*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSEPH C.

ACAMPORA, JR.

(AC 38468)

DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of the crimes of assault of a disabled person in the third degree

and disorderly conduct, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed,

inter alia, that the trial court violated his constitutional right to counsel

when it permitted him to represent himself at arraignment and during

plea negotiations without obtaining a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the

defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to

counsel and invoked his right to self-representation: that court had no

duty to canvass the defendant concerning his waiver of the right to

counsel and his invocation of the right to self-representation until he

clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation, which

he did not do at arraignment, and although the defendant clearly and

unambiguously invoked his right to self-representation at a pretrial hearing, the court canvassed the defendant that same day; moreover, to the

extent that the defendant claimed that the court violated his right to

counsel by not canvassing him prior to the date of that hearing, this

court declined to review that claim, the defendant having raised the

claim for the first time in his reply brief and there having been no

exceptional circumstances to warrant a consideration of the claim.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the court’s canvass at

the pretrial hearing was constitutionally inadequate because the court

did not explain in sufficient detail the nature of the charges against the

defendant and did not advise him of specific dangers and disadvantages

of self-representation: it was not necessary that the defendant be specifically informed of the particular elements of the crimes he was charged

with before being permitted to waive counsel and to proceed pro se,

as the court advised the defendant of the statutory names of the charges

pending against him as well as the penalties associated with those

charges, the elements of which were relatively straightforward and

aligned with the statutory names of the offenses, and the court reasonably could have concluded that the defendant understood the nature of

the charges against him sufficiently to render his waiver of the right to

counsel knowing and intelligent; moreover, during its canvass, the court

explored the defendant’s lack of familiarity with substantive law and

procedural rules, and alerted him to the fact that he would be expected

to educate himself on those areas of the law and procedure and to

comply with the same rules that govern attorneys during trial, and that

discussion sufficiently apprised the defendant of the general dangers

and disadvantages associated with self-representation, as opposed to

representation by an attorney trained in the law.

3. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial

court violated his right to present a defense by improperly denying his

motion to open the evidence so that he could present the testimony of

an objective third party witness who would have been able to directly

attack the credibility of the victim as to whether an ambulance had

been dispatched to his residence on the date of the incident at issue;

the evidence that the defendant sought to admit would not have been

admissible in his case-in-chief, as it was a voice mail message that

constituted inadmissible hearsay, the defendant did not identify any

exception to the hearsay rule that would have permitted its admission,

and even if the court interpreted the defendant’s statements about the

voice mail as a request to open the evidence, the testimony about

whether an ambulance was dispatched to the victim’s residence related

to a collateral matter and not a material issue, and the impeachment

of the victim’s testimony on a collateral matter through extrinsic evidence was not permitted under our rules of evidence.

Argued May 22—officially released September 5, 2017
Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of assault of a disabled person in the third

degree, disorderly conduct and interfering with an

emergency call, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number seven, and tried to the jury before Klatt, J.; thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s motion to open

the evidence; verdict and judgment of guilty of assault

of a disabled person in the third degree and disorderly

conduct, from which the defendant appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Mary A. Beattie, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state’s

attorney, and James R. Dinnan, senior assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, Joseph C. Acampora, Jr.,

appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after

a jury trial, of one count of assault of a disabled person

in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a61a and one count of disorderly conduct in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (1). The defendant

was found not guilty of interfering with an emergency

call in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183b. The

defendant represented himself at trial. On appeal, the

defendant claims that the trial court (1) violated his

right to counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution when it permitted him to represent himself without obtaining a valid

waiver of his right to counsel and (2) violated his right

to present a defense, as guaranteed by the sixth and

fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, when it denied his motion to open the evidence.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the

jury reasonably could have found the following facts.

The defendant and the victim, Anthony Toth, are brothers. The victim has cerebral palsy. In August, 2011, they

shared an apartment in a multifamily house with their

mother. At approximately 11:40 a.m. on August 3, 2011,

the defendant entered the victim’s bedroom and

grabbed him. The defendant accused the victim’s friend

of putting a hole in the windshield of his van when

they were setting off fireworks the night before. The

defendant slapped and punched the victim in the face

and head, and dragged him about the apartment. When

the victim grabbed his phone, the defendant took it

from him and threw it, causing the battery to fall out.

Thereafter, the defendant called the Wallingford Police

Department to report that his van had been vandalized,

and the victim called the police to report the assault

after he located and replaced his phone’s battery.

At approximately noon that same day, Officer James

Onofrio was dispatched to the defendant and the victim’s residence in response to the defendant’s vehicle

vandalism complaint. When Onofrio arrived, he met

with the defendant outside and examined the defendant’s damaged windshield. The defendant explained

that he believed that the victim’s friend had damaged

the windshield with a firework the night before, but he

admitted that he had no proof of who caused the damage. While talking to the defendant, police dispatch

informed Onofrio of the victim’s assault complaint. The

defendant informed Onofrio that he needed to leave to

go to a doctor, and Onofrio obliged because he did not

know, at that time, that the defendant was the subject

of the assault complaint.

Onofrio met the victim in his apartment. The victim

had a cut on his nose and blood on his nose, neck, and
arm, and he explained to Onofrio that the defendant

had assaulted him earlier that day because he believed

that the victim’s friend damaged his van’s windshield.

Consistent with the victim’s complaint, a neighbor

informed Onofrio that approximately fifteen minutes

before he had arrived in response to the defendant’s

vehicle vandalism complaint, she had heard the defendant yelling and ‘‘loud banging and a lot of commotion’’

coming from the defendant and victim’s apartment.

Thereafter, the defendant was charged with assault

of a disabled person in the third degree, disorderly

conduct, and interfering with an emergency call. After

a jury trial, at which the defendant represented himself,

the defendant was found guilty of assault of a disabled

person in the third degree and disorderly conduct. The

defendant was found not guilty of interfering with an

emergency call. The court sentenced the defendant to

a total effective sentence of one year of imprisonment.

This appeal followed.

