecution and incarceration—could prevent people who have important intelligence 

information from coming forward and speaking freely. The panel has suggested that this 

collection entity would not have arrest powers—that authority will continue to rest with the FBI,

other Federal law enforcement agencies, and State and local law enforcement. Nor should it 

have authority to engage in deportations or other actions with respect to immigration issues, to 

seize the assets of foreign terrorists or their supporters, or to conduct any other punitive activities 

against persons suspected of being terrorists or supporters of terrorism. This independent entity 

could provide information that can be “actionable” to those agencies that do have the authority to 

take action. A challenge will arise on those occasions when the independent body needs to pass 

intelligence “cueing” to law enforcement agencies for the purpose of constituting an arrest. But 

the challenge will be fundamentally no greater than it is today when existing U.S. intelligence 

agencies “cue” Federal law enforcements agencies for such purposes.

This new collection component of an independent agency would have to operate under 

significant judicial, policy, and administrative restraints. It will be subject to the requirements of

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)14 and the Attorney General’s Guidelines for 

terrorism investigations. This component would be required to seek legal authority from the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for intrusive (surveillance or search) activities. 

The FBI would continue to have responsibility for purely domestic terrorist organizations and for 

non-terrorism related organized crime. Title III wiretap responsibilities would remain with the 

FBI for criminal activities. 

Further, to address several of the challenges discussed above, we recommend that the 

Congress establish the Terrorist Threat Integration Center as an independent agency and 

 

13 At a recent meeting of the Advisory Panel, the Attorney General of the United States made a strong and wellreasoned argument why, from his perspective, the FBI should be allowed to continue domestic intelligence 

collection. Among other points he raised were the extensive experience that the FBI has, and the network of

contacts that it has established with State and local law enforcement, which he (correctly) suggests also collect law 

enforcement intelligence. 14 50 U.S. Code, Chapter 36 (50 USC Sections 1801-1863) (PL 105-511, October 25, 1978) 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

that the TTIC be required to have permanent staff from representative State and local 

entities. 

Finally to address these challenges, the Attorney General should modify the AG guidelines. The 

potential chilling effect of broadened surveillance authority could be reduced if, in addition to 

barring the collection or storage of information solely for monitoring protected activity, a more 

rigorous standard was imposed for any targeting that involved protected activity. The key would 

be to ensure that the higher threshold was not interpreted in the field as effectively a prohibition 

against such collection or storage, as has happened in the past. 

Organizations want more intelligence information about the terrorist threat, but security 

clearances are lagging 

The RAND survey confirmed that State and local organizations are looking to DHS for 

dissemination of intelligence information and information about the terrorist threat within their 

jurisdiction or State, in part to help them in conducting their own risk assessments. Since 

September 11, 2001, about half of law enforcement and half of local and State OEMs have 

received guidance from the FBI about what type of information about suspected terrorist activity 

should be collected and passed to FBI field offices. In comparison, only a quarter of 

paid/combination fire departments and hospitals and only a few volunteer fire departments 

indicated they have received such guidance. 

Despite a desire for more detailed intelligence information since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, State 

OEMs and State public health departments are primarily the only organizations that have sought 

security clearances for their personnel. (For more information, see Appendix D). This finding is 

likely related to recent requests by DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services 

(DHHS) for States to apply for such clearances for their senior officials. To date, only about half 

of State OEMs and a third of State public health departments that applied for security clearances 

have received them for at least some of their personnel.15

Recently, DHS announced that, in addition to State governors, five senior State officials would 

be issued security clearances to receive about specific threats or targets. (These clearances are 

in addition to the security clearances to be issued to public health officials.16) However, there is 

concern among State officials that the number of security clearances allocated may still be too 

few to account for all their needs. 

Based on the foregoing, we recommend 

 That the Federal government develop and disseminate continuing comprehensive 

strategic threat assessments on the character, magnitude, and objectives of 

terrorists and their organizations. As we have said consistently in previous reports,

 

15 Because the survey did not ask when organizations had applied for government security clearances, RAND cannot 

distinguish between those who may have applied only recently versus those that have been waiting for a longer

period of time to receive their security clearances. 16DHS Office of the Press Secretary, Press Release August 18, 2003. “Secretary Ridge Addresses National 

Governors Association.” 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

these assessments must be more than current, actionable information in order to be 

helpful in longer-term planning and prioritization of resources. 

 That the President designate one or more security clearance-granting authorities,

which can grant clearances Federal government wide that are recognized by all 

Federal agencies. It is incomprehensible that the security clearances of one Federal 

agency are not recognized by other Federal agencies. Agency-specific requirements may 

indicate who can have access to certain information (the “need to know”), and certain 

information will logically fall into the special categories (e.g., Special Access Programs 

and Special Compartmented Information). Nevertheless, basic clearances—once granted 

by a competent authority—should be “portable” to the maximum extent possible. 

 That the President direct the development of a new regime of clearances and 

classification of intelligence and other information for dissemination to States, 

localities, and the private sector. This new regime would remove some of the specific 

elements that raise the data to a traditional “national security” classification (e.g., sources 

and methods information) to provide the widest possible distribution to local and State 

responders and in a form that it conveys meaningful and useful information. Such a 

process could also prove to be less expensive and less time consuming for background 

investigations and the grant of clearances, as well as more effective in disseminating 

valuable intelligence. Furthermore, States could be empowered as managing partners by 

being “certified” to conduct background investigations. During his recent appearance 

before the panel, we asked the Attorney General if any thought had been given to such a 

new regime. He answered candidly that he did not know. With the urgent requirement to 

get information into the right hands in the most timely and effective way, we strongly 

believe that it is time for such a new system. 

 That DHS develop a training program for State and local officials and elements of 

the private sector for interpreting intelligence products. Many State, local, and 

private sector officials have had limited if any practical experience in how to best use 

intelligence information. Most of these same officials, while not meteorologists, 

understand how to make operational decisions based on weather forecasts because they 

understand the inherent variables in the data. The same needs to be true with shared 

intelligence. How best to utilize important intelligence product is just as important as the 

product itself for sound decisionmaking. 

In the information sharing arena, we recommend that DHS establish comprehensive

procedures, with definitive standards for the equipment and software vehicles, for sharing 

information with relevant State and local officials. There is no central repository and 

clearinghouse for information related to combating terrorism. There are legacy systems that 

should be integrated and new ones that should be established. 

Research and Development and Related Standards 

The Department of Homeland Security has a substantial research and development role. In its 

second year of funding, it has a research and development budget request of 1.0 billion dollars, 

giving it the eighth largest research and development budget among Federal departments and 

33 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

independent Federal research agencies. Research and development should not be limited to 

technology. There is a host of policy, organizational, and legal issues that need urgent attention. 

The sudden and large commitment of resources to a new mission carries with it some important 

challenges. Chief among these challenges is for the Department of Homeland Security to 

organize and coordinate an effective research and development program amidst great uncertainty 

and across numerous operational needs. Moreover, DHS will have to contend with the 

challenges of implementing and coordinating research in an arena in which the organizations 

conducting research are almost entirely unrelated to the organizations that must implement the 

results of that research. Finally, Department of Homeland Security's research and development 

efforts will have to be developed mindful of the fact that substantial fractions of both the 

research and user communities largely are outside of the department. 

Although DHS is given some R&D coordinating authority under the Homeland Security Act of 

2002, that coordinating mechanism needs to be specified. We recommend the formal 

establishment, by Executive Order of Presidential Decision Directive, of a Federal 

Interagency Homeland Security Research and Development Council, chaired by the 

Secretary of Homeland Security (or his designee) and with representatives of Federal R&D 

entities as well as end users. Within that process, R&D should be categorized and prioritized 

across the entire Federal government, for internal (Federal laboratory) and external (contract and 

grant) programs. That process must also include input from end users at the State and local 

levels, and from the private sector, both on requirements and on the utility of developed and 

emerging technologies. Moreover, that process must include procedures for establishing national 

standards for equipment and technology, with government and private sector involvement. 

Funding and Resources

 

Billions of Federal dollars are now flowing to State and localities. While these dollars will 

undoubtedly improve preparedness in many areas, the lack of a national implementation plan, 

standards, prioritization and clear guidance on objectives may be leading to ineffective 

application of these monies. We are poised to make measurable improvement in the nations 

readiness but only if we pursue a disciplined and deliberate approach that ensures at the end of 

the day that we have spent limited resources wisely and to the best ends. 

The RAND survey found a positive relationship between receipt of funding and other resources 

since 9/11 and the assignment of a higher priority to spending departmental resources on 

terrorism preparedness. In particular, differences in priority between State and local 

organizations may reflect differences in the distribution and receipt of funding from the Federal 

government (as well as from other sources) following the 9/11 attacks. The initial influx of 

Federal funds focused on State governments (since in many cases they provide or fund public 

health services at the local level) and on bioterrorism preparedness. Differences in priority 

assigned to terrorism preparedness may partly reflect differences in organizational mission. For 

example, State organizations that have an overall emergency preparedness mission versus firstresponder organizations, such as law enforcement or fire services, which have a broader public 

safety mission. 

A recurring theme from State and local organizations was that they needed funding support for 

such activities as training and equipping, as well as for conducting risk assessments. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Organizations cited limited training and equipment procurement budgets, as well as competing 

or higher departmental budget priorities, as factors limiting their ability to purchase specialized 

equipment for terrorism preparedness and to participate in Federally sponsored training or 

equipment programs. Primarily, State and local organizations were looking toward DHS for 

financial support in these areas. (For more detailed survey information, see Appendix D.) 

Prognostication about the amount of funding that the Federal government should provide in the 

near future is premature at best. Recent calls for the funding upward of $100 billion is, in our 

view, not the wisest approach. Federal funds have started to flow. Absent a more clear 

articulation of an end state, and the levels of preparedness sought to be achieved—with some

reasonable way to measure our efforts—any attempt to establish an overall price tag is mere 

speculation and could be politically unwise. Moreover, we have consistently said that “one size

doesn’t fit all;” we should develop and implement a more logical process for improving capacity 

that just pushing increasingly more money into the system. We should evaluate efforts 

underway, continue to develop a better system of requirements generation, and refine priorities 

for funding along the way. 

To ensure improving and continued preparedness the Federal Government should continue to 

provide sustained, assured levels of Federal funding, so that States and localities can plan and 

implement programs with both Federal and their own funding with more certainty about the 

funding available. One process could be multi-year funding that will allow States and

communities to plan more effectively over time.

17 A finite time frame may be subject to 

adjustment because of another series of attacks. That being said, States and communities should 

also recognize that they should not expect a multi-year funding program to be extended as it 

nears it end and should resist the temptation to lobby accordingly unless there is a significantly 

compelling reason. 

This funding should be provided through formula or other types of grants based on risk—threat 

and vulnerability considerations (where population is only one measure of vulnerability). 

Funding should not be based on consideration of vulnerability (or fear) alone. Performance 

measures must be established and evaluations conducted to ensure that funds are actually used 

wisely and are effectively improving or maintaining preparedness. As previously noted, risk 

based funding makes good practical sense but current threat and vulnerability data is not 

sufficient to implement such a process in the near term. 

Psychological Preparedness 

Preparing the nation for the psychological and behavioral consequences associated with 

terrorism involves more than just a strategic communication plan. Individuals not only need 

information and resources to help them understand and interpret the risks associated with 

terrorism, they need tools to help them prepare for and cope with the potential physical, 

psychological, and behavioral consequences associated with threatened and real acts of 

terrorism. This requires a broad, public health and education based model not only to inform and 

educate, but also to create community based resources for support or treatment. Such a 

community-based approach should involve not only public health officials and agencies, but 

 

17 The COPS program provides a useful example of States and communities ability to plan on sustained assistance 

over a five-year period. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

must involve the private health care providers and other non-traditional health care and 

psychological support providers, including schools, local civic organizations, and the faith based 

community as active partners. 

This community-based model will facilitate trust, enable better communication, and promote 

greater adherence to public health recommendations, while at the same time help in alleviating 

the psychological distress and potential negative behavioral consequences. Preparedness and 

response mechanisms must recognize that psychological distress and behavioral reactions are 

normal and will likely be common following a threatened or real event; yet not everyone will 

require a formalized mental health intervention. While not minimizing the importance of an 

evidence-based mental health response for those most in need, we must also recognize the need 

to address acute and long term psychological distress and behavioral reactions. For example, the 

nation’s ability to respond effectively to a terrorist event will depend upon public cooperation. 

Yet, we know that following terrorist events, psychological distress and heightened anxiety can 

result in behavioral actions that will impede the response effort, including when individuals take 

unwarranted response actions (such as spontaneous evacuation or taking unnecessary 

medications). It also has significant economic implications, manifested in absenteeism and 

decreased productivity. The Panel heard compelling testimony on potential approaches to 

“shielding” the population during biological incidents. This concept recognizes that educating 

and informing citizens ahead of incidents could achieve higher compliance of protective 

measures while minimizing overall disruption to community life. 

To address these issues and create comprehensive preparedness and response plans at all levels, 

Federal leadership is needed to indicate the importance of the psychological and behavioral 

readiness component by creating the funding opportunities for resiliency building and requiring 

accountability for State and local public health agencies to design and implement programs 

based on evidence. In a recent report, an Institute of Medicine committee established 

specifically to consider these issues made several cogent recommendations for limiting the 

psychological consequences of terrorism during all phases of a terrorism event, including before 

an event occurs.18 First, they recommended that DHHS (including NIH, SAMHSA, and CDC) 

develop evidence based techniques, training and education in psychological first aid to address 

all hazards and all members of society and that the same develop public health surveillance and 

methods for applying the findings of this surveillance through appropriate interventions for 

groups of special interest. Further they recommended that academic healthcare centers, 

professional associations and societies for mental health professionals, and state board of 

education, in collaboration with DHHS (including SAMHSA, NIH, and CDC), ensure the 

education and training of mental health care providers, including community- and school-based 

mental health care providers, relevant professionals in health fields, including primary care 

providers, school-based health care providers, public health officials, and the public safety 

sector, and a range of relevant community leaders and ancillary providers. In addition, the 

Committee recommended that NIOSH, the Department of Labor, and the Department of 

Education ensure the existence of appropriate guidelines to protect workers in a variety of work 

environments; that Federal agencies should coordinate research agendas, cooperate in 

establishing funding mechanisms, and award timely and sufficient funding on best practices for 

 

18 National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine (2003) Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of

Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy. Butler, Panzer, and Goldfrank, Editors. National Academies Press, 

Washington, DC

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

interventions; and that DHHS and DHS analyze terrorism preparedness to ensure that the public 

health infrastructure is prepared to respond. Finally, the Committee suggested that Federal, state, 

and local disaster planners should address psychological consequences in their planning and 

preparedness and resources. 

We recommend: 

1. Implementation of the IOM Committee’s recommendations 

2. That Congress provide increased funding to DHS and DHHS for States and local 

agencies, and that DHS and DHHS require and monitor State and local compliance 

of incorporating in plans an appropriate focus on psychological and behavioral 

consequence preparedness and management 

3. That DHS and DHHS create a Federal joint task force on these issues 

Agroterrorism 

To date, terrorists have not yet successfully carried out or even attempted (as far as we know) a 

large-scale agricultural attack. Yet, attacks against agriculture could emerge as a favored form of 

secondary aggression. A major terrorist attack on the U.S. agricultural sector would have serious 

economic impact and could undermine the public’s confidence in government. Further, if the 

disease were transmissible to humans, there could be significant adverse public health 

consequences. The agricultural sector is vulnerable to deliberate and natural introductions of 

disease for several reasons,19 all the more threatening because the capabilities required for 

exploiting them are not significant. 

If an attack were perpetrated, emergency assistance funds for crop and livestock disease 

outbreaks are nearly non-existent. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 specifically 

excludes crop and livestock from Federal compensation programs from insured losses. The 

USDA simply advises producers to purchase private insurance as their primary risk management 

strategy. Emergency compensation for livestock established under the 21 U.S. Code Chapter 4 

(on seizure, quarantine, and disposal of livestock or poultry to guard against introduction or 

dissemination of communicable disease) requires the USDA to compensate owners of any 

animal, carcass, product, or article destroyed within a quarantine zone at the fair market value of 

the destroyed asset but does not account for the significant losses caused by decontamination, 

lost income, and reduced production capacity. On the crop side, the Agriculture Risk Protection 

Act of 2000 gives the Secretary of Agriculture the "ability to prohibit or restrict the importation, 

exportation, and the interstate movement of plants, plant products, certain biological control 

organisms, noxious weeds, and plant pests." If implemented, the Act only provides the Secretary 

with the option to provide compensation for economic losses. 

USDA is, nevertheless making changes to meet these challenges,20 including: 

• The formation of a Homeland Security Council, 

 

19The vulnerabilities are taken directly from Hitting America's Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate 

Biological Attacks Against the U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry, Peter Chalk, MG-135-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2004). 20This information is taken from Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman’s Statement to Panel September 9, 2003 at

Appendix M.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

• The institution of a dedicated Homeland Security Staff, 

• The implementation of the “Select Agents Rule,”21 and 

• A pilot program for the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN).22

USDA has also developed guidance on communications for State and local partners; upgraded 

security systems in the field offices; and enhanced training. For food supply protection, USDA 

has participated in drills to enhance government response coordination; conducted threat and 

vulnerability assessments; moved to develop an integrated food security plan; increased biosecurity testing and surveillance measures; enhanced physical security and diagnostic capacities 

at laboratories; and implemented Consumer Complaint Monitoring. USDA has also addressed 

USDA Laboratory security including pathogen control and cyber security. It is implementing a 

USDA National Incident Management System in conjunction with DHS. 

USDA plans to expand laboratory networks, increase lab security, improve diagnostic, 

prevention, and treatment capabilities; expand the plant lab network through standard operating 

procedures and inter-regional communication and by creating a national monitoring database. In 

addition, USDA plans to hire 80 additional field inspectors; increase on-site farm checks; 

improve communication with the private sector; and coordinate efforts with DHHS and DHS. 

Although these efforts represent a first step, several areas require increased attention. Measures 

need to be undertaken to create a partnership of Federal, State, local and private sector entities to 

secure the industry from deliberate disruption and sabotage. These initiatives would also have the 

dual-use benefit of strengthening overall prevention and response efforts in relation to naturallyoccurring disease outbreaks. While USDA is increasing personnel, a 1% increase in inspectors is 

unlikely to make a significant difference given the thousands of agricultural facilities in the 

United States. Other issues include insufficient personnel and laboratory capacity, such as 

appropriately secured disease research laboratories (the USDA still lacks any BSL-4 facilities),23

and too few veterinarians trained to diagnose and treat foreign/exotic animal pathogens. 

Coordination and standardization with State, local, and private participants in the agricultural 

sector is still lacking and forensic and information collaboration with relevant members of the 

intelligence and criminal justice communities remains inadequate. Added to these problems is 

inconsistent food surveillance and inspections at processing and packing plants and an 

emergency response program that is limited by an unreliable passive disease-reporting system

and a lack of trust between regulators and producers. 

To address these shortcomings, we recommend that the President designate DHS as the lead 

and USDA as the technical advisor on all homeland security issues regarding food safety 

and agriculture and emergency preparedness across the full spectrum of activities from 

awareness through response and recovery. 

Both DHS and USDA must foster better cooperation among states and producers. USDA should 

work to prioritize R&D and security resources; further increase the number and capabilities of

 

21 7 CFR part 331 and 9 CFR part 121, Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins, mandated by

the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002. 22The NAHLN designates the National Veterinary Services Laboratory as the lead animal health laboratory and 

allows selected State and academic laboratories to work in foreign animal disease surveillance and related services. 23 In the panel’s Fourth Report, Plum Island was mistakenly identified as a BSL-4 facility; it is BSL-3.

38 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal, State, and local personnel with the skills to identify/treat exotic foreign animal diseases; 

foster more coordinated and standardized links with the intelligence and law enforcement 

communities; review the effectiveness of the passive disease reporting system through Federal 

and State outreach, information, and indemnity programs; and evaluate the short-term cost versus 

long-term benefit of upgrading biosecurity at food processing and packing plants. Over the 

longer-term, a national strategy must include processes to standardize and integrate food supply 

and agricultural safety measures within Federal, State, and local agencies and the private 

sector.24

Role of the Military 

The potential for serious infringement of liberties stemming from the domestic deployment of 

troops could be significantly reduced by the development of Rules for the Use of Force for 

activities inside the United States and its territories; rigorous training; and publicly articulated 

standards and procedures for determining when the military is conducting a military operation in 

its homeland defense role and when it is conducting law enforcement activities. These issues 

need to be fully discussed in the public arena so that the American people understand and are 

prepared for the military’s intervention, should that become necessary. 

Furthermore, there should be a well coordinated, clearly defined set of roles and missions for the 

military, including the National Guard, where the military is expected to support State and local 

government in response to terrorism, as well as other hazards. Ideally, civilian response 

capabilities will be improved to such an extent that there will be minimal requirements for the 

military to provide support to civil authorities. As a result, both the active and reserve 

components can concentrate on traditional military missions. In the meantime, in the broader 

scheme of Federal funding for support to States and localities, near-term military roles and 

missions should not detract from enhanced funding, training, and equipping for State and local 

responders. 

Congress should consider working with the Administration to develop, in statute as 

supplemented by Executive Order, new guidelines and procedures for domestic intelligence 

collection by the military. Definitions may need to be revisited, or additional safeguards added, 

in order to address the challenges of this unconventional war. 

 

24 In part from Hitting America's Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate Biological Attacks Against the 

U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry, Peter Chalk, MG-135-OSD, 2004. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

CONCLUSION 

This panel firmly believes that it has contributed materially to the national debate and has been 

instrumental in advancing homeland security dialogue and action across the nation. Over the 

five years of its tenure, we were able to consider the fundamental challenges of combating 

terrorism, making comprehensive findings and recommendations both prior and subsequent to 

September 11. Our work is reflected in many of the advances the nation has made in recent 

years. 

We complete our work with a great sense of pride. We thank all of those who have contributed 

to our efforts. We believe our work reflects the hope and desire of every American for a more 

secure homeland—one that also preserves our essential liberty in the process. 

The panel recognizes that its responsibility transcends the completion of this effort and should 

empower other similar entities to take significant steps to make the shared goal of a safer and 

more secure America a reality. Accordingly, we are providing a copy of this report and our four 

previous reports to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also 

known as the “9-11 Commission”) with the hope that it will measurably assist and inform their 

efforts. 

Our duties now completed, the panel members, individually and collectively, recognize that we 

must remain resolute in our efforts to achieve a more secure homeland. The tragedy of 

September 11th remains a vivid image, especially the loss of our friend and fellow panel member 

Chief Ray Downey and the thousands of others who died that day—a compelling reminder of the 

importance of our work. We are reminded of the ancient Athenian saying: "The true statesman is 

one who plants a tree knowing he will never personally enjoy its shade." 

We now entrust our work to the thousands of dedicated Americans in and out of government 

who are working tirelessly every day to attain these laudable and noble goals. 

40 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

TABLE OF APPENDICES 

Appendix A—Enabling Legislation..........................................................................................................A-1 

Appendix B—Panel Chair and Members.................................................................................................. B-1 

Appendix C—Persons Interviewed........................................................................................................... C-1 

Appendix D—Survey Analysis and Information......................................................................................D-1

 Tab 1—Methods ..........................................................................................................................D-1-1 

 Tab 2—Details Of Comparison Between Distribution Of Funding And Support And Preparedness 

Activities......................................................................................................................D-2-1 

 Tab 3—Participation in Federally Sponsored Programs Since 9/11............................................D-3-1 

 Tab 4—Weighting and Sampling Design ....................................................................................D-4-1 

 Tab 5—The Survey Instrument....................................................................................................D-5-1 

 Tab 6—Fire Department Survey..................................................................................................D-6-1 

 Tab 7—Survey Tabulations.........................................................................................................D-7-1 

 Tab 8—Survey Comments...........................................................................................................D-8-1 

Appendix E—Civil Liberties in a Post-9/11 World.................................................................................. E-1 

 Tab—Summary of Key Provisions of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001.................................... E-15 

Appendix F—Burden Sharing ...................................................................................................................F-1 

Appendix G—Creating the Department of Homeland Security ...............................................................G-1 

Appendix H—Developing a Strategy for Research and Development in the Department of Homeland 

Security ...........................................................................................................................H-1 

Appendix I— Communications Interoperability and Emergency Response ..............................................I-1 

Appendix J— Trends in Terrorism............................................................................................................J-1 

Appendix K—Status of Previous Advisory Panel Recommendations......................................................K-1 

Appendix L—Side-by-Side Comparison of Alternative Visions.............................................................. L-1 

Appendix M—Testimony of Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman, September 9, 2003.................... M-1 

Appendix N—Statement by C. Michael Armstrong, The Business Roundtable ......................................N-1 

Appendix O— List of Abbreviations........................................................................................................O-1 

Appendix P— Panel Activities – Calendar Year 2003 ..............................................................................P-1 

Appendix Q— RAND Staff Providing Support to the Advisory Panel....................................................Q-1 

41 
APPENDICES 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

APPENDIX A--ENABLING LEGISLATION 

Following is an extract of the legislation, sponsored by Representative Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, which created

the Advisory Panel and provided its mandate. 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

An Extract of Public Law 105-261 (105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998) 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

SEC. 1405. ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM 

INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. 

a. REQUIREMENT FOR PANEL- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of 

Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

shall enter into a contract with a federally funded research and development center to establish a panel to assess the 

capabilities for domestic response to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. 

b. COMPOSITION OF PANEL; SELECTION- (1) The panel shall be composed of members who shall be private 

citizens of the United States with knowledge and expertise in emergency response matters. (2) Members of the panel shall 

be selected by the federally funded research and development center in accordance with the terms of the contract 

established pursuant to subsection (a). 

c. PROCEDURES FOR PANEL- The federally funded research and development center shall be responsible for 

establishing appropriate procedures for the panel, including procedures for selection of a panel chairman. 

d. DUTIES OF PANEL- The panel shall-- 

1. assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; 

2. assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass 

destruction; 

3. assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, including a review of 

unfunded communications, equipment, and planning requirements, and the needs of maritime regions; 

4. recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to Federal agency weapons of mass destruction 

response efforts, and for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for weapons of mass destruction incidents; 

and 

5. assess the appropriate roles of State and local government in funding effective local response capabilities. 

e. DEADLINE TO ENTER INTO CONTRACT- The Secretary of Defense shall enter into the contract required 

under subsection (a) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

f. DEADLINE FOR SELECTION OF PANEL MEMBERS- Selection of panel members shall be made not later 

than 30 days after the date on which the Secretary enters into the contract required by subsection (a). 

g. INITIAL MEETING OF THE PANEL- The panel shall conduct its first meeting not later than 30 days after the 

date that all the selections to the panel have been made. 

h. REPORTS- (1) Not later than 6 months after the date of the first meeting of the panel, the panel shall submit to the 

President and to Congress an initial report setting forth its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving 

Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass 

destruction. (2) Not later than December 15 of each year, beginning in 1999 and ending in 2001, the panel shall 

submit to the President and to the Congress a report setting forth its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for 

improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of 

mass destruction. 

i. COOPERATION OF OTHER AGENCIES- (1) The panel may secure directly from the Department of Defense, 

the Department of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, or any other Federal department or agency information that the panel considers 

necessary for the panel to carry out its duties. (2) The Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 

Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

and any other official of the United States shall provide the panel with full and timely cooperation in carrying out its 

duties under this section. 

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

An Extract of Public Law 107-107, December 28, 2001 (107th Congress, 1st Session) 

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

SEC. 1514. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE 

CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. 

(a) EXTENSION OF ADVISORY PANEL.—Section 1405 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 1999 (50 U.S.C. 2301 note) is amended—

(1) in subsection (h)(2), by striking ‘‘2001’’ and inserting ‘‘2003’’; and 

(2) in subsection (l), by striking ‘‘three years’’ and inserting ‘‘five years’’. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

APPENDIX B--PANEL CHAIR AND MEMBERS 

Current Members Expertise 

James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney at Law, and former Governor of the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, Chairman

State government

George Foresman, Deputy Director, Office of Commonwealth 

Preparedness, Commonwealth of Virginia, Vice Chairman

Emergency response—State

L. Paul Bremer, Presidential Envoy and Administrator of the 

Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq; Former Ambassador-atLarge for Counter-Terrorism, U.S. Department of State (Member 

until May 5, 2003)

Michael Freeman, Chief, Los Angeles County Fire Department

Counterterrorism

Emergency response—local 

William Garrison (Major General, U.S. Army, Retired), Corporate 

Executive, and Former Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command's Delta Force

Military special operations

Ellen M. Gordon, Administrator, Emergency Management Division, 

Department of Public Defense, State of Iowa, and Past President, 

National Emergency Management Association 

Emergency response—State

James Greenleaf, Independent Consultant, and Former Associate 

Deputy for Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Law enforcement—Federal

William Jenaway, Independent Consultant, and Chief of Fire and 

Rescue Services, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

Emergency response—local

William Dallas Jones, Director, Office of Emergency Services, State 

of California

Emergency response—State

Paul M. Maniscalco, University Assistant Professor, Past President, 

National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians, and 

Deputy Chief/Paramedic, City of New York Fire Department, EMSC

Emergency response—local

John O. Marsh, Jr., Attorney at Law, former Secretary of the Army, 

and former Member of Congress

Government structure, interagency

coordination, cyber, and legal 

Kathleen O'Brien, University Executive, and former City 

Coordinator, City of Minneapolis, Minnesota

Municipal government

M. Patricia Quinlisk, M.D., Medical Director/State Epidemiologist, 

Department of Public Health, State of Iowa

Health—State

Patrick Ralston, Executive Director, Indiana State Emergency

Management Agency; Executive Director, Department of Fire and

Building Services; and Executive Director, Public Safety Training 

Institute, State of Indiana

Emergency response—State

William Reno (Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired), Corporate 

Executive, former Senior Vice President of Operations, American 

Red Cross

Non-governmental organizations

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Kenneth Shine, M.D., Policy Analyst, and former President, 

Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences

Health—Federal

Alan D. Vickery, Deputy Chief, Special Operations, Seattle Fire 

Department 

Emergency response—local 

Hubert Williams, President, The Police Foundation Law enforcement/civil liberties

NON-VOTING PARTICIPANTS 

John Hathaway, U.S. Department of Defense Representative 

John Lombardi, U.S. Department of Defense Alternative Representative 

Michael A. Wermuth, Senior Policy Analyst, RAND, Executive Project Director 

Jennifer Brower, Senior Policy Analyst, RAND, Co-Project Director

FORMER MEMBERS

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense 

James R. Clapper, Jr. (Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Retired), former panel Vice 

Chairman; Director, National Imagery and Mapping Administration; former Director, 

Defense Intelligence Agency

 

James Q. Wilson, Ph.D., former Harvard and UCLA professor; Member, board of trustees, 

American Enterprise Institute; former member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board 

Richard Falkenrath, Office of Homeland Security; former Associate Professor, John F. 

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Ronald S. Neubauer, Chief of Police, St. Peters, Missouri, and Past President, International 

Association of Chiefs of Police

Raymond Downey, Deputy Chief, and Commander, Special Operations, Fire Department 

of the City of New York (Killed in the Line of Duty, New York City, September 11, 2001) 

John Gannon, Staff Director, Select Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of 

Representatives; former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; and former Chairman, 

National Intelligence Council 

Joseph Samuels, Jr., Chief of Police, Richmond, California, and Immediate Past President, 

International Association of Chief of Police 

 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

JAMES S. GILMORE III—CHAIRMAN 

Jim Gilmore is a former Governor of Virginia (1998-2002) and a partner at the law firm of Kelley Drye

and Warren, where he practices corporate and technology law, and counsels clients on homeland security

matters. He received his undergraduate degree from the University of Virginia and attended the 

University of Virginia Law School, from which he graduated in 1977. Gilmore worked for over a decade 

as a lawyer in a private practice. In 1993, Mr. Gilmore was elected Virginia Attorney General, a post that 

he held until his election as Governor in 1997. Gilmore has been the Chairman of the Congressional 

Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 

Destruction since its inception in 1999. He also chaired the national Advisory Commission on Electronic

Commerce, which was charged with making recommendations to Congress on Internet taxation. He was 

appointed by President Bush to serve on the Board of Visitors of the United States Air Force Academy,

and was elected President of the Board by the members. He is a Distinguished Fellow at the Heritage 

Foundation. 

GEORGE WILLIAMSON FORESMAN—VICE CHAIRMAN 

George Foresman currently holds the Cabinet rank post of Deputy Assistant to the Governor for 

Commonwealth Preparedness for the Commonwealth of Virginia, appointed by Governor Mark Warner 

in January 2002, and is responsible for ensuring Virginia’s preparedness for emergencies and disasters of 

all kinds, including terrorism. He is also responsible for Continuity of Operations and Continuity of 

Government activities and serves as special liaison for the Governor with Virginia’s military installations 

and commands. Previously, Foresman was appointed by former Governor James S. Gilmore to the post 

of Deputy State Coordinator of Emergency Management. In 1985, he joined the Virginia Department of 

Emergency Management where he did work with disaster grants management, local and state planning,

risk and hazard reduction, special projects, intergovernmental relations and operations. Together, 

Foresman has nearly twenty years of local and state level public safety response and executive leadership 

experience. He is nationally recognized as an expert on emergency preparedness, homeland security and 

government management issues and active with numerous national and state associations. He is a 

graduate of the Virginia Military Institute. 

L. PAUL BREMER, III 

Jerry Bremer was named Presidential Envoy to Iraq on May 6, 2003 and in this capacity is the 

Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Until that appointment, he had been a member of 

the Advisory Panel since its inception in 1999. Bremer served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 

of the Marsh Crisis Consulting Company until May 2003. From 1989 to 2000, he was Managing Director 

of Kissinger Associates, headed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Bremer spent 23 years in 

the U.S. State Department, serving in embassies in Afghanistan, Malawi, Norway and the Netherlands. 

President Reagan named him Ambassador to the Netherlands in 1983 where he served for three years. 

Ambassador Bremer also served as President Reagan's Ambassador-at-Large for Counter Terrorism. In 

1999, Ambassador Bremer was appointed Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism. 

Ambassador Bremer was also appointed to the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council in June 

2002. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

P. MICHAEL FREEMAN 

Michael Freeman is the Fire Chief of the Los Angeles County Fire Department, a position he has held 

since February of 1989. The Department provides fire protection and emergency medical services to 

more than 3 million residents in 2,200 square miles and 57 cities within the County of Los Angeles. 

Chief Freeman has successfully led the Department through numerous large-scale emergencies, including 

the 1993 brush fires and the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, and most recently, the 2003 Fire Siege. Under 

his leadership, the Department has grown with the addition of specialized services including Urban 

Search and Rescue, Swiftwater Response Teams, and state-of-the-art Firehawk helicopters. Chief 

Freeman majored in Business and Personnel Management at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, 

Texas. He is the Chairman of the FIRESCOPE Board of Directors; a member of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency's National Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Advisory Committee; Chairman of 

the International Association of Fire Chiefs Terrorism Committee; and mutual aid coordinator for a fivecounty area in Southern California. Chief Freeman also serves on the Department of Homeland Security

Emergency Response Senior Advisory Committee. 

MAJOR GENERAL (RET) WILLIAM F. GARRISON 

Bill Garrison, a retired U.S. Army Major General, has over thirty years of direct experience involving 

terrorism, intelligence, security management, emergency response training, and tactical operations. 

Garrison was a member of the U.S. Army’s Special Forces and commanded the Delta Force. Currently, 

Garrison supports the U.S. State Department’s Antiterrorism Training Assistant Program (ATAP), the 

Department of Justice International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP), 

and the Department of Energy Defense Program’s for Emergency Response. He has extensive experience 

in conduction intelligence assessments and managing intelligence operations, combined with training 

management and tactical responses to threat scenarios. 

ELLEN M. GORDON 

Ellen Gordon, who has held the position of Administrator of Iowa Emergency Management Division 

since July 1986, was additionally appointed as Iowa Homeland Security Advisor in October 2001. In this 

post, she has led the State of Iowa through numerous State disasters, including the United Airlines 232 

Crash in Sioux City, the most costly and widespread flooding disaster in the State’s history, severe ice 

storms, tornadoes and the State’s largest chemical release incident. Prior to her appointment at the State 

level, Gordon had eight years of local government emergency management experience. Ms. Gordon is a 

Past-President of the National Emergency Management Association after serving several years as a 

NEMA Regional Vice President. She now sits as the head of the NEMA Homeland Security Committee. 

Gordon is also a former member of the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government Executive 

Session on Domestic Preparedness and a member of the Iowa Emergency Response Commission. 

JAMES W. GREENLEAF 

For more than twenty-six years, James Greenleaf served the FBI in positions in Virginia, Minnesota, 

Washington, DC, Illinois, Massachusetts and London, England. After completing his training at 

Quantico, Virginia he served in Minneapolis, Norfolk, Virginia, and Washington, DC. Greenleaf then 

held the position of Assistant Special Agent in Charge in Chicago. In 1981, he was placed in charge of 

the FBI’s Inspection Division. From 1982 to 1986, Greenleaf was the Special Agent in Charge of the 

Boston Field Office. After this post, Greenleaf was named FBI Assistant Director in Charge of Training 

and Director of the FBI Academy. In 1989, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency appointed 

Greenleaf CIA Director of Public Affairs. He returned to the FBI in 1990, as Associate Deputy Director 

for Administration. In 1992, Greenleaf was assigned as the Legal Attaché in London where he remained 

until his retirement in July 1994. Since his retirement, Greenleaf has worked as a consultant to NBC 

Television and to the Laborers’ International Union of North America, assisting the Union in its efforts to 

rid itself of organized crime influences. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

DR. WILLIAM F. JENAWAY

Dr. William Jenaway has spent over thirty years as a field specialist in the area of insurance risk control 

and risk management. Currently, Jenaway holds the position of Executive Vice President of VFIS, the 

country's largest insurer of emergency service organizations. Jenaway holds AS, BS, MA and PhD 

Degrees, and has authored seven books and published over 200 magazine articles. Jenaway has been a 

member of the volunteer fire services in his hometown of King of Prussia, Pennsylvania for almost thirty

years, including holding the position of Chief of Fire and Rescue Services. He is an expert in Fire Service 

Risk Management and Disaster and Emergency Planning, and has served as the Chairman of the Risk 

Management Committee of the National Fire Protection Association, and as President of the 

Congressional Fire Services Institute. Jenaway is also an adjunct professor of Risk Analysis and Disaster 

Management in the graduate school of St. Joseph's University in Philadelphia. 

WILLIAM DALLAS JONES 

For the past five years, Dallas Jones has been the Director of the California Governor's Office of 

Emergency Services (OES). He has directed state emergency response and recovery operations for 

numerous disasters, including a severe freeze, two serious earthquakes, and several wildfires, including 

the recent 2003 South California Fire Siege. Since the September 11th attacks, Mr. Jones has directed 

California's anti-terrorism planning, preparedness, and response operations. He is also Chairman of the 

California Emergency Council and the Governor's School Violence Prevention and Response Task Force. 

Additionally, Jones serves as the Vice President for the National Emergency Management Association 

(NEMA)'s Region IX, as well as the Director of the Western States Seismic Policy Council (WSSPC). 

Prior to his position at the State level, Jones served for 32 years with the Los Angeles County Fire 

Department, 16 years of which he was the President of the Los Angeles County Fire Fighters. Jones also 

served as Vice President of both the California Labor Federation and the Los Angeles County Federation 

of Labor. 

PAUL M. MANISCALCO

Paul M. Maniscalco (MPA, EMT/P) is an Assistant Professor with The George Washington University

School of Medicine and Health Sciences. Maniscalco is an active member of the National Association of 

Emergency Medical Technicians (NAEMT), a current member of its Board of Directors and a 

NAEMT Past President. Maniscalco is also Chairman of the NAEMT National EMS Administrators 

Division. For over twenty-nine years, Maniscalco has been working in the areas of public safety

emergency response, planning, training, supervision and management. During this tenure he rose through

the ranks of the City of New York EMS & FDNY to Deputy Chief /Paramedic. As an academic, 

Maniscalco has many published works on the Emergency Medical Service, fire service, management, 

special operations, terrorism, public safety, and national security issues. 

JOHN O. MARSH, JR. 

Jack Marsh is a native of Virginia. He enlisted in the United States Army in WWII and received a 

commission at age 19 by graduation from Infantry Officer Candidate School. A graduate in Law from

Washington and Lee University, he practiced in Strasburg, Virginia until elected to the 88th Congress in 

1962, where he served four terms. He was a member of the House Appropriations Committee. Choosing 

not to seek a fifth term, he resumed the practice of law. In 1973 he returned to Federal service holding the 

positions of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), Assistant for National Security Affairs 

to Vice-President Ford, and later Counsellor, with Cabinet Rank, to President Ford. He chaired for 

President Ford the special cabinet level panel that recommended to the President measures for the 

reorganization and reform of U. S. intelligence community. In 1981, Marsh was sworn in as Secretary of 

the Army, a position he held for over eight years, to become the longest serving military Secretary in 

U. S. history. After WWII service, he joined the Virginia National Guard, retiring after twenty-three years 

of Guard service. Marsh is currently a Distinguished Professor of Law at George Mason University where 

he teaches in the field of Cyber issues and National Security Law. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

KATHLEEN O’BRIEN 

As vice president for University Services at the University of Minnesota, Kathleen O’Brien serves as an 

innovative executive who provides strategic direction and strong execution. Under her leadership, nearly

3,000 employees have undergone a reorganization that has brought a new level of accountability, more 

effective management systems, and a renewed emphasis on customer service to the organization. 

University Services, with a $300 million annual operating budget includes units and departments such as: 

Facilities Management, Capital Planning and Project Management, Auxiliary Services, Public Safety, 

Environmental Health and the Building Code Officials. Currently, O’Brien leads several University

committees, including the President’s Initiative on Sustainability, the Capital Oversight Group, and 

University Master Plan Update. From 1994 to 2002, O’Brien served as City Coordinator for the City of 

Minneapolis, Minnesota, where she oversaw a $75 million annual budget and 800 full-time employees. 

O’Brien was instrumental in the success of several major projects including the Convention Center 

Expansion, the Empowerment Zone and the new Central Library. O’Brien served as Chief of Staff for 

University of Minnesota President Nils Hasselmo from 1989 to 1994. Elected to the Minneapolis City

Council in 1982, O’Brien represented the city’s Second Ward and University community for seven and a 

half years. Kathleen O’Brien is a 1967 graduate of the College of St. Catherine in St. Paul, received a 

Masters of Arts Degree from Marquette University in Milwaukee and completed coursework toward a 

PhD in history at the University of Minnesota. 

 

DR. PATRICIA QUINLISK

Dr. Quinlisk is a medical epidemiologist practicing at the Iowa Department of Public Health where she 

also holds the position of Medical Director and the State Epidemiologist. Her background includes 

training as a clinical microbiologist, training microbiologists while a Peace Corps Volunteer in Nepal, a 

Masters of Public Health from Johns Hopkins with an emphasis in infectious disease epidemiology, 

medical school at the University of Wisconsin, and training as a field epidemiologist in the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention's Epidemic Intelligence Service. Yearly, for the last ten years, she has 

conducted weeklong epidemiologic training courses in Europe and teaches regularly at the University of 

Iowa, Des Moines University, Iowa State University and other educational institutes throughout the 

Midwest. Dr. Quinlisk serves or has served on a number of national advisory committees including the 

National Vaccine Advisory Committee, the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response 

Force, the DOD's Gilmore Commission, on various Institute of Medicine committees and as President 

of the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE). Recently, she was named to the Board of 

Scientific Counselors for the National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention. 

PATRICK RALSTON 

Since 1997, Pat Ralston has served the State of Indiana as the Executive Director of State Emergency

Management Agency (SEMA), State Fire Marshal, State Building Commissioner and Chairman of the 

Board of the Public Safety Training Institute. In addition to his duties as Executive Director, Ralston 

serves as Chairman of the Indiana Emergency Response Commission, sits on the Governor’s Council for 

Impaired Driving, acts as Secretary for the Emergency Medical Commission, is a member of the Board of 

Fire Fighters Personnel Standards and Education and serves as Chairman of the Board of the Central 

United States Earthquake Consortium. Prior to his work with SEMA, Ralston served as Director of the 

Indiana Department of Natural Resources from 1989-1997. He was recently appointed by the National 

Emergency Management Association to represent State emergency management directors on the board of 

the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

WILLIAM H. RENO 

Bill Reno is the Chief Executive Officer of the Wexford Group International, an international consulting 

company (www.thewexfordgroup.com). The company specializes in high impact consulting in program

management, contract management, human resources, and applications of high technology to military

problem solving. It works extensively in former Warsaw Pact countries to transform their Armed Forces 

into Western Models. Before his work with this group, Reno was the Senior Vice-President of National 

Operations for the American Red Cross, a position that he held from 1992-1997. In this post, Mr. Reno 

was responsible for all financial management, human resources, contract management, audit and 

coordination of programs across the departments within the institution. From 1990-1992, Reno held the 

post of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel for the United States Army, responsible for plans, policies and 

programs for the management of all military and civilian personnel of U.S. Army Active and Reserve 

Component forces. 

KENNETH I. SHINE 

Ken Shine, the former President of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the founding Director of the 

RAND Center for Domestic and International Health Security, was named the Executive Vice Chancellor 

for Health Affairs at the University of Texas in November of 2003. At RAND, Dr. Shine led the Center’s 

efforts to make health a central component of U.S. foreign policy and guide the Center’s evolving 

research agenda. Under Dr. Shine’s leadership, the IOM played an important and visible role in 

addressing key issues in medicine and healthcare. Prior to his work at the IOM, Dr. Shine was Chairman 

of the Council of Deans of the Association of American Medical Colleges from 1991-1992 and was 

President of the American Heart Association from 1985-1986. 

ALAN DENNIS (A.D.) VICKERY 

A.D. Vickery, a 38-year veteran of the Seattle Fire Department, currently holds the rank of Deputy Chief 

of Safety and Homeland Security. During his tenure with the Department, he has worked on both combat 

and administrative positions, covering the entire spectrum of fire service responsibilities. In 1992, the 

Seattle Fire Department became a participant in the national FEMA Urban Search and Rescue program

and Vickery was appointed a Rescue Team Manager, where he worked to improve regional and local 

capability to respond to catastrophic events. In 1994, Vickery became a Task Force Leader of the 

Washington State Team, a position that he retains to this day. Chief Vickery has been deployed to 

numerous national emergencies including the terrorist attacks in Oklahoma City and the 9-11 World 

Trade Center attack. He is Chairman of the Puget Sound Marine Fire Fighting Commission, Co-Chair of 

the State of Washington Committee on Terrorism Equipment Workgroup and active nationally on Fire, 

HazMat, EMS as well as law enforcement first responder issues. Chief Vickery is currently the elected 

Chair of the national InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability (IAB).

HUBERT WILLIAMS 

Hubert Williams, a thirty-year veteran of policing, is the president of the Police Foundation, a

nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to supporting innovation and improvement in policing. He 

has been a leading advocate for professional standards and uniform practices in policing, and has presided 

over the design and implementation of scientific field experiments that are on the leading edge of the 

development of modern police policy and procedure. From 1974-1985, Mr. Williams was the police 

director in Newark, New Jersey, the largest police department in the state during a time in which innercity deterioration, civil unrest, and drug-related crime plagued most of the nation's urban areas. His 

experience in the civil disorders in Newark and his leadership as president of the Police Foundation 

prompted the City of Los Angeles to appoint him as deputy special advisor to the Los Angeles Police 

Commission in the evaluation of the police response to the civil disorder in that city during 1992. 

Williams has also published various texts on the subject of policing.

B-7
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

APPENDIX C--PERSONS INTERVIEWED 

An “interview,” for the purpose of this list, includes a formal presentation to members of the Advisory

Panel, a formal interview by a panel member or support staff, the written submission or exchange of 

information, or discussions about the issues addressed in this report with a panel member or support staff. 

Major General (Ret) Richard Alexander 

National Guard Association of the United States 

Lt. Col. Mark G. Allen 

National Guard Bureau 

Graham Allison, Ph.D. 

Harvard University

Tom Antush 

Transportation Security Administration 

Ann Beauchesne 

National Governors Association 

Richard Behrenhausen 

McCormick Tribune Foundation 

Peter Beering 

US Filter 

Eugene Bowman, J.D., LL.M. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Paul Boyd 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center

Captain Rodney Bullard 

U.S. Air Force 

Sam Brinkley 

Department of State 

Michael Byrne 

Department of Homeland Security 

F. Marion Cain III 

Office for Domestic Preparedness 

Stephen L. Caldwell 

General Accounting Office

Richard Callis 

Emergency Management Institute 

Frank Cilluffo 

Executive Office of the President 

Rudy Cohen 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Brian Cowan 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Hank Christian 

Unconventional Concepts 

Willie Curtis 

U.S. Naval Academy

Darrell Darnell 

Office for Domestic Preparedness 

Raymond Decker 

General Accounting Office

Scott Deitchman, M.D. 

American Medical Association 

Rebecca Denlinger 

Cobb County Georgia Fire Department 

Captain Daniel Donovan 

U.S. Navy

William W. Ellis 

Congressional Research Service

Eugene Fidell

National Institute of Military Justice 

Glenn Fiedelholtz 

SAIC 

Jack Fenimore

Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.) 

Richard Friedman, J.D. 

National Strategy Forum 

David Grange 

McCormick Tribune Foundation 

Don Hamilton

Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 

Terrorism 

David Hamon

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Paul Hankins 

Transportation Security Administration 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Major General David Harris

Adjutant General of Illinois 

Francis Hartmann 

Harvard University

Jane Hindmarsh

California Governor’s Office of Emergency 

Services

Arnold Howitt, Ph.D. 

Harvard University

Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Huckabee 

U.S. Army 

Barbara Kambouris

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Dan Kaniewski 

George Washington University 

Juliette Kayyem, J.D. 

Harvard University

Thomas Kneir 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Peter LaPorte 

Emergency Management Agency 

District of Columbia 

Bruce Lawlor 

Department of Homeland Security 

Scott Layne, M.D. 

University of California at Los Angeles 

Marcelle Layton, M.D. 

New York City Department of Health 

Timothy Lowenberg 

Adjutant General 

State of Washington 

Gene Matthews, J.D. 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

Department of Health and Human Services

The Honorable Edwin Meese 

The Heritage Foundation 

Judith Miller 

Williams & Connolly 

Major General Paul Monroe, Jr. 

California National Guard 

R. Nicholas Palarino, 

Subcommittee on National Security, 

 Veterans Affairs, and International 

 Relations

U.S. House of Representatives

Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker

University of the Pacific 

Ann Petersen, J.D. 

Charles Ramsey

Metropolitan Police Department 

Washington, DC 

Colonel Ronald Reed

U.S. Air Force 

Dennis Reimer 

Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 

Terrorism 

Ford Rowan 

Rown & Blewitt 

Gregory Saathof, MD 

University of Virginia 

Senior Official

Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) 

Senior Official

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 

(ASIO) 

Senior Official

Australian Federal Police (AFP) 

Senior Official

Los Angeles Police Department 

Senior Official

Strategic and Defense Studies Centre (SDSC) 

Australian National University 

The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

United States Senate 

Stephen Sharro 

Emergency Management Institute 

Brendan Shields 

Department of Homeland Security 

Scott Silliman 

Duke University 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Amy Smithson 

The Henry L. Stimson Center 

Brigadier General Annette Sobel 

National Guard Bureau 

Robert Stephan 

Department of Homeland Security 

Darrel Stephens, Charlotte-Mecklenburg North 

Carolina Police Department 

Jessica Stern

Harvard University

Paul Schott Stevens 

Dechert LLP 

Patrick Sullivan 

Cherry Creek Colorado Schools 

John Sullivan 

Los Angeles Sheriff's Department 

Michelle Van Cleave 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Michael Vatis 

Institute for Security Technology Studies 

Dartmouth College 

Peter Verga 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Winston Wiley

Terrorist Threat Integration Center

John Allen Williams 

Loyola University Chicago 

Randy Williamson 

Government Accounting Office 

Frances Edwards-Winslow

San Jose California Office of Emergency 

Services

James Woolsey

Attorney at Law 

Lee Zeichner 

LegalNetWorks 

The Honorable James Ziglar 

Commissioner 

Immigration and Naturalization Service 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

APPENDIX D—SUMMARY OF SELECTED SURVEY RESULTS25

Introduction 

Since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, State and local governments and 

response organizations have focused their attention on preparing for, and responding to, acts of domestic 

terrorism. Of particular concern has been improving State and local response capabilities to deal with 

terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as the use of biological, 

radiological, or chemical weapons. Much activity has focused on what the Federal government itself can 

do to better support the efforts of State and local organizations in the war on terrorism. 

The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (otherwise known as the Gilmore Commission), which was established by Congress on 

October 17, 1998, has been evaluating the progress of Federal preparedness programs for local emergency

response and recommending strategies for effective coordination of preparedness and response efforts 

between Federal, State, and local government and response organizations. 

As part of its support for this effort, and just prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, RAND conducted the first 

wave of a nationwide survey to gather in-depth data about States and local response organizations’ 

assessments of Federal preparedness programs for combating terrorism. Two other survey waves were

conducted in 2002 and 2003. Taken together, the survey waves have gathered in-depth data, beginning

just prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks up through the Fall of 2003, on the planning and preparedness 

activities of the key professional communities involved in preparedness and emergency response: law 

enforcement, fire service, office of emergency management (OEM), emergency medical services (EMS), 

hospitals, and public health. 

We present here a selected summary of the findings from the third wave of the nationwide survey of State 

and local response organizations—Survey III of Federal Preparedness Programs For Combating 

Terrorism—conducted in 2003. The report is organized around five key issues of interest to the Advisory

Panel: (1) intelligence, information, and warning; (2) which incident types State and local organizations 

consider preparations most important for; (3) organizations’ views about funding support needs and the 

association between receipt of funding and preparedness activities; (4) differences between State and 

local organizations in their participation in Federal programs and expectations of the Federal government; 

and (5) involvement of organizations with the private sector. Tab 1 provides a summary of the survey

methods and response rates. 

Organizations want more intelligence about the terrorist threat, but security clearances are lagging 

State and local organizations are looking to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for intelligence 

information and information about the terrorist threat within their jurisdiction or State is one of the areas 

that. Organizations also want more detailed information on the threat and on terrorist capabilities to help 

them in conducting risk assessments. In addition, organizations had a number of suggestions for 

improving the Homeland Advisory System. Between 60-70 percent of State and local organizations 

suggested providing additional information about the threat (type of incident likely to occur, where the 

threat is likely to occur, and during what time period) to help guide them in responding to changes in the 

threat level. Other suggestions for improving the Homeland Advisory System included: (1) using a 

regional alert system to notify emergency responders about threats specific to their jurisdiction/State; (2) 

providing training to emergency responders about what protective actions are necessary at different threat 

 

25 Lois M. Davis, Louis T. Mariano, Jennifer Pace, Sarah K. Cotton, and Paul Steinberg. Tabs 1 and 5 are largely based upon 

RAND PM-1236-OSD, Sampling Design, Respondent Selection, and Construction of Survey Weights for the Federal Weapons of

Mass Destruction Preparedness Programs Survey, by Jerry Jacobson, Ronald Fricker, and Lois Davis (August 2001). 

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levels; and (3) after an increase in threat level, having DHS follow-up on what additional actions ought to 

be taken.26

Since September 11, 2001, about half of law enforcement and half of local and State OEMs have received 

guidance from the FBI about what type of information about suspected terrorist activity should be 

collected and/or passed onto FBI field offices. In comparison, only a quarter of paid/combination fire 

departments and hospitals and only a few volunteer fire departments indicated they have received such 

guidance. 

Despite a desire for more detailed intelligence information since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, State OEMs 

and State public health departments are primarily the organizations that have sought security clearances 

for their personnel (Table 1). This finding is likely related to recent requests by DHS and the Department 

of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for States to apply for such clearances for their senior officials. 

To date, only about half of State OEMs and a third of State public health departments that applied for 

security clearances have received them for at least some of their personnel. 

Because the survey did not ask when organizations had applied for government security clearances, we 

cannot distinguish between those who may have applied only recently versus those that have been waiting 

for a longer period of time. Regardless, there appears to be a mismatch between the desire for more

intelligence information versus ability to access such information. Recently, DHS announced that in 

addition to the State governors, five senior officials within each State would be issued security clearances 

to receive classified information and to allow governors to obtain intelligence information Federal 

agencies may have about specific threats or targets. (These clearances are in addition to the security

clearances to be issued to public health officials).27 However, there is a concern among some State 

officials that the number of security clearances allocated may be too few to account for all their needs. 

Table 1. How Many Organizations Have Applied for and Received Security Clearances Since 9/11? 

Of Those Organizations That Applied, How Many of Their 

Personnel Have Received Clearances? 

(% of Those Orgs That Applied)

Organization Type 

Has Organization

Applied for Security

Clearance(s) Since 9/11? 

(% of All Orgs) All Some None

Local Response Organizations 

Law Enforcement 7 (2) 56 (15) 25 (13) 19 (11) 

Local/Regional EMS* 5 (2) 33 (33) 33 (33) 34 (33) 

Local OEM 6 (2) 60 (18) 30 (15) 10 (8) 

Paid/Combo Fire 2 (1) 89 (10) 6 (8) 5 (4) 

Volunteer Fire 0 (0) -- -- -- 

State Organizations 

State EMS 16 (4) 0 40 (23) 60 (23) 

State OEM 88 (4) 9 (4) 48 (8) 43 (8) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 6 (3) 70 (32) 30 (32) 0 

Local Public Health 8 (4) 97 (3) 1 (1) 3 (3) 

State Public Health 86 (3) 10 (3) 30 (5) 60 (6) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Dashes in the table indicate that a particular organizational type either was not asked 

the question or given a particular response option. . *Local/ regional EMS organizations were not selected randomly. We display standard 

errors for this group throughout this document so that the reader may gain a broader sense about the variability of these responses (on the same

metric as the other organization types). However, generalizations of these results to a population broader than those local/regional EMS 

organizations that responded to the survey should not be inferred.

 

26 60-70 percent of State and local organizations listed these additional recommendations for improving the advisory system. 27 DHS Office of the Press Secretary, August 18, 2003. “Secretary Ridge Addresses National Governors Association”. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Incidents considered important to prepare for are consistent with missions, but priorities vary 

State and local organizations were asked to rank which incident type--chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear, or conventional explosives--was most important for their organization to prepare for. Not 

surprisingly, the rankings tended to follow organizational mission. Local responders, such as law 

enforcement and fire departments, tended to rank conventional explosives, then chemical, incidents as 

being most important to prepare for, as did State OEMs. In comparison, health organizations (State and 

local public health, and State emergency medical services (EMS) agencies) focused on bioterrorism

preparedness. Hospitals, local/regional EMS agencies, and local OEMs ranked chemical incidents as 

most important to prepare for. 

State and local organizations differed in how high a priority they assigned to spending departmental 

resources on preparing for the top-ranked incident type they chose (Table 2). For example, of those 

organizations that chose as their top-ranked incident conventional explosives, 8 – 16 percent of fire 

departments and law enforcement agencies considered it a high priority for their organization to spend 

resources in this areas as compared to 56 percent of State OEMs (Table 2). In general, about half of local 

responders and two-thirds of hospitals considered it was only somewhat of a priority for their 

organization to spend resources on the top-ranked incident type they had chosen. In comparison, twothirds of State public health departments and State OEMs and half of State EMS agencies and local public 

health agencies considered it a high priority for their organization to spend resources on the top-ranked 

incident type they had selected. 

Table 2. How High a Priority for Organizations Is It to Spend Resources Preparing for the Top-Ranked Incident Type

They Chose? 

Percent of All Organizations Organization Type High Priority Somewhat a 

Priority Low Priority

Not At All 

a Priority

Top Ranked Incident: Conventional Explosives

Law Enforcement 16 (5) 38 (5) 33 (5) 13 (4) 

Paid/Combo Fire 13 (4) 50 (6) 28 (5) 9 (3) 

Volunteer Fire 8 (4) 32 (8) 38 (9) 21 (7) 

State OEM 56 (7) 40 (7) 4 (3) 0 

Top Ranked Incident: Bioterrorism 

Local Public Health 40 (8) 52 (9) 6 (3) 2 (1) 

State Public Health 69 (4) 22 (4) 8 (3) 0 

State EMS 43 (6) 40 (6) 10 (3) 7 (3) 

Top Ranked Incident: Chemical

Hospital 14 (4) 56 (7) 23 (6) 7 (4) 

Local/Regional EMS 15 (4) 52 (5) 24 (5) 9 (3) 

Local OEM 29 (5) 51 (6) 15 (5) 5 (3) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. 

In addition, we found a positive association between receipt of funding and/or resources since 9/11 and 

the assignment of a higher priority rating to spending departmental resources on terrorism preparedness. 

In particular, differences in priority assigned to preparedness between State and local organizations may

reflect differences in the distribution and receipt of funding from the Federal government (as well as from

other sources) following the 9/11 attacks where the initial influx of funds focused on State governments 

and on bioterrorism preparedness. In addition, differences in priority assigned to terrorism preparedness 

may partly reflect differences in organizational mission. For example, State organizations that have an 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

overall emergency preparedness mission versus first-responder organizations, such as law enforcement or 

fire services, which have a broader public safety mission. 

Organizations also varied in terms of which response capabilities they considered to be the weakest for 

the incident type they had selected as being most important to prepare for. A majority of local responders 

and local public health agencies were concerned about protecting response personnel and hazard 

identification. First responders and State and local public health agencies were also concerned about 

decontamination of victims and mass care capabilities. Both State and local organizations felt equally 

that coordination and communication between the State and local levels needed improvement. To help 

strengthen response capabilities, State and local organizations wanted support in terms of training courses 

and exercises. In addition, the majority of local response organizations wanted new or more up-to-date 

equipment. Among the health organizations, local public health agencies were most likely to want 

support in the areas of training courses, exercises, new or more up-to-date equipment, and technical 

support. These survey results are consistent with LaTourrette et al. study (2003) of emergency responder 

protection needs. Based on structured discussions with representatives from the emergency responder 

community, they found a common concern expressed was the need for adequate protection against 

terrorist attacks and the vulnerability of nonspecialist responders.28

An association exists between receipt of funding and steps organizations have undertaken to improve 

response capabilities 

A recurring theme we heard from State and local organizations was that they needed funding support for

such activities as training and equipping, as well as for conducting risk assessments. Organizations cited 

limited training and equipment procurement budgets, as well as competing or higher departmental budget 

priorities, as factors limiting their ability to purchase specialized equipment for terrorism preparedness 

and to participate in Federally sponsored training or equipment programs. Primarily, State and local 

organizations were looking toward DHS for financial support in these areas. 

Following the 9/11 attacks, most State organizations increased spending or reallocated resources to 

improve their response capabilities for terrorism and indicated that they received external funding and/or 

resources to support these activities (Table 3). In comparison, only 1 out of 5 law enforcement agencies 

and 1 out of 3 paid/combination fire departments increased spending or reallocated resources following 

9/11 to improve response capabilities for terrorism, and only half of those organizations received external 

funding to support these activities. The primary reasons organizations internally increased spending or 

shifted resources following 9/11 were to do planning, training of personnel, or to purchase PPE and other 

equipment. 

Health organizations fared better than other responders because of the Federal government’s focus on 

improving bioterrorism preparedness following 9/11. Almost all State public health departments and 

State EMS and two-thirds of local public health agencies and hospitals increased spending following 9/11 

(Table 3). However, although not shown, while all State public health departments and 70 percent of 

State EMS received Federal support for bioterrorism preparedness,29 only 44 percent of hospitals and 31 

percent of local public health agencies indicated they had received additional funding or resources from

their State government since 9/11 to support their preparedness activities. 

 

28 LaTourrette, T, DJ Peterson, JT Bartis, and BA Jackson. Protecting Emergency Responders, Volume 2: Community Views of 

Safety and Health Risks and Personal Protection Needs, RAND, MR-1646-NIOSH, 2003. 29Following 9/11 all State public health departments received funding from the Federal government through the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) cooperative grants to improve their States’ bioterrorism preparedness. State EMS 

organizations received funding following 9/11 through the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) cooperative 

agreements. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 3. Following 9/11, Which Organizations Increased Spending or Internally Reallocated Resources to Improve 

Response Capabilities? 

For What Purposes? (%)

Organization Type 

Did Org 

Increase Spending/ 

Shift Resources

Internally 

Since 9/11? 

(%)

Planning

Training

Purchase 

PPE/Equip. 

Did Org Receive 

External Funding

and/ or Resources to 

Support Activities?

(%)

Local Organizations 

Law Enforcement 18 (4) 9 (3) 14 (3) 8 (2) 13 (4) 

Local/Regional EMS 46 (5) 69 (7) 31 (5) 17 (4) 35 (5) 

Local OEM 42 (6) 30 (5) 32 (6) 28 (5) 62 (6) 

Paid/Combo Fire 29 (6) 19 (6) 25 (6) 20 (6) 20 (4) 

Volunteer Fire 1 (1) .10 (.7) 1 (.7) 1 (.7) 0 

State Organizations 

State EMS 81 (4) 66 (5) 63 (5) 22 (5) 67 (5) 

State OEM 85 (5) 81 (6) 58 (7) 38 (7) 92 (4) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 66 (7) 32 (6) 60 (7) 47 (8) 44 (7) 

Local Public Health 70 (12) -- -- -- -- 

State Public Health 94 (2) -- -- -- -- 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Numbers in table represent percent of all organizations. Dashes in the 

table indicate that a particular organizational type either was not asked the question or given a particular response option.

One of the issues we wanted to understand was whether receiving an increase in funding or resources was 

related to organizations taking steps to improve preparedness compared to other organizations of the same 

type that did not receive such an increase.30 In general, we found that local organizations and State EMS 

organizations31 that had received an increase in funding or resources following 9/11 were also more likely

than other organizations of their same type to have: (1) assigned a higher priority to expending resources 

on terrorism preparedness; (2) updated response plans for one or more types of CBRNE; (3) created new 

organizational structures to address terrorism preparedness; 32 (4) identified or scheduled training 

opportunities for their personnel; 33 (5) purchased terrorism-related detection or protective equipment; and 

(6) assessed their overall level of preparedness as higher than those organizations that had not received an 

increase in funding or resources.34 

To illustrate, Table 4 shows the percent of local organizations that updated their response plans for 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, conventional explosives (CBRNE) following the 9/11 attacks. 

Local OEMs and hospitals were most likely to have updated their plans than other local organizations. 

Within each organizational type (except volunteer fire departments), those local organizations that 

received external funding or support also were more likely to have updated their response plans. For 

example, overall 41 percent of law enforcement agencies updated their response plans for one or more 

types of CBRNE incidents following the 9/11 attacks. However, of those law enforcement agencies that 

had received an increase in funding or support 61 percent also updated their response plans, whereas 

among law enforcement agencies that had not received an increase only 35 percent updated their response 

plans for CBRNE. Of course, these identified associations do not imply a causal effect due to the receipt 

 

30 See Tab 2 for a detailed discussion of this analysis. 31 Because all State public health departments and nearly all State OEMs had received Federal support following 9/11, a similar

comparison could not be made. 32 With the exception of hospitals and paid/combination fire departments. 33 With the exception of paid/combination fire departments. 34Because all State public health departments and nearly all State OEMs had received Federal support following 9/11, a similar

comparison could not be made. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

of funding or support. For example, organizations that are more actively engaged in preparedness 

activities also may be more likely to both apply for funding and/or to be more successful at obtaining 

funding.

Table 4. Since 9/11, Percent of Local Organizations That Updated Response Plans for One or More Types of CBRNE 

Incidents 

Percent of Orgs That Updated Response Plans 

and . . . 

Organization Type 

Did Organization Update 

Emergency Response 

Plans for CBRNE

Following 9/11? (% of All 

Orgs) 

HAD Received

Funding or Other 

Support 

HAD NOT Received

Any Funding or Other 

Support 

Law Enforcement 41 (6) 61 (11) 35 (7) 

Local/Regional EMS 48 (5) 59 (8) 40 (7) 

Local OEM 75 (5) 82 (5) 37 (15) 

Local Public Health 60 (11) 77 (5) 22 (14) 

Paid/Combo Fire 39 (6) 52 (7) 28 (8) 

Volunteer Fire 13 (6) 10 (11) 15 (8) 

Hospital 89 (4) 100 71 (10) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses.

Organizations differ in their participation in federally sponsored programs and their expectations of 

DHS and the Federal government in general 

Since September 11, 2001, State organizations have participated more than local organizations in 

federally sponsored training, equipment, or funding programs.35 In addition, while State organizations 

tended to participate across a variety of programs, local organizations participated in a more limited 

number of programs specific to their professional community. Further, State organizations tended to have 

much higher participation rates than local organizations. In general, State organizations that had 

participated in Federally sponsored programs since the 9/11 attacks also shared those resources with other 

organizations within their State (commensurate with their mission and role as serving as a pass-through 

for Federal support to local communities and response organizations). In addition, those local 

organizations that had received Federal support also tended to share it with other organizations within 

their jurisdiction. 

State and local organizations differed in their views about whether Federal funding was reaching the right 

communities and organizations. State OEMs and State public health departments (those organizations 

responsible for distributing Federal funding and/or resources within their State for emergency and 

bioterrorism preparedness) tended to believe that Federal support was reaching those communities and 

organizations with the greatest need. However, local organizations were more likely to believe that 

Federal funding was not reaching the communities and organizations with the greatest need, regardless of 

whether the funding was distributed through the State governments or directly to local communities and 

response organizations. 

States and locals were fairly consistent in what impact they expected DHS to have on their organizations 

(Table 5). For example, most organizations expected DHS to improve coordination, communication, and 

information-sharing between the Federal/State/local levels; to standardize and streamline the grant 

application process across Federal programs; and to consolidate multiple grant requirements. Where there 

were differences in views (not shown), the pattern tended to be for some organizations to want DHS to 

undertake a specific activity even more so than did the other organizations. For example, overall between 

 

35 For a detailed summary of the survey results regarding organizations participation in Federally sponsored programs, see Tab 3.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

50 and 60 percent of organizations expected DHS to standardize the grant application process across 

Federal agencies and to consolidate multiple grant application requirements, whereas 80 percent of State 

OEMs expressed this view.36 

Table 5. In What Ways Do Local/State Responders Expect the DHS to Impact Them? 

Percent of Organizations Activities 

70-80% expect DHS to . . . Improve coordination, information-sharing, and communication between 

Federal/State/local levels 

60-70% expect DHS to . . . Streamline grant application process across Federal grant programs

50-60% expect DHS to . . . Standardize the grant application process across Federal agencies and 

consolidate multiple grant application requirements

40-60% expect DHS to . . . Establish single point of contact at Federal level for information on available 

programs 

Provide primary contact at Federal level instead of many on training, equipment, 

planning and other critical needs* 

45-60% expect DHS to . . . Provide intelligence information and more detailed guidance on terrorist threat 

40-60% expect DHS to . . . Consolidate numerous training courses/ programs and numerous equipment 

programs** 

40-60% expect DHS to . . . Provide better/standardized templates and/or guidance to help with planning 

30-40% expect DHS to . . . Improve integration between public/private sectors’ efforts to improve terrorism 

preparedness and protect critical infrastructure 

30-40% expect DHS to . . . Help conduct threat assessment for jurisdiction or region*** 

*Health organizations not given this response option. **Health organizations not asked about equipment programs. ***Hospitals were not 

given this response option.

However, State and local organizations differed in some of their expectations of the Federal government 

in general (Table 6). For example, 1 out of 5 local public health agencies wanted Federal support to 

enhance surveillance systems, help with the development of local/regional response plans, establish 

communication systems to notify health providers about disease outbreaks, and establish a laboratory

network, whereas few State public health departments felt Federal support was needed in these areas. 

Table 6. In What Ways Can the Federal Government Support Public Health Organizations’ Efforts to Improve

Preparedness?

Type of Support Looking Toward Federal Government to Local Public 

Health (%)

State Public 

Health (%)

Enhance current surveillance systems 20 (6) 3 (2) 

Assist with development of local and regional response plans 22 (6) 6 (2) 

Establish centralized communication system for notification regarding disease 

outbreaks related to bioterrorism 

19 (6) 3 (2) 

Establish integrated, multi-level laboratory response network for bioterrorism 15 (5) 6 (2) 

Establish rapid response and advanced technology lab for chemical agents 16 (5) 6 (2) 

Assist with the exercising of local and regional response plans 19 (6) 10 (3) 

Assist with development of plans to coordinate local/regional medical systems 17 (6) 0 

Assist with the development of plans to coordinate local/regional veterinarian 

systems 

12 (5) 3 (2) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Public health organizations were asked in what ways the Federal government (e.g.,

through the CDC, DHHS, USPHS) can support the efforts of public health departments like theirs to improve terrorism preparedness. 

 

36The stronger desire by State OEMs for DHS’ support in these areas is consistent with the mission of the State OEMs and their 

role in helping to distribute Federal preparedness funding and support to locals. In general, the patterns seen were consistent with 

the individual organizations’ missions and scope of responsibilities. 

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Also, local organizations wanted Federal support in the areas of equipment procurement, training or 

training aids, and provision of technical information, whereas few State organizations indicated a need for 

Federal support in these areas (Table 7). These results suggest differences between the local and State 

levels in expectations of the Federal government. For example, State public health and State OEMs may

believe their State is getting all that it needs in these areas. Given that State organizations often are 

responsible for distributing Federal support to local communities within their State, these results also 

suggest that there might be room for improvement for State organizations to get technical information and 

Federal support out to the local levels. 

Table 7. In What Ways Can the Federal Government Support Organizations’ Efforts to Improve Preparedness?--Other

Areas of Disagreement

Type of Support Looking Toward Federal 

Government For 

Percent of Orgs Exceptions 

(Percent) 

Equipment procurement 20-35% None of the State public health or State 

OEMs wanted equipment procurement 

support 

Training or training aids 25-40% Only 7-8% of State public health and State 

OEMs wanted such support 

Distribution of technical information 10-20% Only 5-6% of State public health and State 

EMS wanted such support 

State and local organizations also differed in what role they expected the Federal Military and National 

Guard to play during the response to a terrorism-related incident (Table 8). For example, most local and 

State EMS organizations viewed both the Federal Military’s and the National Guard’s role as to maintain 

order and provide security. However, only about a quarter of State OEMs viewed this as being a Federal 

Military role, reflecting perhaps a better understanding of such issues as restrictions about the Federal 

Military’s domestic role under the Posse Comitatus Act. 

Table 8. Organizations Differ in What Role They Expect the Federal Military and National Guard to Play During

Response to a Terrorism-related Incident

Federal Military’s Role National Guard’s Role 

Organization Type 

Maintain Order/ 

Provide Security

(%)

Help 

Enforce Quarantine 

(%)

Maintain Order/ 

Provide Security (%) 

Help Enforce 

Quarantine 

(%)

Local Organizations 

Law Enforcement 71 (5) 58 (6) 89 (3) 61 (6) 

Local/Regional EMS 76 (5) 56 (5) 89 (3) 64 (5) 

Local OEM 74 (5) 55 (6) 86 (4) 67 (6) 

Paid/Combo Fire 81 (4) 53 (7) 89 (4) 60 (6) 

Volunteer Fire 75 (7) 31 (7) 77 (7) 30 (7) 

State Organizations 

State EMS 63 (5) 37 (5) 87 (4) 67 (5) 

State OEM 27 (6) 42 (7) 77 (6) 65 (7) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital -- 82 (4) -- 86 (4) 

Local Public Health -- -- 95 (2) 52 (10) 

State Public Health -- -- 100 53 (5) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Dashes in the table indicate that a particular organizational type either was not 

asked the question or given a particular response option.

In addition (as shown in Table 8), State and local organizations and health organizations (public health 

versus hospitals) seem to differ in how they view the role of the Federal Military or National Guard in the 

event of a major disease outbreak. About two-thirds of local organizations felt the role of the Federal 

Military and the National Guard should include helping to enforce a quarantine. However, fewer State 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

OEMs and State EMS considered this to be a role for the Federal Military, and only half of local and State 

public health agencies (compared to 86 percent of hospitals) viewed this as a role for the National Guard. 

In some cases, these differences in views may reflect a lack of knowledge or misunderstanding about the 

roles and responsibilities of the Federal Military under the Federal Response Plan or the new National 

Response Plan, as well as a lack of knowledge about legal restrictions on the domestic use of the Federal 

Military. In addition, these differences in views suggest that organizations may be doing planning under 

different assumptions about what role they can expect the Federal Military or the National Guard to play

during a response to a terrorist-related incident. In either case, it appears this is an area for improving 

awareness. 

Room for improvement in coordination with the private sector 

One issue of importance to the Advisory Panel is the role of the private sector in homeland security and in 

helping to ensure preparedness for terrorism. As noted by the panel in its fourth report to Congress:37 

The private sector controls approximately 85 percent of the infrastructure in this country and 

employs approximately 85 percent of the national workforce. 

Enhancing coordination with the private sector is seen as critical for ensuring the preparedness of States 

and localities and for protecting vital infrastructure. In the third wave of the survey, we asked State and 

local organizations about their coordination activities with the private sector. Following the 9/11 attacks, 

nearly all the State organizations and between a third to three-quarters of the local organizations created 

new organizational structures (e.g., positions, units, committees, or groups) to address preparedness for 

terrorism-related incidents (Table 9). 

Table 9. Have Organizations Created New Structures to Address Terrorism Preparedness Following 9/11? 

Organization Type 

Created New Organizational 

Structures Following 9/11? 

(% of All Orgs) 

Of Those That Created New

Structures, Do Duties of the New

Unit or Position Include Liaison

with Private Sector? (%)

Local Response Organizations 

Law Enforcement 38 (6) 45 (9) 

Local/Regional EMS 62 (5) -- 

Local OEM 62 (6) 48 (8) 

Paid/Combo Fire 52 (6) 37 (11) 

Volunteer Fire 30 (8) 36 (16) 

State Organizations

State EMS 91 (3) -- 

State OEM 92 (4) 65 (7) 

Health Organizations

Hospital 81 (5) --

Local Public Health 77 (12) 91 (3) 

State Public Health 100 (0) 97 (2) 

Standard error for each point estimate is shown in parentheses. Dashes in the table indicate that a particular organizational 

type either was not asked the question or given a particular response option. 

Of those that created new structures, about half (except for public health) indicated that the duties of these 

new positions or units included liaison with the private sector. Although nearly all local and State public 

health departments indicated that part of the duties of these new positions or units included liaison with 

 

37Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 

Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 16, 2001, pp. 30-31. www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

the private sector, what they probably are referring to are coordination activities with hospitals, managed 

care organizations, or other individual healthcare providers, many of which belong to the private sector.38 

However, when we compare these results to whether organizations say they have any formal agreements 

in place with the private sector about emergency planning or response, many fewer organizations 

indicated this to be the case. Only about 1 out of 3 local and State OEMs and 1 out of 5 of the other 

organizations said they had formal agreements with private companies, businesses, or labor unions to 

share information or resources in the event of an emergency or disaster. These agreements addressed 

coordination and planning, as well as response. Further, few local organizations and only about 1 out of 5 

State organizations and local OEMs indicated that they would contact the private sector if they had any

threat information to pass on about suspected terrorist activities within their jurisdiction or region. 

State organizations, in particular, recognize there is room for improvement in strengthening coordination 

with the private sector. Between half to two-thirds of State organizations expect DHS to help improve 

integration between the public/private sectors’ efforts to improve terrorism preparedness and to protect 

critical infrastructure. 

Conclusions 

A common theme heard from organizations was the desire for additional funding to support their 

preparedness activities and to pay for overtime and backfill costs. Another common theme was the desire 

for more detailed information about the nature and type of threat facing their jurisdiction or State to 

inform planning and their response to changes in the threat level. Organizations are looking primarily to

DHS for support and have high expectations of the Department in terms of improving coordination 

between the Federal/State/local levels, streamlining grant processes and requirements, consolidating 

training courses/programs and equipment programs, and facilitating integration of the private sector in 

terrorism planning and preparedness. 

Although organizations have undertaken a range of activities since the 9/11 terrorist attacks to improve 

their response capabilities, it is difficult to say how much better prepared they are without any 

standardized measures of organizational and community preparedness. As noted by some survey

respondents, they are doing more since 9/11, but at the end of the day, how do they know whether their 

organization (or community) is adequately prepared? 

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Federal funding focused initially on bioterrorism preparedness, with 

nearly $1 billion set aside in early 2002 for States to help improve their public health infrastructure for 

biological attacks.39 Most of the initial funding went to State public health departments (and to a lesser 

degree, to State EMS) to develop and implement an overarching plan for improving their State’s capacity

to respond to bioterrorist attacks. Since then, additional funding has been forthcoming to improve both 

public health and hospital preparedness. However, Federal funding through DHS did not begin to flow to

the first-responder community through the State governments until approximately two and a half years 

after 9/11. In March 2003, DHS announced the availability of approximately $750 million to the States 

for police, firefighters, and EMS workers to be used for training, exercises, and the purchase of 

 

38The CDC cooperative agreements for public health preparedness encourage establishing public/private partnerships, with one of 

the enhanced capacities calling for the strengthening of relationships between the health department and emergency responders, 

the business community, and other key individuals or organizations involved in healthcare, public health, or law enforcement. 

Source: CDC Continuation Guidance for Cooperative Agreement on Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism--

Budget Year Four Program Announcement 99051, May 2, 2003. 39“Federal Funds for Public Health Infrastructure Begins to Flow to States,” HHS News, U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services, January 25, 2002. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

equipment.40 Our survey was conducted from July through September 2003, about the time one might 

expect these initial funds to have begun reaching the first-responder community. 

Overall, we found that State governments had received more Federal funding and support and have 

participated in a wider range of Federal preparedness programs than local organizations since the 9/11 

attacks. However, the story is more complex than what it may seem on the surface. Although it appears 

that State organizations have fared better than local organizations, State organizations also have served as 

a vehicle for administering Federal grants received and as a pass-through to the locals of Federal funding 

and support. Nearly all State organizations indicated they had shared resources received. At the same 

time, local organizations predominantly believe that Federal funding has not reached either local 

communities or organizations with the greatest need, regardless of the mode of distribution. In the survey

written comments, a common theme was the need for Federal support to be distributed directly to local 

organizations, bypassing the State and county governments. 

With respect to local organizations, fewer indicated having received external funding or support 

(regardless of the source) following the 9/11 attacks to support their preparedness activities than State 

organizations. For example, only 13 percent of law enforcement agencies and 20 percent of 

paid/combination fire departments indicated having received an increase in external funding or support

from any source. However, some local organizations’ participation in Federal preparedness programs 

may be more understated than the survey results alone suggest. For example, the Emergency

Management Performance Grants (EMPG) program run by FEMA provides States with funds to support 

all hazards preparedness activities and emergency management. The EMPG program existed prior to 

9/11. An important source of funding for the fire service has been the Assistance to Firefighters Grant 

Program. Indeed, we found that 46 percent of paid/combination fire departments and 20 percent of 

volunteer fire departments indicated they had participated in this program since 9/11. Although law 

enforcement has not been an important component of the First Responder Equipment grant program, it 

had received Federal funding through the Department of Justice (DOJ) prior to 9/11 through several 

different programs. The Community Oriented Police Services (COPS) Program and the Local Law 

Enforcement Block Grant Program, for example, have been an important source of Federal support that 

have enabled law enforcement to hire additional personnel and purchase needed equipment. Yet in our 

survey, we found that only between 10-13 percent of law enforcement agencies indicated they had 

participated in the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program since 9/11; our survey did not ask about 

the COPS program. Further, the President’s first-responder initiative had a significant impact on these 

programs. The FY 2003 Omnibus Appropriations bill cut by $150 million the funding requested by the 

Senate for the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program41 and the COPS and Local Law Enforcement 

Block Grant programs have now been absorbed by ODP. As a result, some have argued that in the longrun it is not clear to what extent there has been a net gain in the Federal support available to law 

enforcement and other first responders for preparedness activities. 

