[Cite as Blair v. Adkins , 2021-Ohio-2292.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE D ISTRICT OF OHIO

FAYETTE COUNTY

CHRISTINA BLAIR, et al., Appellees,

- vs -

ANTHONY B. ADKINS, Appellant. :

:

:

:

:

: CASE NO. CA2020-10-018

O P I N I O N 7/6/2021

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS JUVENILE DIVISION Case No. 06AD0396

Christina Blair, pro se Jess C. Weade, Fayette County Prosecuting Attorney, Andrea M. V an Fossen, 133 S. Main Street, Washington Court House, Ohio 43160, for appellee, Fayet te County Child Support Enforcement Agency Anthony B. Adkins, pro se

S. POWELL, J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Anthony B. Adkins, appeals the decision of the Fayet te County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, ordering him to pay c hild support at the statutoryFayette CA2020-10-018

- 2 - minimum amount of $80 per month rather than a child support pay ment of $0 per month. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the juvenile court's decision. {¶ 2} On August 7, 2020, appellee, the Fayette County Child Support E nforcement Agency ("CSEA"), filed a motion on Adkins' behalf moving the ju venile court to reduce Adkins' monthly child support payment. In its motion, CSEA not ed that Adkins had requested the reduction due to his current incarceration in the London Correctional Institution resulting from Adkins' conviction on several felony offenses for which Adkins had an expected release date of June 22, 2038. {¶ 3} On September 23, 2020, a hearing was held before Judge David B. Bender. Although Adkins was given notice of this hearing, Adkins never requested to appear at this hearing from prison via phone or video. Following this hearing , on October 1, 2020, the juvenile court issued an entry ordering Adkins to pay child sup port at the statutory minimum amount of $80 per month rather than his requested payment of $0 per month. In so holding, the juvenile court stated: The Court finds that as [Adkins] is currently incarcerated in prison it would be inappropriate to deem him voluntarily unemployed and impute an income to him. The Court further finds that the CSEA has issued a wage withholding order to the Prison and is collecting support from his prison wages based upon the allowable percentage of prisoner wages that may be withheld. The Court finds that it would not be in the best interests of the minor child to have [Adkins'] child support obligation reduced to nothing. {¶ 4} Adkins now appeals the juvenile court's decision, raising two a ssignments of

error for review. {¶ 5} Assignment of Error No. 1: {¶ 6} APPELLANT WAS DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BY THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST OF JUDGE DAVID B. B[E]NDER. {¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, Adkins argues he was denied h is right toFayette CA2020-10-018

- 3 - procedural due process because the juvenile court judge who pre sided over this matter, Judge Bender, also "signed several investigative warrants in [h is] criminal case." This, according to Adkins, demonstrates a conflict of interest on the part of Judge Bender that rose to the level of judicial bias that denied Adkins his right to a fair and impartial proceeding. We disagree. {¶ 8} As the record indicates, Adkins never asked Judge Bender to rec use himself from these proceedings, nor did Adkins file an affidavit of dis qualification with the Ohio Supreme Court as required by R.C. 2701.03(A). Pursuant to that statute: If a judge of the court of common pleas allegedly is interested in a proceeding pending before the court, allegedly is related to or has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding pending before the court or a party's counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified to preside in a proceeding pending before the court, any party to the proceeding or the party's counsel may file an affidavit of disqualification with the cler k of the supreme court in accordance with division (B) of this secti on. {¶ 9} "R.C. 2701.03 provides the exclusive means by which a litigant may claim that a common pleas judge is biased and prejudiced." Vogel v. Felts, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2008-05-051, 2008-Ohio-6569, ¶ 14, citing Vera v. Yellowrobe , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1081, 2006-Ohio-3911, ¶ 54. To that end, it is the Ohio S upreme Court, not this court, that has the authority to determine whether a juvenile c ourt judge is biased or prejudiced. See In re Guardianship of Constable , 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA97-11-101, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1279, *13 (Mar. 30, 1998) ("'[a] court of appeals is without authority to pass upon the disqualification of a judge'"), quoting State v. Blankenship , 115 Ohio App. 3d 512, 516 (12th Dist.1996). A dkins' claim otherwise lacks me rit. {¶ 10} To the extent that Adkins' claims of judicial bias also raises procedural due process concerns, Adkins' allegations are without merit. This is because, as the record indicates, the facts upon which the juvenile court rendered its decision were jointly stipulatedFayette CA2020-10-018