I

We begin with the defendant’s claim that his right to

counsel was violated when the court permitted him to

represent himself without obtaining a valid waiver of

his right to counsel. Specifically, the defendant claims

that the court improperly permitted him to represent

himself at arraignment and during plea negotiations

without canvassing him concerning his waiver of his

right to counsel. The defendant also claims that the

canvass performed by the court at a pretrial proceeding

on February 23, 2012, was constitutionally inadequate.

We reject both of these claims.

The following additional facts are relevant to these

claims. On September 14, 2011, the defendant appeared

for arraignment unrepresented by counsel. Because the

case involved allegations of domestic violence, a discussion was held concerning whether family services, part

of the Court Support Services Division, was going to

be involved in the case, whether a protective order

needed to be put in place, and what the conditions of

that order should be because the defendant and the

victim lived together. The defendant declined the assistance of family services, and the court, Scarpellino, J.,

ultimately agreed to permit the defendant to return to

the apartment that he shared with the victim. The court

continued the matter for one week so that family services could contact the victim and obtain more information. The following week, on September 21, 2011, family

services indicated that it had still been unable to contact

the victim, and the court granted another continuance.

Between September 28, 2011, and November 29, 2011,

the defendant requested and received four continuances so that he could retain counsel. At the hearing

on November 29, 2011, the following colloquy occurred:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: [The defendant] is asking for a
continuance to hire an attorney.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Still going.

‘‘The Court: One week.

‘‘[The Defendant]: One week.

‘‘The Court: Well, how many times do you want me

to continue? You know—

‘‘[The Defendant]: —well, listen, I’m not the one pursuing the case. You guys are coming after me, so—

‘‘The Court: Yeah, well—

‘‘[The Defendant]: —I mean—

‘‘The Court: —you can get a public defender—

‘‘[The Defendant]: —I don’t—I’ll represent myself,

Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Did you apply for a public defender?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I, I got too much unemployment.

I get just enough not to get it, and—

‘‘The Court: All right. What was the offer on this?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: There hasn’t been one because he

wanted to retain the services of counsel.

‘‘The Court: Once you tell the prosecutor you want

a lawyer, the prosecutor is going to—

‘‘[The Defendant]: Well, no. I did not tell him that.

‘‘The Court: All right.

‘‘[The Defendant]: They told me to get a lawyer, Your

Honor. So—

‘‘The Court: All right, well, because, so, so, then give

him—send it back and then give him an offer.’’

Thereafter, the defendant interjected that the case

was ‘‘ridiculous . . . .’’ The court explained to the

defendant that ‘‘the charge that’s there . . . carries a

mandatory year in jail. You, you need to get an attorney

. . . .’’ The defendant proceeded to argue about why

the case was ‘‘based on a bunch of crap’’ and stated:

‘‘And now, you—I, I,—if you want a big trial thing about

it, then I’d rather represent myself and I’ll do my own

investigation. . . . Because, honestly, from what I see

of attorneys, I believe I can do a better job myself.’’

The court said, ‘‘All right,’’ and the defendant asked,

‘‘So, we’ll give it one week again?’’ The court instructed

the defendant to talk to the prosecutor about his case

first. When the defendant’s case was recalled, the prosecutor indicated that he was unable to have a ‘‘cogent

conversation’’ with the defendant and stated that the

defendant ‘‘really needs an attorney to help him out.’’

The court therefore granted the defendant’s motion for

a continuance.

On December 13, 2011, after the defendant’s case

was called, the prosecutor noted that ‘‘[t]his is a matter
that’s been continued since September 14 [2011] at the

request of the defendant each time to hire counsel. The

state’s made an offer.’’ The court asked the defendant

how his efforts to retain counsel were proceeding. The

defendant responded: ‘‘Saving up [for an attorney]. I

got, like, $500 saved, and the lowest I got they want is,

like, $800. So, I’m unemployed. So, I’ve been unemployed. So, plus, I pay my rent. I mean, I only get so much

from unemployment.’’ The court agreed to continue the

case so that the defendant could continue his efforts

to retain counsel. Between December 29, 2011, and

February 16, 2012, the court continued the case five

additional times so that the defendant could retain

counsel.1

On February 23, 2012, the state explained to the court,

McNamara, J., that the defendant’s case had been continued several times so that the defendant could retain

counsel. The court asked the defendant whether he had

in fact retained an attorney. The defendant replied: ‘‘No.

Um, well, I’m on unemployment. The person was my

brother. I called the police. I don’t believe I need a

lawyer. I don’t want a lawyer. I don’t have the money

to afford a lawyer.’’ When the court mentioned Judge

Scarpellino, the defendant interjected: ‘‘I asked him to

go on the jury trial.’’ The court asked the defendant

whether he had asked for more time to retain an attorney, and the defendant indicated that he had. The defendant explained that he had been saving money over the

last several weeks for an attorney, and he stated that

‘‘if I need to represent myself, I will, Your Honor, I will.

. . . I don’t believe I really need to . . . sacrifice . . .

not paying my rent to hire an attorney for . . . for a

junk case.’’

The court engaged in a discussion with the defendant

concerning his attempts to retain counsel. The defendant stated: ‘‘They offered me forty-five days, which I

will not accept. So, the next move would have to be

trial. So, if we can start picking and maybe I’ll have

to—if I lose trial, I’ll . . . maybe I’ll . . . I’ll save my

money for the appeal.’’ The court asked the state

whether an offer had been made, and the state

responded that one had been made in December, 2011.

The defendant confirmed that he was rejecting that

offer. The court stated that it would place the case on

the firm trial list and canvassed the defendant concerning his waiver of the right to counsel and invocation

of his right to self-representation. After completing its

canvass, the court found, inter alia, that the defendant

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right

to counsel.

Having reviewed the relevant factual and procedural

history, we now turn to the legal principles that guide

our analysis of the defendant’s claims. The sixth amendment to the United States constitution, as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment,
embodies the right to counsel at all critical stages of a

criminal prosecution, including arraignment2 and plea

negotiations. See State v. Braswell, 318 Conn. 815, 827,

123 A.3d 835 (2015); State v. Pires, 310 Conn. 222, 230,

77 A.3d 87 (2013); see also Gonzalez v. Commissioner

of Correction, 308 Conn. 463, 474–84, 68 A.3d 624

(defendant’s arraignment was critical stage because of

presentence confinement issues that arose), cert.

denied sub nom. Dzurenda v. Gonzalez, U.S. ,

134 S. Ct. 639, 187 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2013); Mahon v. Commissioner of Correction, 157 Conn. App. 246, 253, 116

A.3d 331 (‘‘[p]retrial negotiations implicating the decision of whether to plead guilty [are] a critical stage in

criminal proceedings’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 317 Conn. 917, 117 A.3d 855 (2015);

accord Davis v. Greiner, 428 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 2005)

(‘‘[i]t is well settled a defendant’s Sixth Amendment

right to counsel extends to plea negotiations’’).