Nonetheless, we found an association between the degree to which different activities have been 

undertaken by local organizations and State EMS organizations to improve preparedness for terrorismrelated incidents and the receipt of external funding and/or resources since 9/11 to support such activities. 

Within each organizational type (e.g., law enforcement), those agencies that had received external 

funding or resources following the 9/11 attacks were more likely than agencies that had not received such 

support to undertake a range of different preparedness activities. Of course, this relationship may or may

not be a causal one, and in any case, the direction of causality is indeterminate. 

 

40U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Press Secretary, “Department of Homeland Security Announces Opening 

of Grant Application Process for Firefighter Assistance Grants,” March 10, 2003. 41Funding of FEMA’s Firefighter Assistance Grants in the FY 2003 bill was set at $750,000,000. These grants can be used to 

support training, fire prevention programs, purchase of equipment and new fire apparatus, and to enhance emergency medical 

services (EMS) programs. “First Responders Funding in Fiscal Year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Bill,” U.S. Senator Patrick

Leahy, http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200302/021403a.html. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

The tabs to the appendix contain detailed information on all aspects of the State and Local Responder 

Survey. 

TAB 1— METHODS 

 TAB 2— DETAILS OF COMPARISON BETWEEN DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDING AND 

SUPPORT AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES 

TAB 3— PARTICIPATION IN FEDERALLY SPONSORED PROGRAMS SINCE 9/11 

TAB 4—WEIGHTING AND SAMPLING DESIGN

TAB 5— THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT 

TAB 6—FIRE DEPARTMENT SURVEY 

TAB 7—SURVEY TABULATIONS 

TAB 8—SURVEY COMMENTS 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

TAB 1—METHODS 

The third survey instrument contained seven sections: (1) Emergency Response Planning Activities 

(included questions about planning, joint preparedness activities, training); (2) Resourcing Preparedness 

Activities (including questions about increased spending since 9/11 and receipt of external funding to 

support these additional activities); (3) Responding to Specific Terrorist Incidents (including questions to 

elicit their self-assessment of response capabilities for the type of incident they considered most important 

for their organization to prepare for); (4) Assessment of Federal Programs (including questions about their 

participation in Federal preparedness programs since 9/11, expectations of the Department of Homeland 

Security, and their support needs); (5)Intelligence Information and Warning (including questions about 

intelligence support needs and suggestions for improving the Homeland Security Advisory System); (6) 

Other Homeland Security Issues (including questions about their threat experience since 9/11, risk 

assessment activities, and views regarding the role of the military), and (7) Organizational Information 

(including questions about organizational characteristics and asked for overall written comments). For a 

copy of the survey instrument, see Tab 6. 

The third survey was mailed to those organizations that were selected for the initial survey, which was 

constructed by first randomly selecting 200 counties throughout the United States and then one of each 

type of local responder organization (law enforcement, fire—paid, volunteer, and combination—

departments; emergency medical service, EMS agencies; public health, hospital, and Offices of

Emergency Management, OEMs) was randomly chosen within each county. All the relevant State-level 

organizations (public health, OEMs, EMS) were surveyed, including those in Washington, D.C. We 

updated the original 2001 contact database to account for any changes over time in personnel and in six 

instances, we found that the organization no longer existed. For two of the cases, we were able to draw a 

replacement organization for their organizational type in each relevant county. In the remaining cases, we 

were unable to identify a replacement organization. For a detailed discussion of the Methods used for the 

first survey, please see RAND PM-1236-OSD, Sampling Design, Respondent Selection, and Construction 

of Survey Weights for the Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Programs Survey, by Jerry

Jacobson, Ronald Fricker, and Lois Davis (August 2001). 

Table 1A shows the current status of the first and third waves of the survey and their response rates.42 In 

Wave I, the overall response rate was 65 percent with 1,068 organizations responding. By organizational 

type, the response rates varied from 48 percent for local/regional EMS organizations to 80 percent for 

State public health departments. The resulting sample of survey respondents in Wave I was 

representative of local and State responders both geographically and across the different emergency

response and health disciplines. Wave I surveys were received from every State in the union and the 

District of Columbia. For the third survey (Wave III), our overall response rate was 56 percent with 918 

organizations responding. Because this was the third time we had surveyed these organizations and given 

the fact that the third survey was the longest instrument by far, we expected some attrition to occur in 

terms of response rates. Our overall aim was to achieve at least a 50 percent response rate for each group. 

For most organizations, we met or exceeded this goal with five of the organizational types having 

responses rates approximately 60 percent or higher. The response rate for hospitals was similar to that 

which was achieved in Wave I, reflecting the fact that these organizations historically tend to be 

particularly difficult to survey. The local/regional EMS response rate was somewhat lower than the 2001 

response rate for this group. This also is a group that historically is difficult to achieve high response 

 

42 In this report, we present the response rates for Waves I and III for comparison purposes since in these two waves the full 

sample of organizations were surveyed. In Wave II (2002) survey, a subset of the original sample was surveyed – those 

organizations that had replied to Wave I. For the Wave II response rates, please refer to the: Fourth Annual Report to the 

President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of

Mass Destruction, December 12, 2002, Appendix D. http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

rates for. We also found that since 2001 the responsibility for terrorism preparedness and planning 

among the EMS community in some States had been assigned to the State-level EMS organization. So in 

some cases, local/regional EMS organizations elected not to participate in the third survey and instead, 

deferred to their State EMS organization. 

Table 1A. Current Status of the Surveys and Response Rates for Waves I and III 

WAVE I (2001) WAVE III (2003) 

Response Organizations Number of

Organizations 

Surveyed

Response 

Rate 

Number of

Organizations 

Surveyed

Response Rate

Local Organizations 

Public Health 199 74% 199 63% 

Law Enforcement 208 71% 208 63% 

OEM 202 71% 202 53%

Fire Department* 443 68% 440 58% 

Hospital 208 51% 208 49%

Local/Regional EMS 230 48% 229 40% 

State Organizations 

OEM 51 78% 51 55%

EMS 51 63% 51 63%

Public Health 51 80% 51 73% 

TOTAL/OVERALL RATE 1,643 65% 1,639 56%

*Includes paid, combination, and volunteer fire service organizations. **Wave I response rate includes completed surveys returned 

prior to September 11, 2001. 

Unless otherwise indicated, results have been statistically adjusted to represent the entire population in 

that discipline (e.g., law enforcement).43 For each result we also include in parentheses an estimate of the 

standard error. Standard errors are useful for judging the likely range of the true value: That is, the actual 

value for the entire population is highly likely to lie within the observed survey percentage plus or minus 

the standard error. 

For those organizational types that were randomly selected (law enforcement, fire, local OEM, local 

public health, and hospitals), we investigated further weighting the survey responses to reflect identified 

non-response patterns. For example, hospitals in the Northeast were less likely to respond to the third 

survey than were hospitals in the Midwest. To account for this discrepancy, we applied additional weight 

to the responses from the Northeast, so that the results would not be biased toward Midwestern hospitals. 

The non-response weights were generated using logistic regression models to describe the probability of 

response, based on several county and organizational-level explanatory variables. No recognizable nonresponse patterns for local OEM’s were identified, so no further weighting was applied to this group. For 

each of the other four organizational types, region of the country (Northeast, South, Midwest, and West) 

was a significant explanatory variable and was factored into the non-response weighting. In addition, law 

enforcement organizations were adjusted for the population size they serve and whether their jurisdiction 

has 911 service; fire departments were adjusted for whether their personnel are volunteer, paid, or a 

combination of paid and volunteer; hospitals were adjusted for the number of full-time-equivalent staff 

they employ; and local public health departments were adjusted to reflect whether they served urban 

areas. For further details regarding the weighting methodology and sampling design, see Tabs 4 and 5. 

 

43The exception is local/regional EMS organizations. These organizations represent a convenience sample and so the results are 

unweighted: Findings pertain to the sample only and are not generalizable to the entire population of EMS organizations. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

TAB 2— DETAILS OF COMPARISON BETWEEN DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDING AND 

SUPPORT AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES 

We undertook a series of analyses to look at whether there is an association between receipt of funding 

and/or resources following 9/11and different types of preparedness activities undertaken. Survey

indicators44 used in the comparison of the distribution of funding and support and preparedness for 

terrorism-related activities included: 

Funding and support items: 

 Since September 11th, 2001, has your organization received an increase in its funding 

and/or resources for terrorism preparedness?45 (Ques. 43, Fire Dept. Survey) 

 Since September 11, 2001, has your organization received agency-specific funding, 

training, equipment, or other terrorism preparedness support from the Federal government? 

(Ques. 59, Fire Dept. Survey) 

Preparedness indicators: 

Budget/spending

 How high a priority is spending additional resources for combating terrorism, when 

compared to other current needs of your organization? (Q45, Fire Dept. Survey) 

 Since September 11, 2001, has your organization increased its spending, or shifted 

resources internally, to address terrorism-related incidents? (Q41, Fire dept. Survey) 

Response plans

 Has your organization updated or newly developed a written emergency response plan to 

specifically address... 

o Respondents were given the following options and asked to mark all that apply:

chemical, biological, radiological, conventional explosives, cyberterrorism, or 

attacks on critical infrastructure incidents. (Ques. 13, Fire Dept. Survey) 

Preparedness self-ratings

 How would you rate your organization’s overall level of preparedness at present to

respond to terrorism in general? (rated on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1=inadequate; 

5=excellent) (Ques. 38, Fire Dept. Survey) 

 How would you rate your organization’s overall level of preparedness at present to

respond to high consequence CBRNE terrorism, specifically? (rated on a scale of 1 to 5, 

where 1=inadequate; 5=excellent) (Ques. 39, Fire Dept. Survey) 

 Your organization’s written emergency plan to be used during a response to an event 

similar to the CBRNE event you selected as most important is: (rated on a scale of 1 to 5)46

(Ques. 49, Fire Dept. Survey) 

 Your organizations knowledge and expertise about response to this type of event47 are: 

(rated on a scale of 1 to 5) (Ques. 50, Fire Dept. Survey) 

 Your organization’s equipment to respond to this type of event is: (rated on a scale of 1 to 

5) (Ques. 51, Fire Dept. Survey) 

 Your organization’s training to prepare for this type of event is: (rated on a scale of 1 to 5) 

(Ques. 52, Fire Dept. Survey) 

 

44 Some indicators were constructed by combining categorical responses to individual survey questions. 45 The local and State public health versions of the survey narrow this question to receipt from their State government. 46 Where scales of 1 to 5 are indicated, the organization is asked to chose a whole number between 1 and 5 where 1=inadequate 

and 5=excellent. 

47 “this type of event” refers to the CBRNE event the organization identified as most important. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 Your organization’s exercises to prepare for this type of event are: (rated on a scale of 1 to 

5) (Ques. 53, Fire Dept. Survey) 

 Your organization’s ability to communicate and coordinate with other organizations likely

to be involved in a response to this type of even is: (rated on a scale of 1 to 5) (Ques. 54, 

Fire Dept. Survey) 

 How would you rank your organization’s overall preparedness to respond to this type of 

event? (on a scale of 1-5) (Ques. 55, Fire Dept. Survey) 

Organization/personnel 

 Since September 11, 2001, has your organization created a new (a) position, (b) unit, or (c) 

group to address prevention, preparedness, response or recovery for terrorism-related 

incidents, or (d) specially assigned personnel for this task? (Ques. 2, Fire Dept. Survey) 

 Since September 11, 2001, has your organization identified, or scheduled, training

opportunities for emergency response to terrorism-related incidents? (Ques. 25, Fire Dept. 

Survey) 

 Does your organization have any unit(s) specially trained and/or equipped to respond to 

terrorism-related incidents? 48 (Ques. 36, Fire Dept. Survey) 

Protective/detection equipment

 Since September 11, 2001, has your organization purchased (or is it in the process of 

purchasing) specialized protective, monitoring, or detection equipment? 49 (Ques. 32, Fire 

Dept. Survey) 

 Since September 11, 2001, has your organization purchased (or is it in the process of 

purchasing) monitoring and detection equipment for any chemical, biological or 

radiological agents, equipment for cyber detection, or equipment for decontamination of 

victims and/or sites? 50 (Ques. 30, Fire Dept. Survey) 

Analysis and Results 

We found a strong association between the distribution of funding and support mechanisms and the 

preparedness activities of local organizations to respond to terrorism-related incidents. Specifically, with 

the exception of public health departments, the survey contained two separate funding and support 

questions: 

1. “Since September 11th, 2001, has your organization received an increase in its funding and/or

resources for terrorism preparedness?”, and 

2. “Since September 11th, 2001, has your organization received agency-specific funding, training, 

equipment, or other terrorism preparedness support from the Federal government?” 

The second question is narrower in the sense that it restricts focus to support received from the Federal 

government, yet it is broader in the categories of support cited. Thus, it is possible for an individual 

organization to answer “yes” to both of these questions or either one individually without the other. We 

first looked at the distribution of responses to these two funding and support questions. The weighted 

percentages in Table B1 indicate which responding local organizations answered affirmatively to the 

above two questions regarding receipt of support. 

Almost all State OEMs and about two-thirds of local OEMs and State EMS organizations answered 

affirmatively to both questions in Table B1 regarding receipt of external funding and/or resources 

following 9/11. On the other hand, 71 percent of law enforcement agencies and about half of 

paid/combination fire departments and local/regional EMS answered in the negative to both questions 

indicating that they had not received external funding and/or resources from any source following 9/11. 

 

48 Question not posed to State or local public health organizations. 49 Question not posed to hospitals or State or local public health organizations. 50 Question not posed to State or local public health organizations. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Also, few volunteer fire departments indicated receipt of any external funding and/or resources following 

9/11. About a quarter of hospitals answered affirmatively to both questions in Table 2A regarding receipt 

of external funding and/or resources following 9/11; whereas, 40 percent of hospitals answered in the 

negative to both support questions. 

Table 2A. Receipt of External Funding and/or Resources Following 9/11 to Support Preparedness Activities 

Percent of All Organizations 

Only Answered Yes to 

Ques. 1 - Has 

Organization Received 

an Increase in 

External Funding

and/or Resources 

from Any Source

Since 9/11?

Only Answered Yes 

to Ques. 2 – 

Has Organization

Received Support 

From the Federal 

Government Since 

9/11?

Answered Yes to 

both Questions 1 

and 2 regarding

receipt of funding 

and/or other 

support Since 

9/11 

Answered no to both 

questions – 

Organization Did Not 

Receive Any External 

Funding and/or 

Resources Since 9/11 

LOCAL 

ORGANIZATIONS

Law Enforcement 4 (2) 16 (4) 9 (3) 71 (5) 

Local/Regional EMS 10 (3) 11 (3) 25 (5) 54 (5) 

Local OEM 6 (3) 23 (6) 56 (6) 15 (4) 

Paid/Combo Fire 1 (1) 26 (5) 18 (4) 55 (6) 

Volunteer Fire 0 16 (7) 0 84 (7) 

STATE 

ORGANIZATIONS

State EMS 7 (3) 10 (3) 60 (6) 23 (5) 

State OEM 0 8 (4) 92 (4) 0 

HEALTH

ORGANIZATIONS

Hospitals 17 (5) 17 (9) 26 (6) 40 (7) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. 

Under the CDC cooperative agreements, all State public health departments received Federal funding 

following 9/11 to increase their State’s bioterrorism preparedness. With the expectation that this funding 

would be shared with local-level public health departments, instead of the two questions indicated above, 

all public health departments were asked a single funding and support question: "Since September 11, 

2001 has your health department received from your State government an increase in funding and/or 

resources for terrorism preparedness?" Response proportions to this question are indicated in Table 2B. 

Table 2B. Receipt by Public Health Organizations of External Funding and/or Resources From Their State Government 

To Support Preparedness Activities Following 9/11 

Percent Of All Public Health Organizations That Received Increase In 

Funding/Resources For Terrorism Preparedness From Their State Government

Received Increase Did Not Receive Increase 

Local Public Health 69 (12) 31 (12) 

State Public Health 25 (4) 75 (4) 

In summary, we found that among local organizations, since September 11TH, 2001 local OEMs were 

most likely to receive Federal support and external funding/resources in general, while law enforcement 

and volunteer fire departments were least likely to receive such funding or support. In considering 

positive associations between receipt of funding/resources and preparedness activities, a greater

proportion of local OEM’s currently benefit from such associations while the benefit of these associations 

exists in a smaller proportion of the other organization types. 

To gain a sense of the association between funding distribution and preparedness, we compared responses 

to these two funding and support questions individually with responses to twenty-one indicators of 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

preparedness (which are listed above). These indicators, listed above, fell into five broadly related 

categories: i) a shift in budget/spending; ii) updating written response plans; iii) self-ratings of 

preparedness; iv) a shift in organizational/ personnel structure; and v) purchasing terrorism-related 

protective/ detection equipment. Comparisons were first made on an exploratory basis via crosstabulations. Where appropriate, weighted logistic regression models were fit to test whether an 

association exists between individual preparedness indicators and the individual funding and support

questions. 51 

Across law enforcement, paid/combination fire, local OEMs, hospitals, and local public health agencies, 

dependencies were observed between the two funding and support questions and preparedness indicators 

within each of the five indicator categories cited above. 52 For some categories, every indicator was 

significant for a particular organization type; for all combinations of these organization types and 

indicator categories, at least one of the indicators within each category demonstrated a significant 

dependency with the receipt funding or support.53 For example, within the organizational/personnel 

category, paid/combination fire departments demonstrated a significant positive relationship between an 

increase in funding or resources and having any unit(s) specially trained and/or equipped to respond to

terrorism-related incidents, but not the other indicators in this category. These dependencies were 

observed even if an organization only benefited from one of the funding and support sources. Volunteer 

fire organizations were anomalous in that the direction of the association was not always positive, i.e., for 

some indicators, the increase in support was associated with less preparedness (see, for example, Table 

B3 below). For all other organization types, the observed associations were positive; more 

funding/support was associated with improved preparedness. 

To illustrate, Table 2C shows the percent of organizations that updated their response plans following 

9/11 for CBRNE. Overall, State and local offices of emergency management (OEMs), State public 

health, and hospitals were most likely to have updated their plans as compared to other organizations. 

Within each organizational type (except volunteer fire), those organizations that received external funding 

or support as indicated in at least one of the funding and support questions listed above also were more 

likely to update their response plans. For example, although overall only 41 percent of law enforcement 

agencies updated their response plans for one or more types of CBRNE incidents following 9/11, those 

law enforcement agencies that indicated receipt of funding or support under at least one of the survey

questions above were above were more likely (61 percent versus 35 percent) to have updated their written 

response plans for one or more types of CBRNE than law enforcement agencies that had not received 

funding or support. 

 

51 The hypothesis test used was a Wald test that all the explanatory logistic regression coefficients are zero. A non-zero 

coefficient would imply the existence of a relationship between the preparedness indicator and the funding question. 52 The lone exception was that hospitals did not demonstrate a shift in organizational/personnel structure or an increase in 

preparedness self-ratings. 53 Overall, roughly 200 hypothesis test were conducted. Typically, conducting this many hypothesis test creates a multiple

testing problem—in general, testing multiple independent hypotheses at the .05 significance level, we would expect 5 percent of

the tests to reject the null hypothesis randomly, just by chance, when no actual relationship exists. Given that the goal of this

analysis is to gain a general sense of the relationship between funding and preparedness, and not to specifically examine each 

individual organization-indicator combination, this concern is somewhat mitigated. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 2C.Since 9/11, Percent Of Local Organizations That Updated Response Plans For One Or More Types Of CBRNE 

Incidents 

Percent of Local 

Organizations Overall 

That Updated Their 

Response Plans For

CBRNE 

Updated Response

Plans AND Received

Funding or Other 

Support (Percent) 

Updated Response

Plans BUT Did Not

Receive Funding or 

Other Support 

(Percent) 

Law Enforcement 41 (6) 61 (11) 35 (7) 

Local/Regional EMS 48 (5) 59 (8) 40 (7) 

Local OEM 75 (5) 82 (5) 37 (15) 

Local Public Health 60 (11) 77 (5) 22 (14) 

Paid/Combo Fire 39 (6) 52 (7) 28 (8) 

Volunteer Fire 13 (6) 10 (11) 15 (8) 

Hospital 89 (4) 100 71 (10)

Standard error of the estimate shown in parentheses.

In addition, although not shown, on a scale from 1 (inadequate) to 5 (excellent), paid/combination fire 

departments who received an increase in its funding or resources for terrorism preparedness were more

likely to rate their organization’s equipment as adequate (a score of 3) or higher for responding to the type 

of CBRNE incident they ranked as most important for preparation; 64 percent of those receiving an 

increase in funding or resources for terrorism preparedness rated their organization’s equipment as 

adequate or higher while only 34 percent of those not receiving such support rated their equipment as 

adequate or better. Hospitals that received agency-specific Federal support were more likely (19 percent 

versus 77 percent) to purchase specific monitoring and decontamination equipment than hospitals that had 

not received an increase in funding or resources. 

In general, local organizations (except volunteer fire organizations) that received an increase in funding or 

resources for terrorism preparedness or received agency specific Federal support were more likely than 

other organizations of their same type to have self-reported: 

 Increased spending or reallocated internal resources after September 11th, 2001, to address 

terrorism preparedness 

 Assigned a higher priority to expending departmental resources on terrorism preparedness 

 Updated their written response plans for one or more types of CBRNE 

 Created new organizational structures following September 11th, 2001, to address terrorism

preparedness (except hospitals and paid/combination fire departments) 

 Identified and scheduled training opportunities in terrorism-related incidents for their personnel 

(except paid/combination fire departments)54

 Purchased terrorism-related protective or detection equipment 

 Assessed their level of terrorism preparedness higher (except hospitals).55

Although formal statistical tests for association were not appropriate for the local/regional EMS 

organizations since they were a convenience sample, patterns of dependence were easily observable here 

 

54 Although the observed frequency was higher for those paid/combination fire organizations that received an

increase in funding or agency-specific support, the difference was not large enough to generate a statistically 

significant result. 55 Within the self-rating category, the directional differences for hospitals were ambiguous, with some showing a 

positive relationship and others demonstrating a negative relationship with increased funding or support.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

as well for all twenty-one of the indicators. For example, rating their organizations overall level of 

preparedness to respond to terrorism in general on a scale from 1 (inadequate) to 5 (excellent), 67 percent 

of the local EMS organizations who indicated they had not received an increase in funding or resources 

for terrorism preparedness gave a rating of 1 or 2, while 63% of those local EMS organizations who 

responded that they had received such an increase rated their preparedness at 3 or above. 

Of course, these identified associations do not imply a causal effect due to the receipt of funding or 

support. For example, it would be reasonable to believe that an organization, which has made the 

decision to improve their terrorism response capabilities, would seek out both additional funding and 

training opportunities. 

The same questions regarding funding and support were also asked of the State-level organizations. All 

the State public health organizations as well as all the responding State OEMs received agency-specific 

support, so there are no meaningful comparisons to be made between organizations that did or did not 

receive any support. However, we can directly examine the observed responses of the State EMS 

organizations for positive associations between receipt of funding/resources and preparedness activities 

(as with the local EMS organizations, formal statistical tests for association between these questions and 

the twenty-one indicators of preparedness (listed above) were not appropriate since the State-level 

organizations were not sampled randomly). 

Of the responding State EMS organizations, those that received an increase in funding and support were 

more likely to update response plans for CBRNE, internally increase spending or reallocate resources to 

address terrorism preparedness, create new organizational structures to address response preparedness, 

and purchase specialized equipment. Among these observed associations, State EMS organizations who 

received an increase in funding or resources for terrorism preparedness were twice as likely to increase 

spending for terrorism related incidents and classify such spending as a high or somewhat high priority, 

50 percent more likely to create a new terrorism-related unit or assign individual(s) specifically to 

terrorism preparedness, and 23 percent more likely to update their terrorism response plans; those who 

purchased monitoring and detection all received an increase. However, those State EMS organizations 

that did not receive an increase in funding or support rated their overall level of preparedness to respond 

to CBRNE terrorism at equal levels as those State EMS who did receive such benefits. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

TAB 3—PARTICIPATION IN FEDERALLY SPONSORED PROGRAMS SINCE 9/11 

The following tables show what percent of State and local organizations have participated in 

Federally sponsored funding, training, or equipment programs since 9/11 and the primary Federal 

programs they have participated in. The reader should be careful in over-interpreting these 

results in that the responses are highly dependent on how knowledgeable the individual who filled 

out the questionnaire for their organization was regarding the numerous Federal programs 

available and which ones their organization may have actually participated in. For example, a

law enforcement officer filling out the survey with knowledge about training programs may be 

less knowledgeable about his or her organization’s participation in equipment programs, etc. 

Also, because the number of Federally sponsored training, equipment, or funding programs are 

numerous, it was not possible to list all in the questionnaire. We gave respondents the option of 

writing in “other programs” participated in, however, relatively few wrote in additional programs. 

Thus, the results give us only an approximate idea about differences in participation rates since 

9/11 and the range of Federal preparedness programs in which different organizational types have 

participated. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 3A.Since 9/11, Percent of Local Response Organizations That Have Participated in Federally Sponsored

Funding, Equipment, Or Training Programs 

Percent of Orgs Have

Participated in Any

Federally Sponsored 

Programs Since 9/11 

Primary Federal Program(s) 

Participated in Since 9/11 

(Percent of All Organizations) 

Law Enforcement 

42 (6) 

Since 9/11, law enforcement has participated in: 

 10% (2) FEMA Emergency Management Institute Course(s) 

 13% (4) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Equip. Program 

 12% (4) ODP/DHS State Homeland Security Grant Program 

 4% (3) BJA/OJP Local Law Enforcement Block Grants Program 

58% (6) Participated in None 

Local/Region. EMS 

46 (5) 

Since 9/11, local/regional EMS has participated in: 

 16% (4) ODP/DHS State Homeland Security Grant Program 

 11% (3) FEMA Emergency Management Institute Course(s) 

 10% (3) National Fire Academy Emergency Response to Terrorism course(s) 

 9% (3) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Equipment Program 

 8% (3) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Exercise Program

 54% (5) Have not participated in any Federally sponsored programs

Local OEM 

83 (5) 

Since 9/11, local OEMs have participated in:

 8% (3) EPA Emergency Response Training Program (ERTP)

 9% (4) DOE Training for Radiological Emergencies 

 11% (3) Other National Domestic Preparedness Consortium Training Courses 

 31% (5) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Exercise Program

 25% (6) OJP Anti-Terrorism State and Local Training Grants (SLATT) 

 19% (4) National Fire Academy Emergency Response to Terrorism course(s) 

 15% (4) NM Tech’s Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings Course 

 39% (6) FEMA Emergency Management Institute Course(s) 

 34% (6) Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program 

 31% (5) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Exercise Program

 48% (6) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Equip. Program 

 55% (6) ODP/DHS State Homeland Security Grant Program 

 17% (5) Have not participated in any Federally sponsored programs

Paid/Combo Fire

73 (5) 

Since 9/11, paid/combination fire departments have participated in: 

 5% (3) EPA Emergency Response Training Program (ERTP)

 5% (1) DOE Training for Radiological Emergencies 

 6% (2) NM Tech’s Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings Course

 6% (2) Other National Domestic Preparedness Consortium Training Courses 

 6% (2) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Exercise Program

 5% (2) ODP/DHS State and Local Domestic Preparedness Training and 

Technical Assistance Program 

 13% (3) ODP/DHS State Homeland Security Grant Program 

 10% (3) OJP Anti-Terrorism State and Local Training Grants (SLATT) 

 21% (5) FEMA Emergency Management Institute Course(s) 

 24% (5) National Fire Academy Emergency Response to Terrorism course(s) 

 20% (6) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Equip. Program 

 46% (7) Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program 

 27% (5) Have not participated in any Federally sponsored programs

Volunteer Fire 

31 (7) 

Since 9/11, paid/combination fire departments have participated in: 

 5% (3) EPA Emergency Response Training Program (ERTP)

 5% (1) DOE Training for Radiological Emergencies 

 6% (2) NM Tech’s Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings Course

 6% (2) Other National Domestic Preparedness Consortium Training Courses 

 6% (2) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Exercise Program

 5% (2) ODP/DHS State and Local Domestic Preparedness Training and 

Technical Assistance Program 

 13% (3) ODP/DHS State Homeland Security Grant Program 

 10% (3) OJP Anti-Terrorism State and Local Training Grants (SLATT) 

 21% (5) FEMA Emergency Management Institute Course(s) 

 24% (5) National Fire Academy Emergency Response to Terrorism course(s) 

 20% (6) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Equip. Program 

 46% (7) Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program 

 27% (5) Have not participated in any Federally sponsored programs

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 3B. Since 9/11, Percent of State Organizations That Have Participated in Federally-Sponsored Funding,

Equipment, Or Training Programs 

Percent of State Orgs

Have Participated in 

Any FederallySponsored Programs

Since 9/11 

Primary Federal Program(s) Have 

Participated in Since 9/11 

(Percent of All Organizations) 

State EMS 

87 (4) 

Since 9/11, State EMS has participated in: 

 23% (5) ODP/DHS State and Local Domestic Preparedness Training

and Technical Assistance Program 

 40% (6) ODP/DHS State Homeland Security Grant Program

 7% (3) Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program 

 30% (5) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Exercise Program 

 27% (5) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Equip. Program 

 10% (3) EPA Emergency Response Training Program (ERTP) 

 27% (5) Other National Domestic Preparedness Consortium Training

Courses 

 7% (3) NM Tech’s Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings Course 

 7% (3) DOE Training for Radiological Emergencies 

 24% (5) National Fire Academy Emergency Response to Terrorism 

course(s) 

 43% (6) FEMA Emergency Management Institute Course(s) 

 20% (5) OJP Anti-Terrorism State and Local Training Grants (SLATT) 

 37% (5) Other 

13% (4) Have not participated in any Federally sponsored programs 

State OEM 

100 

Since 9/11, State OEMs have participated in:

 65% (7) ODP/DHS State and Local Domestic Preparedness Training

and Technical Assistance Program 

 38% (7) ODP/DHS Urban Areas Security Initiative (2003) 

 81% (6) ODP/DHS State Homeland Security Grant Program

 4% (3) BJA/OJP Local Law Enforcement Block Grants Program 

 23% (6) BJA/OJP Byrne Formula Grant Program 

 23% (6) Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program 

 88% (4) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Exercise Program 

 92% (4) ODP/DHS State and Local Preparedness Equip. Program 

 12% (4) FBI Hazardous Devices School 

 23% (6) EPA Emergency Response Training Program (ERTP) 

 65% (7) Other National Domestic Preparedness Consortium Training

Courses 

 58% (7) NM Tech’s Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings Course 

 50% (7) DOE Training for Radiological Emergencies 

 15% (5) US Army Chemical School Training Program (USACLMS) 

 46% (7) National Fire Academy Emergency Response to Terrorism 

course(s) 

 77% (6) FEMA Emergency Management Institute Course(s) 

 38% (7) OJP Anti-Terrorism State and Local Training Grants (SLATT)

 8% (4) NDPO Equipment Research and Development Program 

 8% (4) Other Federal Programs 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 3C. Since 9/11, Percent of Health Organizations That Have Participated in Federally-Sponsored Training 

Programs or Academic Conferences

Percent Of Health

Orgs Have

Participated In Any

Federally-Sponsored

Training Programs or 

Academic

Conferences 

Primary Federal Program(s) 

Participated in Since 9/11 

(Percent of All Health Organizations) 

Hospitals 

51 (8) 

Since 9/11, hospitals have participated in: 

 37% (7) CDC Satellite Broadcasts or Conferences 

 16% (4) CDC’s MMWR Continuing Medical Education Program 

 32% (6) CDC Training Modules 

 16% (4) FEMA Emergency Management Institute Course(s) 

 5% (3) US Army Chemical School Training Program (USACLMS) 

 3% (2) DOE Training for Radiological Emergencies 

 8% (3) Other 

49% (8) Said we have not participated in any such Federally sponsored training

programs or conferences 

Local Public Health 

70 (12) 

Since 9/11, local public health has participated in: 

 5% (2) US Army Chemical School Training Program (USACLMS) 

 27% (7) CDC’s MMWR Continuing Medical Education Program 

 59% (11) CDC Training Modules 

 64% (11) CDC Satellite Broadcasts or Conferences 

 13% (5) Other 

30% (12) Said we have not participated in any such Federally sponsored 

training programs or conferences 

State Public Health 

100 

Since 9/11, State public health has participated in: 

 97% (2) CDC Satellite Broadcasts or Conferences 

 97% (2) CDC Training Modules 

 54% (5) CDC’s MMWR Continuing Medical Education Program 

 51% (5) FEMA Emergency Management Institute Course(s) 

 37% (5) DOE Training for Radiological Emergencies 

 23% (4) Other 

0% Said we have not participated in any such Federally sponsored training

programs or conferences 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Note, health organizations were asked a somewhat different question than 

local responders or State organizations. Health organizations also were given fewer response options than local and State 

organizations.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

TAB 4-WEIGHTING AND SAMPLING DESIGN 

This tab describes the construction of sampling and non-response weighting used in the analysis 

of responses to Wave III of the survey. Together, these adjustments permit findings from the 

survey to be generalized to the larger population of response organizations nationwide. Wave III 

solicited the same sample of organizations as were solicited for Wave I. This choice combined 

the practicality of not having to absorb the expense of creating a second sample with the 

advantage of facilitating possible longitudinal analyses on the set of organizations that responded 

to common survey items in both of those waves. The discussion in this tab is based largely on 

RAND PM-1236-OSD, Sampling Design, Respondent Selection, and Construction of Survey 

Weights for the Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Programs Survey, by Jerry

Jacobson, Ronald Fricker, and Lois Davis (August 2001) which has been updated to incorporate 

information relevant to the third survey. 

Updating the sample 

Responses to Wave III of the survey were solicited from the same sample of organizations that 

were solicited to participate in Wave I. An effort was made to update all addresses and points of 

contact for the sample prior to placing Wave III into the field. This effort was necessary due to 

the possibility that the sample organizations may have had a turnover in personnel--in particular, 

the employee most appropriate to fill out the survey--or may have moved to a new address. 

Additionally, some organizations may have no longer existed and would therefore need to be 

replaced. 

Two organizations were identified as no longer existing, one law enforcement and one fire 

organization. Each of these organizations was replaced by another qualified organization in that 

same county.

56 The implications of these replacements on the probability of selection of these 

organizations into the sample are described in the next section. The act of replacing these two 

organizations did not impact the probability of selection of organizations in other counties or 

other organizational types in the same county. 

In addition, several local EMS organizations forwarded their surveys on to their respective State 

organizations for completion. As these events occurred after the survey was in the field and the 

set of local EMS organizations were as convenience sample, no attempt was made to replace 

these organizations, which essentially self-selected out of the sample. 

Constructing the survey sampling weights 

Survey weights account for differential probability of being sampled among strata and for nonresponse. These statistical adjustments allow the analysis to properly infer back to the correct 

population. 

The overall survey weight applied to any respondent can be expressed as 

igj

igj P

1

W = , where 

Pigj is the probability that respondent i in group g (e.g., hospitals) in county j was selected and 

completed the survey. Because organizations were selected from within counties, this overall 

 

56 Each replacement was chosen randomly from a compiled list of similar organizations in that same county. The 

associated sampling weights described in Section 3 were adjusted accordingly. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

probability is really threefold: it depends on (1) the probability county j was selected in the first 

stage; (2) the probability organization i was selected from among the eligible organizations in

group g in the second stage, given county j was selected in the first stage; and (3) the probability 

organization i completed and returned the survey, given organization i was selected. If we call 

these probabilities π , π , and π , respectively, then the overall probability of response, 

which is all that is needed to calculate a particular respondent’s survey weight, is just their 

product: 

j

igj

igj

j

R

igj

= (1) R Pigj πj * πigj * πigj

The first terms above, π and , are referred to as the “probabilities of selection” and their 

derivation depends only on the sampling methodology employed for each group of respondents. 

The final term, π , has a different meaning: it is an adjustment to account for the fact that 

some organizations that were asked to complete the survey were more likely than others to 

actually complete and return it. , is referred to as the “probability of response”; it accounts 

for observed patterns of response that can only be determined after all surveys have been returned 

and processed. For example, we observed that, on average, hospitals in which the number of fulltime equivalent (FTE) physicians was below the median FTE were less likely to complete and 

return the survey than their larger counterparts. In this case, the adjustment is necessary to ensure 

that smaller hospitals’ views are not underemphasized because of differences in response rates 

when results from hospitals of all FTE sizes are aggregated. 

πigj

R πigj

R

The next sections derive the right-hand side probabilities in equation (1) separately for each 

respondent group. The separate derivations are necessary because differences in organizational 

structure between groups and in the data available to construct sampling frames generated 

different sampling rules. The impact of these differences on each term in equation (1), 

summarized in Table D1, is to follow. The derivation of the “probabilities of selection” was

originally described in Jacobson, et. al (2001). For completeness, they are described again herein. 

Weights have not been constructed for EMS respondents, since the sample of EMS organizations 

is a convenience sample. Findings from the local and regional EMS samples cannot be 

generalized to the larger EMS population. Weights also have not been constructed for State-level 

respondents, since the State surveys are censuses rather than randomly selected samples. 

Probability of Selection for Counties 

The sample of n = 200 counties was drawn without replacement from the N = 3,105

counties in the contiguous United States, Alaska, and Hawaii, with probabilities of selection 

proportional to the square root of each county’s population.57 If we call county j’s population ρj, 

then the probability of selection for the jth county was58

 

57 Population estimates were taken from the February, 2000 release of the DHHS’s Area Resource File. Sampling was 

carried out using SAS’s SURVEYSELECT procedure. 58 Tab 4 describes the assumptions necessary for Equation (2) to represent true probabilities.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

∑

N

k

k

j

j

ρ

n ρ

π

=1

= (2)

Note that later sections will describe adjustments to the πj required for public health, OEM, and 

hospital respondents. 

Probability of Selection for Organizations 

Apart from the exceptions described in the next section and in the section on County

Weighting Details below, only one representative from each group was selected per county.

Therefore, the probability of selection for any organization i in group g and county j, given 

county j was selected in the first stage, was just 

gj

igj N

π

1 = (3)

where Ngj is the number of organizations from group g eligible for sampling within county j. 

Adjustment for OEMs and Public Health Respondents 

A number of public health departments and OEMs have jurisdiction over neighboring 

counties that have no such organizations within their borders. For these (which we term

“regional” organizations), the county probability of selection given in equation (2) must be 

augmented to account for the fact that if any county under their jurisdiction had been selected in 

the first stage sample of counties, then the regional organization in question would have been 

selected into the sample in the second stage. 

Let π ’ be the adjusted probability of selection for a public health department or OEM in county 

R (for “regional”) that has N

R

R>1 counties under its jurisdiction. Then, 

′ ∑ (4)

NR

c

πR πR πc

=1

= +

where the right-hand side probabilities are just the probabilities from equation (2). πj

Adjustment for Hospitals 

Hospitals with trauma centers were over-sampled in order to ensure selection of an adequate 

number of hospitals involved in emergency response. In each county, a sampling procedure was 

constructed to ensure a 70% or greater chance of selecting a hospital with a trauma center.59 

Essentially, the list of trauma center hospitals was replicated an integer Z number of times until 

trauma center hospitals comprised at least 70 per cent of all hospitals. Let Tj and NTj be the 

number of hospitals with, and without, trauma centers, respectively, in county j. Then Z is

ceil(0.7NTj/0.3Tj), where the ceil operator rounds its argument to the next highest integer. 

 

59 In counties where no trauma center hospital was present, the usual selection mechanism was employed: one hospital 

was selected at random from all of the eligible hospitals (eligibility was discussed in Section 3). 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

This procedure results in a probability of selection for each trauma center hospital t in county j of 

j j j

j

t hj Z T NT

Z

π * + , = (5)

and for each hospital nt, that does not have a trauma center, of 

j j j

nt hj Z T NT

π * +

1 , = (6)

where h in the subscripts indicates the hospital respondent group. The equations above replace 

equation (3) for hospitals in the calculation of survey weights. 

One final adjustment to the hospital weights is necessary to account for the “nearest neighbor” 

selection rule that was employed when no hospital could be identified within a county. The 

adjustment, described below, results in an expression similar to the regional adjustment for public 

health departments and OEMs in equation (4) in the sense that it does not affect the adjustments 

given in (5) and (6) above, but instead replaces the hospitals’ county probabilities of selection 

given in equation (2). 

When no hospital could be identified within a county c, a hospital from the county nearest to c

was selected at random. Consequently, hospitals in the sample could have been selected either 

because they a) were located within a sample county, or b) because they were in a county, call it 

R, that did have a hospital within its borders and happened to be the county closest to c. Thus, an 

adjustment to each hospital’s probability of selection is required. In this case, it is more 

straightforward to make the adjustment to each hospital’s county probability of selection, π , 

than to the organizational probability of selection, . Let N

j

j

πihj R be the number of counties 

surrounding c that contain no hospital and for which R is the nearest county that does contain a 

hospital. If we interpret R and NR in this manner, equation (4) gives the correctly adjusted π for 

hospitals. 

Table 4A below summarizes the above discussion. For each respondent group, it lists the number 

of the equation used to form the county probability of selection and the organizational probability 

of selection, respectively. These give the correct inputs to equation (1), adjusted as necessary for 

the different sampling rules required for each group. The derivation of survey weights for fire 

departments is more involved and appears below. 

Table 4A. Equation References for Adjusted Probabilities of Selection due to Special Weighting Considerations 

Respondent group g πj πigj Reason for weighting adjustment 

Law enforcement (2) (3) No adjustment necessary

Fire (2) * 

EMS (2) πigj =1 Convenience sample 

Public health (4) (3) Regional, multi-county jurisdictions 

OEM (4) (3) Regional, multi-county jurisdictions 

Hospitals (4) (5)/(6) Over-sampling of trauma centers; nearest neighbor rule 

Stratification by HAZMAT; paid, volunteer, combination 

departments 

*See section on Probabilities of Selection for Fire Departments.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Constructing the Survey Non-Response Weights 

Probability of Non-Response

Non-response was accounted for using the propensity score method of Little and Rubin (1987) to 

determine the probability, from equation (1), that organization i in group g in county j

responded given that organization i was sampled. This probability was calculated by fitting a 

separate logistic regression model for each respondent group of the form

R πigj

1 + exp( + + )

exp( + + ) =

g i j

R g i j

igj β

β

π

X Y

X Y

 (7) 

where βg is the intercept coefficient for the respondent group (e.g., hospitals), and Xg, and Yj are

vectors of organization-specific and county-specific characteristics, respectively.

At both the county and organization level, covariates were candidates for inclusion in the model if 

they were predictive of observed patterns of non-response60 or willingness to respond (e.g., 

urbanicity of the respondent’s county). Data availability also restricted the covariates available 

for inclusion in (7): only variables from the datasets used to construct the sampling frame—with 

few missing values for all respondents in the sample—could be included since the variables, 

defined on the population, must be available for both survey respondents and non-respondents 

alike.61 

For a county j, the following factors hypothesized to influence a respondent’s willingness 

to respond were considered for inclusion in the model: 

• regionj is a categorical variable indicating whether the county is in the 

Midwest, Northeast, South, or West 

• popj is the county’s 1998 population (on the natural logarithm scale) 

• landj is the land area of the county (on the natural logarithm scale) 

• densityj is the population density, popj/landj of the county in 1998 (on the 

natural logarithm scale) 

• urbanj is an indicator for urban versus rural62

Apart from the region variables, all of the above are proxies for a county’s size or its urbanicity. 

As we would expect, these variables are often collinear. This poses no problem, however, as it 

does in other settings, because the purpose of the non-response models here is prediction, as 

opposed to evaluating the statistical significance of any particular coefficient. Population, land

area, and density all possess a skew in the positive direction. To improve model fit, these 

variables were transformed to the natural logarithm scale, which shifts the distribution of these 

variables much closer to that of a Normal distribution. In addition to the county-level 

characteristics above, variables specific to the individual organizational types were also 

considered when appropriate. Additional detail on the sources of the variables may be found later 

in this Tab. 

 

60 The significance of each covariate was a standard z-test within the logistic framework. 61 Where possible, missing values were inferred from the survey responses (to any of the waves where such information 

was solicited). The number of full time equivalent physicians, used in the nonresponse model for hospitals, was 

missing in the AHA’s database for several hospitals that completed surveys. Since the initial Federal Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Preparedness Programs Survey (FWMDPPS) asked hospitals a similar question, values were imputed from 

the survey for use in prediction of the non-response model for these respondents. The FWMDPPS values were found to 

be well within the range of values reported for this variable in the AHA dataset. 62 These variables were provided by the DHHS’s Area Resource File, which contains projections for 1998 based on the 

1990 Census. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

For each respondent group, a number of models were identified whose covariates satisfied the 

criteria described above. Individual t-tests were used to identify those variables with strong 

explanatory potential. However, relying only on these tests poses a multiple testing problem. For 

example, the seven county level coefficients (three region coefficients and one each for the four 

quantitative variables) occur in each of the five organizational non-response models, for a total of 

35 individual t-tests. Using the standard level .05 significance test (a more liberal threshold was 

actually employed in the analysis), we should expect two of the coefficients to demonstrate an

effect when no effect is actually present just by the luck of the draw. For this analysis, the final 

model presented was chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), which characterizes 

overall model fit on a likelihood basis while penalizing for over-parameterization. 

Law Enforcement 

In addition to the county-level characteristics above, the size of law enforcement organizations 

and other indicators of emergency response capabilities were considered for inclusion in the nonresponse model. For law enforcement organization i: 

• have_911i is an indicator corresponding to whether organization i participates 

in a 911 emergency dispatch system. 

• officersi is the organization’s number of sworn officers 

The presence of a 911 emergency dispatch system proved informative upon non-response, with 

those without a 911 system being more likely to respond to the survey. As in Wave I, region of

the country and county population were found to be good predictors. Law enforcement 

organizations in the West were more likely to complete the survey than respondents in any other 

region, as were respondents in counties with relatively large populations. Law organizations in 

the Midwest and South were more likely to respond than those in the Northeast. The values of 

the estimated logistic coefficients (βl’s), along with the estimated β’s for the other respondent 

groups, are given in the section on Estimated Coefficients for Non-Response Models. 

Fire Departments 

Factors considered for the fire department non-response model included measures of 

organizational size, structure, and emergency response capabilities. For fire department i: 

• fire_typei is a categorical variable classifying personnel at department i as all 

volunteer, all paid, or some combination

• hazmati is an indicator corresponding to whether department i has HAZMAT 

capability

• have_911i is an indicator corresponding to whether department i participates 

in a 911 emergency dispatch system. 

The National Public Safety Information Bureau’s (NPSIB, see the section on Description of the 

Data Files) variable for number of personnel was excluded from the analysis because it was 

inconsistent with values provided by respondents in Wave I of the FWMDPPS. Other variables 

from the NPSIB were found to be more consistent (agreement on 80 per cent or more 

observations). 

D-4-6 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

A pooled model with indicators for volunteer and combination was used (paid was used as the 

reference category). The final pooled model indicates that all-volunteer departments were least 

likely to respond. Paid and combination departments were almost equally likely to respond, with 

paid being slightly less. Departments with HAZMAT capability were also more likely to 

respond, as were departments in the Midwest, followed by the West, and then the South and 

Northeast. 

Hospitals 

Covariates considered for inclusion in the hospital non-response model were organizational size 

and management structure. For hospital i: 

• Hosp_typei is a categorical variable classifying the organizational type of 

hospital i as government or Federal, not-for-profit, or for-profit

• hosp_bedi is the number of staffed hospital beds 

• ftei is the number of full-time-equivalent medical staff 

• traumai is an indicator corresponding to whether the hospital has a trauma

center 

• 

Of the above, only FTE was predictive of response. Like the county-level continuous variables, 

FTE had a heavy positive skew (i.e. there existed some atypically large hospitals). A correction 

to the natural logarithm scale was not successful in compensating for the skew, so the variable 

parsed into four categories, one for each quartile of the sample distribution. The hospitals with 

the fewest number of FTE physicians (those in the first quartile) were least likely to respond, 

followed by the second and then the fourth quartiles; the hospitals in the third quartile were most 

likely to respond. 

Region of the county was also a strong predictor of hospital response. Hospitals in the Midwest 

were most likely to respond, with those on the South and West equally likely to respond. 

Northeastern hospitals were least likely to respond.

Public Health Departments 

The data sets, described in the section on Description of the Data Files, do not provide reliable 

organizational-level data for public health organizations (recall that they were used primarily to

obtain contact information for these respondents). For this reason, only the county level 

covariates were considered for these organizations 

The final model for public health departments indicates that public health departments in the 

Midwest were most likely to respond, with the likelihood of response for the other three regions 

being almost equal. Urban departments were more likely to respond than rural health 

departments. 

Offices of Emergency Management 

Reliable organizational-level data for emergency management offices were also not available 

from the datasets in the section on Description of the Data Files. Among the county-level 

covariates, none proved to be predictive of response. Thus, no adjustment for non-response was 

made for these organizations. 

D-4-7 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

References 

Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of 

Mass Destruction. Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, December 16, 

2001, www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/. 

Akaike, H. (1973), “Information Theory and an Extension of the Maximum Likelihood

Principal,” in Second International Symposium on Information Theory, eds. B.N. Petrox 

and F. Caski, Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, p.267 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Continuation Guidance for Cooperative 

Agreement on Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism--Budget Year 

Four Program Announcement 99051, May 2, 2003.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Research and Planning, Bureau of 

Health Professions. Area Resource File. February, 2000 release. 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. “Federal Funds for Public Health Infrastructure 

Begins to Flow to States,” HHS News, January 25, 2002. 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Press Secretary. “Department of Homeland 

Security Announces Opening of Grant Application Process for Firefighter Assistance 

Grants,” March 10, 2003. 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Press Secretary. “Secretary Ridge 

Addresses National Governors Association,” Press Release August 18, 2003. 

Fowler, F. Jr. Survey Research Methods (2nd ed.), Newbury Park, CA, Sage Publications, 1993. 

Fox, D.R. (1989), “Computer Selection of Sized-Biased Samples,” The American Statistician, 

43(3), 168–171. 

Jacobson, J., Fricker, R., and Davis, L. (2001), RAND/PM-1236-OSD, Sample Design, 

Respondent Selection, and Construction of Survey Weights for the Federal Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Preparedness Programs Survey. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 

LaTourrette, T, DJ Peterson, JT Bartis, and BA Jackson. Protecting Emergency Responders, 

Volume 2: Community Views of Safety and Health Risks and Personal Protection Needs, 

RAND, MR-1646-NIOSH, 2003. 

U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy. “First Responders Funding in Fiscal Year 2003 Omnibus 

Appropriations Bill,” http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200302/021403a.html. 

Little, R.J.A. and Rubin, D.B. (1987), Statistical Analysis with Missing Data. John Wiley and 

Sons. New York, New York. 

Rice, J. (1995), Mathematical Statistics and Data Analysis, Second Edition, Duxbury Press, 

Belmont, California. 

Vijayan, K. (1968), “An Exact π ps Sampling Scheme: Generalization of a Method of Hanurav,” 

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 30, 556–566. 

D-4-8 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

County weighting details

 The sample of n=200 counties was drawn without replacement from the N=3,105 counties in the 

contiguous United States, Alaska, and Hawaii, with probabilities of selection proportional to the square 

root of each county’s population. Population estimates were taken from the February, 2000 release of the 

Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) Area Resource File. Sampling based on population 

size allowed for a representative number of larger counties to be included in the sample. However, using 

the actual population values, instead of their square roots, the sample would have been skewed too 

heavily in favor of the larger counties, and the number of smaller counties in the sample would have been 

too small to be representative. Transforming to the square root provided a means for balancing the 

number of counties sampled across the various county sizes. 

If we call county j’s population ρ j , then the probability π j of selection into the sample for the j

th county

was: 

∑

N

k

k

j

j

ρ

n ρ

π

=1

= (1) 

where 

n

N

k

k

j j

∑

1 max = ≤

ρ

ρ (2) 

Equation (2) implies that the square root of the population of the largest U.S. county must be no greater 

than the sum of the square root of the population in each U.S. county, divided by the sample size. 

Sampling was carried out using SAS’s SURVEYSELECT procedure, which utilizes the Hanurav-Vijayan 

(Vijayan, 1968; see also Fox, 1989) algorithm for probability proportional to size (PPS) selection without 

replacement. Provided that the assumption of Equation (2) holds, this algorithm produces a sample with 

probabilities of selection as displayed in Equation (1). Note that if we had attempted to used the actual 

county populations for sampling, instead of their square roots, the assumption of Equation (2) would fail 

to hold, which reflects that the skew is too heavy in favor of the larger counties in this case. 

Probabilities of Selection for Fire Departments 

This section describes the construction of the probabilities of selection, π , for a fire department i in a 

county c. is required to compute survey weights for fire departments, as described in the main 

document. 

ifc

πifc

Determining the Sampling Scheme 

We followed one of two schemes in each county to select departments for the sample, depending on the 

distribution of departments with HAZMAT capability across the departments’ organizational strata: all 

volunteer, all paid, and combination. From here on, department stratum refers to this classification. Which 

scheme we used will affect how the weights are computed in the county.

Let Nc be the total number of fire departments in county c. For each department in county c, 

define: 

i ∈ {1KNc}

vic = 1 if department is Volunteer, else 0 

D-4-9 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

pic = 1 if department is Paid, else 0 

cic = 1 if department is Combination, else 0 

hic = 1 if department has HAZMAT capability, else 0 

Then the number of HAZMAT departments in each stratum, volunteer, paid, and combination, 

respectively, in county c is: 

 HV ∑ (1) 

Nc

i

c vichic

=1

=

 HP ∑ (2) 

Nc

i

c pichic

=1

=

 HC ∑ (3) 

Nc

i

c cichic

=1

=

Now, the number of strata of departments in county c with HAZMAT capability is: 

HTc = min(1, HVc) + min(1, HPc) + min(1, HCc) 

We chose the sampling scheme, Sc ∈{1,2}, for county c according to: 

 Sc { 2

< 2

2

1 = c ≥

c

HT

HT

if

if

More Definitions 

We need a few more definitions before we can write down the expressions for weighting under each 

scheme in each county c: 

∑ # of volunteer departments Nc

i Vc vic =1 =

∑ # of paid departments Nc

i Pc pic =1 =

∑ # of combination departments Nc

i Cc cic =1 =

Hc = HVc + HPc + HCc # of HAZMAT departments 

Sampling Scheme One 

This scheme was used if, out of the three department strata in a county, at most one had any fire

departments with HAZMAT capability. In this case, we considered volunteer, paid, and combination 

departments separately and randomly selected one respondent from each group so that the probability of

selection, , for a department just depends on its stratum. πifc

So, for a county with Sc = 1, 

= 1

= 1

= 1

=

1

1

1

ic

ic

ic

C

P

V

ifc

c

p

v

if

if

if

π

c

c

c

(4)

or just 

D-4-10 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

ic c ic c c ic

ifc

p P v V C c

π

+ +

1 = (5) 

Sampling Scheme Two 

Here there were two stages. First, one department was selected randomly from all HAZMAT 

departments, irrespective of its stratum. We then noted the stratum of the department that was selected 

and ruled this stratum out from further sampling in the county. This left either one or two strata of 

departments, depending on the county. In the second stage, one department was randomly selected from

each of the remaining strata. 

For HAZMAT departments, then, πifc is determined by the chance of getting selected in the first round, 

Hc

1 , plus the likelihood of getting selected in a subsequent round given i’s stratum wasn’t the same as the 

department chosen in the first round. For example, for a volunteer department i, the chance i’s stratum

was not chosen in the first round is c

c

H

HV 1− . That is one minus the chance a HAZMAT of i’s stratum,

volunteer, was selected from among all HAZMATs. So, if Sc = 2 and hic = 1: 

= 1

= 1

= 1

(1 )

(1 )

(1 )

+

+

+

=

1

1

1

1

1

1

ic

ic

ic

H C

HC

H P

HP

H V

HV

H

H

H

ifc

c

p

v

if

if

if

π

c c

c

c c

c

c c

c

c

c

c

-

-

-

 (6) 

The last case is if hic = 0, a non-HAZMAT department in a county using the second sampling scheme. 

Here, there is no chance of selection in the first round, but the chance of selection in a subsequent round is 

the same. 

So, if Sc = 2 and hic = 0: 

= 1

= 1

= 1

(1 )

(1 )

(1 )

=

1

1

1

ic

ic

ic

H C

HC

H P

HP

H V

HV

ifc

c

p

v

if

if

if

π

c c

c

c c

c

c c

c

-

-

-

 (7) 

D-4-11 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Estimated Coefficients for Non-response Models 

Dependent Variable is Response=1 (i.e. Response=yes) 

Law

Enforcement 

Fire

Departments Hospitals 

Public Health 

Departments

County-level Variables:

Northeast -0.93 -0.60 -1.24 -0.92

South -0.09 -0.55 -0.39 -0.87

West 0.79 -0.24 -0.39 -0.87

pop 0.20 --- --- ---

urban --- --- --- 0.69

Organizational 

variables: 

have_911 -0.76 --- --- ---

paid --- 0.11 --- ---

volunteer --- -1.14 --- ---

hazmat --- 0.39 --- ---

fte Q2 --- --- 0.22 ---

fte Q3 --- --- 1.17 ---

fte Q4 --- --- 0.86 ---

βg0 -1.15 0.93 -0.28 0.42

N* 208 443 208 202

*

Observations in the nonresponse model include organizations drawn from the two-stage random sample and purposively added 

“sensitized” organizations; a small number of observations were excluded from some models due to incomplete data in the datasets 

used to construct the sampling frame.

”---“ indicates that the variable was excluded from the model.

 The characters fte Q2, fte Q3 and fte Q4 are indicators of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quartiles of the sample distribution of full-time equivalent 

physicians. 

The Midwest region, combination fire departments and the 1st quartile of FTE were all used as reference categories for identifiability 

of the logistic regression models (i.e. the effects of the Northeast, South and West regions are all relative to the Midwest).

Description of the Data Files 

Law Enforcement

National Public Safety Information Bureau’s (NPSIB’s) 2000 National Directory of Law Enforcement 

Administrators (NDLEA) provides contact information for over 36,600 law enforcement organizations 

throughout the U.S. with descriptions of personnel, size of population served, type of department, and 

department specializations, among others. The NDLEA had been used previously in a separate RAND 

study, the 2000 Law Enforcement Technology Survey, where no serious questions were encountered 

regarding the completeness or bias of the NDLEA data. 

Fire Departments and Emergency Medical Services

The NPSIB’s 2000 National Directory of Fire Chiefs and EMS Administrators provides contact 

information for the administrators of over 28,700 fire departments and 6,000 EMS departments 

throughout the U.S. In 1991, the NPSIB compiled its initial list of departments by requesting a listing 

from State agencies. Each year since 1991, the NPSIB has contacted each department in the directory in 

order to verify and update data for each entry, including contact information, size of population served, 

number of emergency response personnel, type of department, specializations, and financial structure. 

New entries are added to the list passively, as NPSIB is updated by various agencies or gets word of a 

new department at trade shows and other events. 

D-4-12 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Unfortunately, the NPSIB does not attempt to summarize the quality of its data or estimate the fraction of 

departments unaccounted for, so that the completeness of sampling frames based on NPSIB data is 

unknown. However, the directory is the most comprehensive listing available and is the only nationwide 

listing that claims comprehensiveness with respect to volunteer departments. 

Hospitals

The American Hospital Association’s (AHA) 1997 Annual Survey of Hospitals profiles a 

universe of more than 6,000 hospitals throughout the United States. The survey is mailed in October of 

each year to the hospital administrator of every hospital in the U.S. Estimates are generated for missing 

data on the basis of their values in previous years. Individual hospitals are contacted for clarification and 

verification of specific responses that fail edit tests. There are seven separate subject areas presented in 

the data: reporting period, classification, facilities and services, beds and utilization by inpatient service, 

total beds and utilization, financial data, and hospital personnel. Although the AHA’s survey provides the 

most comprehensive sampling frame of hospitals available, the frame is incomplete to the extent that 

hospitals do not respond to AHA’s survey. In 1997, the AHA achieved a response rate of 85% for the 

subset of general medical and surgical hospitals. 

Public Health Departments

The National Association of City and County Health Organization’s (NACCHO’s) membership

list for the current year, 2001, provides contact information for 2,948 public health organizations 

throughout the U.S. The list is not a complete enumeration of all city and county public health 

organizations, but instead a list of those organizations who have chosen to become members in the 

Association. To the extent that organizations do not choose to become members, the sampling frame is 

incomplete. 

Offices of Emergency Management

We were unable to identify any current and comprehensive list of OEMs or emergency managers. 

The most relevant list we identified through an extensive search was compiled in 1987 by the 

International Association of Emergency Managers. As expected, due to its age the contact it provided 

were largely inaccurate. Though time intensive, nearly all county OEMs were identified through calls to 

other county agencies and State offices of emergency management. 

Data sources used to identify State-level organizations are described in the main document, in the 

section titled, “Selecting State-level Organizations.” 

D-4-13 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

TAB 5—THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT 

Survey Format 

 

The information collected across the various local and State response organizations followed a similar 

format as shown in the survey outline in Figure 5A. The third survey instrument contained seven sections: 

(1) Emergency Response Planning Activities; (2) Resourcing Preparedness Activities; (3) Responding to

Specific Terrorist Incidents; (4) Assessment of Federal Programs; (5) Intelligence Information and 

Warning; (6) Other Homeland Security Issues, and (7) Organizational Information. 

 

Figure 5A. Survey III Instrument Outline 

Section 1. Emergency Response Planning Activities 

 Organizational participation in emergency response planning activities 

 Changes made to emergency response plans since September 11, 2001 

 Joint preparedness activities 

 Training and exercises 

 Equipment acquisition or purchasing since September 11, 2001 

 Creation of new organizational structures since September 11, 2001 

 Communications interoperability issues 

Section 2. Resourcing Preparedness Activities 

 Changes in spending or reallocation of resources made following September 11, 2001 

 Receipt of external funding and/or resources to support preparedness activities 

 Priority assigned by organizations to expending resources in this area 

Section 3. Responding to Specific Terrorist Incidents

 Ranking incident types according to importance to the organization to prepare for 

 Self-assessed ratings of preparedness to respond to top-ranked incident type

 Self-assessed areas of weaknesses and support needs to improve response capabilities

Section 4. Assessment of Federal Programs 

 Participation in Federal programs since September 11, 2001

 Factors that limit participation in Federal programs 

 Views and expectations of Federal preparedness programs

 Expectations of the Department of Homeland Security

Section 5. Intelligence Information and Warning 

 Intelligence warning and application for security clearances

 Views regarding the Homeland Advisory Security System 

Section 6. Other Homeland Security Issues

 Organizational experience since September 11, 2001 with actual terrorist hoaxes and/or 

incidents 

 Risk assessment and support needs 

 Views regarding the role of the Federal Military and State National Guard

 Organizational experience with call-ups of reserve personnel 

Section 7. Organizational Information 

 Organizational characteristics including type of organization, size of organization, size of 

jurisdiction and size of population served 

In addition to the above sections, several questions at the end collected information on the individual 

completing the survey, and provided an opportunity for the respondent to share additional, open-ended 

comments and suggestions regarding changes or improvements in Federal and State programs for 

terrorism preparedness, as well as other issues of importance to their organization that the survey had not 

addressed. 

D-5-1 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Pretesting The Survey Instrument 

Once the initial draft instrument was ready, the surveys were reviewed and pretested over a period of 

three months to refine and test the draft questionnaire. Individuals pretesting the surveys included 

members of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, in addition to other experts in each survey field. Survey instruments then 

were revised according to feedback between each round of pretest and/or review. This iterative testing 

process was essential in helping us to pinpoint and fix instrument problems, streamline questioning, and 

attempt to reduce respondent burden. 

Overview Of The Fielding Process 

The data collection process for this study followed the model of that designed for the first wave of the 

study in 2001: that is, it operated as a mail survey (with telephone follow-up) with individually crafted 

questions for each responder population. The primary components involved in the fielding of the study

were as follows: an advance letter accompanied by a one-page summary of how previous survey results 

had helped informed the Advisory Panel’s third and fourth reports to Congress; inclusion of a motivating 

cover letter signed by the Chairman of the Advisory Panel (James S. Gilmore, III), enclosed with the 

survey packet itself; telephone follow-up to assure arrival of the survey and to emphasize the importance 

of the study; establishment of a toll-free 800 number to field respondent questions; follow-up postcard 

reminders mailed two weeks post-survey mailing; the mailing of a second, replacement survey; a final 

round of telephone follow-up; and lastly, an endorsement letter signed by designated Panel members 

representing each of the responder communities were sent to those groups with low response rates (EMS, 

hospitals, public health, and volunteer fire departments). 

Fielding of the Survey 

Data collection for this survey was primarily conducted between July and September 2003. In order to 

better manage the fielding process, the nine types of organizations were divided into groups, or “waves.” 

The data collection schedule for each was staggered by approximately 6 days to allow the telephone 

survey staff adequate time to contact each respondent during the various phases of telephone follow-up. 

Each survey wave opened with an advance letter to the respondent indicating the importance of the 

survey, and alerting them to its imminent arrival. With the advance letter was enclosed the one-page 

summary described above. Advance letters were printed on RAND stationary, and signed by both the 

RAND study director, and former Virginia Governor and Panel Chairman James S. Gilmore, III. Seven 

days following the advance letter mailing, the survey was sent out with a cover letter, printed on Panel 

stationary and signed by Chairman Gilmore. As with the previous Panel surveys, the cover letter gave the 

addressee the option of assigning a knowledgeable survey designee if they deemed it appropriate. The 

survey itself was bound in the same brightly colored cover as was mailed to each in the Panel’s first 

survey, designed to attract attention once removed from its envelope. 

Seven days following the survey mailing, reminder postcards were sent out to all cases. The postcard 

thanked respondents if they had already filled out and returned the survey, but also prodded them to 

complete the survey if they had not already. The importance of the study and their participation in it was 

again communicated. 

Approximately four weeks following the initial mailing of the survey packet, a replacement survey was 

mailed to all candidates for whom a returned survey was not on file (the exception being State OEM, 

whose second packets were mailed five weeks after the initial survey mailing). In an effort to draw 

greater attention to the second packet and mitigate it getting lost in an inbox, brightly colored labels 

D-5-2 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

printed with “A Request from the Gilmore Commission” were affixed to the front of each envelope, 

excepting the law enforcement and fire department samples (whose second mailings had already been 

mailed when this idea was conceived), and hospitals (to whom we mailed all second surveys via FedEx, 

based on our previous outreach experiences during fielding of the first and second surveys in 2001 and 

2002 reaching this hard-to-reach population). A total of 171 second survey packets were mailed to the 

hospital sample via FedEx, with 64 hospital responses attributed to that FedEx mailing, which comprised 

65 percent of the total hospital cases returned. 

One week following this second survey mailing, second-round telephone follow-up began, with 

interviewers stepping up attempts to convert potential survey refusals. For the samples with the higher 

response rates at this stage, the second round calling was less intense than for those groups for which we 

had fewer responses. In particular, this period of telephone follow-up was most intensive and lengthy for 

the hospital group, as their response rates were substantially lower than for the other groups. Hospital 

respondents also proved to be the most difficult to reach by telephone, due to the nature of their 

occupations, and a particular emphasis in the second calling round was made to reach the respondents’

assistants and managing nurses. 

While the response rates for the majority of the groups were higher than 50 percent as the fielding period

drew to a close, response rates for EMS, hospitals, public health, and volunteer fire remained low. Based 

on this, a decision was made to send out a final “endorsement” letter on RAND letterhead to those groups 

for whom response rates were lower than desirable. This endorsement letter (or in the case of OEM, an 

endorsement “announcement”), followed after the second survey had been mailed and the second round 

of phone follow-up completed. Each endorsement was made by the appropriate Gilmore Commission 

Panel member in each field, as follows: for hospitals, the endorsement letter was sent out under the 

signature of Kenneth Shine, MD, Former President of the Institute of Medicine; for public health, Patricia 

Quinlisk, MD, MPH, Medical Director and State Epidemiologist, Iowa Department of Public Health; for 

volunteer fire departments, Deputy Chief A.D. Vickery, Seattle Fire Department; and for EMS, Paul 

Maniscalco, MPA EMT/P, Past President, National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians; and 

Ellen Gordon, current President of the National Association of Emergency Managers (NAEM), who made 

an announcement at the NAEM conference on the study’s behalf, asking OEM managers at their annual 

meeting to please complete the survey and return it to RAND. 

D-5-3 
TAB 6—FIRE DEPARTMENT SURVEY 

Fire Departments July 7, 2003 RAND

BAR CODE LABEL

SURVEY III OF FEDERAL 

PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS 

FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 

Conducted by 

RAND 

on behalf of 

The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities 

for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

INSTRUCTIONS 

1. Please use a dark colored pen to fill out the survey. 

2. Mark only one box or circle one number per item, unless otherwise instructed. 

3. As the designated representative of your organization, please fill out all questions, 

to the best of your ability, from the perspective of your organization as a whole. 

 

BATCH:

D-6-1

 
Fire Departments RAND

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this study, we ask you to keep the following definitions and their scope in mind when 

answering the remainder of the survey.

♦ Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) – CBRNE 

incidents are typically defined as involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear devices or 

high-yield explosives. 

♦ Terrorism – A criminal act of violence, or threat of violence, designed to create an atmosphere of 

fear and alarm and to achieve maximum publicity in order to coerce others into actions they 

otherwise would not undertake, or into refraining from actions that they desire to take. Terrorists are 

motivated by political aims, may be either lone actors or members of a group, and seek to produce 

effects beyond the immediate physical damage that they cause. Terrorist incidents may involve the 

use of CBRNE to cause mass casualties or higher probability/lower consequence attacks involving 

conventional explosives or chemical, biological, or radiological agents. 

♦ Cyber-Terrorism – A criminal act involving computer systems or networks designed to cause 

massive disruption of physical or electronic services in order to intimidate or coerce others. 

Examples of cyber-terrorism include:

• An attack against an industrial facility’s communications or control systems, resulting in the 

release of a toxic substance

• An attack against local responder communications and other computer systems that impairs 

response, in coordination with a conventional weapons attack

• Infiltration or corruption of critical data systems (at a hospital or bank, for example) in order to

impair normal operations resulting in a lack of public confidence and societal disruption. 

♦ In this survey, we ask the respondent to keep in mind while answering the following questions that 

“preparedness” encompasses awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. 

 1
Fire Departments RAND

Acronyms Used in this Survey

ATTF Anti-terrorism Task Force 

BJA/OJP Bureau of Justice Assistance/Office of Justice Programs 

BW Biological Weapon 

CB Chemical/Biological 

CBIAC Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center 

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Health and Human Services

CMI Consequence Management Interoperability 

CW Chemical Weapon 

DoD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOT Department of Transportation 

EMS Emergency Medical Services

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

Epi-X Epidemic Information Exchange 

ER Emergency Room 

ERTP Emergency Response Training Program, Environmental Protection Agency 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 

HAN Health Alert Network

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

ICS Incident Command System

IRP Improved Response Program 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee or Commission 

NDPO National Domestic Preparedness Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

NEIC National Enforcement Investigation Center, Environmental Protection Agency 

ODP/DHS Office of Domestic Preparedness/Department of Homeland Security 

OEP Office of Emergency Preparedness, Department of Health and Human Services 

OJP Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice 

OSLDPS Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support, Office of Justice Programs, 

Department of Justice 

PPE Personal Protection Equipment 

RRIS Rapid Response Information System 

SBCCOM U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command

SOP Standard Operating Procedure 

USACLMS U.S. Army Chemical School

2-PAM Pralidoxime chloride

 2
Fire Departments RAND

Section 1: 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING ACTIVITIES

1. Does your organization have any individuals specifically assigned (full-time or part-time) to do 

emergency management or response planning?

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes

2 ❒ No 

2. Since September 11, 2001, has your organization created a new position, unit, or group to address 

prevention, preparedness, response or recovery for terrorism-related incidents, or specially

assigned personnel for this task? 

(Mark All That Apply) 

1 ❒ Created a special unit or position to address emergency preparedness for terrorism-related incidents 

2 ❒ Assigned individual(s) (full-time or part-time) to specifically address emergency preparedness for terrorismrelated incidents 

3 ❒ Created an internal task force to address emergency preparedness for terrorism-related incidents 

within our organization 

4 ❒ Assigned personnel to serve as liaisons to other responder agencies and/or task forces that are 

addressing emergency planning for terrorism-related incidents

5 ❒ Other (please specify): ________________________________________________

 _________________________________________________________________

6 ❒ No, no such new positions, units, or groups have been created or assigned for 

terrorism-related purposes since September 11, 2001 Î Skip to Question 4, Next Page

3 
Fire Departments RAND

3. Which of the following duties does this new position, unit, group, or specially assigned personnel 

perform?

(Mark All That Apply) 

1❒ Analysis and dissemination of information

2❒ Training of other fire departments’ personnel 

3 ❒ Training of our own fire department personnel 

4❒ Liaison with other local fire departments 

5❒ Liaison with local law enforcement agencies

6❒ Provide logistical support to other fire departments in our jurisdiction or region

7❒ Liaison with state agencies

8❒ Liaison with Federal agencies

9❒ Liaison with the private sector (e.g., business, industry, nongovernmental organization)

10❒ Investigate specific terrorist incidents (e.g., arson-related)

11❒ Other (specify): ______________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

4. Is your organization a member of an interagency disaster preparedness committee, task force, or 

working group in your jurisdiction or region? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes Î Continue to Question 5

2 ❒ No Î Skip to Question 7, Next Page

5. Does this interagency disaster preparedness committee, task force, or working group address 

local planning for terrorism-related incidents? 

 (Mark One) 

1 ❒ Yes

2 ❒ No 

6. Does this interagency disaster preparedness committee, task force, or working group address 

regional (i.e., multi-jurisdictional) planning for terrorism-related incidents?

 (Mark One) 

1 ❒ Yes

2 ❒ No 

4 
Fire Departments RAND

7. Numerous task forces have been established to address terrorism prevention, preparedness, 

response and/or recovery. Of the following task forces, which ones does your organization 

participate in, liaison with, or are you an official member of?

 (Mark All That Apply) 

1❒ Your State’s homeland security office task force

2❒ County/city-level interagency task force

3❒ Other (specify): ________________________________________________________ 

4❒ None of the above

8. Does your organization have formal agreements with other fire departments or response agencies for 

mutual aid?

(Mark One)

1❒ Yes

2❒ No

9. Since September 11th, 2001, has your organization updated existing mutual aid

agreements, or established new ones, with other city, county, state, or regional 

organizations for disaster and emergency response? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Yes, for disaster and emergency response in general

2 ❒ Yes, for terrorism-related incidents in general

3 ❒ No new changes have been made to such agreements since 9/11

4❒ No mutual aid agreements exist

5 
Fire Departments RAND

10. Does your organization have formal agreements with private companies, businesses, or 

labor unions in your jurisdiction or region to share information or resources in the event 

of an emergency or disaster? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes, for coordination purposes

2 ❒ Yes, for response purposes (i.e., specialized equipment and/or personnel)

3 ❒ Yes, for planning purposes

4 ❒ No 

11. Does your organization have a written emergency response plan? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes Î Continue to Question 12, Next Page

2 ❒ No Î Skip to Question 14, page 8

6 
Fire Departments RAND

12. Does your organization’s written emergency response plan . . .

 (Mark One Box Per Question)

a. Address operational areas and jurisdictional boundaries? .... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

b. Include a plan for communicating with the public 

and / or the media? ............................................................... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

c. Address how your organization would communicate with

other first responders (e.g., law enforcement, fire, EMS,

HAZMAT organizations) within your jurisdiction? ................. 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

d. Address how your organization would communicate with 

health responders (e.g., hospitals, public health agencies) 

within your jurisdiction? ......................................................... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No 

e. Address procedures for mass decontamination of victims? .. 1❒ Yes 2❒ No 

f. Address procedures for individual decontamination? ............ 1❒ Yes 2❒ No 

g. Address procedures for decontamination of an area or site? 1❒ Yes 2❒ No 

h. Address how your organization would coordinate with 

other agencies outside your jurisdiction? .............................. 1❒ Yes 2❒ No 

i. Address integration with other local response plans? .......... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No 

j. Address integration with state response plans? ................... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No 

k. Address integration with the Federal Response Plan? ......... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No 

l. Address recovery phase and/or post-incident remediation ... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No 

m. Address coordination with hospitals for multi-casualty 

incidents?............................................................................. 1❒ Yes 2❒ No 

 

13. Has your organization updated or newly developed a written emergency response plan to 

specifically address . . . 

(Mark All That Apply)

1❒ Biological incidents?

2❒ Chemical incidents?

3 ❒ Radiological incidents?

4❒ Conventional explosives terrorism incidents?

5 ❒ Cyber terrorism incidents?

6 ❒ Attacks on critical infrastructure?

7❒ No, none of the above

7 
Fire Departments RAND

14. Has your jurisdiction developed a contingency plan to accommodate (e.g., provide shelter to) 

large numbers of people seeking refuge from a nearby community or jurisdiction as a result of a 

terrorism-related incident? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes, and we have exercised this contingency plan 

2 ❒ Yes, but we have not yet exercised this contingency plan 

3 ❒ No 

4 ❒ Don’t know

15. In the table below, please mark the appropriate boxes to indicate whether your organization has 

participated since September 11, 2001, in joint preparedness activities for natural disasters and / 

or terrorism-related incidents with any of the local organizations listed. 

Since September 11, 2001, our organization has participated in joint preparedness 

activities with . . .

(Please Mark All That Apply)

Natural 

disasters and 

emergencies

with:

Terrorism-related 

incident 

response 

with:

A. LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 1 ❒ 2 ❒

B. OTHER FIRE DEPARTMENTS 1 ❒ 2 ❒

C. FREE-STANDING HAZMAT ORGANIZATIONS 1 ❒ 2 ❒

D. LOCAL HOSPITALS OR OTHER MEDICAL 

INSTITUTIONS 1 ❒ 2 ❒

E. EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (EMS) 1 ❒ 2 ❒

F. LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS 1 ❒ 2 ❒

G. PUBLIC OR PRIVATE UTILITIES (E.G., WATER, 

POWER) 1 ❒ 2 ❒

H. PUBLIC OR PRIVATE TRANSPORTATION 

ORGANIZATIONS 1 ❒ 2 ❒

I. LOCAL OFFICE OF EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT OR PREPAREDNESS 1 ❒ 2 ❒

J. SURROUNDING MUTUAL AID AGENCIES 1 ❒ 2 ❒

K. LOCAL MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 1 ❒ 2 ❒

0❒ Our organization has not participated in joint preparedness activities with any of the 

8 

above local organizations since September 11, 2001. 
Fire Departments RAND

16. In the table below, please mark the appropriate boxes to indicate whether your organization has 

participated in the past year in joint preparedness activities for natural disasters and / or terrorismrelated incidents with any of the following state or federal organizations listed. 

Our organization has participated (since September 11, 2001), in joint preparedness activities with . . . 

(Please Mark All That Apply)

Natural 

disasters and 

emergencies

with:

Terrorism-related 

incident 

response 

with:

A. STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 ❒ 2 ❒

B. NATIONAL GUARD 1 ❒ 2 ❒

C. STATE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 1 ❒ 2 ❒

D. STATE PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT 1 ❒ 2 ❒

E. STATE EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (EMS) 1 ❒ 2 ❒

F. FEDERAL MILITARY 1 ❒ 2 ❒

G. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) 1 ❒ 2 ❒

0❒ Our organization has not participated in joint preparedness activities with any of the 

above state or federal organizations since September 11, 2001. 

17. What formal protocol for command and control does your organization use for emergency

incidents?

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Incident Command System (ICS) as taught by the National Fire Academy

2 ❒ Incident management system (IMS) 

3 ❒ Other standardized incident command and control or management system 

4 ❒ None of the above 

18. Does your organization participate in a statewide adopted incident command system? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes

2 ❒ No, our organization does not participate in the statewide adopted incident command system

3 ❒ No, our state does not currently have a statewide adopted incident command system 

9 
Fire Departments RAND 

Now we’d like to ask you some questions about communications interoperability.

By interoperability, we mean the ability of responders involved in an emergency to communicate in realtime within their organization and across agencies and/or jurisdictions via radio or telephone, in order to 

mount a well-coordinated response. 

19. In the event of a large-scale emergency involving multiple agencies or jurisdictions, 

how would you rate your organization’s ability to communicate with other responding units 

or organizations? 

 (Circle One Number For Each Line) 

INADEQUATE EXCELLENT

Within your organization............... 1 2 3 4 5 

Within your jurisdiction.................. 1 2 3 4 5 

Across multiple jurisdictions......... 1 2 3 4 5 

20. Please indicate below if your organization has experienced communications interoperability

problems with any of the following groups since September 11, 2001. 

(Please Mark All That Apply)

Within Your 

Jurisdiction

Outside Your

Jurisdiction

A. Fire Departments 1 ❒ 2 ❒

B. Police 1 ❒ 2 ❒

C. EMS 1 ❒ 2 ❒

D. Medical Organizations 1 ❒ 2 ❒

E. Public Health Agencies 1 ❒ 2 ❒

F. County Agencies 1 ❒ 2 ❒

G. National Guard 1 ❒ 2 ❒

H. State Agencies 1 ❒ 2 ❒

I. Federal Military 1 ❒ 2 ❒

J. Other Federal Agencies 1 ❒ 2 ❒

K. Other (Please Specify): _____________ 1 ❒ 2 ❒

0❒ Yes, interoperability problems exist, but we’ve been able to find work-arounds (such 

as co-locating staff from different agencies in the emergency operations center). 

 10
Fire Departments RAND 

21. What factors, if any, limit efforts to improve the interoperability of your organization’s 

communications system?