- 4 - into the record. The same holds true regarding Adkins' claim t hat it was Judge Bender's bias that resulted in Adkins being denied the ability to partic ipate in the proceedings from prison via phone or video. Adkins never made any such request to appear before the juvenile court in that manner. Therefore, given Adkins never m oved the juvenile court to appear before the juvenile court from prison via phone or video , Adkins' claim that the juvenile court "denied [him] the ability to participate in the proceedings" is simply incorrect. {¶ 11} In so holding, we note that "judicial rulings alone almost neve r constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994). The same holds true as it relates to "expre ssions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger," all of which are " within the bounds of what imperfect men and women * * * sometimes display." Id. This includes "judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases," all of which "ordinarily do not s upport a bias or partiality challenge." Id. This would also include, without more, a juvenile court judge that had signed several investigative warrants in a party's earlier, unrelated criminal case. Therefore, because there is nothing in the record to indicate Adkins did n ot receive a fair and impartial proceeding presided over by Judge Bender, and because the recor d is devoid of any evidence indicating Adkins' procedural due process rights were violated, Adkins' first assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled. {¶ 12} Assignment of Error No. 2: {¶ 13} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO REDUCE [APPELLANT'S] CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION TO NOTHING. {¶ 14} In his second assignment of error, Adkins argues the juvenile c ourt erred by ordering him to pay child support at the statutory minimum of $ 80 per month rather than a child support payment of $0 per month. We again disagree.Fayette CA2020-10-018

- 5 - {¶ 15} "A juvenile court has 'considerable discretion' in deciding mat ters related to child support." S.E.J. v. C.S.J. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107576, 2019-Ohio-3274, ¶ 17. This includes calculating child-support awards. In re Bailey, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C970871, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5288, *9 (Nov. 6, 1998) ("[t]he ju venile court has considerable discretion in calculating child-support awards"), citing Dunbar v. Dunbar , 68 Ohio St.3d 369, 371 (1994). To that end, "[o]ur standard of re view in child support cases is

abuse of discretion." Estes v. Smith , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2001-09-206, 2002-Ohio5448, ¶ 10, citing Booth v. Booth , 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989). "A juvenile court abuses its discretion when its decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." Johnson v.

Melton , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-07-160, 2011-Ohio-792, ¶ 10, cit ing Blakemore v.

Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). "A decision is unreasonable wh ere it is not supported by a sound reasoning process." In re L.M. , 12th Dist. Preble Nos. CA2020-12- 017 and CA2020-12-018, 2021-Ohio-1630, ¶ 22, citing Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co. v.

Heidler , 12th Dist. Clinton Nos. CA20 18-06-003, CA2018- 07-004, CA2018- 09-012, and CA2018-09-015, 2019-Ohio-4311, ¶ 46. {¶ 16} Although given "considerable discretion" in child support matte rs, the juvenile court must still comply with all child support statutes. Pahls v. Pahls , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-01-005, 2009-Ohio-6923, ¶ 13 ("the trial court must comp ly with all child support statutes"). This includes R.C. 3119.06(A), a statute that requ ires the juvenile court to issue a minimum child support order of at least $80 per month "in any action in which a court or a child support enforcement agency issues or modifies a child s upport order or in any other proceeding in which a court or agency determines the amount of child support to be paid pursuant to a child support order." But, even though the juven ile court is statutorily required to issue a minimum child support order of at least $80 per mont h, the juvenile court may nevertheless order a minimum child support order of less than $ 80 per month "in itsFayette CA2020-10-018

- 6 - discretion and in appropriate circumstances." R.C. 3119.06(A). This includes a minimum child support order of $0 per month. In re Adoption of B.I. , 157 Ohio St.3d 29, 2019-Ohio2450, ¶ 25 ("pursuant to R.C. 3119.06, the court has the discre tion to reduce a minimum order of support to zero"). {¶ 17} Adkins argues his current incarceration in the London Correctio nal Institution is an appropriate circumstance in which the juvenile court shou ld have ordered a minimum child support order of $0 per month rather than the statutory m inimum of $80 per month. To support this claim, Adkins argues the juvenile court's decis ion will result in him being released from prison "under a financial hardship." Adkins also argues the juvenile court's decision was improper since his child support obligation "can b arely provide" the child with a "Happy Meal" and unnecessarily depletes the financial resourc es he would have used in order to overturn his conviction. This, according to Adkins, i ndicates the juvenile court erred and did not make a "fair and just determination" regarding what may be in the best interest

of the child. {¶ 18} However, as the CSEA aptly notes, Adkins' arguments are based s olely on

what Adkins believes would be best for him , not on what would be in the best interest of the

child at issue. "[C]hild support is intended to benefit the child." Porter v. Ferrall , 11th Dist. Portage No. 2002-P-0109, 2003-Ohio-6685, ¶ 22. The juvenile co urt found it would not be in the child's best interest to reduce Adkins' child support ob ligation to $0 per month. The juvenile court reached this decision despite knowing Adkins wou ld likely not be released from prison until the summer of 2038. The juvenile court's dec ision was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable, and thus not an abuse of discr etion. The juvenile court's decision was instead reasonable given the facts and circumstanc es of this case. Therefore, finding no merit to any of the arguments advanced by Adkins her ein, Adkins' second assignment of error also lacks merit and is overruled.Fayette CA2020-10-018

- 7 - {¶ 19} Judgment affirmed.

PIPER, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.