‘‘Embedded within the sixth amendment right to

assistance of counsel is the defendant’s right to elect

to represent himself, when such election is voluntary

and intelligent. . . . [T]he right to counsel and the right

to self-representation present mutually exclusive alternatives. . . . Although both rights are constitutionally

protected, a defendant must choose between the two.

. . . We require a defendant to clearly and unequivocally assert his right to self-representation because the

right, unlike the right to the assistance of counsel, protects interests other than providing a fair trial, such as

the defendant’s interest in personal autonomy. . . .

Put another way, a defendant properly exercises his

right to self-representation by knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to representation by counsel.

. . . Once the right has been invoked, the trial court

must canvass the defendant to determine if the defendant’s invocation of the right, and simultaneous waiver

of his right to the assistance of counsel, is voluntary

and intelligent.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Braswell,

supra, 318 Conn. 827–28.

‘‘In the absence of a clear and unequivocal assertion

of the right to self-representation [however], a trial

court has no independent obligation to inquire into the

defendant’s interest in representing himself . . . .

[Instead] recognition of the right becomes a matter

entrusted to the exercise of discretion by the trial

court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Pires, supra, 310 Conn. 231. ‘‘In the exercise of that

discretion, the trial court must weigh into the balance its

obligation to indulge in every reasonable presumption

against waiver of the right to counsel.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter, 200 Conn. 607,

614, 513 A.2d 47 (1986).

‘‘We ordinarily review for abuse of discretion a trial

court’s determination, made after a canvass . . . that
a defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his

right to counsel. . . . In cases . . . where the defendant claims that the trial court improperly failed to

exercise that discretion by canvassing him after he

clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to represent

himself . . . whether the defendant’s request was clear

and unequivocal presents a mixed question of law and

fact, over which . . . our review is plenary.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1, 13–14, 44 A.3d 794 (2012).

A

The defendant first claims that the court deprived

him of his right to counsel when it permitted him to

represent himself at arraignment and during plea negotiations without being canvassed concerning his waiver

of the right to counsel and invocation of the right to

self-representation. That is, the defendant contends that

a trial court’s duty to canvass is triggered whenever a

defendant appears at a critical stage of the proceeding

unrepresented by counsel. The defendant’s argument

is predicated on the assumption that ‘‘[t]he right to

self-representation is not triggered until the court has

canvassed a defendant in accordance with Practice

Book § 44-3 and the defendant has effectively waived

the right to counsel.’’ The defendant misapprehends our

jurisprudence concerning the invocation of the right to

self-representation and a trial court’s duty to canvass.

‘‘State and federal courts consistently have discussed

the right to self-representation in terms of invoking or

asserting it . . . and have concluded that there can be

no infringement of the right to self-representation in

the absence of a defendant’s proper assertion of that

right. . . . The threshold requirement that the defendant clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to proceed pro se is one of many safeguards of the

fundamental right to counsel. . . . Accordingly, [t]he

constitutional right of self-representation depends . . .

upon its invocation by the defendant in a clear and

unequivocal manner. . . . In the absence of a clear and

unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation, a trial court has no independent obligation to

inquire into the defendant’s interest in representing

himself . . . . [Instead] recognition of the right

becomes a matter entrusted to the exercise of discretion

by the trial court.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Pires, supra, 310 Conn. 231.

This constitutional rule ‘‘is grounded in the policy

and practical consideration that, such advices [about

the right to self-representation] might suggest to the

average defendant that he could in fact adequately represent himself and does not need an attorney, and it

would be fundamentally unwise to impose a requirement to advise of the self-representation procedure

which, if opted for by the defendant, is likely to be to

no one’s benefit. . . . It also is consistent with well
settled Connecticut law, that, [i]n the absence of a clear

and unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation, a trial court has no independent obligation to

inquire into the defendant’s interest in representing

himself, because the right of self-representation, unlike

the right to counsel, is not a critical aspect of a fair

trial, but instead affords protection to the defendant’s

interest in personal autonomy.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 248.

Accordingly, the court had no duty to canvass the

defendant concerning his waiver of the right to counsel

and his invocation of the right to self-representation

until he clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to

self-representation.

B

We next address whether and when the defendant

invoked his right to self-representation. It is undisputed

that the defendant did not clearly and unambiguously

invoke his right to counsel at arraignment. It is also

undisputed that the defendant clearly and unambiguously invoked his right to self-representation on February 23, 2012, and that the court canvassed the defendant

that same day. To the extent that the defendant further

claims that the court violated his right to counsel by

not canvassing him prior to February 23, 2012, however,

we conclude that such a claim is unreviewable.

In his opening brief, the defendant argued only that

the court violated his right to counsel by permitting him

to represent himself at critical stages of the proceedings

without canvassing him as to his waiver of his right to

counsel and invocation of his right to self-representation. In its brief, the state responded that the court was

not required to canvass the defendant until he clearly

and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation. The state further observed: ‘‘The record reveals,

and the defendant does not assert otherwise, that he

did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to

self-representation until February 23, 2012.’’ The state

did not thereafter address whether the defendant

clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation prior to February 23, 2012. In his reply brief,

the defendant continued to maintain that because it

was ‘‘obvious’’ that he was representing himself at

arraignment and during plea negotiations, the court was

required to canvass him. In the alternative, the defendant argued that, even if he was required to clearly and

unequivocally invoke his right to self-representation, he

did so on November 29, 2011, and February 23, 2012.3

The defendant claimed therefore that the court violated

his right to counsel by not canvassing him before he

engaged in plea negotiations with the state on November 29, 2011, and rejected the state’s plea offer on February 23, 2012.
‘‘It is axiomatic that a party may not raise an issue

for the first time on appeal in its reply brief. . . . Our

practice requires an appellant to raise claims of error

in his original brief, so that the issue as framed by him

can be fully responded to by the appellee in its brief,

and so that we can have the full benefit of that written

argument. Although the function of the appellant’s reply

brief is to respond to the arguments and authority presented in the appellee’s brief, that function does not

include raising an entirely new claim of error.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 165,