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Aging communications system and hardware

2 ❒ Lack of information or guidance on what technologies to purchase

3 ❒ Uncertainty surrounding the availability of spectrum for public safety use

4 ❒ Frequency incompatibility between emergency response organizations in our region

5 ❒ Lack of funding

6 ❒ Inter-agency politics / disagreements

7 ❒ Differences between jurisdictions in rules and regulations

8 ❒ Differences between jurisdictions or agencies in resource priorities

9 ❒ Differing technologies due to different brands of communications equipment

10 ❒ Other (please specify) _________________________________________________

11 ❒ No limits to improvement encountered

22. Has any portion of your organization been trained in the following areas? 

(Mark One Box for Each Item) 

a. Incident command management .......................................... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

b. Threat and risk assessment .................................................. 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

c. Decontamination procedures................................................. 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

d. Emergency response to biological incidents.......................... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

e. Emergency response to hazardous materials incidents 

 (e.g., chemical) ...................................................................... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

f. Emergency response to radiological/nuclear incidents.......... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

g. Use of personal protection equipment (PPE) ........................ 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

h. Detection of release of chemical or biological agents............ 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

i. Detection of release of radiological/nuclear agents ............... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

j. Prevention of terrorism-related incidents ............................... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

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Fire Departments RAND 

23. What specific training courses have your personnel taken since September 11, 2001? 

 1❒ Name of training course(s): (please specify) _____________________________________ 

 _________________________________________________________________________ 

 _________________________________________________________________________ 

 _________________________________________________________________________

24. What percentage of your response personnel are trained in the following areas?

(Please give your best estimate) 

Percent of Response 

Personnel Trained 

a. Incident command or incident management %

b. Personal Protective Equipment Level A %

c. Personal Protective Equipment Levels B or C %

d. Hazardous Materials technician / specialist %

e. Certified Emergency Medical Technician - Intermediate %

f. Certified Emergency Medical Technician - Paramedic %

g. CBRNE awareness or response %

25. Since September 11th, 2001, has your organization . . . (Mark One Box for Each Item) 

a. Increased (or shifted over) the number of staff dedicated to

addressing emergency preparedness for terrorism-related 

 incidents .............................................................................................. 1❒ Yes 2❒ No 

b. Identified training opportunities for emergency response 

 to terrorism-related incidents? ............................................................. 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

c. Scheduled training for terrorism-related incidents? ............................. 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

d. Trained personnel on emergency response for

terrorism-related incidents (or are personnel in the process of

being trained)? ..................................................................................... 1❒ Yes 2❒ No

 12
Fire Departments RAND 

26. Since September 11, 2001, has your organization participated in any table-top exercises? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes, and we received funding to participate in the exercise(s) 

2 ❒ Yes, but we did not receive any funding for this purpose

3 ❒ No Î Skip to Question 29, Next Page 

27. Since September 11, 2001, has your organization participated in any field exercises? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes, and we received funding to participate in the exercise(s) 

2 ❒ Yes, but we did not receive any funding for this purpose

3 ❒ No Î Skip to Question 29, Next Page

28. If so, please indicate for which type(s) of incidents and with what type of organizations. 

 (For Each Row, Mark All That Apply)

With Local 

Organizations 

With State 

Organizations 

With Federal

Organizations 

In the past year, our organization has participated 

in exercises for: 

A. Chemical Incidents 1❒ 2❒ 3❒

B. Biological Incidents 1❒ 2❒ 3❒

C. Radiological Incidents 1❒ 2❒ 3❒

D. Cyber-Terrorism Incidents 1❒ 2❒ 3❒

E. Conventional Explosives Incidents 1❒ 2❒ 3❒

F. Natural Disasters 1❒ 2❒ 3❒

G. Critical Infrastructure Protection 1❒ 2❒ 3❒

H. Other (Please Specify): ________________ 1❒ 2❒ 3❒

 13
Fire Departments RAND 

Equipment Issues 

29. Since September 11th, 2001, has your organization purchased (or is it in the process of 

purchasing) any of the following types of equipment? If so, please indicate how much of 

your total force is being outfitted. 

 (Check One Choice For Each Line)

All of 

the Force 

A Portion of 

the Force 

Specialized

Units Only 

None of 

the Force 

Personal Protective Suits (PPE) 

A. PPE Level A: fully encapsulated 1❒ 2❒ 3❒ 4❒

B. PPE Level B: liquid splash resistant 1❒ 2❒ 3❒ 4❒

C. PPE Level C: liquid splash resistant 1❒ 2❒ 3❒ 4❒

Respiratory protection 

D. N95 Respirator Masks 1❒ 2❒ 3❒ 4❒

E. Self-contained breathing apparatus 1❒ 2❒ 3❒ 4❒

F. Powered air purifying respirator

1❒ 2❒ 3❒ 4❒

G. Closed-circuit breathing apparatus

1❒ 2❒ 3❒ 4❒

H. Air purifying respirator

1❒ 2❒ 3❒ 4❒

Additional equipment 

I. In-suit communications system 1❒ 2❒ 3❒ 4❒

J. Personnel alert safety system (PASS) 1❒ 2❒ 3❒ 4❒

K. Personal cooling system 1❒ 2❒ 3❒ 4❒

30. Since September 11, 2001, has your organization purchased (or is it in the process of

purchasing) any of the following types of equipment? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Monitoring and detection equipment for chemical agents

2 ❒ Monitoring and detection equipment for radiological agents 

3 ❒ Monitoring and detection equipment for biological agents

4 ❒ Monitoring and detection equipment for cyber detection

5 ❒ Equipment for decontamination of victims and/or sites 

6 ❒ No, we have not purchased any of these types of equipment since September, 11, 2001. 

31. Have antidotes for chemical or nerve agents been issued to your organization’s response 

personnel?

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes 

2 ❒ No 

 14
Fire Departments RAND 

32. What funding sources were used to purchase the equipment listed in Questions 29 & 30? 

 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Used department’s existing equipment budget to purchase the new equipment

2 ❒ Received additional funding from the city or county to purchase the new equipment

3 ❒ Received funding from our state government to purchase the new equipment 

4 ❒ Received a federal grant to purchase the new equipment (please specify name of the 

 grant programs): ____________________________________________________ 

5 ❒ We did not purchase ourselves the equipment indicated in Questions 29 & 30, but rather 

acquired some or all of it through another group (e.g., the military) that had received grant 

funding to purchase new equipment. 

6 ❒ We did not purchase ourselves the equipment indicated in Questions 29 & 30, but rather 

acquired some or all of it through another group (e.g., the military) that gave our organization 

excess equipment they no longer needed. 

7 ❒ We have not purchased nor are in the process of purchasing any of the equipment listed in 

Questions 29 & 30. 

33. Is your organization coordinating its equipment/technology procurement process for 

terrorism-related needs with any other organizations? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Coordinating with similar types of response organizations inside or outside of your jurisdiction 

or region (e.g., other fire departments) 

2 ❒ Coordinating with other types of response organizations (e.g., police, EMS) within your 

jurisdiction or region 

3 ❒ Coordinating with other response organizations within your mutual aid network 

4 ❒ Coordinating with your local emergency planning group (or inter-agency task force) 

5 ❒ Coordinating with a multi-county emergency planning group 

6 ❒ Coordinating with your state’s emergency planning group

7 ❒ Other (please specify): ___________________________________________________

 ______________________________________________________________________

8 ❒ We are not coordinating our equipment procurement process with any other 

 organization. 

34. Does your organization address both annual recurring maintenance costs and have a 

timetable for replacement of equipment needed to address terrorism?

(Mark One) 

1 ❒ Yes 

2 ❒ No 

 15
Fire Departments RAND 

35. What factors, if any, limit your organization’s ability to purchase equipment or technology

for terrorism-related needs? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Lack of standardization as to what equipment is available 

2 ❒ Lack of information as to what equipment has been certified for use by our responder 

 community 

3 ❒ Available equipment is not appropriate for our concept of operations

4 ❒ Unsure as to what equipment/technology is needed to ensure our organization’s 

preparedness for terrorism

5 ❒ Unsure what specific terrorism threats are most important for our organization to prepare for 

6 ❒ Competing/higher priorities for spending our organization’s equipment budget 

7 ❒ Lack of sufficient funding 

8 ❒ Other (please specify): ___________________________________________________

 ______________________________________________________________________

9 ❒ No limits to purchasing ability

36. Does your organization have any unit(s) specially trained and/or equipped to respond to 

terrorism-related incidents? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes Î Continue to Question 37

2 ❒ No, but other organizations we work with in our jurisdiction have such 

 units Î Continue to Question 37

3 ❒ No Î Skip to Question 38, Next Page

37. What types of terrorism-related incidents are they trained to respond to?

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Chemical

2 ❒ Biological

3 ❒ Radiological

4 ❒ Cyber-terrorism

5 ❒ Large-scale conventional explosives

6 ❒ Nuclear

7 ❒ Other (please specify): ___________________________________________________

 16
Fire Departments RAND 

38. How would you rate your organization’s overall level of preparedness at present to respond 

to terrorism in general? 

 (Circle One Number) 

INADEQUATE EXCELLENT

1 2 3 4 5

39. How would you rate your organization’s overall level of preparedness at present to respond 

to high consequence CBRNE terrorism, specifically?

 (Circle One Number) 

INADEQUATE EXCELLENT

1 2 3 4 5

40. Since September 11, 2001, has your organization or jurisdiction used FEMA’s Local 

Capability Assessment for Readiness (LCAR) tool to assess your community’s readiness 

and emergency response capabilities? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes

2 ❒ No 

 17
Fire Departments RAND 

Section 2: 

RESOURCING PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES

41. Since September 11th, 2001, has your organization increased its spending, or shifted 

resources internally, to address terrorism-related incidents?

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Yes, internally increased spending Î Continue to Question 42

2 ❒ Yes, internally shifted resources Î Continue to Question 42

3 ❒ No Î Skip to Question 43, Next Page

42. If so, for what purpose(s)? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1❒ Additional security for your organization

2 ❒ Staff overtime 

3 ❒ Additional training of personnel

4 ❒ Purchase of personal protective equipment or other equipment (e.g., sensor equipment) 

specific to terrorism response

5❒ Planning activities specific to terrorism response 

6❒ Additional security for your airport 

7 ❒ Conduct or participate in tabletop and/or field exercises

8 ❒ Develop emergency response or contingency plans 

9❒ Support interagency planning and coordination activities

10 ❒ Conduct a needs assessment for your organization

11❒ Create an anti-terrorism position, unit, or division 

12❒ Assign personnel (full-time or part-time) to the local terrorism-related task force 

13 ❒ Assign personnel (full-time or part-time) to the state terrorism-related task force 

14❒ Other (please specify) _______________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________

 

 18
Fire Departments RAND 

43. Since September 11th, 2001, has your organization received an increase in its funding 

and / or resources for terrorism preparedness? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes Î Continue to Question 44

2 ❒ No Î Skip to Question 45 

44. What was the source(s) of this increase?

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ From the City or County 

2 ❒ From the State Office of Emergency Management (or equivalent in your state) 

3 ❒ From other State agencies

4 ❒ From the Federal government 

5❒ Other (please specify) _________________________________________________________

45. How high a priority is spending additional resources for combating terrorism, when 

compared to the other current needs of your organization? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ High priority 

2 ❒ Somewhat of a priority 

3❒ Low priority 

4❒ Not at all a priority 

 19
Fire Departments RAND 

Section 3: 

RESPONDING TO SPECIFIC TERRORIST INCIDENTS

46. In what ways is your organization better or worse prepared today to respond to terrorismrelated incidents as compared to September 11, 2001? 

(Mark One Box for Each Line) 

 Our organization is... 

 Better Worse 

 Prepared Prepared 

a. Adequate equipment for terrorism related incidents involving 

hazardous agents (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological).................... 1❒ 2❒ 

b. Personnel trained in terrorism-related response .................................... 1❒ 2❒ 

c. Personnel trained in incident command/management........................... 1❒ 2❒ 

d. Resources (e.g., personnel, funding) to address 

 terrorism-related preparedness .............................................................. 1❒ 2❒ 

e. Planning for terrorism-related incidents.................................................. 1❒ 2❒ 

f. Coordination of preparedness activities with other local response 

organizations and/or interagency task forces......................................... 1❒ 2❒ 

g. Integration of preparedness activities with that of State and/or 

 Federal agencies .................................................................................... 1❒ 2❒ 

h. Personnel dedicated to addressing terrorism-related 

 preparedness.......................................................................................... 1❒ 2❒ 

i. Other (please specify): ____________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________. 1❒ 2❒ 

1❒ Additional comments: ___________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________ 

47. For the following types of incidents, please rank order to indicate how important it is for 

your organization to prepare for them, where 1=most important and 5=least important. 

Please rank in order of importance, 1 – 5. 

_____ Biological 

 _____ Chemical 

 _____ Radiological 

 _____ Nuclear 

 _____ Conventional explosives

 20
Fire Departments RAND 

48. How high a priority is it for your organization to expend resources preparing for the type 

of incident you ranked as most important in Question 47? 

(Mark One) 

1 ❒ High priority

2 ❒ Somewhat of a priority 

3 ❒ Low priority

4 ❒ Not at all a priority 

Considering the type of incident you ranked as most important in Question 47, please 

rate your organization’s level of readiness on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being INADEQUATE 

and 5 being EXCELLENT. 

Please circle one number for each question on the 5-point scale given below. 

49. Your organization’s written emergency plan to be used during a response to an event similar to

the one you selected is: 

INADEQUATE EXCELLENT

1 2 3 4 5 

50. Your organization’s knowledge and expertise about response to this type of event are: 

INADEQUATE EXCELLENT

1 2 3 4 5 

51. Your organization’s equipment to respond to this type of event is: 

INADEQUATE EXCELLENT

1 2 3 4 5 

52. Your organization’s training to prepare for this type of event is: 

INADEQUATE EXCELLENT

1 2 3 4 5 

53. Your organization’s exercises to prepare for this type of event are: 

INADEQUATE EXCELLENT

1 2 3 4 5 

54. Your organization’s ability to communicate and coordinate with other organizations likely to 

 be involved in a response to this type of event is: 

INADEQUATE EXCELLENT

1 2 3 4 5 

55. How would you rank your organization’s overall preparedness to respond to this type of event? 

INADEQUATE EXCELLENT

1 2 3 4 5 

 21
Fire Departments RAND 

56.Again, for the type of incident you ranked as most important in Question 47, which of your 

response capabilities do you think are the weakest? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Hazard ID and detection

2 ❒ Protection of response personnel from exposure to harmful agents

3 ❒ Medical treatment of victims

4 ❒ Mass care (e.g., bulk distribution of food, shelter, and basic necessities)

5 ❒ Decontamination of victims

6 ❒ Communication / coordination with local response organizations

7 ❒ Communication / coordination with state and Federal agencies

8 ❒ Media and information management

9 ❒ Coordination with local hospitals 

10 ❒ Coordination with local public health agencies

11 ❒ Basic operations during this kind of incident

12 ❒ None of the above Î Skip to Question 58, Page 24 

 22
Fire Departments RAND 

57. What item(s) would be most helpful to strengthen the response capabilities you 

 indicated as weaknesses in Question 56? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ New or more up-to-date equipment

2 ❒ Training courses for personnel (including “train the trainers”)

3 ❒ Exercises

4 ❒ Better integration of preparedness activities with local response organizations

5 ❒ Better integration of preparedness activities with state agencies

6 ❒ Better integration of preparedness activities with Federal agencies

7 ❒ Information and reference materials about responding to this kind of incident

8 ❒ Improved facilities

9 ❒ Personnel

10 ❒ Technical support 

11 ❒ Funding of overtime/backfill costs to send personnel to training

12 ❒ Other (please specify):

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________ 

 23
Fire Departments RAND 

Section 4: 

ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

In answering Questions 58-60, please also keep in mind applications submitted, but for which 

funding has not yet been received. 

58. Since September 11, 2001, has your organization been informed about or applied for agencyspecific funding, training, equipment, or other terrorism preparedness support available 

from the Federal government, regardless of whether or not you received it? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes 

2 ❒ No 

59. Since September 11, 2001 has your organization received agency-specific funding, training, 

equipment, or other terrorism preparedness support from the Federal government? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes Î Continue to Question 60

2 ❒ No Î Skip to Question 61, Next Page

60. How were the Federal terrorism resources that your organization received used? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Shared with other organizations in your region

2 ❒ Used only by your organization 

 24
Fire Departments RAND 

61. Since September 11, 2001, has your organization participated in any Federally-sponsored 

programs for funding, equipment, or training to improve terrorism preparedness? If so, 

please indicate which ones: 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ NDPO Equipment Research and Development Program 

2 ❒ OJP Anti-Terrorism State and Local Training Grants (SLATT)

3 ❒ FEMA Emergency Management Institute course(s) (terrorism-related only) 

4 ❒ National Fire Academy Emergency Response to Terrorism course(s) 

5 ❒ U.S. Army Chemical School (USACLMS) Training Program

6 ❒ DOE Training for Radiological Emergencies

7 ❒ New Mexico Tech’s Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings course

8 ❒ Other National Domestic Preparedness Consortium training courses

9 ❒ EPA Emergency Response Training Program (ERTP)

10 ❒ FBI Hazardous Devices School

11 ❒ ODP/DHS State and Local Domestic Preparedness Equipment program

12 ❒ ODP/DHS State and Local Domestic Preparedness Exercise program

13 ❒ Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program

14 ❒ ODP/DHS State Homeland Security Grant Program (2003)

15 ❒ ODP/DHS Urban Areas Security Initiative (2003)

16 ❒ ODP/DHS State and Local Domestic Preparedness Training and Technical 

 Assistance Program

17 ❒ Other (please specify) : _____________________________________________________

18 ❒ We have not participated in any such Federally-sponsored programs.

62. Which of the above programs have been the most helpful to your organization? 

Name of Program: __________________________________________________________

 ___________________________________________________________________________

 25
Fire Departments RAND 

63. Since September 11, 2001, has your organization used or obtained information or technical 

assistance for terrorism preparedness or response from any of the following Federallysponsored resources?

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program (CW IRP)

2 ❒ Biological Weapons Improved Response Program (BW IRP)

3 ❒ CDC’s Health Alert Network (HAN) 

4 ❒ CDC’s Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) 

5 ❒ FBI’s National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO)

6 ❒ FEMA Rapid Response Information System (RRIS)

7 ❒ Chemical and Biological (CB) Hotline

8 ❒ DOT Emergency Response Guidebook

9 ❒ DoD Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center (CBIAC) 

10 ❒ DoD Consequence Management Interoperability Services (CMI)

11 ❒ ODP Technical Assistance Program

12 ❒ ODP State and Local Domestic preparedness Support Helpline

13 ❒ SBCCOM technical evaluation and information program 

14 ❒ Interagency Board (IAB)

15 ❒ Other (please specify):_______________________________________________________ 

 

16❒ We have not used or obtained information or technical assistance 

from any of the above sources since September 11, 2001.

 26
Fire Departments RAND 

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: 

64. Federal terrorism preparedness funding that is being distributed through state governments

is reaching local organizations and communities with the greatest need. 

 (Mark One Box)

 Neither

Strongly Agree Nor Strongly 

Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒ 5 ❒

65. Terrorism preparedness funding being distributed by the Federal government directly to

local communities and local responders is reaching the organizations and communities with 

the greatest need. 

 (Mark One Box)

 Neither

Strongly Agree Nor Strongly 

Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒ 5 ❒

66. Our jurisdiction has had to move forward on its own with measures to improve local 

preparedness for terrorism without guidance from the Federal level. 

 (Mark One Box)

 Neither

Strongly Agree Nor Strongly 

Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒ 5 ❒

67. Information and guidance from the Federal government about terrorism preparedness is 

adequate for helping local responders prepare for terrorism. 

 (Mark One Box)

 Neither

Strongly Agree Nor Strongly 

Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒ 5 ❒

 27
Fire Departments RAND 

68. Federal Government programs for improving local responder terrorism preparedness . . . 

(Circle One Choice for Each Line)

Strongly Neither Agree Strongly

Disagree Nor Disagree Agree

a. are carefully coordinated and well-organized ............... 1 2 3 4 5 

b. are flexible enough to allow our organization to 

 use Federal funding and resources as we see fit......... 1 2 3 4 5 

c. are taking funding and resources away 

from more important priorities ....................................... 1 2 3 4 5 

d. are focused on highly unlikely scenarios 

 at the expense of more likely scenarios ...................... 1 2 3 4 5 

e. should provide threat and risk assessment 

 information to local response organizations ................ 1 2 3 4 5 

 f. are so numerous that we have difficulty in 

figuring out what is relevant to our organization ........... 1 2 3 4 5 

g. are of little use to our organization ............................... 1 2 3 4 5 

h. fit well with our community’s local 

 preparedness strategy ................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 

 i. should involve dedicated Federal assets

so that local response organizations can 

concentrate on their primary mission ........................... 1 2 3 4 5 

 j. should provide intelligence about terrorist 

 activities to local response organizations .................... 1 2 3 4 5 

k. should promote research and development of 

 new technologies to combat terrorism.......................... 1 2 3 4 5 

 l. should involve better coordination between the 

 Federal Government and local responders ................. 1 2 3 4 5 

m. should help our organization strengthen

 the security of our computer systems 

 against cyber-terrorist attacks ...................................... 1 2 3 4 5 

n. provide insufficient time between notices of 

funding opportunities and grant submittal 

 deadlines ....................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 

 28
Fire Departments RAND 

69. What is the single most important way that the Federal government can support the 

efforts of local organizations like yours to improve their terrorism preparedness? 

(Mark ONE Box Only)

1 ❒ Direct financial support 

2 ❒ Equipment procurement 

3 ❒ Training or training aids

4 ❒ Exercise coordination and support 

5 ❒ Distribution of terrorism technical information 

6 ❒ Research and development on terrorism preparedness and response 

7 ❒ Outreach to state and local organizations

8 ❒ Dissemination of intelligence data 

9 ❒ Evaluation of new technologies and equipment 

10 ❒ Setting standards for equipment and training 

11 ❒ Perform technical evaluation 

12 ❒ Provide venues for information sharing 

13 ❒ Provide guidance on benchmarks for measuring or assessing organizational preparedness 

14 ❒ Provide funding to pay for overtime/backfill costs for sending personnel to training courses 

15 ❒ Other (please specify):__________________________________________________________

16 ❒ No improvement needed

 29
Fire Departments RAND 

70. In general, what factors limit your organization’s ability to participate in Federally-sponsored 

training programs? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1❒ Not eligible to participate in these programs

2❒ Unaware of what Federal training programs are available

3❒ Content is not relevant to our organization’s needs

4❒ Time commitment is excessive

5 ❒ Training is not scheduled during times when our personnel can attend

6❒ Backfill requirements to send personnel for training are burdensome 

7❒ Personnel shortages do not allow our organization to free up personnel for training

8❒ Lack dollars to pay staff overtime to attend training (or to pay backfill) 

9❒ Programs are poorly organized and/or difficult to understand 

10❒ Limited training budget

11 ❒ Application process is too involved

12❒ We do not have an individual dedicated to researching and/or training opportunities to filling 

out applications for our organization 

13❒ Uncertain as to what training programs would be most beneficial for our organization to 

 improve preparedness for terrorism 

14❒ Training is not conducted at locations convenient to our organization

15❒ Other (please specify):_____________________________________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________________________________

16 ❒ We have other more important training priorities to worry about

17❒ Our organization’s preparedness would not be improved through participation

18❒ We have not been limited in our ability to participate in Federally-sponsored training 

 programs. 

 30
Fire Departments RAND 

 

71. In general, what factors limit your organization’s ability to participate in Federally-sponsored 

equipment programs? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1❒ Not eligible to participate in these programs

2❒ Unaware of what Federal equipment programs are available

3❒ The equipment made available is not relevant to our organization’s needs

4❒ Application process is too involved

5 ❒ Programs are poorly organized and/or difficult to understand

6❒ Limited equipment procurement budget 

7❒ We do not have an individual dedicated to researching equipment program opportunities 

and/or to filling out applications for our organization

8❒ Uncertain as to what equipment programs would be most beneficial for our organization to 

improve preparedness for terrorism 

9❒ Other (please specify):_____________________________________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________________________________

10❒ We have other more important equipment procurement priorities to worry about 

11❒ Our organization’s preparedness would not be improved through participation 

12 ❒ We have not been limited in our ability to participate in Federally-sponsored 

 equipment programs.

 31
Fire Departments RAND 

72. In the event of a terrorist-related incident, what type of support do you expect the Federal 

government to provide for your locality?

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Provide technical expertise during the event 

2 ❒ Assist with crisis management 

3 ❒ Assist with consequence management

4 ❒ Provide technical information during the event in an actionable form 

5 ❒ Assist our organization or locality in obtaining specialized equipment, personnel or units 

to augment local response capabilities 

6 ❒ Assist with intelligence gathering 

7 ❒ Provide logistical support 

8❒ Other (please specify):_____________________________________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________________________________

73. Setting aside incident-specific support, what other type of ongoing support would you like 

the Federal government to provide to your locality?

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Threat assessment intelligence information (information as to what type of threat your locality 

 should be preparing for) 

2 ❒ Technical information on ways of preparing for terrorism (e.g., certification, ___ standardization) 

3 ❒ Information as to what resources are available to your organization

4 ❒ Information on training and equipment grant programs

5 ❒ Information on best practices for terrorism-related preparedness 

6❒ Other (please specify):_____________________________________________________________ 

 32
Fire Departments RAND 

Now we are going to ask you specifically about the new Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS). 

74. What type of support are you looking specifically to the new Department of Homeland 

Security to provide to local responders? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Funding

2 ❒ Training

3 ❒ Assistance with planning

4 ❒ Standardization and certification of equipment and training 

5 ❒ Research and development 

6 ❒ Testing of new equipment

7 ❒ Assistance with emergency response 

8 ❒ Guidance on benchmarks that can be used to measure or assess organizational preparedness 

9❒ Other (please specify): ____________________________________________________________ 

 33
Fire Departments RAND 

75. In what way(s) do you expect the new Department of Homeland Security to impact your 

organization? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1❒ Improve coordination between the federal/state/local levels in terrorism preparedness 

2❒ Improve information-sharing between the federal/state/local levels

3❒ Improve communications among federal/state/local levels

4❒ Provide better/standardized templates and/or guidance to assist with planning 

5 ❒ Improve integration between the public and private sectors’ efforts to improve 

terrorism preparedness and to protect critical infrastructure

6❒ Establish a single point of contact at the federal-level for information on available programs

 (including means for state and local response organizations to provide feedback on 

programs) 

7❒ Establish a primary contact at the federal-level instead of many on training, equipment, 

planning, and other critical needs

8❒ Consolidate the numerous training courses and programs being offered to local responders 

9❒ Consolidate the numerous equipment programs 

10❒ Streamline the grant application process for federally-sponsored training and/or 

 equipment programs 

11❒ Provide intelligence information and more detailed guidance on terrorist threat

12❒ Assist in the conduct of threat assessments for your jurisdiction or region 

13❒ Standardize the grant application process across federal agencies 

14❒ Consolidate multiple grant application requirements into a single set of requirements 

15❒ Other (please specify):____________________________________________________________ 

 34
Fire Departments RAND 

Section 5: 

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND WARNING 

76. What organizations does your organization contact if it has threat information to pass on 

regarding suspected terrorist activities within your jurisdiction or region?

(Mark All That Apply)

1❒ Local FBI field office

2❒ FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)

3❒ County/city-level interagency task force

4❒ Your State’s Homeland Security Office

5 ❒ U.S.-led Attorney General Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF) within your State 

6 ❒ Other law enforcement agencies (state or local)

7 ❒ Private sector groups (e.g., businesses, airlines, utilities, etc.) 

8 ❒ Public health agencies (if a biological, radiological, or chemical threat)

9❒ Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

10❒ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

11❒ U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) 

12 ❒ Other local responders 

13 ❒ Other state responders 

14❒ Other (please specify):______________________________________________________________

77. Since September 11, 2001, has your organization received any guidance from the FBI 

regarding what type of information about suspected terrorist activity should be collected by

local fire departments and/or passed onto FBI field offices? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes 

2 ❒ No 

78. Since September 11, 2001, has your organization applied for government security clearances 

for its personnel? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes Î Continue to Question 79, Next Page 

2 ❒ No Î Skip to Question 81, Next Page

35 
Fire Departments RAND 

79. If yes, for how many personnel? 

(Please give your best estimate) 

Number of personnel that have applied for government security clearances: _______________ 

80. How many of these personnel have received their government clearance? 

(Mark One)

1❒ All of the personnel that have applied

2❒ Some of the personnel that have applied

3❒ None that have applied since 9/11 have received their government clearances

The following questions are about the Homeland Security Advisory System (5-colored system), 

where the five threat conditions represent differing levels of risk of terrorist attacks. 

81. When the threat-level increases from elevated (yellow) to high (orange), does your 

organization make changes to its normal operations? 

 (Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes Î Continue to Question 82 

2 ❒ No Î Skip to Question 83, Next Page

82. If yes, what changes are made? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1❒ Increase the security for your organization

2❒ Stand-up the emergency operations center 

3❒ Mobilize specialized units (e.g., anti-terrorism teams)

4❒ Redirect personnel from non-essential areas 

5❒ Increase overtime

6❒ Increase length of work shifts

7❒ Cancel staff vacations and leave 

 8❒ We investigate first whether the threat is relevant to our jurisdiction before making any 

changes (e.g., contact our local FBI field office or colleagues) 

 9❒ Other (please specify):____________________________________________________________ 

 ______________________________________________________________________________

36 
Fire Departments RAND 

83. In your opinion, what modifications, if any, would improve the usefulness of the Homeland 

Security Advisory System for your organization?

(Mark All That Apply)

1❒ Use a regional alert system to notify emergency responders about threats specific 

to their jurisdiction or region

2❒ Provide more detailed information through existing communications channels (not the 

media) as to what type of incident is likely to occur

3❒ Provide more detailed information as to where the threat is likely to occur 

4❒ Provide more detailed information as to during what period of time the threat is likely to occur 

5❒ Provide training to emergency responders as to what protective actions are necessary at 

 different threat levels 

 6❒ After an increase in threat-level, have the DHS follow-up on what additional actions ought to 

 be undertaken 

7❒ Other (please specify): ____________________________________________________________ 

 ______________________________________________________________________________

8❒ No improvements are necessary to the Homeland Security Advisory System. 

37 
Fire Departments RAND 

Section 6: 

OTHER HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES 

84. Since September 11th, 2001, have any incidents of terrorism (including hoaxes) occurred, 

been attempted, or threatened within your jurisdiction or region that required a response by

your organization? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes Î Continue to Question 85

2 ❒ No Î Skip to Question 86, Next Page

85. Did any of these terrorist incidents and/or hoaxes involve the use (or threat of use) of the 

following? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1❒ Anthrax

2❒ Other biological agent 

3❒ Toxic industrial materials

4❒ Toxic industrial chemicals

5❒ Other chemical agents

6❒ Radiological agent

7 ❒ Conventional explosives

8❒ Cyber-terrorism

9❒ Military-grade weapons (e.g., automatic weapons, rifles, mortars)

10❒ Agroterrorism 

11❒ Arson and/or incendiary devices

12❒ Attacks on critical infrastructure 

13❒ Other (please specify):______________________________________________________________

14❒ None of the above

38 
Fire Departments RAND 

86. Since September 11, 2001, has your organization conducted a risk assessment to identify 

key threats or vulnerabilities within your jurisdiction or region? 

 (Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes, a risk assessment was conducted specifically for terrorism

2 ❒ Yes, a risk assessment was conducted for a wide range of contingencies including terrorism 

3 ❒ No, a risk assessment was not conducted Î Skip to Question 88

87. Who conducted the risk assessment? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Our fire department

2 ❒ Jointly conducted by our fire department and local law enforcement 

3 ❒ An inter-agency task force

4 ❒ FBI 

6 ❒ Other (please specify): _______________________________________________________

7 ❒ Don’t know

88. What type of support does your organization need in order to conduct future risk 

assessments? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Protocols for conducting and/or evaluating risk assessments

2 ❒ Training on how to conduct risk assessments 

3 ❒ Better intelligence and terrorist threat/capability information from the Federal government

4 ❒ Outside consultant expertise to assist with risk assessment

5 ❒ Funding and/or personnel to conduct the assessment 

6 ❒ Other (briefly describe): __________________________________________________________________________________________________

 ________________________________________________________________________________

7 ❒ No additional support is needed. 

39 
Fire Departments RAND 

B. Role of the Military

89. What roles do you feel would be appropriate for the Federal military to play during a

response to a domestic terrorism-related incident?

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Maintain order and / or provide security

2 ❒ Advise other response organizations on technical and / or logistical matters 

3 ❒ Conduct a rapid needs assessment to determine what kind of response is required

4 ❒ Provide personnel and equipment to support local, State, and / or Federal agencies

5 ❒ Set up kitchens, clinics, and mass care facilities for victims and relief workers

6 ❒ No form of participation by the military would be appropriate 

7 ❒ Enforcement of quarantine

8 ❒ Other (please specify):__________________________________________________________

90. What roles do you feel would be appropriate for the State National Guard to play during a 

response to a domestic terrorism-related incident?

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Maintain order and / or provide security

2 ❒ Advise other response organizations on technical and / or logistical matters

3 ❒ Conduct a rapid needs assessment to determine what kind of response is required

4 ❒ Provide personnel and equipment to support local, State, and / or Federal agencies

5 ❒ Set up kitchens, clinics, and mass care facilities for victims and relief workers

6 ❒ No form of participation by the National Guard would be appropriate

7 ❒ Enforcement of quarantine

8 ❒ Other (please specify):__________________________________________________________

40 
Fire Departments RAND 

91. Does your organization keep records on the military reserve status (Federal Reservists or 

State National Guard) of its personnel? 

(Mark One)

1❒ Yes Î Continue to Question 92

2❒ No Î Skip to Question 93 

92. How many call-ups of personnel who are military reservists has your organization 

experienced since September 11, 2001? 

(Please give your best estimate) 

1❒ Number of Response Personnel: _____________

2❒ Number of Senior Staff: __________ 

3❒ Number of Total Staff: __________

4❒ None of our personnel were called-up Î Skip to Question 94

93. To what extent did these call-ups impact the ability of your organization to respond to 

emergencies?

(Mark One)

1❒ Greatly impacted our ability to respond to emergencies 

2❒ Moderately impacted our ability to respond to emergencies

3❒ Mildly impacted our ability to respond to emergencies

4❒ No impact on our ability to respond to emergencies 

94. Does your organization have a plan in place to backfill personnel who are mobilized as part 

of a call-up of military reservists (Federal reservists or State National Guard)? 

(Mark One)

1❒ Yes

2❒ No 

41 
Fire Departments RAND 

95. How would you rate the likelihood of the following types of major terrorism-related incidents 

(e.g., more than 30 individuals with serious injuries) occurring within your jurisdiction or 

region in the next 5 years? 

Please keep in mind that “cyber-terrorism” is defined as the disruption of critical 

infrastructure or key information systems for more than one day. 

(Mark One Box on Each Row)

Very Somewhat Somewhat Very

Unlikely Unlikely Likely Likely

a. Terrorism-related chemical incident ......... 1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒ 

b. Terrorism-related biological incident ........ 1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒ 

c. Terrorism-related radiological incident .... 1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒ 

d. Terrorism-related nuclear incident ............ 1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒

e. Conventional explosives terrorism 

 incident .................................................... 1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒

f. Cyber-terrorism incident ........................... 1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒

 g. Terrorism incident involving the use

 of military-grade weapons (e.g., 

 automatic weapons, rifles, mortars) ........ 1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒ 

h. Attack on critical infrastructure ................. 1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒ 

i. Arson and/or incendiary device ................ 1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒ 

j. Other (please specify): ___________ .... 1 ❒ 2 ❒ 3 ❒ 4 ❒ 

42 
Fire Departments RAND 

Section 7: 

ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION 

96. Does your organization specialize in any of the following functions, in addition to your core 

fire department role? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Hazardous materials containment and / or clean-up (HAZMAT)

2 ❒ Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 

3 ❒ Specialized rescue response capabilities

4❒ Other (please specify): ________________________________________

5 ❒ None of the above Î Skip to Question 98

97. Which of the following services does your organization provide regionally or to 

another jurisdiction as part of a mutual aid agreement? 

(Mark All That Apply)

1 ❒ Hazardous materials containment and/or clean-up (HAZMAT)

2 ❒ Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 

3 ❒ Specialized rescue response capabilities

4❒ Other (please specify): _______________________________________

5 ❒ We do not provide any of the above services regionally or to other jurisdictions

98. Which of the following categories best describes your agency?

(Mark One) 

1 ❒ Volunteer department only

2 ❒ Paid department only 

3 ❒ Combination department (both paid and volunteer personnel)

43 
Fire Departments RAND 

99. What is the size of your organization? (Please give your best estimate)

y Number of paid firefighter personnel: .................................. ,

y Number of volunteer firefighter personnel: ............................... ,

y Number of HAZMAT personnel: ............................................... ,

y Number of EMS personnel: ...................................................... ,

100. What is the size of the population your organization serves? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ 1 – 15,000

2 ❒ 15,001 – 30,000 

3 ❒ 30,001 – 65,000 

4 ❒ 65,001 – 250,000 

5 ❒ 250,001 – 1,000,000 

6 ❒ 1,000,001 + 

101. What type of jurisdiction does your organization serve? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ City

2 ❒ City/County 

3 ❒ County

4 ❒ Multi-county or regional (within your state)

5 ❒ State

6 ❒ Other (please specify): _________________________________________

44 
Fire Departments RAND 

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

102. Do you personally serve a specific terrorism-related role within your organization? 

(Mark One)

1 ❒ Yes (briefly describe) : __________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________ 

2 ❒ No 

Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. If this questionnaire did not address 

all of the terrorism-related issues of importance to your organization, please use this space or 

attach additional pages to add comments or clarifications. 

103. Does your organization have other suggestions for changes or improvements in Federal

programs for terrorism preparedness that this survey has not covered? 

______________________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

104. Does your organization have other suggestions for changes or improvements in State 

programs for terrorism preparedness that this survey has not covered? 

______________________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

45 
Fire Departments RAND 

105. Has your organization’s experiences or challenges in preparing for domestic terrorism 

incidents resulted in other lessons learned that were not addressed in this survey? 

______________________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________

Point of contact for matters related to this survey:

Your Name:________________________________________________________________ 

Position Title: ______________________________________________________________

Title of organization: _________________________________________________________

Address: _________________________________________________________________

Street 

_________________________________________________________________

City State Zip Code

E-Mail: ___________________________________________________________

Phone: ( _______ ) __________ - ________________

Fax: ( _______ ) __________ - ________________

Thank you for completing this important survey. Please return your completed survey in the 

 business reply envelope provided. If you have any questions regarding this study, please 

call Dr. Lois Davis at R, tel. 877-287-4995, or feel free to e-mail me at Lois_Davis@rand.org). 

46 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

TAB 7—SURVEY TABULATIONS

This Tab presents the tables of results summarized in the main body of Appendix D. The table results 

have been statistically adjusted to account for oversampling and non-response. The reader should refer 

to Tab 2 for a discussion of the comparison between the distribution of funding and support and 

preparedness activities and to Tab 3 for details regarding participation in Federally-sponsored 

programs. Tabs 1, 4, and 5 discuss the methodology used in this study. For each table, we show in the 

table note and in parentheses the question numbers that correspond to the fire department survey

instrument (shown in Tab 6). This Tab is organized around the sections shown in Appendix D. 

Want More Intelligence Information About The Terrorist Threat, But Security Clearances 

Are Lagging 

Table 7A. Percent of Organizations That Would Like the Federal Government to 

Disseminate Intelligence Data 

Percent of

Organizations That 

Would Like the 

Federal Government

to Disseminate 

Intelligence Data 

Percent of Organizations 

That Would Like DHS

Specifically to Provide

Intelligence Information and 

More Detailed Guidance on

Terrorist Threat 

Local Response Organizations 

Law Enforcement 18 (5) 62 (5) 

Local/Regional EMS* 13 (3) 43 (5) 

Local OEM 9 (3) 46 (6) 

Paid/Combo Fire 7 (2) 45 (7) 

Volunteer Fire 18 (2) 35 (8) 

State Organizations 

State EMS 3 (2) 59 (5) 

State OEM 19 (6) 73 (6) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 9 (4) --

Local Public Health 17 (6) 45 (9) 

State Public Health 10 (3) 56 (5) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Dashes in the tables indicate that a particular 

organizational type was not asked the question or given a particular response option. For example, in Table 

7A hospitals were not asked the question regarding DHS. * Local/ regional EMS organizations were not 

selected randomly. We display standard errors for this group throughout this document so that the reader

may gain a broader sense about the variability of these responses (on the same metric as the other 

organization types). However, generalizations of these results to a population broader than those 

local/regional EMS organizations that responded to the survey should not be inferred. (Questions 69 and 

75)

D-7-1 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 7B. Suggestions for Improving the Usefulness of the Homeland Security Advisory 

System With Respect to Threat Information Provided

PERCENT OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS

 “Provide more detailed 

information through 

existing communications 

channels as to the type of

incident likely to occur” 

“Provide more detailed 

information as to where

the threat is likely to 

occur” 

“Provide more detailed 

information as to during 

what period of time the

threat is likely to occur: 

Local Response

Organizations 

Law Enforcement 71 (5) 77 (5) 65 (6) 

Local/Regional EMS 75 (5) 67 (5) 61 (5) 

Local OEM 75 (5) 73 (6) 62 (6) 

Paid/Combo Fire 67 (7) 80 (4) 69 (5) 

Volunteer Fire 69 (8) 59 (9) 49 (9) 

State Organizations 

State EMS 72 (5) 65 (5) 66 (5) 

State OEM 76 (6) 88 (5) 76 (6) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 75 (5) 60 (8) 63 (8) 

Local Public Health -- -- -- 

State Public Health -- -- -- 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Local and State public health not asked this question. (Question 83)

Table 7C. Since 9/11, Have Organizations Received Guidance from the FBI as to What Type of Information They 

Should Collect Regarding Suspected Terrorist Activity? 

Percent of Organizations That Have Received 

Guidance from the FBI since 9/11 on Type of 

Information About Suspected Terrorist Activity

That Should be Collected and/or Passed onto

FBI Field Offices 

Local Response Organizations 

Law Enforcement 47 (6) 

Local/Regional EMS -- 

Local OEM 42 (6) 

Paid/Combo Fire 23 (5) 

Volunteer Fire 2 (1) 

State Organizations 

State EMS -- 

State OEM 50 (7) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 25 (6)

Local Public Health -- 

State Public Health -- 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Local/regional and State EMS and 

local and State public health were not asked this question. (Question 77)

D-7-2 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 7D. Whom Do Organizations Contact to Pass On Threat Information? 

Local FBI Field 

Office FBI’s JTTF 

City/County

Interagency Task

Force 

State’s 

Homeland

Security Office 

U.S.-led 

ATTF 

Local Response

Organizations 

Law Enforcement 81 (5) 25 (5) 25 (5) 22 (5) 14 (4) 

Local/Regional EMS 39 (5) 4 (2) 29 (5) 9 (3) 1 (1) 

Local OEM 69 (6) 8 (2) 35 (6) 33 (7) 5 (2) 

Paid/Combo Fire 53 (6) 13 (6) 40 (7) 13 (4) 8 (6) 

Volunteer Fire 28 (9) 0.5 (0.5) 42 (9) 11 (6) 0 

State Organizations 

State EMS 38 (5) 3 (2) 9 (3) 47 (5) 6 (3) 

State OEM 73 (6) 54 (7) 15 (5) 77 (6) 38 (7) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 39 (7) -- 39 (8) 10 (4) -- 

Local Public Health -- -- 44 (9) 20 (7) 0.1 (0.1) 

State Public Health -- -- 22 (4) 81 (4) 17 (3) 

Law

Enforcement

(Other Than FBI)

Public 

Health

Agencies (if

CBR threat) 

Other Local 

Responders

Other State 

Responders

Private 

Sector 

Local Response

Organizations 

Law Enforcement 66 (5) 15 (4) 30 (5) 22 (5) 6 (2) 

Local/Regional EMS 78 (4) 30 (5) 21 (4) 10 (3) 7 (3) 

Local OEM 74 (5) 55 (6) 52 (6) 29 (6) 14 (4) 

Paid/Combo Fire 64 (6) 25 (6) 38 (6) 12 (4) 6 (3) 

Volunteer Fire 72 (9) 12 (5) 24 (8) 24 (8) 3 (3) 

State Organizations 

State EMS 69 (5) 66 (5) 13 (4) 41 (5) 6 (3) 

State OEM 77 (6) 38 (7) 31 (6) 38 (7) 19 (6) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 88 (4) 69 (6) -- -- -- 

Local Public Health 82 (5) 57 (10) 49 (9) 34 (7) 13 (5) 

State Public Health 67 (4) 72 (4) 36 (4) 47 (5) 17 (3) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. (Question 76)

Table 7E. Since 9/11, Which Organizations Have Applied for Security Clearances? 

Percent 

LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS 

Law Enforcement 7 (2) 

Local/Regional EMS 5 (2) 

Local OEM 6 (2) 

Paid/Combo Fire 2 (1) 

Volunteer Fire 0 (0) 

STATE ORGANIZATIONS 

State EMS 16 (4) 

State OEM 88 (4) 

HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS 

Hospital 6 (3)

Local Public Health 8 (4) 

State Public Health 86 (3) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. (Question 78)

D-7-3 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 7F. Of Those Organizations That Applied for Security Clearances, How Many Orgs Have Received Clearances

for Their Personnel? 

Of Those Organizations That Applied For A Security Clearance, How Many of Their 

Personnel Have Received a Clearance? 

All of Their Personnel 

That Applied 

(Percent of Orgs That 

Applied) 

Some of Their Personnel 

That Applied (Percent of 

Orgs That Applied) 

None of Their Personnel 

That Applied (Percent of 

Orgs That Applied) 

Local Response

Organizations 

Law Enforcement 56 (15) 25 (13) 19 (11) 

Local/Regional EMS 33 (33) 33 (33) 34 (33) 

Local OEM 60 (18) 30 (15) 10 (8) 

Paid/Combo Fire 89 (10) 6 (8) 5 (4) 

Volunteer Fire -- -- -- 

State Organizations 

State EMS 0 40 (23) 60 (23) 

State OEM 9 (4) 48 (8) 43 (8) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 70 (32) 30 (32) 0 

Local Public Health 97 (3) 1 (1) 3 (3) 

State Public Health 10 (3) 30 (5) 60 (6) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. (Question 80)

Table 7G. Since 9/11, How Many Organizations Have Conducted Risk Assessments and Where Do They Need 

Support? 

Has Your Org. Conducted a Risk 

Assessment Since 9/11? 

Type of Support Needed to Conduct Future Risk Assessments 

(Percent of All Orgs) 

Local Response

Organizations 

Percent of All

Orgs 

Better Intelligence 

on Terrorist Threat/ 

Capability Info 

Protocols 

Training on

How to 

Conduct 

No Additional

Support Needed

Law Enforcement 59 (6) 30 (5) 44 (6) 57 (6) 14 (4) 

Local/Region-al EMS 45 (5) 41 (5) 66 (5) 67 (5) 5 (2) 

Local OEM 85 (4) 44 (6) 57 (6) 48 (6) 5 (2) 

Paid/Combo Fire 65 (7) 41 (7) 55 (7) 57 (7) 8 (3) 

Volunteer Fire 18 (6) 34 (8) 65 (8) 75 (7) 7 (5) 

State Organizations 

State EMS 57 (6) 39 (6) 43 (6) 61 (6) 0 

State OEM 92 (4) 54 (7) 50 (7) 38 (7) 8 (4) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 70 (8) 36 (7) 56 (8) 61 (7) 5 (3) 

Local Public Health 42 (8) 31 (7) 68 (8) 68 (8) 1 (1) 

State Public Health 80 (4) 50 (5) 58 (5) 53 (5) 8 (3) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses.(Questions 86,88)

D-7-4 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Incident Types Organizations Consider Most Important To Prepare Is Consistent With 

Their Mission, But They Vary In Priority Placed 

Table 7H. How do Local and State Responders Rank Each Type of Incident in Order of Importance? 

Rank Order of Incidents by Organizational Type 

Incident Type 

Fire

Vol. 

Fire

Paid 

Law 

Local 

OEM

Local/RegEMS State

OEM

State 

EMS Hosp

Loc PH State PH 

Biological

3 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 1 

Chemical 

42 32 32 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 

Radiol.

44 44 44 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 

Nuclear 

55 55 55 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 

1 1 1 2 3 3 4 4 

Conv.

Explosive 

2 1 

State and local organizations were asked to rank order the different types of incidents – biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear, 

conventional explosives – in terms how important it is for their organization to prepare for that type of incident. Organizations were asked to 

rank order the incidents from 1 to 5, where 1=most important to prepare for and 5=least important to prepare for. Based on the mean scores, 

Table 8 shows the relative ranking of each type of incident by the different organizations. (Question 47) 

Table 7I. How High a Priority is the Top-Ranked Incident to Expend Resources Preparing For?

Percent of All Organizations 

Organizational Type 

High 

Priority

Somewhat 

of a Priority

Low Priority Not at all a 

Priority

Top-Ranked Incident: Conventional Explosives

Law Enforcement 16 (5) 38 (5) 33 (5) 13 (4) 

Paid/Combo Fire 13 (4) 50 (6) 28 (5) 9 (3) 

Volunteer Fire 8 (4) 32 (8) 38 (9) 21 (7) 

State OEM 56 (7) 40 (7) 4 (3) 0 

Top-Ranked Incident: Bioterrorism

Local Public Health 40 (8) 52 (9) 6 (3) 2 (1) 

State Public Health 69 (4) 22 (4) 8 (3) 0 

State EMS 43 (6) 40 (6) 10 (3) 7 (3) 

Top-Ranked Incident: Chemical

Hospital 14 (4) 56 (7) 23 (6) 7 (4) 

Local/Regional EMS 15 (4) 52 (5) 24 (5) 9 (3) 

Local OEM 29 (5) 51 (6) 15 (5) 5 (3) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. (Question 48)

Table 7J. What Do Organizations View as Being Their Weakest Response Capabilities for Top-Ranked Incident? 

Percent of All Organizations 

Communic/Coord

Local Response

Organizations 

Hazard 

ID and 

Detect

Protection of 

Response 

Personnel 

W/Local 

Response 

Orgs. 

With

State or 

Fed. 

Orgs 

Medical 

Treatment

of Victims 

Mass 

Care 

Decon of 

Victims 

Law Enforcement 41 (6) 68 (5) 24 (5) 39 6) 20 (4) 41(6) 43 (6) 

39 (5) 55 (5) 30 (5) 50(5) 25 (5) 42(5) 39 (5) 

Local OEM 47 (6) 59 (6) 30 (6) 44(6) 37 (6) 50(6) 38 (6) 

Paid/Combo Fire 42 (7) 56 (7) 17 (3) 52(7) 35 (7) 52(7) 39 (7) 

Volunteer Fire 39 (9) 77 (7) 25 (7) 39(9) 50 (9) 61(9) 65 (8) 

State Organizations 

State EMS 34 (5) 31 (5) 45 (6) 34(5) 21 (5) 24(5) 45 (6) 

State OEM 28 (6) 12 (5) 36 (7) 36(7) 40 (7) 24(6) 16 (5) 

Health Organizations 

47 (8) 40 (7) 16 (5) 13 (5) -- 28 (6) 

Local Public Health 48 (9) 54 (9) 17 (5) 24(6) 24 (6) 48(10) 60 (8) 

State Public Health 21 (4) 18 (4) 24 (4) 9 (3) 48 (5) 58(5) 27 (4) 

Local/Region. EMS 

Hospital 30(8) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. (Question 56)

D-7-5 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 7K. What Would Be Most Helpful to Strengthen Indicated Weaknesses in Response Capabilities? 

Percent of All Organizations 

Local Response

Organizations 

Training

Courses Exercises 

New or More 

Up-to-date

Equipment 

More 

Personnel 

Tech. 

Support 

Law Enforcement 88 (3) 76 (5) 85 (4) 63 (6) 61 (6) 

Local/Region. EMS -- 64 (6) 58 (6) 42 (6) 53 (6) 

Local OEM 76 (5) 64 (6) 79 (4) 57 (6) 37 (6) 

Paid/Combo Fire 87 (3) 74 (5) 73 (5) 64 (7) 45 (6) 

Volunteer Fire 74 (11) 66 (10) 68 (10) 35 (9) 42 (9) 

State Organizations 

-- 74 (6) 41 (6) 41 (6) 30 (6) 

State OEM 52 (8) 67 (8) 33 (8) 57 (8) 10 (5) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 64 (8) 55 (8) 34 (6) 27 (6) 32 (6) 

Local Public Health 88 (4) 79 (6) 59 (9) 39 (8) 63 (8) 

State Public Health 44 (5) 56 (5) 19 (4) 53 (5) 28 (5) 

State EMS 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. (Question 57)

Organizations’ Views Regarding Funding Needs 

Table 7L.Organizations Desire Funding Support from the Federal Government to Help Improve Preparedness for

Terrorism

Percent of Orgs Desire 

Funding Support from

the Federal Government

to Pay for Overtime/ 

Backfill Costs for 

Sending Personnel to

Training

Percent of Orgs Indicated 

Direct Financial Support 

from the Federal 

Government Would Help 

Them Improve Their 

Preparedness for 

Terrorism 

Law Enforcement 19 (5) 62 (6) 89 (3) 

Local/Regional EMS 22 (4) 55 (5) 82 (4) 

Local OEM 20 (5) 66 (6) 95 (3) 

Paid/Combo Fire 21 (5) 64 (6) 89 (4) 

Vol Fire 7 (3) 70 (8) 91 (4) 

STATE ORGANIZATIONS 

State EMS 20 (5) 37 (5) 88 (4) 

State OEM 15 (5) 50 (7) 92 (4) 

HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS 

Hospital -- 63 (7) 68 (9) 

Local Public Health -- 67 (7) -- 

State Public Health -- 81 (4) -- 

Percent of Orgs That

Are Looking Toward 

DHS Specifically for 

Funding Support 

LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Hospitals and public health organizations not asked about overtime/backfill 

costs; public health not asked about type of support looked toward DHS for. (Questions 69 and 74)

D-7-6 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 7M. Funding Cited as a Limiting Factor In Ability of Organizations to Participate in Federal Training and 

Equipment Programs 

Funding as a Limiting Factor in Terms of 

Participation in Federal Training Programs

Funding as a Limiting Factor 

in Terms of Participation in

Federal Equipment Programs 

Lack Budget to Pay

Staff Overtime to

Participate in Training

(Percent) 

Org Has a 

Limited Training

Budget (Percent) 

Org Has a Limited 

Equipment Procurement 

Budget (Percent) 

LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS 

Law Enforcement 72 (5) 70 (5) 62 (5) 

Local/Regional EMS 50 (5) 48 (5) 40 (5) 

Local OEM 58 (6) 65 (6) -- 

Paid/Combo Fire 67 (6) 57 (7) 40 (6) 

26 (7) 66 (8) 58 (8) 

STATE ORGANIZATIONS 

State EMS 40 (6) 66 (8) 17 (4) 

State OEM 44 (7) 20 (6) -- 

Hospital 55 (8) 55 (7) -- 

Local Public Health -- -- -- 

State Public Health -- -- -- 

Vol Fire 

HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Public health organizations not asked about what factors limit participation in 

Federal training programs. Health organizations not asked about what factors limit their participation in Federal equipment programs.

(Questions 70 and 71)

Table 7N. What Factors Limit Organizations’ Ability to Purchase Specialized Equipment for Terrorism Response? 

Percent of All Organizations 

Competing/ Higher 

Budget Priorities 

Unsure of Org’s

Equipment Needs 

Lack Information as to

What Equipment Has 

Been Certified 

LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS 

Law Enforcement 65 (5) 41 (6) 25 (5) 

Local/Regional EMS 63 (5) 30 (5) 25 (5) 

Local OEM 57 (6) 24 (5) 20 (5) 

Paid/Combo Fire 41 (6) 26 (4) 22 (5) 

Vol Fire 37 (8) 36 (8) 17 (5) 

STATE ORGANIZATIONS 

State EMS 45 (6) 17 (4) 21 (5) 

State OEM 36 (7) 16 (5) 20 (6) 

66 (8) 39 (7) 30 (6) 

Local Public Health - -- -- 

State Public Health -- 

HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS 

Hospital

-- -- 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Public health not asked this question. (Question 35)

D-7-7 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 7O. Percent of Organizations Indicated Need for Funding and/or

 Personnel to Support Risk Assessment Activities

Indicated Need for 

Funding And/or

Personnel To Conduct 

Future Risk Assessments 

(Percent) 

LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS 

Law Enforcement 61 (6) 

Local/Regional EMS 68 (5) 

Local OEM 76 (5) 

Paid/Combo Fire 65 (7) 

Vol Fire 65 (10) 

STATE ORGANIZATIONS 

State EMS 61 (6) 

State OEM 77 (6) 

HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS 

Hospital 51 (8)

Local Public Health 78 (7) 

State Public Health 50 (5) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. (Question 88)

Table 7P. Following 9/11, Which Organizations Increased Spending or Internally Reallocated Resources to Improve 

Response Capabilities? 

Did Org Increase 

Spending/Shift 

Resources Internally

Since 9/11? 

To DoPlanning

To doTraining

To Purchase PPE/Equip. 

Did Org Receive 

External Funding

and/ or Resources 

To Support These 

Activities? 

LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS Percent % % % Percent

Law Enforcement 18 (4) 9 (3) 14 (3) 8 (2) 13 (4) 

Local/Regional EMS 46 (5) 69 (7) 31 (5) 17 (4) 35 (5) 

Local OEM 42 (6) 30 (5) 32 (6) 28 (5) 62 (6) 

Paid/Combo Fire 29 (6) 19 (6) 25 (6) 20 (6) 20 (4) 

Vol Fire 1 (1) .10 (.70) 1 (.70) 1 (.70) 0 

STATE ORGANIZATIONS 

State EMS 81 (4) 66 (5) 63 (5) 22 (5) 67 (5) 

State OEM 85 (5) 81 (6) 58 (7) 38 (7) 92 (4) 

HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS 

Hospital 66 (7) 32 (6) 60 (7) 47 (8) 44 (7) 

Local Public Health 70 (12) -- -- -- -- 

State Public Health 94 (2) -- -- -- -- 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Numbers represent percent of all organizations. (Questions 41, 42, and 43)

For tables of results and comparison regarding association between receipt of funding and steps 

organizations have undertaken to improve response capabilities—see Tab 2 to Appendix D. 

D-7-8 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Organizations Differ in their Participation in Federally Sponsored Programs and their Expectations 

of DHS and the Federal Government in General 

Table 7Q.Since 9/11, Percent of Organizations That Have Participated in Federally Sponsored Programs

Percent of Organizations That Have Participated 

in Federally Sponsored Programs Since 9/11 

LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS 

Law Enforcement 42 (6) 

Local/Region. EMS 46 (5) 

Local OEM 83 (5) 

Paid/Combo Fire 73 (5) 

Vol Fire 31 (7) 

STATE ORGANIZATIONS 

State EMS 87 (4) 

State OEM 100 

HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS 

Hospital 50 (8) 

Local Pub. Health 70 (12) 

State Pub. Health 100 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Organizations were asked whether since 9/11 they had participated in 

agency-specific Federally sponsored funding, training, or equipment programs. (Question 61)

Table 7R. Since 9/11, Percent of Organizations Received Support from the Federal Government for Terrorism 

Preparedness

Of Those Orgs That Received Federal 

Support, How Was it Used? 

Informed About/

Applied for 

Support From 

Federal 

Government 

(Percent All 

Orgs) 

Rec’d Funding, 

Training, 

Equipment, or 

Other Support 

from Federal 

Government 

(Percent All Orgs

Shared With Other 

Organizations in

Region (Percent) 

Used Only by

Their Organization 

(Percent) 

Local Organizations 

Law Enforcement 52 (6) 24 (5) 69 (13) 31 (13) 

Local/Regional EMS 55 (5) 36 (5) 78 (7) 22 (7) 

Local OEM 95 (3) 79 (5) 88 (5) 12 (5) 

Paid/Combo Fire 75 (5) 44 (6) 71 (7) 29 (7) 

Vol Fire 65 (8) 15 (7) 47 (25) 53 (25) 

State Organizations 

State EMS 84 (4) 72 (5) 96 (3) 4 (3) 

State OEM 100 100 100 0 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 69 (7) 42 (8) 43 (13) 57 (13) 

-- -- -- -- 

State Public Health -- -- -- -- 

Local Public Health 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Public health not asked question since all would have been informed about

bioterrorism funding released by the Federal government following 9/11. (Questions 58, 59, and 60)

Table 7S. Does Distribution Mode of Federal Funding Affect Whether It Reaches Those with Greatest Need? 

Opinion Regarding Federal 

Support Distributed 

Through the State (Mean) 

Opinion Regarding Federal Support 

Distributed Directly to Local Communities 

and Responders (Mean) 

Local Organizations 

2.3 (0.1) 

Local/Regional EMS 2.2 (0.1) 2.3 (0.1) 

Local OEM 3.0 (0.1) 2.8 (0.1) 

Paid/Combo Fire 2.6 (0.1) 2.7 (0.1) 

Vol Fire 2.2 (0.2) 2.3 (0.2) 

State Organizations 

State EMS 2.7 (0.1) 2.4 (0.1) 

State OEM 4.2 (0.1) 2.9 (0.1) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 2.6 (0.1) 2.7 (0.1) 

Local Public Health 3.0 (0.3) -- 

State Public Health 4.0 (0.1) -- 

Law Enforcement 2.3 (0.1) 

Standard error for each point estimate is shown in parentheses. Scale runs from 1=strongly disagree; 3=neither agree or 

disagree; 5=strongly agree. (Questions 64 and 65)

D-7-9 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 7T. Do Organizations Feel Jurisdiction/State Has Had to Move Forward with Terrorism Preparedness Without 

Federal Guidance?

Mean Score 

Local Organizations 

Law Enforcement 3.3 (0.1) 

Local/Regional EMS 3.4 (0.1) 

Local OEM 3.0 (0.1) 

Paid/Combo Fire 3.2 (0.1) 

Vol Fire 3.4 (0.2) 

State Organizations 

State EMS 2.8 (0.1) 

State OEM 3.0 (0.2) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital 3.3 (0.1)

Local Public Health -- 

State Public Health -- 

Standard error for each point estimate is shown in parentheses. Scale runs 

from 1=strongly disagree; 3=neither agree or disagree; 5=strongly agree. Public 

health not asked this question. (Question 66)

Table 7U. In What Ways Do Local/State Responders Expect the DHS to Impact Them? 

Activities

70-80% expect DHS to... 

60-70% expect DHS to... 

50-60% expect DHS to... 

40-60% expect DHS to... 

45-60% expect DHS to... 

40-60% expect DHS to... 

40-60% expect DHS to... 

30-40% expect DHS to... 

30-40% expect DHS to... 

 Improve coordination, information-sharing, and communication between 

Federal/State/local levels 

 Streamline grant application process across Federal grant programs

 Standardize the grant application process across Federal agencies and 

consolidate multiple grant application requirements

 Establish single point of contact at Federal level for information on available 

programs 

 Provide primary contact at Federal level instead of many on training, equipment, 

planning and other critical needs 

o Health orgs. not asked this question

 Provide intelligence information and more detailed guidance on terrorist threat 

 Consolidate numerous training courses/ programs and numerous equipment 

programs 

o Health orgs. not asked about equipment programs

 Provide better/standardized templates and/or guidance to help with planning 

 Improve integration between public/private sectors’ efforts to improve terrorism 

and protect critical infrastructure 

 Help conduct threat assessment for jurisdiction or region 

o Hospitals not asked this question

(Question 75)

Table 7V. In What Ways Can the Federal Government Support Public Health Organizations’ Efforts to Improve

Preparedness?

Type of Support Looking Toward Federal Government For Local Public Health 

(Percent) 

State Public Health 

(Percent) 

Enhance current surveillance systems 20 (6) 3 (2) 

Assist with development of local and regional response plans 22 (6) 6 (2) 

Establish centralized communication system for notification 

regarding disease outbreaks related to bioterrorism 

19 (6) 3 (2) 

Establish integrated, multi-level laboratory response network 

for bioterrorism 

15 (5) 6 (2) 

Establish rapid response and advanced technology lab for 

chemical agents 

16 (5) 6 (2) 

Assist with the exercising of local and regional response plans 19 (6) 10 (3) 

Assist with development of plans to coordinate local/regional 

medical systems 

17 (6) 0 

Assist with the development of plans to coordinate

local/regional veterinarian systems 

12 (5) 3 (2) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. Public health organizations were asked in what ways the Federal 

government (e.g., through the CDC, DHHS, USPHS) can support the efforts of public health departments like theirs to improve 

terrorism preparedness. (Question 58, Local Public Health Survey)

D-7-10 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Table 7W. In What Ways Can the Federal Government Support Organizations’ Efforts to Improve Preparedness? – 

Areas of Disagreement

Type Of Support Looking Toward Federal 

Government For 

Percent of 

Orgs 

Exceptions 

(Percent) 

Equipment procurement 20-35% 0% of State Public Health and State OEMs 

Training or training aids 25-40% 7-8% of State Public Health and State OEMs 

Outreach to State/local organizations 10-20% 3-4% of State Public Health and State OEMs 

Distributing technical information 0-20% 5-6% of State Public Health and State EMS 

(Question 69)

Table 7X. In What Ways Can the Federal Government Support Organizations’ Efforts to Improve Preparedness? – 

Areas of Agreement

Type Of Support Looking Toward Federal Government For Percent of All Orgs 

Provide funds to pay for overtime/backfill costs** 10-20% 

Set standards for equipment/training* 15-20% 

Exercise coordination and support 10-25% 

Provide venues for information sharing* 10-15% 

Through R&D on terrorism preparedness and response 10-15% 

Provide guidance on benchmarks for measuring preparedness** 5-15% 

Perform technical evaluations* 5-10% 

Evaluate new technologies and equipment* 5-10% 

*Local and State public health not given response option. **Hospitals and local and State public health 

not given response option. (Question 69)

Table 7Y. Organizations Differ in Views Regarding Appropriate Role of Federal Military and National Guard During 

Response to a Terrorism-related Incident? 

Federal Military’s Role National Guard’s Role 

Maintain

Order/

Provide 

Security

(Percent) 

Help with 

Enforcement of

Quarantine 

(Percent) 

Maintain

Order/

Provide 

Security

(Percent)

Help with 

Enforcement of

Quarantine 

(Percent) 

Set-up Kitchens, 

Clinics, and Mass 

Care Facilities 

(Percent) 

Local Organizations 

Law Enforcement 71 (5) 58 (6) 89 (3) 61 (6) 70 (5) 

Local/Regional EMS 76 (5) 56 (5) 89 (3) 64 (5) 51 (5) 

Local OEM 74 (5) 55 (6) 86 (4) 67 (6) 73 (5) 

Paid/Combo Fire 81 (4) 53 (7) 89 (4) 60 (6) 63 (6) 

Vol Fire 75 (7) 31 (7) 77 (7) 30 (7) 74 (7) 

State Organizations 

State EMS 63 (5) 37 (5) 87 (4) 67 (5) 40 (6) 

State OEM 27 (6) 42 (7) 77 (6) 65 (7) 58 (7) 

Health Organizations 

Hospital -- 82 (4) -- 86 (4) 45 (7) 

Local Public Health -- -- 95 (2) 52 (10) 51 (9) 

State Public Health -- -- 100 53 (5) 53 (5) 

Standard error of the estimate is shown in parentheses. (Questions 89 and 90)

D-7-11 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

TAB 8—SURVEY COMMENTS 

In the third wave of the survey, we provided room for written comments asking respondents to comment 

on: (1) their suggestions for improving Federal and State programs for terrorism preparedness; and (2) 

their organization’s experiences or challenges in preparing for these types of incidents that may have 

resulted in lessons learned not addressed in the survey. Hospitals were also asked for suggestions for 

changes or improvements in national/professional organizations for terrorism preparedness. The 

comments received in these areas are presented below, organized by each organizational type. We have 

listed here each of the written comments received without any editing other than to fix grammatical errors 

or to mask the identify of the respondent. For example, if a comment gave the name of a respondent’s 

city we edited the comment to replace the actual name of the city with a generic reference (e.g., “our 

city”). The written comments below are listed in their entirety and do not represent the views of the 

Advisory Panel or of RAND, but instead the views of the individual organizations that responded to the 

survey. 

Law Enforcement 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

It appears to be a common perception that the Federal government approach is uncoordinated. There is replication 

of effort in certain areas, and no effort in others. There is no Federal coordination with local governments below the

county level. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Coordination of training (standards) in the area of WMD and terrorism response. There are so many courses out

there – different directions. Not everyone is on the same page. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

You must prepare locally to handle situations with your own resources. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We are totally unaware of what Federal programs are available. 

 State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

We are totally unaware of what state programs are available. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

We have learned that unless you have access to the web and someone dedicated solely to surfing the web 

information is extremely difficult to obtain.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Quit changing color threat levels. (Terrorists are watching TV also)! More money for us to hire more police 

officers. Quit spending money in overseas policy. Start concentrating on USA more. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

More money to small depts. like ours to hire more police, [purchase] equipment and be ready when it hits. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Funding and informing of training would be a good start.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Funding and informing of training would be a good start.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Faster direct funding!

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The FBI, Secret Service, INS, etc., all Federal agencies that we have worked with in the past have been very good!

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness 

Better controls on distribution of funds and equipment by county emergency management agencies

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Federal programs need to include localities in training-funding-planning to prepare for a terror attack. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as Federal – increase towns-villages, counties etc., in a training program. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

This survey drives home the need for us to have an ongoing terrorism program in-place with the proper training 

available.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

1. [Federal] Programs should better integrate local needs and capabilities. 

2. Need better coordination among Federal entities themselves. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

[State] Programs should better integrate local needs and capabilities. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

A great benefit has resulted from lateral information sharing among law, fire & health agencies (i.e. agency-toagency) in the areas of threat/intelligence and operational concepts. Not all “experience” resides at the Federal 

level. This is not just a top-down issue, bottom-up and lateral efforts are also needed and proving valuable. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

We attempt to update officers and training. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Interoperable radios needed

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We need money for training and equipment

We need regional meetings 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Set clear requirements the state must follow to fund equipment needs of local jurisdictions based on a threat/risk

analysis, NOT equitable distribution, or to agencies with low priority needs. OR bypass state in distribution process. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

There needs to be much faster ability to field test suspected biological agents. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

During the period of time of the anthrax cases and hoax cases, the number of calls to these types of incidents and the 

nature of them were extremely taxing on agency resources. I don’t feel that it is well known that the Emergency 

Response Community and State Dept. of Health labs were very much over-burdened at that time. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Consistency could be provided if supplemental funding was available to support administrative personnel to manage 

emergency management programs. Currently, most small rural areas only attempt to qualify for grants, for 

equipment and training, when available through State level government aid. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

The agency or agencies tasked with grant application should contact response agencies to assess their needs before 

purchases are made. 

Their Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Better observation techniques have resulted in suspicious event calls increasing. Officers take situations more 

seriously when unknown substances are reported, etc. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Don’t allow the FBI to classify information or stop them from putting their own classification on info[rmation]. 

They hamper the sharing of info[rmation] to those who need to know. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Some local, State and Federal laws put in place for HazMat hamper training and response. Hybrid laws or changes 

need to be done to place terrorism in its own class. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Training. We have yet to be offered any training. We have been given PPE, but no training. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Training offered is not clearly publicized. It needs to be clear, what the training is, and what the bottom dollar line 

will be in regards to who funds the training. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Better channels of communication between the State program coordinators and local governmental organizations. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

We had problems getting information from our local Emergency Services Coordinator. 

Comment About State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Municipalities should apply for assistance directly – not through counties. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

We will be on our own for some time. You cannot rely on County level emergency managers as they aggressively 

protect County assets without regard to local community needs. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Better lines of communication would enhance awareness of programs, training and funding available to state/local 

agencies. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Require states to publish plans and require specific time frames for grants to be applied for (State has published & 

closed time frame in as little as 5 days.) 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

We created a citywide multi-disciplinary team to plan and prepare grant applications for Homeland Security funds. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

We have had a fair amount of experience for a small city with pipe bombings of vehicles and planned our state 

Militia Assault. We had good interagency experience and several good experiences with ATF and FBI. We had a 

flood of “[white] powder in envelope” calls after the anthrax disaster (all fake) or nothing. Very little help in

dealing with them. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes, local government officials, which are unwilling to support local enforcement efforts, and don’t believe that 

“bad things can happen” are the biggest obstacle. Local politics, not Federal, determine how well each is prepared. 

Only Federal mandates which address funding, training, equipment, and manpower needs at the local level will 

resolve this issue. Local politics only care about what is popular not that which is needed.

Fire Departments 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Basic guidance; self-evaluation checklists.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Training should be coordinated within state guidelines.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Need more EMS Programs

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We were not aware of many of the Federally sponsored programs listed in this questionnaire/survey. Available 

programs information needs to be sent directly to local agencies along with the state and county. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Make sure programs are passed down to all local agencies.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Aid for additional personnel – our mission has increased and our training and equipment has increased, but our

number of personnel has stayed the same. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Fund cross training with the U.S. Coast Guard. We are an ocean community and deal with the U.S.C.G. more than 

any other Federal agency. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Improved information on training programs and response aids. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

We have spent a lot of time and resources to secure funding for countywide public safety communications 

improvements, County Fire Hazmat JPA equipment upgrades, and county-wide bomb squad equipment upgrades. 

Very little of the money available has filtered down to our small community needs. It has been focused on

countywide response gaps.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Time frame of grants. By the time we get through lower levels of Gov’t, we have 2 or 3 months to finalize Grants. 

We need more time. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

The WMD Task Force has no street level Fire or EMS providers on it. Appear out of touch with our needs.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Federal programs must get to the State. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

State programs must get to the local level. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Other lessons learned: Ability to work with other local (Police), County Depts, State Agencies and Feds. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Regional teams funded & trained in specific response situations and available to local jurisdictions. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

More funding for state and local planning, training, and equipment. A lot of promises, but little follow through. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

State programs are very good – Funding is coming to local responders based on needs priority. Very pleased with

state response to our needs. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Just that promises are just that—promises. The Federal Government has promised first responders they would be

taken care of informationally, financially, and in equipment. This has not happened at this point. The Federal

Gov’t. has reneged on its promises to State & Local Govts to assist us to upgrade training, equipment and

information.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

The State and other Police have received a disproportionate share of equipment resulting in local Fire Depts., who 

will be primarily first in, closest and provide the most aid to the citizens, being shorted.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Need more info passed onto locals. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Fed[eral] programs should serve to coordinate state and local efforts. There are too many different organizations 

duplicating each other’s efforts. Too many surveys. Too many meetings. Too much planning and too little action.

These activities interfere with normal operations with small results. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above. Interagency communications frequencies and equipment should be mandated by law. ICS training

should be required for selected officials and failure to observe an incident commander’s instruction during an

emergency response should be a punishable offense. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Decisions by heads of the largest public safety agencies in a local area can have negative effects on surrounding area 

agencies, i.e., communications system changes.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The state is not the best agency to provide/pass funding to the local agencies. They decide where to use the dollars. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

See above. The areas where terrorist attacks are not treated with a higher level of support. The most rural and least 

likely areas of the state receive the same funding. The State receives the money and does not seek local input. If 

they do, it is lip service only. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes, the amount and length of surveys has increased.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Have Federal programs offered at more regional locations. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Have state programs offered at more regional locations. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Information from State/Federal level was very slow in coming on specific details of a infrastructure threat (critical). 

Took two to three days to get specific info. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Our department is not financially able to maintain equipment and vehicles used to provide fire protection as well as 

we should. Funding for domestic terrorism is non-existent from any local funds.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Feds give the money to the State which keeps 25 percent and gives the rest to the Counties, which disperse it

according to political preference. Terrorist attacks are much more likely to happen in major metropolitan areas and 

that is where the funding should be concentrated. The U.S. Fire Administration lists 23 Fire Depts. in our State that 

got funding – every one of them is a volunteer fire dept. that will never have a connection with terrorism.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We know the focus is on more populated areas, i.e., big cities, but if people leave the cities where are they going? – 

Small Town, USA. We do need to be better prepared to handle these folks and the problems they will bring that will 

overtax our system. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Yes, many of the grants associated with domestic terrorism are not available to volunteer agencies. All agencies

should have a basic level of protection and/or detection.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

I believe that terrorism preparedness needs to be a part of your organizations, all hazards planning and preparedness. 

The Federal government can best help by improving inter-agency communication at emergency scenes.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Our Department is, as many departments, small with very little funding. I feel more funding and training should be

developed to help Small Town USA. Mainly, volunteer departments.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Federal programs should go farther than providing funds without any definitive criteria for fund/equipment 

distribution to the local jurisdictions. The local fire depts. and police depts. are the first responders who will suffer 

the initial consequences for the political games played at the Federal and state levels. The consequences include 

those responders’ lives. Providing money at the Federal level does not make the country safe. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

See above. If possible, the political entanglements and mismanagement at the state level are even worse. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

As noted, the political considerations – hurdles, corruption, mismanagement, etc.—are the biggest challenge. For 

someone who has spent lives protecting the citizenry of a jurisdiction, the political games which delay or stop the 

D-8-5 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

distribution of the money, equipment, and training needed at the local level is at least incompetent and at most 

criminal.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Provide funding for more local/regional training and support.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Keep the State programs as support for training, but pass the financial support to the local jurisdictions rather than to

the states—then down. The trickle down isn’t happening. The finances never get out of the capital. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

We respond to emergencies every day. We are trained for that. The Federal Gov. is trying to re-invent the wheel by 

creating this different dept. to handle terrorism. Equip the first responders better & you will meet the need rather 

than take funding away from us.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Not at this time. Basic plans need funding to the local levels of Gov’t. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Funds seem to go to politically connected jurisdictions and communities. Police seem to get more funding than Fire 

Depts. Too much money is wasted on salaries and evaluations instead of needed equipment. The public is very 

misinformed of how much money actually gets to local responders.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Public opinion of how much money local fire depts.get for WMD preparedness. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Leave Fire Grant alone. Work on making things more regionally doable for New Englanders (who are reluctant to

change). 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Bring it to the locals, don’t try to have locals come to you.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

No money for any programs and as stated earlier – reluctant to change. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Information needs to be shared. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Information and equipment need to be shared equally. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Preparing for domestic terrorism strengthen accidental emergencies and disaster. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Making sure that the Federal money passed on to state govt’s gets to the local responders.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Making sure that they do not hold the Federal money and pass it on to the local responders 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Structural needs from personnel, to training, to building and grounds and equipment. Stop building more parks. 

Our local park district has more money, more grants, better equipment, better buildings than both fire and police 

combined. Turn over Fire & Police protection to the Park Districts; they have more money.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Funds, equipment and training must go to local First Responders, not to agency that respond after the fact. Local 

fire, police and EMS are the front line vs. Hazard terrorist acts. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Please institute a Federal sponsorship program that assist with a degree program in counter-terrorism operations. 

Also consolidate FEMA, NFA, EMI, ODP, and OJP training for Unified command training. Provide bi-annual

technology symposiums for organization preparing or improving WMD operations. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Exercise the states’ emergency operation centers with the joint terrorism task forces. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes, our political leaders do not understand the standards for WMD response. The community needs CBRNE 

information to begin preparation efforts related to the high target areas near residence. Fire organizations require

“combat” approach to offensive counter-measures. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The Federal government should provide emergency response equipment to financially strapped local fire

departments to better provide terrorism preparedness as well as better communications to regions known to have a

serious terrorism threat. Too much terrorism information is being concealed by the Federal government. Not

enough terrorist information getting to local levels. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

More guidance. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

More guidance. An awareness of what could happen. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Funding is our largest problem; it causes an inability to receive proper training and to equip our department with

proper gear and equipment.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Continue DHS coordination, use existing personnel of L-S-F level, limit funding to consultants (especially those 

with limited or military only). 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Consider our large metropolitan area as a state – passing [Federal support] through the state government just adds

another layer. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Not at this time. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Get money to the local jurisdiction sooner. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Provide training courses either locally, or regional that combines law enforcement, fire/EMS and public works 

response.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

More money.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

More money.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Less money. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We need to see a quicker pass through of funding from Fed’s to state to local jurisdiction! Organized regional

response teams, will be needed. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

As stated, there is a multitude of programs, organizations, guidelines mandates, etc., so much so that confusion is 

becoming a problem, especially who does what, who can, etc. Also large scale chem/bio will probably affect metro

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

areas – conventional still most probable- no need for a rural/suburb with unlikely targeting to have same

preparedness/resources mandate. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes – standardize equipment and resources – in the event of a large scale terrorism event you should know outside 

responding agencies are all on the same page and similarly equipped and trained, ready to assume duties and 

positions that are already in motion. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

They should assess if small cities are at risk. If so, then fund and train at that risk. If not, then regionalize response 

teams from large cities if needed. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

State government should focus on what happens after an incident. Or stabilizing local needs after the emergency. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Information flows through too many agencies. Some through fire, EMS, law enforcement, emergency management. 

Need one collecting agency per county/city.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Yes, set up a policy agency for inept chief who doesn’t know how or want to evolve. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

The state should pay for the equipment that is ordered on the WMD grant form instead of having the county or city

purchase it and them reimburse them after they turn in the receipts. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Do more to combine local resources. In many cases there is a duplication of resources from municipality to

municipality. People will apply for grants for equipment a neighboring town already has. We need to work 

together. We end up with more equipment than we need and not enough trained personnel. Bring training to local

levels, especially existing police departments. Stop creating more agencies. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Do not funnel money for response programs, training etc. through the state systems. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Develop funding systems that improve the flow of resources.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Need better study on local needs. Insurance that money goes to the local level – not state, not county.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Make it easier to attain funding for training, equipment exercises and overtime (back-fill positions). 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

The same as for fed’s. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

After 9/11, our city created an internal Task Force to review any deficiencies in our EMP-Plans. We found 321 

deficiencies and have addressed all of them in a work plan I developed myself. All of our EMP plans have been

updated, a brochure was developed (recently doing a reprint with new info) to be mailed to all of our community, 

and have developed many relationships with other communities, county, civic groups and private sector. If you

would like a copy, please call me. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

This response concerns both questions #103 and #104. We have a concern about grant equipment that we have

received from the State that was purchased with Federal dollars, not being what we needed. Instead it ended up 

being equipment that a committee at the State level decided we should have. As it result, it is my estimate that half

of the funds expended was for equipment we don’t have a use for or is not compatible with equipment we currently

have. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

 (See above) 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes – our organization has participated in three major drills, in three metropolitan cities and TOPOFF. We have

learned that there is a major confusion in the fire service in differentiating between standard HAZMAT incidents 

and WMD incidents. Please feel free to contact me about these “lessons learned.” 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The monies should go to small cities and towns, not just the larger cities and towns. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

More coordination from the Feds through the state to the county and local levels. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Yes, the big towns get the grants and for some reason we don’t! Grants should be on needs and not on how good

someone talks on paper. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Information sharing is a definite problem. There is a lack of information dissemination by law enforcement 

agencies to fire departments. Everything is a big secret. Where fire departments are the first-responders in most 

incidents, it would be helpful to know that there is a threat before and not after the incident. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Quicker dissemination of funding to the smaller, local agencies. The smaller agencies are going to be the primary 

recipients of the exodus of the larger impacted cities. Placing all the funding, or the majority of the funding in the 

cities that may be destroyed seems sort of unrealistic. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

As with most programs the most important factor is funding. With most fire departments facing budget cuts and

reduction in manpower, it is of the utmost importance that funding for programs of those related to terrorist attacks 

or weapons of mass destruction be forthcoming. The fire departments in this country have been neglected for too 

long. In order for them to continue to respond in a safe and effective manner to an incident they need to receive

funding at the federal level. This fund should go directly to the fire department and not through federal or state 

agencies. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Establish a tiered response plan with local, regional, state and national levels of reinforced response and support. 

The concept of quick action by local agencies reinforced by adjacent agencies/counties within region, then a more 

sustained response by state/federal agencies. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Establish regional multi-jurisdictional response teams for: hazmat, explosive detection/disposal, USAR-resive, mass 

casualty/care, biological-health department. Fund: equipment, training and personnel costs for these. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

The Federal effort to assist local government with this issue has resulted in a poorly coordinated money grab. The 

process is not results oriented and will not ensure a meaningful improvement in local, regional and state response 

capability unless corrected. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

More funding for volunteer agencies. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Yes. Enable/allow Federal contractors to apply and get grants and training. We are a career fire department

surrounded by volunteer departments. We have highly trained but few personnel and extremely limited funding 

because we are a science site. The “vollies” have money, are eligible for grants, and have people (albeit not as welltrained). We could function as a resource to the mutual aid agencies around us if we had more people and/or money.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

See above. Same reasons. 

D-8-9 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Have a state curriculum. There are too many courses coming from all different kinds of agencies. Should be 

streamlined like this: WMD awareness, operational, chief officer/command, logistics, HazMat Specialist. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

That in some cases things/items have not been made or on the market. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

State should focus less on hurricanes and more on other items. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes, this survey is far too long and time consuming.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

More information needs to be available about how the old FEMA will be wrapped into the Department of Homeland

Security. Local governments are waiting to know specifics of how the DHS will be operating. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Our State also needs to clarify the merging roles of the Office of Emergency Services and our own Department of 

Homeland Security. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We would like to see the FEMA Guidelines simplified but keep the funds coming from FEMA. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We need funding for equipment.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Having lived here for 30 years with the dam out my kitchen window, I am concerned with what would happen down

stream if the dam broke. Flooding many cities and towns. Our Judge feared people in his county would be in

danger. I agree.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

No one has contacted us about anything. If contacted we would do what ever we could. There is no one else out 

here to respond. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Federal money channeled through local FEMA/EMA is not distributed properly. It becomes a popularity contest. 