197, 982 A.2d 620 (2009). Exceptional circumstances

may persuade us to consider an issue raised for the

first time in a reply brief. See, e.g., State v. McIver,

201 Conn. 559, 563, 518 A.2d 1368 (1986) (permitting

defendant to raise issue for first time in reply brief

because record adequately supported claim defendant

had been deprived of fundamental constitutional right

and fair trial); see also Curry v. Burns, 225 Conn. 782,

789 n.2, 626 A.2d 719 (1993) (permitting appellant in

reply brief to join amicus curiae request to overrule

prior case law); 37 Huntington Street, H, LLC v. Hartford, 62 Conn. App. 586, 597 n.17, 772 A.2d 633

(addressing issue raised in reply brief where appellant

had no earlier opportunity to respond to issues raised

in briefs filed by amici curiae), cert. denied, 256 Conn.

914, 772 A.2d 1127 (2001).

No exceptional circumstances exist that persuade us

to consider this issue, which was raised for the first

time in a reply brief. Therefore, we decline to review

the defendant’s belated claim that he clearly and

unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation

on November 29, 2011, and that the court violated his

right to counsel by not canvassing him on that date.

C

The defendant next claims that the court’s canvass

on February 23, 2012, was constitutionally inadequate

because the court failed to explain to him in sufficient

detail the nature of the charges and to advise him of

specific dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to the

defendant’s claim. On February 23, 2012, the court,

McNamara, J., canvassed the defendant concerning his

waiver of his right to counsel and invocation of his

right to self-representation. In relevant part, the court

engaged in the following colloquy with the defendant

concerning the charges pending against him:

‘‘The Court: All right. Do you understand the charges

that you are facing, sir?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, I do.

‘‘The Court: You are facing the charge of assault in
the third degree—is it a victim over sixty—of a victim

over sixty?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: It’s on a disabled person. Correct.

‘‘The Court: A disabled person.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Correct.

‘‘The Court: Interfering with an emergency call and

disorderly conduct. Do you understand that?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, I do.

‘‘The Court: Do you understand the minimum and

maximum penalties of these charges?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Do I understand the minimum—

‘‘The Court: —and maximum penalties in these

charges.

‘‘[The Defendant]: What are they? I don’t think they

were told to me.

‘‘The Court: All right. For the assault on a person,

disabled person—

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: It’s a one year minimum, one

year maximum.

‘‘The Court: —is a one year minimum, mandatory

minimum, which means that if you were convicted you

would do a minimum time of one year in jail for that

charge alone. All right. For the charge of interfering

with an emergency call, you would—that would be a

[class] C mis—let me see—that would be a [class] A

misdemeanor. You can get another year in jail, plus a

$2000 fine. And disorderly conduct is ninety days and

[a] $500 fine. So, now you understand the penalties

involved. Is that right?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, I do, Your Honor.’’

The court also canvassed the defendant concerning

his education and experience with the law, as well as

his obligation to educate himself on the relevant law

and procedure and to comply with the same rules that

govern attorneys during trial:

‘‘The Court: And how far have you gone in school?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I graduated high school.

‘‘The Court: Can you read?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: All right. You know you have a right

to counsel?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: All right. Have you ever been involved

in a criminal trial before?

‘‘[The Defendant]: In a trial? No, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: All right. Have you ever been the subject
of a competency evaluation?

‘‘[The Defendant]: No, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Did you represent yourself during any

cases at all?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Criminally, no.

‘‘The Court: Any cases at all, I said.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Um, up at the appellate division

in Hartford. Yes. Back in last year. Yes, I did. . . .

‘‘The Court: All right. Are you familiar with the laws

and rules of procedure regarding evidence, pretrial

motions, voir dire for criminal trials?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Um, no, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: All right. Are you familiar with the rules

of discovery for criminal matters, sir?

‘‘[The Defendant]: No, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Do you realize that, if you represent

yourself, the judge will be impartial and cannot advise

you on the procedures, [substantive] issues in the case?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I understand that now.

‘‘The Court: All right. Are you familiar with plea bargaining?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, I am.

‘‘The Court: Can you do that yourself?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes. I believe I could.

‘‘The Court: Okay. Are you—do you have access to a

library to learn these things that you need to understand

before you go to trial?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, I do, ma’am.

‘‘The Court: Can you conduct yourself at a trial?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I believe so.

‘‘The Court: All right. So, you feel you possess the

training, education, and experience and skill to represent yourself and to try the case yourself. Is that

true, sir?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yeah. Yes, sir, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: All right.

‘‘[The Defendant]: I believe I can.

‘‘The Court: You understand that you can’t have an

attorney and represent yourself? You either represent

yourself, or you have an attorney represent you. You

understand that, sir?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, I do.

‘‘The Court: All right.

‘‘[The Defendant]: But I have one question.
‘‘The Court: And, at trial, you will be at the counsel

table all by yourself. You understand that?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: You’ll be sitting there presenting your

case on your own. Now, when you have a criminal trial,

you’re expected to follow the rules and procedures that

we make the lawyers follow.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Okay. Can I have one of my—if

someone decides to, can I have an attorney present in

the courtroom while it’s being—

‘‘The Court: —You can’t have the attorney sit with

you at the table.

‘‘[The Defendant]: I can’t have anyone even sit—I

don’t want to have my—

‘‘The Court: He—if he—he can sit—

‘‘[The Defendant]: I’m sorry. Okay.

‘‘The Court: —he can sit in the courtroom—

‘‘[The Defendant]: That’s fine. That’s fine.

‘‘The Court: —if you—

‘‘[The Defendant]: He can hear the case.

‘‘The Court: —he can sit in the courtroom, but—

‘‘[The Defendant]: Excellent.

‘‘The Court: —if you decide you want the attorney

to represent you, that attorney would file an appearance

and be present. You understand that?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yeah. No. I want to represent

myself.

‘‘The Court: All right. So, is it your wish today to

proceed to trial and represent yourself?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Is this your decision?

‘‘[The Defendant]: This is my decision in full.

‘‘The Court: Are you making it voluntarily and of your

own free will?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes. Yes, ma’am.

‘‘The Court: And no one has found—has threatened

you or promised you. Is that right?

‘‘[The Defendant]: That’s correct.’’

After completing its canvass, the court found, inter

alia, that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

‘‘The United States Supreme Court has explained:

[I]n order competently and intelligently to choose selfrepresentation, [a defendant] should be made aware of

the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,
so that the record will establish that he knows what

he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.

. . . That court further explained that a record that

affirmatively shows that the defendant is literate, competent, and understanding, and that he [is] voluntarily

exercising his informed free will is sufficient to support

a finding that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently

invoked his right. . . . Practice Book § 44-34

serves to

guide our trial courts in making this inquiry. . . . Nevertheless, [b]ecause the . . . inquiry [under § 44-3]

simultaneously triggers the constitutional right of a

defendant to represent himself and enables the waiver

of the constitutional right of a defendant to counsel,

the provision of § [44-3] cannot be construed to require

anything more than is constitutionally mandated. . . .

Thus, the court need not question a defendant regarding

all of the . . . § 44-3 factors. . . . Instead, the analysis

under that rule of practice is designed to help the court

answer two questions: [W]hether a criminal defendant

is minimally competent to make the decision to waive

counsel, and . . . whether the defendant actually

made that decision in a knowing, voluntary and intelligent fashion.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Braswell,

supra, 318 Conn. 828–29.

‘‘The fact that the defendant’s decision to represent

himself was misguided or based on his erroneous perceptions of . . . his own ability to defend himself and

resulted in a conviction is of no consequence. We review

the record to determine whether the trial court properly

concluded that the defendant was competent to make

the decision to waive counsel, and that his decision was

made in a knowing, voluntary and intelligent fashion.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taylor, 63

Conn. App. 386, 403, 776 A.2d 1154, cert. denied, 257

Conn. 907, 777 A.2d 687, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 978, 122

S. Ct. 406, 151 L. Ed. 2d 308 (2001).

On February 23, 2012, the court encountered, by all

appearances, a competent defendant seeking to represent himself. The defendant claimed that he had been

attempting for months to retain counsel without success. The defendant explained that, although he knew

that he had the right to counsel, he was not financially

able to retain counsel at that time, that he prioritized

paying his rent over paying for an attorney, and that

he would prefer to save his money to hire appellate

counsel, if necessary, rather than trial counsel. The

court then canvassed the defendant concerning his educational background, experience with the law, and his

obligations when representing himself. The defendant

confirmed that he could read. He further acknowledged

that he had only a high school education, had never

been involved in a criminal trial before, had never represented himself in a criminal proceeding, and was not

familiar with the laws and rules of procedure regarding

evidence, pretrial motions, voir dire, and discovery in
criminal matters. The court admonished the defendant

that ‘‘if you represent yourself, the judge will be impartial and cannot advise you on the procedures, [substantive] issues in the case . . . .’’ The court asked the

defendant whether he had ‘‘access to a library to learn

these things that you need to understand before you

go to trial . . . .’’ The court then cautioned the defendant that ‘‘when you have a criminal trial, you’re

expected to follow the rules and procedures that we

make the lawyers follow,’’ and that, although he could

have an attorney sit in the courtroom, he could not

have the attorney sit with him at the table unless the

attorney filed an appearance in the case. Finally, toward

the end of its canvass, the court advised the defendant

that, if he changed his mind, he could have an attorney

file an appearance in the case and be present at trial.

The defendant affirmatively responded to each of these

admonitions but maintained, ‘‘I want to represent

myself.’’ On the basis of this record, the court reasonably could have concluded that the defendant was literate, competent, that he possessed sufficient

understanding of the duties of self-representation, and

that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will

by waiving his right to counsel and invoking his right

to self-representation. See State v. Braswell, supra, 318

Conn. 828–29.

The defendant nonetheless contends that his waiver

of his right to counsel was not knowing and voluntary

because the court did not engage in a ‘‘comprehensive

discussion’’ with him concerning the elements of each

pending charge. As we have previously stated, ‘‘the

defendant need not be specifically informed of the particular elements of the crimes charged before being

permitted to waive counsel and proceed pro se. In fact

. . . perfect comprehension of each element of a criminal charge does not appear to be necessary to a finding

of a knowing and intelligent waiver. . . . A discussion

of the elements of the charged crimes would be helpful,

and may be one of the factors involved in the ultimate

determination of whether the defendant understands

the nature of the charges against him. A description of

the elements of the crime is not, however, a sine qua non

of the defendant’s constitutional rights in this context.

Indeed, in our cases we have approved of a defendant’s

assertion of the right to proceed pro se where the record

did not affirmatively disclose that the trial court

explained the specific elements of the crimes charged

to the defendant as long as the defendant understood

the nature of the crimes charged. . . . In each of those

cases, we concluded that the defendant had validly

waived his right to counsel, although none of those

decisions indicated that the defendant had been

expressly apprised of the elements of the crimes

charged.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Bangulescu, 80 Conn. App. 26, 45–46,

832 A.2d 1187, cert. denied, 267 Conn. 907, 840 A.2d
1171 (2003); accord State v. Wolff, 237 Conn. 633, 656,

678 A.2d 1369 (1996) (‘‘ ‘perfect comprehension of each

element of a criminal charge does not appear to be

necessary to a finding of a knowing and intelligent

waiver’ ’’).

We recognize that because the defendant was never

represented by counsel, the court could not appropriately presume that an attorney had explained the nature

of the charges in detail to the defendant. See State v.