Buying equipment for agencies other than first responders, police & fire. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

We have started to work closely with the area Fire Departments. Including combined training and sharing of

equipment and resources. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The funding/training needs to be delivered directly to the local agencies. Too much funding is being caught up and 

diverted at state and local level. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes, don't rock the boat when it comes to identifying deficiencies in operation or funding. If you do, your

organization will be left out altogether. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Whatever the Federal government mandates in the future, they will need to provide funding that reaches the local 

governments so they may implement what is needed locally. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Again, if some program is mandated to the fire service the state government must make funding available to local 

government to implement the programs. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes other mutual aid and regional emergency response agencies depend upon my organization to fill gaps in 

preparedness/response capabilities. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Focus on IMS, awareness, and emergency management planning for all agencies. We must get everyone to a basic 

level before we waste money on anything advanced. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

It would be nice if all the agencies who attend the WMD courses had a yearly schedule with the allotted slots per 

jurisdiction. This would help in the planning and selection of perspective participants; it would also quantify 

different agencies allotments. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Funding and support for local departments are needed. 

Local Offices of Emergency Management 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

It is important to focus upon and provide direct support to county or regional consortia efforts. Counties and 

regional efforts are being short-circuited by the state and funds (controlled by the state) are being allocated without 

the counties/regions being involved in the decision making process. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

The state must involve the counties in strategic decision-making. How can they hope to achieve standardization of 

training and equipment for a combined mutual aid response if they do not involve the counties?

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

The 80%/20% fund allocations are much too high for the states to take (20%). The money needs to get to the real 

First Responders at the city, village, and township levels. That is where the rubber meets the road...not at the state 

capitol or state police agency. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

All of this terrorism stuff has really placed a burden on our operation. Our operation of 911/emergency mgmt was 

difficult to maintain even before the 9/11 terrorism. With the additional work, we can no longer excel or focus on

any of our duties. We need more personnel to allow us to do the proper job! 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Better coordination and consolidation of programs. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Fully fund WMD training, exercises, and equipment (including maintenance and calibration). 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

No. I addressed the questions from the viewpoint of the Local Emergency Planning Committee which is also the 

emergency responders in our jurisdiction.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Small jurisdictions do not have the time to address the Risk and Treat assessment and grant writing. To hire 

someone to do the R&T assessment is impossible. You need background on what is in your jurisdiction; also, there 

wasn’t enough time to do all the work. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Current programs are not flexible enough to allow funds to be spent on specific local needs. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

A written developed plan on possible or feasible funding. By accomplishing this, the trickle down effect of local 

agencies would be enhanced.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Have satellite offices spread elsewhere in the state to assist in completed federal/state mandated requirements 

(assessment–mitigation–grants). 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Receipt of equipment that exceeds needs. No consideration of other agency participation in other federal programs

such as MMRS or NLD. 

D-8-11 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

One of the biggest hurdles we face is changing the laws and old ways we have done response and recovery, and, 

probably more so, planning and preparedness. Laws and procedures happen to block mentally and physically the 

transition to regionalization to planning and response. In our state, statutes mandate each jurisdiction plan and 

manage its own disasters essentially. Plans are written to support this philosophy. Incidents of a regional nature in 

our planning region should require commissioners and mayor from each jurisdiction to be in a regional EOC (if you 

use the regional approach). Each of our 18 counties has 3 commissioners. That means 51 commissioners would 

need to be involved, not counting mayors. Who would be in charge? Hopefully if regional planning and response 

and recovery are the goal, we’ll find a way of getting there. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We need and appreciate the support, but all funding comes with restrictions and limitations imposed by the state or 

the grant itself. It doesn’t help when the equipment we have is listed as eligible and the equipment we need to add is 

not listed as eligible. Let the locals decide what is needed for situation.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

I would like to see the money that was supposed to go to First Responders get to the local level and not be given to

the larger cities at the whim of a local director, who doesn’t understand how the volunteer system works or how to

treat volunteers. Most First Responders in this nation are volunteers and they deserve the funds. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Provide enough funding and training for First Responders. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Funds need to go directly to locals. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

States waste a lot of funding dollars. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Cut the strings and bureaucracy with the grants! The Feds seem to be creating red tape so power is confirmed. They

need to relinquish power. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

More funding to local level. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Send the equipment procured from Homeland Security grants to local agencies quicker. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Set national standards for local response capabilities. Give local govt’s a choice of what response level they wish to

achieve. Distribute funding to those jurisdictions that are in the most need. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Monies sent down from the Federal side take approximately a year to reach the First Responders in our State. We at

the local level are still waiting for the 2002 ODP dollars. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Most local emergency management programs have one paid part or full time staff. We need staff support funding 

for local offices. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

If items are on an approved list to buy with current monies, why must they be re-approved before they can be

purchased?

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The programs need to be geared toward the rural areas of the county. This is the area that relies on Volunteers for 

most responses as the local funding does not have the capability to fund full time EM - FDs – PDs and other 

emergency responders. Yes, NYC was a target, but what about the local Wal-Marts, etc., in small town America?

D-8-12 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Include the impact of crisis relocation/fleeing on host areas. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Currently, the state has two separate terrorism preparedness offices which are not coordinating together or

duplicating services and/or programs already existing in other law enforcement agencies. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

The State Health and CDC must learn to work with the State and Local EMA and not reinvent the wheel.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Be able to hire more people. Long-range plan as to what is going to be available in future. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Cut down on the state cut of money. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Decrease paperwork requirements. Send more money for staff to assist in the assessments. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Get organized by getting the politicians out of the planning process except to appropriate funds. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Small urban areas would benefit from state or regional programs such as a state telephone system that would allow 

county response groups to call the entire group with one call (on a pager system) – small urban areas can’t afford

such systems. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes, we’re still more likely to have a severe weather event and need our systems to handle that also. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

More focus should be placed on small, frequent functional drills and tabletops than on large full-scale exercises. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Give locals more latitude on what to implement and how to implement. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Politics and turf battles continue to impede progress. Incentives are needed to get some agencies to work together. 

In some cases, a city or dept. won’t actively cooperate with a county because they know they can get funding

through other mediums. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The Federal money is starting to reach the small governments. This needs to be done sooner. Application process is 

too cumbersome and short turn around time from receiving application to return same. We have a very limited staff 

with normal day-to-day duties and other emergency issues. Give us more time! 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same comments made above apply here also. We cannot do things overnight. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Local political people do not take the terrorism threat serious. The Federal/State need to reach out to them through 

State and Federal political people to address this issue.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Programs need to get to us. Programs need more time to be responded to. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Money for salary and equipment is needed. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Funding needs to go to agencies, not to the state, then agencies - or at least not have the state take 20% off the top!

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

1. Broaden the focus to all hazards planning—too much terrorism-specific effort that dilutes overall preparedness. 

2. Improved coordination at Federal level—too many disparate programs from too many agencies 

3. Improved operational focus on response and recovery—too many “one-shot” programs, especially in equipment,

that don’t build a comprehensive system. 

D-8-13 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

See above comment. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Need for operational plans 

Need for broad perspective (see comment #3 above) 

State Offices of Emergency Management 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

1) Funding kept at zero match. 2) Freedom to use money as needed. 3) All Homeland Security money through one 

state Homeland Security Entity. 4) Notification of any related funds. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

No suggestions beyond answers previously discussed and answered in this survey. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

FEMA must make application packages easier. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

A continued emphasis on the use of technology to overcome communication and other command system problems. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Need to have funds for personnel to use training and equipment provided by current grants. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Yes – more focus on all-hazards response. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes – the percentage of “other” hazards occurring far exceed the changes of domestic terrorism incidents. In rural 

America, the responders are few in number and will respond to all incidents, including terrorism. All efforts to be

prepared should be focused on all-hazards. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

DHS/ODP reporting requirements/administrative approval of proposed equipment purchases needs to be 

streamlined. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Implementing on scene incident command/unified command during WMD exercises.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

This survey did not rate the performance of the current National Homeland Security effort of our agency. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Merely a matrix of all Federal grants would be helpful. Especially if it was updated as grants are awarded, similar to

Federal Fire Administration fire grants. We at the state level don’t know all these grants that come to us. I suspect 

GAO can find out – but should be readily available to anyone on a website that consolidates all federal grants on one 

website. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Preparedness for terrorism incidents greatly enhances response capabilities statewide for all emergency response.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Stop multiple assessments – one assessment – one standard! Stop multiple Exercise Programs (CDC, EPA, FEMA, 

DHS, DOJ, FBI) – one Homeland Security Exercise program!

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Size include contracted personnel. 

LOCAL/REGIONAL EMS 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

The information given above reflects the EMS region’s resources. There are 37 cities & towns with own law 

enforcement, fire and EMS departments. ESTIMATE! 

D-8-14 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Make access easier and more widespread. Improve information sharing with EMS & Fire, seems very much law 

enforcement only. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Public and EMS education is difficult. The “it won’t happen here” mindset was overcome through education – 

specifically – we have a nuclear power plant and major tourist attractions that make good targets. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Most Federal programs are not available for privately owned EMS organizations. Anything we have asked for has 

been turned down because we are not a non-profit organization at both the state and Federal levels. We are a large

part of our county’s MABA’s program, but are treated as a “greedy private ambulance” by state and federal 

programs. We provide back up services and mutual aid to all departments in our county. We provide ambulances to

most major fires and fire ground rehab free of charge at our own expense. When we have asked for Federal or state 

assistance in funding, we have consistently been turned down. We cannot afford to be more prepared for anything

else at this time at our own expense.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Faster access to funding and less cumbersome applications 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Faster access to funding and less cumbersome applications 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Please just provide some of the things you have asked about. For 3 yrs., we have answered these questions but no

improvements, no funding, no training offered. Where are the things we need?

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Funding 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Work to get the funding to the areas needed most! 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

There is very little to no communication with those in the trenches. There are ICS systems that have been in effect 

in CT that are being ignored. I have had to go to independent agencies for programs and courses due to the lack of

any programs at the federal and state levels. It appears that Homeland Security and DHS talk to who is politically 

expedient, not to those who are active in the field. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

The same comments as above. The one sad note is to watch the funding thrown away on projects we will most 

likely never use. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

The only experiences that we have received is training from independent sources and the programs from agencies 

such as “American Red Cross: who had courses when the Homeland Security and DPN had nothing and still don’t 

for EMS.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Our organization is no more prepared for this than before Sept. 11, 2001.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Same as above.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Public health issues such as smallpox being addressed. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Provide clear, understandable funding for training and antidotes to private healthcare organizations (hospital, 

ambulances, clinics). 

D-8-15 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Send funding through EMS associations as opposed to through Emergency Management Coordinators.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Many of the Federal training and equipment grant programs are being made available to EMS programs that are fire

department-based. In our State, only 35% of the transport EMS service programs are fire based. That leaves 65% of 

our ambulance services ineligible for funding.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We need funding help for general operations. We may not be here otherwise. Our vehicles are crap, our local

funding sucks. Federal & state bureaucracies are killing us with oppressive rules and mandates. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The primary focus seems to be on fire based EMS programs which leave out the majority of EMS providers. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

State Homeland Security Council does not include EMS and has to liaison with the Health Department member. 

Bioterrorism focus leaves out EMS which should have played the primary role in state terrorism planning and 

response to events. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes. Mostly that public health and others were re-inventing the wheel with plans and contact lists that were already 

in place and updated regularly.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The biggest challenge we face is lack of interest of our employees regarding training. I would like to see mandated 

training with the funding available. By making it a requirement for re-certification would bring every employee up 

to date. If the Feds can mandate HIPPA training, they should be able to mandate WMD training. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above. We are faced with too much politics within the 4 county areas that we serve. I would suggest one 

lead agency (that being the State) to control protocol, training, and equipment.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Funding! 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Funding! 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Because we are a private company all grants go to local Fire Depts. only. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Have a knowledgeable person/advocate that the little guys can call for help. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Communications should be simple. Grants should be simple. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Communications – Reddinet vs Rims. State is trying to impose Rims upon Reddinet system to report to the state. 

Reddinet is simple and easier to operate. I can go to Bank of America and process my account from any B/A site, 

but I cannot do that in emergency communication – that is terrible. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

As stated before, Federal programs have been helpful. Our primary problem is our state health division (OHS);

while they clearly are making some effort, assistance and coordination and pass through funding has been slow. 

Some problems (including smallpox programs) they frankly have resisted. Direct funding to locals would be

beneficial. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Yes 1) There needs to be specific federal requirements on the type of response, stakeholders and organization. 2)

Agreements should include evaluation of performance of state coordinators by local agency. State has not 

communicated well to date with its EMS agencies or hospitals. 

D-8-16 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes. Communications and intra operability was not directly addressed in this survey. Federal guidance of “surge

capability” and methods communities can use is scarce. DHS (Homeland Security) organization and coordination is 

obviously early in its organization. Single stop shopping would help. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

More funding and programs at EMS/Health projects and training – not just fire. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Get these programs together. Most are going in own direction. We still are not working together. If there is a 

need, we will still not be on the same track with each other. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes. 1) What we are able to do. 2) A Plan. 3) Local Response Teams 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The United States Fire Administration (USFA) National Fire Academy’s EMS special operation, two-week course 

was excellent preparation for multi-agency, all-hazard preparedness and response. Unfortunately, core mission 

does not even involve EMS and there was an attempt to cancel these courses for budget reasons in the spring of 

2003. We also make extensive use of National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) incident command courses.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Our state programs barely recognize that EMS even exists.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Duplication must be stopped. City and State levels of emergency preparedness are vying for the same funds and

creating the same services. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Direct funding to EMS 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Direct funding to EMS 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

1) Easier application process. 2) More flexibility in spending/funding to meet local needs and enhance current 

capabilities. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Give regional EMS councils direct resources and responsibilities. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

We worry that the State is beginning to view EMS as a Homeland Security program first, rather than address the 

day-to-day issues EMS faces. Regional EMS Councils are not included in any meaningful way by the State DPH 

and are not funded to increase staff to permit us to do what needs to be done to support our providers and towns. 

State “Centers of Excellence” do not include EMS Councils in EMS-related planning or activities. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

I would need to survey our regional towns and provinces to respond to most of these questions and I simply don’t

have the staffing or time.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We do fairly well in treating patients, but not so well in planning. We could use more information on planning and 

where best to spend our available money. Financial assistance would also be beneficial. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as previous question.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Most were covered. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Our EMS organization is a non-governmental organization (private). I believe we have roadblocks that restrict our 

access to funds for training, equipment, expertise and consulting resources. 

D-8-17 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Individual EMS providers servicing the communities do not get first hands-on training due to staff shortage – 

personnel trained in areas of expertise. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Local counties are not prepared to handle an incident of great magnitude if needs be. Hospitals are not equipped as

well for these types of incidents. Physician shortage – EMS vehicle and personnel shortage state-wide. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Campus Law Enforcement – Security Issues

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Most important – one source for info/grants.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

They all should be computer based, compatible with email, since most grants require more than one person to fill 

them out. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

No. I believe that more programs, information, grants, etc., have originated at the federal level for states and local 

agencies in this past year. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

While we have done better this past year, states still need to be more aware of the needs of small volunteer 

departments. Training needs to be closer to “home” for people with jobs and families. Training on new protective 

equipment needs to follow more closely to the grants allowing local depts to purchase same. Templates for small 

depts. to use to set up training exercises - What is expected of us?

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Coordinate all efforts, training, funding through a single federal entity! 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Coordinate all efforts through one state agency 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Yes. Identify Opportunities, Training and Funding.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

See comments below for state programs. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Equipment caches; funding for equipment; basic equipment lists for EMS providers 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

No challenges. Only experience is “WMD” being jammed down our throats, but there are no basic standards to

follow – requirements for personnel, basic equipment needed for EMS units, standardized training. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

More money and assistance for training! 

Radio frequency: too long to get one; poor coverage; poor multi-agency communication ability.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

The state needs to realize that when it comes to purchasing equipment for local governments “one size does not fit

all.” Local government is very diverse even though they reside in the same county or region. They should have a bit 

more autonomy in making purchasing decisions.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The Federal resources for planning and coordinating the system do not pass down to regional and local levels. 

D-8-18 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Not sure; we are very small - 30 trips/month service with no county involvement. 

STATE EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Currently there are no federal grants focused primarily on EMS agencies but they are sorely needed. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

1) Train with your fellow responders – police, fire, EM, management and hospitals. We list our joint training

opportunities on a state website and all responders are welcome to attend. 2) Conduct tabletop exercises that involve

all of the responders so that they get to know each other personally and to familiarize each other with the resources 

that each organization can (or can’t) bring to mitigate a disaster. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

EMS is only based in fire departments in 33% of state’s RMS agencies – fire based RMS is only in 34% of RMS 

agencies nationally. Fire does not equal EMS. Without RMS – incident response is flawed – will be unsuccessful. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Lessons learned thus far – nationally RMS is pretty unprepared because the funding stream is not set up to assist

local, regional, or national RMS response preparation. State RMS Directors have been surveyed and can give 

figures of non-funding from almost all sources. Call 703-538-1299 or e-mail NASEMSD@aol.com for more 

information. If RAND really wants to make a difference – advise Congress and President that the response 

assistance program is extremely flawed.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Need centralized coordination. EMS in all states is fragmented (i.e.: fire, hospital-based, private services). It is a

part of the nation’s health care infrastructure. 

Continue development of casualty surge capabilities, statewide triage, and patient tracking programs. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

From a statewide perspective, many local responders do not feel counter terrorism is a high priority. Challenges 

exist with a system that is 55% volunteer based.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Better communication and coordination. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Need for equipment.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

EMS Programs are not being adequately considered. When the assumption that addressing fire services takes care 

of EMS is made, MOST EMS is not included. Funding that flows through Emergency Management channels does

not go to EMS. Federal grants, advisory boards, planning, etc., do not have EMS leaders involved. Every state has 

a STATE EMS DIRECTOR. The directors all belong to the National Association and regularly provide liaison and 

work with any who ask. Please address this problem.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

State programs MUST include State EMS directors. If they do not, the lead agency makes decisions that do not 

adequately factor medical, scope of practice, drug use limitations, protocols, etc., into plans, operations, and many

other activities. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes: 1) CDC must include EMS environments when issuing patient care messages – some cannot be implemented. 

2) Protective equipment is a very general term – situation/threat varies and impacts in many ways, e.g., SARS

different from anthrax, different from smallpox, different from plague, etc. Complicated and so often NOT

addressed. Needs to be.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Make more specific request to FUND EMS programs in Grant application in the state. 

D-8-19 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

FEMA does not understand how EMS functions in much of this country. FEMA thinks that the fire service equates 

to EMS, but this is not there in much, if not most, of the U.S. There needs to be accurate, commonly understood

definition of EMS system. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Our challenges arise from working in a state public health system that does not understand EMS.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

1) There are no Federal financial support programs for EMS. This part of the continuum of response, therefore, is 

not evolving at the same rate as other partners, even though EMS if the first provider responder. 

2) Much better coordination at the policy level by the Federal government is needed, with the understanding that

most of the activity is at the state and local level. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Make programs and FUNDING specific enough for EMS that it is not gobbled up by State Health Agencies to fund 

project for local health departments that have minimal initial response responsibilities. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

As previously stated in above comment. 

HOSPITALS 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Need to address the needs of small rural hospitals with limited funds. Most of the preparedness activities, programs, 

etc., focus on large hospitals with lots of resources. The government may want to break down hospitals into

categories pertaining to size of hospital and population served and geographical area. Then develop or help develop

standardized response plans for those categories. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Rather than spend a lot of money we don’t have, try to determine ways to respond using current resources or

thinking “out of the box.” If we have no decontamination equipment, use a pool, a hose, and a couple of tarps 

around a pt for decontamination, etc.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Please let us know where funding and training can be sought.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Assist small facilities especially the border facilities (Canadian border). 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Need consented and consistent training drills and exercises. The state and feds can coordinate the best system-wide. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

In reference to questions 77 and 78 – if Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for terrorism preparedness, then

perhaps Public Health and HRSA should be managed by or work closely with them to ensure we have one plan to

follow. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Our state Department of Public Health is doing a fantastic job of managing HRSA funds and developing a hospital

response plan by regions. If we received that same assistance from our Emergency Management and Homeland 

Security, the state would be better prepared. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

How important it is for all entities to work together under one plan towards a common goal. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Get the dollars to the local level – distribution to state ensures allocation to state levels with little to local hospitals. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

 [Same as above.] Develop uniform realistic response protocols for implementation at local level. 

D-8-20 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Federal money is being poorly used at the state level – guidelines on appropriate levels of 

equipment/training/personnel for each health care facility should be developed and then funded 100%. 

 Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned: 

Experience with SARS cases at nearby airport has strengthened our skill at dealing with all infectious diseases. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

I have seen absolutely no effect for any Aederal program. Anything that has been done, we have done ourselves. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

OSHA guidelines conflict with preparedness activities, things like fit testing, respiratory protection plan. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Keep small rural hospitals involved and well prepared – we may be the first impacted because we aren’t as well 

versed, drilled, etc., as major cities. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

I believe the Federal government should be more involved with assisting hospital organization. There should be 

specific liaison access to address issues of preparation including technical and financial support. We are a rural 

hospital with limited resources. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

I believe most of the money the state has received has gone to own grandiose schemes and not to address local

areas. The big boys in our State (our City) have gotten the bulk of the funding. 

National/Professional Organizations Efforts in Terrorism Preparedness: 

Greater technical support. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

I believe there should be a center coordination body – one-stop shopping.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

There is so much training/equipment and seminars available to hospitals, but there is not adequate funding. 

Security, safety, and awareness are extremely expensive. Last year we (our hospital) received $9,000. We spent

eight times that amount and we were conservative with expenditure. 

Yes, hospitals need to share lessons learned in a more non-competitive arena. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

More information (if not capital) sharing to rural (vs. urban) facilities. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

National/Professional Organizations Efforts in Terrorism Preparedness: 

Same as above.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

In the rural part of our State, the threat known is very small. Our greatest threat is being asked to assist others. Our 

traffic-way will cause us collateral more than direct involvement. Unless told we have a direct threat, I will continue

to plan for conventional and industrial reactions more than tactical responses to a localized threat. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Develop a communications system with at least one redundancy; Communicate more to health care locations what 

the support is in each area of responsibility being segregated; Set up an auto-e-mail information source (website), 

with or without access codes, to keep updated our state level threats or intelligence flow.

National/Professional Organizations Efforts in Terrorism Preparedness: 

Additional training and updates are always needed. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

To standardize the program and standardize available equipment. This would allow state and Federal training to be

the same – cost savings. Everybody is going in own direction, different equipment, different training, no continuity

from one facility to the next, one agency to the next. Military equipment and training from one branch to the next

comparable so people can work together, train together, speak the same language. List: this is the equipment 

available. Provide: training curriculum. Personnel from one hospital could be sent to another to assist in an

emergency – typically can’t be done now.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

We strongly feel that the true impact that terrorists have had on the country is how successful they have been at 

getting us to divest our time, energy, money, etc., to this very nebulous effort and the stress that we have all endured. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Assistance with field drills.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

A lot–most–of the money that was designated for bioterrorism went to fire/police departments. Of more than

$63,000 earmarked for bioterrorism, only $5,000 went to hospitals. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

District-wide training.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

1) Get funding red tape under control and get funding availability down to the hospital level immediately (not local 

EMS/EMA agencies). 2) Standardize syndromic surveillance technology at national level – automate ASAP! 3) 

Provide for funding of ANFTE add-on to assist regional hospitals with dedicated terrorism staff expertise. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

1) Look at Georgia model for implementation. 

2) Help states streamline funding channels. 

3) Provide funding for FTE add-one for terrorism...regional HC systems. 

4) Get ODP to recognize level A&B decon EQ’s training needs in hospital – DO NOT CAP AT LEVEL C

– no detection equipment or expertise – this seem like a...battle with EMS. 

National/Professional Organizations Efforts in Terrorism Preparedness: 

Create ANSI standardized for “second responders” – hospital WMD/hazmat PPE operations. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

1) Weakness in the Public Health System. 

2) Need to shift focus of terrorism from HHS to Homeland Security. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Federal government should supply a standard plan and provide each hospital with the equipment and funds for 

compliance. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Provide advances on grant funds to facilities. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Best practices/Clearinghouse info/website would be helpful.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Better coordination of training and funding for communication issues. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Preparing training modules, helping develop and implement training exercises, and providing annual support for 

equipment and personnel should be primary functions of state agencies with the underlying funding supported by

federal dollars. Direct Federal involvement should include manpower support for occurrences and more significant 

intelligence about threats. 

National/Professional Organizations Efforts in Terrorism Preparedness: 

Training modules for components of CBRNE should be developed by the federal government in conjunction with

specific groups like NAEMSP, ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians), ENA (Emergency Nurse

Assoc.), etc. 

D-8-22 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Provide templates and recommended forms for plans, job descriptions (i.e. for staff at a mass immunization clinic). 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Small Health Departments need easy, accurate planning templates for response plans. We should all be doing 

relatively the same thing and responding the same way. Help!

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Coordination between State Emergency Management and State Health. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes. Locally, we are better coordinated with Public Safety/Hazmat/Fire/EMS Law Enforcement than the State 

Agencies are to one another and to the locals. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Yes, 1) Responsible to all risk communication. 2) Liaison to police, fire, emergency management. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Management of media messages is key. Our residents get disease/terror info instantly on Web and CNN. Messages 

must be in real time. HAN is vital. Must be faster. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Need Federal dialogue in appropriate response to actual smallpox case – i.e. ring or mass vaccination. How many 

cases, where, what circumstances would trigger mass vaccination?

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Would like additional help from state in designing and carrying out exercises. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Trying to overcome complacency of physicians.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

More exercises, funding to augment time away for training and exercises.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Continue to closely monitor relationship between state and local agencies.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Ensure uniformity/consistency nationwide (top-down). 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Tremendous staff time required sacrificing needed public health services. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Need to integrate public safety and health agencies in research, training, planning, communications, operations and 

recovery efforts – still very insular. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Public service employees have important roles to play within public health but also in numerous support functions 

throughout government agencies and with community-based resources.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Use resources wisely. Prevent duplication of service. Put in a days+ work. Take job seriously. Ask for local input 

prior to policy/law making – since the front lines have the experience and firsthand knowledge of what will work

and what will muck up a working system. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Be prepared to roll up sleeves and help. Merit input at local level. Don’t put every city in a mold – big and small 

cities have major differences in resources and needs and risks. Listen/Work/Help! 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Difficulty hiring for position for emergency response has on adding duties of emergency preparedness to other 

duties. Lack of background. Identified “turf” still exists. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Far too much emphasis on smallpox. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

State programs are organized, planned and imposed on local health departments by people with little field

experience and less common sense.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Yes, criteria for allocation of grant funding should be determined jointly by Federal, state, and local agencies. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Yes, priorities for funding allocations should be determined at the local level.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

The local public health system (non metro urban areas)/(rural) do not have the money, personnel, capacity to

respond at the local level. Public health needs to be a system; not based on voluntary participation at the local level.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

States need to ensure that monies received for designated activities, are, indeed spent on that intended. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Need more training in all areas WMD response planning etc. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The guidance documents are very difficult to follow. Far better compliance would be achieved if information was 

transmitted clearly and concisely. Models with timelines and checklists seem to work best. While there is no

interest in stifling local initiative, there are tremendous benefits to seeing that all jurisdictions achieve a solid

foundation quickly.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Yes. Our state has not regionalized its effort. The result is that we have 55 counties doing own thing without a

cohesive, collaborative effort.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Tremendous teamwork has been developed at our agency. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The smallpox vaccination program is hindered by the lack of workmen’s compensation coverage at our regional 

hospitals. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Get more money to the local level where the work is being done. Fewer hurdles to get money, results at the local

level. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Private sector training exercises don’t help the local level responses or provide a secure environment to the public. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Credentialing volunteer(s) properly is an issue that is not easy to accomplish. Getting volunteers to step up when

not in imminent danger is also hard to accomplish. Local health departments have no money for PPE for biological

so definite lack of equipment for chem., nuclear, incendiary incidents. Local public health departments also lack

communication capability with other local emergency responders. (800 Mhz) tracking radios that are secure with 

HIPAA are quite costly, about 45,000 each. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Yes, carry forward funding from fiscal year to fiscal year. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Some of the areas do not take planned activities into account. Some programs, such as ours, are new and have not

had enough time to accomplish specific items in the survey, but have them planned for the near future. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Our county has gaps in communication with our county hospital. This communication is badly needed. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Yes – the role of the health department in emergency operations is much diminished. Conventional first responders

(law enforcement, fire service/EMS) are welcoming the new emphasis on countering bioterrorism and the resources 

being brought to bear on the issue.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Adequate funding for local health departments in high-risk areas would be a tremendous help! 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Much of the Federal approach to funding (especially Department of Justice) is irrational. It is based on purchasing

equipment/supplies without regard to either the existence of a plan or consideration of responders’ roles in a WMD 

response. Funding would be better directed at system response standards (i.e. specific functional responses). 

Equipment, personnel and other resources could then be rationally determined. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Our state has yet to develop a vision of what a successful response to terrorism or emergencies should look like. All 

work is buried in specific technical actions and details without a unifying framework. There needs to be emphasis 

on 1) the big picture of capacity and 2) the process for achieving that capacity. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Preparing for terrorism has helped us become more flexible organizationally. We are more fluent in negotiating

organization al cultures outside of public health. We have also learned to implement actions at a scale and speed

that we previously hadn’t imagined. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

I believe there has been too much money given to too many organizations, state and county-wide. There is much 

duplication and not enough definition of the hierarchy of control (i.e., everyone believes his/her organization is in

charge). If there ever was an incident, there would be mass confusion. In addition, perhaps the worst fiasco to come

out of this preparedness issue has been the smallpox inoculations. This so called risk appeared out of nowhere. No

one could even tell us satisfactorily who picked this disease as a risk to the nation. The information on this and 

other issues has been very slow to non-existent in coming to us in local public health. We are supposed to support

the decisions that are made at higher levels and relate directly to the public. I have found this to be an impossible 

task. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

The state health department’s deadline for submission of its grant was much too short! They were given virtually no

time to put together a well conceived plan for terrorism preparedness. 

No – but like most Americans, we only feel the axe of cutbacks in other important public health programs. Most, if 

not all, of my staff are not preoccupied on a daily basis with thoughts of domestic terrorism. They focus instead on

areas of public health, most of which have been cut back due to the increases in the dollars given to terrorism

preparedness. If anything, there is a great deal of resentment towards the preparedness programs. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

None that hasn’t already been covered. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Development of templates for plans and forms that can easily be adapted for locality specific situations. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

The political, inter-agency and inter-jurisdictional issues which must be addressed to be successful. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

1) Plan for regionally trained staff to provide leadership in events. 2) Plan drills every 6 months for increased 

proficiency.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Same as above.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Realization that, as trained staff leave, we experience huge loss of preparedness abilities.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Yes: a local man was one of those infected with anthrax. NO special program to help him and family despite being

unable to work! Better quality education ex. Smallpox. Too voluminous, information changed over time. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Better mental health services for victims of terrorism. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

That the victims can be forgotten despite great losses to personal lives and families. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

I believe the President is trying to protect this country from another attack, but we need better cooperation among

the Federal, state, and local agencies. Due to budget cuts, the money is not filtering down to the local level. We feel 

left out of the loop. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Better surveillance systems for chemical, biological, events. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

People still worry about turf protection of individual entities instead of the good of all the people. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Progress has clearly been made – funding needs to be flexible and based on local priorities and needs. To 

effectively respond to a bioterrorism incident, the entire public health system has to be rebuilt – plans without 

personnel are only “shelfware.”

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Good effort at state level. Staffing is marginal, skill-levels are shakey. Leadership is excellent, however. Need

dedicated, long-term, capacity building funding (not short-term crisis oriented). 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Public Health system has woefully deteriorated in past 40 years – public and medical community awareness is very 

low. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Communication with all levels. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Federal agencies need to better understand the circumstances and constraints on local agencies. We appreciate the

“guidances” that have been issued; but guidance that recommends/requires eight times the available staff is not

helpful. Guidance that expects we can utilize non-existent professionals is also not helpful. And it is not realistic to

expect local agencies to prepare a plan in two weeks to respond to a document the Federal agency spent 9 months –

1 year writing.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We sponsor a DMAT team. There should be better information about appropriate use of DMAT teams. The federal 

government should train individuals/teams to manage the initial phase of SNS distribution. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

State should train individuals and help coordinate SNS distribution regionally (between counties). 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

We have competent, resilient staff who have good reason to believe they can respond appropriately if and when they 

are asked to do so.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

See comment below. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

1) Better cooperation and integration of plans/expectations from state level. 2) Plan based on ICS/IMS structure, not

focus areas. 3) Less emphasis on information technology. It will fail in many emergencies. 4) Require less detail in

plans. Plans must be general to allow adaptation during emergencies. 

D-8-26 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

The strength of plans rests in the partnerships and trust formed at the local level. Partnership between local and

state, as well as local/fed, level is in need of improvement. Multiple conflicting demands on local health

departments are counterproductive.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

There is much technical assistance and information provided by CDC to bioterrorism-grantees that never trickles 

down to the front line, or local health departments. This information (e.g. HAN info, training guidelines, etc.) 

should be more available, meetings opened up to all levels of public health agencies, who would benefit from the 

information, even if they remain ineligible for direct funding. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Much of the state’s bioterrorism funding appears to be spent on NEDBS and other information systems/sources,

with little demonstrable improvement in capacity to identify or investigate outbreaks. Additional staff should be

hired, especially at district/local level, with better coordination and leadership centrally. Current state efforts suffer 

from lack of front-line contributions, like coordination with state EMA, political concerns overriding any intelligent 

or clear vision for true, statewide preparedness.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Better inter-agency coordination and information sharing.

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Programs are too “stove-piped” – different CDC Focus Area programs are not well coordinated. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Incident command system and all “hazards planning” for local health departments, money for one-time and staff 

back-filling to allow for more training and exercises. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Need direct contact with individual departments to assess specific needs.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Continued support and planning. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Rebuild public health infrastructure. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Move training closer to local level. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Fund locals based on population formula not base plus population. This latter formula is very poor with larger units. 

The smaller units tend to come to anyway. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We work very closely with the city County HHS which retains a great deal of the personal resources to address the 

issues in this study. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Local input into needs – no bureaucratic ladders. Thank you. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

The state has been receptive of our efforts at coordinating our metropolitan area’s and statewide activities. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Helpful in preparing for West Nile and SARS. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Looking back two years, this region/state has made tremendous progress. The time-lag on funding held up needed

staff recruitment and training. This region is still in the recruitment and training of new bioterrorism (BT) staff. 

Older public health staff with Civil Defense training has given the support needed immediately (smallpox, 

community assessments, emergency response plans, etc.) 

D-8-27 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

1) Need for closer working relationship with regional State Emergency management coordinators; law enforcement

and emergency medical personnel. 2) Need for better emergency communication system locally and state wide. 3) 

Need to recruit/maintain younger people into public health. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

The money should all be saved in a fund for clean up and rebuilding a city! We are not stopping anyone with this 

training. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

On the local level classify the roles/responsibilities of staff response and involvement to incidents other than 

bioterrorism, i.e. chemical, radiological, nuclear, IED, cyber. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

The State Division of Mental Health in our state is dangerously ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and poorly trained to

respond to even a minor incident. State and local mental health do not involve themselves in preparing or planning

for any such events. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Allow local health districts to carry over WMD funding from CDC into next budget year. The state is throwing

monies at local health districts so fast that we are unable to effectively utilize the funds. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Intra- and inter-agency communication and coordination are still presenting problems. This will be a concern and

should be addressed in greater detail.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

From the local level, it appears that the HRSA and CDC bioterrorism preparedness programs are not well integrated 

and operate in an overly compartmentalized manner. While local health departments (LHDs) do not receive HRSA

hospital preparedness funds, we do receive CDC funds to support activities that require working with the same

partners and issues addressed by the HRSA funds. At the local level, we integrate activities funded by both

agencies, but do not see the same at the federal or state levels. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Local health departments need to be seen as both state and Federal agencies’ strongest partners for developing

strong state and Federal public health preparedness programs. Deliberate efforts and practices by both state and 

federal agencies to work through local HDs and local public health preparedness programs is necessary to build

these programs at local level and support LHDs’ role as leaders in communities. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

1) Local health departments are state and Federal government’s best and strongest partners for developing state and 

national programs, and need to be recognized and supported as leaders in communities by working through them, 

not around them. 

2) Over compartmentalization of programs inhibits development of an integrated approach at the local level.

3) Cannot under estimate or overlook the costs of infrastructure development, including time, money, personnel and 

capital equipment, and the need for a grants management infrastructure. Investments are needed at the local level to

support both programmatic and administrative infrastructures to assure program success and integration with the 

local unified command structure.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Standardized templates – I’m tired of recreating systems that could be the same across the nation. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: Standardize templates. 

STATE PUBLIC HEALTH

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Funding at state level.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Personnel issues continue to plague planning and preparedness. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Federal programs should provide sustained, stable base funding for public health preparedness, basic public health

and environmental protection programs, emergency medical services and trauma systems, and health care coverage, 

D-8-28 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

so that basic public health and medical care and surge capacity are supported and sustained. Federal funding for

chemical, radiological and nuclear response and preparedness is inadequate. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Our State budget is under severe stress and is not able to provide additional support for counter-terrorism efforts. 

Basic public services are being severely reduced. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Counter-terrorism and preparedness for response to WMD need to be a high public health priority because the threat

of a catastrophic biological attack or emerging infectious diseases is real. SARS, pandemic influenza, or rapid 

spread of diseases like West Nile Virus all represent real threats. With potential for catastrophic consequences, 

public health is cheap insurance, considering the magnitude of biological threat. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

More flexibility in use of funds. We find that we cannot utilize CDC and HRSA funds to complete parts of our 

emergency response plans (are not permitted to utilize funds for medications or certain equipment). Constant

frustration working with CDC. HRSA much easier. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

More flexibility with funding uses. Focus on sustainable infrastructure building. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

We need clarification about what constitutes an adequate assessment and resultant response plan. Contingency 

planning is not part of the culture of public health, and so there is little experience to guide the development of 

response plans. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Communication has not improved over last 11⁄2 years, from Feds to state. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Challenge is building foundational elements while concerned about sustainment of funding.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Coordinate the Federal terrorism-related grants. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

More converge w/in DHS. We (in Our State) are doing a great job of working with ODP Grantee and FEMA/DHS

grantees – FEDERAL level still appears disjointed. NIMS – we were asked to comment on draft, but not invited to

the session in D.C. – vulnerability and risk assessments are being funded by at least 3 Federal agencies. We don’t

have time! 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Slow down – the smallpox program alienated many of our local health departments and over taxed the limited state 

staff. No progress was made in many of the more critical areas (Planning, Training, Exercising). Advocate using 

ODP money to fund all WMD exercises at all levels. It works for us. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Centralized Federal surveillance and response for terrorism would be more efficient than repeating the exercise 50+ 

times. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

State government need to establish streamlined systems to administer the programs.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Required integration of WMD-DHS funding for first responders and public health/hospitals. 

 Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned: 

The recent power blackout tested communication systems that are power based. Many patients are being discharged

to home or are in ambulatory care (outpatient facilities), that rely on medical devices that require power. Hospitals 

are being asked to absorb these patients during power outages and this may be unrealistic. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

More flexibility in utilization of funds to meet particular circumstances of jurisdiction for preparedness. 

D-8-29 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Our greatest difficulties are inability to hire staff even there is money (HR stalls) and inability to move

money/contracts to assist in projects. Department infrastructure staff are angry that terrorism efforts are diverting

resources and tend to throw up special “oversight” requirements – i.e., its bureaucratic red tape not imposed on other 

programs. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Lack of coordination between CDC and HRSA grants is simply unacceptable. At this point, Department of 

Homeland Security provides us no benefit other than confusion and misuse of resources.

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Improved all hazards approach. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Need better coordination of funds coming from all the different Federal sources. Too many overlapping reports 

required. Expenditure tracking requirements across grants are not consistent and often very labor intensive. Need to

be streamlined. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Templates/training specific to cooperative agreement requirements. Coordination of reporting requirements to

funding agencies and others. Enhanced biologic response tools/infrastructure (surveillance; planning; exercising; 

laboratory; communication; risk communication) has enhanced response to emerging infectious disease(s), (SARS,

West Nile, Monkeypox, etc.) 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Clearly understand need for strong accountability of funding. However, need to evolve meaningful methods of 

undertaking this. Grants management activities and required fiscal tracking systems that frequently change, etc. are 

impinging upon/delaying ability to get actual preparedness task accomplished. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

Importance of developing a good all hazards plan first before adapting to specific scenarios/diseases – smallpox, 

pandemic flu, SARS. Push for disease specific plans is too soon. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

1) Establish and fund a national laboratory response network that will assure adequate lab support for bio, chem., 

radiation and nuclear detection, response and assessment is available. 2) Require that USDA, FDA, EPA coordinate

with and fund state capabilities to respond to food and environmental incidents much like CDC has done for 

biological incidents.

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Assistance with operational planning and development of medical and health incident management structures. 

Increased attention to special populations. 

Organization’s Experiences or Lessons Learned:

This survey is very comprehensive, but does not show qualitative measure of our progress. We are underway with 

many preparedness activities, but we still have a long way to go. Other areas that we may have answered “no” are 

in the planning stages. 

Federal Programs for Terrorism Preparedness: 

Too much reporting required on grants. The administrative burden is overwhelming and a barrier to program

achievement. 

State Programs for Terrorism Preparedness:

Get some templates developed and distributed. 

D-8-30 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

APPENDIX E–CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A POST-9/11 WORLD* 

The attacks of September 11, 2001, led to new laws, policies, and practices designed to enhance the 

nation’s security against the terrorist threat. These security measures have prompted a debate about their 

impact on civil liberties. For its final report, the Advisory Panel seeks to contribute to the development of 

a long-term, sustainable approach to security that protects not just lives but also our way of life. 

The Panel could advance this objective by reframing the terms of the civil liberties debate and 

emphasizing the importance of understanding the implications of the fundamentally altered environment 

in which individual counterterrorism initiatives need to be evaluated. Rather than the traditional portrayal 

of security and civil liberties as competing values that must be weighed on opposite ends of a balance, 

these values should be recognized as mutually reinforcing. Under this framework, counterterrorism

initiatives would be evaluated in terms of how well they preserve all of the unalienable rights that the 

founders believed were essential to the strength and security of our nation: life, liberty, and the pursuit of 

happiness. 

The Declaration of Independence rests on the premise that there are certain “unalienable rights,” to 

include “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The terrorists seek to destroy all three of these. A 

successful strategy to defeat the terrorists’ objective, then, should seek to preserve not just life, but also 

liberty and our way of life. 

Moreover, an effective evaluation should focus not just on individual initiatives but on the way these 

initiatives fit into a fundamentally changed approach to counterterrorism overall. For example, we have 

moved from a largely law-enforcement approach in combating terrorism to a global war in which the 

continental United States is part of the battlefield. It is important to analyze the impact this may have on 

public reaction, judicial interpretation, and the applicable legal framework. Similarly, the FBI now has a 

broader mission that often eliminates the traditional requirement for a criminal predicate in order to 

justify intrusive investigative techniques. “Law enforcement” means something different than it did on 

September 10, 2001. These new paradigms must inform the evaluation of existing and proposed laws and 

policies. 

Reframing the Debate 

In times of crisis, when the pressure for dramatic change is most intense, it is helpful to return to the 

fundamental principles that have guided this nation since its inception. As Thomas Jefferson advised in 

his first Inaugural Address, "[t]he essential principles of our Government form the bright constellation 

which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation....[S]hould 

we wander from them in moments of error or of alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the 

road which alone leads to peace, liberty and safety." 

Moreover, history teaches that the debate about finding the right “balance” between security and civil 

liberties is misleading. This traditional debate implies that security and liberty are competing values and 

are mutually exclusive. It assumes that our liberties make us vulnerable and if we will give up some of 

these liberties, at least temporarily, we will be more secure. Yet, consider the context in which civil 

liberties were first firmly established. The framers of the Constitution had just survived a truly existential 

threat and were acutely aware of the fragility of their nascent nation. In this uncertain and insecure 

environment, the framers chose not to consolidate power and restrict freedoms but to devolve power to 

* Suzanne Spaulding, J.D. 

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the people and protect civil liberties from encroachment. They recognized that civil liberties and security

are mutually reinforcing. Security clearly ensures the freedom to exercise our liberties, but it is also true 

that the exercise of civil liberties and our way of life contributes to our strength and security. 

Local police have learned how essential it is to become a more integral part of their communities.

Moreover, citizen support is strengthened by a sense that the system is just and fair. If that conviction 

begins to erode, so might vital citizen support. Thus, some police departments have expressed concern 

about some of the activities that Federal officials have asked them to undertake in their local 

communities, particularly with regard to enforcement of immigration laws. The concern is greatest with 

respect to the Arab American community, where support for government efforts could yield significant 

benefits but relations are often severely strained by policies perceived to be discriminatory.

 

For example, no one individual or handful of people possesses the knowledge, wisdom, and skills to 

defeat the threat of terrorism. The solutions can only be derived through collective wisdom and 

innovation emerging from the marketplace of ideas that flourishes in a free society. The frequent 

admonition to “think outside the box” reflects the recognition that iconoclastic, nonconformist input

maximizes the prospects for finding solutions. To meet today’s threats, we need technological 

breakthroughs, such as the development of sensors to detect deadly chemicals or biological agents, and 

new ideas, such as ways of educating and assisting citizens to effectively protect themselves in the event 

of a terror attack. These developments are far less likely to emerge where "group think" dominates. 

Yet many of the security measures added or expanded after 9/11 involve efforts to detect terrorists by

looking for “outliers.” Government officials at all levels, as well as the American public, have been 

instructed to watch for activity that is different or outside the norm. Combine this with the prospect of 

increased government surveillance over an ever-widening range of activities and individuals, and the 

pressure to conform grows. 

Protection of civil liberties and our way of life also promotes the kind of relationship between the 

government and the governed that keeps the nation strong and secure. The framers understood that the 

strongest nation would be one in which the people viewed their government as “us” and not “them.” The 

brave men and women who struggled on September 11 to keep their plane from being used to decapitate 

the government confirmed that the most effective antidote to threats inside our borders is an informed 

citizenry committed to preserving a nation in which they have a very real stake. Yet security restrictions 

can begin to drive a wedge between government and the people. Before the attacks of 9/11, an average of 

10,000 to 20,000 visitors roamed the halls of the U.S. Capitol on busy days. Now, visitors are only

allowed if they are on a tour, and the number is down to about 1,000. Similar limitations on access 

characterize Federal offices all across the country. A government that shuts off the halls of power inside 

jersey barriers and cloisters its public servants behind armed guards runs the risk of detaching itself from

the governed. 

63 

Similarly, one of the greatest risks of the current plans for responding to bioterrorism, which are based 

primarily on compulsory measures such as quarantine or mandatory vaccinations, is that they may create

an adversarial relationship between the government and the public. One of the most compelling 

advantages of adding the option of a measure such as Shielding, or “stay at home,” is that it undermines 

the terrorist objective by building upon the strengths of democracy. Our system of government reflects 

the framers’ faith in the wisdom of an informed citizenry to make decisions about what is best for 

themselves, their families, their communities, and their nation. Shielding reflects that same belief and 

63 See “Community Policing and Terrorism”, Matthew C. Scheider and Robert Chapman, Journal of Homeland

Security, April 2003, (http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/displayarticle.asp?article=88) which

emphasizes that “community policing philosophy is well positioned to play a central role in local law enforcement 

responses to terrorism” p.2. 

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takes advantage of the strengths of a democracy, empowering ordinary citizens through education and 

community-based decision-making. 

The rights described in the Declaration of Independence and enshrined in the Constitution were not 

viewed as a luxury of peace and stability but as the best hope for a people embarking on the dangerous 

and daring endeavor of creating a new nation. They are no less essential to the nation’s security today. 

Thus, proposed security measures should be evaluated on how well they frustrate the terrorists’ targeting 

not just of life, but also liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The impact on these latter rights may be 

clear and direct, such as denial of due process, or subtler, such as chilling first amendment activity,

creating pressure to conform, or otherwise deterring lawful activity. These more subtle effects are largely

a result of the sense that government is casting a broad net that is more likely to “catch” non-terrorists—

i.e., us. 

Many of the security initiatives implemented since 9/11 have been challenged as possible violations of the 

Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search or seizure. Some of these challenges are 

currently pending in Federal courts. However, this paper focuses on the more subtle and potentially

profound impact on the exercise of First Amendment rights and, more broadly, on the ability to pursue 

our way of life. 

 

Evaluating an initiative’s impact on “the pursuit of Happiness” can also yield a more accurate assessment 

of its cost. Overly burdensome financial reporting requirements, for example, may not infringe on core 

civil liberties, but they do raise transactional costs and will inhibit beneficial activity along with criminal 

activity. Similarly, the opportunity to fly may be viewed as a privilege rather than a right, but overly

stringent and apparently arbitrary security hurdles can not only have an economic impact but also increase 

public skepticism about security measures generally. 

A clearer assessment of the full costs of security measures should provide insights into more effective 

ways of achieving the desired impact on terrorist activity while minimizing the impact on our way of life. 

Narrowing the scope of new legal authorities, providing procedural or technological safeguards against 

abuse, or simply doing a better job of educating the public on implementation might significantly reduce 

the potential harm from new measures without significantly reducing their effectiveness against terrorism.

Possible Recommendation:

Efforts to combat terrorism should be evaluated in terms of how well they frustrate the terrorists’ 

objective of destroying life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 

Understanding the Broader Context 

The civil liberties debate often focuses on specific laws, policies, or practices. However, as this paper 

attempts to illustrate, these initiatives are implemented in the context of fundamental changes in our 

counterterrorism approach, which can have a significant consequences for their overall effectiveness and 

impact on the protection of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This is presents a significant 

challenge for evaluating civil liberties in the post-9/11 world. 

The War on Terrorism

One of the most immediate and dramatic changes brought about on the morning of September 11, 2001, 

was the shift from viewing terrorist attacks as first and foremost a crime to viewing them as belligerent 

operations in an ongoing war. Americans are only now beginning to sort through the full implications of 

this shift. It was fairly straightforward as manifested in the combat operations in Afghanistan. However, 

the end of that conflict did not signal the end of the global war on terrorism. Thus, all actions taken to 

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protect Americans from terrorist attack occur in the context of this war; a war in which the enemy cannot 

be distinguished by uniforms, nationality, or location, with no defined battlefield, and with no discernable 

end point. This war has an impact on how courts and the Congress view the actions of the Executive 

branch, on what laws apply, and on how those laws are applied. 

As Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted in his book on civil liberties in wartime, All the 

Laws but One, it is often said that law is silent during war (Inter arma silent leges). In part, this is 

because, as a matter of law, the government’s authority to restrict civil liberty is greater during war than 

in peacetime. But Rehnquist also observes that “[q]uite apart from the added authority that the law itself 

may give the President in time of war, presidents may act in ways that push their legal authority to its 

outer limits, if not beyond.” In addition, courts are reluctant to decide a case against the government on 

an issue of national security during a war. Rehnquist ultimately rejects the traditional maxim, concluding 

that the laws will not be entirely silent in time of war, but he does conclude that “they will speak with a 

somewhat different voice.” 

It becomes important, then, to understand the impact that this “somewhat different voice” may have on 

the legal framework for counterterrorism

Homeland Defense—Distinguishing between law enforcement and military operations 

The attacks of September 11 brought home the reality that the continental US is part of the battlefield in 

this unconventional war. As those who live along the Potomac River just outside the nation’s capital can 

attest, the US military patrols this battlefield regularly in an effort to detect and deter enemy combatants. 

As further testament to the importance of the domestic mission of the military, the Department of Defense 

established a new command, the Northern Command, whose responsibilities include homeland defense 

and support to civil authorities. Yet, these new domestic missions for the military have received 

relatively little public discussion and debate. 

 

One consequence of the homeland defense mission is its potential impact on the application of Posse 

Comitatus. Questions have been raised as to whether the Posse Comitatus Act

64 provided DOD with 

sufficient flexibility to perform its domestic missions. What has been missed in much of that discussion, 

however, is that posse comitatus only applies when soldiers are asked to perform law enforcement 

functions. It does not apply to military operations. In today’s environment, activities or situations that 

look very much like law enforcement may turn out to be military operations or activities.65 

Thus, if terrorists were known to be hiding inside a warehouse and the military arrived upon the scene, it 

might not be clear whether any action they took was part of a military operation against enemy

combatants or a law enforcement activity against suspected criminals. The application of Posse 

Comitatus would be uncertain. Yet, some of the concerns that prompted the Posse Comitatus Act might 

also apply to the domestic use of the military in a combat operation. 

64 18 USC sec 1385. 65 Jose Padilla, the terrorist suspect arrested in O’Hare airport and subsequently designated an enemy combatant (see 

“Enemy Combatants” section, below), argued that his detention by the military violated the Posse Comitatus Act 

(PCA). The court found, however, that PCA did not apply: “Padilla is not being detained by the military in order to

execute a civilian law or for violating a civilian law, notwithstanding that his alleged conduct may in fact violate one

or more such laws. He is being detained in order to interrogate him about the unlawful organization with which he 

is said to be affiliated and with which the military is in active combat, and to prevent him from becoming reaffiliated

with that organization. Therefore, his detention by the military does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act.” Order of 

Judge Michael Mukasey, US District Court, SDNY, December 4, 2002, at 47.

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Guidance on the use of force by the military is usually provided by “rules of engagement” (ROEs). Yet 

there are reportedly no clearly articulated rules of engagement or “use of force” rules to govern the 

military’s actions inside the United States in a situation like that described above. It is hard to imagine 

how troops could have been adequately trained to respond appropriately to such a contingency without 

the development of such guidelines. 

Possible Recommendations:

The potential for serious infringement of liberties stemming from the domestic deployment of troops 

could be significantly reduced by the development of ROEs for the Continental United States (CONUS), 

rigorous training, and publicly articulated standards and procedures for determining when the military is 

conducting a military operation in its homeland defense role and when it is conducting law enforcement 

activities. These issues need to be fully discussed in the public arena so that the American people 

understand and are prepared for the military’s intervention, should that become necessary.

DOD Intelligence Collection

 

Another consequence of the homeland defense mission is the enhanced collection of intelligence by the 

military inside the United States. Just as the military undertook intensive intelligence collection in 

Afghanistan prior to and during the war in order to support its combat operations, the military is 

collecting intelligence on the battlefield here in the US. Thus, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA) has funded research into advanced data mining technology that would gather 

information from US companies, though not about US persons. In addition, the New York Times reported 

that the DOD, along with the CIA, was seeking authority similar to that currently exercised by the FBI to 

compel US businesses to provide records on targeted individuals.66 And the National Imagery and 

Mapping Agency, which is responsible for analyzing images from satellites, has significantly increased its 

interest in targets inside the United States. 

Yet, our system of laws and safeguards did not anticipate the homeland defense mission. For example, 

domestic intelligence collection by DOD has generally been viewed as a law enforcement activity

governed by Posse Comitatus and related policies. However, as discussed above, today domestic 

intelligence collection is presumably being undertaken for military purposes, something the current legal 

framework did not contemplate. 

It is not entirely clear how the courts will view intrusive intelligence collection, such as satellite imagery,

undertaken inside the United States for military purposes during a time of war. As we have seen in the 

cases involving electronic surveillance, the courts have allowed some distinction between purely domestic

situations and those involving a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. In that situation, however, 

Congress chose to step in and articulate clear procedures to govern electronic surveillance for intelligence 

purposes inside the United States, enacting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978.67 This new 

context may warrant similar clarification. 

Even with respect to actions overseas, the global war on terrorism may render certain laws inapplicable. 

For example, Congress and the Executive branch developed an extensive system of safeguards with 

respect to covert actions. However, the relevant statute notes that the requirements to do not apply to 

“traditional military activities.”68 Thus, not only are actions that might look like law enforcement 

susceptible to being labeled military operations, activities that might otherwise be considered covert 

actions are likely to be viewed as military operations if undertaken by DOD. To the extent that this 

66 See “http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/02/attack/main552014.shtml” 67 50 USC 1801 et seq. 68 50 USC 413b. 

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complicates oversight by Congress and the Executive branch, it may also frustrate efforts to fully 

understand the civil liberties implications of the war on terrorism. 

Possible Recommendations:

Congress should consider working with the Administration to develop, in statute and/or Executive Order, 

new guidelines and procedures for domestic intelligence collection by the military. Definitions may need 

to be revisited, or additional safeguards added, in order to address the challenges of this unconventional 

war.

Enemy Combatants

The war on terrorism brings with it the legal framework of the law of armed conflict. Yet this body of 

law was developed to govern the actions of nation states. Attempts to apply it to non-state actors in nontraditional global conflict present unique challenges. This is most clearly evidenced in the legal issues 

surrounding the detention of suspected terrorists as “enemy combatants.” 

The courts are currently considering habeas corpus cases involving the detention as enemy combatants of 

two American citizens, Yasser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla. Hamdi was taken into custody in 

Afghanistan during the armed conflict there, while Jose Padilla was initially taken into custody by law 

enforcement officers in O’Hare airport and detained under the material witness statute. A few days

before a hearing on the legality of his detention, Padilla was removed from the criminal justice system, 

designated as an enemy combatant, and transferred to military custody. 

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, Virginia, has held in the Hamdi case that 

the President has the authority to designate US citizens as enemy combatants and detain them without 

access to a lawyer. However, the court has noted that Hamdi was apprehended in a “zone of active 

combat” and “during a military campaign on foreign soil.” Thus, it is not clear that the court would reach 

the same conclusion in the case of someone captured inside the US, such as Jose Padilla. 

US District Judge Michael B. Mukasey in New York is hearing Padilla’s case. While he has agreed with 

the 4th Circuit that the President has the authority to detain a US citizen as an enemy combatant, he has 

ruled that Padilla “must have the opportunity to present evidence that undermines the reliability of the 

[government’s] declaration.” Unlike the 4th Circuit, Judge Mukasey ruled that “the only practical way” to 

give Padilla that opportunity was for Padilla to have access to his attorneys. The government argues that 

access to attorneys will defeat efforts to gather intelligence from these detainees that could prevent 

another terrorist attack. The government is appealing this decision and oral arguments are expected in the 

fall. To date, Padilla has been held in solitary confinement for over a year with no access to his attorneys. 

Under international law, prisoners of war can be detained for the duration of the conflict. No one has yet 

speculated on when the war on terrorism might end. 

These cases have raised concerns about the potentially indefinite detention of Americans with no formal 

charges and no right to challenge the basis for their designation as enemy combatants. When individuals 

are detained outside a zone of combat, the risk of error is significantly heightened. Moreover, there is 

some concern that the threat to remove a criminal defendant from the civilian court into the indefinite 

status of an enemy combatant may introduce a level of coercion into our criminal justice system that 

threatens its fairness. 

The government is pursuing policies that seek to preserve maximum flexibility to meet the unique and 

potentially unforeseeable challenges inherent in this new approach to terrorism as an ongoing war. Thus, 

it is reluctant to articulate hard and fast rules or make categorical statements that might wind up limiting 

options in the future. Yet, in addition to the direct impact on those detained, this approach risks 

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undermining public support over time by raising concerns of arbitrariness. Moreover, the uncertainty

about the scope of this approach can have a chilling effect, just as with vague or over-broad criminal 

statutes. 

Possible recommendations:

If the current enemy combatant policy is evaluated in terms of how well it protects life, liberty, and the 

pursuit of happiness, some changes might be recommended. Such recommendations might include 

establishing guidelines that define, at least in general terms, the circumstances under which an individual 

might be designated as an enemy combatant and the length of time an individual so designated could be 

held incommunicado for purposes of intelligence interrogation, as well as providing access to an attorney

at the end of that period of time for those detainees taken into custody somewhere other than in a zone of 

active combat or foreign military campaign. Clearer guidance on the circumstances that might lead to 

eventual release or the filing of criminal charges against detainees would also reduce the sense that the 

designation is a legal “black hole.” 

Similar clarifications on the policies regarding non-US citizens detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 

might also serve to sustain national and international support over the long haul. 

More broadly, given the significant implications of the legal status that this war, unlike the war on drugs, 

appears to have, it may be appropriate for the Administration, Congress, and the courts to consider 

distinguishing between the war against Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and broader counterterrorism efforts 

aimed at the phenomenon of terrorism generally or at other terrorist groups or individuals. Legal 

justification for this distinction, and for drawing some lines around the scope of the “enemy” could be 

found in the Congressional authorization for the use of force after September 11, which has been cited by 

the Executive Branch as part of the legal basis for the actions such as the detention of enemy combatants. 

The resolution authorized the President to “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 

nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 

attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.” It is not clear 

that the “global war on terrorism” is limited to those covered by this authorization. While efforts to 

combat terrorism may well need to be broader than just those responsible for 9/11 and their helpers, and 

include those who have never targeted the US or Americans, it may be worth considering whether all of 

those efforts should have the legal status of a traditional war. 

 

The Changing Role of Law Enforcement 

Another significant change in the overall environment in which security initiatives should be evaluated is 

in the roles and mission of the FBI and local law enforcement. Where the Bureau’s mission had been to 

investigate criminal activity with the objective of bringing a successful prosecution, the primary mission 

today is to prevent a terrorist attack. Criminal prosecution is simply one possible avenue for achieving 

this objective. Intelligence collection and disruption, neither of which requires any criminal predicate, are 

now equally important roles for FBI agents. The move away from the traditional requirement for a 

criminal predicate to justify law enforcement activity has potentially far reaching implications. Not only 

has this change prompted some concomitant changes laws and policies it also affects the application of 

laws that were already on the books. The full impact of these changes on the nation’s ability to protect 

life, liberty, and our way of life may not be known for years. 

A fundamental principle of our democracy is that law-abiding citizens should be able to go about their 

lives without fear of government detention or interference. Law enforcement authority was, by definition, 

to be used to enforce the laws. Interference by law enforcement was to be limited to those situations 

involving a violation of the law, usually criminal laws. Thus, we require crimes to be clearly defined so 

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that people can know when they are violating the law. Law enforcement may mistakenly target an 

innocent person, but such mistakes should be rare and the system should operate to detect those mistakes 

as promptly as possible. 

When law enforcement officials start looking for “suspicious” activity rather than criminal activity, this 

clarity is lost. People are left to speculate about whether their activity might be viewed as suspicious. 

While it may still be unlikely that a law-abiding citizen will be convicted for terrorism, they may well 

come under heightened scrutiny. This can have several consequences. The mere prospect that the 

government may be watching is sufficient to deter some people from engaging in otherwise lawful 

activity, including protected activity like exercise of religion or free speech. Moreover, enhanced 

surveillance raises the prospect that the government will detect non-terrorism violations, such as failure to 

pay child support or problems with income taxes. Just as Al Capone was locked up for tax fraud, 

Attorney General John Ashcroft has said the government will go after suspected terrorists for “spitting on 

the sidewalk.” Thus, violations that might not otherwise be detected or rise to a level warranting 

prosecution may result in liability because “suspicious” activity led to heightened scrutiny. While few 

would object to using whatever laws are applicable to lock up terrorists, this approach also places nonterrorists at greater risk of prosecution if they engage in behavior the government has labeled as 

“suspicious.” Aside from its chilling effect, this can eventually impugn the perceived credibility and 

fairness of the system, undermining vital citizen support. 

Law-abiding individuals may also be at greater risk of other kinds of government interference, short of 

criminal prosecution, because of the Bureau’s increasing reliance on “disruption” techniques. The 

intelligence community has traditionally used disruption overseas when there is information indicating a 

possible attack but either inadequate information or insufficient capability to move directly against the 

terrorists. In those situation, intelligence officials, usually working with cooperative foreign 

governments, will generate activity designed primarily to intimidate the terrorists into delaying or 

canceling the attack. “Rounding up the usual suspects”—detaining members of the communities of 

which the terrorists are thought to be a part-- is a classic form of disruption. Authorities may get lucky

and actually take into custody someone who is necessary for the attack but, at a minimum, they put the 

terrorists on notice that the government knows something is up. The Attorney General and FBI Director 

have made it clear that disruption is now part of the strategy inside the United States, raising issues not 

present in the overseas context. To some extent, at least, the large-scale detentions and questioning of 

immigrants after September 11 was part of a disruption campaign. Other kinds of government disruption 

that falls short of criminal prosecution might include IRS audits, denying permission to board an airplane, 

or extensive questioning or searches each time you try to board a plane. These activities do not require 

any criminal predicate for justification and often are not governed by the safeguards the system usually

imposes to prevent abuses of government authority. Typically, the targeted individuals have little 

recourse to challenge the basis for the government action, unlike the protections built into the criminal 

justice system. 

Concern about being caught up in anti-terrorism actions because you have engaged in “suspicious,” rather 

than criminal, activity is heightened by technology designed to enhance the government’s surveillance 

capability. Broad search capabilities designed to find terrorists based on a “profile” raise the greatest 

concern. These might include some proposals for data mining, as well as physical surveillance 

technologies such as facial recognition and gait analysis. Underlying this heightened concern is

skepticism about the government’s ability to create a profile that is sufficiently accurate to detect all 

terrorist activity and only terrorist activity. Instead, many fear that the profile will miss some terrorists 

and “catch” too many non-terrorists. Similar concerns underlie the controversy over technologies that 

would access databases of questionable accuracy in programs like CAPPS II. These concerns might be 

alleviated, then, if the public were assured of the accuracy and effectiveness of the data and the profile, 

and if the “cost” to non-terrorists of being mistakenly profiled were relatively low. A more accurate 

system for “profiling” terrorists, if one could be developed, might actually enhance civil liberties and 

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reduce the fear of unwarranted government interference by reducing the likelihood that law abiding 

individuals would be targeted. 

Proposals for a national ID card also raise the prospect of heightened government surveillance. The idea 

of a card that can be a more reliable form of identification through the use of biometrics, for example, 

would address a number of security concerns. However, in order for the biometrics to be an identifier, 

presumably the government will have to have some way of matching the data. For example, if the 

biometric identifier were fingerprints or DNA, the government would need to have everyone’s 

fingerprints or DNA on file in order to match the card with the name. This is personal information the 

government currently does not have for most Americans. Moreover, as more and more businesses, 

employers, locations, and others begin to require these ID cards, they will form records of our every

action. These records will be susceptible to government access. 

Many of the challenges to various surveillance and search techniques are based on the Fourth Amendment 

prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. However, evaluations of these techniques should also 

include consideration of their potential chilling affect on protected activity. In counterterrorism efforts, 

particularly, Fourth Amendment and First Amendment rights are often closely connected. As Supreme 

Court Justice Lewis Powell noted in a decision on electronic surveillance, “[n]ational security

cases...often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of 

‘ordinary’ crime. Thought the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is 

there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech.”69 This is particularly pronounced in 

investigations targeting politically or religiously motivated terrorism. 

Possible Recommendations:

Efforts to detect possible terrorists living in our midst could more effectively preserve life, liberty, and the 

ability to pursue happiness if safeguards could be developed to maximize the fairness and effectiveness of 

the methods utilized. 

For example, concerns about government surveillance and use of profiling might be alleviated by the 

development technologies and methodologies to maximize the effectiveness of terrorist “profiles” and 

strengthen the accuracy of data. Moreover, privacy concerns could be eased by ensuring that data 

remains “anonymous”--allowing computers to do “blind” matches so that no person has access to the 

names--until a court, magistrate, or other independent authority determines that the investigator has met 

an appropriate threshold for allowing names to be matched with data. 

 

The costs of a “false positive” should also be reduced, perhaps by establishing mechanisms that would 

allow individuals to get off watch lists, developing more timely mechanisms for verifying information 

leading to a “hit”, and placing limits on the type of action that can be taken on the basis of such a hit. 

 

Accountability could be enhanced by using technology to build in rigorous audit controls to detect 

unauthorized activity such as improper storage of information on protected activity, or inappropriate 

searches of databases or uses of surveillance technology.

70

69 United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 70 These kinds of safeguards might also be applicable to privacy concerns regarding health records. Developing

appropriate mechanisms for preventing the abuse of access to health information might ease concerns about sharing 

that information with law enforcement or others who may need it to prevent or mitigate a bioterrorism attack, for 

example. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Law Enforcement and Intelligence

As FBI and local cops focus on prevention, it becomes harder to distinguish between law enforcement 

and intelligence. According to the revised Attorney General Guidelines issued in May, 2002, law 

enforcement activity includes activities related to counterterrorism and foreign intelligence. (AG 

Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise, and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, 

Section VI(C).) FBI activity is defined as “law enforcement activity” even if it involves actions designed 

to collect intelligence rather than to investigate criminal activity. 

 

Traditionally, as FBI Director Robert Meuller has told the Advisory Panel, criminal investigators brought 

a certain discipline to the collection and analysis of information because that information might 

eventually be evidence in a criminal prosecution. Law enforcement officers at the local, State, and 

Federal level knew that if information was not collected in a manner consistent with the Fourth 

Amendment, for example, it could not be used at trial. This served as a safeguard against the potential 

abuse of law enforcement powers. However, since prosecution is no longer the primary objective, this 

safeguard may no longer be effective. Indeed, it has been reported that many of those detained after 

September 11 were not read their Miranda rights or given access to counsel because the objective of the 

detention was to collect intelligence information rather than to use that information in a prosecution. 

Most were detained under the material witness statute and, while this is probably not unconstitutional71, it 

is a different way of doing business for the FBI and it may be appropriate for Congress to consider 

whether new safeguards are needed. 

Other investigative techniques have also been broadened to apply even when there is no indication of 

criminal activity. For example, online searches for information about individuals or groups prior to 

September 11 could not be conducted in the absence of some showing of possible criminal activity. Law 

enforcement actions that touched upon First Amendment activity, particularly the exercise of religion, 

were subject to particular scrutiny. Many agents in the field interpreted this policy as a virtual ban on 

such actions and important opportunities to detect terrorist recruitment efforts, for example, may have 

been lost. 

The revised AG Guidelines authorize FBI agents to visit any place and attend any event that is open to the 

public, and conduct online search activity or access online sites and forums, on the same terms and 

conditions as members of the public generally, for the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist 

activities. Section 411 broadly defines “terrorist activities” and again makes it clear that criminal activity 

is not required. 

The most significant concern with allowing the monitoring of First Amendment activities such as exercise

of religion and freedom of speech is that it will have a chilling effect. This concern is exacerbated if 

those doing the monitoring are allowed to keep files on individuals they observe. 

The AG guidelines attempt to address this concern by stating that: 

The law enforcement activities authorized by this Part do not include maintaining 

files on individuals solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the 

First Amendment or the lawful exercise of any other rights secured by the 

71 Courts have upheld the use of the material witness statute in this context and the Supreme Court has recently 

held—though in a fractured opinion that left some questions open-- that coercive interrogation without criminal 

prosecution does not violate the Constitution, at least where the interrogation does not “shock the conscience.” 

(Chavez v. Martinez, No. 01–1444, Decided May 27, 2003.)

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Constitution or laws of the United States. Rather, all such law enforcement activities 

must have a valid law enforcement purpose as described in this part.

This apparent safeguard is not as strong as it might at first appear. First, files could be maintained if they

were for another purpose in addition to monitoring constitutionally protected activity. Moreover, the 

activities permitted must have a valid law enforcement purpose but, as discussed above, that term is now 

very broadly defined. 

Possible Recommendation:

The potential chilling effect of broadened surveillance authority could also be reduced if, in addition to 

baring the collection or storage of information solely for monitoring protected activity, a more rigorous 

standard was imposed for any targeting that involved protected activity. The key would be to ensure that 

the higher threshold was not interpreted in the field as effectively a prohibition against such collection or 

storage, as happened in the past.72

Changes in FISA

The blurred distinction between law enforcement and intelligence has been most clearly evidenced in the 

application of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Pursuant to FISA, FBI can apply for 

orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) authorizing electronic surveillance or 

physical searches where there is probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an agent of 

a foreign power, as opposed to the traditional Title III wiretap authority used in criminal cases, which 

requires probable cause to believe the target is involved in criminal activity. Unlike surveillance or 

searches authorized under the criminal code, FISA activities can be undertaken without ever notifying the 

target. 

The definition of a foreign power includes “a group engaged in international terrorism or in preparation 

therefore.” “Agent of a foreign power” includes a non-US person who is a member of an international 

terrorism group or any person, including a US person, who knowingly engages in sabotage or

international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefore, for or on behalf of a foreign power; 

or knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign 

power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of 

a foreign power; or knowingly aids and abets persons engaged in such activities. 

Long interpreted by some elements of the intelligence community as applying only where the “primary

purpose” of the surveillance was foreign intelligence rather than law enforcement, the statute was 

amended as part of the USA PATRIOT Act to allow its use when foreign intelligence was merely a 

“significant purpose.” Subsequently, the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review concluded that there was 

never any constitutional requirement for distinguishing between a law enforcement and foreign 

intelligence purpose where the two overlap, as they do with regard to international terrorism. The court 

tore down the wall that had been erected over a period of 25 years between these two communities. 

One immediate impact of this is to allow criminal investigators to receive information collected pursuant 

to FISA. However, it also allows those investigators to assist in identifying targets. For all practical 

purposes, FISA has now replaced the traditional criminal wiretap authority for all international terrorism

investigations. Again, one significant impact of this change is to effectively remove the requirement for a 

criminal predicate for electronic surveillance of international terrorism suspects. 

 

72 Again, there are parallels in the health arena, where misunderstandings about the application of HIPPA have

unnecessarily restricted information sharing. 

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In addition, the potential scope of the FISA authority may have been significantly expanded by other 

changes in the law. The statute prohibiting material support to terrorists, for example, was also broadened 

in the USA PATRIOT Act and is now being challenged in court as unconstitutionally vague and 

overbroad. If “material support” as broadly defined in that statute informs the FISA threshold that allows 

targeting of individuals who “knowingly aid and abet” individuals engaged in international terrorism, the 

scope of potential FISA targets has grown correspondingly. If constitutional challenges to the material 

support statute are upheld, they may call into question the legitimacy of the related FISA collection. 

Possible Recommendation:

Congress should carefully monitor the application of FISA as amended, particularly in light of the 

decision of the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review and changes in other laws, to ensure that the powers 

authorized still meet constitutional requirements and do not chill legitimate activity. 

Section 215 – Library Records

Another change to FISA contained in the USA PATRIOT Act that has been of particular concern to civil 

liberties advocates is the expanded authority to compel libraries, bookstores, schools, Internet service 

providers, retailers, and others to turn over information to the government. Section 215 of the PATRIOT 

Act amended FISA to give FBI the authority to seek an order from a FISA judge or magistrate requiring 

anyone served with such an order to turn over “any tangible things (including books, records papers, 

documents, and other items).” Prior to this amendment, this authority was limited to business records 

held by common carriers, hotels, storage facilities, or car rental companies. The provision as amended is 

not limited to businesses or business records but would apparently apply to tangible things held by any 

individual or entity. Its potential application to libraries and bookstores is what has prompted the greatest 

concern. 

The amendment makes several other changes to the provision. The original provision required that the 

information was being sought pursuant to an FBI investigation and that there were “specific and 

articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or 

an agent of a foreign power.” Neither of these requirements was carried over to the amended version. 

Applications seeking information on non-US persons need only be “to obtain foreign intelligence 

information.” 

However, if the information sought involves a US person, the amended provision can only be used if its 

purpose is to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities (espionage) and 

only if it is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the 

Constitution. Thus, a request to a library to turn over records indicating what books were checked out by 

a US person presumably would be justified if it were related to an international terrorism investigation—

generally a fairly relaxed standard. Moreover, as with the AG Guidelines on maintaining files, the bar on 

inquiries based “solely” upon protected activity—without a more definitive requirement for showing a 

connection to terrorism—provides limited protection. 

The records covered by Section 215 could have been sought prior to the USA PATRIOT Act by getting a 

subpoena from a grand jury. However, convening a grand jury requires a criminal predicate. Moreover, 

grand jury subpoenas would not necessarily enjoy the same level of secrecy imposed by Section 215. 

Possible Recommendations:

As suggested above, concerns about the application of Section 215 might be alleviated if a higher 

threshold were imposed to collect information directly related to First Amendment activity, in addition to

barring collection based solely on protected activity. For example, we know that some of the 9/11 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

highjackers used library computers prior to the attacks. If investigators pick up Internet activity that they

reasonably believe is related to terrorism and can identify that it came from a computer in a library during 

a certain time period on a certain day, it makes sense to give them authority to find out who used the 

library’s computers at that time. However, a significantly higher threshold, such as that required to 

monitor voice communications, should be required to give the government access to information on the 

content of that activity or what books someone checked out. 

More fundamentally, having a separate domestic intelligence collection agency might allow the FBI to 

return to a context in which a criminal predicate is once again a pre-requisite for law enforcement activity. 

It could also provide a clearer context in which to evaluate and address concerns that relate specifically to 

the collection of intelligence inside the Unites States, separate and apart from the issues related to what 

actions the government can take based on that information. Clarifying the distinction between 

intelligence collection authority and law enforcement power could also clarify oversight responsibility. 

Treatment of Immigrants

Because the terrorists involved in the attacks of September 11, like many of those involved in the first 

bombing of the World Trade Center, were non-citizens, terrorism prevention efforts have had a particular 

focus on the immigrant community. It is important to improve the nation’s ability to know who has 

entered or is attempting to enter this country. However, because enforcement of our immigration laws 

and policies has been so lax for so many years, there is an “enforcement deficit” that invites potential 

discrimination, or at least the perception of discriminatory treatment. Moreover, the complexity of 

immigration requirements and delays in processing paperwork means many people are unwittingly or 

unavoidably out of status at any given time. 

For example, in an effort to get a better understanding of foreigners already present in the country, the 

government has initiated a registration program. The numbers are too great to register all foreigners at 

once. Since the highjackers came from the Middle East and that is the ideological home of Al Qaeda, the 

decision was made to register visitors from those countries first. What has exacerbated concern over this 

disparate treatment is that a significant number of those showing up to register wound up being charged 

with immigration violations and, often, deported. As with the heightened scrutiny for suspicious activity

described above, the immigration violations were only detected because of the registration requirement. 

Thus, young Arab men were more likely to be caught and deported because of the decision to require 

them, as opposed to young men from other countries, to register. 

The opportunity to visit this country is a privilege rather than a right. Moreover, the ability of a country

to control who enters and lives in their country is a fundamental sovereign right. Thus, countries have 

wide latitude in setting immigration policies. Once an individual has entered the country, however, more 

rights begin to attach. The Supreme Court has said that virtually all of the constitutional protections 

apply to immigrants who have “substantial contacts” with this country. 

Moreover, as noted at the outset of this paper, because community relations can be an important element 

in preserving security, policies that pass constitutional muster may nevertheless have a negative impact on 

security if they undermine the sense that the system is fair and just. The objections of some in local law 

enforcement to suggestions that they should take a more active role in enforcing immigration laws, for 

example, reflect, in part, this concern about disrupting important community relations. 

Possible Recommendations:

One possible way to evaluate the rights of immigrants is to distinguish between the fundamental rights 

accorded to all people—what the founders referred to as unalienable rights—and the whole panoply of 

specific rights that are granted by virtue of the social compact between a government and those it governs. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

In the enemy combatants’ situation, for example, you might conclude that all detainees have basic rights 

against arbitrary detention or torture. Thus, the government must explain the basis for their detention. 

However, non-citizen/resident detainees may not have a right to challenge their detention in US courts. 

That right could be viewed as deriving from the social compact and therefore only available to US 

citizens or permanent residents. This is consistent with the way the Supreme Court has generally viewed 

these issues. 

As noted, however, security may actually be enhanced by adopting policies that are sensitive not just to

the legal rights of immigrants but also to the impact of those policies on the immigrants’ way of life, and 

thus on community relations. The “enforcement deficit” is difficult to address short of an overhaul of our 

immigration policies and enforcement resources. However, at a minimum, evaluations of the actions 

taken against immigrants as part of the effort to prevent another terrorist attack should include the security

costs of infringing on immigrant liberties and way of life. 

Conclusion 

As Justice Louis Brandeis observed, “Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the 

state was to make men free to develop their faculties....They valued liberty both as an end and as a 

means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.” 

If this nation can maintain the courage to preserve liberty in the face of terror, it will succeed in sustaining 

a long-term strategy that defeats the terrorists’ objectives. 

 

TAB—SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001

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TAB—SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS OF USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001 

(Reprinted from the National Security Law Reporter of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National

Security. Prepared by Dale Bosley, Stephen Kroll, Gordon Lederman, Joshua Levy, Michael Smith, and Suzanne Spaulding.) 

Title I – Enhancing Domestic Security Against Terrorism

• Establishes a Counterterrorism Fund to reimburse DOJ for costs incurred in counterterrorism efforts. 

• Authorizes $600 million over three years for the FBI’s Technical Support Center. 

• Sense of the Congress condemning discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans.

• Directs Secret Service to develop a national network of electronic crime task forces. 

• Provides for military support to law enforcement under certain emergency circumstances where required to 

enforce prohibition on use of chemical or biological weapons. 

• Expands President’s authority under IEPA to include any property subject to US jurisdiction, allow orders 

to block assets during an investigation, and provide for the confiscation of property of foreign persons, 

organizations, or countries determined to be involved in armed hostilities or attacks against the US. 

Title II -- Enhanced Surveillance Procedures 

• Seeks to significantly enhance the government’s ability to collect, analyze and share intelligence 

information concerning international terrorism.

• Amends Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 U.S.C. 2501 et seq.) (Title III) to: 

-provide new criminal statute predicates that would support an application for a warrant; 

-permit seizure of voice mail pursuant to a warrant; 

-permit the results of surveillances to be shared with intelligence agencies, subject to Attorney General 

 procedures if the information concerns a United States person; and 

-expand authority to intercept computer trespasser communications. 

• Amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) (FISA) to: 

-enable surveillances to be implemented against targets who attempt to thwart surveillance, e.g., by

switching phones, without going back to the Foreign Surveillance Court; 

-lengthen, in certain cases, the duration of initial surveillances and renewals; 

-broaden the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices “to protect against international terrorism or 

clandestine intelligence activities”; this authority may not be used against USP’s solely on the basis of 

activities that are protected by the First Amendment. A similar change is made to the FISA provision that 

permits access to records and other items; and 

-permit surveillance under FISA when foreign intelligence is “a significant purpose” rather than “the

purpose”. 

• Amends the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. 2701 et seq) to: 

-broaden the scope of subpoenas for records of electronic communications to cover internet sessions but not

the content of those sessions;

-permit emergency disclosure of electronic communications to protect life and limb; and

-permit nationwide service of warrants for electronic surveillance. 

• Modifies the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FCRP) to: 

- permit delayed notification of the execution of a warrant when the warrant prohibits a seizure and

disclosure may have an adverse result on the investigation ("sneak and peek"):

-expand the scope of court orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices to collect information on 

internet sessions but not including the content of those sessions; and 

-give nationwide effect to search warrants issued in terrorism investigations. 

• Enhances sharing of information between the intelligence and law enforcement communities through the 

change to Title III noted above and through a modification to Rule 6 (e) of FRCP to permit the passage of 

information obtained by a grand jury to any intelligence or national defense official provided it is “foreign

intelligence information” (a defined term). 

• Permits "aggrieved persons" to seek money damages in a civil action against the United States for improper 

disclosure of information obtained pursuant to FISA, ECPA and Title III. 

• Contains a sunset provision (December 31, 2005) for most of the changes to FISA and certain changes to 

ECPA and Title III. 