Caracoglia, 95 Conn. App. 95, 113, 895 A.2d 810 (‘‘[i]n

general, a trial court may appropriately presume that

defense counsel has explained the nature of the offense

in sufficient detail’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]),

cert. denied, 278 Conn. 922, 901 A.2d 1222 (2006). We

disagree with the defendant, however, that, because

he was never represented by counsel, the court was

required to engage in a comprehensive discussion with

him about the elements of the pending charges in order

for his waiver to be valid. During the canvass, the court

advised the defendant of the statutory names of the

charges pending against him as well as the penalties

associated with the charges. The elements of each of

those charges are relatively straightforward and align

with the statutory names of the offenses.5 Cf. State

v. Frye, 224 Conn. 253, 261–62, 617 A.2d 1382 (1992)

(canvass inadequate where court failed to apprise

defendant of complexity involved in defending himself

against charge of possession of cocaine by person who

is not drug-dependent because, during course of his

defense, he would have to determine whether to present

evidence of drug dependency, which ‘‘is a complex

issue’’). The defendant was also well aware of the factual underpinnings of those charges, i.e., his alleged

assault of his brother, the victim, on the morning of

August 3, 2011. As a result, the court reasonably could

have concluded that the defendant understood the

nature of the charges pending against him sufficiently

to render his waiver of the right to counsel knowing

and intelligent.

The defendant also claims that the court’s canvass

was inadequate because the court failed to apprise him

of specific dangers and disadvantages associated with

self-representation. To support this proposition, the

defendant relies on several cases in which we have held

that a canvass including an advisement about certain

specific dangers or disadvantages associated with selfrepresentation was constitutionally adequate. The fact

that we held in these cases that a certain canvass was

constitutionally adequate does not mean that the constitution requires all defendants to receive the same or a

similar canvass as the one being examined in another

case. ‘‘The defendant, however, does not possess a constitutional right to a specifically formulated canvass

. . . . His constitutional right is not violated as long as

the court’s canvass, whatever its form, is sufficient to

establish that the defendant’s waiver was voluntary and
knowing.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Diaz, 274 Conn. 818, 831, 878 A.2d 1078 (2005). In the

present case, the court explored during its canvass the

defendant’s lack of familiarity with substantive law and

procedural rules, and alerted him to the fact that he

would be expected to educate himself on these areas

of the law and procedure and to comply with the same

rules that govern attorneys during trial. This discussion

was sufficient to apprise the defendant of the general

dangers and disadvantages associated with self-representation, as opposed to representation by an attorney

trained in the law.

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse

its discretion when it determined that the defendant

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right

to counsel and invoked his right to self-representation

on February 23, 2012.

II

The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court,

Klatt, J., abused its discretion and violated his right to

present a defense when it denied his motion to open

the evidence so that he could present the testimony

of the battalion chief of the local fire department. In

particular, the defendant contends that the denial of

his motion to open violated his right to present a defense

because the battalion chief was ‘‘an objective third party

witness who would have been able to directly attack

the credibility of the [victim] on a key point,’’ i.e.,

whether an ambulance was dispatched to his and the

victim’s residence on August 3, 2011. The defendant

seeks Golding review6 of this unpreserved federal constitutional claim. The state argues that the court properly exercised its discretion when denying the

defendant’s motion to open the evidence and did not

violate the defendant’s right to present a defense

because this evidence was inadmissible and related to

a collateral issue at trial. We conclude that, although

the defendant’s claim is reviewable under the first and

second prongs of Golding, the defendant has failed to

prove that a constitutional violation exists and deprived

him of a fair trial, as required by the third prong of

Golding.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. On Thursday, July 16, 2015, trial commenced.

The state presented the testimony of Onofrio and the

victim. Onofrio testified, inter alia, that the victim had

visible injuries to his face when he met with him and

that the victim identified the defendant as his assailant.

Through Onofrio, the state admitted into evidence photographs Onofrio took of the victim on August 3, 2011,

which showed a bloody cut on the victim’s nose and

blood on his face, neck, and arm.

The victim testified that on August 3, 2011, the defendant accused the victim’s friend of damaging the wind-
shield of the defendant’s van with a firework and

demanded to know the name of the victim’s friend.

The victim explained that during the course of their

altercation, the defendant injured him and threw his

phone while he was attempting to call 911. While discussing the sequence of events with the victim on crossexamination, the following exchange occurred:

‘‘[The Defendant]: Did you ask them—when the

police arrived, did you ask for medical attention?

‘‘[The Victim]: Yes.

‘‘[The Defendant]: And you received an ambulance

at the scene?

‘‘[The Victim]: An ambulance came, yes.

‘‘[The Defendant]:An ambulance came? Okay. I don’t

know. That wasn’t in the [police] report.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Objection.

‘‘The Court: Strike that comment.

‘‘[The Defendant]: I’m sorry.

‘‘The Court: Question only, sir.’’ (Emphasis added.)

During his case-in-chief, the defendant first presented

the testimony of his and the victim’s mother, Karen

Toth. Karen Toth testified that she was living with the

defendant and the victim in August, 2011. She stated

that on the morning of August 3, 2011, and prior to the

altercation between the defendant and the victim, she

noticed that the victim had a lot of bruising and scrapes

on his face. Karen Toth explained that, over the years,

the victim frequently fell because of his cerebral palsy

and related seizures. After Karen Toth’s testimony, the

defendant testified, inter alia, that although he confronted the victim about whether he damaged the van’s

windshield, he never hit the victim and never took the

victim’s phone.

When the defendant completed his testimony, the

court asked him whether he intended to call any additional witnesses, and the defendant began explaining a

clerical issue he had with his subpoenas. The court

interrupted the defendant and asked whether he would

be calling any additional witnesses that day, and he

stated that he would not. Thereafter, the jury was

excused and the court discussed with the defendant

the issue he had with his subpoenas. After that discussion, the court asked the defendant whether he in fact

intended to call any other defense witnesses. The defendant stated that he did not. The court asked the state

whether it intended to call any rebuttal witnesses, and

the state indicated that it did not. The court then stated:

‘‘So, we’ll conclude the evidence,’’ and the defendant

agreed.

On Tuesday, July 21, 2015, trial resumed. When the

court began to review the proposed jury charge with the
defendant and the state, the court-appointed standby

counsel for the defendant interjected that he would

‘‘like to bring something to the court’s attention. When

I spoke to [the defendant] this morning, he indicated

that he wanted to [open the] evidence because he had

new evidence to put on.’’ The defendant explained that

he wanted to present evidence to contradict the victim’s

testimony that ‘‘he saw an ambulance and that he had

medical attention at the scene.’’ The court then engaged

in the following colloquy with the defendant:

‘‘The Court: How do you intend to? You have a witness here?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes. Yes. Well, on Friday [July 17,

2015], I, you know—I was able to—I talked to [the]

Wallingford Fire Department. Was that okay, or no?

And they said, okay, that there’s no record that they,

[that] there was an ambulance service sent there on

August 3, 2011.

‘‘The Court: Okay. But did you subpoena anyone to

come to testify?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I just had their voice recording on

my voice mail.

‘‘The Court: All right. Here’s—

‘‘[The Defendant]: Would you like to hear it?

‘‘The Court: No.

‘‘[The Defendant]: It’s from a chief battalion.

‘‘The Court: All right. Can’t—

‘‘[The Defendant]: I think it would be great for an

appeal.

‘‘The Court: All right. All right. . . .

‘‘The Court: But in terms of an additional witness,

who would you call?

‘‘[The Defendant]: The witness is, I have my voice—

I have a voice mail from chief battalion of the Wallingford. I mean, this is serious business.

‘‘The Court: All right.

‘‘[The Defendant]: This is my life. . . .

‘‘The Court: But the situation is, the matter was put—

the matter’s four years old.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Mm-hmm. Yeah.

‘‘The Court: You had ample time—

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yeah, four years of my life.

‘‘The Court: —to subpoena the witness. This is not

information that was unknown to you. You were given

the opportunity to investigate and subpoena the witnesses at [the] time of trial.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.
‘‘The Court: So, your motion to [open] the evidence

is denied.’’

The defendant continued to argue that he only had

‘‘one day’’ to research this issue because he did not

know that the victim asked for or received medical

treatment until he testified that an ambulance came to

his residence on August 3, 2011. The court acknowledged the defendant’s arguments, but it stated that it

was still denying the defendant’s motion to open the

evidence because it believed that the defendant had an

adequate opportunity and sufficient resources to obtain

this evidence earlier.

‘‘The sixth amendment right to compulsory process

includes the right to offer the testimony of witnesses,

and to compel their attendance, if necessary, [and] is

in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right

to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well

as the prosecution’s to the jury so that it may decide

where the truth lies.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cerreta, 260 Conn. 251, 260–61, 796 A.2d

1176 (2002). Nevertheless, the decision to open the evidence either to present omitted evidence or to add

further testimony after either party has rested is within

the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Carter,

228 Conn. 412, 420, 636 A.2d 821 (1994); State v. Rodriguez, 151 Conn. App. 120, 124, 93 A.3d 1186 (2014). In

order for a trial court’s denial of a motion to open the

evidence to constitute a sixth amendment violation, the

defendant must show that the evidence was of such

importance to the achievement of a just result that the

need for admitting it overrides the presumption favoring

enforcement of our usual trial procedures. State v. Carter, supra, 421. That is, ‘‘[i]f the motion to [open] is

denied, we must, in determining whether the trial court

has abused its discretion, look to see if an injustice has

occurred by the omission of the evidence.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘Every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness

of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has

been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Leconte, 320 Conn. 500, 511, 131 A.3d

1132 (2016).

‘‘In order to determine whether the trial court acted

reasonably in denying the defendant’s request to open

his case, we must first determine whether [the disputed

evidence] would have been admissible had the defendant sought to introduce that evidence during the presentation of his case.’’ State v. Carter, supra, 228 Conn.

422. ‘‘The constitutional right to present a defense does

not compel the admission of any and all evidence

offered in support thereof. . . . The trial court retains

the discretion to rule on the admissibility, under the

traditional rules of evidence, regarding the defense

offered.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. DeJesus, 260 Conn. 466, 481, 797 A.2d
1101 (2002). We conclude that the court did not violate

the defendant’s right to present a defense because the

evidence that the defendant sought to admit would not

have been admissible in his case-in-chief.

As an initial matter, we observe that the defendant

argues for the first time on appeal that the evidence he

sought to present was the testimony of the battalion

chief. (Emphasis added.) At trial, the defendant represented that the evidence he sought to admit was the

voice mail message from the battalion chief. The voice

mail message constitutes inadmissible hearsay; Conn.

Code Evid. §§ 8-1 and 8-2; and the defendant has not

identified an exception to the rule against hearsay that

would have permitted its admission into evidence. Even

if we were, for the sake of argument, to interpret the

defendant’s statements about the voice mail as a request

by the defendant to open the evidence so that he could

call the battalion chief as a witness, we would still

conclude that this evidence was inadmissible.

‘‘A witness may be impeached by the introduction of

contradictory evidence of other witnesses as long as

the evidence is in fact contradictory . . . and that evidence does not relate to collateral matters . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Jose G., 290 Conn. 331, 344, 963

A.2d 42 (2009). It is well settled, however, that a court

may properly exclude evidence that has only slight relevance due to its tendency to inject a collateral issue

into the trial. State v. Annulli, 309 Conn. 482, 493, 71

A.3d 530 (2013). A matter is collateral if it is ‘‘not directly

relevant and material to the merits of the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jose G., supra,

344. Stated another way, the extrinsic evidence must

be ‘‘relevant to a material issue in the case apart from

its tendency to contradict the witness’’ to be considered

noncollateral and admissible. (Emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Annulli,

supra, 493; State v. West, 274 Conn. 605, 641, 877 A.2d

787, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1049, 126 S. Ct. 775, 163 L.

Ed. 2d 601 (2005); see also State v. Dougherty, 123

Conn. App. 872, 877, 3 A.3d 208 (‘‘[e]vidence is material

where it is offered to prove a fact directly in issue or

a fact probative of a matter in issue’’), cert. denied, 299

Conn. 901, 10 A.3d 521 (2010); State v. Maner, 147 Conn.