Title III - International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001 

• Seeks to increase significantly the strength of U.S. measures to prevent, detect, and prosecute international 

money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and to facilitate dissemination of financial information to

the intelligence community in connection with efforts to fight international terrorism.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

• Amends the Bank Secrecy Act (12 U.S.C. 1951-59 and 1829b, 31 U.S.C. 5311-5332) in a number of ways, 

most importantly to: 

-give the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with other senior government officials, authority to

impose one or more of five new “special” recordkeeping, reporting, and account restriction “measures” 

against foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions, transactions or types of accounts that the Secretary, 

after consultation with Secretary of State and the Attorney General, determines to be of a “primary money

laundering concern” to the United States. 

-require a U.S. financial institution that maintains a correspondent account or private banking account for a 

non-United States person to establish appropriate, specific, and, where necessary, enhanced due diligence 

procedures that are reasonably designed to detect and report instances of money laundering. 

-mandate additional, more specific controls and monitoring for accounts opened by offshore banks or banks

from countries with substandard money laundering controls and for private banking accounts, especially 

those potentially owned by foreign political figures.

-bar any depository institution or registered broker-dealer operating in the United States from establishing, 

maintaining, administering, or managing a correspondent account in the United States for a foreign “shell” 

or “brass plate” bank, i.e., a bank that does not have “a physical presence in any country.” 

-require foreign banks with U.S. accounts to appoint U.S. agents for service of process in connection with

records relating to U.S. account transactions, and require the closing of any such account upon notice from

the Department of Justice or Treasury that a subpoena served on such agent has not been either complied 

with or challenged. 

-require issuance within one year of regulations for uniform identity verification requirements for U.S. 

nationals opening financial institution accounts, and ask Treasury to recommend within six months similar 

requirements (and perhaps a uniform identification number system) for non-United States nationals 

opening such accounts. 

-mandate a “law of the U.S.” solution to disputes involving forfeitures of funds in interbank accounts. 

• 

• Amends the Right to Financial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C. 3401

-require financial institutions in the U.S. to set up anti-money laundering programs. 

-require issuance by July 1, 2002, of regulations requiring reporting by securities broker-dealers of 

suspicious transactions. 

-clarify application of the Bank Secrecy Act to underground banking and money transmission systems. 

• Amends Title 18 in a number of ways, most importantly to:

-add a number of “specified unlawful activities,” including corruption directed at foreign governments, 

support for designated terrorist organizations, and criminal export control violations, to the criminal 

money laundering statutes. 

-make banks that do not operate in the U.S. subject to the extraterritorial jurisdiction provisions of the 

criminal money laundering statutes. 

Amends the purpose and disclosure provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act to include as a statutory purpose

the preservation of records and dissemination of required reports “for use in the conduct of intelligence and

counter-intelligence activities, including analysis, to protect against international terrorism.”

et seq.)(the “RFPA”): 

- to permit records obtained pursuant to the RFPA’s terms by one agency (e.g., a law enforcement agency) 

to be transferred to another agency if the records are relevant to an “intelligence or counterintelligence 

activity, investigation or analysis related to international terrorism,” as well as to a law enforcement 

inquiry (as under existing law). 

-to extend existing special RFPA procedures for requesting records relevant to counter-intelligence or

foreign-positive intelligence inquiries, and protective function inquiries, to requests from “a government

authority authorized to conduct investigations of, or intelligence or counterintelligence analyses related to, 

international terrorism” for the purpose thereof. 

-to permit records obtained by grand jury subpoena to be used for one of the purposes for which RFPA

contains such special procedures.

• Amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.) to require consumer reporting agencies to

furnish information to “a government agency authorized to conduct investigations of, or intelligence or 

counterintelligence activities or analysis related to, international terrorism,” upon receipt of an appropriate

certification from that agency. 

• Requires the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations, within 120 days of the date of enactment, to

encourage cooperation among financial institutions, financial regulators and law enforcement officials, and 

to permit the sharing of information by law enforcement and regulatory authorities with such institutions

regarding persons reasonably suspected, based on credible evidence, of engaging in terrorist acts or money

laundering activities. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

• Allows (with notice to the Secretary of the Treasury) the sharing of information among banks involving

possible terrorist or money laundering

Title IV – Protecting the Border 

• For the Canadian border, triples INS-personnel, increases facilities supporting them, and improves 

monitoring technology.

• Requires DOJ to provide INS and State access to data on visa-applicants’ criminal histories. 

• Requires Attorney General and the Secretary of State to create identity-confirming technology for aliens, 

within two years.

• Requires the Attorney General to report to Congress on the feasibility of enhancing the fingerprinting system

used for those aliens entering or exiting the U.S.

• Bars admission of aliens who endorsed or espoused terrorist activities, persuaded others to support terrorist

activities or terrorist organizations, or are influential members of groups whose public endorsement of

terrorism has undermined the U.S.-effort to fight terrorism.

• Broadens definition of “engaged in terrorist activity” to include providing material support or 

encouragement to groups that the individual knew or should have known were terrorist organizations. 

• Mandates detention of aliens that the AG certifies as threats to national security, but must charge with

criminal or immigration offenses within seven days, in which case detention may continue for six months 

unless found removable, in which case detention continues until removed or no longer a threat; allows 

limited judicial review in DC Circuit. 

• Gives the Secretary of State discretion to share visa lookout database information and other records on aliens 

with reciprocating countries. 

• Authorizes appropriations for AG’s rapid and full implementation of integrated exit and entry data system

for airports, seaports, and land ports of entry.

• Authorizes AG to collect information from flight schools, language schools, and other vocational schools on

alien students in the same manner in which AG can collect information on alien students in higher 

educational institutions. 

• Requires SecState to monitor checking of passports and issuing of consular visas. 

• Creates special immigrant status for certain aliens, whose relatives have lived in the U.S. before September

11, 2001 and whose same relatives died as a result of a terrorist attack. Neither this status nor any other

government benefit shall be conferred to relatives of the terrorists. 

Title V – Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism

• Authorizes the Attorney General, and broadens the Secretary of State’s authority, to pay rewards to combat 

terrorism. 

• Authorizes officials engaged in FISA surveillance to consult with Federal law enforcement officers to

coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against specified threats from a foreign power or an agent of a 

foreign power, such as an actual or potential attack, sabotage or international terrorism, or clandestine 

intelligence activities. 

• Gives the Secret Service concurrent authority with FBI to investigate cyber-terrorism crimes against 

government computers. 

• Authorizes an Assistant Attorney General to obtain a court order for the purpose of collecting educational

records that are relevant to the investigation or prosecution of a grave felony or terrorism. 

• Allows FBI Deputy Assistant Director or higher (or Special Agent in Charge) to issue National Security 

Letters for telephone toll and transaction records, financial records, and consumer reports. 

Title VI – Providing for Victims of Terrorism, Public Safety Officers, and Families 

• Expedites government payments to beneficiaries of public safety workers who were catastrophically injured

or killed in connection with the prevention, investigation, rescue, or recovery effort related to a terrorist

attack. 

• Increases death benefits for such workers’ beneficiaries from $100,000 to $250,000. 

• Enlarges the fund for victims of terrorist acts and their beneficiaries. Creates fund to compensate response to 

September 11, 2001 events.

Title VII – Increased Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Protection 

• Authorizes $150 million over the next two years for DOJ to establish secure information sharing systems with

state and local law enforcement entities to enhance investigation and prosecution of multi-jurisdictional 

terrorist conspiracies and activities. 

Title VIII—Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism 

• Expands criminal sanctions to include possession of biological agents, toxins, or delivery systems for other 

than, or of a type or quantity not justified for, peaceful purposes. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

• Adds special penalties for criminal possession of biological materials by “restricted persons” defined to

include fugitives, illegal aliens, felons, and others. 

• Expands definition of domestic terrorism to include “mass destruction” ands requires intent to intimidate or

coerce civilian populace or to influence government policy or conduct. 

• Adds a list of specified crimes to definition of ``federal crime of terrorism'' in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B)

(which already contains a requirement that the activity “is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of

government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct”). 

• Adds terrorism crimes listed in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B) as predicates under RICO. 

• Makes it a crime to engage in terrorist attacks on mass transportation systems. 

• Adds special penalties for harboring or concealing persons known or reasonably believed to be terrorists. 

• Expands authority to go against all assets used to support, plan, conduct or conceal acts of domestic or 

international terrorism.

• Extends statute of limitations to bring indictments in noncapital terrorist offenses (8 years) and capital 

terrorist offenses (no time limit). 

• Provides that parties to a conspiracy to commit certain terrorism offenses may be punished to the same extent

as actual perpetrators. 

• Expresses Sense of Congress encouraging intelligence relationships with terrorists. 

• Increases maximum penalties for terrorism offenses including “for any term of years or for life” in capital 

cases. 

• Defines threshold damages for acts of cyberterrorism as $5000, physical injury, threat to public health or

safety, or damage of any kind to a government computer system used in administration of justice, national

defense or national security. 

• Authorizes $50 million annually to enable the Attorney General to establish regional computer forensic

laboratories to assist in defense against cyberterrorism. 

Title IX – Improved Intelligence 

• Gives DCI explicit authority to establish requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence (FI) collection 

under FISA and work with the AG to ensure dissemination.

• Requires AG, in consultation with DCI, to develop guidelines to ensure (1) prompt disclosure to the DCI of

FI acquired during a criminal investigation and (2) timely notice to DCI of decision whether to commence a 

criminal investigation based on information provided by the DCI to DOJ regarding possible criminal activity 

by a current or potential FI source. 

• Directs AG and DCI to develop a program to train appropriate federal, state, and local officials to identify FI 

that may be encountered in the course of their official duties.

• Requires a report from the AG, DCI, and Secretary of Treasury on feasibility and desirability of reconfiguring

current foreign asset tracking and control entities so as to improve analysis and dissemination of FI related to

terrorist financing. 

• Requires a report on the establishment of a virtual translation center within the intelligence community. 

Title X—Miscellaneous 

• Requires the DOJ Inspector General to designate an official to receive complaints alleging abuses of civil

rights and liberties by DOJ employees and submit reports to Congress. 

• Defines ``electronic surveillance'' in FISA to exclude the acquisition of computer trespassers' 

communications. 

• Endeavors to enhance states and local governments' ability to respond to and prevent terrorism through

various DOJ grant programs. 

• Requires FBI to report to Congress on feasibility of providing airlines with names of passengers who are 

suspected to be terrorists. 

• Enhances statutes making it unlawful to fraudulently solicit charitable contributions. 

• Requires determination by Transportation Secretary that licensee poses no security risk before states can issue 

licenses to transport hazardous materials. 

• Establishes National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center in DOD to protect United States' critical 

infrastructure from terrorist attacks.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

APPENDIX F–BURDEN SHARING* 

Background 

Objectives

 

For a number of years the Federal government has been concerned with the ability of states and localities 

to adequately deal with terrorist incidents involving chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. This 

concern over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) prompted the U.S. Congress and the President in 1998 

to establish the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (the “Gilmore Commission”).73 One of the Gilmore Commission’s

specific charges is to “assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for incidents 

involving weapons of mass destruction.” 

 

Grant programs are frequently used as Federal tools for improving State and local response capabilities 

for WMD incidents. Some programs target specific local-responder groups (e.g., law enforcement, 

emergency medical services, public health agencies) or specific categories of need (e.g., equipment, 

training, overtime). Other programs fund activities that span multiple areas. Regardless of their scope, 

grant programs provide State and local jurisdictions with tangible incentives and assistance to undertake 

actions to increase preparedness. 

But Federal grant programs can be structured in various ways. For example, some programs use 

competitive project grants, where applicants compete against one another for funding, while others use 

formula grants, where agencies allocate predetermined amounts of funding to jurisdictions. Some grant 

programs require matching funds while others do not. And some grant programs distribute money

directly to localities while others pass funding to localities through the states. How these Federal 

programs are structured, or alternatively how these programs share responsibilities between Federal, 

State, and local authorities, can affect how successful they are at achieving Federal goals for national 

WMD preparedness. 

In support of the Gilmore Commission’s work, this paper provides a cursory examination of issues 

involving burden sharing between the Federal, State, and local governments for WMD preparedness. 

This research draws on the theoretical literature in economics and political science, the applied literature 

in public policy, and on interviews conducted with Federal and State program administrators. The paper 

attempts to inform the following question: If the Federal government provides financial grants to states 

and localities to enhance specific aspects of local-responder capabilities, how might elements of the 

program’s design support or hinder the Federal government’s efforts?74 

Specifically, we looked at the three major elements that vary across Federal grant programs generally. 

These include: 

• the flow of funds from the Federal government to local responders (i.e., whether or not funds 

pass through the States); 

• how funds are allocated (i.e., through formula grants or project grants); and 

73 Established in section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261. 74 This report defines local responders broadly as law enforcement, firefighters, emergency medical services, emergency 

management operations, hospitals, and public health agencies. However, the report only considers grant programs for local 

responders generically. That is, it does not address differences in the ways that different local-responder communities have 

traditionally been funded. 

* Justin Adams, Ph.D. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

• the requirements for State or local funding funds, particularly State and local matching funds 

and maintenance of effort; 

And we examined the main ways in which they affect achievement of Federal goals for WMD 

preparedness:

• the level and/or quality of preparedness activities provided by local-responder jurisdictions; 

• the strength of coordination across the different levels of government; 

• the geographic distribution of funds across local-responder jurisdictions; 

• the administration of the program; 

• and, innovation in States and localities. 

Insights gained from this research can help the Federal government design more efficient and effective 

local-responder grant programs. Given the disparity between the funding available for improving WMD 

response capabilities and the nationwide need, this is particularly important. The Council on Foreign 

Relations (2003), for example, estimates that the U.S. will fall approximately $98.4 billion short of 

meeting critical emergency responder needs under current Federal, State, and local funding levels. 

Consequently, it is imperative that the Federal government stretches every dollar for local responders to 

the greatest extent possible. 

Review Of Studies 

There are a number of reasons why the Federal government might be motivated to provide funds to local 

responders for WMD preparedness rather than rely solely on State and local efforts:

government has access to a wider range of revenue sources; as Zycher (2003) points out, the Federal 

government has relatively greater taxing power over businesses and individuals than the States and 

localities and it can borrow money to finance consumption rather than investment. The Federal 

government can help facilitate preparedness for and responses to terrorist incidents with adverse impacts 

that spill across neighboring communities and neighboring States. Additionally, the Federal government 

might have a greater interest in ensuring equal levels of preparedness (or instead minimal levels) across 

the country. And, the Federal government might want to regulate State or local preparedness efforts; 

Federal funds provide it a substantial amount of leverage over recipients. 

 

75 The Federal 

In light of these possible motives for Federal funding, this report addresses the question of how the 

structure of grant programs might support Federal efforts to enhance WMD preparedness. That is, it 

examines the design elements of Federal programs for local responders and the mechanisms by which 

they impact local preparedness. 

With respect to design elements, we examined the three major elements that vary across Federal grant 

programs:76

• Flow of Federal funds. Program funds can flow directly from the Federal government to local 

jurisdictions. In this case the Federal government maintains responsibility for selecting 

recipients and allocating funds. Alternatively, program funds can flow first to State 

governments who then pass this money through to local jurisdictions. Here, States have the 

75 There are also reasons why the Federal government might not rely solely on the private sector to provide sufficient levels of

WMD preparedness nationwide. WMD preparedness activities are collective goods, meaning that their benefits go to society as a 

whole rather than to particular individuals. As such, these preparedness activities are likely to be underprovided by the free

market relative to an economically efficient level, since individuals are less likely to pay for activities that provide benefits from 

which they cannot be excluded. And one way of mitigating these problems is through Federal subsidies. For a more complete 

discussion see Zycher (1993). 76 Other related analyses have looked at these elements as well. See Canada (July 8, 2003), for example. 

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responsibility for selecting recipients and allocating funds subject to Federal guidelines. 

• Allocation of Federal funds. Program funds can be allocated to local responders through

competitive project grants or instead allocated on the basis of formulas. Under programs with 

competitive grants, eligible local responders apply to a Federal agency for funds, and money is

awarded on the strength of their applications. Under programs with formula grants, the 

responsible Federal or State agency allocates funding based on factors such as population or 

need (however need is defined); formulas could be specified in statute or determined by the 

appropriate agency. 

• Requirements for State or local funding. As a condition of receiving funds, Federal programs 

sometimes require that State or local jurisdictions spend some amount of their own money on 

the desired activity. One type of requirement is for State or local matching funds, which are 

predetermined recipient contributions. A fire department that uses Federal funds to purchase 

equipment, for example, might be required to match 30 percent of the Federal award. A 

second type of requirement is for State or local maintenance of effort, which requires that 

recipients maintain a specified level of State or local expenditure as a condition of a grant 

award. In cases where Federal programs provide funding to help recipient jurisdictions 

augment their existing and locally funded activities, maintenance-of-effort requirements 

prevent recipients from simply supplanting local funds with Federal funds. 

Federal efforts at enhancing WMD preparedness are broad and wide-ranging. They include facilitating 

the purchase of equipment for local responders, providing resources for education and training, fostering 

improved communication between local-responder communities, and assisting State and local planning 

efforts. In this report, we considered five general goals that Federal programs might focus on to enhance 

WMD preparedness: 

• Strengthening coordination across different levels of government. Given the multitude of

local-responder communities and the central planning capabilities of the States and the 

Federal government, the Federal government might want to improve WMD preparedness by

strengthening the degree of coordination across levels of government. In this case, the 

Federal government can structure a particular grant program to encourage or require 

coordination and cooperation by recipients. For example, a program could have funds flow 

through the States rather than directly to localities to ensure that local efforts are consistent 

with statewide needs. 

• Enhancing the level and/or quality of preparedness activities by local responders. Federal 

programs might have the goal of enhancing the WMD preparedness activities of State and 

local governments by providing them with new or additional resources. Programs then can 

utilize design elements to ensure that States and localities employ these resources to increase 

the amount or types of preparedness activities undertaken, or improve the quality of their 

activities. For example, if the Federal government is interested in getting local governments 

to do more of a locally funded activity, it could incorporate a maintenance-of-effort 

requirement that prohibits the redirection of funds. 

• Improving the geographic distribution of funds across local-responder jurisdictions. 

Depending on its intended purpose, a Federal program targets one or more local-responder 

groups to help them address some need, such as building the capability to handle a specific 

threat. The Federal government then could have a goal of improving the distribution of funds

by better targeting relevant jurisdictions. For example, if the Federal government wanted to 

provide a base level of funding to all communities with a particular need, the grant program

could employ a formula to allocate funding appropriately. 

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• Improving the administration of Federal grant programs. The Federal government might 

have as a goal improving WMD preparedness by ensuring that Federal grant programs are 

administered effectively and efficiently. Federal officials, for example, may desire to have 

local jurisdictions receive funds as quickly as possible. They may also want assurances that 

programs are managed well, with a minimum of administrative costs and where localities 

spend funding only on eligible activities that are part of a coherent plan. 

• Encouraging innovation in States and localities. Because local-responder communities are 

closer to WMD threats and in many cases know their own needs better than the Federal and 

State governments, the Federal government might have as a goal to increase the flexibility

and innovation of local jurisdictions. As such, the Federal government could design Federal 

programs to limit restrictions on the acceptable uses of funds, for example by utilizing block 

grants. 

This discussion of possible Federal preparedness goals is not to suggest that this set of goals is 

exhaustive. There could be others, although the five listed appear to be the most relevant for enhancing 

State and local WMD preparedness efforts. Nor is this discussion to suggest that Federal programs

support preparedness efforts in each of the five ways. Some of these goals conflict might with one 

another; a program that encourages strong coordination between the States and localities, for example, 

could limit local flexibility and innovation. But this list of ways that Federal goals could potentially 

influence State and local behavior conveniently frames the discussion for the reviews of studies on 

intergovernmental aid and the three Federal programs that follow. 

Enhancing The Level And Quality Of Local Efforts 

Discerning the impact of program design elements (i.e., the flow of funds, the allocation of funds, and 

State and local funding requirements) on the ability of the Federal government to help enhance the level 

and/or quality of local-responder preparedness efforts requires the examination of two issues. The first is 

whether the Federal government can influence State and local jurisdictions in a meaningful way so that 

they take action to enhance their response capabilities. That is, do Federal local-responder programs

designed to achieve specific objectives actually serve as inducements for these communities to undertake 

activities that they may not have otherwise? The second is the magnitude of this impact on State and 

local behavior and how it changes over time. These issues are addressed in turn. 

Incentives for Higher State and Local Spending 

Unlike legislative mandates that require specific behavior by States and localities, Federal grants simply

provide incentives to communities and expand their resources. Certainly it is true that States and locals 

must undertake specified actions on the condition of accepting Federal money. But they could decide not 

to participate in these programs, and recipients always retain the ability to opt out of Federal programs 

should they choose to do so. Given that Federal grants serve only as inducements, it is conceivable then 

that Federal influence over State and local actions could be minor, especially when Federal funding levels 

are low. 

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Federal government is in fact able to exert sizeable influence over 

States and localities, however. And some studies on State and local responses to Federal spending 

generally support this notion as well. Welch and Thompson (1980), for example, examined 57 State 

public policies to see how Federal incentives impacted the spread of new policies across the States. 

Specifically, they analyzed whether State public policies that were exposed to “positive” Federal 

incentives (i.e., the provision of funding) or “negative” Federal incentives (i.e., the threat of depriving 

States of existing funding) hastened their adoption in all 50 States. They found that Federal incentives 

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stimulate policy diffusion significantly regardless of the policy area, and that direct fiscal aid stimulates 

causes more States to adopt policies earlier.77 

Hofferbert and Urice (1985) examined Federal funding for the arts. They showed how the creation of the 

National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) in 1965, and its subsequent formula and competitive grants to 

the States, spurred State spending on the arts: In 1967, the States other than New York appropriated a 

combined $505,000 to their respective arts agencies, but by 1974 this figure (including New York) totaled 

$33 million and by 1980 it reached $96 million. This nationwide investment came despite the fact that 

the arts represented only a minor policy area with a small constituency. 

Nathan and Doolittle (1985) studied the growth and decline in Federal aid from the 1960s to the early

1980s. They found that as Federal aid to the States and locals was cut under President Reagan, local 

jurisdictions were generally much less likely than the States to replace these programs with local ones. 

Although local jurisdictions occasionally lobbied the States to create replacement programs, this 

nevertheless suggests that outside funding can cause localities to undertake activities that they would not 

otherwise. 

 

These studies suggest that Federal local-responder programs can affect State and local decisions, but an 

important issue is the magnitude of this impact over time. Public choice theory suggests that the impact 

of Federal programs on State and local behavior could be small: Communities can provide different levels 

of public services, and voters have some choice over the community in which to reside and the level of 

public services provided by their community, so one would expect that over time the public programs 

provided by a locality would coincide with local preferences for those programs. If this is the case, 

Federal grants (in particular unrestricted lump-sum grants) might have little impact on States and 

localities; local officials, following the desires of their taxpaying constituents, could return a similar 

amount of non-Federal revenue back to them.

78

In contrast with this theory, a substantial literature on intergovernmental grants shows that Federal aid has 

significant and large stimulative effects on local spending (see Gramlich, 1977). These effects occur 

whether the Federal funding comes as categorical grants or instead as unrestricted lump-sum grants. For 

unrestricted lump-sum grants in particular, the stimulative effects are often referred to as ‘flypaper 

effects’, meaning that money seems to stick to wherever it hits. Studies by Logan (1986), Aronson and 

Munley (1994), and Hines and Thaler (1995), all attempted to explain away the empirical findings of 

higher State and local spending as an artifact, but they were unable to do so. 

Stein (1984) found that flypaper effects exist not just with respect to local spending, but also with respect 

to municipal public employment. He found that municipalities take a “wait and see” approach with 

Federal aid, where cities initially resist hiring new employees because they see this assistance as 

temporary and because it is typically difficult to eliminate government positions once they have been 

filled. Over time, however, municipalities eventually give in as they begin to consider Federal aid as a 

permanent source of revenue. 

Thus, the literature indicates that Federal grant programs can stimulate State and local spending 

significantly, and that this is the case even when Federal funding has no restrictions. This suggests that if 

the Federal government added restrictions to its grant programs such as State and local matching 

requirements, maintenance-of-effort requirements, and categorical grants, it could stimulate State and 

local behavior even further. Matching requirements and maintenance-of-effort requirements would help 

77 However, they also found that the speed of diffusion still remains lengthy. Federally affected policies took an average of 13.7

years to diffuse across 50% of the States and 29.7 years to diffuse across 100 percent of the States. For policies not impacted by

Federal incentives, the averages were 23.5 years and 50.1 years, respectively. It should be noted, however, that Welch and

Thomson’s dataset encompassed policies that dated only to the 1970s. 78 This assumes, of course, that local bureaucrats do not have their own individual motivations, such as to maximize local agency

expenditures regardless of whether the money is Federal or non-Federal. 

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ensure that the States and localities maintain at least some minimum level of contributions, and 

categorical grants would tend to limit the ability of States and localities to redirect funds. 

However, there is a potential downside to the stimulative effects of Federal programs. State and local 

jurisdictions can become dependent on Federal aid while at the same time having no control over it. So

when grants for activities terminate, States and localities are faced with having to cut services or assume

local responsibility for these programs. Levine and Posner (1981) also point out that during revenue 

downturns, States and localities are more likely to cut or eliminate entirely local programs in order to 

maintain matching funds in the federally subsidized programs. As a result, this dependence could skew 

the portfolio of services provided at the State and local level. Thus, locally-supported responder 

programs not subsidized by the Federal government might be cut over time, and the portfolio of

preparedness programs could be distorted and overall preparedness could even be adversely impacted. 

Supplanting State and Local Funding

Over the longer term, an issue is whether State and local spending for preparedness can be sustained. 

Generally, sustainment refers to whether the States and localities take “ownership” of programs so that 

they do not terminate if Federal funding ends. To address this, the GAO (2003) and Posner (The Nelson 

A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2003) raised the possibility of a Federal “seed money” approach. 

An issue opposite to that of flypaper effects is supplantation. Supplantation occurs when the States and 

localities use new Federal money simply to replace their own funding for existing activities, thereby 

freeing up State and local funds for other things including tax reduction. Supplantation is particularly

relevant when a Federal program comes in the form of a block grant, where recipients receive large 

amounts of funding that have few restrictions as to their use. So two natural questions are how much 

supplantation typically occurs with Federal programs, and how can Federal programs be structured to 

mitigate it? 

Ellwood and Boyd (2000) saw relatively little evidence of supplantation from their investigation of the 

Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program in the aftermath of welfare reform. In looking 

at whether the States in their study (California, Georgia, Missouri, and Wisconsin) spent more Federal 

money and less State money on social services than they did prior to welfare reform, Ellwood and Boyd

generally found that this was not the case although they did find some instances of supplantation in 

specific areas. 

The GAO (1996, 2003) noted in their reports on Federal grants and homeland security that, with respect 

to the studies they examined, every additional Federal grant dollar resulted in about 60 cents of

supplantation on average. In other words every Federal dollar generated only about 40 cents more in 

combined (Federal, State and local) spending. This finding was especially true with respect to block 

grants received by public programs with prior State and local involvement. 

The GAO discussed how a number of program characteristics could help to mitigate supplantation. It 

noted that restrictive Federal programs such as categorical grants could limit the ability to redirect funds 

relative to unrestrictive programs such as block grants, since recipients could only supplant funds within 

the specific category. Second, it pointed out that providing Federal matching funds also helps maintain 

State and local spending, because in these cases Federal funds act to effectively reduce the price of an 

activity to the citizens of the States and thereby encourage States and localities to “purchase” more of it; 

here Federal matches could be capped at a specified total dollar amount or instead remain open ended. 

And it noted that maintenance-of-effort requirements could help to maintain State and local spending. 

But with respect to homeland security, the GAO asserted that maintenance-of-effort requirements could 

potentially penalize the communities that took the initiative after September 11, 2001 to increase their 

own preparedness spending; these communities would be required to maintain a higher level of spending 

than communities that did nothing. 

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Here, the Federal government would encourage sustained State and local spending by offering an initial 

Federal match and lowering the match over time. This would allow State and local governments to 

gradually adjust their budgets over time to accommodate spending on preparedness activities.

Some studies advocate that the States play a key role in resolving the needs of local jurisdictions with the 

desires of the Federal government. Kettl (The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2003), for 

example, argued that coordination of local-responder efforts is unlikely to happen on its own, and that 

State governments could promote and nurture this coordination. Given that the types of problems faced 

vary from State to State as well as the responses needed, he argued that coordination at the State level 

would be preferable to coordination by the Federal government. Accordingly, he concluded that

intergovernmental aid for homeland security should come in the form of Federal block grants to the 

States, where the Federal government sets minimum national standards for preparedness and the States 

have wide discretion to allocate funding to local governments. 

Improving Coordination Among Levels of Government 

Many describe local communities as being on the front lines for responding to terrorist incidents 

involving WMD. At the same time, the Federal government has significant resources, and both the 

Federal and State governments have substantial central planning capabilities. Consequently, many studies

on homeland security conclude that strong coordination and collaboration between Federal, State, and 

local governments are needed. 

One way to strengthen intergovernmental coordination and cooperation is to require that funding from

Federal grant programs flow through the States to the localities. The Gilmore Commission in its third 

report (2001) and again in its fourth report (2002) recommended that all Federal funding and grant 

programs be coordinated through the States. It asserted that scarce Federal money that is used to improve 

local capabilities should be used to complement State plans and requirements and, importantly, should be 

subject to a level of prioritization that the States can provide. 

However, passing Federal funds through the States can potentially have some negative consequences for 

WMD preparedness. Delegating Federal responsibility for the allocation of funding to the States could 

result in the States choosing recipients that are more consistent with State prerogatives than Federal goals. 

It could also result in funding being disbursed to local jurisdictions in a less than timely fashion or being 

withheld entirely. To help mitigate these consequences, the Gilmore Commission (2002) concluded that 

as a general rule of thumb, States should not withhold more than 25 percent of Federal funds that are 

intended to improve State and/or local response capabilities. The Commission also concluded that 

activities where funding is available for joint State and local efforts, the States should withhold no more 

funding than the percentage of State effort. 

The U.S. Conference of Mayors (2003) argued against passing Federal funds through the States for 

similar reasons. It asserted that States traditionally (and mistakenly) viewed counties as the focal points 

of emergency and disaster response rather than cities. Moreover, it asserted that States receiving Federal 

pass-through funds would dilute and delay funding intended for local responders. 

But it should be noted that the flow of funding is not the only mechanism by which the Federal 

government can facilitate increased coordination and cooperation. The Federal government could, for 

example, allocate funds to localities itself but mandate that the States and localities engage in particular 

behavior such as having States sign off on local projects. Or the Federal government could develop 

standards to promote cooperation. As Thomas (1979) pointed out, coordination describes both a process 

and a goal. It requires that the various participants develop a consensus over the objectives to be obtained 

and the means to use. 

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Improving the Geographic Distribution of Funds

 

The next issue pertains to whether a Federal program can be structured so that it better targets local 

jurisdictions in need, however need is determined by the program.

79 That is, can program design elements 

improve the ability of Federal funding to make its way to the local-responder communities that need it 

most to better stretch scarce Federal dollars? 

There are two approaches to answering this question. The first examines the responsiveness of the 

Federal government in trying to allocate funding to where the need exists (supply side of Federal 

programs). The second examines whether needy communities seek out Federal funding (demand side of 

Federal programs). 

Pushing Funding to Needy Communities 

Depending on the specific WMD preparedness goals the Federal government is trying to achieve, it might 

want to selectively target communities in need. Such programs might draw on the Federal government’s 

private information or on its unique analytical skills (e.g., threat assessments) to push money where it is 

needed the most. 

One issue in pushing funding to needy communities is that determining a community’s actual “need” in 

the face of a given threat can be difficult. There are often a number of possible objective and subjective 

metrics that Federal agencies can use to measure a community’s level of preparedness. For example, in 

the context of prioritizing funds for WMD preparedness in urban areas, a community’s need could be 

measured by its population, its population density, its number of special sites, its economic importance, or 

by other metrics. Using one metric (or more) over another could result in a different ranking of need, and 

determining which metric(s) is most appropriate to use for a given threat is not always straightforward. 

This remains problematic whether an agency is devising a funding formula for a program or instead 

deciding how to rank applications for competitively funded awards. 

Once communities have been ranked according to some measure of need, a second issue that emerges is 

whether funds actually get allocated to the communities with the greatest needs or are spread more

broadly. Political pressures can influence which jurisdictions receive funding under formula allocations, 

whether the formulas are determined by agencies or are specified in statute, so that some less needy

communities obtain funding. Similarly, communities with lesser needs can attempt to lobby agencies 

over the awarding of competitive grants. 

The studies reviewed show a decidedly mixed picture with respect to the Federal government’s ability to 

design programs that effectively allocate funding according to need. In other words, these studies tend to 

show weak correlations between the jurisdictions that needed funding under programs and the 

jurisdictions that got it. Importantly, even in instances where the Federal government appeared 

responsive to local needs, the States appeared to be more responsive. This might suggest a benefit from

having Federal funds flow through the States. However, it should be stressed that in these studies 

researchers often developed their own ways in which to measure need. So conclusions about the 

effectiveness of Federal programs are in essence statements of how well these programs measured up 

against researchers’ estimates of need. 

In one study, Dye and Hurley (1978) examined total Federal outlays (primarily for housing, economic 

opportunity, and health, education and welfare) during the late 1960s and early 1970s to 243 central cities 

79 Depending on the grant program, need could be defined narrowly or broadly. A program to enhance port security, 

for example, might define needy communities as only those coastal jurisdictions immediately adjacent to water, 

resulting in a limited set of eligible applicants. On the other hand, a firefighter preparedness program might

encompass all jurisdictions with paid or volunteer firefighters and result in a far larger set of eligible applicants. 

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with populations of at least 50,000. They found that differences in city demographic measures could 

explain only about 15 to 22 percent of the variation in Federal per capita funding to these cities, so they

concluded that Federal outlays were generally unrelated to urban needs and resources. In comparing 

Federal grants-in-aid to State grants-in-aid for these same cities, they found higher correlations between 

State funding and city demographic measures, and thus concluded that State grants-in-aid generally were 

more responsive than Federal grants-in-aid to the needs of the cities.80 

Dye and Hurley’s study was criticized on methodological grounds, particularly because they used per 

capita funding figures rather than total allocations; some argued that using per capita figures is 

inappropriate because legislators do not make decisions over funding allocations in this way. Pelissero 

(1984) attempted to test some of Dye and Hurley’s conclusions taking these critiques into account. 

Pelissero analyzed the total intergovernmental funding from the States to the 47 largest cities (with 1970 

populations of at least 300,000) for the years 1962 and 1976 after controlling for city population. He still 

found consistent correlations between State aid and common city demographic measures, and concluded 

that States were responsive to the needs of cities. 

In the area of education, Pelissero and Morgan (1992) examined 1982 data for over 13,500 independent 

school districts to determine whether the Federal or State governments were better at targeting aid to local 

schools with social, economic, or fiscal hardships. Pelissero and Morgan saw little evidence that either 

the Federal or State government targets school aid according to socioeconomic need, finding little 

correlation between aid and demographic measures of need. They instead found some evidence that 

intergovernmental aid is driven mostly by enrollment, particularly at the State level. 

And in the area of homeland security, the GAO (October 2, 1998; November 1998) commented on the 

inefficiencies in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program that resulted from poorly

specified Federal funding formulas. The Domestic Preparedness Program was intended to enhance 

domestic response capabilities for incidents involving WMD, and the Department of Defense (DoD) as 

the lead agency chose to allocate funding to cities based on core city populations. Because the DoD used 

population measures rather than assessments of city preparedness, financial ability, and threats, the GAO 

concluded that the DoD was potentially wasting program funds by insufficiently tying funding to local 

needs. For example, it could be replicating training in nearby cities that might be part of the same

response system or mutual aid area, or providing assistance to communities with a smaller threat risk over 

those with a larger threat risk. 

 

Although this last example illustrated a problem with funding formulas, it is not to suggest that using 

competitive grants is necessarily better at targeting communities in need. Just as a Federal (or possibly

State) agency would have to define a specific formula under a formula funding program, it would have to

define specific eligibility and application criteria under a competitive grant program. Thus inefficiencies 

could arise under either setting. 

Encouraging Communities to Apply for Funding 

The general literature on intergovernmental aid suggests that Federal assistance does not just find its way 

to communities in need. Instead, localities typically must demonstrate both entrepreneurial spirit as well 

as a strong capacity for planning in order to obtain Federal aid. These can be beneficial qualities for local 

jurisdictions to have, since they help to ensure that grant awards are used effectively. 

Saltzstein (1977) studied whether differences in the amounts of financial aid received by cities are best 

explained by social and economic need or by the attitudes and practices of local decision makers. He 

80 The State funding they examined typically included Federal funding that passed through the States that could affect the level of 

State responsiveness, but they also noted that this should not necessarily make the State more responsive than Federal direct 

grants. 

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analyzed Federal assistance from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the 

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to cities in Texas with populations from 50,000 to 

300,000 and a council-manager form of government between 1971 and 1973 (20 cities). He found no 

support for the notion that communities with more social and economic need received more funding, but 

he did find that funding by the LEAA was highly correlated with the effort exerted by the city manager to 

receive funds. 

 

Stein (1979) analyzed the factors that drive communities to apply for Federal grants. Looking at 145

communities in southeastern Wisconsin, he found that communities with clear need and significant 

planning resources tended to seek Federal assistance, but that communities with low levels of fiscal 

capacity and little support for planning activities tend not to apply, despite the fact that they are often the 

intended beneficiaries of the Federal programs. He concluded that, given the importance of the 

application process, Federal attempts to correct inequities in the allocation of Federal funds should focus 

on areas like administrative technical assistance to communities rather than on altering funding formulas. 

Rich (1989) studied six Federal programs on community and economic development to determine to what 

extent political influence, community needs, and local demand and administrative capacity affected the 

distribution of Federal grants. In the presence of significant political and community effects over time, he 

found that local demand for Federal aid and the extent of participation in prior project grant programs 

were important factors in the allocation of funding. 

Rich’s study provides additional insights because the six Federal programs he studied involved both 

formula and project grants, sometimes managed by the same agency. He found that programs with 

formula grants tended to yield wide, almost universalistic geographic coverage (although not necessarily

with equal per capita allocations). On the other hand, programs with project grants had a more limited 

distribution that was sometimes influenced by political factors such as maintaining the support of key

legislators. He also found that while formula grant programs tended to provide funding to more 

jurisdictions with little or no need than categorical grant programs, administrators still managed to direct 

money in both types of programs toward the neediest communities. 

Not mentioned by these studies is the fact that the Federal government can entice local communities to 

apply for funds by using tools such as Federal matching funds or online application and grant 

management processes. By providing Federal matching funds for State or local spending on particular 

activities, the Federal government effectively reduces the price the State or locality faces for the activities, 

so undertaking the activities becomes more attractive. By using online application and grant management 

processes, the Federal government can make it easier for jurisdictions to apply for funds and for recipients 

to administer them. But these tools are only inducements; they do not obligate State or local participation 

in Federal programs. 

Together, these studies on the geographic distribution of Federal grants raise the issue of whether formula 

funding or a competitive grant better targets communities in need. They suggest that if the Federal 

government intends to distribute funds widely under a specific WMD preparedness program, perhaps to 

spur State and local spending on a new activity, a formula allocation might be more beneficial. Rich 

(1989) in particular showed that formulas allocations tend to be more universalistic than competitive grant 

allocations. A competitive grant, on the other hand, might be more consistent with a narrow WMD 

preparedness program. 

These studies also demonstrate that how need is defined (e.g., population, threats, fiscal capacity) matters 

importantly with respect to which communities receive funding. This fact was particularly evident in the 

GAO critique of the funding formula used in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program. However, the 

definition of need also matters with respect to competitive grant programs, since need is often used to 

determine the pool of eligible applicants. A significant problem is that the most appropriate measure for a 

given program is not always clear. And, as suggested in the studies by Dye and Hurley (1978), Pelissero 

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(1984), and Pelissero and Morgan (1992), targeting funds exclusively to the neediest communities might 

still be difficult. 

Improving Program Management

The Federal government might have as a goal improving WMD preparedness by ensuring that Federal 

grant programs are well administered. This could involve concern over a number of areas, including 

whether local-responder funds reach their recipients in a timely fashion; how well compliance with 

program requirements is monitored and regulated; and how political influences affect program operation 

over time. 

Timely Allocation of Funds 

With respect to Federal funds flowing through the States, the U.S. Conference of Mayors (2003) issued a 

report presenting the results of a survey on the status of ten Federal grants for homeland security for FY 

2003. In the report, many of the responding 168 cities complained that their parent States often failed to 

disburse pass-through funds on time (sometimes in violation of statutory deadlines). States also often 

failed to notify cities in a timely manner if they would be receiving funds, and failed to consult them in 

the use of funds. 

As mentioned earlier, the Gilmore Commission (2002) recommended some steps to help mitigate these 

consequences. It advocated that States not withhold more than 25 percent of Federal funds that are 

intended to improve State and/or local response capabilities, and that the States should withhold no more 

funding than their percentage of joint State and local efforts. 

Regulating and Monitoring Compliance 

Another issue is how well the Federal government does at regulating and monitoring program compliance 

by grant recipients. The Federal government must ensure, for example, that grant recipients expend funds 

only on eligible activities, and that they comply with State and local funding requirements, if any. More 

importantly, though, if a Federal program passes funds through the States, the States then assume some 

level of responsibility for regulation and enforcement as well. So an interesting question is, what happens 

when some responsibility for regulation or enforcement is devolved to State or even local authorities? 

The literature surveyed indicates that Federal and State regulators become subject to pressures from all 

political levels. Wood (1992), for example, analyzed enforcement of the Clean Air Act by the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 50 States from 1977 to 1985. He found that the top tier 

of environmental oversight, the EPA, was influenced mostly by national policymakers (e.g., the President, 

the Congress). On the other hand the lower tier of enforcement, the States, was subjected to a wider range 

of influences from the Federal level (i.e., the EPA) as well as the State level (e.g., governor, legislature). 

Hedge and Scicchitano (1994) studied the issue of Federal oversight as it pertained to environmental 

regulation where responsibility for enforcement of Federal standards was transferred to the State. They 

analyzed Federal oversight behavior at the Office of Surface Mining (Department of the Interior) during 

1985-1989 with an eye to how Federal regulators acted. They found that oversight actions were 

influenced not only from the top by national policymakers but also from the bottom by State actors such 

as governors, legislators, and interest groups. As they noted, Federal regulation is often justified on the 

basis that it is less subject to capture by political interests, so as a result their research calls into question 

whether regulation by the Federal government is necessarily any better than regulation by State 

governments. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Political Influence on Program Operations 

Some studies also suggest that political pressures by the Congress or Federal administrators to 

“universalize” Federal programs could lead to waste and inefficiency over time. Hamman (1993), for 

instance, studied the evolution of mass transportation programs operated by the Urban Mass 

Transportation Administration (UTMA) from the 1960s to the 1980s. He concluded that Federal 

administrators in the UTMA used their discretion in funding to broaden the reach of their mass 

transportation program, and advocated that it be bundled with additional programs during congressional 

reauthorization. In this way the UTMA was able to steadily increase the number of jurisdictions and 

constituencies it served and, in turn, steadily increase its base of congressional support.

Local-responder communities are closer to WMD threats than the Federal government, and in many cases 

they know their own needs better than the Federal and State governments. Consequently, a desirable goal 

of the Federal government regarding programs that target domestic response capabilities could be to 

encourage innovation at the State and local level. 

One possible way of countering political pressures from the Federal, State, and local levels is by using 

performance measures in program management. Performance measures provide objective assessments of 

local needs and how well they are being met and allow for a rational distribution of funding. Consistent 

with this view, the Gilmore Commission (2002) advocated the development and use of an integrated 

system of metrics to ensure that the Federal government could measure the level of preparedness across 

the country and that dollars were being spent effectively. 

Encouraging Innovation in States and Localities 

In the context of Federal grant programs, State and local flexibility essentially equates to having few 

Federal requirements or restrictions placed on them. These include things like maintenance-of-effort 

requirements, but they also include more basic things such as financial performance reporting and eligible 

activities. Although the surveyed literature shows that greater flexibility and autonomy can lead to more 

innovation, it also shows that there are barriers to providing it at the local level tradeoffs with planning

and accountability.

With respect to the benefits of flexibility, Marcus (1998) for example looked at how 24 nuclear power 

plants implemented safety review innovations in 1981 and 1982 that were introduced by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) after the Three Mile Island reactor accident. Although causality is 

difficult to demonstrate, he tested for a mutually reinforcing relationship between having autonomy and 

being a plant with good safety performance and found some evidence to support this assertion. Similarly,

he found some evidence to support the notion of a mutually reinforcing relationship between having little 

autonomy and being a plant with poor safety performance. He concluded that poor performing plants 

would likely improve their safety with more autonomy, but that given their past performance they would 

be unlikely to receive it. 

But some studies suggest that the States have been unwilling to provide local governments the same 

authority and flexibility that they sought from the Federal government in the 1990s. Kelly and Ransom

(2000) explored the relationship between three cities and their parent States (Richmond, Virginia; 

Trenton, New Jersey; and Tallahassee, Florida) and noted similarities in their interactions. They found 

that most State-city contacts were initiated by the cities, and that the communications channels used by

the cities are hampered by, among other things, the lack of structural ties with State leaders and the 

tendency for States to look on local jurisdictions as lobbying groups. Thus, the flow of funds through the 

States potentially could adversely impact local flexibility.

Other obstacles to innovation stem from the nature of the homeland security threat. Posner (The Nelson 

A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2003) advocated a model with performance partnerships or 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

contracts between the Federal, State and local jurisdictions, partially because it allows for local 

experimentation and innovation. He noted that this type of collaboration works best when the stakes are 

lower, when there is limited national consensus, and when there is limited knowledge of how best to meet 

objectives. In the case of homeland security, however, he concluded that knowledge is limited but the 

stakes are high and there is general agreement that the preparedness and response system is

interdependent and only as strong as its weakest link.

The reviewed literature on intergovernmental aid yields a number of insights relevant to the design of 

Federal grant programs. The important points are summarized below: 

Also, having greater flexibility and autonomy conflicts to some extent with accountability. The GAO 

(1998) looked at grant program design in education and other areas and created a typology of programs. 

The GAO noted that accountability for performance to the Federal government tends to be greatest in 

programs with national performance objectives and with few major activities; these programs easily allow 

program dollars spent across the country to be tracked and compared with respect to outcomes. But at the 

same time these types of programs provide little flexibility to the States and localities. On the other hand, 

expenditures for larger block grants that incorporate State and local flexibility often cannot be measured 

against national goals because every State’s implementation can differ. 

Summary

• Federal grant programs can stimulate State and local effort in significant and desirable 

ways, however sustained effort might require a sustained Federal commitment. The selected 

literature showed that State and local governments respond positively to Federal financial 

incentives by more than one would expect. This is true even when unrestricted lump-sum grants 

are used, and it is likely that the effects are greater when restrictions are imposed such as 

maintenance-of-effort requirements and categorical grant requirements. But the States and 

localities will likely take a “wait and see” approach before they agree to commit their resources to 

fund a new activity over the long term. 

• Studies find that, on average, the States and localities supplant 60 cents on every Federal

dollar of grants, but this can be mitigated to some extent by State and local fund 

requirements. This supplantation estimate by the GAO is especially true with respect to block 

grants and activities that have had previous State and local involvement. Matching fund

requirements and maintenance-of-effort requirements can help preserve local commitment, but 

the Federal government must be careful to not penalize jurisdictions that undertook homeland 

security investments on their own initiative. 

• Studies suggest that State involvement with Federal funding for local jurisdictions could 

improve coordination between levels of government, but State involvement is not a necessity 

and has disadvantages. Many of the reviewed studies indicate that passing Federal funds 

through the States to localities can help to translate and focus Federal goals into local activities 

that are relevant to their specific geographic regions. States can also help to ensure that local 

jurisdictions collaborate with one another and take actions that are regionally coherent and 

consistent with State plans. However, States can at times be unresponsive to the needs of local 

communities with respect to the distribution of funds. This can be mitigated to some extent by 

Federal requirements limiting how much funding States can withhold and for how long. 

Moreover, mechanisms other than the flow of funding can help to facilitate coordination. 

• Studies suggest some evidence that Federal and State governments have had difficulties in 

targeting aid to the communities where it is needed the most, but that States sometimes do

slightly better. The surveyed literature showed little correlation between measures of 

community need and actual allocations. It is unclear, however, whether these results arise from

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

programs poorly targeting needy communities, or from programs having other objectives, or from

researchers poorly measuring community need. Moreover, the grant type can also have an effect: 

one study showed that formula grants tend to lead to situations with universalistic funding

whereas competitive grants are sometimes influenced by political persuasion. 

• Studies indicate that the allocation of competitive grants often coincides more with local 

administrative capacity rather than local needs. The surveyed literature suggests that the local 

communities with the strongest planning and administrative functions and the greatest 

entrepreneurial spirit tended to apply for grants. This can be mitigated to some extent by

programs that provide administrative technical assistance to applicants. 

• Studies suggest that the effectiveness of Federal programs can get diluted over time because 

of political pressures on regulatory activity and funding decisions. The studies reviewed on 

the management of Federal grant programs showed examples of Federal and State influence on 

regulatory enforcement actions. They also showed attempts by Federal agencies to broaden the 

coverage of grant programs to increase Congressional support rather than to fulfill unmet local 

needs. 

• Studies indicate that greater program flexibility can likely increase local innovation, but 

there can be tradeoffs with accountability and possibly preparedness. The studies reviewed

on State and local innovation illustrated that block grants provide local jurisdictions the flexibility 

to direct funds to activities they deem the most critical because they have the fewest Federal 

restrictions. At the same time, however, they suggested that flexibility can make it harder to track 

where dollars are spent relative to when targeted project grants are used. Also, some studies 

indicated that fostering innovation might make less sense in a homeland security setting, since 

experimentation could possibly result in weak links in national preparedness in the form of one or 

more poorly prepared local jurisdictions or responder communities. 

Program Reviews 

Our research includes reviews of three current Federal grant programs to provide some real-world 

context for the studies discussed in the literature review. The three grant programs examined relate to fire 

protection and emergency preparedness. They include: the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program

(AFGP), the Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) program, and the Urban Areas 

Security Initiative (UASI). 

Grant Program Flow of Funds Type of 

 Funds 

Matching

Requirement 

Maintenanceof-Effort ? 

Assistance to 

Firefighters Grant 

Program

Direct to locals Competitive 

10 to 30 percent, 

depending on

population 

Yes

Emergency Management 

Performance Grants 

To States for 

allocation to 

locals

Formula 

Trend to 50/50

Fed/State cost share 

No 

Urban Areas Security

Initiative

Direct/passthrough to locals 

and States 

Formula None No

Source: RAND Table 3.1: Design Elements of Selected Grant Programs

Although a number of local-responder programs exist, these three were selected because they present an 

interesting diversity of program design elements. As shown in Table 3.1, the AFGP, EMPG, and UASI 

use among them a mix of competitive and formula grants. Two programs allocate some funding directly

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

to local jurisdictions; one program employs pass-through funding for localities; and one program allocates 

funding to the States, which may then reallocate it as they see fit. Two programs have matching or costshare requirements, and one has a maintenance-of-effort requirement. Together, these programs can 

provide insight into how different design elements interact to achieve different Federal goals. 

 

Assistance To Firefighters Grant Program81

The Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program (AFGP) contains the following design elements: It 

provides competitive grants directly to local jurisdictions. It has a local matching requirement of 10 to 30 

percent depending on the population of the local jurisdiction. It also has a local maintenance-of-effort 

requirement allowing no supplantation. 

Administered by the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) in the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA), the AFGP provides funding to support those local fire departments that lack the tools and 

resources necessary to protect the health and safety of the public as well as that of firefighting personnel. 

Congress created the AFGP in 2000 (Public Law 106-398) out of a concern that local firefighters were

facing greater risks in their jobs but with fewer resources.82 The AFGP derives its authority specifically

from the Federal Fire Protection and Control Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.), as amended. Congress 

appropriated $360 million in FY 2002 and another $750 million in FY 2003 and again in FY 2004 to fund 

the program. 

Eligibility for the AFGP is limited to fire departments of a State that provide fire suppression to a 

population within a fixed geographical area. Each year, local fire departments may apply for grants to 

fund one or more eligible activities in a programmatic or functional area. This approach, in use since FY 

2002, has heretofore used four program operations: fire operations and firefighter safety; fire prevention; 

emergency medical services; and firefighting vehicles acquisition. The eligible activities in a given 

programmatic or functional area are multiple and intended to be comprehensive for that area.83

The AFGP provides one-year grants on a competitive basis, and awards are made directly to local fire 

departments. The competition has two phases. In the first phase, applications are ranked based on how 

well they meet established program funding priorities for the type of community served (i.e., urban, 

suburban, and rural). The applications that best address the program funding priorities will be considered 

to be in the “competitive range” and will undergo the second phase of competition. In the second phase, 

applications are assessed according to the clarity and completeness of the project description, the 

demonstration of the financial need of the applicant, and a description of cost and benefit. 

The AFGP contain a matching requirement. Applicants who protect a population of 50,000 or less are 

required to provide a non-Federal cost-share of at least 10 percent of the total award; those protecting a 

population greater than 50,000 are required to provide a non-Federal match of at least 30 percent. The 

AFGP also has a maintenance-of-effort requirement to ensure that the Federal funds are used to 

supplement, not supplant, existing resources. Grant awards tend to be rather uncomplicated: they are 

81 This description is based on Federal Emergency Management Agency documents (March 11, 2003; March 14, 2003) and on a 

phone interview with Brian Cowan, Director of the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program, U.S. Fire Administration, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security. 82 For example, see testimony to the House Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management on HR 

1168, the Firefighter Investment and Response Enhancement Act (Congressional Record, April 12, 2000). Kenneth Burris, Chief

Operating Officer of the United States Fire Administration, noted in his remarks that 100 firefighters died in 1999 (where 16

deaths occurred in December alone) with an average of 90,000 firefighters being injured on the job each year. He also mentioned 

that “now fire departments are being called on to provide an ever expanding and more complex array of services including

hazardous materials, search and rescue, emergency medical, disaster response, and counter-terrorism [while] at the same time 

local governments and fire departments are encountering severe budget challenges.” 83 For example, eligible activities under the fire operations and firefighter safety program fall under training; wellness and fitness; 

firefighting equipment acquisition; personal protective equipment acquisition; and modifications to fire stations and facilities.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

relatively small (the average award size is $70,000) and typically are used for basic firefighter activities 

and equipment. 

 

The program as structured seemingly tends to result in wide and balanced geographic coverage, which 

from the literature review is more typical of formula grant programs than competitive grant programs. 

This results, however, because of the AFGP’s small average award size and large number of awards: The 

AFGP has received 19,000 to 21,000 applications a year, and under its FY 2003 appropriation anticipates 

that it will award grants to about 9,000 fire departments nationwide.84 (It distributed about 5,300 grants in 

2002, and about 1,850 grants in 2001.) These fire departments are spread across every region, every type 

of community (e.g., urban, rural), and every type of department (e.g., paid, volunteer). 

But the wide and balanced geographic coverage might also occur because the AFGP has made applying 

for funding simple and straightforward. The Director of the AFGP noted that an important focus of the 

program is “getting needed resources to local fire departments as quickly as possible.” To this end, the 

AFGP utilizes online application and grant management systems to help funding get disbursed and 

obligated in a timely manner. 

It should also be stressed that resources in the AFGP are not necessarily targeted towards the most 

“needy,” as need is defined here; proposed funding uses first must be consistent with program priorities 

and secondarily based on need and cost-benefit analyses. But on the margin, the Director of AFGP has 

some discretion to direct funding towards particular types of communities and particular regions. And the 

Director has anecdotal evidence that suggests that grants often go to regional areas that are supportive of 

urban centers. 

With respect to coordination between the different levels of government, interactions under the AFGP 

occur mostly between FEMA and the localities. Direct funding to local fire departments means that the 

States are bypassed. Consequently, State fire marshals and emergency management centers have 

complained about their lack of input in to the program, so the Director of AFGP feels that there is some 

room for increased coordination with the States. That said, the AFGP is intended primarily as a local fire 

department program, however, and as such there tends to be less need for coordination with the States; the 

level of detail from the program’s decisions (e.g., numbers of self-contained breathing apparatuses, 

lengths of hose) is beyond normal State-level coordination activities. Moreover, as mentioned there is at 

least some evidence that local jurisdictions already do collaborate on their own initiative. 

Local innovation is not a particular concern of the AFGP. The Director notes that the program determines 

the eligible activities (which tend to focus on “meeting basic firefighter needs”) and it funds fire

departments according to how well local requests mesh with program priorities. That said, the AFGP 

does try to allow for local flexibility by presenting a comprehensive list of eligible activities in its 

program areas. 

In essence, the AFGP has as its primary goal to increase the level and/or quality of preparedness 

activities, with a secondary goal of improving the geographic distribution of funds. It provides an 

example of a narrowly tailored Federal program that focuses on helping to provide basic equipment and 

training to resource-constrained fire departments across the country. The requirement for local matching 

funds for these one-time competitive grants provides an incentive for fire departments to acquire only

necessities. The maintenance-of-effort requirement ensures that over time fire departments increase their 

level of preparedness. And because the AFGP fills basic needs such as vehicles and hoses, funding 

bypasses State governments and goes directly to localities. 

84 It also has a statutory grant limit of $750,000 to any one fire department. 

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Emergency Management Performance Grants85

The Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) program contains the following program

design elements: It provides formula funding that passes through the States to localities. It has a 

matching funds requirement and no maintenance-of-effort requirement. 

Administered by FEMA, the EMPG assists the development, maintenance, and improvement of State and 

local emergency management capabilities. EMPG funds help to meet State and local needs in disaster 

mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The EMPG is a consolidation of former planning 

program activities, and as such it receives its authority from a number of statutes: The Departments of 

Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000,

Public Law 106-74; 38 U.S.C. 301; Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as 

amended, Title II, Section 201(d), Title VI, Sections 611 and 613, 42 U.S.C. 5196 and 5196(b); Public 

Law 93-288, as amended; 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.; and, 42 U.S.C. 5195 et seq. Congress appropriated 

$165 million for the EMPG for FY 2003 and $181 million for FY 2004. 

Eligible applicants for EMPG funding are all 50 States plus the District of Columbia and all territories 

and possessions. EMPG funding is used to help the States achieve the goals set out in their five-year 

operations plans by supporting a variety of functional areas of emergency management. 

EMPG funding is allocated to the States by formula, although the specific formula is not in statute. For 

each State, FEMA derives a target allocation for the year by calculating the percentage of available 

EMPG funds that the State received in the prior year. A matching requirement is calculated for each 

State, where each recipient's cost share percentage will increase by one percent over the prior year's match 

until the 50 percent Federal/50 percent State level is reached. There is no maintenance-of-effort 

requirement, although the structure of the matching requirement effectively maintains or increases State 

spending for EMPG activities over time. 

The States can then distribute EMPG funding across their localities as they see fit to support emergency

management activities. According to the FEMA Region IX Emergency Management Specialist, States 

often differ as to their statewide response structures, so they often differ in terms of how they implement 

the program. Many States allocate funds by formula across their local jurisdictions after first adding

additional State goals and performance requirements for locals to meet. 

Take California as an example. FEMA Region IX (California’s FEMA liaison) considers California to be 

a “model” State given its sophistication in planning and training and its utilization of regional offices. 

California allocates 75 percent of its EMPG funds to all of its county operational areas. Here, a county

operational area is a body comprising all of the political jurisdictions and responder groups in a county

where all members are treated equally. The State Office of Emergency Services (OES), which 

administers the EMPG in California, provides each operational area a baseline amount of money and 

allocates the rest according to population. 

Each operational area then decides which constituent jurisdictions get EMPG funds in order to best meet 

Federal and State guidelines and requirements. The OES Planning Branch Chief responsible for the 

EMPG believes that such a distribution mechanism makes it likely that funds ultimately get spread 

geographically according to need. This is because the jurisdictions in each operational area have to 

decide how to distribute limited funds among themselves; these compromises are made at the lowest 

level, or the “impact area.” These compromises, of course, can be adversely affected to the extent that 

FEMA and OES guidelines interfere with the distribution of funds according to actual needs. 

 

85 This description is based on the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (2003) and on phone interviews with Jane Hindmarsh, 

Planning and Technological Assistance Branch Chief, Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, State of California; and 

Barbara Kambouris, Emergency Management Specialist, FEMA Region IX, Department of Homeland Security. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Coordination between levels of government is supported under the EMPG because FEMA allocates 

funding to the States rather than to local emergency management centers. As the FEMA Region IX 

Specialist points out, relying on the States is good because the States are “the leader of the band,” and 

because dealing with the locals requires a lot of effort and the States are better positioned than the Federal 

government to do this. Additionally, the States have the opportunity to add their own guidelines to local 

allocations, thereby adding coherence to the use of EMPG grants by the localities. California also uses its 

six regional OES offices to foster collaboration between operational areas in a region as well as with other 

State agencies. 

Given the small size of the grant awards (the average State award in FY 2001 was $2.4 million) and the 

narrow purpose of the program, local jurisdictions tend to complain more about insufficient funding than 

about insufficient flexibility or inefficient program management. Local innovation can happen in the 

EMPG, though. In California’s case it is fostered by the collaboration required for the operational areas 

to function effectively. 

Consequently, as a program to enhance emergency management planning at the State and local level, the 

EMPG has a primary goal of increasing the level and/or quality of preparedness activities and a secondary

goal of improving the coordination between levels of government. The EMPG represents an example of a 

Federal program that funds a narrow set of activities on an ongoing basis. Its small average award 

allocated by formula means that recipient funding is relatively predictable from one year to the next. 

There is no maintenance-of-effort requirement, but the 50/50 Federal/State cost share helps to minimize 

the supplantation of recipient funds. And the allocation of funding to the States with the subsequent 

reallocation to localities (with added State requirements) helps to facilitate coordination. 

 

Urban Areas Security Initiative86

The Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) Grant Program contains the following design elements: It 

provides one set of formula grants directly to local jurisdictions; it provides a second set of formula grants 

through the States to local jurisdictions. There are no local matching fund requirements or maintenanceof-effort requirements. 

Administered by the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) in the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), the UASI provides funds to enhance the ability of State and local governments to prepare 

for and respond to terrorist threats or incidents. The stated purpose of the UASI is to address the unique 

needs of large urban areas, and to assist them in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity. The 

intent behind the program is to provide localities in the short term needed resources to address new and 

significant terrorist threats, and to develop sustainable models in the long term that other urban areas 

across the nation can look to and learn from. The UASI consists of two separate parts, Grant Program

(GP) I and GP II. The UASI GP I is authorized by the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2003 (Public Law 

108-7), with appropriations of $100 million for FY 2003; the UASI GP II is authorized by the Emergency

Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-11), with appropriations of $700 

million for FY 2003. 

Seven selected jurisdictions are eligible to receive UASI GP I funding,87 and 30 jurisdictions (including

the original 7) are eligible to receive GP II funding.88 These urban areas are regions, typically consisting 

86 This description is based on documents from the Office of Domestic Preparedness (2003a, 2003b) and on a phone interview 

with Darrell Darnell, Director of the Urban Areas Security Initiative, Office for Domestic Preparedness, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security. 87 They are New York City, the National Capital Region, Los Angeles, Seattle, Chicago, San Francisco, and Houston.

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of a county with a core city. They were chosen by DHS based on an assessment of three key factors: 

existing critical infrastructure in a core city and region; an analysis of current threat estimates produced 

by the DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division for a core city and region; and 

population density in a core city and region. Eligible jurisdictions may use UASI GP I and GP II funding 

for a wide variety of needs, including planning, equipment, training, and exercises. 

The formula that determined eligible jurisdictions is also used to allocate funding amounts to the urban 

areas. Under UASI GP I, funding is being distributed directly from DHS to the localities. Under UASI 

GP II, however, funding is being passed through the States. States must pass through at least 80 percent of 

the funds to their eligible urban areas. States may use up to 20 percent of grant award to complement 

State assets that will provide direct assistance to the urban areas for terrorist threats or incidents. There 

are no State or local matching requirements, but there is a requirement that UASI funding not supplant 

funds appropriated for the same purpose. 

According to the Director of the UASI, the program emphasizes the importance of building “sustainable 

anti-terrorism programs” at the local level. The focus on regions rather than on individual cities is to 

facilitate local partnerships and complementary capabilities that will enhance the regions’ overall 

capability to prevent, deter, or respond to a terrorist incident. A key component of the program is the 

development of metrics and an evaluation process to measure how well regions are prepared.

The program also emphasizes effectiveness and flexibility. The UASI is designed to get funding to 

localities to start meeting their needs as soon as possible; funding either goes directly to the locals or must 

be released by the States within 45 days. And only 3 percent of grant awards may be used for program

management and administration purposes. Flexibility comes through the variety of eligible uses. 

The UASI also stresses the importance of attempting to target areas with the highest need. The allocation 

formula used (based on critical infrastructure, threat estimates, and population density) was a direct 

attempt to measure need in an objective fashion with the most pertinent information. Of course, as 

discussed in the literature review, it can be difficult to accurately define an area’s “need” for any program. 

That said, though, it is not readily apparent that there are necessarily better measures of need than those 

currently employed in the UASI. 

An interesting insight regarding the UASI comes from the transition from GP I to GP II. The original 

program (GP I) allocates funding directly to the 7 urban areas. The urban areas under GP I have immense 

flexibility considering that, aside from reporting requirements, they are only required to submit their plans 

to a designated State agency for administrative review (if applicable). But as a result of lessons learned 

from other Federal programs and a desire to facilitate State and local collaboration, ODP amended the 

distribution procedures for UASI GP II such that the States now are critical actors and have much greater 

responsibilities to ensure collaboration and coordination. 

Under UASI GP II, a State administrative agency for an urban area must specifically define the geographic 

boundaries of that urban area consistent with the boundaries of the local responder communities. A State 

also must facilitate the development of an Urban Area Working Group, comprising the chief executive 

officers of all its constituent jurisdictions. This working group is then responsible for assessing the 

capabilities of the urban area and developing a homeland security strategy before the bulk of funds can be 

released. 

Essentially, the UASI has as its primary goal increasing the level and/or quality of preparedness activities, 

with secondary goals of strengthening coordination across different levels of government and encouraging 

 88 The remaining 23 urban areas are Buffalo, NY; Dallas, TX; San Diego, CA; Sacramento, CA; Long Beach, CA; Boston, MA; 

Denver, CO; Philadelphia, PA; Pittsburgh, PA; St. Louis, MO; Kansas City, MO; Miami, FL; Tampa, FL; Cincinnati, OH; 

Cleveland, OH; Detroit, MI; Newark, NJ; Phoenix, AZ; Baltimore, MD; Honolulu, HI; Portland, OR; New Orleans, LA; and 

Memphis, TN.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

innovation. Having arisen in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 out of concern 

that large urban areas were not adequately prepared to deal with their unique threats, the UASI provides 

an example of a Federal program designed to address a new and complex need. DHS developed a 

formula to determine which areas had the greatest needs, it selected a subset of these areas, and is 

allocating funding to them accordingly over a few years. In light of the substantial resources needed for 

localities to develop a sustained capability to deal with these threats, the UASI has no State or local 

funding requirements; large urban areas can begin developing their preparedness capacity immediately

with Federal funds, and over time adjust their local finances to take ownership of their new 

responsibilities. The initial version of the UASI had funds flow directly to localities; the second version 

amended this to involve the States to help facilitate regional cooperation and stretch Federal resources. 

Findings 

The literature review on intergovernmental grants generally and the review of three Federal grant 

programs for fire protection and emergency preparedness have provided a number of relevant insights 

into burden sharing between the Federal, State, and local governments. The main findings, described 

below, can be used to help the Federal government design programs for WMD preparedness that 

effectively meet its desired goals: 

• If a goal of the Federal government were to enhance the level and/or quality of 

preparedness activities by local responders, then having categorical grants, local matching 

fund requirements, and maintenance-of-effort requirements will help augment State and 

local efforts. Studies suggest that even unrestricted lump-sum grants stimulate State and local 

behavior. But adding additional conditions on Federal grants will make it more difficult for State 

and local governments to substitute Federal funding for their own funding. 

• If a goal of the Federal government were to strengthen coordination across different levels 

of government, then requiring Federal funds to flow through the States to local jurisdictions 

could be beneficial but is not necessary. Some studies suggested that allocating funding 

through the States can help translate and focus Federal goals into local activities that are relevant 

to their specific geographic regions. States can also help to ensure that local jurisdictions 

collaborate with one another and take actions that are regionally coherent and consistent with 

State plans. However, the Federal government can conceivably impose standards or other 

requirements on States and localities to facilitate coordination. 

• If a goal of the Federal government were to improve the geographic distribution of funds 

across local-responder jurisdictions, formula grants and competitive grants can result in 

different outcomes. Studies suggest that both Federal and State governments have had 

difficulties in targeting aid to the communities where it is needed the most. But formula grants

tend to result in universalistic coverage, whereas competitive grants often depend on the planning 

capacity and entrepreneurial spirit of the applicants. 

• If a goal of the Federal government were to improve the administration of Federal grant 

programs, then limits on the States when pass-through funding is used would be beneficial. 

The two reviewed Federal programs that allocated funding through the States limited the amount 

of funding that the States could withhold and set dates by which the States had to disburse money

to local recipients. 

• If a goal of the Federal government were to encourage innovation in States and localities, 

then imposing few Federal grant requirements could be beneficial but there could be 

tradeoffs with accountability and possibly preparedness. Studies suggested that block grants 

provide localities the flexibility to direct funds to activities they deem the most critical because 

they have the fewest Federal restrictions. At the same time, this flexibility can make it harder to 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

track where dollars are spent, and unsuccessful experimentation could result in weak links in 

national preparedness. 

REFERENCES 

Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,

“III. For Ray Downey: Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

December 15, 2001. 

-----, “IV. Implementing the National Strategy: Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress,” Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, December 15, 2002. 

Aronson, Richard J., and Vincent G. Munley, “(Non)equivalence in a Federalism: Dual Tax Shares, Flypaper Effects 

and Leviathan,” Public Choice, Vol. 89, 1996, pp. 53-62.

Bradford, David F., and Wallace E. Oates, “Towards a Predictive Theory of Intergovernmental Grants,” The 

American Economic Review, Vol. 61, No.2, May 1971, pp. 440-448. 

Canada, Ben, “Department of Homeland Security: State and Local Preparedness Issues,” Washington, D.C.: 

Congressional Research Service, CRS Report RL31490, May 5, 2003. 

-----, “First Responder Initiative: Policy Issues and Options,” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 

CRS Report RL31475, July 8, 2003.

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, “97.042 Emergency Management Performance Grants,“ 

http://www.cdfa.gov/public/ viewprog.asp?progid=1738, 2003. 

Council on Foreign Relations, “Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared,”

Report of an Independent Task Force, 2003. 

Dye, Thomas R., and Thomas L. Hurley, “The Responsiveness of Federal and State Governments to Urban

Problems,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1, February 1978, pp. 196-207. 

Ellwood, Deborah A., and Donald J. Boyd, “Changes in State Spending on Social Services Since the 

Implementation of Welfare Reform: A Preliminary Report,” The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of

Government, February 2000. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “2003 Program

Guidance for the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program,” http://www.usfa.fema.gov/fireservice/grants/2003grants/03prgguide.pdf, March 11, 2003. 

-----, “Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program; Final Rule and Notice,” Federal Register, Vol. 68, No. 50, March 

14, 2003, pp. 12544-12560. 

Gramlich, Edward M., “Intergovernmental Grants: A Review of the Empirical Literature,” in The Political Economy 

of Fiscal Federalism, edited by Wallace E. Oates, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977. 

Hamman, John A., “Universalism, Program Development, and the Distribution of Federal Assistance,” Legislative 

Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4, November 1993, pp. 553-568. 

Hedge, David M. and Michael J. Scicchitano, “Regulating in Space and Time: The Case of Regulatory Federalism,” 

The Journal of Politics, Vol. 56, No. 1, February 1994, pp. 134-153.

Hines, James R., and Richard H. Thaler, “Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 

Vol. 9, No. 4, Autumn 1995, pp. 217-226. 

Hofferbert, Richard I., and John K. Urice, “Small-Scale Policy: The Federal Stimulus versus Competing 

Explanations for State Funding of the Arts,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 2, May 

1985, pp. 308-329.

Kelly, Janet, and Bruce Ransom, “State Urban Policy: ‘New’ Federalism in Virginia, New Jersey and Florida,” 

Policy Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 2/3, Summer/Autumn 2000, pp. 62-83. 

Levine, Charles H., and Paul L. Posner, “The Centralizing Effects of Austerity on the Intergovernmental System,” 

Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 1, Spring 1981, pp. 67-85. 

Logan, Robert R., “Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, Issue 

6, December 1986, pp. 1304-1318. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Marcus, Alfred A., “Implementing Externally Induced Innovations: A Comparison of Rule-Bound and Autonomous

Approaches,” The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 1988, pp. 235-256. 

Nathan, Richard P., and Fred C. Doolittle, “Federal Grants: Giving and Taking Away,” Political Science Quarterly, 

Vol. 100, No. 1, Spring 1985, pp. 53-74. 

Oates, Wallace E., “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, Issue 3, September 

1999, pp. 1120-1149. 

Office for Domestic Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Year 2003 Urban Areas Security

Initiative Grant Program I: Program Guidelines and Application Kit,” NCJ200848, 2003a. 

-----, “Fiscal Year 2003 Urban Areas Security Initiative Grant Program II: Program Guidelines and Application Kit,” 

NCJ200849, 2003b. 

Pelissero, John P., “State Aid and City Needs: An Examination of Residual State Aid to Large Cities,” The Journal

of Politics, Vol. 46, No. 3. August 1984, pp. 916-935. 

Pelissero, John P., and David R. Morgan, “Targeting Intergovernmental Aid to Local Schools: An Analysis of

Federal and State Efforts,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4, December 1992, pp. 985-999. 

Saltzstein, Alan L., “Federal Categorical Aid to Cities: Who Needs It versus Who Wants It,” The Western Political

Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 1977, pp. 377-383. 

Rich, Michael J., “Distributive Politics and the Allocation of Federal Grants,” The American Political Science 

Review, Vol. 83, No. 1, March 1989, pp. 193-213. 

Stein, Robert M., “Federal Categorical Aid: Equalization and the Application Process,” The Western Political

Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1979, pp. 396-408. 

Stein, Robert M., “Municipal Public Employment: An Examination of Intergovernmental Influences,” American 

Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4, November 1984, pp. 636-653. 

The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, “The Role of ‘Home’ in Homeland Security: The Federalism

Challenge,” Albany, NY, March 24, 2003. 

Thomas, Robert D., “Implementing Federal Programs at the Local Level,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 94, No. 

3, Autumn 1979, pp. 419-435.

U.S. Conference of Mayors Homeland Security Monitoring Center, “First Mayors’ Report to the Nation: Tracking

Federal Homeland Security Funds Sent to the 50 State Governments,” September 2003. 

U.S. General Accounting Office, “Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go

Further,” GAO/AIMD-97-7, December 1996. 

-----, “Balancing Flexibility and Accountability: Grant Program Design in Education and Other Areas,” GAO/TGGD/HEHS-98-94, February 11, 1998. 

-----, “Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program,” 

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, October 2, 1998. 

-----, “Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency,” 

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-3, November 1998. 

Welch, Susan, and Kay Thompson, “The Impact of Federal Incentives on State Policy Innovation,” American 

Journal of Political Science, Vol. 24, No. 4, November 1980, pp. 715-729. 

-----, “National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an

Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security,” GAO-02-621T, April 11, 2002. 

-----, “Homeland Security: Reforming Federal Grants to Better Meet Outstanding Needs,” GAO-03-1146T, 

September 3, 2003. 

Wood, B. Dan, “Modeling Federal Implementation as a System: The Clean Air Case,” American Journal of Political

Science, Vol. 36, No. 1, February 1992, pp. 40-67.

Zycher, Benjamin, “A Preliminary Benefit/Cost Framework for Counterterrorism Public Expenditures,” Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1693-RC, 2003. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

APPENDIX G-CREATING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY* 

The process of creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been one of the most significant 

and challenging United States government restructuring efforts since World War II. The aim of 

establishing DHS and integrating a wide range of agencies and offices from the Coast Guard to FEMA 

was to increase the security of the U.S. homeland and to improve the government’s ability to prevent and 

prepare for terrorist attacks and other major disasters. Indeed, the challenge of integrating 22 separate 

agencies into a single, effective department has been substantial. 

 

Unfortunately, there has been little comprehensive and systematic examination of DHS’s structure and 

strategy. This appendix assesses and evaluates DHS’s efforts and challenges in four areas: 

• Information analysis 

• Emergency preparedness and response 

• Science and technology

• Border and transportation security

These areas were chosen for two major reasons. First, they represent critical homeland security issue 

areas. Information analysis is important to understand the threats to the homeland, recognize 

vulnerabilities, and disseminate information to the American public and State, local, and private sector 

entities. Emergency preparedness and response is necessary to prepare for, and respond to, future attacks 

and other major disasters. Science and technology is critical to research and utilize relevant technologies 

and scientific talent in order to improve the security of the United States. And border and transportation 

security is important to protect points of entry such as seaports, land borders, coastlines, airports, 

highways, railroads, and waterways. Second, these areas correlate with the major directorates of DHS, 

which serve as the core functional departments in DHS. They include the Directorates of Information 

Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Science and Technology, 

and Border and Transportation Security.

Several important caveats are apropos. To begin with, there are significant hurdles in evaluating a 

department that has just been established. The Homeland Security Act was passed by Congress and 

signed by President George W. Bush in November 2002, and a number of related organizations such as 

the Terrorist Threat Information Center (TTIC) were established as recently as May 2003. This reality

presents practical challenges because it takes time to hire staff, restructure agencies, and outline strategic 

objectives. Nonetheless, it is both possible and necessary to explore the logic of DHS’s structure, examine 

and evaluate its strategies and priorities thus far, and analyze whether current efforts maximize the 

nation’s security. Furthermore, this chapter does not pretend to offer a comprehensive evaluation of the 

strategy and structure of DHS. There are important functions of DHS that are not included in this 

analysis, such as infrastructure protection. Their absence should not be regarded as a statement of their 

relative importance or success, but rather are due to the limited scope of this effort. Rather, it focuses on 

several significant issues of homeland security that DHS has been tasked to address. 

DHS Structure and Objectives 

Since its inception in 1998, the Gilmore Commission has offered a number of homeland security 

recommendations that are now applicable to current DHS strategy and structure. First, it recommended 

the creation of a National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) as a “stand-alone” organization to 

consolidate the analysis of foreign-collected and domestically-collected intelligence and information on 

international terrorists and terrorist organizations that threaten attacks against the United States. It 

contended that the organization should be located outside of the CIA for legal, policy, perception, and 

* Seth G. Jones

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

cultural reasons; outside of the FBI because of concern that it might focus too much on law enforcement 

at the expense of detection and prevention; and outside DHS because it would be viewed as more 

responsive to DHS activities at the expense of other agencies.89 Second, the Gilmore Commission argued 

that terrorism-related threat assessments and intelligence should be disseminated to appropriate State and 

local agencies and response organizations.90 Third, the Commission recommended preserving an allhazards approach to emergency preparedness. It advised Federal agencies to coordinate training and 

equipment programs as part of all-hazards preparedness, including the incorporation of training for 

combating terrorism into existing all-hazards training.91 Similarly, it suggested consolidating information 

about, and application procedures for, Federal terrorism preparedness grant programs into one office.92

Fourth, it recommended the development of nationally recognized standards for equipment and training,

with the ultimate objective of providing official certification.93

Figure 1: DHS Organizational Structure 

 

Secretary ----------------------------------

Deputy Secretary

Under Secretary

Science and Technology

Under Secretary

Information Analysis and

Infrastructure Protection

Under Secretary

Border & 

Transportation Security

Under Secretary

Emergency 

Preparedness and

Response

Under Secretary

Management

Inspector General

Director of the

Secret Service (1)

Commandant of

Coast Guard (1)

Director, Bureau of Citizenship

& Immigration Services (1)

General Counsel

State and Local Coordination

Special Assistant to the Secretary

(private sector)

National Capital Region

Coordination

Shared Services

Citizenship & 

Immigration Service

Ombudsman (1)

Legislative Affairs

Public Affairs

Civil Rights and

Civil Liberties

Chief of Staff

Privacy Officer

Executive Secretary

International Affairs

Counter Narcotics

Small & Disadvantaged

Business

In response to these and other recommendations – and particularly to the September 2001 attacks in New 

York City and Washington – the Department of Homeland Security was created. It has three broad 

objectives. As outlined in the White House’s National Strategy for Homeland Security, they include 

preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 

responding to attacks and disasters that do occur.94 As President George W. Bush noted upon signing the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002: “The new department will analyze threats, will guard our borders and 

airports, protect our critical infrastructure, and coordinate the response of our nation for future 

emergencies.”

95 In order to meet these objectives, DHS is divided into five major directorates, as 

illustrated in Figure 1. The directorates include Border and Transportation Security, Emergency 

Preparedness and Response, Science and Technology, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, 

89 Implementing the National Strategy: The Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to

Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,

December 2002), pp. iii-v, 42. 90 Fourth Annual Report, p. iv; Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 

Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, December 2001), p. 4. 91 Third Annual Report, p. 10. 92 Third Annual Report, pp. 8-9. 93 Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Second Annual Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 

Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, December 2000), p. 

xi. 

94 National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. vii. On DHS objectives also see the Homeland Security Act of 2002, p. 8; Bush,

The Department of Homeland Security, p. 1. 95 Remarks by the President at the Signing of H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Washington, DC: Office of the 

Press Secretary, November 25, 2002). 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

and Management. Furthermore, DHS also includes several “stand-alone” agencies such as the Coast 

Guard, Secret Service, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, and Office of State and Local 

overnment Coordination. 

rity

ists

,

is broad array of responsibilities makes it 

ritical for DHS to coordinate homeland security strategies. 

nalysis of DHS 

gency preparedness and 

response, science and technology, and border and transportation security. 

1. Information Analysis 

G

In addition to DHS, a number of other Federal departments and agencies have critical homeland secu

functions. For example, the Department of Defense established U.S. Northern Command in 2002 to

conduct operations against threats aimed at the United States and its interests, as well as to provide 

military assistance to civil authorities through such components as the National Guard. The Central 

Intelligence Agency plays an important role in collecting intelligence abroad on terrorist threats to the 

United States and analyzing it in such bodies as the Counterterrorist Center (CTC). The Department of 

Justice has a number of important homeland security missions, ranging from the prosecution of terror

to domestic counterterrorism and cyber security efforts by the FBI. In the Department of Health and 

Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control provide a system of health surveillance to monitor 

biological and radiological attacks, implement prevention strategies, and play a key role in protecting 

public health during and after an attack. Numerous other Federal agencies such as the Departments of 

Energy, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture, as well as State, local, and private sector entities

also have important homeland security functions. In short, th

c

A

This section examines four issue areas of DHS: information analysis, emer

us reports 

nal

e

al terrorists and organizations threatening attacks against the United 

States.99 This did not quite happen. 

ntral

 

One of the most important rationales for creating DHS was to help improve the coordination, analysis, 

and dissemination of intelligence information on terrorist threats and likely targets.96 As numero

have pointed out, cooperation between departments of the Federal government, State and local

government agencies, and private sector entities has clearly been inadequate.97 For example, the Natio

Strategy for Homeland Security argues: “Agencies at all levels of government have not always fully

shared homeland security information due to real and perceived legal and cultural barriers, as well as th

limitations of their information systems.”98 In response to this challenge and contrary to the Homeland 

Security Act, the Gilmore Commission’s Fourth Report recommended that a stand-alone organization 

should be established outside of the FBI, CIA, or DHS to consolidate the analysis of information gathered

in the U.S. and abroad on internation

Instead, the Bush Administration created two major entities addressed here that involve DHS. The first is 

the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) in DHS, which has a ce

96 As the Homeland Security Act of 2002 noted, the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection has a 

stated mission “to access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information

from agencies of the Federal government, State and local government agencies, and private sector entities, and to integrate such 

information.” Homeland Security Act of 2002, p. 12. 97 Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001

(Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 

December 2002); Ivo H. Daalder et al, Assessing the Department of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: The Brookings

Institution, July 2002), pp. 17-21; Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, America – Still Unprepared, Still in Danger (New York:

Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), pp. 1-5; Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age: A Report of the Markle 

Foundation Task Force (New York: The Markle Foundation, October 2002), pp. 69-78. 98 National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. 16. 99 Implementing the National Strategy: The Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to

Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,

December 2002), pp. 41-50. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

objective of coordinating and analyzing intelligence information about terrorist threats to the U.S., 

assessing vulnerabilities to U.S. infrastructure, and disseminating information to the private sector and 

relevant Federal, State, and local officials. It also includes providing terrorist threat warning through such

formats as the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System. The second entity is TTIC, which wa

created in May 2003 to coordinate and provide comprehensive terrorism-related threat analysis to t

President, DHS, and other Federal agencies.100 President Bush noted that TTIC was established to 

“integrate and analyze all terrorist threat information, collected domestically and abroad in a single 

location ... When the center is fully operational, it will fully house a database

s

he

d

A, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 

Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and State. 

it is legally

and it

ities

onsolidating intelligence from across the 

telligence community is critical for homeland security. 

estic 

on and has had a detrimental affect on DHS. There are several main 

challenges with the cu

Figure 2: Primary Agencies Analyzing Terrorist-Related Intelligence

104

 

of known and suspecte

terrorists that officials across the country will be able to access and act upon.”101 TTIC is staffed by

representatives that have been assigned from the CIA, NS

On a purely statutory level, the Director for Central Intelligence (DCI) oversees TTIC, though

not part of the CIA. However, in practice the distinction is much less clear. The CIA wields a 

preponderant amount of influence in the center. TTIC is currently located at CIA Headquarters, though 

there have been some indications that it could move to the neighboring area of Tyson’s Corner, VA,

is funded through the CIA’s budget.102 Indeed, the logic for giving the DCI, rather than DHS or the 

Department of Justice, authority over TTIC was that the CIA is considered to have the most competent 

terrorism analysis capabilities. Some argued that it would be most efficient to have a single agency – the 

CIA – oversee offensive capabilities such as penetrating terrorist organizations and attacking them

through preemptive strikes, as well as defensive capabilities such as analyzing threats and vulnerabil

to the U.S. homeland.103 The need for a center capable of c

in

What are the main challenges with the current DHS and intelligence structures? Interagency intelligence

cooperation has improved somewhat over the past two years. As Figure 2 illustrates, however, there are 

still a plethora of government departments and agencies that collect, analyze, and disseminate dom

and foreign intelligence information, and indeed there is a strong argument that there needs to be. 

However, this complicates coordinati

rrent structure. 

100 On TTIC see Fact Sheet: Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America (Washington, DC: The White House, January

2003); John O. Brennan, “The Terrorist Threat Integration Center and Its Relationship with the Departments of Justice and 

Homeland Security,” House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary and the House of Representatives Select Committee 

on Homeland Security, July 22, 2003. 101 George W. Bush, “New Terrorist Threat Integration Center,” Speech at the FBI, February 14, 2003. 102 William New, “Key House Chairman Backs Secret Anti-Terrorism Center,” GovExec.com, October 8, 2003. 103 Interview with senior intelligence officials, August 6, 2003 and August 13, 2003. 

President

Department of

Homeland Security

Director of Central

Intelligence

Department

of Justice

FBI

CT Division

Department

of State

INR

Department of

Defense

NSA

DIA

Army

Navy

Air Force

Executive Asst. Marines

Director for CT & CI

Directorate of

Info Analysis & 

Infrastructure

Protection

Executive

Director’s Office

Directorate 

of

Operations

Directorate 

of

Intelligence

CTC

Asst. Sec for 

Information

Analysis

TTIC

NRO

NIMA

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

First, the Department of Homeland Security – and IAIP in particular – has largely been sidelined 

regarding the analysis and even dissemination of terrorism-related intelligence. DHS has a primary

responsibility of protecting the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks, but little power and capability to do 

this. To begin with, IAIP does not have significant analytical power. In theory, the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 gives DHS substantial responsibility “to access, receive, and analyze law enforcement 

information, intelligence information, and other information” collected at home and abroad to identify

and assess terrorist threats to the homeland and potential domestic vulnerabilities.105 In practice, however, 

the creation of TTIC gives the CIA the de facto responsibility for sifting through and analyzing raw 

terrorist intelligence information on threats to the homeland. This has largely sidelined DHS and left it 

with a paucity of competent intelligence analysts, while intelligence professionals have been much more

willing to go to the CIA or Departments of Justice, Defense, or State.106 Despite the existence of some

analysts, DHS has also been crippled by a number of other problems such as installing secure SIPRNET 

lines to send and receive classified information. 

Interviews with State and local officials have indicated that DHS has not effectively shared threat 

information with appropriate State and local entities. Indeed, DHS has had significant competition from

r, and

as also

he

cal

ver, Federal officials have not yet established 

comprehensive processes and procedures to promote sharing.”109

and

s and

other Federal agencies in disseminating information to State and local authorities, the private secto

other areas, despite President Bush’s July 2003 Executive Order giving the Secretary of Homeland 

Security primary authority for sharing homeland security information.107 Some of these problems may be 

due to overlapping responsibilities. For example, the FBI is responsible for sharing intelligence

information with State and local law enforcement through its Joint Terrorism Task Forces, but h

disseminated information to other actors such as State and local governments. Other problems may be t

result of proactive efforts by State and local governments. Senior intelligence officials have told the 

Gilmore Commission that there has been some intelligence sharing between the CIA and State and lo

actors, often at the initiation of State and local entities.108 These conclusions are supported by other 

studies. For example, a recent GAO study argued that while organizations such as DHS have initiatives 

under way to improve information-sharing, they have not been sufficient: “Information on threats, 

methods, and techniques of terrorists is not routinely shared; and the information that is shared is not 

perceived as timely, accurate, or relevant. Moreo

Second, there have been several problems with giving the CIA de facto authority over the TTIC. Perhaps

the most significant is cultural. The CIA has developed an effective culture for collecting and analyzing 

intelligence information on terrorist threats, penetrating foreign organizations and governments, and

conducting covert attacks. The CIA’s raison d’être necessitates dealing with unsavory characters, 

protecting sources and methods used to gather information, keeping a close hold on intelligence,

conducting foreign intelligence gathering and operations. Consequently, it has rigid standards for 

employment such as requiring prospective employees to take a polygraph examination, and it is deeply

reluctant to share information. This culture is at odds with what is needed for homeland security, and

further raises concerns about the CIA’s influence in domestic matters.110 As several studies have noted, an

effective homeland security model requires analyzing intelligence from domestic and foreign source

 

104 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, February 26, 2003. 105 Homeland Security Act of 2002, p. 11. 106 John Mintz, “At Homeland Security, Doubts Arise Over Intelligence,” Washington Post, July 21, 2003, p. A12; Edward 

Alden, “U.S. Fails to ‘Connect the Dots’ By Pooling Its Terrorist Watch Lists,” Financial Times, July 16, 2003, p. 7; “September

11 and Today,” Christian Science Monitor, July 29, 2003, p. 10. 107 George W. Bush, Executive Order: Homeland Security Information Sharing (Washington: White House Office of the Press

Secretary, July 29, 2003). 108 Interview with senior intelligence official, August 6, 2003. 109 Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened, GAO-03-760 (Washington: United

States Government Accounting Office, August 2003). 110 Dan Eggen, “Center to Assess Terrorist Threat,” Washington Post, May 1, 2003, p. A10; Robert Bryant, John Hamre, John 

Lawn, John MacGaffin, Howard Shapiro, and Jeffrey Smith, “America Needs More Spies – Intelligence and Security” 

Economist, July 12, 2003. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

quickly disseminating it to relevant State and local actors and the private sector.111 To be clear,

little concern that information hasn’t been – or won’t be – shar

there is

f there is a specific and unambiguous 

threat about an attack in the United States. But there is anxiety that important information will not be 

eral

wer

. 

s

ts

between States, locals, the private 

ector, and the intelligence community. Second, the United States Congress should consider transitioning 

rity

o State and locals.

. It

,

ed i

shared efficiently with relevant State, local, private sector, and health entities in most other instances 

when the threat is more ambiguous but potentially just as serious. 

In sum, the current DHS and intelligence structure has modestly improved coordination among Fed

departments and agencies. While it is too early to make definitive conclusions, placing much of the po

of collecting and analyzing homeland security threats in an agency that is primarily geared toward

maintaining secrecy and focusing on foreign threats and operations may compromise homeland security

The current structure also unnecessarily complicates Federal communication with State and local actor

and the private sector, sidelines the newly-created DHS, and largely duplicates what the CIA already has 

in its CTC. 

Consequently, several steps can be taken. First, DHS should establish comprehensive procedures for 

coordinating with entities such as the FBI and CIA to share information with relevant State and local 

officials. While it is unlikely that DHS will have significant analytical capabilities in the near future, i

primary intelligence role at the present should be as the focal point

s

TTIC from the DCI to DHS, or ensure its existence as a stand-alone agency separate from the CIA and 

responsible directly to the President. The Gilmore Commission laid out the logic for a stand-alone agency

in its Fourth Annual Report. Moreover, DHS, which is supposed to be the hub of all homeland secu

efforts, is also a logical place where the fusion of terrorist analysis should take place.112 Indeed, agencies 

within DHS have the central responsibility to act on intelligence to perform such important missions as 

protecting borders, screening airline passengers, securing critical infrastructure, and disseminating 

information t

Recommendation: DHS has largely been sidelined regarding terrorist-related intelligence information

has little analytical power and insufficiently developed capabilities to disseminate information to State

local, and private actors. We recommend that DHS establish comprehensive procedures for sharing

information with relevant State and local officials, and that the U.S. Congress consider either 1) 

transitioning TTIC from the DCI to DHS or 2) establishing it as an independent agency in the near 

future. 

2. Preparedness and Response

In order to improve the U.S.’s ability to prepare for and respond to future terrorist attacks and other majo

disasters, DHS took several steps. The first was to establish a Directorate for Emergency Preparedn

and Response (EP&R), which pr

r

ess

imarily integrates the Federal Emergency Management Agency into the 

epartment. Its primary tasks include improving the U.S.’s preparation for, response to, and recovery

The second step was to integrate the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), formerly in the 

Department of Justice, into DHS’s Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. ODP’s primary

 

d

from natural disasters and terrorist incidents, as well as developing and managing a national training and 

evaluation system to design curriculums, set standards, and evaluate local, State, and Federal training 

effort.113

111 Bruce Berkowitz, “A Fresh Start Against Terror,” New York Times, August 4, 2003; Siobhan Gorman, “FBI, CIA Remain 

Worlds Apart,” National Journal, August 1, 2003. 112 On moving TTIC to DHS see James B. Steinberg, Hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, February 14, 

2003; Berkowitz, “A Fresh Start Against Terror”; Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age, pp. 71-72; Joseph

Lieberman, “Lieberman Hails Intelligence Analysis Center As Necessary; Says it Belongs in Homeland Security Department, 

Not CIA,” Press Statement (Washington, DC: Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, January 29, 2003). 113 Homeland Security Act of 2002, pp. 78-79. 

G-6 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

objectives are similar to those of the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response, though the

Homeland Security Act of 2002 gives ODP “primary responsibility” for preparedness for terrorist attacks. 

ODP tasks include providing State and local governments and first responders with grants, training, and 

technical assistance to improve their readiness for terrorism incidents.114 One of ODP’s principle vehicles 

tional Domestic Preparedness Consortium, which consists of several 

training centers such as the Center for Domestic Preparedness and Texas A&M University’s National 

to

nd other major disasters? The current structure suffers from a duplication of preparedness efforts 

and a lack of coordination among relevant entities.116 ODP, which is located in the Directorate of Border 

e

Human Services (DHHS) 

f

Energy (DOE) 

for doing this is through the Na

Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center. The third step was to establish the Office of State and 

Local Government coordination as a stand-alone agency within the department to coordinate activities 

with State and local governments, assess their needs, and provide them with information, research, and 

technical support.115

What are the main challenges with the current DHS structure in improving preparedness and response

terrorist a

and Transportation Security, issues grants to State and local first responders and offers terrorism

preparedness training courses through the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. The Directorat

of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) issues some grants directly to State and local fire 

departments and offers training through such facilities as the Emergency Management Institute and the 

Noble Training Center. The Office of State and Local Government Coordination is the principal liaison to

State and local officials, but does not administer grant programs.117 As Figures 3 and 4 illustrates, there 

are several entities within DHS and the Federal government that have overlapping responsibilities for

training and assistance. 

Figure 3: Federal All-Hazards Assistance, 2003 

ODP (DHS) EP&R (DHS) Department of Health and Department o

Center for Domestic Emergency Management Centers for Public Health Nevada Test 

Training

centers

Preparedness 

NMIMT

Texas A&M 

LSU 

Institute 

National Fire Academy 

Noble Training Center 

Preparedness Site 

Grants 

and Aid 

State and Local 

Terrorism Prevention 

Grants 

Domestic 

Preparedness 

Equipment Grants 

Urban Area Security

Initiative Funds 

Byrne Formul

Local Law

Assistance to Firefighters 

Grants118

Hazard Mitigation Grants 

Emergency Management 

Preparedness and 

Assistance Grants 

Cooperative Agreement on 

Public Health Preparedness 

and Response for 

Bioterrorism 

Hospital Bioterrorism 

Preparedness Program 

Bioterrorism Training and 

Curriculum Development 

Transp

Emergency

Preparedn

Program 

a Grant s

Enforcement Block 

Grants Program

Emergency Medical Services 

for Children 

Trauma / Emergency Medical 

ortation

ess 

Services 

Figure 4: Federal All-Hazards Train

(DHS) HS) DHHS DOT EPA

ing Courses, 2003119

ODP / BTS EP&R (D DOE DoD DOJ 

Courses 53 61 2 40 9 2 6 3 

 

114 Homeland Security Act of 2002, pp. 57-58. 115 Homeland Security Act of 2002, pp. 86-87. 116 See U.S. Representatives John Sweeney and Jo Ann Emerson’s comments, Hearing on FY2004 Emergency Preparedness and 

Response Directorate, House Appropriations Committee, April 30, 2003; 117 John M. Doyle, “Ridge Says DHS Working to Change First-Responder Funding Formula,” Aviation Week’s Homeland 

Security and Defense, Vol. 2, No. 19, May 7, 2003, p. 4. 118 Will likely be shifted to ODP in FY2004. 119 Compendium of Federal Terrorism Training:For State and Local Audiences (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2003). 

G-7 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

One of the m t c a ng these dispara es

tural disa errorist attack 0

 The logic is that they are distin

d require d f training strategy. Combining them would compromise both 

owe roble erences between terrorist attacks and natural 

are not always clear-cut.121 First, terrorist attacks can include a plethora of different incidents, 

ranging from conventional attacks like the September 2001 inc d New York to

biological, c and nuclear attacks. Consequently, it is difficult to see the logic behind 

consolidating idents as different as chemic t separating

training for c nd chemical attacks that are in ma dentical. Second, a number of 

well-respected training centers such as the Center for Domestic Preparedness currently teach preparedness 

for natural disasters and terr h such classes as “WMD

Advanced Hazardous Materials Technician Training,” which prepares hazard material technicians for 

both terrorist and H t e aining c to teac thora of

different types of classes to emergency responders. Third, since terrorist attacks are low probability

events, an all-hazards approach to response and preparedness seems sensible in order to increase the 

r

c

ed

other costs of

not consolidating and coordinating preparedness efforts: confusion among State and local officials, and 

r

cult

ajor arguments for no onsolid ti te entities is that preparedn s efforts for

na sters and t nts

ifferent types o

ver, this logic is p

s should be separated.

, equipment, and

matic, and the diff

12 ct incide

an

efforts. H

disasters

idents in Washington an

hemical, r

 the training for inc

hemical spills a

adiological,

al and biological attacks, bu

ny ways i

orist attacks. For instance, in 2003 the CDP taug t

AZMAT inciden s. Indeed, it is possibl for tr enters h a ple

utility of first responders by improving their preparedness for multiple types of events. After all, first 

responders will be the same for all types of events, and preparedness efforts are in many ways similar fo

incidents such as conventional terrorist attacks and natural disasters such as earthquakes.122

As U.S. Representative James Langevin noted in June 2003: “I am perplexed, along with many of my

colleagues, about the apparently overlapping roles of the EP&R Directorate and the Office for Domesti

Preparedness. This division ... looks like a recipe for duplication of efforts – or worse, crucial tasks 

falling through the cracks. In addition, it seems to be breeding unnecessary confusion at the State and 

local level, as the very time we should be ensuring a clear direction and streamlined system for 

information-sharing, technical guidance, and funding assistance.”123 In addition to the Gilmore 

Commission, a number of reports have noted the redundancy of Federal preparedness efforts and the ne

for greater Federal coordination.124 Indeed, the creation of DHS was supposed to eliminate these 

redundancies. 

In the April 2003 Semiannual Report to the Congress on the Department of Homeland Security, the 

Office of Inspector General argues that placing planning, training, and equipment purchases for 

emergency management personnel in different DHS directorates creates problems with interdepartmental 

coordination, performance accountability, and fiscal accountability.

125 There are at least two

the absence of agreed-upon training standards. State and locals should have a one-stop clearinghouse fo

grants, training programs, and other types of terrorist and disaster preparedness assistance. The 

multiplicity of programs continues to lead to confusion at the State and local levels and makes it diffi

 

120 Interview with Andrew T. Mitchell, Office for Domestic Preparedness, August 2002. 121 There are several differences between terrorist attacks and natural disaste s, but these don’t outweigh the s

combining them within the same directorate. For example, terrorist attacks have a prevention and prosecutorial component that 

r ensibility in

do not exist for natural disasters. 122 Additionally, we should also not rule out the possibility of terrorists using natural disasters as triggering events for attacks on

first responders. 123 U.S. Representative James Langevin, Hearing on Response to Terrorism: How is DHS Improving Our Capabilities? House 

Select Homeland Security Committee, June 19, 2003. 124 See, for example, Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the 

U.S. Response, Report No. 35 (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, October 2000), p. 154; Richard A. Falkenrath, 

“Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic Terrorist Attack,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, Spring 2001, 

pp. 147-186; Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, DC: U.S.

General Accounting Office, September 2001); Daalder et al, Assessing the Department of Homeland Security, pp. vi, 21-24; 

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National Preparedness Strategy, GAO-02-549T (Washington, DC: 

U.S. General Accounting Office, March 2002). 125 Department of Homeland Security: Semiannual Report to the Congress (Washington, DC: Office of Inspector General, April 

2003), pp. 3-4.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

for them to identify available Federal preparedness resources. Perhaps more seriously, the absenc

coordinated pre

e of

paredness efforts makes it difficult to develop training standards that are agreed upon and 

utilized by all relevant training centers. Are different training centers teaching the same preparedness and 

first

quate

cal

ld

nd EP&R into one directorate, or perhaps at a minimum ensuring that 

training, grants, and other assistance were each consolidated into one office. 

have

g

ning

e able to assault a building, 

clear a trench line, and conduct an ambush, and his performance is monitored in measurable terms.130

the

Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) in separate directorates is confusing for State and local officials 

and leads to problems with interdepartmental coordination, performance accountability, and fiscal 

accountability. We recommend that DHS consolidate emergency response training, grants, and allhazards assistance to ameliorate these drawbacks.

There are still no agreed-upon standards for training first responders. This is primarily a result of 

insufficient coordination within DHS regarding preparedness efforts. A good model for DHS to consider 

 

response methods for terrorist attacks and natural disasters? Are they providing adequate training for

responders? Individuals from both EP&R and ODP have acknowledged that there has been inade

coordination between them. 

Consequently, DHS should take at least three steps. First, it should consolidate responsibility for 

emergency response training, grants, and all-hazards assistance into one organization to ameliorate these 

drawbacks. It appears likely in 2004 that ODP will be moved to the DHS Office of State and Lo

Government to improve Federal assistance programs.126 This may help consolidate existing grants by 

placing most in a single program, though some terrorism grants for incidents such as biological attacks

will stay in other departments, such as Health and Human Services.127 Unfortunately, this change does not

adequately address terrorism and all-hazards training centers and courses, which will continue to suffer 

from insufficient unity of command and coordination. The logical and most efficient step would be to 

integrate natural disaster and terrorist training, grants, and other assistance into a single office. This cou

be done by integrating ODP a

Second, DHS needs to develop a strategy for creating training standards for first responders. There have 

been some attempts to do this, such as ODP’s Emergency Responder Guidelines, but these measures

been inadequate because the recommendations are not specific enough.128 A good model might be the 

United States Army’s Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The ARTEP provides mission trainin

plans and performance standards for active and reserve component commanders, staffs, units, and 

soldiers. It also describes the tasks each must be prepared to perform, the conditions under which they

must be performed, and standards to which soldiers and units must perform their critical wartime 

missions.129 These include essential tasks that soldiers should be able to perform, unit tasks for specific 

missions, and guidance to leaders and trainers for planning, preparing, executing, and evaluating trai

exercises. For example, a soldier in an infantry rifle platoon or squad should b

Consequently, in order to improve the preparedness of first responders and ensure they are receiving 

adequate training, DHS should develop comparable training plans for individual first responders such as 

police officers and firefighters, as well as definable units such as HAZMAT teams. 

Recommendations: 

Current DHS structure suffers from a duplication of emergency preparedness and response efforts. In 

particular, the existence of the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) and

126 See, for example, James Jay Carafano, “Fixing the Homeland Security Appropriations Bill,” Heritage Foundation Executive 

Memorandum, No. 891, July 9, 2003; Michael Scardaville, “Adding Flexibility and Purpose to Domestic Preparedness Grant

Programs,” Heritage Foundation Reports, No. 1652, May 6, 2003. 127 The retention of certain agencies such as HHS for public health responsibilities is probably necessary, but is not examined in

this analysis. 128 Emergency Responder Guidelines (Washington, DC: Office for Domestic Preparedness, 2002). 129 See, for example, Mission Training Plan for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, ARTEP 7-

5-MTP (Fort Benning, GA: TRADOC, May 2003); Mission Training Plan for the Military Intelligence Company (Armored

Cavalry Regiment), ARTEP 34-114-30-MTP (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2002). 130 Mission Training Plan for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, pp. 2-2 and 2-3. 

G-9 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

is the United States Army’s Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), which outlines essential tasks 

that must be prepared for, the conditions under which they must be performed, and the standards that 

must be met in their performance.131 We recommend that DHS develop a strategy for establishing 

training standards for first responders that outlines the tasks, conditions and standards of 

performance for individuals and units.

3. Science and Technology

The absence of interoperable communications and equipment standards has been singled out as a serious 

1

ffering

In order to help rectify this problem, DHS has several responsibilities. First, as outlined in the Homeland 

reating

ble

, also

dards. As noted in a May 2003 MOU, the Directorate of 

Science and Technology and the Department of Commerce’s Technology Administration agreed to 

standards” in order to establish the “successful development, testing, 

evaluation, and deployment” of critical technological tools to protect the homeland.136

– and a number 

of interagency and independent organizations that develop homeland security-related communication and 

 

problem in preparedness and response to terrorist attacks, including the response to the September 200

attacks in Washington and New York City.132 As a FEMA report concluded: “Standards are critical in 

many key areas. For example, in too many instances – including the response to the World Trade Center 

attack – first responders and government officials were not able to fully communicate because of di

communication standards, and mutual aid was hindered by incompatible equipment.”133 

Security Act of 2002, the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response was tasked with c

“comprehensive programs for developing interoperative communications technology, and helping to 

ensure that emergency response providers acquire such technology.”134 The National Strategy for 

Homeland Security similarly argues that one of the most important EP&R initiatives should be to “ena

seamless communication among all responders.”135 Second, the Directorate of Science and Technology, 

which is in charge of research and development efforts and priorities in support of DHS missions

plays an important role in developing stan

oversee “the development of

What are the main challenges with DHS’s structure and strategy for improving communications and 

equipment standards? There are several. To begin with, there continues to be a notable vacuum in 

authority for establishing at least minimal communication and equipment standards for emergency

responders. As Figure 5 highlights, there are at least six Federal departments – the Departments of 

Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Labor, Commerce, Defense, and Justice

equipment standards.137 Coordination is generally subpar, despite the existence of such groups as the 

Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and InterOperability. This situation creates several 

problems. 

131 This does not mean directly transferring the ARTEP template to homeland security preparedness efforts. Rather, it means

incorporating ARTEP’s basic framework, including the development of standards by a central authority and the monitoring and 

enforcement of those standards to ensure that they are upheld. 132 After-Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon (San Diego: Titan Systems

Corporation, 2002); Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness (New York: McKinsey & Company, 2002); Hart and Rudman, America – 

Still Unprepared, Still in Danger, p. 14. 133 A Nation Prepared: Federal Emergency Management Agency Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2003-2008 (Washington, DC: 

FEMA, 2002), p. 3. 134 Homeland Security Act of 2002, p. 79. 135 National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. x. 136 Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate of Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

and the Technology Administration, National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, May 2003. 137 Note that such standard setting bodies and NIST, NTIA, OSHA, and NIOSH reside within these agencies. 

G-10 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Figure 5: Organizations that Develop Homeland Security Standards and Guidelines

Organization Affiliation Tasks

Directorate of Emergency Department of Establishes standards – including

Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Homeland Security

e with respect to 

the Nuclear Incident Response Team – and certifies when 

thos

those standards have been met. 

Directorate of Science and Technology

(S&T) 

Department of 

Homeland Security

Develops standards in conjunction with other offices suc

as Commerce’s Technology Administration. 

h

National Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health (NIOSH) 

Department of 

Health and Human 

Services 

Conducts research and suggests standards to reduce

injuries and illnesses among workers in high-priority a

and high-risk sectors. Provides workers, employers, a

the public with information and training to prevent 

occupational injuries and illnesses.

reas 

nd

Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA)

Department of Labor Establishes protective standards, works to enforce them, 

and offers technical assistance and consultation program

to employers and employees throughout the country. 

s

National In

Technolog

stitute of Standards and 

y (NIST) 

Department of 

Commerce 

Develops and promotes measurement, standards, and 

technology to enhance productivity. 

National Telecommunications and 

Information Administration (NTIA)

Department of 

Commerce 

Advises executive branch on domestic and international 

telecommunications and information technology issues, 

including standards. 

National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Department of 

Justice 

Publishes and identifies research reports, guides, and 

other documents for practitioners, policymakers, and 

researchers interested in communications interoperability

and information sharing. 

Technical Support Working Group

(TSWG)

Department of 

Defense 

Develops guidelines for first responders to assist in the 

selection of detectors, personal protective equipment, and 

communications equipment for terrorist incidents. 

Interagency Board for Equipment 

Standardization and InterOperability

(IAB) 

Departments of 

Justice and Defense 

Publishes a standardized equipment list and promotes 

interoperability among civil and military WMD response 

units at local, State, and Federal levels. 

Federal Communications Commission Independent 

government agency

Regulates interstate and international communications by

radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. 

National Fire Protection Association 

(NFPA) 

Private organization Develops and advocates scientifically-based consensus 

codes and standards, research, training, and education to 

reduce the global burden of fire and other hazards.

International Organization for 

Standardization (ISO) 

Private organization Develops voluntary technical standards for businesses 

across the globe. 

Telecommunications Industry

Association (TIA)

Private organization Develops standards and facilitates the convergence of 

new communications networks. 

American National Standards Institute 

(ANSI) 

Private organization Promotes and facilitates voluntary standards and 

conformity assessment systems for U.S. private sector. 

First, there is confusion among State and local officials about what equipment to buy. For example, in 

2002 the State of Indiana purchased 16,000 gas masks at a cost of $650,000 for police, firefighters, and 

emergency medical personnel. However, the masks were constructed of silicone, which chemical agents 

such as mustard gas can penetrate in a few minutes. A better – though more expensive – option would 

have been to purchase butyl rubber masks, which provide emergency responders with far better 

protection138 Without a centralized information source for equipment and communications standards, 

State and local entities may purchase the wrong – or at least subpar – equipment and unnecessarily

jeopardize the safety of emergency responders. As some studies have noted, this can also include the 

entire personal protective equipment (PPE) ensemble. Examples include incompatibility problems that 

have led to gaps between the face opening in chemical protective hoods and the self-contained breathing 

apparatus (SCBA) mask. Some first responders have complained that the SCBA tank can interfere with 

the rear brim of the helmet and limit movement – or even knock the helmet off.139 The concern about the 

 

138 Karen Hensel, “Mask Confusion,” Investigative Report for WISH-TV, Indianapolis; “State Officials Consider Replacing 

Thousands of New Gas Masks,” Associated Press, February 17, 2003. 139 Tom LaTourrette et al, Protecting Emergency Responders: Community Views of Safety and Health Risks and Personal 

Protection Needs , Vol. 2 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), pp. 25-41. 

G-11 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

absence of stand ilmore 

Co the past, and these ar ssues that need immediate attention.140

Se n he le

co y affe ts.

This problem can exist among local ng tions, and

be and ral age t

res n the absen u y

different manufacturers and have different fittings. This ded

emergencies as responders spend time trying to match u anks and canisters

with breathing devices, particularly if supplies are broug

caches, or manufacturers.141

In tant r ling st

systems, and acting as the centralized information sourc

sector. As the Gilmore Commission noted in its Second single Federal office should 

“coordinate the development of natio ecognized st ory

protocols and techniques, with the ultimate objective be

compiling information, DHS could coordinate the assess rtification of equipment

fro o radios, cooperate with Federal agencies and the private sector, publish the results annually,

and make them available on the internet for easy access. Some might respond that this should not be a 

Fe e inte d sta d by

State and local entities, the most logical option is to pursue change through a top-down process led by

DH

Re There are at least six Federal depart

independent organizations that are involved in developin d

eq akes it d n e

po en d

de tandards for homeland security related equipment and communications systems, 

an v c ndards

for State and local entities and the private sector. 

ards and confusion among State and local entities has been noted by the G

mmission in e critical i

cond, the absence of common sta dards increases t likelihood that departments will use incompatib

mmunication systems and equipment, which ma

departments, amo

ct interoperability at the scene of major inciden

departments in neighboring jurisdic

tween municipal departments

pirator systems is that i

State or Fede

ce of even minim

ncies. For example, a common concern abou

m performance standards, they are constructed b

can create notable problems during exten

p respirator parts such as air t

ht in from neighboring jurisdictions, Federal 

sum, DHS can play an impor ole by compi andards for equipment and communication 

e for State and local entities and the private 

Annual Report, a

nally r andards for equipment, training, and laborat

ing official certification.”142 In addition to 

ment, testing, and ce

m PPE t

deral responsibility. But sinc roperability an ndardization problems are not being addresse

S.

commendation: ments and a number of interagency and 

g standards for communication systems an

uipment. This situation m ifficult for States a d locals to know what to buy and increases th

ssibility of incompatible equipm

velopment of s

t. We recommen that DHS compile and coordinate the

d become the single Federal go ernment point of ontact for information on technical sta

4. Border and Transportation Security

Over the last century, the security of the United States has been facilitated by friendly and cooperative 

relations with Canada and Mexico to its north and south, and two vast oceans to its east and west

However, this sense of security has changed. Terrorists, their infrastructure, and other individuals have

attempted to penetrate America’s borders through various ports of entry such as seaports, coastlines, 

airports, highways, railroads, and waterways. Within DHS, border and transportation security includes

number of Federal agencies such as the United States Customs Service, the enforcement division of the

Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Transportation Security Administration. The primary

focus here will be on the United States Coast Guard for several reasons. To begin with, the Coast Guard

plays a critical border and transportation role as the lead Federal agency for ma

.

a

 

ritime security. 

Furthermore, since some of its homeland security functions such as patrolling ports and coastlines have 

140 Note that failure to act quickly affects both the safety of responders and the fiscal position of State and local governments.

Reality dictates that jurisdictions must purchase needed equipment for their first responders as soon as is possible. The failure of

the Federal government to publish information about, and standards for, such equipment makes very real the possibility that

substandard or incompatible equipment will be purchased. Jurisdictions will then have to either expend large sums to repurchase

this substandard or incompatible equipment, or more likely live with it until some later date when it needs to be replaced. This is, 

therefore, an effort that must be tackled promptly and with vigor. 141 Jackson et al, Protecting Emergency Responders, pp. 23-24. 142 Second Annual Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of

Mass Destruction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, December 2000), p. xi. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

been enhanced since September 2001, it offers a useful test case of how well Federal agencies are 

balancing their resources. However, as the last segment of this section illustrates, the issue of balancing 

resource allocation to “new” and “traditional” missions is relevant for a number of important homeland 

g

ety; conducting search and rescue operations; providing navigation 

assistance in ports and waterways; enforcing the protection of living marine resources; eliminating 

lity in

s

me

larly troublesome since there is often a nexus between terrorist and drug-trafficking organizations. 

urthermore, the Coast Guard’s integration into DHS has changed its priorities and working parameters, 

:

substantially below pre-September 11th levels.

147

ollowing the September 2001 attacks, most Coast Guard cutters previously conducting offshore patrols 

boats,

n

security functions such as cargo security and public health. 

The Coast Guard has two primary sets of missions. First, its homeland security missions include 

patrolling ports, waterways, and coastlines; conducting drug and illegal migrant interdiction; performin

military operations for the Department of Defense and sustaining military readiness; and conducting other 

law enforcement tasks such as eliminating illegal encroachment by foreign fishing vessels. These 

missions also include Marine Transportation Act of 2002 (MTSA) objectives such as performing port 

threat and vulnerability assessments.143 Second, the Coast Guard’s non-homeland security missions 

include protecting marine saf

garbage, oil, and plastics that have been discharged into the water; and providing icebreaking capabi

polar regions.144 Both sets of missions are critical. As the Homeland Security Act of 2002 argues, the

Coast Guard is expected to maintain all of its core missions: “The authorities, functions, and capabilitie

of the Coast Guard to perform its missions shall be maintained intact and without significant reduction 

after the transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department [of Homeland Security].”

145

What are the Coast Guard’s main homeland security challenges? One of the primary challenges for the 

Coast Guard has been balancing its missions. Specifically, while it has put significant resources into so

homeland security missions and performed U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has 

decreased resources for important homeland security missions such as drug interdiction.146 This is 

particu

F

and in some cases pulled it away from critical missions. As an April 2003 GAO report concluded

The emphasis the Coast Guard placed on security after September 11th has had varying 

effects on its level of effort among all of its missions ... The most current available data 

show that some security-related missions, such as migrant interdiction and coastal security, 

have grown significantly since September 11th ... However, the level of effort for other 

missions, most notably the interdiction of illegal drugs and fisheries enforcement, is 

F

for fisheries law enforcement and drug and migrant interdiction were ordered to patrol the entrances to 

such major ports as Boston, San Francisco, New York, and Miami. Smaller patrol boats and motor

which had been utilized for missions such as fisheries patrol, were used to conduct security patrols withi

port facilities.148 Furthermore, Coast Guard resources have been used for the U.S. wars in Afghanistan

 

143 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-295 (Washington: Government Printing Office, N

2003). 

144 Homeland Security Act of 2002, p. 115; U.S. Coast Guard FY 2002 Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, 2002). 

ovember 25,

145 Homeland Security Act of 2002, p. 115. 146 Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions, GAO-03-155 (Washington, DC: 

Government Accounting Office, November 2002); Christopher Lee, “Traditional Coast Guard Duties Suffer,” Washington Post, 

April 2, 2003, p. A15; Michael E. O’Hanlon, Hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, March 20, 2003; Alex

Fryer, “Anti-Terror Workload a Worry,” Seattle Times, May 26, 2003, p. B1; Senator Patty Murray, Hearing of the Senate

Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, May 1, 2003; Ronald O’Rourke, Homeland Security: Coast Guard

Operations – Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 2003). 147 Coast Guard: Challenges During the Transition to the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-03-534T(Washington, DC: 

Government Accounting Office, April 2003), p. 5 148 Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions, p. 8. 

G-13 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(Operation Enduring Freedom) and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom).149 One way to measure the Coa

Guard’s efforts is to examine its “resource hours.” The Coast Guard maintains information about how 

cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft are used; each hour that resources are utilized for a mission is termed a 

“resource hour.” An examination of Coast Guard resource h

st

ours over the last several years shows a 

significant decline in several areas, most notably drug interdiction and fisheries enforcement. 

oast

U.S.

ed from 

as cut

, 

their operations. As

Steven Casteel, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence at the Drug Enforcement Agency, recently

ent 

ure 7

 

Specifically, the Coast Guard has substantially reduced its resources for drug interdiction, an important 

homeland security mission. Combating the flow of illegal drugs into the United States is a joint, 

interagency task, with contributions from the Department of Defense, the U.S. Customs Service, C

Guard, and other Federal agencies. The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime drug 

interdiction and shares lead responsibility for air interdiction with U.S. Customs, making it a critical

government component. As Figure 6 illustrates, the Coast Guard’s counterdrug efforts have dropp

approximately 35,000 resource hours at the end of 2000 to nearly 13,000 by 2003. For example, it h

back on conducting counter-drug patrols in southern California and northern Mexico in order to pursue 

other homeland security missions such as port security.150 This is a problem not only because drug 

interdiction by itself is an important homeland security and law enforcement mission of the United States

but because terrorist and drug-trafficking organizations are often intertwined. Such organizations as alQaeda, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Abu Sayyaf Group use drug trafficking to finance

argued: “Whether it is a State, such as formerly Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, or a narco-terrorist 

organization, such as the FARC, the nexus between drugs and terrorism is perilously evident.”151

Furthermore, fisheries enforcement includes protecting U.S. fishing grounds from foreign encroachm

and enforcing domestic fishing laws and regulations through inspections and fishery patrols. As Fig

highlights, resource hours for fisheries enforcement have decreased from approximately 25,000 in 2001 to

around 15,000 in 2003. Figure 6: Resource Hours for Drug Interdiction152

149 Rep. Harold Rogers, Hearing of the House Subcommittee on Homeland Security, April 10, 2003. On the Coast Guard’s role in

military operations see John Mintz and Vernon Loeb, “Coast Guard Fights to Retain War Role,” Washington Post, August 31,

2003, p. A7. 150 Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions, p. 17. 151 Steven W. Casteel, Statement Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 20, 2003. 152 Coast Guard: Challenges During the Transition to the Department of Homeland Security, p. 11. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Figure 7: Resource Hours for Fisheries Enforcement

153

The Coast Guard’s challenges with balancing resources is also apparent in a number of other areas such 

as cargo security and public health. First, with respect to cargo security, DHS has struggled to balanc

tasks of a) maximizing border security with b) ensuring that legitimate “low risk” cargo is cleared in

timely and efficient manner. Addressing this challenge falls principally to the Bureau of Custo

e the

a

and

iculture. Indeed, CBP’s increased antiterrorism efforts have not been met with 

adequate steps to speed up the vel coming into the United 

States.154 This has potentially serious economic consequences. On the one hand, CBP plays a pivotal role 

in preventing high-risk, harmful cargo from coming into the country. On the other hand, it needs to do so 

in a timely manner because searching every cargo and traveler that enters the country would cripple the 

flow of legitimate trade and travel and would require an exorbitant resource commitment. 

Second, the public health sector has struggled with balancing resources for homeland security and more 

traditional missions. This issue area comes mainly under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health and 

Human Services, though it is nonetheless a useful illustration of the trade-off dilemma. For example, 

some studies have noted that in the event of a large-scale infectious disease outbreak such as a bioterrorist 

attack involving anthrax or botulism, most hospitals would not have the capacity to accept and treat a 

sudden, large increase in the number of patients. They would not have sufficient medical equipment such 

as ventilators, personal protective equipment suits, or isolation beds.155 However, meeting those needs 

presents hospitals with a trade-off. Since bioterrorism preparedness is expensive and attacks are low 

probability events, should hospitals redirect precious resources to create capacities that are not needed on 

a routine basis and may never be used? How do we measure this trade-off? The answers are not clear, 

and require further analysis of the costs and benefits of redirecting resources from traditional public 

health functions to new homeland security ones. Indeed, there have been concerns that the Federal 

smallpox vaccination program has diverted resources from such traditional public health activities as 

 

ms

Border Protection (CBP) in DHS, which consists of the inspections component of the former U.S. 

Customs Service; the Border Patrol and Inspections component of the former Immigration and 

Naturalization Service; and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, a former component of the 

U.S. Department of Agr

movement of international commerce and tra

153 Coast Guard: Challenges During the Transition to the Department of Homeland Security, p. 11. 154 Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade 

Facilitation Missions (Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 2003). 155 Hospital Preparedness: Most Urban Hospitals Have Emergency Plans but Lack Certain Capacities for Bioterrorism 

Response (Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 2003). 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

routine immunizations, healt at in some cases common 

resources could be utilized for both functions so that there is a dual-use benefit, but this will not always be 

an option. 

In sum, DHS and other relevant government agencies need to think systematically about how they are 

balancing their resources, and what the costs and benefits are to redirecting resources away from

traditional functions. For example, the Coast Guard has put significant resources into some missions such 

as port security and assisted in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it has decreased 

resources for important homeland security missions such as drug interdiction. This concern is also 

apparent in other areas such as cargo security and public health. 

Recommendation: Current DHS efforts have diminished and compromised important “traditional” 

missions of some component agencies. For example, the Coast Guard has put substantial resources into 

patrolling ports and assisting in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. But it has decreased 

resources for important homeland security missions such as drug interdiction. We recommend that DHS 

conduct research to measure the effects of decreasing “traditional” missions of component agencies 

and adopting new missions related to homeland security.

 

h promotion, and screening.156 It is conceivable th

156 Daniel J. Kuhles and David M. Ackman, “The Federal Smallpox Vaccination Program: Where Do We Go From Here?”

Health Affairs, October 22, 2003; Andrea B. Staiti, Aaron Katz, and John F. Hoadley, “Has Bioterrorism Preparedness Improved 

Public Health?” Issue Brief, No. 65 (Washington, DC: Center for Studying Health System Change, July 2003); “Impact of 

Smallpox Vaccination Program on Local Public Health Services,” Research Brief, No. 9 (Washington, DC: National Association

of County and City Health Officials, February 2003).

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

APPENDIX H–DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY*

sm has 

he

y. The justification for federally funded 

search and development is that public benefits exist that the private sector cannot capture (e.g., National 

r

al departments and independent Federal 

research agencies (AAAS Intersociety Working Group, 2003). The vast majority of this funding is for 

homeland security-related work.158 Eighty percent of this funding is for the Science and Technology 

Directorate, with most of the remainder in the Border and Transportation Security Directorate (AAAS 

Intersociety Working Group, 2003). 

This sudden and large commitment of resources to a new mission159 carries with it some important 

challenges. Chief among these challenges is for the Department of Homeland Security to organize and 

coordinate an effective research and development program amidst great uncertainty and across numerous 

operational needs. Moreover, DHS will have to contend with the challenges of implementing and 

coordinating research in an arena in which the organizations conducting research are almost entirely

unrelated to the organizations that must implement the results of that research. Finally, Department of 

Homeland Security's research and development efforts will have to be developed mindful of the fact that 

substantial fractions of both the research and user communities largely are outside of the department.160 

This appendix addresses the challenge of prioritizing and organizing research and development efforts 

funded and overseen by the Department of Homeland Security. It examines: 

 

With the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, protecting America from terrori

become a top priority and permanent component of the Federal government. As such it represents a new 

force shaping the character of our national goals and activities. One very important responsibility of t

Federal government, particularly since the end of World War II, has been to maintain a program of

research and development in science, engineering, and technolog

re

Research Council, 2001a)157. This is clearly the case for many basic sciences, but also holds true fo

some more applied areas such as energy technologies and homeland security. 

The Department of Homeland Security has a substantial research and development role. In its second 

year of funding, it has a research and development budget request of 1.0 billion dollars, giving it the 

eighth largest research and development budget among Feder

157 This may result from the probability of achieving the anticipated benefits being too low to warrant industry investment, the 

expected duration between research and return of anticipated benefits being too long for industry to capture those investments, or

the anticipated benefits being in a form that private industry does not value (e.g., environmental protection). 158 Although 34 percent of the Department’s total funding is for non-homeland security work, the majority of this funding is for

the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, the Secret Service, and non-homeland security-related work for the Coast 

Guard, which receive little or no research and development funding (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2003a). 159 Homeland security is currently not a formal functional are in the Federal government. Homeland security research and 

development spending is counted in the missions of defense, general science, agriculture, and transportation (AAAS Intersociety

Working Group, 2003). As a result, there are no estimates of Federal research and development funds directed towards homeland

security. 160 The primary research performers include National Institutes of Health, Department of Energy and its national lab system, 

National Institute of Standards and Technology, Department of Defense, National Science Foundation, National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health, National Institute of Justice, Department of Agriculture, and Homeland Security Advanced

Research Projects Agency. Only the last of these is in the Department of Homeland Security. The main users, on the other hand, 

are not primarily research and development agencies, and include Transportation Security Administration; Coast Guard; Federal 

Bureau of Investigation; Postal Service; private industry; and State and local emergency responders, emergency managers, and 

public health agencies (National Research Council, 2002). 

* Tom LaTourrette 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

• Different ways to classify homeland security research and development 

• Options for prioritizing research and development

Likely challenges for research and development coordination and implementation 

• Terrorism response standards. 

l is

.

This appendix is based on an examination of the literature concerning general principles of research and 

in

in

in

Classifying Homeland Security Research and Development 

 is 

hich research and development areas are defined and classified also helps frame the research problems 

andidate areas for prioritization are often defined by the way an agency is organized, legislative 

mandate, or other means. Being new, the Department of Homeland Security does not have a well 

established suite of research and development areas among which to select priorities. Several 

classification schemes for homeland security research and development have been envisioned (e.g., 

President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2002; National Research Council, 2002; 

Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, 2000; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003b). These include 

• weapon type 

• target type 

• mission areas of constituent agencies 

• phases of counterterrorism (e.g., intelligence, prevention, protection, response) 

• technology area (e.g., sensors, computers, medicines, materials, communications) 

as well as various combinations of these categories. The merits of different classification schemes can be 

examined in light of some particular characteristics of homeland security. 

Perhaps the single most defining characteristic of homeland security is the great uncertainty surrounding 

the terrorist threat and how that threat may evolve. If threats evolve rapidly and in unpredictable ways, a 

•

For this discussion, we have in mind a comprehensive research and development program that includes 

activities directed at generating innovations in science and technology as well as the operational 

protocols, organizational structures, and standards that guide their application. While a primary goa

improving support to State and local authorities in the area of terrorism response, the report is intended to 

guide research and development in all areas of homeland security, such as information analysis, 

infrastructure protection, border and transportation security, and emergency preparedness and response

development prioritization, analyses of research and development prioritization in specific agencies and

fields, and research and development in homeland security in particular. Project time and budget 

constraints limited the extent of the literature that could be reviewed. Because the amount of literature

the former two categories is extensive, only a sampling of such reports could be included. The findings

this report were developed primarily by examining general research and development policy principles

the context of homeland security. 

Descriptions of Department of Homeland Security's research plans are not yet well-developed and 

general, and reflect significant flux in decisionmaking that is understandable given the early State of this 

new field (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003b; Check, 2003). 

Hence, an important first step in establishing research and development priorities for homeland security

to determine how to best classify research and development areas.. Classification of research and 

development helps define the scope of issues to be considered in the prioritization process. The way in 

w

that need to be addressed. 

C

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

focu n y not appropriately

refl t ification along these lines might therefore 

requ elopment

effo ( 0). 

), the

d 

classification according to phases of counterterrorism is attractive in some aspects: It would help 

f Federal research agencies. These resources are all invested in a wide 

nge of efforts and may not be able or willing to substantially retool themselves for homeland security; 

this is all the more apropos considering that most relevant research and development agencies remain 

utside the Department of Homeland Security and are therefore subject to minimal influence by the 

ganizing homeland security

search and development priorities around technology areas is attractive. 

will

include a mix of dimensions. No arguments strongly support one scheme 

ver another. However, the strengths and weaknesses of each should be considered by DHS 

s o weapon or target type may be restrictive and any chosen framework ma

ect he homeland security landscape in the future. Class

ire frequent re-organization to stay current, which can be damaging to research and dev

rts National Research Council, 200

Another characteristic is the wide range of agency missions. While the mission of the Department of 

Homeland Security is focused on terrorism and natural disasters (Homeland Security Act of 2002

missions of many of the 22 constituent agencies extend well beyond these areas. Classifying research an

development according to agency mission would therefore be complicated by the need to account for 

these often disparate and possibly conflicting mission elements. 

A

insure that research and development addresses all aspects of counterterrorism efforts. It is also a 

relatively permanent construct that is not likely to evolve in the future. 

A shortcoming of all of these schemes is that they are unique to homeland security and so do not naturally

interface with the nation's existing research and development infrastructure. Homeland security must 

utilize the nation's existing research and development resources, such as national laboratories, university

faculty, and in-house capabilities o

ra

o

Department and its user agencies. The more homeland security is able to cast its research and 

development needs in more conventional research areas, the better able it will be to capitalize on the 

nation's excellent research and development capabilities. In this context, or

re

In practice, many research programs and projects pursued by the Department of Homeland Security

be derived from operational needs, in which case the organization of research areas will tend to emerge 

from the prioritization process itself. The resulting organization of homeland security research and 

development may therefore

o

decisionmakers in deliberations. 

Prioritizing Homeland Security Research and Development 

The Importance of Criteria

Much has been written about prioritizing research and development efforts (e.g., National Science Boa

2001; Bromley, 2003; National Research Council, 1998, 2000, 2002; Office of Tech

rd,

nology Assessment,

1991; d One of the most common critiques of existing approaches is a perceived lack of 

a clear e r priority setting and coordination. The resulting conclusion of nearly all such 

reports is that a strengthened process for research allocation decisions is needed. Without an explicit 

priorit ti uture payoffs, 

visibil a can be

ifficult to defend and assess. 

zation criteria. One of the

trengths of such an approach stems from the observation that specific priorities can change dramatically

an many others).

m thodology fo

iza on methodology, decisions can be based on undesirable factors such as faith in f

ity nd tenacity of proponent constituencies, or serendipity. As a result, such decisions

d

Efforts to systematize the prioritization process involve developing prioriti

s

and quickly, while criteria established for assessing priorities do not. Given the inherent uncertainties in 

assessing the terrorist threat, homeland security is particularly vulnerable to shifting priorities. This was 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

clearly demonstrated on September 11, 2001 and again after the anthrax attacks during the fall of 2001. 

The criteria established before these attacks remained largely valid and in general have much more

stability and longevity than do the priorities derived from them (Bromley, 2003).

nother benefit of a criteria-driven approach is that it helps ensure that research and development 

l,

A

activities are well-linked to the agency's or department's mission. In doing so, the criteria help keep 

research and development on target and provide accountability to the public (National Research Counci

1998). 

Specific Criteria for Homeland Security R&D

Most discussions of criteria for prioritizing research and development in science and technology (e.g

National Science Board, 2001; Office of Technology Assessment, 1991; Bromley, 2003; National 

Research Council, 1998) call for three general elements to be considered

.,

: intrinsic merit, socioeconomic 

enefits, and programmatic concerns.

a

e

sidering some important 

istinguishing characteristics of homeland security. These characteristics and their implications for 

b

Intrinsic merit refers to such issues as objective and significance, breadth of interest, potential for new

discoveries and understanding, and uniqueness. This criterion is relevant primarily to basic science and 

can usually be applied only at the individual project level. Socioeconomic benefits are the most generally

applicable and include improvement of the human condition, economic and environmental benefits, and 

contribution to national pride and prestige. Programmatic concerns include the readiness of the research 

and development infrastructure to pursue the topic as well as the responsibility to develop and sustain

functioning infrastructure that is well-positioned to address a wide scope of topics. 

With these general principles as a starting point, criteria for a research and development agenda under th

auspices of the Department of Homeland Security can be developed by con

d

designing prioritization criteria are described below. 

A New Mission

The Department of Homeland Security is a new organization with a new mission. Because it

new research area, homeland secu

represents a 

rity does not have a distinct or well-developed theoretical or empirical 

search base. Indeed, a major challenge for the Department of Homeland Security is to define the scope 

earch portfolio that encompasses both 

basic and applied research. Consequently, the Department of Homeland Security must build upon 

rams in other areas (Frist et el., 2002). In time, important basic research 

eeds will undoubtedly emerge. In the mean time, however, homeland security research will need to 

onders have expressed a desire for broad-spectrum, real-time, and portable 

nvironmental sensors. They have also called for location monitoring technologies to help pinpoint

re

of research and generate a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary res

existing basic research prog

n

concentrate on more downstream, or applied, research and development. This means that some criteria 

related to intrinsic merit, such as the potential for new discoveries and understanding, should initially be 

weighted less than socioeconomic and programmatic criteria. 

An initial emphasis on applied research and development in the Department of Homeland Security has

been affirmed by the Undersecretary for Science and Technology (Check, 2003). Such an emphasis has 

implications for which needs can be addressed now and which must await more basic research. For 

instance, many emergency resp

e

trapped responders (LaTourrette et al,. 2003). Developing these technologies will require advances in

basic research. In the meantime, applied research can be directed at achieving incremental improvements

in existing technologies—such as making them more light-weight and easy to use. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Uncertainty

Another important characteristic of homeland security is the uncertainty that surrounds the terrorist threat 

nd the difficulty in estimating how much this threat is mitigated with the introduction of new counternd

acks

ed counter-measures or preventative efforts would have. 

ist threat (in terms of weapons, targets, severity, frequency)

so great, prioritizing research and development based on the type of threat it addresses is very difficult. 

be

. A single biological or nuclear attack could realistically kill tens 

f thousands of people, while chemical, radiological, or conventional attacks are 10 to 1000 times less 

search.

egy will vary depending on the phase of 

counterterrorism activity it addresses or the target type it protects. For instance, for most threats, research 

ing attack prevention or interdiction has the potential to save many more lives than 

search addressing attack response. Thus, efforts to provide early warning of chemical or biological 

urity is the inherent objective of risk

anagement. This approach is used by the Environmental Protection Agency, which has developed some

 characterized to 

develop risk management options. If so, the next step is to determine whether risk management options 

a

measures. These uncertainties are problematic because estimates of the effectiveness of research a

development conducted under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security in preventing att

or injuries require a baseline estimate of what attacks and injuries are expected to occur and what impact 

improv

Because the uncertainty surrounding the terror

is

One way to narrow the problem slightly is to assume that high attack frequencies cannot be sustained, 

because the mechanism would eventually be identified and intercepted. In this case priority would

given to research and development directed towards threats that have the potential to produce the greatest 

numbers of casualties in a given attack

o

lethal (e.g., Davis et al., 2003). Therefore, on the basis of estimated casualties, research addressing 

biological and nuclear threats would receive priority. 

However, given that other less catastrophic threats exist and have a greater probability of occurring, car 

bombs and suicide bombs, for example, research and development addressing other attack modes cannot 

be neglected. Thus an additional way to cope with the threat uncertainty is to make an effort to be 

comprehensive in terms of the spectrum of threats addressed in homeland security re

The second uncertainty–estimating the effectiveness of a particular innovation in decreasing the 

frequency, magnitude, or impact of attacks–it somewhat more tractable. This uncertainty can be 

examined by considering the aspect of counterterrorism operations that a particular innovation would

address. The effectiveness of a counterterrorism strat

aimed at improv

re

attacks by means of detectors, surveillance, and information sharing would receive priority over research 

on emergency responder protection and decontamination. Viewed in this context, some research and 

development efforts may emerge as particularly valuable and hence warrant high priority. Proposed 

innovations that address multiple threats, targets, or counterterrorism phases would warrant greater 

priority. 

Risk Management 

Another characteristic of the homeland security effort that can help shape how to think about prioritizing 

research and development in the Department of Homeland Sec

m

criteria designed around this goal. Many of these criteria can be adapted to homeland security. A major

difference between the challenges faced by environmental protection and homeland security, however, is

that sources of environmental risks are generally more identifiable and their potential effects more 

quantifiable than terrorism risks. Nonetheless, for those terrorism risks that have been identified, the 

concept of risk management may be very effective in prioritizing research and development options.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (2001) risk-based criteria start with identifying the effect 

that proposed research would address and assessing whether the effect is sufficiently

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(which, for homeland security, may include diplomatic, military, political, legal, procedural, 

rganizational, or technical) currently exist. Finally, if options amenable to development through 

n

in

ecentralized Organization

o

research and development exist (procedural, organizational, or technical), could new such solutions 

effectively mitigate the risk cost-effectively and in a manner acceptable to stakeholders? This evaluatio

process requires an understanding of the potential benefits of research and development solutions with

the context of the larger array of potential approaches to reducing the threat of terrorism. Such an 

approach has the advantage of taking a holistic view of an issue. 

D

s

pic).

hese problems will impede any research and development effort, but may be particularly detrimental in 

nd

sponders is discussed in later in this report. In general, it will be important to gather expert and 

these

Another relevant characteristic of the homeland security arena is that there is a substantial separation 

between those performing research and development and those responsible for implementing the result

of that research and development–such as private industry and State and local responder organizations.

Such a decentralized arrangement can lead to a form of principle-agent problem. This can result in 

research being conducted without the necessary input from the end-users, which could lead to misdirected

or irrelevant efforts. Also, research performers may not receive the support and guidance they need to 

succeed (see "Coordinating Research and Development" section below for more discussion of this to

T

homeland security, where user requirements and priorities may evolve quickly and in unexpected ways.

Because of these potential problems, it is important that research and development options be explicitly

examined in the context of how they will address the needs of the user agencies, particularly State a

local agencies. One approach for accomplishing this coordination for the case of local emergency

re

stakeholder input early in the research and development process and maintain interaction between

groups throughout the process to help assure that DHS research programs and user needs stay in 

alignment. 

Dual Use Applications

A final defining characteristic of the Department of Homeland Security's effort is that it will likely be 

characterized by intense periods of great need, followed by longer periods of less activity. In this respect 

DHS is similar to the Department of Defense. While there will always be important ongoing activity,

such as surveillance, training, and systems development, much of the technology and activity that wil

supported by research and development, particularly that addressing terrorism response, will be used

an interm

l be

on

ittent basis. Thus, it is important to consider how any homeland security research and 

evelopment could have other benefits as well (e.g., improving the public health system, improving

isasters and industrial accidents, reducing theft at ports, military applications). This 

o called "dual-use" criterion is particularly important given that many of the users of research and 

up

d for

and

s are

eing achieved.

d

response to natural d

s

development supported by DHS are local municipalities with limited budgets, which limits their ability to

acquire new equipment and provide specialized training. In addition, most of the agencies that make

the Department of Homeland Security have missions that extend well beyond that of the Department. 

The Department of Homeland Security's mission explicitly states that it must ensure that the functions of 

the agencies and sub-divisions within the Department that are not related directly to securing the 

homeland are not diminished or neglected (Homeland Security Act of 2002). This suggests the nee

DHS to develop a rigorous and comprehensive approach to identifying potential dual-use applications

their user communities and then regularly consult with them to confirm if the desired dual-use benefit

b

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Proposed Criteria 

Table 1 summarizes the above discussion and presents a set of criteria for prioritizing research and 

development for homeland security. The recommendations made here should be viewed as illustrative 

and not necessarily complete or in an appropriate rank order. 

Table 1-Criteria for Prioritizing Homeland Security Research and Development 

Category Criteria

Research benefits 

• Potential to reduce threat 

• Risk management considerations 

• Is the targeted effect sufficiently well characterized to develop risk 

management options? 

• Do risk management options for this effect currently exist? 

• Could new technical solutions effectively mitigate the risk costeffectively and in a manner acceptable to stakeholders?

• Addresses needs of research and development users particularly at 

• Relevance to high-impact threats (biological and nuclear) 

local and State level 

• Applicability to non-homeland security use 

• Relevance to non-homeland security mission of DHS agency 

• Relevance to non-homeland security use beyond DHS 

Programmatic considerations

• Is the necessary research and development infrastructure in place 

(researchers with relevant knowledge and skills, necessary

laboratories, equipment, and methods)?

• Is some government agency already supporting it? 

• Is industry supporting it? 

These criteria should provide a provisional basis on which the Department of Homeland Security can 

search and development options. Applying these criteria will require substantial 

xpert and stakeholder input, as evaluating candidate options against several of the criteria requires 

ch

sers in

.

ent. 

examine and rank its re

e

predicting the success and impact of research before it has been conducted.161 The most constructive 

avenue for the Department of Homeland Security to define and evaluate candidate research options will 

be to convene workshops or expert panels of researchers, administrators, and user groups. This approa

is routinely used for setting research agendas in government and industry (e.g., National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health, 1996; National Institutes of Health, 2003; American Forest and Paper 

Association, 1999; Pollard et al., 2003) and. Given the decentralization of researchers and end u

the homeland security arena, it will be important that DHS efforts strive to be as inclusive as possible

Representation by State and local agencies and government research agencies outside Department of 

Homeland Security will be especially valuable. 

Coordinating R&D 

As noted earlier, a significant portion of the research and development the Department of Homeland 

Security funds or participates in likely will be executed by agencies housed outside of the departm

Moreover, those who seek to apply and use the resulting innovations (such as private industry and State 

and local response organizations) also will be third parties operating outside of the jurisdiction of DHS. 

161 Further, not all criteria suggested above are likely to be equally important, and some weighting may need to be

included in prioritization efforts. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

This decentralization has important implications for homeland security research. When an agency

erforming research is not the principal beneficiary of that research, the performing agency tends not to 

e

he results of the research it supports.

onsequently, the Department of Defense is more realistic about the funds and time needed to complete a 

project. This cont h, where the

agency has less at stake in the success of a project or program because there is no expectation of direct 

use and there table for making progress (Office of Tech ssessment, 1991). A potential 

implication for homeland security is ission by

outside agencies may not be respons e y not receive the support and attention it 

needs to be successful. 

The Department of Homeland Security Department

of me of the frag of the

Department's Homeland Security Adva rity Institute, a

substantial fraction of relevant resea h

addition, the Department must support d local emergency responders, emergency

managers, and public health agencie w beyond the 

Department's control. 

Research Performers

p

be heavily invested in the success or failure of a program or project. In contrast, a more vertically

integrated agency tends to be more involved and supportive of the research it sponsors. For example, th

Department of Defense has a large operational investment in t

C

rasts with National Science Foundation and National Institutes of Healt

is no time nology A

Defense. While so

e alternative to vertical integra

that research conducted in support of the Department's m

iv to evolving needs or ma

cannot emulate the vertically integrated model of the

mentation may be lessened in the future with the maturation

nced Research Projects Agency and Homeland Secu

rc will likely always be conducted outside the Department. In 

the needs of State an

s, hose operations and needs will always be largely

Th tion is n the research performer 

side, allowing the Department of Ho luating relevant 

research carried out in outside organ a meland security research (e.g., President's 

Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2002). The importance of such coordination was 

y's

m d

to identify matches between existing research activity

nd homeland security goals. Agencies with matches could then be considered by DHS for partnerships. 

beneficial partners beyond those already mentioned could be envisioned, including

e National Institute of Standards and Technology, various agencies within the Department of Defense, 

nal

Interagency relationships could encompass issues such as research prioritization, design, and funding; 

facility sharing; project and program evaluation; or technology engineering and deployment approaches. 

The most appropriate type of relationship might depend on factors such as the status of an activity or 

capability (i.e., existing, under development, planned) or whether the activity is expected to result in 

close coordination and partnership. O

meland Security to be involved in guiding and eva

iz tions will strengthen ho

acknowledged by Congress and the Administration in forming the Department of Homeland Security, 

although few formal agreements were granted. The department has an advisory role in guiding the 

National Institutes of Health's bioterror research and has authority to utilize the Department of Energ

national laboratories and sites (Malakoff, 2002). The level of success of ho eland security research an

development efforts across the entire Federal government will depend heavily on effective interagency

cooperation. Such cooperation can be enhanced by the further development of formal relationships 

between the Department of Homeland Security and outside research agencies. 

There are over 50 Federal agencies conducting research that is potentially relevant to the Department's

mission. One approach to help guide the selection of agencies with which DHS might want to develop 

formal research relationships is to array agency research activities and capabilities against homeland 

security objectives. Such an array could be used

a

Numerous potentially

th

the National Science Foundation, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the Natio

Institute of Justice, and the Department of Agriculture. An additional benefit of such an exercise would

be to identify gaps in Federal counterterrorism research that the Department of Homeland Security may

choose to concentrate on filling through its internal programs. 

H-8 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

increased knowledge or a deployable system. One example of a potentially beneficial relationship

coordinating with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health on the design of research 

objectives and standards parameters for respiratory protection for terrorism response. Relationships

entail as little as DHS offering to supplement agency or program research budgets or as much as 

transferring programs into the Department of Homeland Security. 

Agency activities related to terrorism could be determined from annual reports or a survey. Some 

compilations of this sort have already been made (e.g., Office of Management and Budget, 2003; 

President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2002). A more challenging aspect is 

deciding what activities to target, that is, the homeland security objectives. Defining these is an ongoing

process and will become more clear as homeland security research is classified and prioritized. 

is

could

Intramural vs. Extramural Research

ome 

act as guides. Strengths of intramural research include the ability to 

arch over decades 

• More easily apply a multidisciplinary approach to problems

ge organizations and some

have obsolete missions. 

A related question is determining which research to conduct within Federal research laboratories 

(intramural) and which to grant or contract to universities, industry, and non-profit research institutions 

(extramural). This could apply to research originating from the Department of Homeland Security or

partner agencies. There is no simple formula for balancing intramural and extramural research. An 

analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each (Office of Technology Assessment, 1991) revealed s

useful insights that can

• Maintain rese

• More often fund higher risk research because the laboratories can absorb a setback without 

jeopardizing young faculty or graduate student careers 

• Allow project managers to more easily maintain involvement in research 

• Be "put on the fast track" when the results are needed quickly

• Assure access and maintenance for large facilities, making Federal laboratories sometimes the 

only sensible place to site them

• Strengths of extramural research include the ability to

• Access the most talented personnel (Federal laboratories must pay government salaries and often 

lack the prestige of a university) 

• Access the "open market" for the most appropriate lab or team for a particular project 

• Stay on the cutting edge of research. Many Federal laboratories are lar

While the second list is shorter, this does not necessarily indicate that extramural research is not worth 

considering. Access to top personnel can be a particularly strong advantage. A single world-class 

investigator can generate ideas and enthusiasm to elevate a research program dramatically. In research, 

leadership is not synonymous with management or administration (National Research Council, 2000). 

Research Users

On the research user side, many relevant agencies reside within the Department of Homeland Security

(see introduction). This should help insure that the users' procedures, technologies, and operational 

environments are understood and taken into consideration in determining research priorities and 

evaluating their progress. In addition, the Department may be able to mandate the use of certain 

approaches or technologies in order to further improve the link between operations and research. 

One notable exception is State and local agencies. Supporting these agencies' research and development 

needs is one of the important challenges for the Department of Homeland Security. To facilitate the 

H-9 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

linkage between Federal research and development and State and local agency needs, the President's 

Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (2002) recommended the establishment of a 

"coordinating council" for State and local governments. This council would oversee the process of 

receiving input from, and relaying information to, pertinent State and local operators regarding ne

programs or technologies. Another important role of such a counc

eded

il would be to design, manage, and 

valuate pilot programs for new technologies at the State and local level. These activities should be high 

th.

s of Emergency Responders

ment of 

he process is based on a set of 12 National Terrorism Response Objectives:

.

.

.

4.

.

valuation and Management 

dical Response 

ess for Biological 

nt

11. Criminal Investigation and Attribution 

gricultural Mitigation and Restoration

Ext iv ber of

func n

subordi ting the objective. For example, the functional capabilities for the 

ersonal protection objective are body protection from all hazards, long-term respiratory protection–

tional

explosive/incendiary–for most response objective categories. 

he next step involves inventorying current capabilities and comparing them against the functional 

, is 

orative

ists

–can

e

priorities for the Department's Office of State and Local Government Coordination. 

One approach to linking research and development efforts to emergency responder operational 

requirements is described below. This model could potentially be adopted for other State and local 

agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities, such as emergency management and public heal

One Effort to Identify the R&D Need

An effort to develop a technology plan for emergency responders that may be useful to the Depart

Homeland Security decisionmakers is "Project Responder" (Pollard et al., 2003). This work presents a 

multi-step process aimed at (a) ensuring that Federal planners understand the capabilities needed by

emergency responders and (b) focusing technology development on filling identified gaps in these 

capabilities. We describe this process below, then discuss how it can be further strengthened and focused. 

T

1 Personal Protection 6. Crisis E

2 Detection, Identification, and 

Assessment 

7. All-Source Situational Understanding 

8. Me

3 Unified Incident Command Decision 9. Public Health Readin

Support and Interoperable Agent Eve

Communications 

Response and Recovery

10. Logistics Support 

5 Emergency Management Preparation 12. A

and Planning

ens e input from emergency responders was used to break down each objective into a num

tio al capabilities and associated operational environments. The functional capabilities are 

nate requirements suppor

p

oxygen available, long-term respiratory protection–oxygen deficient, responder decontamination, and 

escape respiratory protection. The operational environments represent the context in which the func

capabilities would be employed. Based on emergency responder input, Project Responder used the 

environments created by five weapon types–chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 

T

capabilities to identify capability gaps. An evaluation is conducted for each combination of functional 

capability and operational environment to determine if the capability in that environment exists today

marginal or unevenly available among responders, or does not yet exist. This step requires collab

input from technology users (the emergency responder community) and researchers and technolog

(government laboratories, universities, industry). 

Capability-environment combinations that do not exist today, termed capability gaps, are then evaluated 

to assess what approaches–including procedures, organization, training, coordination, and technology

H-10 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

be used to resolve them. Finally, for those gaps that are determined to be amenable to technological 

solutions, technology goals are developed. These goals are intended to cast the problem in terms 

appropriate for the research community, and would identify a specific technology advancement that

would be developed, the agency best suited to conduct the research, metrics to measure the advancemen

timelines for progress, and the funding required. Development of technology goals would be formulate

in an iterative process that involves emergency responders, researchers and technologists, and technology

planners (government agencies, policy researchers). 

t,

d

om the 

key

focus

mbating terrorism (Pollard et al., 2003). 

research needs for emergency 

d to identifying both 

s may include improving 

pera tional structures, training, or e is the

need rent responder s c st

attack

The P to be co r

developm ponders. Another improved is to 

incorporate prioritization considerations. Evaluating the teria

and c hose a ,

gaps r en fill ed.

nother i deration for emergency responders is applicability to non-homeland security use. 

per

ation,

es

sponder

. 

tial body of supporting research and hence can play an 

The Project Responder technology planning methodology was developed with extensive input fr

emergency responder community to insure that the proposed planning framework would capture the

capabilities needed to conduct emergency response operations. Subsequent vetting with numerous

Federal agency representatives and local emergency responders indicates that it has the potential to

and prioritize national investment in advanced technologies for co

The approach is ideally suited for identifying capability gaps and

responders across a wide spectrum of terrorism response activities. Importantly, the methodology

includes roles for all stakeholders and provides and analytical bridge between research and development 

efforts and emergency responder operational needs. 

The Project Responder approach can be made even more useful by expanding its scope. It seems 

unnecessarily restricted to identifying technology needs. Homeland security research and development 

must address more than technology, and the approach appears to be well suite

technical and nontechnical solutions to capability gaps. Nontechnical solution

o tional procedures, organiza

o

 coordination. An important exampl

for perational procedures for diffe

s (LaTourrette et al., 2003). 

ervi es designed for specific types of terrori

roject Responder methodology is designed

ent needs for emergency res

mp ehensive in identifying research and 

way in which it could be

candidate research areas according to the cri

onsiderations in Table 1 could help identify t

elated to high impact threats or gaps that, wh

mportant consi

reas warranting higher priority. For example

ed, will have large benefits, could be prioritiz

A

Additional equipment introduces numerous burdens for emergency responders, such as difficulties in 

assessing when specialized gear is called for, the necessity to train departments and individuals on pro

use, maintaining proficiency and familiarity with seldom-used gear, and increased storage, transport

and maintenance requirements (LaTourrette et al., 2003). Ultimately, research and development 

addressing emergency responder needs must be weighed in the context of research and development in

other areas of homeland security, such as border and transportation security, intelligence analysis, and 

infrastructure protection. In order to provide Department-wide perspective on the research and 

development needs in different areas and to assist with Department-wide prioritization, representativ

from these other areas could be included in the assessment and prioritization of emergency re

research and development needs. 

Terrorism Response Standards 

The issue of standards for terrorism response has received considerable attention throughout the 

formation and early operations of the Department of Homeland Security. Standards can have important 

implications for the nascent research and development agenda of the Department of Homeland Security

One implication is that standards require a substan

important role in determining the direction of Department of Homeland Security research and 

development. A standard that requires capabilities beyond what are currently available, such as is being 

considered for biological and chemical agent detectors (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003b),

H-11 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

must be preceded by research and development to attain that capability. A second implication is that

standards will drive the diffusion and use of particular technologies and counterterrorism activities

the Department of Homeland Security can use standards as a mechanism to promote the disseminatio

new technologies and procedures emerging from the research and development pipeline. Finally, 

development and implementation of the standards themselves will require research support in the form of 

establishing performance requirements, designing certification and testing procedures, and validating their

performance in the field. The Department of Homela

. Thus,

n of

nd Security may thus need to provide research 

support to standards-setting and certification organizations. 

Types of Standards

Terrorism response standards are generally directed at two levels: those that apply to equipment design 

and performance and those that concern overall preparedness, including equipment, procedures, training, 

supplies, and facilities. 

Equipment standards development is progressing naturally through mechanisms and institutions that have

existed prior to the formation of DHS. For example, one of the top priorities of emergency responders in 

e context of terrorism response is protection from chemical warfare agents (e.g., LaTourrette et al., 

ere

res for respiratory protection for chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear weapons (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2001). These and other similar 

dress

pment 

ch 

h

th

2003; Pollard et al., 2003). These concerns have been raised in standard-setting organizations, wh

candidate solutions have been proposed, evaluated, refined, and agreed upon in an open and 

representative forum. The National Fire Protection Association, a widely recognized independent 

organization, has developed a standard for protective garments for chemical and biological terrorism

incidents (National Fire Protection Association, 2001). The National Institute for Occupational Safety

and Health, a Federal agency, working with a number of other organizations, has recently developed 

standards and certification procedu

standards-development institutions and mechanisms appear to be well-positioned to continue to ad

equipment standards for terrorism response. The Department of Homeland Security's role in equi

standards development, therefore, might be limited to collaboration and support, for example, in the area 

of funding to support the activities of these organizations. 

In contrast, no institutions or mechanisms currently exist to develop and enforce the more complex and 

multidisciplinary standards that would be required for terrorism preparedness for emergency response

organizations While current standards-setting efforts do go beyond equipment and address operating 

procedures (e.g., the National Fire Protection Association publishes a standard on recommended practices 

for responding to hazardous materials incidents), standards for terrorism preparedness cover a mu

broader scope which falls beyond the purview and capabilities of a single organization. Developing suc

standards will require creating new capabilities and organizations, and this suggests a more prominent 

role for DHS. 

Options for Generating Standards

Canada (2003) has outlined several policy approaches for generating terrorism preparedness standards 

artment of Homeland Security. These options and some of their 

plications are summarized below. 

y

ttacks is

that merit consideration by the Dep

im

• Maintain the Status Quo. There is by no means universal agreement within the homeland securit

community on whether terrorism preparedness standards are necessary. Some note the extensive 

effort already devoted to funding, planning, and training for disaster response and argue that 

current response capabilities are very good. The response to the September 11, 2001 a

cited as an example of the speed and scale at which the current system is able to operate. A 

related argument is that current equipment and response standards are adequate, and that 

H-12 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

appropriate new standards will evolve as necessary. This reasoning is based on the assumptio

that standards are only useful when they serve a clear objective, and that the current uncertainty 

surrounding the terrorist threat precludes the development of useful preparedness standards. 

• Encourage Development and Adoption. This entails promoting a voluntary consensus process. 

This is the most common process used to create a wide variety of standards, including those 

developed by the National Fire Protection Association. In short, this is a structured process t

involves a number of stakeholders, including users, m

n

hat

anufacturers, researchers, associations, and 

government agencies. It incorporates the principals of due process, openness, balanced 

n, written procedures, and an appeals process. The American National Standards 

Institute advocates these principles. The National Research Council found that this process is 

ry standards. Congress endorsed this approach in the National Technology 

Transfer Advancement Act of 1995 and reaffirmed its commitment to it in the Homeland Security 

standardment 

uch

lt,

estic Preparedness currently requires 

recipients to complete a needs assessment before receiving funds, and equipment grants may only

t, 

ies

ieving the desired level of preparedness. A reasonable compromise would be to have the

standards define specific performance goals, but allow local agencies discretion in determining 

s. Note that conditioning Federal assistance does not solve the problem

of what standards should be chosen and how they should be developed. Either a voluntary 

ns. The most aggressive approach would be for DHS to develop 

and implement preparedness standards or to direct other Federal agencies to do so. This would 

uired

participatio

effective, particularly when Federal agencies participate, and found that it is often faster than 

Federal regulatory approaches and results in standards that are as stringent and demanding as 

Federal regulato

Act of 2002. Success of this approach requires high participation from stakeholders and good 

communication among participants. 

While widely heralded, this approach offers Federal authorities limited influence over the pace

and direction of activities. Aside from increasing grant funding to nongovernmental

setting organizations or sponsoring interagency standardization working groups, the govern

has few options for encouraging this process. And there may be little motivation to advance s

an effort voluntarily. The large number of stakeholder groups required and the scope and 

complexity of the task may deter the community from undertaking or completing it. As a resu

this process might not result in the desired level of preparedness. 

• Condition Federal Assistance. Another approach is would be to adopt preparedness standards 

that State and local agencies would be required to meet as a condition for receiving Federal 

assistance. The Federal government has a long tradition of conditioning grants. In fact, the 

Department of Homeland Security's Office of Dom

be used to purchase approved equipment.

A challenge with this approach is establishing the appropriate balance between specific 

operational and technical (micro) standards and overall performance (macro) standards. 

Complying with excessive micro standards may require agencies to alter their plans, equipmen

or training to such an extent that they would decline the assistance. Compliance with overly

broad performance standards, on the other hand, is difficult to evaluate and may result in agenc

not ach

how to achieve these goal

consensus or Federal process must still be employed. 

• Promulgate Federal Regulatio

result in the highest degree of compliance, since Federal regulations are enforceable under the 

law. As with conditioning Federal assistance, this approach is quite common, with agencies such 

as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, National Highway and Traffic Safety

Administration, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency enforcing regulations addressing 

public safety and health. And this approach, too, has already been adopted in the homeland 

security arena: the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 req

H-13 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

community water systems serving more than 3,300 people to complete a vulnerability assessmen

and develop an emergency response plan. 

t

While a Federal regulatory approach may be the best way to assure that standards are developed 

al

s many 

to 

t

ates

nt

nificant burdens in terms of replacing equipment, retraining personnel, or modifying facilities. Preemption of State laws and interference with 

al 

rity

Overcom

and enforced, it has some potential pitfalls that must be considered. First, in general, Federal 

regulations are less likely than a voluntary consensus to be crafted with the necessary technic

knowledge and appropriate stakeholder representation. This may not be true for terrorism

preparedness standards, however, given the large scope and complexity involved. Nonetheless, 

efforts should be made to incorporate as many existing voluntary standards as possible, a

nongovernmental organizations, such as the National Fire Protection Association, have access

more subject matter expertise and are more familiar with the standards-development process. 

Second, Federal standards may raise some federalism issues. States or local jurisdictions migh

argue that Federal preparedness regulations represent an unfunded mandate. Unfunded mand

are discouraged, though not forbidden, by law and exceptions for national security needs are 

permitted. Nonetheless, States may oppose Federal standards that are more stringent than curre

standards, particularly if they pose sig

current practices may also be a concern. Extensive disaster response plans and intergovernment

partnerships have been developed in particular areas to address their unique needs with their 

available resources. Modification of these plans to focus on terrorism, particularly if such 

modification is viewed as interfering with the region's ability to respond to other public safety

concerns, such as natural disasters, may be opposed. If the Department of Homeland Secu

chooses to mandate Federal terrorism preparedness standards, States may challenge them on these

grounds. 

ing Uncertainty in Standards Development

ort to develop terrorism preparedness standards, regardless of the role of DHS, is further 

ated by the tremendous level of uncertainty surrounding terrorism response. In the first p

nty about the terrorist threat–what kinds of weapons may be used, what sites may be targeted, 

en such actions may be attempted–makes it

Any eff

complic lace, the

uncertai

how oft difficult to provide much specificity in a preparedness 

standard. This leaves the choice of making preparedness standards either very general or somewhat 

arbitrari rom

existing rds are

unneces

latter ch to

match th

A secon rs

and othe

emerge m

respons an entail high levels of stress (Jackson et 

al., 2002). This means that, even if the details of a specific of attack were known ahead of time, what 

resp d

contrast

procedu s

impeded

help bet nt

of prepa y

enhance

ly focused on particular possibilities. The former choice will be difficult to distinguish f

general disaster preparedness plans. This may indicate that terrorism preparedness standa

sary and that efforts should focus on disaster preparedness standards instead. The danger of the 

oice is that standards could become obsolete as threats evolve; frequent updating of standards

e latest threat may make it impossible for State and local agencies to keep up. 

d important uncertainty impacting terrorism preparedness standards is how emergency responde

r State and local agencies will operate in a terrorism response. In-depth discussions with 

ncy responders around the country reveal that few specific operational procedures for terroris

e exist (LaTourrette et al., 2003) and that such scenes c

on ers will actually be doing during the response can only be predicted in very general terms. This

s markedly with more common types of responses, such as structural fires, where response 

res and training are well-established and institutionalized. Developing preparedness standards i

by not knowing what responders need to be prepared to do. While preparedness standards may

ter define terrorism response operations, this is not necessarily the case. Thus, the developme

redness standards will be greatly facilitated and the usefulness of those standards will be greatl

d by first developing terrorism response operational procedures. 

H-14 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

These u

in devel standards. In particular, because standards have the 

potential to influence research and development decisions and "lock-in" particular technologies or

procedu

with the

Referen

ncertainties indicate that the Department of Homeland Security will need to proceed with caution 

oping and implementing terrorism response

res, it is important that standards development be conducted iteratively and in close coordination 

research and development of counterterrorism technologies and operational procedures. 

ces

ntersociety Working Group (2003) AAAS Report XXVIII: 

 and Development FY 2004, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, DC, 

at http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/rd04main.htm

AAAS I

Research

available . 

Advisory

(2000) S

http://ww

Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

econd Annual Report to the President and the Congress, available at 

w.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror2.pdf. 

n Forest and Paper Association (1999) The Path Forward: An Implementation Plan, U.S. Department of

ffice of Industrial Technologies, Washington, DC, available at 

w.oit.doe.gov/forest/pdfs/forest_roadmap.pdf

America

Energy O

http://ww . 

DA (2003) “What Criteria Should be Used to Establish Funding Priorities?,” Physics Today, June, 200

5.