App. 761, 768, 83 A.3d 1182 (‘‘materiality turns upon

what is at issue in the case, which generally will be

determined by the pleadings and the applicable substantive law’’ [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted]), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 935, 88 A.3d 550

(2014). ‘‘This is so even when the evidence involves

untruthfulness and could be used to impeach a witness’

credibility.’’ State v. Annulli, supra, 493. Consequently,

if the witness’ answer to a question on cross-examination relates to a collateral issue in the trial, that testimony is conclusive and cannot be later contradicted

through extrinsic evidence. State v. Jose G., supra, 344.
In the present case, testimony about whether an

ambulance was dispatched to the victim’s residence

on August 3, 2011, related to a collateral matter and

therefore was inadmissible. Although the question of

whether an ambulance was dispatched to the victim

might be relevant to the question of whether the victim

was in fact injured, that was not a material issue in the

present case because the defendant did not dispute at

trial that the victim was injured. Instead, the defendant

disputed the timing and source of the victim’s injury.

In particular, he argued that the victim’s face was

injured prior to their altercation and that he was not

therefore the cause of that injury. As a result, the only

value in this evidence at trial was its tendency to contradict the victim’s testimony that an ambulance was dispatched to his residence on August 3, 2011, and, thereby,

presumably to impeach his credibility. Indeed, the

defendant has consistently and exclusively argued

before this court and the trial court that this evidence

should have been admitted so that he could contradict

the victim’s testimony about the ambulance. Under our

rules of evidence, this type of impeachment on a collateral matter through extrinsic evidence is not permitted.

Accordingly, the defendant has failed to prove that a

constitutional violation exists and deprived him of a

fair trial as required by the third prong of Golding.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Nothing in the record reflects that plea negotiations continued during

this period or that any additional offers were made by the state. On December

29, 2011, the state sought to place the case on the firm trial list, but the

court denied that request because the defendant was still attempting to

retain counsel.

2 As our Supreme Court previously has observed, ‘‘in Hamilton v. Alabama, [368 U.S. 52, 54, 82 S. Ct. 157, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1961)] the [United

States] Supreme Court stated only certain arraignments are a ‘critical stage.’

In Hamilton, the Supreme Court concluded that although an arraignment

in Alabama was a ‘critical stage,’ it acknowledged that whether it was a

‘critical stage’ in other jurisdictions depended on the role of an arraignment

in that particular jurisdiction. Id. It is important to note, however, that, in

more recent cases, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that ‘[c]ritical

stages include arraignments, postindictment interrogations, postindictment

lineups, and the entry of a guilty plea.’ Missouri v. Frye, [566 U.S. 134, 140,

132 S. Ct. 1399, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012)]. Therefore, it seems that more

recent Supreme Court cases have not limited only certain arraignments to

be ‘critical stages.’ ’’ Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, 308 Conn.

463, 480, 68 A.3d 624, cert. denied sub nom. Dzurenda v. Gonzalez, U.S.

, 134 S. Ct. 639, 187 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2013).

In the present case, the state does not dispute that the defendant’s arraignment constituted a critical stage. Accordingly, we assume for the purposes

of our analysis that the defendant’s arraignment was a critical stage.

3 We observe that when discussing facts relevant to his first claim on

appeal, the defendant did not reference the language from November 29,

2011, that he claimed in his reply brief constituted a clear and unequivocal

assertion of the right to counsel. He did reference his statement—‘‘I’ll represent myself, Your Honor’’—in a footnote when analyzing his claim that the

court’s February 23, 2012 canvass was constitutionally inadequate. This

footnote, however, did not analyze whether the defendant previously had

invoked his right to self-representation. Instead, it analyzed whether, and

to what extent, the defendant was previously advised of his ‘‘right to assigned

counsel,’’ i.e., a public defender. In particular, the footnote states: ‘‘Judge

Scarpellino told defendant [on November 29, 2011] ‘you can get a public
defender.’ . . . Defendant replied, ‘I’ll represent myself, Your Honor.’ When

the court asked him if he had applied for a public defender, defendant

replied, ‘I get too much unemployment.’ . . . On [December 29, 2011], the

state told the court that defendant did not want to apply for a public

defender.’’ (Citations omitted.)

4

‘‘Practice Book § 44-3 provides: ‘‘A defendant shall be permitted to waive

the right to counsel and shall be permitted to represent himself or herself

at any stage of the proceedings, either prior to or following the appointment

of counsel. A waiver will be accepted only after the judicial authority makes

a thorough inquiry and is satisfied that the defendant:

‘‘(1) Has been clearly advised of the right to the assistance of counsel,

including the right to the assignment of counsel when so entitled;

‘‘(2) Possesses the intelligence and capacity to appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent oneself;

‘‘(3) Comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range

of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad

understanding of the case; and

‘‘(4) Has been made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation.’’ State v. Braswell, supra, 318 Conn. 828–29 n.4.

5

‘‘A person is guilty of assault of . . . [a] disabled . . . person . . . in

the third degree when such person commits assault in the third degree

under section 53a-61 and (1) the victim of such assault . . . [is] physically

disabled . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-61a (a) (1).

‘‘A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when: (1) With intent to

cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such

person or to a third person; or (2) he recklessly causes serious physical

injury to another person; or (3) with criminal negligence, he causes physical

injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon, a dangerous instrument or an electronic defense weapon.’’ General Statutes § 53a-61 (a).

‘‘A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause

inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof,

such person: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening

behavior . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (1).

‘‘A person is guilty of interfering with an emergency call when such person,

with the intent of preventing another person from making or completing a

9-1-1 telephone call or a telephone call or radio communication to any law

enforcement agency to request police protection or report the commission

of a crime, physically or verbally prevents or hinders such other person

from making or completing such telephone call or radio communication.’’

General Statutes § 53a-183b (a).

6

‘‘Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional

error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met:

(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim

is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right;

(3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the

defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the

state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional

violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these

conditions, the defendant’s claim will fail.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, 318 Conn. 495, 511, 122 A.3d 542 (2015); see In re

Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015) (modifying Golding’s

third condition). ‘‘The first two steps in the Golding analysis address the

reviewability of the claim, while the last two steps involve the merits of the

claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Britton, 283 Conn. 598,

615, 929 A.2d 312 (2007). ‘‘The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond

to the defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant

in the particular circumstances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Dixon, supra, 511.