 (2003) Homeland Security: Standards for State and Local Preparedness, Congressional Research Serv

L31680, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 

(2003) “Hom

Bromley 3, 

pp. 54-5

Canada B ice

report R

Check E eland Science Chief Wants Quick Fixes,” Nature, vol. 423, p. 106. 

well DR (2003) Individual Preparedness and Response to

hemical, Radiological, Nuclear, and Biological Terrorist Attacks, MR-1731-SF, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 

Davis LE, LaTourrette T, Mosher DE, Davis LM, and Ho

C

available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1731. 

Frist W, Marburger JH, Lederberg J, Schneider W, and Neal H (2002), Marshalling Science, Bridging the Gap: 

How to Win the War Against Terrorism and Build a Better Peace, Center for the Study of the Presidency,

Washington DC, available at http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/indexpubs.htm. 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 (H.R. 5005), Title 1, Sec. 101 (b), available at 

http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=46. 

Jackson BA, Peterson DJ, Bartis JT, LaTourrette T, Brahmakulam IT, Houser A, and Sollinger JM (2002) 

Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks, CF-176-OSTP, RAND, Santa Monica, 

CA, available at http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF176/. 

LaTourrette T, Peterson DJ, Bartis JT, Jackson BA, and Houser, A (2003), Protecting Emergency Responders, 

Volume 2: Community Views of Safety and Health Risks and Personal Protection Needs, MR-1646-NIOSH, 

RAND, Santa Monica, CA, available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1646/. 

Malakoff D (2002) “New Agency Contains Strong Science Arm,” Science, vol. 298, p. 1534. 

National Fire Protection Association (2001) NFPA 1994—Standard on Protective Ensembles for 

Chemical/Biological Terrorism Incidents, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (1996)

National Occupational Research Agenda, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 96-115, National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health, Washington, DC. 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (2001)

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Approval of Self-Contained Breathing Respirators for Emergency Workers in Terrorist Attacks, National Institute 

for Occupational Safety and Health, Washington, DC, available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/scbasite.html

National Institutes of Health (2003) Setting Research Priorities at the National Institutes of Health, National 

Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, available at http://www.nih.gov/about/researchpriorities.htm. 

search Council (1998) Scientific Opportunities and Public Needs: Improving Priority Setting and

at the National Institutes of Health, National Academies Press, Washington, DC. 

. Environmental Protection Agency: Research

g the Government Performance and Results Act for Research: A 

f Science and Technology In Countering

l 

dation, Washington, DC, available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubsys/ods/getpub.cfm?nsb01156

National Re

Public Input 

National Research Council (2000) Strengthening Science at the U.S

Management and Peer-Review Practices, National Academies Press, Washington, DC. 

National Research Council (2001a) Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It?, National Academies Press, 

Washington, DC. 

National Research Council (2001b) Implementin

Status Report, National Academies Press, Washington, DC. 

National Research Council (2002) Making the Nation Safer: The Role O

Terrorism, National Academies Press, Washington, DC. 

National Science Board (2001) Federal Research Resources: A Process for Setting Priorities, NSB 01-156, Nationa

Science Foun . 

Office of Management and Budget (2003) 2003 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, Office of 

Management and Budget, Washington, DC, available at 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003_combat_terr.pdf

Office of Technology Assessment (1991) Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade, available at 

http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/ns20/pubs_f.html. 

Pollard NA, Tuohy RV, and Garwin T (2003) Project Responder, Interim Report: Emergency Responders' Needs,

Goals, and Priorities, Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Oklahoma City,

OK, available at http://www.mipt.org/pdf/projectresponderneeds.pdf. 

President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (2002), Report on Maximizing the Contribution of

f Science and Technology Policy, 

h 0REPORT%20WITH%20APPENDICES.pdf

Science and Technology Within the Department of Homeland Security, Office o

Washington, DC, available at 

ttp://www.OSTP.gov/PCAST/FINAL%20DHS%2 . 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2003a) Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief - Fiscal Year 

2004, available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/FY_2004_BUDGET_IN_BRIEF.pdf. 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2003b) Address by Dr. Charles E. McQueary to the DOE Facilities Caucus

Breakfast Meeting, available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=1818. 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2001) Office of Research and Development Strat

0

egic Plan, EPA/600/R1/003, Washington, DC, available at http://www.epa.gov/osp/stplan.htm.

H-16 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

APPENDIX I–COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE*

ctly

vidual 

sponders. Without it, emergency workers have only a limited ability to remain aware of evolving 

.

g multiple 

sponding organizations. In multiagency and multijurisdictional response operations, communication 

nses to a natural disaster

al.

Failures in communication can reduce the effectiveness of response operations and put the safety of 

ng

tial to contribute to responder injuries and loss of 

fe. Similarly, when responders cannot effectively share tactical and operational information, their ability

h Federal Building in Oklahoma City, failures in 

communication systems forced responders to use messengers to relay messages around the incident 

ity of response organizations’ radios or other 

wing their members to talk to one another.165 

Although the technical barriers that prevent responders from talking with one another are a critical 

place

means to

exchange information, the practices that ensure that the needed information is delivered at the right time 

hat includes all components necessary to 

n

e

ganizations potentially involved in large-scale response operations – including 

teer groups – 

the generic term public safety agencies will be used throughout the discussion. 

The exchange of information, whether by voice over a radio handset, via computer systems, or dire

face-to-face, is crucial to the effectiveness of response operations and to the safety of indi

re

emergency situations, access tactical and threat information, and call on assistance and reinforcement

Communications are particularly important in larger, more complex incidents involvin

re

provides the links that make coordinated and organized action possible. From joint police and rescue 

efforts at a major traffic accident to large-scale multiagency, multi-service respo

or terrorist attack, the need to share information among responders and their organizations is essenti

responders at risk. As the tragedy of September 11, 2001 showed, breakdowns in communications amo

individuals and responding organizations have the poten

li

to act effectively can be reduced. At many large-scale incidents, including the Pentagon on 9/11, the 

1993 World Trade Center bombing, and at the Murra

scenes and among responding organizations, delaying or preventing the exchange of critical incident

information.162,163,164 

Significant effort in this area has focused on the abil

communications systems to connect – or interoperate – allo

component of this problem, there are organizational and procedural components that must also be in

before responders can effectively communicate.

166

 Effective communication requires the 

and in the right amount to meet operational needs, and the communications procedures (e.g., common 

terminologies) to ensure that the information is understandable for its intended recipients. As a result, this

analysis adopts a definition of communications interoperability t

ensure that individual emergency responders and response managers have access to critical informatio

during response operations regardless of organizational, jurisdictional, or functional boundaries. Becaus

of the range of responder or

fire, emergency medical services, law enforcement, public health, State, Federal, and volun

162 Manzi C, Powers MJ, Zetterlund K. “Special Report: Critical Information Flows in the Alfred P. Murrah Building Bombing: 

A Case Study,” May 2003. http://www.cbaci.org/murrahcasestudyfinal.pdf (Date Accessed: May 2003). 

ay 2003). 4

 Arlington County, Virginia. “Arlington County After-Action Report on the Response to September 11 Terrorist Attack on the 

entagon,” 2002. http://www.co.arlington.va.us/fire/edu/about/pdf/after_report.pdf (Date Accessed: May 2003), A-10. 5

 Communications interoperability problems can affect all forms of public safety communications including the exchange of

data via computer terminals, crosslinking of databases, geographic information systems, etc. This paper will focus on radio

communications, though many of the strategies and approaches described also apply, to differing extents, to these other 

communications systems and problems. 166 Rubin DL and Maniscalco P “EMS Incident Management: Operational Communications” Emergency Medical Services, May 

2000, 93-95. 

163 Manning WA, ed., “The World Trade Center Bombing: Report and Analysis,” 1993. 

http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-076.pdf (Date Accessed: M 16

P

16

• Brian Jackson and Mike Geruso 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

The following discussion introduces the sources of interoperability problems. Because this problem has 

been recognized for some time, a range of solutions has been developed and pilot efforts deployed to 

ddress it. Based on the review of the available solutions, the final section identifies areas where 

technical problems or differences in their organizations’ procedures and communications practices. 

a

additional efforts and examination are needed to most effectively promote public safety communications

interoperability.

Sources of Communications Interoperability Problems 

Throughout the public safety community, the communication systems currently in place often lack the 

capability for diverse responders to communicate with one another at multiagency operations. While 

these problems are often most serious among agencies from different jurisdictions or different levels of 

government, even agencies from the same jurisdiction frequently cannot readily communicate due to 

Technical Sources of Interoperability Problems

Although many technologies are being applied to public safety communications and information sharing 

needs – such as field-accessible computer systems, cellular technology, and other mechanisms – the m

route used to exchange information during on-going multiagency, multijurisdictional response operatio

is hand-held, tactical radio systems. As a result, concerns surrounding communications interoperabili

generally focus on the capabilities and characteristics of these radio systems. 

ajor 

ns

ty

Interoperability failures arise from two types of system incompatibility: 

ecause of the way this division was carried out, the frequencies allocated for public safety use are 

scattered across the radio spectrum. Instead of a single “slice” of frequencies, the public safety spectrum

is fragmented into 10 different bands (Figure 1). Most radio equipment can only broadcast across one to 

three of these bands.167 This means that if a fire department operates in one band of frequencies and a 

police department operates on another, they cannot use their radios to speak directly to each other. 

 

1. Different organizations’ communications systems may operate on separate, and therefore 

incompatible, radio frequencies, and 

2. Proprietary differences among radio systems produced by different manufacturers can make 

radios incompatible, even if they use the same radio frequency.

Incompatible Radio Frequencies. All radio systems utilize a portion of the radio spectrum to send and 

receive signals carrying voice or other data. The radio spectrum consists of a continuous series of 

frequencies, divided into a finite set of frequency channels across which signals can be broadcast. 

Because a finite number of these broadcasting channels exist, the radio spectrum is a limited public 

resource. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has designated certain frequency bands, 

which are ranges of adjacent frequencies, for specific uses, such as television broadcasting, commercial 

radio, and public safety communications. 

B

167 Imel KJ and Hart JW “Understanding Wireless Communications in Public Safety: A Guidebook to Technology, Issues, 

Planning and Management,” January 2003. http://rmlectc.dri.du.edu/documents/GuideWC/Front(VersII).PDF (Date Accessed: 

September 2003), 108. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 

Figure 1: Segments of the Radio Spectrum Allocated to Public Safety Communication 

systems that operate in the 

ame section of the radio spectrum but will still be unable to communicate. For example, differences 

communication can make their 

ommunications systems incompatible.168

Procedur

Proprietary Differences. Even when radios utilize the same portion of the radio spectrum, they cannot

necessarily interoperate. Radios produced by different manufacturers can have proprietary differences – 

such as the way the transmitted signal is structured – that make it impossible for them to communicate 

with one another. As a result, adjacent public safety agencies might both have

s

among the encryption techniques used by manufacturers to enable secure

c

al and Organizational Interoperability Issues

Although e of interoperability problems, 

ven addressing all technical issues would not be enough to ensure effective communication among 

unications systems are used during response operations. 

y,

unless responder training specifically addresses interoperability, responders or radio operators may be 

unaware of, or unable to use, interoperability capabilities that are already available.170 For example, 

 

differences among communications systems are a primary sourc

e

responders at multi-agency or multijurisdictional operations. Differences in operational procedures and

training between responding organizations can also create barriers to effective communication. 

Significant differences can exist in two main areas: 

1. Procedures and training regarding the available capabilities of communications systems, and 

2. Protocols associated with how comm

Capabilities of Communications Systems. Differences in procedures and training among different 

response organizations can get in the way of effective use of available interoperability assets. For 

example, public safety organizations or services may manage their radio channels differently – e.g., 

labeling or naming them in significantly different ways. The resulting confusion can produce 

communications failures even if the radio systems themselves actually are interoperable.169 Similarl

168 Public Safety Wireless Network, “Public Safety Wireless Communications Standards Awareness Guide,” 

http://www.publicsafetywins.gov/PolicySolutions/Standards/PSWNSTDS.pdf 169 Imel KJ and Hart JW “Understanding Wireless Communications in Public Safety: A Guidebook to Technology, Issues, 

Planning and Management,” January 2003. http://rmlectc.dri.du.edu/documents/GuideWC/Front(VersII).PDF (Date Accessed: 

September 2003), 108. 170 “Post-Symposium Support Report - New Jersey Public Safety Communications Interoperability Conference,” December 2002. 

http://www.pswn.gov/admin/librarydocs11/NJ_post_symposium_report.pdf (Date Accessed: September 2003) 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

knowledge of interoperability capabilities and procedures can be lost when responders retire or are 

reassigned.171

 

Communications Operational Protocols. Beyond awareness of radio systems’ capabilities, effective 

communication also requires a common understanding among public safety organizations of how radio 

systems should be used during major response operations. Common definitions are needed for: 

• What information should be communicated, 

• How it should be communicated, and 

• To whom it should be communicated. 

What to Communicate. In large-scale emergency events, the sheer volume of traffic can overwhelm

communication systems. Heavy traffic on radio or other systems can effectively render them inoperable 

after an event. If response organizations’ communications procedures result in excessive radio traffic

even compl fic on

communication systems, including voice radio and cellular systems, have been cited in many large-scale 

response operations including the September 11th attacks. Operational usage protocols that reduce traffic 

er to the same pieces of equipment or operations using 

different terms, effective communication and coordinated action are made much more difficult. 

an effort to reduce the volume of radio traffic and 

prove the communication efficiency. Although such radio codes can work effectively for individual 

nse

ith Whom to Communicate. Beyond its potential to clog radio systems, excessive communications traffic 

nders and prevent them from effectively using 

critical information. Responders and organizations playing different roles at a multiagency,

mu ir

act

dec e

174 similar 

neous

 

,

etely interoperable radio systems may not be effective. Problems with excessive traf

can help preserve the utility of communications systems. 

How to Communicate. Differences in the ways responders communicate can also hinder the transfer of 

information during response operations. If responders from different organizations use different 

vocabularies, significant misunderstandings can occur. Developing common terminologies is an 

important component in the design of effective incident management systems for multiagency

operations.172 If different organizations ref

Furthermore, some public safety agencies use codes in

im

organizations, they can cause problems during multiagency or multijurisdictional operations. Confusion 

can rapidly develop if two or more organizations use different codes for the same equipment or respo

activities.173

W

can also overwhelm the attention of response comma

ltijurisdictional incident need access to different types and amounts of information to carry out the

ivities. Too much irrelevant communication can result in information overload and hinder 

isionmaking. This problem was highlighted by responders involved in the September 11th respons

operations at the World Trade Center in New York City. If response organizations do not adopt

conventions about what information should be transmitted to which commanders or units, the extra

traffic can distract, confuse, and otherwise degrade the capability to effectively communicate. If a 

response operation lacks a clear chain of command or available communications resources are not 

effectively allocated and managed, these problems can increase significantly.

171 Public Safety Wireless Network “Operational Best Practices for Managing Trunked Land Mobile Radio Systems,” May 2003. 

http://www.pswn.gov/admin/librarydocs11%5COperational_Best_Practices_for_Trunked_Radio_Systems.pdf, 24. 172 Christen H, Maniscalco P, Vickery A, and Winslow F "An Overview of Incident Management Systems," Perspectives on 

Preparedness, Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 

September 2001. http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/An_Overview_of_Incident_Management_Systems.pdf 

(Date Accessed: May 2003). 173 Rubin DL and Maniscalco P “EMS Incident Management: Operational Communications” Emergency Medical Services, May 

2000, 93-95. 174 Interviews with the author. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Solutions: A Range of Strategies for Improved Communications 

In an effort to improve communications interoperability, a number of programs and organizations have 

vel and in the private sector.178 Such efforts have developed a range of strategies relevant to both 

commun a e organizational interoperability concerns as 

well. 

Technical Approaches to Building Communications Interoperability

been put in place to address these problems. Selected examples include the Public Safety Wireless 

Network program,

175 the National Institute of Justice’s AGILE program,176 and the National Task Force

on Interoperability.

177 A variety of other efforts have also been carried out at the Federal, State, and local 

le

ic tions systems interoperability problems and th

3. Technological strategies including the use of bridges or gateways among incompatible 

n

ions and

y oordinated acquisition. 

ithout

forts

nding 

ual organizations to 

participate in interoperability efforts. 

 

Significant effort has been devoted in both the public and private sectors to addressing the technical 

sources of interoperability failures. Efforts have been focused in four main areas: 

1. Coordination efforts to ensure public safety organizations have compatible radio systems 

2. Radio spectrum allocation 

systems, the use of supplemental communications systems, or other radio traffic or 

access control approaches 

4. Technology standards to address differences among manufacturers’ systems 

Coordinatio . The most straightforward approach to prevent incompatibilities among public safety

agencies’ communications systems is for those organizations to coordinate their purchasing decis

buy systems that can interoperate. Such multiagency and cross-jurisdictional coordination could be aimed

at complete interoperability, i.e., ensuring that all involved agencies can communicate all the time, or at

more limited solutions for use when needed. Beyond their interoperability benefits, these efforts can also

result in cost savings for States and individual localities as a result of the increased purchasing power 

provided b c

Although this multiorganizational approach to communication systems design can provide a solution to 

interoperability problems, there are a number of barriers to effectively putting it into practice:179 

• Response organizations’ different communications needs,180 operational circumstances, or 

political issues can reduce their desire to coordinate or make doing so more difficult. W

strong leadership to bring together the relevant organizations, these differences can significantly

handicap interoperability programs. 

• Differences in acquisition, planning, and funding cycles among organizations complicate ef

to move to common and compatible systems. In some cases, large enough differences in fu

availability or procurement cycles can make it very difficult for individ

175 http://www.pswn.gov 176 http://www.agileprogram.org 177 http://www.agileprogram.org/ntfi/justnet.html 178 See http://pssummit.its.bldrdoc.gov/ for a review of many Federal, State, and local interoperability efforts. 179 National Task Force on Interoperability, “Why Can’t We Talk? Working Together to Bridge the Communications Gap to

Save Lives” http://www.agileprogram.org/ntfi/ntfi_guide.pdf (Date Accessed: September 2003). 180 For example, some public safety organizations may need to communicate more frequently than others or have significantly

different security requirements. Such divergence in requirements can make it more difficult to select common or compatible

systems across organizations. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

• Organizations with significant investments in legacy communications systems may hesitate to 

move toward new interoperable systems. 

n

ping approaches to reduce or eliminate barriers to coordination. Examples have included 

developing shared governance structures, such as boards or joint commissions, to provide sufficient 

tions’ priorities and constraints; 

upport of demonstration and pilot efforts; and preparation of information resources to assist in planning 

adio Spectrum Allocation. Since the fragmentation of the radio spectrum devoted to public safety

commu

spectrum o addressing the problem. In fact, issues surrounding radio 

spectrum ches to putting communications interoperability in place. 

Because

represent a signific

trends have height

• Increasing demand for public safety communications, such as wireless data terminals;182 and 

Changes to spectrum allocations and usage are therefore an important component of interoperability

d

spectrum, are one approach. Tools have also been developed to assist spectrum allocation in radio system

plan n o

As the number of organizations involved in a coordination effort increases – e.g., moving from

synchronizing the communication systems of a small number of local public safety agencies to a 

statewide or regional effort – such barriers to coordination can become even more difficult to address. 

In order to facilitate building interoperability among organizations, significant effort has been focused o

develo

authority for coordination efforts while addressing multiple organiza

s

and coordination.181 

R

nications is a major source of interoperability problems, changes in the location or amount of 

 available are a potential route t

are linked to most other approa

radio spectrum is a finite resource, scarcity of channels for public safety communication 

ant constraint on the design of new approaches for providing interoperability. Two

ened this scarcity: 

• Interference from other strong signals near public safety frequencies, such as commercial 

mobile telephones.183

As a result, even if coordination efforts were successful in providing public safety agencies with 

compatible radios operating in the same parts of the radio spectrum,

184 a lack of sufficient spectrum would

still handicap interoperability efforts. 

efforts.185 Technological strategies, such as the use of “trunked” systems that manage communications 

more efficiently or new systems that can fit more communications channels within a slice of ra io

ni g.

186 Policy efforts are also underway at the national level t allocate additional spectrum to

al Task Force on Interoperability, “Why Can’t We Talk? Working Together to Bridge the Communications Gap to

es” http://www.agileprogram.org/ntfi/ntfi_guide.pdf (Date Accessed: September 2003). 

B and Tolman T “Can We Talk? Public Safety

181 Nation

Save Liv 182 Smith and the Interoperability Challenge” National Institute of Justice Journal,

April 2000, 18-21. 183 National Task Force on Interoperability, “Why Can’t We Talk? Working Together to Bridge the Communications Gap to

Save Lives” http://www.agileprogram.org/ntfi/ntfi_guide.pdf (Date Accessed: September 2003). 184 In addition, radios operating on different frequencies have different operating characteristics that make it less desirable to have 

all public safety agencies using similar systems. For example, some systems have better performance characteristics in some 

terrain types or within buildings. 185 Scannell K and Davis A “Danger: Missing Signals” The Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2003, B1. 186 See, for example, http://www.iacptechnology.org/LEIM/2003Presentations/NIJPresentations/ AGILEProgramUpdate.pdf 

I-6 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

pub s

rational urrent users of the relevant radio spectrum.

189

k

most 

allowing selected members of separate organizations access to all relevant communications. While such a 

strategy is quick and straightforward, the need for individuals to juggle different radios and monitor many

separate communications streams makes it a less than ideal solution. Having multiple separate streams of 

information coming through different radios can result in missed communications and misunderstandings. 

As a result, a several other technology-based strategies have been or are being developed, including: 

• Use of supplemental communications systems

lic afety agencies187 or reallocate spectrum in existing bands.188 Both efforts face complex issues in

izing public safety needs with the needs of c

Technological Strategies. A range of hardware-based strategies has been developed to either lin

responder communications systems or to provide some interoperability at large-scale events. The

basic hardware strategy for rapid interoperability is for responders to simply “trade radios,” thereby

 - Cellular telephones, paging systems, or other 

special systems deployed at an event have been used to provide some interoperability.

190 

• Connections between communications systems – Bridge devices can be installed at either 

responder dispatch centers or in the field to interlink disparate radio systems and provide cros

communication. Such system interconnections can be made to permanently connect systems

provide day-to-day interoperability or installed for individual response operations. 

• Technical solutions for non-technical interoperability problems

s

to 

 – Features have been built into

communications systems to address the risk that excessive communication traffic will either 

degrade the performance of a communications system or result in information overload. Priority 

ac

191 ent

s.

• Flexible radio technologies

cess features can provide commanders the ability to complete critical communications when

needed. Similarly, the ability to subdivide radio systems into talk-groups or allocate differ

radio frequencies to separate response functions also provide strategies to address these issue

– New radio technologies, such as software-based radios192 or internet

on

have applied the first three strategies to improve interoperability;

flexible radio technologies are still being developed and deployed and may provide additional 

ms

variation among different technologies available in a market and provide public safety organizations with 

the assurance that, if their communications system adheres to the standards, it will be able to 

 

protocol communications approaches, may provide ways to reconfigure radios to operate

many different communications systems.193 Similarly, for systems across the public safety

community, a variety of efforts

technical interoperability options in the future. 

Technology Standards. Technology standards seek to eliminate incompatibilities among radio syste

produced by different manufacturers by defining common ways of radio signal encoding and 

management. Commonly accepted standards that serve as the basis for equipment design reduce the

187 National Task Force on Interoperability, “Why Can’t We Talk? Working Together to Bridge the Communications Gap to

Save Lives” http://www.agileprogram.org/ntfi/ntfi_guide.pdf (Date Accessed: September 2003). 188 “In the Matter of Improving Public Safety Communications in the 800 MHz Band - Consolidating the 900 MHz Industrial 

Land Transportation and Business Pool Channels” http://www.iafc.org/downloads/fccfiling1202.pdf (Date Accessed: September 

2003). 

189 For example, in one legislative effort, spectrum has been allocated to public safety organizations that is currently occupied by

television broadcasting. Initially, the deadline for those stations to vacate the spectrum was tied to adoption of digital television

by consumers, making it difficult to determine a timetable when it would be available for public safety use. (National Task Force 

on Interoperability, “Why Can’t We Talk? Working Together to Bridge the Communications Gap to Save Lives: Supplemental 

Resources,” http://www.agileprogram.org/ntfi/ntfi_supplemental.pdf (Date Accessed: September 2003). 190 For public-use systems, e.g., cellular telephones, the increased communications traffic after a major event can render them 

useless as a source of interoperability. Efforts to provide priority access to these systems for public safety agencies could

alleviate this problem. (http://wps.ncs.gov/) 191 The GETS system, which provides priority access to landline telephone networks, has been in place for many years. The 

WPS system, which provides similar access to cellular telephone resources, was been put in place recently to address problems 

public safety agencies faced using mobile phones after large-scale emergencies. 192 http://www.pswn.gov/admin/librarydocs9/software_defined_radio_report_final.doc 193 See http://www.publicsafetywins.gov/TechSolutions/TechMain.cfm for descriptions. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

communicate with other compliant equipment.194 In the public safety area, a variety of standards 

development efforts have been underway with participation from both the private and public 

sectors.

195,196,197 Prominent efforts include the Project 25 family of standards (also titled 

do

not address all relevant concerns, or do not meet the needs of the user communities. For example, law 

enforce e capability to encrypt communications to address 

security and patient privacy concerns; if groups with unique needs are not included in standar

development then the resulting solutions will likely not be acceptable. 

Once de

transitio

manufa ability of a

market

affected

actions,

can prom

Non-Te

Telecommunications Industry Association/Electronics Industry Association [TIA/EIA] 102)198 and

Project MESA, an international effort between the US TIA and the European Telecommunications 

Standards Institute.199 

 

Although standards are an effective strategy to rationalize differences among competing technologies, 

developing standards can be a difficult process. In order to ensure that standards are well designed, the 

development process must be open to technical and user input across all relevant communities. The 

absence of key participants from the process can result in standards that are technologically deficient,

ment and health responders generally require th

ds

veloped, the adoption of standards can also be a complex process as manufacturers and users 

n to manufacturing, purchasing, and using compliant equipment. The willingness of 

cturers to produce equipment matched to a given standard is dependant on the avail

for the products. Acceptance of a standard by both manufacturers and customers can also be

by assumptions about whether the standards will change over time. A range of government 

including preferential procurement of compliant equipment directly or through grant programs, 

ote the adoption of technology standards. 

chnical Approaches for Increasing Interoperability

Alt g a

approac s.

Straight g

comma

commu ed

to supp effort. They include: 

• Procedures to manage co rmation 

flows among command levels or functional branches of the response operation 

• Broad-based understandings of appropriate radio discipline so responder radio traffic does not 

undermine the exchange of critical information 

 

hou h technical solutions can address many interoperability issues, a range of non-technic l 

hes can also contribute to improved communication among responders at large-scale incident

forward strategies such as response organizations utilizing a common command post – puttin

nders from different organizations close enough to talk face-to-face – can improve interagency

nication at the management level.200 A variety of other non-technical components are also need

ort any effective communications interoperability

• Common terminologies and radio languages to minimize the potential for miscommunication 

• Training efforts to ensure responders from different organizations know what interoperability

capabilities are available and how to use them

mmunications as incidents increase in size and to define info

194 Public Safety Wireless Network, “Public Safety Wireless Communications Standards Awareness Guide,” 

http://www.publicsafetywins.gov/PolicySolutions/Standards/PSWNSTDS.pdf 195 http://www.eeel.nist.gov/810.02/public_safety.html 196 http://www.agileprogram.org/standards/justnet.html 197 http://www.nlectc.org/nlectcse/download/pietra_may2002_standards.pdf 198 http://www.project25.org/; http://www.tiaonline.org/standards/project_25/index.cfm 199 http://www.projectmesa.org/whitepaper/WhitePaper_MESA_0110.pdf 200 See, for example, discussion of the Pentagon September 11 response operations in Arlington County, Virginia. “Arlington 

County After-Action Report on the Response to September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon,” 2002. 

http://www.co.arlington.va.us/fire/edu/about/pdf/after_report.pdf (Date Accessed: May 2003) 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Putting these non-technical components of effective communications interoperability in place requ

coordination among public safety organizations during preparedness planning. Current nation

efforts to standardize incident management across the responder community, through dev

application of the National Incident Management System, could provide a mechanism to put

ires

al level 

elopment and 

n

esidual Needs for Improving Communications Interoperability 

f

w

llocation concerns, and 

developing both technology and practice standards. These efforts have been valuable both for promoting 

ication of

luable:

s and practices to address the non-technical 

sources of interoperability failures 

Commo

commo

communications practices and procedures in place. 

R

As described in the previous sections, a range of efforts have been underway for some time in all levels o

government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector seeking to foster improved 

communications interoperability among public safety agencies. In both the technical and non-technical 

arenas, these efforts have developed a range of solutions that can address interoperability problems. In 

addition, these programs have made progress in promoting the adoption of interoperability solutions by 

lowering the barriers to coordination among public safety agencies, developing and evaluating ne

technology options for communications, beginning to address spectrum a

the development of interoperability among groups of public safety organizations and helping shape the

evolution of public safety communications in the future. In some areas and jurisdictions, appl

these strategies has resulted in effective solutions for public safety communications needs. 

To address interoperability concerns for the nation overall, particularly to ensure effective 

communications are available at large-scale response operations to terrorist attack or major natural 

disasters, additional efforts in three areas would be va

• Developing common communications procedure

• Characterizing the strengths and weakness of different local, State, or regional interoperability

strategies 

• Developing a clearer understanding of how different local, State, or regional interoperability

efforts do or do not address the communications needs of large response operations to terrorist 

attack or natural disaster 

n Communications Procedures and Practices. Even if all the technological problems that lead to

inte e

respond s are effective. If response organizations use 

diff n

wil n

they are cations would

ideally

Better Characterization of Different Interoperability Efforts.

rop rability problems were addressed, common procedures and practices are needed among 

ing organizations to ensure that communication

ere t radio codes or transmissions clog the airwaves during major events, no technological solution

l be sufficient to address the problems. Because such standardization efforts are most effective whe

aimed broadly, such an effort to build common protocols for response communi

occur at the national level.

 Many efforts at fostering interoperability

have been focused at the local, State, or regional level. This has been the case because any near term, 

national-scale solution to communications interoperability would be very costly, and the appropriate 

strategy for pursuing such a broad-based effort has not been clear. This smaller-scale approach to these 

problems has provided the opportunity to pilot test a range of interoperability solutions and match specific 

strategies to local needs and operational constraints. In light of these practical and functional reasons, 

there are benefits to pursuing varied approaches to promoting interoperability. However, as a component 

of such a strategy, there is a need for greater crosscutting examination of the strengths and weakness of 

the different strategies to achieve interoperability. Although success stories are available for the full 

range of options described in the previous sections, a systematic understanding is needed of the 

circumstances where each is most applicable and the local requirements and conditions that influence the 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

success of different efforts. Such examination would make it possible to more rigorously identify the 

strengths and weaknesses of different approaches, and to take better advantage of the lessons learned in

different interoperability efforts. 

Defining Interoperability Needs for National Preparedness. In the context of national-level preparedness, 

ere is also a need to better understand whether diverse local, State, or regional interoperability solutions 

cale natural disaster or terrorist 

cident response operations. Although the fundamental problem – the need for responders and response 

 can 

f

For routine 

nt scene. But as incidents increase in size

nd the potential volume of communications traffic increases, the ability of all responders to 

comm

information. For such incidents, focusing interoperability efforts on public safety organizations’ 

comm d

response c

needs at national scale response operations with respect to communication among the commanders of 

involved r l

of respons

Without a clear definition of communications needs at major homeland security-related events, it is 

e

but should be designed to be robust across a range of circumstances 

l,

th

will meet the communications needs of responders involved in large-s

in

organizations to communicate – is the same in small-scale events and major disasters, the solutions 

required may differ. As incidents increase in scale, the numbers of organizations and responders

increase rapidly:

• Routine emergencies likely require involvement of only a few responders from a small number o

local response organizations. 

• Large local events may require participation of larger numbers of response organizations from the

local area and potentially nearby via mutual assistance agreements. 

• Major disasters or terrorist attacks can involve hundreds of organizations, potentially drawn from

across the country or internationally.

It is not clear that the communications needs for incidents at different scales are the same.

events, effective communication may require the ability of all members of an area’s public safety

agencies to communicate directly with each other at an incide

a

unicate on common frequencies or systems could actually hinder the effective transfer of critical 

an ers or within particular response functions may be a more effective approach to meeting 

ommunications needs. There is a clear need to more completely define the communication 

esponse organizations, different layers of incident management system, and for tactical contro

e units.

201 

impossible to determine if or how rapidly current interoperability efforts are addressing those needs or 

whether additional efforts are needed to supplement them. In some cases, on-going interoperability

efforts may already include the ingredients necessary to effectively scale up for national-scale respons

operations, in others they may not. The diversity of interoperability efforts across the nation makes it 

difficult to predict how communications will scale up in any particular area. In the event that local efforts

are not providing the communications capabilities needed for national-scale events, strategies must be 

developed to provide them. Such national-scale strategies could apply a number of the solutions 

discussed in the previous sections,

and to take advantage of interoperability capabilities that are already or are being put in place at the loca

State, or regional level. A crosscutting understanding of these areas from the national perspective could

be built through broader based experiments, pilot projects, and exercises aimed at developing generally

applicable best practices for large-scale incident communications. 

 

201 Initial efforts have been made to produce such a template, however it is not clear whether they fully address all the 

organizations that would be involved in a major terrorist attack or all potential natural disasters. See Imel KJ and Hart

“Understanding Wireless Communications in Public Safety: A Guidebook to Technology, Issues, Planning and Management,” 

JW

January 2003, 107.

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

APPENDIX J–TRENDS IN TERRORISM* 

Since the advent of the Gilmore Commission over five years ago, more and more individuals in the first 

en directed at the United States, its citizens and allies overseas, including the October 

00 t

con a

Thi p

responder and policymaking community have begun to monitor trends in terrorist attacks worldwide. In 

many ways, the attacks on 11 September 2001 represent a watershed in how Americans understand 

terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland. Yet this attack was not an isolated incident: over worldwide, over 

7,700 people have died in terrorist attacks and over 19,100 have been injured during the 1999-2003 tenure

of the Gilmore Commission, not counting the 11 September 2001 attacks. A substantial number of these 

casualties occurred as part of the al-Aqsa Intifada in Israel and the Israeli occupied territories, which 

began in September 2000, almost two years after the start of the Gilmore Commission. Other attacks, 

however, have be

2 2 a tacks in against a tourist nightclub in Bali and the November 2003 attack against the British 

sul te in Istanbul.

s a pendix provides a brief overview of patterns in terrorism since January 1999. 

1000

s

s

Terrorist Attacks Worldwide

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

Totals

Attack

Fatalitie

Injuries

0

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Years

Chart 1 

The first chart, “Terrorist Attacks Worldwide,” captures the number of terrorist attacks, fatalities,

injuries by year from 1 January 1999 through 1 November 2003. The numbers in these charts are taken 

from the RAND Terrorism Chronology and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database. These 

databases track terrorist attacks worldwide, defined as follows: 

Terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by the ide

and

ntity of the perpetrators or the 

nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create 

an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions 

they would otherwise not undertake or refrain from taking actions that they desired to 

take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violations of the rules of war, if a 

State of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against 

* Rebekah (Kim) Cragin

J-1 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are

generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The perpetrators are 

tional borders into the United States to conduct this attack. Similarly, the 

reviously mentioned attack by the Jemaah Islamiyah in Bali is also defined as international, because it 

a City is defined 

as a domestic attack, because it was conducted by a U.S. citizen, with primary residence in the United 

States, against a U.S. target. Similarly, the December 2000 attacks by Jemaah Islamiyah against local 

Christian churches in Indonesia are defined as domestic attacks. 

Chart 1 illustrates the general increase in the number of international and domestic terrorist attacks 

worldwide during the past five years. The ratio of international to domestic attacks is approximately 1 

international attack for every 6 domestic attacks; so of the approximately 1000 attacks in 1999, over 600

were conducted by local groups against local targets. This chart also highlights the significant increase in 

casualties per attack over this time period. Even disregarding 2001 and the 11 September attack, 

casualties (fatalities and injuries) witness a disproportionate increase in 2002 and 2003, as compared to 

attacks. It is difficult to discern what might account for the general increase in terrorist attacks since 1999. 

The following graph explores one possible explanation: it is the result of suicide bombings in the al-Aqsa 

Intifada. 

members of an organized group and, unlike other criminals, they often claim credit for 

their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate 

physical damage they cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a 

particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists, for example, may be intended to 

cause people to exaggerate the strength of the terrorists and the importance of the cause, 

to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent or simply to intimidate and 

thereby enforce compliance with their demands. 

The databases track both international and domestic terrorist attacks. The attack on 11 September 2001, 

for example, is defined as an international attack in the RAND-MIPT database, because al-Qaeda 

terrorists crossed interna

p

targeted foreign tourists. In contrast, the 1995 attack by Timothy McVeigh in Oklahom

Palestinian Attacks as Compared to Terrorism

Worldwide

2500

3000

Chart 2 

0

500

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

1000

1500

2000

Number of Attacks

Palestinians

Others

Years

J-2 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

As men e

chronol s as

Compar ks that take 

place in

beginni cant as

one mig nd in

terrorism rt 1 (above) and Chart 3 (below), both 

emonstrate a general increase in the number of terrorist attacks since 1999, as well as a disproportionate 

tioned previously, the al-Aqsa Intifada arguably represents another significant event in th

ogy of terrorist attacks during the past five years. The second chart, “Palestinian Attack

ed to Terrorism Worldwide,” therefore, highlights the proportion of terrorist attac

Israel and the Israeli occupied territories. These attacks have clearly increased since the 

ng of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, yet the proportion of attacks is not as signifi

ht expect from media coverage. Indeed, these attacks do not appear to alter the general tre

 worldwide, as illustrated below. Comparing Cha

d

increase in casualties per attack. 

Terrorism Worldwide: Subtracting 9/11 and 

Attacks in Israel, West Bank and Gaza

6000

0

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Years

ies

Chart 3 

This third chart, “Terrorism Worldwide: Subtracting 9/11 and Attacks in Israel, West Bank, and Gaza” 

follows the same basic pattern of attacks as the first chart. Indeed, the primary difference is found in the 

fatalities figures for 2001, which is due to the al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center in New York 

and the Pentagon. 

Finally, Chart 4, “Pattern’s In Lethality of Terrorists Attacks,” (as well as Chart 1) illustrates a fairly

significant trend in terrorism: fatalities per attack have increased. Indeed, prior to 2001, the number of 

fatalities per attack averaged well below 1. Now this trend has reversed, with fatalities trending higher on 

average compared with the number of attacks per year. 

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

Attacks

Fatalit

Injuries

J-3 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

20

25

30

f Attack

s

Patterns in Lethality of Terrorist Attacks

0

5

10

15

'91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 01 02 03

N

u

m

ber o

Over 150 Casualties

Over 50 Casualties

Chart 4

J-4 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

APPENDIX K—STATUS OF PREVIOUS ADVISORY PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS 

CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION 

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUTCOME

Office of Homeland Security create an intergovernmental border 

group, with representatives of the responsible Federal agencies and 

, local, and private sector partners from jurisdictions with significant 

y X 

This recommendation has been partially implemented. established within the DHS’ Directorate for Border and coordination of Federal border security activities has be

border security organizations and authorities within DHthe Homeland Security Council has been established twaters, and airspace security. 

Office of Homeland Security facilitate the full integration of affected 

 and local entities, including U.S. Coast Guard "Captains of the 

presentatives of airports of entry, and border crossing communities, 

y committees," as well as into any adjacent 

rism Task Force (coordinated by the FBI) or other interagency X 

This recommendation is being implemented in the mar2002 “port security committees [had] already been infoand [new regulations] establish Area Maritime Security complex and diverse security needs of each of our 361 representatives from “federal, state and local agencies

Office of Homeland Security ensure that all agencies with border 

s are included as full partners in the intelligence collection, 

ysis, and dissemination process, as related to border issues X 

Border agencies under DHS collect information and pacontributing to intelligence activities at the TTIC. 

Office of Homeland Security create a "Border Security Awareness" 

ystem to collect and disseminate information about immigration 

r control; and that the Congress mandate participation of relevant 

encies and provide adequate resources to fund it X 

order Security Act of 2001 includes a 

 p acce

intelligence database information." It also includes a pl

firming identities.

ystem to rovide real-time 

The Enhanced Bto be used in conunified electronic data s

Border 

That the advisory with Stateports of entr

Border 

That the Federal, StatePort," reinto local or regional "port securitJoint Terromechanisms 

Border 

That the responsibilitieanal

Border 

That the database sand bordeFederal ag

Border 

That the Congress enact legislation requiring all shippers to submit cargo manifest information on any shipment transiting U.S. borders at a minimum simultaneous with the arrival of such goods at any U.S. port of entry, with the imposition of severe penalties for noncompliance X 

U.S. Customs Service's Container Security Initiative (CCSI tightens reporting requirements for cargo coming iincludes a 24-hour Advance Cargo Manifest DeclaratioLand and air shipments are subject to the regulations aplan, Customs is also enlisting international ports to cowill set rules for maintaining the integrity of cargo at a l

Border 

That the President direct the establishment of "Trusted Shipper" programs within the relevant agencies of government 

X 

FAA strengthened the Known Shipper Program on Octprogram. Passenger air carriers, all-cargo carriers, anfor verifying a customer's status. TSA is also moving foDatabase and automated Indirect Air Carrier certificatiodeployment of the database in FY 04. A ‘trusted shippU.S. Customs. It is known as the Importer Compliance satisfied that a shipper is ‘low-risk’, after both self-auditissued a ‘trusted shipper’ designation. This year Secreextension of the FAST program, which has been in plasouthern U.S. border. The FAST program is a 'trusted navigate the borders more quickly through preregistrat
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

C

A

TEGORY RECOMMEND

A

TION OUT

COME

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 

That the Congress, in consultation with appropriate Executive Branch Under th

Border 

st Guard authority to include vessels that are o

wned in 

a majority percentage by U.S. persons 

e Custo

ms Enforcement Statute (19 USC. §15

ters" of the United States, the Coast Guar

examine, inspect, and search the vessel and examine 

agencies, expand Coa

X 

"customs wacargo on board, and to this end may...stop such vessevessels without regard to whether the vessel is bound Transportation Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 (HR 3983) eGuard to assess the effectiveness of security syste

ms 

entry to vessels from ports that do not maintain effectiv

The President's F

Y 2003 Budget enacted the largest b

increase of $1 billion over FY 2002). The President's F$500 million, a 10% increase over the FY 2003 enactehas seen the largest increase in its operating expenses will fund the hiring of 2,200 active-duty personnel, incluescort of high-interest vessels. The increase includes fpresence and response, including support for 44 port s

treaties and agreements for combating terrorism with Canada and Mexico Partnership Action Plan was established in March 2002

build a smart border for the 21st century that 

will better 

Protecti

infrastructure include representatives form State and local governments, as well as the private sector 

considering options for interagency and outside expert DHS is planning a national “Cyber Security Summit” to across the critical infrastructures, industry, government solutions for security challenges identified in the White Cyberspace. 

programs designed to promote cyber security, to identify areas where requirements are not being met, to recommend strategies for better securityand to report its finding to the President and the Congress That the President establish a government-fundedindustry concerns---to provide cyber detection, alert, and 

warning functions

To counter cyber attacks across the internet, the DHS established in 2003 a partnership 

with Carnegie 

Mellon 

to create USCERT, a not-for-profit organization coord

response. US-CERT plans to expand to include partnevendors and domestic and international organizations. and respond to cyber attacks. 

InfrastrProtection 

X 

In December 2003, DHS convened a National 

Cyber S

establishing com

mon criteria for detecting and reportin

response. A Cyber Court has not been created. 

Border 

That the Congress increase resources for the U.S. Coast Guard for homeland security missions 

X 

maritime SWAT teams, and increased armed boardingmillion available in grants for ports across the county to 

Border 

We recommend that the U.S. government negotiate more comprehensive 

X 

Ne

w security arrangements have been established with 

simultaneously speeding the legitimate flo

w of goods a

Critical Infrastructure 

on

That the President direct that the interagency policymaking panel on critical 

X 

An advisory panel has not been created. However, DH

Critical Infrastructure Protection 

That the Congress create an independent commission, tasked to evaluate 

, 

X 

The recommended commission has not been created. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection 

, not-for-profit entity that 

can represent the interests of all stakeholders, public and private---national security, law enforcement, other government functions, and business and X 

Critical 

ucture

That the Congress and the Executive Branch convene a "summit" to address, on an urgent basis, necessary changes to a 

wide range of federal statutes in 

order to provide necessary protection and incentive changes that would enhance cyber assurance 

Critical Infrastructure Protection 

That the Congress create a special "Cyber Court" patterned after the court established in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act FISA X 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUTCOME

Critical Infrastructure Protection 

X 

That the Office of Homeland Security develop and implement a comprehensive plan for RDT&E to enhance cyber security

In January 2003, the Institute for Information InfrastrucSecurity Research and Development Agenda, which idsignificant research and development to help secure thThe I3P, a consortium of 23 leading cybersecurity resenational labs and nonprofit organizations, is funded by Institute of Standards and Technology. On November law the Cyber Security Research and Development Ac$903 million over five years to the National Science FoInstitute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The funprograms to improve basic research in computer securindustry and academia, as well as to generate a new c

Critical Infrastructure Protection 

That the President direct that the National Intelligence Council, in coordination with DHS, USDA and DHHS, perform a National Intelligence Estimate on the potential terrorist threat to agriculture and food X 

There are no NIEs underway or planned on this subjecCouncil is completing an NIE on worldwide biological waspects of the terrorist threat to U.S. agriculture. USDA assessment of threats posed by terrorists and vulnerabThe FBI is conducting a comprehensive assessment ohomeland. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan, be included in the Federal Response Plan and the National Incident 

That the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security ensure that an Emergency Support Function for Agriculture and Food, consistent with the intent of the ESF described in the Animal Health Emergency Preparedness Response Plan under development 

X 

The National Strategy for Homeland Security designate

Agricultural production and food are represented in the 

Critical Infrastructure Protection 

Association)That the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture (consistent with the November 2001 resolution of the United States Animal Health 

surveillance for agricultural diseases that are foreign to the United States 

The USDA is expanding its training of lab personnel anestablished the National Animal Health Laboratory Netresources that expands lab capacity and permits a rap

Certain labs operated by States and universities will co

Protecti

That the Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with State and local governments and the private sector, institute a standard sycompensation for agriculture and food loses following an agroterrorism attaand that the Secretary of Health and Human Services should develop a parallel system for non-meat or poultry food

losses are not clearly covered in the Agricultural Assistestablished primarily to aid producers who suffer losseRisk Insurance Act of 2002 excludes crop and livestocprograms for insured losses resulting from acts of terro

Critical Infrastructure Protection 

That the Secretary of Agriculture develop and that the Congress fund programs to improve higher education in veterinary medicine to include 

ltural private sector, for better understanding the 

e internet. USDA is con

focused training on intentional attacks, and to provide additional incentives for professional tracks in that discipline and that the Secretary of Agriculture, in coordination with States, improve education, training and exercises between government and the agricuagroterrorism threat, and for the identification and treatment of intentional introduction of animal diseases and other agricultural attacks 

X

USDA has developed new guidance documents on preindustry and posting them on thawareness of foreign animal diseases. USDA is conduorganizations as well as attack simulations. 

jointly publish regulations implementing a program to train, equip, 

and support specially designated, equipped, secure, and geographicallydistributed veterinary diagnostic laboratories to perform tests and enhance 

X 

Critical Infrastructure 

on

stem for fair 

ck; X 

This recommendation has not been implemented. Theagricultural and food producers who suffer losses caus

Critical Infrastructure Protection 

That the Congress establish and that the President support an Independent Commission to suggest strategies for the protection of the nation's critical infrastructures X 

The National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) mThe Council advises the President on the security of ininfrastructure supporting other sectors of the economytransportation, energy, manufacturing, and emergency the Council continued its deliberations on comments to 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUTCOME

concerning the draft National Strategy to Secure Cybe

Critical Infrastructure Protection 

That the President direct that the National Intelligence Council perform a comprehensive National Intelligence Estimate on the threats to the nation's critical infrastructure X 

There are no NIEs underway or planned on these subjCouncil is completing an NIE on worldwide biological waspects of the terrorist threat to infrastructure in the U.Scomprehensive assessment of the terrorist threat to the vulnerability assessments for CIP. 

screening on commercial passenger aircraft, especially non-passenger cargo 

New screening measures are being implemented or de

Critical InfrastructureProtection 

That DHS, in conjunction with the airline industry, develop comprehensive guidelines for improving the security of general aviation X 

TSA plans to issue formal guidelines early next year fo18,000 airports and landing strips used by about 214,0November 2003 an aviation industry group advising DHDepartment's review and consideration. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection 

ons

X 

issu

parts 375 and 388, which would restrict public informatThe Bureau of Reclamation issued Directives and Stan

That DHS make dam security a priority, and consider establishing regulatifor more effective security of dam facilities 

Many state laws protect dams. FERC has worked with vulnerabilities, develop a comprehensive security plan, for some dam officials. In September 2002, FERC requirements for performing an annual Reclamation-wiand related operations and maintenance activities. The intended to promote the collection of factual input and effectiveness of dam safety, security, and related opera

Critical InfrastructureProtection 

X 

and cyber security issues. 

That the President direct the merger of physical and cyber security policydevelopment into a single policy entity in the White House 

The White House's Homeland Security Council develo

Protecti

describing infrastructure security in meaningful terms, and to determiadequacy of preparedness of various critical infrastructure components That the Assistant Director for Health and Medical Programs seek advicinput from Federal, State, and local public hesuch issues are an important part of the national strategy

The President's Homeland Security Council Executive Homeland Security Advisory Panel and several Senior Emergency Services, Law Enforcement, and Public He

That the National Office for Combating Terrorism consult with the professional organizations, especially those with licensing or certification requirements, to find acceptable methods to implement such programs, including the prospectof providing Federal resources to support certified training programs

Several organizations both not-for-profit and for-profit nand training. For instance, the American College of Ragrants to strengthen bioterrorism training and educatioworkforce as part of DHHS' Bioterrorism Training and Ccreated with the passage of the Public Health Security Response Act of 2002. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection 

That DHS elevate the priority of measures necessary for baggage and cargo 

X 

Critical Infrastructure 

on

That DHS use NISAC modeling and analytic capabilities to develop metrics for 

ne the

X

This recommendation has not been implemented. 

Health and Medical 

e and

alth officials, and from

representatives of public and private medical care providers, to ensure that X 

Health and Medical X 

Association, the CDC, the Emergency Management InPreparedness in DHHS, and the American Institute of few and do not suggest an endorsement. However, thcertification for medical preparedness for terrorism. DH
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

C

A

TEG

O

R

Y

REC

O

M

MEND

A

TIO

N

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUT

COME

Health and Medical

Medical authorities must establish standards for hospital facilities that include minimum capabilities in every hospital to treat victims of a terrorist attack 

X 

priority areas, each with critical benchmarks, which mumilestones, and a proposed budget must also be proviSurge Capacity for the Care of Adult and Pediatric VictAs part of the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparednof $498 million in FY03, HRSA grant a

wardees are to d

awardee must establish a system that allows the triageand pediatric patients per 1,000,000 population, 

with a

hospitalization from a biological, chemical, radiological 

facilities must be able to support the initial evaluation apatients with clinical contagious syndrome suggestive ofever, prior to movement to a definitive isolation facility

Health and Medical se X 

territories as of August 11, 2003. CDC established a 

w

The National Office should review existing Federal and State authorities for mandatory or prescriptive activities such as vaccination and quarantine. It should provide reports that 

will ensure that Federal, State, and local respon

entities have a mutual understanding of the authorities and procedures at all levels of government 

The Model State Health Emergency Powers Act was inpreparation for, and response to, catastrophic events. clinicians, health departments and other decision make

Medical

rapid response to a terrorist biological attack 

In 1999 the CDC and DVA started the Napush packages of pharmaceuticals and medical suppliewas transferred to DHS and renamed the Strategic Nasurge capacity for 500 patients in each state or region Hospital Preparedness Plan in 2002. In July 2002, the million of smallpox vaccine and no

w there are 286 milli

and DHHS officials announced a cooperative effort for made available the anthrax vaccine to stockpile for civi

Health and Medical 

Medical entities such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations should conduct periodic assessments of medical facilities and 

lti-disciplinary exercise 

ating health care entit

antin

r of 

conducting a needs assessment. 

capabilities. Evaluation criteria should include a comprehensive, clear, coordinated, and testable response plan. Medical facilities should test their plans, preferably annually, and ideally through a muwith all response disciplines 

X 

HRSA established the Hospital Preparedness Programpreparedness of the Nation's hospitals and public healtother outbreaks of infectious disease. This progra

ms w

plans to improve the capacity of hospitals, their emergeEMS systems, and other collabormass immunizations, treatment, isolation and quarother outbreaks of infectious disease. The first yea

Health and Medical X 

CDC's Health Alert Net

work 

was established to provide 

Medical and health authorities should establish critical information gathering and dissemination, especially for CBRN attacks. They should simplify and standardize mandatory reporting 

State and local public health laboratories. Connecting pa Critical Benchmark of DHHS' 2002 Emergency Supp

That Federal, State, and local entities as well as affected private-sector medical organizations fully implement the American

Medi

(AMA) "Report and Recommendations on Medical Preparedand Other Disasters" 

A unified public-private entity at the federal level has no

informational resources, the CDC disseminated the moand several pilot programs are ongoing 

with respect to 

diseases. 

Health andMedical 

y

X 

That medical systems fully imple

ment the JCAHO Revised Emergenc 

Management Standard 

The ne

w Emergency Management standards for hospi

and ambulatory care 

were implemented on January 1, 

existing standards and infusing the concept of communprocess. The revised standards broaden the framewororganizations in preparing for and managing a variety o

Health and 

Adequate stockpiles of vaccines should be created and made accessible for 

X 

tional Pharma

Health and Medical 

cal Association 

ness for Terrorism X 

sub recommendations have been implemented in part. organizations are providing education and training, the 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUTCOME

Health and Medical and Response X 

That the Congress provide sufficient resources to the DHHS for full implementation of related CDC and public health preparedness programsincluding Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness 

FY 02, 03, and 04 budgets allocated $940 million for Spreparedness. A portion of this amount was made avaoutbreak control, including epidemiological and medicapreparedness planning and coordination; and the condState public health and hospital systems. 

Health and Medical 

That the Congress provide sufficient resources to the DHHS for full implementation of related CDC and public health preparedness programs including fully resource the CDC Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism

X 

FY 02, 03, and 04 budgets allocated $940 million for Spreparedness. Within this amount, funds were made aLaboratory Response Network. 

including fully resource the CDC Secure and Rapid Communications Networks 

FY 02, 03, and 04 budget allocated $940 million for StaWithin this amount, funds were made available to expacommunications networks 

That DHHS, in coordination with the Office of Homeland Security, develop standard models for health and medical responses to a variety of hazards foruse at Federal, State, and local levels and in conjunction with the private sector

CDC and NIOSH have large amounts of information on chemical and biological agents (http://www.cdc.gov/nioDisaster Medical System under DHS has developed StState and Territorial Directors of Health Promotion and developed the Model Emergency Response CommunicOutbreaks and Bioterrorist Events - Second Edition. 

Health andMedical 

That the Secretary of DHHS reestablish a pre-hospital Emergency Medical Services (EMS) program office X This recommendation has not been implemented. existing Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) and Paramedic National Standardized Training Curricula, and corresponding Refresher Curricula 

The US Department of Justice and the Federal Emergea self-study program designed to provide the basic awaresponders to respond to incidents of terrorism safely afor Fire, emergency medical, hazmat, incident comman

Health and Medical 

That the Congress increase Federal resources for exercises that are informby and targeted at State and local health and medical entities 

ed

X

FY 02 budget allocated $940 million for State and locaof these funds was used to conduct training exercises hospital systems.

Health and Medical 

rity, with advice from its related national 

advisory board and in coordination with DHHS and DVA, review and 

X 

d transporting anthrax and smallpox vaccines

That the Office of Homeland Securecommend appropriate changes to plans for the stockpile of vaccines and critical supplies 

Since September 11, 2001, the stockpile has been tranNational Stockpile and enhanced as follows: supplemeexpand the stockpile and to acquire additional antibiotiburn and trauma supplies have been added to the stocpackages" that are located at 10 sites across the UniteSNS program has increased the technical assistance temergency response planners and developed and dissprepare planning officials to receive and distribute mateAdditionally, SNS staff conduct site visits where they apreparedness plans, conduct classroom training, and p

State and local emergency response exercises. The Sstoring an

Health andMedical 

That the Office of Homeland Security, on the advice of its related nationadvisory board, and in c

al

oordination with the responsible Federal agencies, 

develop a comprehensive plan for the full spectrum of medical and health research for terrorism-related medical issues, including the psychological repercussions of terrorism and pre-hospital interventions 

well as helping to develop the base of scientific expertiresearch. 

X 

The bioterrorism research initiative represents the largeinitiative in the history of NIH. The funding level requesestimated 1,000 biodefense research awards. NIH is aregional extramural Centers of Excellence for Biodefen

The new centers will help bring together and stimulate 

Health and Medical 

That the Congress provide sufficient resources to the DHHS for full implementation of related CDC and public health preparedness programs X 

Health and Medical X 

However comprehensive models from a single source 

Health and Medical 

That the Secretary of Transportation direct the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's Office of Emergency Medical Service to revise the 

X 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUTCOME

Health and Medical 

That the Secretary of DHHS, in conjunction with the Office of Homeland Security and its related advisory board, conduct a thorough review of the authorities, structures, and capabilities under MMRS and NDMS 

X 

On Jan. 24, 2003 DHHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompsfunding for the first installment in the $1 billion designeinfrastructure. The areas to be targeted in this first rounResponse System. The MMRS funding will add an addhave already received funding in past years and will mpopulation will be covered by an MMRS plan. On MarcEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other prto become the Emergency Preparedness and ResponsHomeland Security. 

Health and Medical 

ucation 

model laws X ASTHO), and the National A

That the Office of Homeland Security develop an information and edprogram on the legal and procedural problems involved in a health and medical response to terrorism, and in coordination with the Department ofJustice and the American Bar Association, consider the efficacy of or other programs to enhance future responses to such events 

To unify and update the laws relating to health and mecommissioned Larry Goston to draft the Model State EDecember 11, 2002, CDC's Public Health Law ProgramTerritorial Health Officials (Officials (NACCHO) sponsored a workshop on selectepublic health legal preparedness for bioterrorism. 

Health andMedical 

illion per 

over the next five years to strengthen the public health system in the 

United States 

X 

That DHHS continue to provide financial support on the order of $1 byear 

Support on the order of $1 billion per year was budgete

Health andMedical 

That DHS coordinate and centralize the access to information regarding funding from various agencies such as DHHS (including CDC), EPA, USDAand others and simplify th

,

e application process 

a

e im

local governments will only have to contact one office i

X 

On September 2, 2003, DHS announced plans to creAccess Point for State and Local Grants". With thopportunities, as well as to receive grant guidance, coo

Health and Medical 

e

X 

That DHHS, in consultation with the State, local, and private sector stakeholders, establish and implement a formal process for evaluating theffectiveness of investment in State, local, and private preparedness for responses to terrorist attacks, especially bioterrorism 

DHHS is currently funding (FY04) several efforts to devpublic health and hospital preparedness. 

That DHHS fund studies aimed at modeling the size and scope of thhealthcare and public health workforce needed to respond to a range of puhealth emergencies and day-to-day public health issues 

There are several models for local workforce needs, buresponse has been developed. 

Health and Medical 

ospital system to respond to terrorism, and recommend 

appropriate Federal-State-Local-Private funding strategies 

X 

That DHHS conduct a comprehensive assessment of the resources required by the nation's h

In August 2002, DHHS created the Secretary's CounciCouncil's responsibilities include assessing the nation's attacks. As a result of this assessment, $135 million win FY02; $518 million was allocated in FY03. The Hospin 2003 to help States, territories, and municipalities dechemical preparedness plans focused on hospitals. Fupreparedness offices with bioterrorism coordinators anassessments, develop and implement regional hospitaepidemic, and to focus on four first priority areas: mediand decontamination, communication, and biological d

Health andMedical 

That DHHS continue to strengthen the Health Alert Network and other secuand rapid communications systems, as well as public health information systems that generate surveillance, epidemiologic and laboratory informat

re

ion X

On April 1, 2003, the CDC dedicated the Marcus Emerthat strengthens the agency's response to health crises coordinated responses to public health emergencies accommunications hub supports, organizes and manageCDC, DHHS, as well as federal intelligence and emergand local public health officials. 

Health and Medical 

e 

blic X 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUTCOME

Health and Medical 

ublic X 

That Congress increase Federal resources for appropriately designed exercises to be implemented by State, local, private sector medical and phealth and emergency medical response entities 

DHHS's FY04 budget allocated $518 million for public 

Health andMedical 

That DHHS clearly articulate the roles, missions, capabilities and limitations of special response teams; that a plan be developed for the effective integration of such teams; and that focused training for special teams emphasize integration as well as coordination with States and localities 

X 

This recommendation has not yet been implemented. 

Medical 

assistance to States and localities, and implement changes to make the system more responsive 

In early 2003, Recenassistance to states to help them effectively manage thjurisdictions. In September 2003, CDC issued guidelineofficials should respond to a smallpox outbreak includinmass vaccination. CDC is working to strengthen its intResponse infrastructure to provide enhanced technica

and local health agencies. 

Medical practices in order to help States and localities more effectively manage surge capacity, the distribution of the NPS, and other preparedness goals 

This recommendation has not yet been implemente

Health and Medical 

That NIH, in collaboration with CDC, strengthen programs focusing on both basic medical research and applied public health research, and theapplication of new technologies or devices in public health; and that DHS andOHS, in cooperation, prioritize and coordinate research among NIAID, other NIH entities, and other agencies conducting or sponsoring medical and health research, including DoD, DOE, and USDA, to avoid unnecessary duplication 

In 2002, NIAID developed a strategic plan for counter-b

therapeutics a

X

biodefense research agenda focuses on studies of micmicrobes; the development of new vaccines, therapiesdevelopment of research resources such as appropriatsignificantly more resources - $1.6 billion in FY03. NIAfor biological agents in Categories A-C with USDA, DOa cooperative program with the U.S. Army Research Inworking with DoD on the development of

Health and Medical 

That each State that has not done so either adopt the Model Health PowEmergency Act, as modified to conform to any single

ers

State's special

requirements, or develop legislations of its own that accomplishes the same 

s that

y authorities

As of August 11, 2003, the Act has been introduced in in 43 state legislatures, the District of Columbia, and thtwo states [AL, AZ, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, LA, 

fundamental purposes; and work to operationalize laws and regulationapply to CBRN incidents---naturally occurring, accidental or intentional, especially those that may require isolation, quarantine, emergency vaccination of large segments of the population, or other significant emergenc

X 

NC, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, UT, VT, VA, WI, and resolutions that include provisions from or are closely r

Health andMedical 

h public health agencies, 

EMS and hospitals can share information with law enforcement officials in special emergency circumstances under HIPAA (pg. 64) As a prerequisite for receiving Federal law enforcement and health and medical funds from the Federal government, that States and localities be required to developcomprehensive plans for legally-appropriate cooperation between lawenforcement and public health, EMS, and hospital officials 

X 

That the Congress clarify the conditions under whic HIPAA permits covered entities to disclose protected h

certain circumstances. 

Medical 

That DHHS, in coordination with DHS, develop an on-going, well-coordinated strategy for education of the public on the prevention, risks, signs, symptoms,treatments, and other important health and medical information before, during and after an attack or large-scale naturally occurring outbreak occurs

DHS has a number of initiatives aimed at public educainclude the “Ready.gov” program (see http://www.readCitizen Corps (see http://www.citizencorps.gov/ ), and national network of citizen volunteers. 

Health and 

That DHHS evaluate current processes for providing required technical 

X 

tly, the SNS prepared specific gui

Health and That DHHS develop an electronic, continuously updated handbook on best X d. Health and X 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUTCOME

Health and Medical 

That DHHS, through the National Institute of Mental Health, and in collaboration with CDC, enhance funding for research into the prevention and treatment of the short and long-term psychological consequences of terrorist attacks 

X 

 NIMH is conducting and supporting research relevant psychosocial sequelae of terrorism and mass emergenpractice and health care system factors in two broad gr2. Terrorism Related Research. 

Health and Medical 

That the Intelligence Community improve its capacity for health and medical analysis by obtaining additional expertise in the medical and health implications of various terrorist threats 

X

The Intelligence Community has enhanced its ability w

That DHHS significantly enhance technical assistance to States to develop plans and procedures for distributing the NPS, continue to requexercises that demonstrate the States' ability to employ the NPS, and usspecific metrics for evaluating States' capabilities 

in the CDC cooperative agreements to improve emergeincluding bioterrorism. As such plans, training and testcapacities are required in the State plans and are to be consequence for not doing so is unclear. The CDC is wtransitioning from critical capacities to readiness goals 

nations needs for other vaccines 

An overall vaccine strategy that covers basic research marketing surveillance has not been developed, but NIdeveloped a research strategy and agenda that includsigned BioShield, which is meant to encourage industr

That the smallpox vaccination plan be implemented in incremental stages with careful analysis and continuous assessment of the risks of the vaccine; and that DHHS place a high priority on research for safer smallpox vaccine

against the disease and an intention that by mid-2003 vaccinated. In February 2003, DHHS announced the $20 million in first-year funding to develop safer smallpneed for safer smallpox vaccines, the new contract empredetermined objectives. 

Undertake continuing, comprehensive and articulate assessments of potential,credible, terrorist threats within the United States, and the ensuing risk and 

In 2003, the FBI established the position of Executive AOffice of Intelligence. The new office is completing a nebegun work on a longer-term assessment of domestic intelligence, cybercrime, and organized crime. 

More attention be paid to assessments of the higher-probability/lowerconsequence threats—not at the expense of, but in addition to, assessmentsof the lower-probability/higher-consequence threats

The FBI is making a comprehensive assessment of the  It is not clear that higher probability/lower consequencanalysis 

More needs to be and can be done to obtain and share information on potential terrorist threats at all levels of government, to provide more effective deterrence, prevention, interdiction, or response, using modern information 

Modest improvements in intelligence sharing have beeIn August 2003, the GAO determined that improvemenprocedures for sharing

Intelligence 

The rescission of that portion of the 1995 guidelines, promulgated by the Director of Central Intelligence, which prohibits the engagement of certain foreign intelligence informants who may have previously been involved in human rights violations 

X

The FY02 Intelligence bill (Section 403) directed that thformally rescinded the 1995 recruiting guidelines just aPermanent Select Committee on Intelligence, subcommSecurity report on Counterterrorism Intelligence Capab

Health and Medical 

help 

ire

e X 

Deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile (former

Health and Medical 

That DHHS, in collaboration with DHS and DoD, establish a national strategyfor vaccine development for bioterrorism, which will be consistent with the X 

e

Health and Medical X 

In December 2002, President Bush, announced plans 

Intelligence vulnerability assessments X Intelligence X Intelligence 

technology

X 

analyzes information on terrorist threats, assesses vulninformation. The TTIC was created in May 2003 to coothreat analysis to the President, DHS, and other federaTTIC will house a database of terrorists that officials acand act upon. TTIC is staffed by representatives of the 

information at all levels of gove

Ridge announced that governors and other state-level clearances to receive classified information on homelaRidge stated that DHS would work through governors thas directed DHS to develop by March 2004, a revampbetween all government agencies and the private secto
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUTCOME

Intelligence 

An expansion and improvement in research, development, test, anevaluation (RDT&E) of reliable sensors and rapid readout capability, and the subsequent fielding of a new generation of measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) technology based on enhanced RDT&E efforts 

d

X

According to the intelligence community’s Central MAShave been pursued and have already led to the deploytechnologies. The MASINT Office is also expanding the chemical and biological terrorism threats.

Intelligence 

A thorough review, by a panel of Department of Justice (DOJ) officials and knowledgeable citizens outside the Federal government, of the terrorism portion of the Attorney General’s “Domestic Guidelines.” We recomthe panel review the domestic guidelines 

mend that 

for clarity, in the interests of X 

directed a top-to-bottom review of the guidelines to ensthe legal authority to prevent terrorist attacks. On May 

strengthening them, while providing for the protection of civil rights and liberties 

After September 11, 2001, AG Ashcroft authorized the headquarters approval, in extraordinary cases to preveeffect . 

Intelligence 

That the Attorney General direct the Office of Intelligence Policy and Reviewto modify its procedures to conform to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act statutory requirements 

X 

Internal policy changes have resulted in processes in l

Intelligence

That the National Office for Combating Terrorism foster research and development in forensics technology and analysis and implement anIndications and Warning System for the rapid dissemination of information developed by enhanced forensics 

X

According to the Intelligence Community’s Central MASbeing improved. A database of microbial agent signatualso has a biological forensics research program. DHS microbial forensics system and has partnered with the Analysis Center (BFAC). Details of the Indications and 

The National Office should promote a system for providing some form of security clearance to selected State and Local officials nationwide, and methods of disseminating classified information to these officials in near real 

In 2002, DoJ sponsored and OHS participated in a foruwas co-hosted by the National Governors Association. National Homeland Security Advisory System, Homelatwo-way information sharing, and a future, uniform sys2003, DHS Secretary Ridge announced that governors granted securitydevelopments and activities. Ridge stated that DHS wolocal officials with critical information. However, there is clearances do not transfer from one Federal agency to insufficient. 

Intelligence 

That the FBI consider implementing a "Reports Officer" or similar systanalogous to the process used by the CIA, for tracking and analyzing terrorism indicators and warning 

em, The FBI has implemented a "Reports Officer" system. 

That agencies of the Federal government increase and accelerate thof terrorism-related threat assessments and intelligence with appropriate Stateand local officials and response organizations 

See also item 12. In 2002, the initial integration of collaenforcement, the intelligence community, and the State initiative enables a range a functions, from secure e-manother's databases. The intelligence community's Openow serves as a central hub connecting State's intraneLEO also serves as the backbone for Joint Terrorism Tpilots, which integrate Federal, State and local databasIntegration Center (TTIC) commenced operations in Ja

The NCTC was not created. The Terrorist Threat IntegPresident Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address has certain authorities and planned capabilities that ha

safeguards under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), whichcurrently in the FBI, be transferred to the NCTC 

The NCTC was not created. DoJ, working through the intelligence collection activities within the United States

That the Congress ensure that oversight of the NCTC be concentrated in the intelligence comm

The TTIC will presumably be principally within the over

Intelligence 

time 

X 

clearances to receive classified inform

Intelligence 

e sharing 

X 

Intelligence 

That the President direct the establishment of a National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) X 

Intelligence 

That the collection of intelligence and other information on terrorist activities inside the United States, including the authorities, responsibilities and 

are

X 

Intelligence ittee in each House X 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUTCOME

Intelligence 

That the President direct that the NCTC produce continuing, compre"strategic" assessments of threats inside the United States, to be provided to policymakers at all levels, to help ensure appropriate planning and ofpreparedness and response resources 

hensive 

X

In 2003, the FBI established the position of Executive AOffice of Intelligence. The new office is completing a nebegun work on a longer term assessment of domestic intelligence, cybercrime, and organized crime.

That the Congress and President ensure that the DHS has the authority to levy direct intelligence requirements on the Intelligence Community for thecollection or additional analysis of intelligence of potential threats inside the United States to aid in the execution of its specific responsibilities in the areaof critical infrastructure protection vulnerability assessments. (pg. 48) Tcongress and the President ensure that the DHS has robust capability fcombining threat information generated by the Intelligence Community and the NCTC with vulnerability information the Department generates in cooperation with the private sector to provide comprehensive and continuing assessments on potential risks to U.S. critical infrastructure

The DHS does not have authority to direct intelligence in the TTIC, the DHS can contribute to an interagency requirements. DHS has a limited organic capability for 

Research aDevelopmen

nd

t 

ct to the

mbating terrorism 

That the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) become an adjun National Office for Combating Terrorism in the same manner that it nowserves in the NSC process and that it expand its coordination role for technical aspects of RDT&E for co

X 

While TSWG is still fundamentally a joint DOS-DOD effor DHS. 

That the Assistant Director for RDT&E and National Standards of the NatOffice for Combating Terrorism either enter into a formal relationship with OSTP or have appropriate members of the OSTP staff detailed to the NationOffice for Combating Terrorism on a rotational basis 

OSTP staff are dual-hatted or detailed to DHS and the 

Research and Development 

That the Assistant for RDT&E for National Standards develop equipment testing protocols and continue to explore the prospect of financial support from vendors for equipment live agent test and evaluation, leading to Federal certification 

X 

There is a multi-agency collaborative effort to develop response equipment to be implemented over the next 5 

part of the national strategy, a comprehensive plan for long-range researccombating terrorism 

HSARPA has developed both a short and long-term re

Expand and consolidate researchdetector and warning systems Configure Federal military response assets to support and reinforce existing structures and systems 

X 

A number of Federal military units—with varying levels are prepared to provide military support to civil authoritdedicated to the MSCA mission and they could be depdoes fund, and the states control, National Guard WeaTeams, small units (22 uniformed military personnel) thcoordinate additional Federal and state response activ

authority to establish a new under secretary position for homeland security

In the FY03 National Defense Authorization Act, the Coposition of ASD (HD). On 25 March 2003, Deputy Secrdescribing the duties of the ASD (HD) as follows: “His of the homeland defense activities of the Department uof the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)) with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Adevelop policies, conduct analyses, provide advice,within the Department.” The ASD (HD) has direct acceof his Executive Agent responsibilities for military supp

Intelligence hat the or X Research and Development 

ional

al X 

Research and Development 

That the Assistant Director for RDT&E and National Standards develop, as 

h for X 

Research and Development 

, development, and integration of sensor, X Expanded research in DHS S&T on sensor technologie

Role of Military Role of Military 

That the Secretary of Defense seek and that the Congress approve the 

X 

 an

support to civil authorities, emergency preparedness a
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUTCOME

Role of Military X 

That the National Command Authority establish a single, unified command and control structure to execute all functions for providing military support orassistance to civil authorities 

This recommendation has been implemented nearly in Command was formed. The command will reach full oand assume unified command and control of nearly all support to civil authorities within the continental United Command is responsible for providing similar civil suppTerritories. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Comoperations by federal military forces within U.S. territor

That the Secretary of Defense direct the development of more detailed plans for the use of the military domestically across the spectrum of potential activities, and coordinate with State and other Federal agencies in the creation of more State- or regional-specific plans. We further recommend tthe secretary direct the military departments to institute specific training inmilitary units most likely to be involved in military support to civil authorities and to expand military involvement in related exercises with Federal, State, and local agencies 

This recommendation has not been fully implemented. Homeland Security (DHS) until DHS identifies specific support. 

Role of Military X 

OM has established response and training re

Reaction Forces (QRFs). DoD has for many years conAccording to DoD, numerous interagency agreements response training. For example, the National Disaster Mpartnership that supplements state and local medical re

throughout the country routinely participate in disaster 32 National Guard WMD-CSTs to conduct monthly exe

Expand training and exercises in relevant military units and with Federal,State and local responders 

NORTHCforces for domestic operations. For example, the MACbasis to state National Guard and selected active Army emergencies. The Federal partners are the DHS, DHHits component commands, conduct periodic exercises 

response teams.

That the Secretary of Defense direct specific mission areas for the use of the National Guard for providing support to civil authorities for combating terrorism. 

To date, there have been no requirements established specific study on the Reserve Component’s Role in hoestablished DOD requirements, ASD (RA) prepare a reContributions to HD and CS that will recommend the acommand relationships, and resources required for conLTG Steven Blum, NGB Chief, unveiled a proposal to cengineering units into incident response teams. These will not be dedicated to homeland operations. On 21 Mdescription of LTG Blum’s plan. According to NGB, Blumission essential task lists. LTG Blum has proposed a 

That the Secretary of defense publish a compendium, in layman's terms, of the statutory authorities for using the military domestically to combat terrori

This recommendation has not been implemented. Theto develop the recommended compendium at this timeCommand Authority will make the decision on which stGuard forces to meet domestic emergencies, other thadoes not support the need for a layman’s legal primer. installation commanders, and domestic Joint Task Forcaspects of military assistance to civil authorities, accord

Role of Military 

hat

X 

Department of Defense (DoD) had established numerodomestically (e.g., “Garden Plot” in response to domesresponse to postal emergencies). Since the initiation oSeptember 2001, DoD has developed additional plans military combat operations for the air, land, and maritimAccording to DoD, it is constrained in developing detai

Role of Military X 

homeland security missions. On 9 July 2003, the Secrdirecting studies on rebalancing the U.S. armed forces

Role of Military 

sm, 

with detailed explanations about the procedures for implementing those authorities X 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUTCOME

Role of Military 

d in

issions 

X 

That the Secretary of Defense improve the full-time liaison elements locatethe 10 FEMA regions and assign those elements expanded missions to enhance coordination with State and local agencies in planning, training, and exercising emergency response m

This recommendation has been partially implemented. have been strengthened since the Panel’s recommendexpand the missions of the Emergency Preparedness currently require the commitment of some 200 military 

circumstances when other national assets are fully engaged or otherwise unable to respond, or the mission requires additional or different militarysupport. NORTHCOM should plan and train for such missions accordin

According to DoD, NORTHCOM cannot conduct compDHS establishes civil support requirements. Moreover, mission is clearly stated as follows: “United States Norto deter, prevent, preempt, and defeat threats and aggterritories, and interests within the assigned area of resor Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to management operations.” This mission statement is brpotential activities that would require the provision of m(MSCA), DoD says. 

That the NORTHCOM combatant commander have, at a minimum, operational control of all Federal military forces engaged in missions within the command's area 

This recommendation has been partially implemented. operational control as required over the forces needed area of responsibility. NORTHCOM has no assigned foelements (e.g., JTF-6 and JTF-CS). Commander, U.S. control counterterrorist operations by military forces op

Role of Military 

That the President and the Congress amend existing statutes to ensure that sufficient authorities and safeguards exist for use of the military across the entire spectrum of potential terrorist attacks (including conventional, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats as well as cyber); that the authorities be consolidated in a single chapter of the Title 10; and the DoD prepare a legal "handbook" to ensure that military and civilian authorities better understand the legal authorities governing the use of the militarydomestically in support of civilian authorities for all hazards---natural and manmade 

X 

This recommendation has not been implemented. HowCongress to revise title 10 USC, Section 12304, to perresponse to terrorist incidents. DoD is working with the permit the President to mobilize all Reserve componenresponse to domestic “all hazards” disasters. Congress section the homeland security-related authorities for thhas no plans to develop a “handbook” on the legal auththe military.

among DoD (including NORTHCOM) and Federal, State, and local authoritiesto identify the types and levels of Federal support, including military support,that may be required to assist civil authorities in homeland security

This recommendaeffort to identify homeland security requirements. The Deffort. Within DoD, the ASD (HD) will establish civil supStaff and Commander, NORTHCOM to develop plans 

Commander NORTHCOM has operational control, as 

Commander NORTHCOM establishes training requiremCommander NORTHCOM does not fund civil support tServices fund training to meet his requirements for civimilitary units with specialized training are made availabrequired. NG units within the several states also undercivil support mission training will be expanded. On 9 Juissued a memorandum (see details above) directing a U.S. armed forces’ mix of Active and Reserve componsupport training requirements was also completed for AChief of the National Guard Bureau has proposed (see NG units to provide specialized civil support following a could lead to the creation of dual-missioned NG units. 

This recommendation has been partially implemented. civil support training requirements to the Chairman, Jovalidates them and passes them on to the Services to 

Role of Military 

That the Secretary of defense clarify the NORTHCOM mission to ensure that the Command is developing plans across the full spectrum of potential activities to provide military support to civil authorities, including 

gly

X 

Role of Military of responsibility for support to civil authorities X Role of Military 

That the President direct the DHS to coordinate a comprehensive effort 

efforts and 

to articulate those requirements in the National incident Response Plan 

X 

tion is currently being implemented. 

Role of Military 

That the Secretary of Defense direct that all military personnel and units under NORTHCOM, or designated for NORTHCOM use in any contingency, receive special training for domestic missions. Furthermore, in those cases where military personnel support civil law enforcement, special training programs should be established and executed 

X 

Role of Military 

That the Secretary of Defense clarify NORTHCOM'S combatant command authority to ensure that Commander NORTHCOM can direct subordinate commands to conduct pre-incident planning, training, and exercising of forces required to conduct civil support missions 

X 

requirements. However, as mentioned previously, Commaintain funds to support this training. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

C

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1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUT

COME

Role of 

Military 

That the combatant Commander, NOR

THCOM, have dedicated, rapid 

reaction units with a 

wide range of response capabilities such as an ability to 

support implementation of quarantine, support crowd control activities, provide CBRNE detection and decontamination, provide emergency medical response, perform engineering, and provide communication support to and among the leadership of civil authorities in the event a terrorist attack 

X 

This recommendation has been partially implemented. to the United States during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Nfor Quick Reaction Forces. They are not solely dedicadeployed abroad. 

That the Congress expressly authorize the Secretary of 

Defense to

funds to the governor of a State when such funds are requested for civil support planning, training, exercising and operations by National Guard personnel acting in Title 32 duty status and that the Secretary of Defense collaborate 

with State governors to develop agreed lists of National guard civil 

procedures ensure that Federal 

Agency requests for m

approved, fulfilled by military forces in federal status. 

That the President and governors of the several States establish acollaborative process for deploying National Guard forces in Title 32 dut(pg. 102) That the Congress provide new authority under Title 32 to employthe National Guard (in non-title 10 status) on a multi-State basis, and with governors' consent to conduct homeland security missions, and that the Secretary of Defense define clearly the appropriate command relationshipsbet

ween DoD and the National Guard. (pg. 102) That Congress and DoD 

promote and support the development of a system for National Guard civilsupport activities that can deploy forces regionally--in coordination 

with D

to respond to incidents that overwhelm the resources of an individual Stat

This recommendation has not been implemented. Conauthorities for e

mploying the National Guard on a mult

be expended to perform state activities. DoD has no plInterstate Compact agreements, which have provisions National Guard forces. (Guardsmen deployed under InActive Duty status, where the requesting state reimburDoD’s position that numerous other federal agencies hdomestic emergencies that may involve multiple statesbe exhausted prior to turning to DoD assets. 

That the Secretary of Defense direct that certain National Guard units be trained for and assigned homeland security missions as their exclusive missions (rather than "primary missions" as stated in our 

Third Report) and 

provide resources consistent with the designated priority of their homeland missions 

This recommendcomponent roles in Homeland Defense and Military Asunder study, as directed by the Secretary of Defense oposition that, before dedicating force structure to any hestablish what missions need to be perfor

med as 

well a

that should perform them. 

Develop a national strategy to address the issues of domestic preparedness and response to terrorist incidents 

On 16 July 2002, President George Bush released his Security.” The Strategy is comprehensive; it covers prenational perspective. 

There needs to be a “Federal Government Strategy” component of the national strategy—one which clearly articulates Federal responsibilities, roles, and missions, 

Federal strategy continues to evolve. Key elements in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, Homelanthe National Response Plan. The National Strategy for Homeland Security was deveHo

wever, State and local input is assisting in the devel

The President is directing initiatives through his NationPresidential Directives, and other instruments. 

Comprehensive public education and information programs must bedeveloped, programs that 

will provide straight-forward, timely information a

advice both prior to any terrorist incident and in the immediate after

math of 

any attack 

X

DHS has a number of initiatives aimed at public educainclude the “Ready.gov” program (see http://www.readCitizen Corps (see http://www.citizencorps.gov/ ), and national net

work of citizen volunteers. 

Role of 

Military 

 provide 

support activities for 

which the Defense Department will provide funds 

X 

Existing title 32 USC authority applies to required NG tmissions. According to DOD, it reviews state requests performing operational missions on a case-by-case baexecution of federal missions are considered for title 32 DHS grants, not DOD funding, should be the channel u

and exercises needed by Governors to support their inIn addition, DOD is opposed to changes in existing pro

Role of 

Military 

y

status to support missions of national significance at the President's request 

oD--

e

X 

Role of 

Military X 

ation has not been implemented. As w

Strategy and Structure X Strategy and Structure and distinguishes those from state and 

local ones 

X 

Strategy and Structure 

The national strategy must have a “bottom-up” approach—thatit be developed in close consultation and collaboration with state and local officials, and the law enforcement and emergency response communities from across the country

X 

Strategy and Structure 

The national strategy must have the direct leadership, guidance, and imprimatur of the President X 

Strategy and Structure 

nd
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

C

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MEND

A

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N

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUT

COME

Strategy and 

eapons The National Strategy for Homeland Security is an all-h

Structure 

The national strategy should include incidents involving conventional wthat have the potential to cause significant casualties or physical damage; as well as incidents involving CBRN devices that may not be capable ofproducing “mass casualties” but that can, nevertheless, produce considerablefear, panic, or other major disruptions to the infrastructure or econo

my of the

potential domestic target 

X

Structure 

Further support and develop the N

DPO as a focal point for related 

preparedness information and for directing state and local entities to the appropriate agency of the Federal government for obtaining information,assistance and support 

X

In accordance 

with the Homeland Security Act of 2002

Office 

was transferred to DHS’ Directorate for Emergen

Current DHS structure suffers fro

m a duplication of em

efforts. In particular, the existence of the Directorate of Response and the Office of Domestic Preparedness in state and local officials and has created problems with performance accountability, and fiscal accountability. Iinformed the National Governors Association that DHS shop” for Federal homeland security grants and assista

The Panel recom

mends that the Congress consider forming an ad 

Special or Select Committee, composed of representatives of the various committees with oversight and funding responsibilities for domestic preparedness and response, and give such an entity the authority to make determinations that 

will result in more coherent efforts at the Federal level 

Three new com

mittees have been established in the C

appropriations: the House Select Committee on HomeCommittee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, and Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security. operations in 2003. 

Strategy and Structure 

al,

X 

The Panel recom

mends that there be a revision and codification of univers

unambiguous, and easily understandable definitions of the various terms related to combating terrorism and the terrorist threat 

Homeland Security-related terms and definitions are inthe release of the National Strategy for Homeland Secand NIMS 

Standardize equipment and com

munications systems bet

ween the different 

levels of first responders to ensure better compatibility and inter-operabilitybet

ween potential responders 

DHS has established Project SAFECO

M to p

Association), but these are limited in scope. A comprehstandardization has not been established. Several statoperability and some report significant progress that 

w

Additional coordination 

with Federal responders is requ

national effort. 

Structure to the Congress a national strategy for combating terrorism 

within one year o

assuming office 

The President released hisremarks, the President noted that the document is a "n

Strategy and Structure 

We recommend the establishment of a senior level coordination entity in the 

al Office for Combating 

al

t's activities for combating terrorism

dent Bush established the Office 

Executive Office of the President, entitled the "NationTerrorism, " 

with the responsibility for developing domestic and internation

policy an for coordination the program and budget of the Federal governmen

X

October 8, 2002 PresiHouse. 

Strategy and Structure 

We recommend the establishment of a Special Committee for Combating Terrorism---either a joint committee bet

ween the Houses or separate 

com

mittees in each House---to address authority and funding, and to provide 

Congressional oversight, for Federal programs and authority for co

mb

terrorism

ating

Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, and 

nen

X

Three new com

mittees have been established in the C

appropriations: the House Select Committee on HomeAppropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security. operations in 2003. In addition, the House Armed Servoversight panel on terrorism and the House Permacreated a subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland S

Strategy and Strategy and Structure 

hoc Joint 

X 

Strategy and Structure X 

romote w

at the Federal, State, and local levels. A number of Fedstandardization programs (e.g., such as those conduct

Strategy and The Advisory panel recommends that the next President develop and present 

f X 

National Strategy for Home
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

CATEGORY RECOMMENDATION

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUTCOME

Strategy andStructure 

We recommend that the Department of Justice, in consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress as well as knowledgeable members of the scientific, health and medical communities, and State and local government, continually review existing statutory authorities and regulations. The purpose would be propose specific prohibitions, or at least mandatory reporting procedures, on the domestic sale and purchase of precursors and special equipment that pose a direct, significant risk of being usedand deliver CBRN weapons or agents 

to make

Security and Bioterrorism Prevention and Response Acsimilar protections under CFR Part 331 and 9 CFR ParPrevention Act of 2002: Possession, Use, and TransfeRegulations regarding radiological sources have not ch

X 

 The CDC issued 42 CFR Part 1003 the Possession UToxins: Interim Final Rule December 13, 2002, which i

Structure 

That the National Office for Combating Terrorism foster the developmentprotected, single-source web page system, linking appropriate combating terrorism informat

The Federal Government has not established a compreclearinghouse. 

Strategy and Structure 

That the senior emergency management entity in each State function as the prime Focal Point for that State for domestic preparedness for terrorism X 

Each State has created a Homeland Security Agency omanagement entity as the Focal Point for interacting w

Structure 

departments and agencies should include their plans to respond to terrorist attacks as annexes to the FRP, in accordance with a specific FRP template.The FRP and the relevant Federal agency plans should include input fromState and local entities 

HSPD-5 directs the DHS Secretary to develop and estaSystem and a National Response Plan. According to thFederal Government domestic prevention, preparedneone all-discipline, all-hazards plan." 

Strategy and Structure 

That the National Emergency Management Association, in conjunction withthe Federal Emergency Management Agency, develop a “model” State plan, flexible enough to fit any State’s specific circumstances, but with certain standard features

X

ABS and NEMA developed a strategic plan for Iowa foused the Iowa plan as a model for other States. 

Structure 

This recommendation has been partially implemented. several States to access their level of preparedness anFederal assistance to mitigate. DHS has conducted an programs. States are also conducting their own inventoprograms. 

compacts among states, through FEMA Regional Offices 

FEMA supports the EMAC program and promotes it by programs are also supported by the NIMS. The evolvinjoin mutual aid

Strategy andStructure 

More intense tactical and operational planning to facilitate "second wave" capabilities from outside entities after the depletion of local resources 

"Second- wave” considerations are included in EMACs

Structure 

That States utilize one of the standardized multi-state compacts either the Emergency Management Assistance Compact or the States Compact 

Structure 

That the National Office for Combating Terrorism identify and promote a standardized Incident Command System (ICS) model for tactical operations for response to terrorist incidents that is part of an recommend the identification and promotion, by the National Office for Combating Terrorism, of a standardized Unified Command System (model for operations and multi-agency, multijurisdictional coordination above the tactical operations level. When significant Federal resources are employthat invol

local governments to work effectively and efficiently togrecover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, sinteroperability and compatibility among Federal, Stateinclude a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, command system; multi-agency coordination systems; and management of resources (including systems for cqualifications and certification; and the collection, track

Strategy and of a

ion and databases across all functional disciplines

X 

Strategy and 

That the Federal Response Plan (FRP) be the single source Federaldocument for “all-hazards” response planning. All applicable Federal 

X 

Strategy and 

That the National Office for Combating Terrorism conduct inventories of State and local programs for capabilities that can be utilized in a national context, especially training and exercise programs X 

Strategy and Structure 

That the National Office for Combating Terrorism promote multijurisdictional mutual assistance compacts, using the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces as one model, and facilitate the implementation of interstate mutual assistance X 

compacts as a condition for receiving F

Strategy and 47 states and 4 territories have adopted the EMAC end

CA has the States Compact with surrounding states

Strategy and 

all-hazards approach. We

UCS) 

ed 

ve two or more Federal agencies, we recommend a single Federal 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) be established as part of the UCS. Further that each jurisdiction with an ICS and UCS develop operational templates to provide for alignment of decision-making structures based on the weapon, means of delivery, and severity of the attack 

X 

Homeland Security Presidential Decision Directive/HSPestablish NIMS, a comprehensive incident response syDirective, the “system will provide a consistent nationwand incident resources." 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

C

A

TEG

O

R

Y

REC

O

M

MEND

A

TIO

N

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUT

COME

Strategy and Structure 

n the

X 

That the President always designate a Federal civilian agency other thaDepartment of Defense as the Lead Federal Agency

According to Homeland Security Presidential Decision Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for dPursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the SeFederal operations within the United States to prepare terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencie

Restructuring education and training opportunities to account for the high number of volunteer personnel in key “first responder” disciplines 

In 2003, DHS provided $19 million in grant money to trrespond to emergency situations in their communities tsupplemental appropriation. 

Strategy and Structure 

That the Assistant Director for Domestic Programs in the National Office develop exercise scenarios that are realistic and meet the needs of the State

X 

ging, role-playing exercises involving t

and local response entities and that all major exercises include an independent evaluation 

The U.S. Congress directed Department of State and Dseries of challenofficials who 

would direct a national response to an act

Officials" (TOPOFF), a national-level domestic and inte

produce a more effective, coordinated, global response 

Strategy andStructure 

That the Assistant Director for R

D

T&E and National Standards of the

Office for Combating Terrorism establish a national standards program for combating terrorism, focusing on equipment, training, and laboratory processes and that the National Institute for Standards and Technology andthe National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health be designated as Federal "co-lead"

National

 agencies for the technical aspects of standards 

NIST, Nat

the Occupational Safety and Health Administration havUnderstanding defining each agency or organization’s 

development 

X 

Numerous government agencies currently develop homstandards. Coordination of the various activities is insuStandardization and Interoperability

Working Group wa

lead for all for all relevant activities. NIOSH, enforcing standards or guidelines for responders’ respi

Structure 

That Federal agencies design related training and equipment programs aspart of all-hazards preparedness 

In FY02 FEMA funded ($100 million) governmenincidents of terrorism involving the use of 

weapons of m

critical infrastructure, and for costs related to the develThe ODP equip

ment grant funds enhanced WMD resp

Terrorism Training lists courses for federal WMD traini

Strategy and Structure 

That Federal agencies with training and equipment progra

ms design or 

redesign those programs to include sustainment components 

X

This recommendation has not been implemented. To mreviewing and assessing relevant Federal training and agencies, there are overlapping responsibilities for rele

That the Congress increase that level of funding to States and local government for combating terrorism 

First Responder Initiative in 2003 is intended to help stneeds and apply for resources directly related to respopassed by the 

Congress does not fully support the kind 

requested by the President, the Department has made to states and localities. Part of this funding includes $7responders through the Firefighters Grant Program. Thinteroperability improvements, so that first responders police, and emergency medical technicians, can commmillion will help states and localities modernize their emmillion is allocated for the Community Emergency Res

Consolidating information and application procedures for Federal grant programs for terrorism preparedness in the Office of Homeland Securitythat all funding and grant programs be coordinated through the States

In August 2003, DHS Secretary Ridge informed the Nawas working to establish a “one stop shop” for Federal assistance. 

Strategy and Structure X 

Response Teams. This amount is in addition to $17 m

Strategy and X 

ts to u

a focus on WMD incidents. DOJ's OJP provided funds specialized equipment to enhance the capability of stat

Strategy and Structure X 

Equipment for first responders funding increased from FY01; medical responder fro

m $0 to $2 million; special 

Strategy and Structure and X 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism I

C

A

TEG

O

R

Y

REC

O

M

MEND

A

TIO

N

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 OUT

COME

Strategy and X Structure 

Designing and scheduling Federal preparedness programs so that first responders, particularly those in volunteer-based fire and EM

S organizations, 

can participate 

See also item 8. FEMA trained a record number of leadits Volunteer Incentive Program in 2003. This reflects a program. 

Strategy and Structure 

That the Office Homeland Security serve as a clearinghouse for information about Federal programs, assets, and agencies 

with responsibilities for 

combating terrorism 

X

The Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) establishHelpline is a non-emergency resource for State and locODP's progra

ms. It provides infor

mation on the charac

defensive equipment, mitigation techniques, and availaestablished a Domestic Preparedness Equipment Techtechnical support to jurisdictions in the utilization, sustaequipment. It also started the Domestic Preparedness which is a clearinghouse of information on domestic prWMD infor

mation. 

That the Office of Homeland Security develop ongoing programs, asthe implementation of national strevents about the causes and effects of terrorism and for coordinating public pronouncements during and follo

wing an attack 

See also item 8, above. DHS has created a 

website (w

educating the general public on issues related to the cawhat to do in case of a terrorist attack. 

Strategy and Structure 

That the President and the Congress clearly define the responsibilities of Dand other Federal entities before, during, and after an attack has occurred, especially any authority for directing the activities of other Federal agencies

HS

X

These responsibilities are defined in the National Stratethe NIMS, and HSPD-5. 

That the President specifically designate the DHS as the Lead Federal Agency for response to a bioterrorism attack, and specify its responand authority before, during, and after an attack; and designate the 

DHHS

the Principal Supporting Agency to DHS to provide technical support and provide the interface with State an

This recommendation has not been implemented. Both key authorities for bioterrorism response. 

confusion and to reduce unnecessary expenditure of limited resources alevels 

The Homeland Security Council has been established 

Strategy and Structure 

ugh review of 

before X 

That the President direct the Attorney General to conduct a thoroapplicable laws and regulations and recommend legislative changesthe opening of the next Congress 

Accomplished through the Homeland Security Act of 20related legislation, as well as through specific ExecutivPresidential Directives. 

Structure 

That each House of Congress estab Three new com

mittees have been established in the C

appropriations: the House Select Committee on HomeCommittee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, and Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security. operations in 2003. In addition, the House Armed Servoversight panel on terrorism and the House Permanencreated a subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland S

Strategy and Structure 

 part of 

ategy, for public education prior to terrorist X 

Strategy and Structure 

sibilities 

as

d local public health entities and related 

private sector organizations 

X 

Strategy and Structure 

That the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security revie

w and 

recommend to the President, and that the President direct, a restructuring of interagency mechanisms to ensure better coordination within the Federal government, and with States, localities, and the private sector, to avoid 

t all

X 

Strategy and 

lish a separate authorizing committee and 

related appropriation subcommittee with jurisdiction over Federal programs and authority for Combating Terrorism/Homeland Security

X 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involv

APPENDIX L—SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC VISIONS

Key Strategic Vision 

Dimensions Complacence Reactive Fortress America The New Normalcy 

erties Concerns 

regarding thepotential 

Each terrorist attack is followed by a heated 

Eac

efforts have waned in the absence of terrorist events – 

producing a threat to basic civil liberties. 

put athe c

which itself has diminished 

At the same time some argue that, in the clear Hig

government efforts to adapt the existing legal system to be more

absence of an effective long-term solution tothe terrorism problem, those laws and 

in thethe m

responsive to the terrorism threat. 

regulations promulgated in the wake of 9/11 that could produce an 

lawsthlegis

liberties should be repealed. 

the levCourt. 

lowed by

e more 

sm-related 

ons,

ed debate

damental 

be 

Through a process of often intsome significant changes in thcombat terrorism enacted in thAmericans are again comfortabas regards the protection of civsecurity threat presented by ter

n gu

n n d te

 contr versial 

nation on any change to statutoor im

en passed

veral of

has (or may have) civil libertieunintended consequences)

of the new 

hortly

ft r. S m

upreme

Civil Lib

infringement on civil liberties bygovernment counterterrorism

debate over whether more restrictive laws and regulations are needed, some of which could be construed as infringement on civil 

h attack is fol

a move to producrestrictive terrorilaws a d re latigenerating a heatas to whether funAmerican rights should 

t risk as a response to

o ti ue rrorism

attacks.

hly o

legislation has be

wake of se

ore severe attacks, 

with tests of the constitutionality

following s

erea e o e of the

lation has failed in the

federal courts, including at 

el of the S

A major contributor to this new independent, bipartisan civil liestablished by the President to 

plementing procedures fo

. Th

been key to the resolution of sethe overall national debate on t
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involv

Key Strategic Vision 

Dimensions Complacence Reactive Fortress America The New Normalcy 

ntelligence

and risk assessment 

Efforts at proda useful terrorithreat assessmmaintained

face of the contidifficulty of obtaining goodintelligence on terrorist capabilitiesand the absence ofattacks; most viethe strategic terrorism threatsignificantlydiminished. The challenge of producing actionabwarning of near-tor imminent terrorist 

Effortsuseful terrorismthreat assessment aremaintained in the 

face of the continuedifficulty of obtainigood intelligence on terrorist capabilities and the episodic nature of terrorist attacks whose

d

ng

to 

le

nd

l 

officials, further contributing to the reactive nature of the U.S. posture vis-à-vis terrorism. 

se nature 

attacks continue to take place. 

Federal efforts in collection, analysis

rori

d ef 

m

er

dic

e T 

pres

ers

terroricapabTTIC

nni

tor

mech

ne

possible targets are also vastly improeffort to reduce existing vulnerabiliti

new problems. 

e improvements in threat and vuln

enabled DHS to produce national ristarget sets (e.g., infrastructures and nstate and local governments in high-rperforming site- and community-speincluding geographic specific real-timto new actionable intelligence. There have been several instances in has been available in real-time and creducing the impact of terrorist attachowever, it is still assumed that such available. 

unpredictability bearstestimony to the continued difficulty of the threat assessment task. The inabilitygenerate actionabwarning of potential near-term or imminent terrorist attack continues tofrustrate federal astate and loca

Intensive effort is being devoted to producing a useful terrorism threat assessment, but with only modest success in the face of the continued difficulty of obtaining goodintelligence on terrorist capabilitiesand the diver

terancomon tmeThreov

of the terrorismthreat. Actionable warning of potential near-term or imminent terrorist attack is still not forthcoming and a continuous source of frustration at the state and local level as damaging terrorist

plasecVulofTh

st threat information are increa

fective DHS coordination and 

unity has developed an unprec

rorist threats, including matters 

al factors. 

TIC (with broad federal govern

entation) is seen as increasingl

eas and domestic intelligence to 

sm threat assessment covering 

ilities, and objectives. While u

assessments are sufficiently bo

ng purposes at all government 

. Effective Executive Branch a

anisms have stabilized. 

rability assessments for critica

I(threat plus vulnerability) 

ucing

sm

ent are

 in the 

nued

w

as

le

erm

attack, alwaysdifficult, is given a low priority vis-à-vis other intelligence problems. 

at producing a 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involv

Key Strategic Vision 

Dimensions Complacence Reactive Fortress America The New Normalcy 

nformation

Sharing 

errorism-relate

ooperation on

nformation sharing

ithin the federal

overnment, between

he federal

overnment and state

and local entities, and between government 

nd the private sector

iminishes as society

ocuses on other

roblems. 

Terrorismcooperation oninformation sharingwithin the federal government, betweenthe federal government and state and local entities, andbetween governmentand the private sectocontinues but in fiand starts consistewith the episodic nature of the attacks.

Government and private sectorcooperation interrorism-related n information sharinghas substantially increased withoccasional successes in thwarting terroristattacks, albeit in a general environmwhere none of the nation’s efforts is viewed as verysuccessful in theof the coeffective terrorist attacks. 

Information sharing ofrom risk assessments to best practicthreats—has vastly improved within between the federal government and between governments and the private Intelligence Community has developsystem and a series of unclassified lithat allow dissemproducts available for public health aofficials. Noteworthy is the improvement in inthe government and the owners and oinfrastructures, made possible by maregulations regarding freedom of inftrade. The federal government has acomprehensive pre- and post-event rstrategy for educating the consequences. A substantially improved Health Aleimproved health-related secure commgenerate surveillainformation, is now being utilized wthe medical and health communities. In border control, there is now a welcomprehensive database and informainternal to the border agencies under Federal agencies, state and local entioperators, and cooperating foreign g

I T d

ciwgtgadfp

-related 

r

ts

nt

ent 

light

ntinually

n every aspect 

ination to a wider a

public on t

nce, epidemiologic

o
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involv

Key Strategic Vision 

Dimensions Complacence Reactive Fortress America The New Normalcy 

Coordinationwith State, local and private sector(including burden sharing) 

dness for 

most part the nations’ ability to respond to a major terrorist attack remains embodied in the ongoing federal, state, and local preparedness for natural disasters. 

ts.

e

ese

ents which 

have strongly emphasized dual use as part of an effort to improve overall national disaster preparedness.

 financial support for a natio

Investments madesince 9/11 have produced some stillintact counterterrorismcapability, but for themost the nations’ ability to respond to amajor terrorist attack is embodied in the federal, state, andlocal preparenatural disasters. 

The lurching investments made over the ten years subsequent to 9/11 (with a heavyemphasis on dual use) have produced significantlyimproved counterterrorismcapability in somejurisdictions and against some threats.However, for the 

The increasinginvestment in homeland securityand other facets of counterterrorism hasproduced significantlyimproved counterterrorismcapability in somejurisdictions and against some threaThe impact of somterrorist attacks has been markedlydecreased as a consequence of thinvestm

A consistent federal government profor state and local government effortplayed a major role in sustaining addinvestments and coordination in fedepreparedness planning. Of particular sustained funding to strengthen prepwithin the public health system. Forpreparedness programs based on conwhere population is only one measurDHS has led the development and imcomprehensive process for State and entities in the private sector, to assesrequirements for all-hazards Federal vastly improved the allocation of Fedprioritization of capabilities for potenMost important, the Federal governmprovidedimplementation of a comprehensive, network of mutual aid for all-hazardintrastate multijurisdictional and intecapabilities that has helped to ensure in the country. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involv

Key Strategic Vision 

Dimensions Complacence Reactive Fortress America The New Normalcy

Exercising, Training, EquipmentStandards 

,

ish

rds

d

s

t

added impetus from the terrorism threat. Government-led allhazards training continues at local and state levels but with training for respondingto terrorist attacks a low priority vis-à-vis other potential disasters and private sectorparticipation minimal. There is no significant joint counterterrorismtraining of federal, state, and local officials for potential major terrorism events. 

stablish

ndards

y the 

nd va

rrori

hed co

nd a

ppo

equired to 

standa

esting

ca

ze

equ

ut

s to

hanges

nely

erabili

All-hazards training continues at local and statelevels with no high priorityfor counterterrorismtraining. Some intergovernmental training for terrorism takes place, but with decreased interestbetween attacks. 

ffo

h perfor

as be

y the

ter

ks.

ts continue,

ndards (an

d eval

at is c

not y

s to

ions

erability

pe

ears

.

ai

s with

ng to te

attacks given a high priorityparticipation improving. Intergovernmental is ongoing and steadilyimproving the ability of these government levels to work effectively in terrorism response contexts. 

ulgating of nationa

facilitated by substantial investment in RDT&E, iBest practices in all aspeinformed by lessons learactual events, is availablimproved national databuseful in assisting states capacity and associated r

The effort to establperformance standafor federal, state, anlocal entities withcounterterrorismresponsibilities witherfor lack of interest.The post-disaster/evencommunications interoperability challenge continues to be a subject of interestand effort, but with no 

Efforts to eperformance stabeen frustrated bepisodic nature acharacter of the teattacks, diminisbetween events, aof the sustained suwould be rachieve desired(and associated tevaluation). Improving communiinteroperability is continually emphasithe terrorism event experience and infrtraining sessions, bwithout the impetuundertake the cneeded to genuiimprove interop

have 

ried

st

ncern

lack

rt that 

rds

and

tions

d in

ent

ty.

An ongestablisstandards hfrustrated bvaried characterrorist attacefforof statesting anthereof) thsought hasachieved. Major effortcommunicatinteropunderway butlevel of interostill some ymany venuesAll-hazards trcontinuerespondi

oing e rt to

mance

en

highly 

of the

While

the level

d the

uation

learly

DHS now leads a Federaentity for homeland secustreamlined the grant appprocess throughout the gunnecessary program redDHS has now establisheresponders that outline thstandards of performancIn addition, a DHS-supp

et been 

improve 

are well

 the needed 

hazards exercises, with aterrorism preparedness, state and local level and participation. A joint exmajor CBRN attacks has and implemented nation

rability is 

away in 

ning

rrorist

The sustained level of goterrorism preparedness hestablishment of standarassociated with measurinA successful national effcommunications interopprom

 and private sector 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involv

Strategic Vision 

Key 

Dimensions

Complacence Reactive Fortress America The New Normalcy

Role of theMilitary 

ory au

melan 

s—h

 impr

e mi 

he

d

rules

he U

m

ehe

ng

r as

n t 

continued program of train

OM, other military entities

cohorts. NORTHCOM now maintaiunits with response capabilities relat

ssment, mergency medical supp

antine,

ationa 

it

tr

d f

ary or e

ent

oyin

g au

melan

Statut

the homissiongreatlyusing thdefining thomelandClearinside tfoe is a co

thority and regulations fo

d—for both homeland d

ave been clarified. Exte

oved the understanding a

litary. Specific attention 

parameters and capabili

efense and its distinction

of engagement exist to go

nited States in situations 

batant or a criminal. 

nsive requirements ident

to major attacks has been 

pects of the potential civ

e event of a terrorist atta

A comprrespondiand othemilitary ithrough aNORTHC

h

assequarThe Nmission wplanning,are traineprimDepartmfor deplincludinfor ho

e

and communications sup

l Guard has been given a 

h a comparable increase i

aining, exercises, and ope

or and assigned homelan

xclusive missions. With 

of Defense has establish

g National Guard units i

thority to employ the Gu

d security missions. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involv

Strategic Vision 

Key 

Dimensions 

Complacence Reactive Fortress America The New Normalcy 

Research and Development and Related Standards 

Research and development specifically dedicated to terrorism has waned with some collateral benefits from the continued Department of Defense efforts to prepare to deal with adversaries potentiallyequipped withchemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. 

Research and development specifically dedicated to terrorism is verymodest with little support for R&D efforts that do not promise to curtail or mitigate the effects of the episodic terrorist attacks that the nation continues to suffer. 

Research and development specifically dedicated to terrorism isgrowing steadily with the realization that terrorism presents a long-term problemthat needs to addressed with longterm as well as shortterm investments. 

ntiv

The federal government is providing wide-ranging R&D program that is sin the ability to detect and analyze tedevices both at the borders and in traThe National Institute for Mental Heterm research program examining thboth prepare the public mentally for and to treat people with mental and efollowing such attacks. The Congress has expanded inceencourage industrial production and and chemical defense pharmaceuticawith industry, has launched a major vaccine development in anticipation from natural and genetically modifieThe challenge of improving cybersecthrough a comprehensive governmenthat has developed not only improveprocedures but also industry standardimproved protective techniques and continual basis. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involv

Strategic Vision 

Key

Dimensions 

Complacence Reactive Fortress America The New Normalcy 

EnhancedCriticalInfrastructure Protection 

Tco mfoprleteandivininBd

ation is 

psychologically untouched, if not desensitized to the threat of terrorism, leading to an acrossthe-board decrease in counterterrorismvigilance and the ability to respond quickly and coherently in the face of a future terrorism attack. 

The countrycontinues to make 

mprovements in 

fenses against the 

kinds of terrorist attacks that do 

pisodically take 

place (e.g., akin to the post-9/11 efforts 

reduce

vulnerabilities in the air transport industry)

t he changing

r of the 

attacks has produced a feeling of continuedhigh vulnerabilitythroughout the country. The general population is psychologically affected by terrorist events when they do happen with the expected finger pointing andfrustrations at the nation’s inability to curtail the attacks. 

Theharddefeair tacrogenAmandfrusandpart

bling and a 

threat to U.S. involvement in pressing international security problems. The population is psychologically affected by terrorist events when they do happen with broad concerns about the long-term impact on the traditionalAmerican way of life and values. 

Maj scre

rc

ith

er

ta

andprocAt t 

nd gulations tha

imp fromIn musebiotrespbiotpsycTheinte

and pr

regarding the cyberspace vulnerability.In agriculture and food risk assessments coordinated by an intra-governmental effeducation and training programs, more fueducation, and a program of compensatioa successful attack on agriculture. Specinow perform tests on foreign agricultura

he efforts to

mbat terroris

llowing 9/11 have 

oduced some 

gacy capability of 

rrorism defenses 

d programs 

rected to reducing

ulnerabilities (e.g., 

the air transport

dustry). 

ecause of the 

ecrease in concern 

about terrorism, the general popul

ideetobu tcharacte

country works

to improve 

nses with efforts 

akin to the post-9/11 

ransport efforts

ss society – 

erating a “fortress

erica” sentiment 

posture - to the

tration of allies 

economic 

ners who find this

inward-turning U.S. 

aiwenesa

trend trou

or improvements in infrastructure pro

ening of all baggage and cargo for pa

raft and the equipping of U.S. seapor

extensive suites of detection and mo

gy, chemicals, and telecommunicatio

blished means for evaluating system 

protective measures. Energy especia

ess actions and redundancies. 

he borders, there are now pre-entry id

commercial shipment re

roved prospects of preventing terrori

entering the United States - at minim

edical/health there is a renewed emp

capabilities, well defined health care 

errorism contingencies, and vastly im

coordination at all levels. The national C

onse teams have been updated and u

errorism preparedness. In addition a 

hologically readiness for terrorism i

cyber threat to critical infrastructure

rdependency and cascading effect pro

concern with new protective tools 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

M-1 

APPENDI — STIM OF TARY OF AGRIC TURE AN ENEMAN, 

SEPTEMBER 9, 200

X M TE ONY

3

SECRE UL N V

artment of Agriculture 

retary 

. 20250 

Veneman 

 to the Gilmore Commissi

er 9, 2003 

Commission, thank 

tecting our country from

rrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

years ago, few Americans 

ood the potential impa

United

Statement b

Chairm

the Department of Agricult SDA) role in pro

Panel to Assess Do

When the Gilm

tha is e t c o

de tion. This Commission, however, has been on the forefront of both of these issues, which are now

ce not only t policy to th of every rtme i the Federal

governm nt. I co for its role in heightenin for 

br fo

security

 

In its latest report, the Com

Ameri ma

valu ly

or dependent upon agriculture, the economic mpact of an attack on this sector could be the 

mo e e face.

 

I want to commend the Commission, too, for observi

criti

from the heig

thoug ignated agriculture as a critical 

infrastructure in its t he

new threat requires extraordinary vision, new thinking and the ability to look at the much larger issue –

the protection of ci s ag otential

 

We h se

econom nobody

wants to see r urity and 

 States Dep

Office of the Sec

Washington, D.C

y Secretary 

Septemb

embers of the 

ablished four 

ry few unders

Submitted for the Record

ore and distinguished m

ure’s (U

mestic Response Capabilities for Te

ore Commission was est

m could affect us, and v

on 

you for the opp

 terrorism with the Advisory 

foresaw the p

t of weapons

an Gilm

rror

ortunity to share 

rofound way

t te f mass

struc

ntral

ingi

o American foreign , but also e work

mmend the Commission

ore accountability to the government and r its recommendations for 

mission considers the economic impact 

iculture and finds that, “the downstream effect of a 

dustry would likely be enormous.”

202 Indeed, with o

depa nt w thin

g awareness of these issues, 

improving homeland 

of a significant attack against 

jor act of terrorism against this highly

in eight American jobs direct

e

ng m

. 

can agr

ble i ne

i

t thr at w

ng that because agriculture was not recognized as a 

astructure when critical infrastructures were initially identified, agriculture did not benefit 

htened awareness of terrorist threats that were paid to other sectors. As y

ush Administration has recognized this oversight, des

National Strategy,

203 and has taken strong steps

ou further note, 

oward protecting it. Addressing t

h, the B

our tizen ainst p

en the devastation, destruction and loss 

y the events of that horrible da

epeated. It is why all of us are cons

threats.

of lives – to say nothing about the damage to our 

y, September 11, 2001. It is something that

idering the important issues of homeland sec

ave

y – caused b

202 RAND, The Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 

Response Capa rorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: Chapter VII, Implementing the 

Natio e 68. 203 Th f Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 16, 2002, 

p. 30. 

bilities for Ter

tegy, D cember 15, 2002, p. 

se, Office o

nal Stra

e White Hou

a n

involved in, 

st importan

cal infr
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

how we can best prepare for and prevent future attacks. However, preparedness also requires us to

consider how we can best ready this nation – and the infrastructure which supports it – to respond in the 

vent of another attack.

Background – Post September 11, 2001 

Over the last two years, our mission at USDA has evolved and expanded to include homeland security. In

the past, our focus was on preventing and deterring the unintentional introduction of pests and diseases 

into our country and ensuring a p tentional contamination. 

Shortly after the events of September 11, U -to-bottom review to see how best to 

grapple with potential terrorist threats. I immediately formed a Homeland Security Council to develop a 

Department-wide plan concerning homeland security. USDA’s homeland security efforts are focused 

upon three key areas: agricultural p facilities, and USDA staff and

emergency preparednes p in a series of

organizational changes aimed at improving ility to perform homeland security-related 

ctivities.

nd reporting and action assignments for the mission areas. The staff leads the activation of USDA’s 

tes the

 the Homeland Security Council. Many USDA agencies have also created offices or enhanced 

es to serve a similar function within the agency and work in close coordination with the 

e

fforts.

e

lentiful food supply that is safe from unin

SDA undertook a top

roduction and the food supply, USDA

s. Forming the Homeland Security Council was the first ste

the Department’s ab

a

I also established a Homeland Security Staff to coordinate Department-wide activities. The mission of 

this staff is to provide overall leadership, to coordinate programs, and to plan for, and respond to, major 

natural and terrorist emergencies and threats. This staff coordinates policy formulation, response plans, 

a

incident management system and its Federal Response Plan duties in the event of a major incident and 

oversees USDA’s nationwide homeland security policies and procedures. The staff also coordina

Department’s homeland security activities with the White House’s Homeland Security Council, the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), other federal agencies, and public and private organizations; 

collaborates with many White House offices, USDA agencies, and other federal partners on the 

development and submission of a coordinated budget request for homeland security; and provides staff

support to

existing offic

USDA Homeland Security Staff. 

In addition, USDA has worked closely with th rest of the Administration and Congress during the

creation of the new DHS. USDA will also continue to improve its prevention, surveillance, 

communications and response e

 

Protecting Agricultural Production and the Food Supply 

Agricultural Production

To ensure the security of our animals a d plants, USDA has utilized its personnel, many of whom are 

stationed throughout the nation, as a first line of defense. We have worked with our Federal partners to 

ensure that strong laws and regulations are in place to de

n

ter terrorists. In addition to fortifying our first 

e of defense, we are enhancing the surveillance capabilities of the nation’s plant and animal health 

in

e

Personnel 

Since September 11, 2001, USDA has increased its safeguarding personnel, such as border inspectors, 

wild-land firefighters, and veterinarians – those on the front lines of homeland security. Congress 

recognized the importance of USDA’s border inspection personnel to homeland security programs in the 

Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created DHS. As mandated by the Act, 

lin

laboratories. Lastly, USDA is working closely with its partners at the Federal, State, and local levels,

the private sector, and consumers, to ensure that they are educated and are equipped to aid in the defens

of our agricultural production. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

approximately 2,600 members of the USDA border inspection force have been transferred to the new

department. These individuals enhance prevention efforts to keep foreign agricultural pests and diseases 

from entering the United States. USDA will continue to work in close consultation with DHS to train 

ese inspectors and set policy for plants, animals and commodities entering the nation. 

addition to the transferred personnel, USDA maintains National Forest Service enforcement personnel 

.

urthermore, USDA has added 20 new food import surveillance officers to ports of entry. 

hat

uards reduce the chance of terrorists acquiring dangerous pathogens and toxins. 

e to

reign animal disease be detected in the United States, and lend greater 

redibility to our animal health export certifications. A similar effort is underway to build a laboratory

agriculture, USDA has worked with its partners at the State and 

cal levels and the private sector to ensure they are informed of, and have the tools necessary to both 

documents, security upgrades and 

partnerships are essential to a robust communications system. 

uidance documents provide helpful information to industry, consumers, and State and local partners. 

ckly, securely, and reliably. USDA has upgraded the security systems at 

s State and county offices. This upgrade included establishing a web-based tracking system for disaster 

aintaining databases of fertilizer, food, feed and seed listings, and coordinating with State and 

th

In

along the hundreds of miles of continuous Forest Service land on both our northern and southern borders. 

The Department has also added 18 new veterinarian positions to the agricultural quarantine inspection 

staff at borders, ports of entry, and on farms to ensure that strong preparedness programs are in place

F

Regulations 

One of the most important steps taken to secure American agricultural production and the food supply 

was the “Select Agents Rule” mandated by the Agriculture Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002. USDA 

and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued complementary regulations t

established new safeguards for the possession, use, and transfer of certain toxins and biological agents. 

These safeg

Laboratories 

In its December 2002, report, the Commission urged the expansion of laboratory capacity, noting that in

the event of a terrorist attack, our laboratories would likely be overwhelmed.204 USDA concurs with this

assessment, and is in the process of creating networks that will increase laboratory capacity. 

 

In addition, USDA has begun a pilot version of a National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

(NAHLN), a network of Federal and State resources intended to enable a rapid and sufficient respons

animal health emergencies, including foot and mouth disease and other foreign animal diseases. The 

NAHLN reconfigures the nation’s animal health diagnostic services by positioning the National 

Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa, to be the lead animal health laboratory and allowing 

certain laboratories operated by States and universities to cooperate in foreign animal disease surveillance

and related services. Such an arrangement will enhance the nation’s animal health diagnostic services,

speed response efforts should a fo

c

network for plants. 

Communications 

To ensure the protection of our nation’s 

lo

prevent and respond to an attack. USDA-sponsored guidance

 

G

The voluntary nature of the guidance has enabled USDA to share recommendations and information..

USDA has developed guidance documents for distribution to farmers and ranchers to remind them of 

steps they can take to secure their operations. Information was posted on the USDA website and 

distributed through the USDA Extension system to reach constituents in every county in the nation. 

Strong security systems in the field enhance communication. They enable USDA headquarters and field 

offices to share information qui

it

reporting, m

county emergency boards for assistance during an emergency. 

 

204 RAND at p. 74. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Training and seminars are also key components of a communications strategy. For this reason, USDA

has, and will continue to conduct, on-going Foreign Animal Disease Awareness Training seminars for 

Federal and State veterinarians. In addition, the Department has conducted, and continues to conduct, 

satellite seminars to share vital emergency preparedness information with Federal and State veterinary

fficials and emergency planners, military representatives, and academia. As part of this effort, USDA 

currently

eveloping rapid tests for agents that pose the most serious threats to our agricultural system. Some 

hese threats include foot and mouth disease and rinderpest. 

o

has developed a CD-ROM to help practitioners better identify and diagnose animal diseases and 

distributed it to State and Federal veterinarians, veterinary schools, and associations. 

USDA has also partnered with States, universities and tribal lands to increase their homeland security

prevention, detection and response efforts. USDA provided funding for those efforts and is

d

examples of t

While this is an overview of what we are doing to protect agricultural production, USDA is just as active

in protecting the food supply. 

Food Supply 

As with agricultural production, USDA now must consider how to prevent, and respond to, intentional 

safety of the food supply. Historically, USDA has been responsible for ensuring the safety

k on the

od supply. 

atory

g products. This workforce is comprised of consumer safety inspectors, consumer 

pliance officers, and veterinarians.

e

lnerabilities and assisting with interagency

ordination.

ducted

e the

ecurity of food. The assessments also addressed food purchased by USDA for Federal feeding programs, 

as well as shipping procedures and storage. Based on the assessments, USDA developed a food security

plan and training sessions for employees in preparedness activities.

These assessments also played a vital role in developing a plan for USDA’s role within Liberty Shield, 

the Administration-wide strategy for protecting the homeland from terrorist attacks during the war in Iraq. 

SDA’s measures included increasing the number of agents tested for in the food supply and increasing 

the frequency of testing. 

threats to the

of meat, poultry, and egg products from unintentional contamination. Over the years, USDA has faced 

tampering and intentional contamination of the food supply, but on a small scale. The tragic events of 

September 11, 2001, now require us to seriously consider the possibility of a large-scale attac

fo

As with agricultural production, USDA has relied upon our greatest asset, our field personnel, as we 

adjust to the new threats. In addition to personnel, the keys to protecting the food supply lie in a 

coordinated effort, a strong understanding of the threat and our vulnerabilities, an enhanced labor

system, and communications between all sectors. 

Personnel 

USDA has approximately 7,600 personnel at federally inspected food establishments nationwide. These 

individuals are trained to look for signs that may suggest intentional contamination and adulteration of 

meat, poultry, and eg

safety officers, com

Coordination

USDA has participated in several drills at the Federal and State levels to test and improve respons

procedures. These drills have proven valuable in identifying vu

co

Vulnerabilities and Threats

To ensure that we are taking the right steps to protect the food supply, we first needed to understand its

vulnerabilities and the threats posed by terrorists. In the months following the attacks, USDA con

vulnerability assessments for domestic and imported food and conducted threat assessments to ensur

s

U

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Enhanced Laboratories’ Capabilities 

Food regulatory laboratories are essential surveillance and response tools. One of the most important 

steps USDA has taken is to enhance security at its three food regulatory laboratories and increase their

capacity to test for products, hazards and biological agents. This is consistent with the Commission’s 

recommendation to improve laboratory capacity, addressed above. 

Communications

USDA prepared and distributed food security guidance documents for the processing, distribution, and 

ide 

umer complaints. 

Addressing the concern that foreign terrorists might seek access to laboratory facilities and the pathogens 

research and testing, USDA issued two Departmental Manuals addressing policies and 

se

 the Bio Safety Level 3 (BSL-3) locations. 

s that are knowledgeable and well trained in emergency

reparedness and response are key to this effort. To ensure that our critical infrastructure is protected and 

are safe, USDA developed additional security procedures for use when the threat of terrorist 

t prevention and response activities. Guidance for 

coordinated, prepared workforce can be found in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 

esponse Plan (NRP).

rest Service. The NIMS has systems for command and control, coordination, training and 

ualification, and publication management. This effort is consistent with Homeland Security Presidential 

a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. 

roduction and food be adequately

presented in current national response plans. 

transport of meat, poultry and egg products. USDA has also developed information on biosecurity and

the food supply for constituents and processors. To ensure that consumers have an opportunity to prov

critical information, USDA implemented the national Consumer Complaint Monitoring System, a 

surveillance and sentinel system that monitors and tracks food-related cons

Protecting USDA Laboratory Facilities 

stored there for

procedures for pathogen control, physical security, human reliability, cybersecurity, and incident respon

plans. Additionally, USDA developed departmental policies for the sponsorship of non-citizen scientists 

working in USDA facilities, including a tracking system for these workers. Furthermore, background 

checks are being conducted for non-citizen workers. In addition, all positions at USDA labs are being 

examined for personnel reliability and the appropriate background investigations are being conducted,

beginning with

Protecting USDA Staff and Emergency Preparedness and Response

As our first line of defense, USDA employees play a vital role in protecting the nation’s agricultural 

production and food supply. Therefore, employee

p

employees

attacks, as determined by the Homeland Security Advisory System, increases. This approach was 

integrated with Liberty Shield. 

A coordinated workforce is also essential to carrying ou

a

and National R

USDA is now implementing a Department-wide NIMS based on the successful system currently utilized 

by USDA’s Fo

q

Directive 5, which called for

USDA is working with DHS to draft the NRP and NIMS documents. Various aspects of agricultural 

production and food will be addressed in the new plan, including animal and plant health, food safety,

nutrition, and wild-land firefighting. Since the NRP will integrate the Federal government’s domestic 

prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a single all-discipline, all hazards plan, we 

believe it will address the Commission’s concerns that agricultural p

re

 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Next Steps 

are still vulnerable to attack.

herefore, USDA will continue to build upon its accomplishments thus far, as reflected in the recent 

t calls for bolstering ongoing initiatives. These initiatives fall into four categories: 

Our work to date is just the beginning. We have begun to develop the foundation for an agricultural 

production and food security program. While we carefully consider the next steps, we must continue our 

ongoing efforts because the agricultural production and food sectors

T

budget request tha

prevention and preparedness, surveillance, communications, and response. 

Prevention and Preparedness

USDA is seeking new funding to expand laboratory networks, strengthen laboratory security measures, 

conduct research on emerging animal diseases, and develop new vaccines. The Department will continue 

develop the NAHLN, as mentioned above, train more personnel, expand standardized rapid/sensitive 

ory capacity, assure quality standards and proficiency testing, 

nd improve communications for data sharing. USDA will also expand the plant laboratory network, by

to

testing capabilities, increase BSL-3 laborat

a

establishing national standard operating procedures for diagnostics, sampling, and reporting, by providing

inter-regional communication, and by creating a national database for monitoring disease and pest 

outbreaks. 

 

Surveillance

USDA employees in our nation’s food processing facilities and on the farm are our first line of defense

and have a unique ability to serve as a surveillance tool. Therefore, staffing these positions is essential

the Department’s homeland security efforts. USDA has set

to

a staffing level goal of 7,680 food inspectors, 

n increase of 80 inspectors, who are on the front line in our nation’s food facilities looking for 

examining ways to expand the 

le of its Extension Service and other on-site employees to include homeland security responsibilities. 

esearch is key to a strong surveillance program. USDA is researching remote sensing technology that 

vironmental, physical, and social sciences relevant to agriculture, 

od, and the environment. 

a

unintentional and intentional threats to food safety. In addition, USDA is

ro

USDA employees on the farm also serve as a surveillance tool. USDA has set goals to increase on the 

farm inspections, expand the availability of foot and mouth disease vaccines, provide protection against 

chronic wasting disease and poultry diseases, and expand diagnostic and other scientific and technical 

services. 

R

would detect the introduction of foreign pests and plant and animal diseases and has requested funding for 

the National Research Initiative, a USDA grants program funding research on a peer-reviewed, 

competitive basis in the biological, en

fo

Communications

Two of our highest homeland security priorities at USDA are the improvement of communications 

channels between the Department and the intelligence community, and the creation of a more 

sophisticated way of communicating sensitive information to the private sector so that when there are 

esponse

incidents, warnings or threats, the private sector can assist us in preventing or mitigating a problem.

USDA is working with DHS to coordinate our communications programs to better protect agricultural 

production and the food supply. One such joint effort is the DHS-USDA-HHS project to organize the 

food and agriculture sectors. An organized sector can provide assistance to the industry. For example, 

this sector could suggest guidelines and best practices, and provide a means for sharing information. 

R

As mentioned above, USDA is working with DHS to write and implement the NRP and NIMS 

documents. As part of this effort, USDA will implement NIMS throughout the entire Department, starting 

this year with online training and other forms of training and certification. 

M-6 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, USDA has acted decisively and aggressively since September 11, 2001, to establish a

national strategy to keep American agricultural production secure from intentional harm and to maintain a

secure and reliable food supply. We have done this through a top-to-bottom review of our organiza

thorough assessments of our vulnerabilities, simulating attack scenario exercises, increased surveillan

more targeted and expedited communications, and a more robust response strategy. 

 

tion,

ce,

While I cannot tell you that we have mitigated all of the threats to American agriculture, I can state that 

we are much better off today than we were two years ago and that we are aggressively pursuing new 

programs and policies to better protect agricultural production and the food supply. 

 

Finally, I want to thank the Commission for its work, which has brought attention to the threats that 

terrorism presents and a specific focus to the threat posed to agriculture and food. 

M-7 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

N-1 

APPENDIX N—STATEMENT BY C. MICHAEL ARMSTRONG, THE BUSINESS 

ROUNDTABLE 

Statement by C. Michael Armstrong 

 Chairman, Security Task Force, The Business Roundtable 

Before the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

September 3, 2003 

Thank you, Governor Gilmore and Members of the Advisory Panel.

My name is Mike Armstrong, and I am Chairman of Comcast Corporation and Chairman of The Business 

Roundtable’s Security Task Force. I appreciate the opportunity to express the views of The Business 

Roundtable with respect to how the private sector can assist government in disaster response and recovery

efforts. 

Before I begin, let me take this opportunity to recognize Governor Gilmore and the distinguished 

members of this panel for their leadership in terrorist response and recovery efforts. Your work is vital to 

the ability of this nation to prepare for and protect against future threats. 

The Business Roundtable is an association of 150 chief executive officers of leading corporations with a 

combined workforce of more than 10 million employees in the United States, $3.7 trillion in annual 

revenues, and a presence in every state in the nation. The chief executives are committed to advocating 

public policies that foster vigorous economic growth and a dynamic global economy. 

Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Business Roundtable created a Security Task Force to 

address ways that the private sector could improve the security of our employees, their communities and 

our companies. 

The Roundtable believes that the business community has an important role in disaster response and 

recovery, and must be a partner in a coordinated effort with federal, state and local governments. We 

believe that the government cannot face these challenges alone, because more that 85 percent of the 

critical infrastructure in the country – the power grid, financial services, information services, railroads, 

airlines and others – is controlled by the private sector, not the government. 

Businesses are committed to protecting their employees, customers, facilities and communities. We 

accept this responsibility and have moved forward on strengthening our security. The private sector is 

ready and willing to partner with government in disaster response and recovery in significant ways. For 

example, following the September 11th attacks, companies from across New York and across the country

responded with respirators, boots and other materials for rescue personnel. The private sector also helped 

restore phone service and power, and helped get institutions such as the New York Stock Exchange ready

to reopen. 

The terrorist attacks on our nation revealed that America needed a way for government and business 

leaders to exchange information in times of crisis. Coordinated security efforts by government and 

business will lead to better protection for our citizens, facilities, communities and nation. 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

OUNDTABLE HAS DEVELOPED WAYS FOR GOVERNMENT AND THE 

RIVATE SECTOR TO WORK TOGETHER TO PROTECT AMERICA. 

the months since September 11th, the Business Roundtable’s Security Task Force has been working 

losely with the Bush Administration, including the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to 

ollaborate and coordinate improved security and responses to terrorist attacks. The hallmark of the 

usiness Roundtable’s efforts is the development and implementation of CEO COM LINKSM, a secure 

telecommunications bridge that e to exchange timely information 

in the event of a terro

CE ts

and recover after an attack. The cap ent by offering real-time access to 

the nation’s business resources. We have expanded CEO COM LINKSM to include representatives from

the banking, chemicals and water industry sectors. We are in the process of adding other critical 

frastructure sectors as well. 

s we further develop CEO COM LINKSM, we work closely with the Department of Homeland Security 

ncing CEO COM LINKSM and improving the security alert system. We continue to seek ways to 

nhance CEO COM LINKSM and are working with DHS on setting up a 7x24 real-time system that would 

. 

rnance procedures

to bring security under board review. Specifically, the Roundtable is urging boards of directors to 

rporate Governance, a set of best practices designed to guide corporate governance 

ractices and advance the ability of U.S. companies to compete, create jobs and generate economic 

e

Second, the BRT has developed a Crisis Communications Toolkit that offers best practices for

ther

e

s

ronment, as terrorists can target any number of 

usiness assets. We cannot afford to build fences or moats around our employees and facilities. 

THE BUSINESS R

P

In

c

c

B

nables senior federal officials and CEOs

rist threat or a crisis. 

O COM LINKSM enables CEOs to get the information they need in order to respond to terrorist threa

ability equally serves the governm

in

A

(DHS) and other security officials throughout the federal government. We are now working with them to 

refine CEO COM LINKSM so that calls can be made to appropriate industries in response to a specific

sector threat. In May, the BRT brought together a number of company security officials to get their ideas 

for enha

e

be used in an on-going basis by the public and private sectors to coordinate response and recovery

IMPROVING COMPANY SECURITY PROCEDURES 

The Business Roundtable is also providing best practices and ideas to improve company security 

procedures. These efforts concentrated in five areas.

First, the Roundtable made a series of recommendations that strengthen corporate gove

designate management responsibility for business resiliency and to periodically review management’s

plans as part of their oversight function. The Roundtable added this new security component to its 

Principles of Co

p

growth. 

In today’s world, America’s security is inexorably linked to our nation’s economic growth. It is mor

vital today than ever before that corporate boards review management’s security plans and procedures. 

communicating with employees, customers and neighbors during a crisis. We have shared this with o

business groups, such as the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, th

Small Business Association, and the National Federation of Independent Businesses. A copy of the Crisi

Communications Toolkit can be found in the security section of www.brt.org. 

Third, the Roundtable’s Security Task Force is developing a risk assessment toolkit. Business enterprises 

face many threats and vulnerabilities in the global envi

b

Performing a current risk assessment on threats and vulnerabilities is one way that businesses can manage 

the evolving threat environment. Similar to the Crisis Communications Toolkit, this risk assessment

N-2 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

aterial offers important templates and procedures for both business and government executives that 

Fourth, the Business Roundtable has also made recommendations on security regulation by government 

l

Finally, to better understand how CEO COM LINKSM could add value, leaders of major U.S. businesses 

The wargame established the critical importance of crisis communication and collaboration mechanisms 

er

everaging these lessons can help shape the U.S.’s ability to respond to and recover from crises that could 

curity. 

realterface with a national command and control 

enter.

rts

n significant. CEO COM LINKSM has been utilized successfully several times when the terror 

reat level changed. The Department of Homeland Security is including the Business Roundtable and 

ttack.

owever, while the business community is making progress in some areas, the private sector is not yet 

ot

m

manage critical infrastructures. 

in a regulation white paper that was released in July. Industry is willing to accept greater costs and 

additional security regulation, but we strongly believe that security regulations must be based on rationa

and open processes. The best security solutions will come from government policies that encourage 

greater business participation and are based on collaborative efforts that favor flexible and focused 

private-sector initiatives. 

and government agencies engaged in a two-day wargame simulation on April 8-9, 2003, in Washington 

DC. The war game – conducted by the Business Roundtable and Booz Allen Hamilton – simulated a 

catastrophic cyber failure in the accounting systems of two major U.S. banks in New York City and, 

simultaneously, an outbreak of pneumonic plague at the Chicago Stock Exchange. 

between the public and private sectors to foster economic and societal resilience in the face of asymmetric

attacks. It showed that CEO COM LINKSM saved hundreds of thousands of lives due to the ability for the 

public and private sector to communicate and respond. Going forward, government and industry togeth

have a critical role to play and a unique opportunity to enhance public-private sector interaction. Their 

crisis response must encompass new decision models, communications capabilities, and dynamic 

organizations and structures, with CEO COM LINKSM serving as an important element. 

L

otherwise jeopardize our national, homeland and economic se

The CEO COM LINKSM wargame showed that in times of crisis, we must be able to communicate

time to respond to events through 7x24 capability to in

c

A summary of the CEO COM LINKSM wargame report is included as part of this testimony. 

PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BUT MUCH LEFT TO DO

The efforts of the Business Roundtable and DHS to include businesses in response and recovery effo

have bee

th

member companies as part of its Crisis Action Team (CAT). We are working with DHS to identify 

company experts on a variety of issues who can be called upon by the government in the event of an 

a

The Gilmore Commission’s decision to invite the Business Roundtable to testify is recognition of the role 

that the business community can play. We acknowledge that involving the private sector in disaster 

response and recovery is new and uncertain territory for many of you, and we appreciate this opportunity.

H

adequately integrated in disaster response planning and activities. For example, the Roundtable and other

private sector organizations were not fully part of TOPOFF II, the wargame this past spring on disaster

response by government. Roundtable representatives were at TOPOFF II, but only as observers, n

participants. 

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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

d

vels are raised, there is no mechanism for governors and CEOs to 

oordinate their efforts. It is essential that we address this national, public-private deficiency. In the 

use

tate

BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP FOR A SECURE AMERICA 

The Business Roundtable is encouraged by the progress that has been made to involve our companies in 

matters of homeland security, response and recovery. Yet there is much more left we can do to build on 

this foundation of cooperation and partnership – tasks that will benefit America during a time of crisis. 

I would encourage Governor Gilmore and every member of the Panel to consider the nation’s business 

ll

tor at all levels. 

pecifically, we recommend exploring partnerships between business groups such as the Business 

ue

ce its capability. However, with regard to state and local entities, there is no link, whether in 

terms of agreed upon processes or technological support. In addition, it is critical that a single home be 

found for CEO COM LINKSM and disaster response – and to hard wire this capability. This would 

clude configurability as well as supporting real-time bridge capacity on a 24x7 basis. 

Finally, the private sector has taken responsibility in protecting the security of our employees, facilities, 

conclusion, we believe that the business community, working in close partnership with federal, state 

he private sector is ready, willing and able to be a partner with government at all levels in disaster 

response and recovery. To have an effective national response system, the private sector much be 

involved in planning so that everyone understands roles and responsibilities. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to share the business perspective on this issue. I appreciate the 

Panel’s willingness to listen and am now available to take your questions. 

# # # 

In addition, while the governors and Roundtable CEOs are both briefed by the Department of Homelan

Security when the terror threat le

c

event of an attack, for example, it is imperative that the decisions by businesses on whether to send 

thousands of workers home be coordinated with state officials and local responders who may need to

the same roadways. There are many other issues that senior principals in state and local government and 

the business community should address as part of a well-exercised process – whether locally, at the S

level, within a region, or as a national matter. 

community and its important role in response and recovery efforts. 

The Business Roundtable believes that recommendations to Congress by this panel would be an effective 

means to strengthen public-private partnerships. These recommendations should encourage more robust 

and targeted private sector roles in homeland security planning and disaster response and recovery – at a

levels of government, including regional and national in scope. It should also clarify roles, 

responsibilities and systems in disaster response and recovery, and include the private sec

S

Roundtable with states and local governments, possibly through the National Governors Association or 

the National Emergency Managers Association, as warranted. 

We also believe that CEO COM LINKSM should be integrated into our national response and recovery. 

At the federal level, the Administration has embraced the capability, tested its use, and we will contin

to enhan

in

customers and communities. We have expressed that in a security component of the Business 

Roundtable’s Principles of Corporate Governance. We would appreciate the Gilmore Commission’s 

endorsement of the Business Roundtable’s corporate governance principles for security for all of the 

nation’s businesses. We would also challenge government entities to develop similar governance 

principles for security. 

In

and local governments, is the best way to plan for and mitigate the effects of future threats to our 

homeland security.

T

N-4 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

N-5 

Executive Summary

Rapidly Linking the public and private sectors during a crisis can dramatically improve collaboration and effectiveness

in enhancing homeland security. The CEO COM LINKSM, developed by the Business Roundtable, is an essential tool 

that enables this collaboration prior to, during, or in the aftermath of a significant national crisis. To better understand 

ow CEO COM LINKSM could add value, leaders of

Wargame

Improving Response and Recovery

major U.S. businesses and government agencies engaged in a 

o-day exercise, the CEO COM LINKSM Wargame, on April 8 and 9, 2003, in Washington DC. The wargame 

jor U.S. banks in New York City and, 

multaneously, an outbreak of pneumonic plague at the Chicago Stock Exchange. 

,

ector interaction. Their crisis response toolkit must encompass new decision models, communications capabilities, 

om crises that could otherwise jeopardize 

technology consulting firm. Participants 

i enting government were officials from the 

ie

ajor discrepancies 

the account balances of corporate and consumer customers of two of the largest U.S. banks. The situation resulted

cenario. 

e

ity, 

help 

d recovery.

rk. Participants discovered that effective public-private collaboration is essential to fulfilling the 

omeland security mission, improving our response and recovery to national crises by filling the gaps between needs 

nsequently, DHS required 

put from the healthcare industry to identify additional resources and to increase production of pharmaceuticals. 

e

ased on this experience, participants concluded that effective public-private sector collaboration is built on three 

critical elements: 

h

tw

simulated a catastrophic cyber failure in the accounting systems of two ma

si

The wargame established the critical importance of crisis communication and collaboration mechanisms between the

public and private sectors to foster economic and societal resilience in the face of asymmetric attacks. Going forward

government and industry together have a critical role to play and a unique opportunity to enhance public-private 

s

and dynamic organizations and structures, with CEO COM LINKSM serving as an important element. Leveraging 

these lessons can help shape the U.S.’s ability to respond to and recover fr

our national, homeland and economic security. 

“In times of crisis we must figure out how we are going to expand traditional networks, how we are going to interface 

with the command and control center (Department of Homeland Security), and then we need to practice,” said C. 

Michael Armstrong, Chairman of Comcast and Chairman of The Business Roundtable’s Security Task Force, who 

participated in the exercise. 

The Wargame 

The Business Roundtable, an association of CEOs representing the nation’s leading companies, co-sponsored the 

two-day exercise with Booz Allen Hamilton, a global management and

ncluded more than 70 senior policymakers and business leaders. Repres

White House, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Treasury, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

as well as officials from city and state agenc s. Business participants included CEOs and senior executives from a 

broad array of industries, including financial services, pharmaceuticals, high-tech, manufacturing, consumer products

and telecommunications. 

At the start of the game participants faced a potentially catastrophic scenario – an outbreak of pneumonic plague 

suspected to have originated at the Chicago Stock Exchange, and a software glitch that caused m

in

in a halt of payment and investment activity throughout the country. Six teams, representing government and 

business stakeholders, had to make choices, and live with the consequences of their actions. The teams then 

identified next steps to improve real-world communication and collaboration in response to the evolving s

The intent of the wargame was not to assess the preparedness or responsiveness of specific groups. Instead, th

wargame sought to increase awareness among all participants about the challenges in assuring homeland secur

and to explore how to enhance public-private collaboration and to identify ways that CEO COM LINKSM could

improve crisis response an

Insights & Recommendations

The objective of the wargame was to better understand how CEO COM LINKSM could serve as a crisis 

communications netwo

h

and capabilities. 

For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served as the focal point during the wargame for 

mobilizing government and business resources in response to the biological attack. Co

in

Participants leveraged CEO COM LINKSM to coordinate actions, which demonstrated that a centralized and flexibl

public-private collaboration mechanism can improve crisis response. 

B
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 Dynamic Organization and Operations: Observation of CEO COM LINKSM calls revealed the need to 

dynamically shift among multiple collaboration models, depending on the objectives and stage of the crisis. 

Creation of a “strategic architecture,” Linking various collaboration models and response plans across the 

enable rapid and informed crisis response. Inclusion of established criteria would enable

decision-makers to determine quickly which model to use and who should participate. 

d for timely, relevant, 

accurate, and clear communications. Clarity – in terms of objectives, language, decisions and action – is

forward: 

ic-level interface between business and government. 

lop integrated decision models for crisis response. The decision model should help leaders establish 

ntify solutions in real-world crises. 

ipants 

Finally, participants identified insights and enhancements to ensure that CEO COM LINK continues to serve as an 

i

s and address cross-sector and cross-agency issues 

transition from strategic decisions to operational implementation increases the value SM

variety

 Participation in CEO COM LINKSM calls should expand, as necessary, beyond the core CEO/senior official 

group, to include other relevant government and business stakeholders. However, the ability to designate 

country, would 

 Balanced Decision-Making: During crises, there is rarely sufficient time and information to satisfy decision 

makers. Nevertheless, crisis management demands decisive and expedient responses to control cascading

damages. Such decision-making must be balanced, considering risks, urgency of needs, information fidelity

and availability. 

 Flexible Communications: Throughout the wargame, participants stressed the nee

critical, and use of industry or agency-specific jargon and acronyms must be strongly discouraged. 

Communication must take place early in the crisis, with regular updates, to allow stakeholders to make

decisions and take actions to resolve issues and mitigate impacts before the crisis spins out of control. 

The wargame demonstrated that DHS provided an effective, single focal point to coordinate government and 

business response, speed decision-making and mitigate long-term impact. However, additional actions are required 

to enhance crisis preparedness, response and recovery. The wargame identified several key imperatives to enhance 

business and government collaboration moving

 Build operating models to guide government and industry in effective communication and collaboration. 

Ensure that these models enable real-time establishment and modification of networks and incorporate 

appropriate decision rights and processes. CEO COM LINKSM should be leveraged as a key element, 

providing a strateg

 Deve

criteria for rapidly assessing what collaboration is needed and what actions need to be taken, when, how

and by whom. This will facilitate the crisis decision-making process, even in the absence of complete 

information. 

 Test – and refine – operating models, decision-making capabilities and CEO COM LINKSM through 

continuous practice and simulation. Provide decision-makers with “experience” in simulated risk-free 

environments that enables them to better anticipate and resolve critical issues and potential stumbling 

blocks, and ide

 Address the regulatory and commercial issues that might become roadblocks to effective public-private

sector crisis collaboration and response. Seek ways to creatively address issues that may result in 

government’s or industry’s inability to take action during a crisis. By understanding the implications of 

regulations and commercial issues in advance of a crisis and thinking through contingencies, partic

can make more informed decisions. 

SM

effective crisis response resource for business and government leaders: 

 CEO COM LINKSM is most applicable for urgent, strategic level communications and decis on making to

enhance situational awarenes

 The ability to quickly

of CEO COM LINK in crisis situations 

 Proactive call management – setting the agenda in advance, driving decision making, appointing a single

leader for each call, assigning responsibility, and following-up – drives key decisions and action items 

 The communications model (e.g., who is on the call) should be flexible and dynamic to address a

of situations 

 Stakeholders should develop a better understanding of each other’s relevant and unique capabilities, 

concerns and challenges to mitigate potential communication gaps during a crisis 

N-6 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

participants based on sector or geography is critical to ensure calls are managed efficiently and members 



A Case for Enterprise Resilience 

The warg

organiza

many co t considered: Today’s heightened risk environment, increased business model complexity

and i terdependence have significantly altered the risk landscape of the extended enterprise. Boards and corporate 

leadersh

focus an nt 

capabiliti nse and 

identifyin

are provided with relevant information 

Coordination with other communication mechanisms such as industry Information Sharing and Analysis 

Centers (ISACs) would provide expertise and help implement decisions 

ame revealed that in addition to public-private sector collaboration, government and private industry

tions should take steps to improve their own enterprise resilience. The exercise revealed a set of risks that 

mpanies have no

n

ip must now grow and protect their businesses by proactively managing risk and enhancing management

d accountability through corporate-wide risk stewardship. They also must develop adaptive risk manageme

es. Wargame exercises such as this one are an effective means for regularly assessing crisis respo

g solutions to enhance an organization’s resilience.

N-7 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

ss Roundtable, June 2003)

A full c

xecutive Summary

Terrorism: Real Threats. Real Costs. Joint Solutions. 

(The Busine

opy of this publication is available at www.brt.org

E

overnments and businesses both have critical roles to play in improving security after September 11, 2001. 

uld be 

We can never protect America lives and property against every possible threat, even with optimal public and private 

investment and ideal collaboration between business and government or among governmental entities. 

Where government intervention is necessary, policymakers should avoid command-and-control regulation and 

instead favor deference to private initiative, incentives, flexibility, and careful priority-setting. Despite inherent 

uncertainties underlying terrorist threats, analytical tools such as risk-assessment, cost-benefit analysis, and costeffectiveness analysis should be used and refined to maximize security enhancement per dollar invested. Public 

participation and transparency should be retained for security rulemaking. 

Protection against terrorist acts is uniquely a governmental function. Any security mandates that lead to extraordinary 

additional costs on the private sector should be paid by the government. 

Terrorism: Real threats. Real Costs. Joint Solutions examines the challenges and responsibilities in developing 

ways to improve the security of our nation, communities, employees and facilities. These include: 

Refining our understanding of the terrorism risk and selecting security programs

G

However, determining which security measures to implement, how they should be implemented, and what sho

the roles of business and government present significant challenges. The Business Roundtable’s goal is to explore 

those challenges and encourage smarter regulatory decision-making. Our key conclusions: 

Acting alone, neither business nor government can adequately assess and manage security risk. Both have roles to

play in securing our nation, although both are subject to limited resources and other constraints. Collaboration, not 

regulation, presents the most effective approach to addressing security risk. Information-sharing is integral to 

effective collaboration. 

 

Although the threat of terrorist attacks on the American homeland is very real, the risk of occurrence of a particular 

kind of attack in a specific place is far less certain, primarily due to the dearth of precise threat information. Despite 

this uncertainty, government tends to respond to public fears of terrorist attack. Regulating in response to fear will

impose costly security regimes that may mitigate fear without increasing security. A rational approach to security

regulation will achieve greater increases in security per dollar spent by both government and business. 

Achieving trust between government and business

Because neither government nor businesses can manage security risks alone, effective security risk-management 

requires cooperation and for each to set aside suspicions that have often characterized their roles in other regulatory

contexts. A key responsibility for the new Department of Homeland Security will be to instill trust and facilitate the flow

of threat information to the private sector. 

The business role. Businesses have multiple incentives for investing in security: ensuring the continued existence of 

the business maintaining profitability; legal obligations; and competitive benefits and patriotism. And businesses are 

usually in the best position to assess vulnerabilities, devise cost-effective protection, and respond flexibly to adverse 

events. Before mandating security schemes, government should defer to business security initiatives. However, 

businesses also have limitations in making security investment such as limited loss potential; limited resources, 

limited capacity to protect due to significant interdependencies, and uncertainty surrounding the terrorism risk. 

The government role. Although government brings unique strengths to the security arena, there are also significant 

governmental limitations. The traditional governmental “one size fits all” approach is unwieldy for the fast-evolving 

security arena. Government is less sensitive to the problem of substitution risk. Government is likely to be more 

willing to direct resources in response to public fear, even where the security risk is smaller than the public perceives. 

Finally, government often fails to develop the most effective and efficient solutions. Nonetheless, the public will look 

to government to play a role in ensuring enhanced security for the private sector. 

Ensuring procedural fairness, transparency, and rational decision-making

If government does step in to regulate to reduce security risks, it should guarantee the greatest participation of the 

private sector through open and deliberative processes. Transparency not only ensures that public debate refines 

N-8 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

and improves policy, but also ment homeland security

initiatives. 

y security regime. Any allocation of resources should then

be made pursuant to a coherent and cost-effective risk-management strategy that includes examining alternative 

asset using the traditional tools of rational regulation. Policymakers must decide how much

security they will consider “adequate” for a particular site or sector (given that there is no perfect or impenetrable level 

reinforces the public-private cooperation necessary to imple

Risk assessments should be the first step in developing an

methods of securing an

of security), determine whether additional security is required, and be explicit about what assumptions they are

making and the level of uncertainty in the terrorism risk analysis, and compare costs of alternatives. Performance 

standards, incentives, and market mechanisms should always be favored over command-and-control regulation for 

achieving security objectives. 

Determining who pays for added security

A security program that provides a benefit to only a select few should ideally be paid for by those beneficiaries

traditional responsibility

. The 

 of government to guard our borders suggests that security risks of national significance 

hould be overseen – and paid for – by the government. The challenge of allocating the costs of security occurs 

nt mandates

xtraordinary additional costs to enhance homeland security against terrorism, these costs should ordinarily be borne 

s

between these two ends of the spectrum – and is complicated by the nature of the terrorist threat. Any newly

implemented security program should include a close analysis of the question of funding. If the governme

e

by the government. 

N-9 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

APPENDIX O—LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

2-PAM (Pralidoxime Chloride) 

ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians) 

AFGP (Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program)

AG (U.S. Attorney General) 

AHA (American Hospital Association)

AIC (Akaike Information Criterion)

ANSI (American National Standards Institute) 

APHIS (Animal Plant Health Inspection Services) 

ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Program)

ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) 

ATTF (U.S. Attorneys Anti-Terrorism Task Forces) 

BJA (Bureau of Justice)

BSL (Bio-Safety Level) 

BT (Bioterrorism)

BW (Biological Weapons) 

CAPPS II (Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System II) 

CB (Chemical/Biological) 

CBIAC (Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center) 

CBP (Customs and Border Protection)

CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) 

CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high Explosive) 

CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) 

CDP (Center for Domestic Preparedness)

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 

CMI (Consequences Management Interoperability) 

CNN (Cable News Network) 

CONUS (Continental United States) 

COPS (Community Oriented Police Services) 

CT (Counter Terrorism) 

CTC (Counter Terrorism Center) 

CW (Chemical Weapon) 

DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) 

DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) 

DHHS (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) 

DHS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security) 

DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Teams) 

DoD (Department of Defense) 

DOE (Department of Energy) 

DOJ (Department of Justice) 

DOT (Department of Transportation)

EIA (Electronics Industries Association) 

O-1 

EMI (Emergency Management Institute) 

EMPG (Emergency Management Performance Grants) 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

MT (Emergency Medical Technician) 

tion)

n Agency) 

)

)

FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 

 Enforcement Network) 

ligence Surveillance Act) 

eillance Court) 

ons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Programs) 

HAN (Health Alert Network)

ccountability Act) 

es Administration) 

lopment)

Directorate)

ystem) 

)

nt System) 

ion)

es) 

tance Administration) 

ing Committee or Commission) 

ystem) 

EMS (Emergency Medical Services) 

E

ENA (Emergency Nurse Associa

EOC (Emergency Operations Center) 

EP&R (Emergency Preparedness and Response) 

EPA (Environmental Protectio

Epi-X (Epidemic Information Exchange

ER (Emergency Room) 

ERTP (Emergency Response Training Program

FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 

FCC (Federal Communications Commission) 

FCRP (Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) 

FDA (Food and Drug Administration)

FinCEN (Financial Crimes

FISA (Foreign Intel

FISC (Foreign Intelligence Surv

FTE (Full Time Equivalent) 

FWMDPPS (Federal Weap

GAO (U. S. General Accounting Office) 

GP (Grant Program)

HAZMAT (Hazardous Material) 

HHS (Health and Human Services) 

HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and A

HRSA (Health Resources and Servic

HSC (Homeland Security Council) 

HUD (Housing and Urban Deve

IAB (Interagency Board) 

IAIP (Information and Infrastructure Protection

ICS (Incident Command S

IED (Incendiary Explosive Device

IMS (Incident Manageme

INS (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service) 

IOM (Institute of Medicine) 

IRP (Improved Response Program)

IRS (Internal Revenue Service)

ISO (International Organization for Standardizat

JTTF (Joint Terrorism Task Forc

LEAA (Law Enforcement Assis

LEPC (Local Emergency Plann

LHD (Local Health Departments) 

MMRS (Metropolitan Medical Response S

MOU (Memorandum of Understanding)

O-2 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

tion of Terrorism)

Health Officials) 

ency Managers) 

twork)

r)

rcement Administrators) 

ic Preparedness Office) 

on Center) 

d Infectious Diseases) 

nd Health) 

hnology) 

 Information Bureau) 

ommunications and Information Administration)

inating Group) 

ness) 

ment) 

land Security) 

ty and Health Administration)

Support)

nt) 

st, and Evaluation)

iological Chemical Command)

e)

iation) 

MTSA (Marine Transportation Act) 

MIPT (Memorial Institute for the Preven

NACCHO (National Association of City and County 

NAEM (National Association of Emerg

NAHLN (National Animal Health Laboratory Ne

NCTC (National Counter Terrorism Cente

NDLEA (National Directory of Law Enfo

NDPO (National Domest

NEA (National Endowment for the Arts) 

NEIC (National Enforcement Investigati

NFA (National Fire Academy) 

NFPA (National Fire Protection Association)

NIAID (National Institute of Allergy an

NIJ (National Institute of Justice) 

NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety a

NIST (National Institute for Standards and Tec

NORTHCOM (U.S. Northern Command) 

NPSIB (National Public Safety

NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 

NSA (National Security Agency) 

NTIA (National Telec

NWCG (National Wildlife Coord

ODP (Office of Domestic Prepared

OEM (Office of Emergency Manage

OEP (Office of Emergency Preparedness) 

OES (Office of Emergency Services) 

OHS (White House Office of Home

OJP (Office of Justice Programs) 

OSHA (Occupational Safe

OSLDPS (Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness

PPE (Personal Protective Equipme

R&D (Research and Development) 

RDT&E (Research, Development, Te

RFPA (Right to Financial Privacy Act)

ROE (Rules of Engagement)

RRIS (Rapid Response Information System)

S&T (Science and Technology)

SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) 

SBCCOM (U.S. Army Soldier and B

SCBA (Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) 

SLATT (Anti-Terrorism State and Local Training Grants) 

SOP (Standard Operating Procedur

TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) 

TIA (Telecommunications Industry Assoc

O-3 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

roup) 

nistration) 

TSWG (Technical Support Working G

TTIC (Terrorist Threat Integration Center) 

USACLMS (U.S. Army Chemical School) 

USAI (Urban Areas Security Initiative) 

USC (United States Code) 

USCG (U.S. Coast Guard) 

USDA (United States Department of Agriculture) 

USFA (United States Fire Administration) 

UMTA (Urban Mass Transportation Admi

WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) 

O-4 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

S—CALENDAR YEAR 2003 

ive formal meetings: 

3, RAND Washington Office, Arlington, VA 

gton Office, Arlington, VA 

June 16-17, 2003, RAND Washington Office, Arlington, VA 

arters, California Office of Emergency Services, Sacramento 

gton Office, Arlington, VA

During the course of those meetings, panel members received presentations or engaged in categorical 

discussions as follows: 

The Honorable Tom Ridge, Secretary of Homeland Security 

The Honorable John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States 

The Honorable Ann Veneman, Secretary of Agriculture (submitted written testimony) 

The Honorable Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI organizational and 

mission restructuring (classified and unclassified)(two appearances) 

The Honorable James Loy, Transportation Security Administration, Passenger Identification 

Technology

John Brennan, Director, Terrorist Threat Integration Center (classified) 

John Poindexter, Defense Advance Research Projects Agency, Information Technology for 

Counterterrorism (classified) 

Greg Saathoff, Critical Incidents Analysis Group, University of Virginia, Shielding Discussion 

Mike Armstrong, Business Roundtable, Private Sector Discussion 

Joe Samuels, International Association of Chiefs of Police 

Ernie Mitchell, International Association of Fire Chiefs 

Glen Woodbury, National Emergency Management Association 

Steven Charvat, International Association of Emergency Managers 

Bill Webb, Congressional Fire Services Institute 

Mike Selves, National Association of Counties 

James Ferguson, International Association of Fire Fighters 

John Roquemore, National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians 

APPENDIX P—PANEL ACTIVITIE

During the past year, the panel held f

March 20-21, 200

April 30-May 1, 2003, RAND Washin

September 3-4, 2003, Headqu

November 17-18, 2003, RAND Washin

P-1 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

Ted Macklin and Corey Gruber, Office of Domestic Preparedness, Department of Justice – Briefing 

n TOPOFF II

ergeant John Sullivan, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Terrorism Early Warning Group 

Bureau

nder the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, meetings of the panel are generally open to

one

tated in the Act. Notices of meetings are published in the Federal Register and 

osted on the panel’s web page on the RAND web site, http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel

o

S

Major General Paul Sullivan and Colonel Peter Alyward, National Guard

Armond Mascelli and Scott Conner, American Red Cross 

U

the public, except when national security classified information is being presented or discussed, or for

of the other exceptions s

p . Unclassified 

n as the panel has approved them. 

Written testimony and 

omments are also posted to the panel web site. 

anel members and support staff also attended and participated directly in numerous conferences, 

ny when requested and appropriate. 

minutes of the panel meetings are posted to that web page as soo

The Advisory Panel also accepts written testimony and public comment.

c

P

workshops, and symposia on the subject of terrorism. In addition, panel members and staff attended 

numerous Congressional hearings on terrorism and presented testimo

P-2 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

APPENDIX Q—RAND STAFF PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE ADVISORY PANEL 

Michael Wermuth 

Report

obert Button 

im Cragin 

Susan Hosek 

Felicia Joshua 

Lou Mariano

Charles Meade 

Roger Molander 

Paul Steinberg 

g

Michael Stoto 

Terri Tanielian 

Principal Administrative Support 

illary Peck Nancy Rizor Michael DuVal Elizabeth Whitaker 

Other RAND Staff Providing Support 

Kimberly Alldredge 

Charles Allen 

Carole Berkson 

Nurith Berstein 

Stephen Bloodsworth 

Roger Castle 

Bob Cheng 

Christel Chichester 

Patricia Clark

Leo Cloutier 

Tania Coderre 

Molly Coleman 

Ethan Collins

Linda Daly

Steven Drew

David Egner 

Karen Echeverri 

Leanna Ferguson 

Dorothy Gardner 

Evelyn Gonzalez 

Monica Granados 

Hunter Granger 

Tyrone Greene 

Allison Hill 

Candace Hoffman 

Peter Hoffman 

Douglas Kim 

Jessica Kmiec 

Barbara Lacy 

Tom LaTourrette 

Lee Meyer 

Phillip Mazzocco 

Ryan McKay 

Vanessa Miller 

Kathy Mills 

Paige Parham 

D.J. Peterson

Joanna Polak 

Luetta Pope 

Monica Rodriguez 

Carolyn Rogers 

Amy Rudibaugh 

Shirley Ruhe

Kimberly Sadler 

Irene Sanchez 

Dan Sheehan 

Dan Solosan 

Diana Thornton 

Sandra Wade-Grusky

Sophia Washam

Stephen Watkins 

Deanna Webber 

Elwood Whitaker 

Patricia Williams 

Ralda Williams 

Natalie Ziegler 

RAND Corporate Leadership for the Project 

Jeffrey Isaacson, Vice President, National Security Research Division, and Director, National Defense 

Research Institute (NDRI) 

Susan Everingham, Director, Forces and Resources Policy Center (NDRI) 

James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center (NDRI) 

Executive Project Director 

Co-Project Director 

Jennifer Brower 

Research Staff for the

Justin Adams

Gabrielle Bloom

Susan Bohandy

Irene Brahmakulam 

David Brannan 

Bruce Don 

Can Du 

Ron Fricker 

Michael Geruso 

Bruce Hoffman 

Renee Labor 

Francis Lacroix 

Josephine Levy

Michael Lostumbo 

Nicole Lurie 

John Parachini 

Negeen Pegahi 

Kevin Jack Riley

Heather Robertson

William Rosenau 

R

Gary Cecchine 

Peter Chalk 

David Howell

Brian Jenkins 

Scott McMahon Suzanne Spauldin

K

Sara Daly

Teresa Dausch

Lois Davis 

Seth Jones 

Terrence Kelly

Jacob Klerman 

Sarah Myers 

Sarah Cotton Nelson 

Jennifer Pace

Gregory Treverton

Jeffrey Wasserman 

Barbara Wynn

H

Q-1 
List of Key Recommendations

State and Local Empowerment

• Combine all departmental grant making programs into a single entity in DHS (DHS)

• Establish an interagency mechanism for homeland security grants (President)

• Develop a comprehensive process for establishing training and exercise standards for responders (DHS)

• Revise the Homeland Advisory System to include (1) a regional alert system (2) training to emergency

responders about preventive actions; and (3) specific guidance to potentially affected regions (DHS)

• Establish sustained funding to enhance EMS response capacity for acts of terrorism (Congress)

• Reestablish a Federal office specifically to support EMS operational and systems issues (Congress)

• Establish a “Matrix” of Mutual Aid in coordination with local, State, and other Federal agencies, for a nationwide

system of mutually supporting capabilities (DHS)

Private Sector Engagement

• Adopt the Business Roundtable’s Principles of Corporate Governance security component (DHS and private

sector)

Intelligence and Information Sharing

• Establish the Terrorist Threat Integration Center as an independent agency and require TTIC to have permanent

staff from representative State and local entities (Congress)

• Develop and disseminate continuing comprehensive strategic threat assessments (Intelligence Community and

DHS)

• Designate one or more security clearance-granting authorities, which can grant clearances Federal government

wide that are recognized by all Federal agencies (President)

• Develop a new regime of clearances and classification of intelligence and other information for dissemination to

States, localities, and the private sector (President)

• Develop a training program for State, local, and private sector for interpreting intelligence products (DHS)

• Establish comprehensive procedures for sharing information with relevant State and local officials (DHS)

Research and Development and Related Standards

• Establish a Federal Interagency Homeland Security Research and Development Council (President)

Psychological Preparedness

• Implement IOM Committee’s recommendations on psychological preparedness (DHS and DHHS)

• Provide increased funding and DHS and DHHS monitor State and local compliance of incorporating in plans an

appropriate focus on psychological and behavioral consequence preparedness and management (Congress,

DHS and DHHS)

• Create a Federal task force on psychological issues, jointly led by DHHS and DHS (President)

Agroterrorism

• Designate DHS as the lead and USDA as the technical advisor on food safety and agriculture and emergency

preparedness (President)