SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Afghan Major Crimes Task Force

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

U.S. Agencies Have Provided Training and Support to

Afghanistan’s Major Crimes Task Force, but Reporting 

and Reimbursement Issues Need to be Addressed

July 19, 2011
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Afghan Major Crimes Task Force Page i

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

July 19, 2011

Executive Departments and Agencies:

This report discusses the results of an audit of U.S. efforts to strengthen Afghanistan’s Major Crimes 

Task Force (MCTF). This report includes two recommendations to improve financial reporting and 

accountability of U.S. assistance for the MCTF.

When preparing the final report, we considered comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 

U.S. Embassy in Kabul, the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (INL), and the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition 

Command – Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A), which are reproduced in appendices III-VI of this report. The 

U.S. Embassy, INL, and CSTC-A supported our recommendations and noted actions taken to address 

them. 

A summary of this report is on page ii. This performance audit was conducted by the Office of the 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, 

as amended; the Inspector General Act of 1978; and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008. 

Herbert Richardson 

Acting Special Inspector General 

 for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Afghan Major Crimes Task Force Page ii

List of Addressees

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State

The Honorable Leon E. Panetta

Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr.

Attorney General

General James N. Mattis

Commander, U.S. Central Command 

General David Petraeus 

Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force 

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV 

Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/ 

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

Mr. Robert S. Mueller, III

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

Department of Justice

Mr. David T. Johnson 

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs 

U.S. Department of State
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Afghan Major Crimes Task Force Page iii

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR Audit-11-12 July 2011

U.S. Agencies Have Provided Training and Support to 

Afghanistan’s Major Crimes Task Force, but Reporting 

and Reimbursement Issues Need to be Addressed

What SIGAR Reviewed

Corruption continues to be a significant problem in Afghanistan. To help fight corruption, the Afghan government 

established the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) in 2009 as the principal Afghan government agency responsible 

for investigating and processing major anti-corruption, kidnapping, and organized crime cases. In particular, the 

MCTF conducts corruption investigations of high-level Afghan government officials. U.S. government agents, 

primarily from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), mentor and train Afghan investigators who are assigned 

to the MCTF. SIGAR conducted this audit to (1) determine the nature and extent of U.S. assistance for the MCTF 

and (2) evaluate whether U.S. assistance was provided in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. This 

report is part of a series of audits by SIGAR addressing U.S. government efforts to strengthen anti-corruption 

capabilities of the Afghan government. We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., from 

September 2010 to July 2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

What SIGAR Found

The U.S. government has provided at least $15.5 million to assist the MCTF through fiscal year 2010, including 

refurbishing and maintaining its facilities and training and mentoring its investigators. Funding for fiscal year 2011 

is expected to total $24 million. The Department of Defense (DOD) has provided the majority of funding for U.S. 

assistance to the MCTF. DOD manages MCTF funding through the Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan (CSTC-A). Other U.S. government agencies, including the Department of State’s Bureau of

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, 

have also provided assistance to the MCTF. As of November 2010, the FBI had assigned 14 staff to the MCTF with 

DOD funding and funded 6 additional mentor positions at its own cost. In addition, as of November 2010, there 

were 163 Afghan personnel assigned to the MCTF.

In accordance with applicable laws and regulations, DOD provided funding to the FBI and INL to support the MCTF 

through interagency agreements. To obligate DOD funds, the FBI and INL signed memoranda of understanding 

with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). SIGAR found several problems with the accountability 

over U.S. assistance to the MCTF. First, DSCA and the FBI had not de-obligated $1.6 million in unused funds for the 

MCTF that expired as of September 30, 2010. Second, INL has not provided DOD required reporting for 

$6.2 million in funds used for MCTF operations and maintenance. Third, CSTC-A and INL do not yet have a system 

to charge and collect reimbursements from international partners receiving services at MCTF facilities, as 

required.

What SIGAR Recommends

Our draft of this report included a recommendation that the FBI de-obligate its unused MCTF funds. In commenting on 

a draft of this report, the FBI provided documentation that it had de-obligated the $1.6 million. As a result, SIGAR 

deleted the recommendation. SIGAR is making two other recommendations to INL. First, to improve 

accountability over U.S. assistance to the MCTF, SIGAR recommends that INL provide an accounting of the $6.2 

million transferred to INL for operations and maintenance, in compliance with the terms of its agreement with 

DOD to provide quarterly financial reporting. Second, to ensure that the U.S. government is reimbursed, as 

appropriate, for some of the costs of assistance to the MCTF, SIGAR recommends that INL, in consultation with 

CSTC-A, bill and collect funds from non-U.S. international personnel receiving services at MCTF facilities. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, INL, and CSTC-A supported these 

recommendations and noted some actions taken to address them. 

For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 602-8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Afghan Major Crimes Task Force Page iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background ...................................................................................................................................................1

U.S. Agencies Have Provided at Least $15.5 Million to Help Establish and 

Maintain MCTF Facilities and Train and Mentor Afghan Investigators..................................................3

Although U.S. Assistance Was Generally Provided in Accordance with Applicable 

Laws and Regulations, Financial Accountability Could Be Improved.....................................................5

Conclusion.....................................................................................................................................................7

Recommendations........................................................................................................................................7

Comments.....................................................................................................................................................7

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology...........................................................................................................8

Appendix II: Organizational Structure of the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF)..........................................9

Appendix III: Comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation..........................................................11

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul .........................................................................13

Appendix V: Comments from NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan..........................................................................................15

Appendix VI: Comments from Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs .............................................................................................................................16

TABLES

Table 1: U.S. Obligations and Disbursements for the MCTF, as of September 30, 

2010 ($ in millions).................................................................................................................................4

Table 2: FBI Training Objectives for MCTF Investigators in Fiscal Year 2010................................................5

FIGURES

Figure 1: Budgeting, Funding, and Approval Process for Assistance to the MCTF .......................................3

Figure I: MCTF Organizational Structure.......................................................................................................9
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Afghan Major Crimes Task Force Page v

ACRONYMS

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOD

DOJ

Department of Defense

Department of Justice

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

MCTF Major Crimes Task Force

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

MOI Ministry of Interior

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

NDS National Directorate of Security

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

State Department of State
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force Page 1

U.S. Agencies Have Provided Training and Support to Afghanistan’s Major 

Crimes Task Force, but Funding and Reporting Issues Need to be Addressed

Corruption continues to be a significant problem in Afghanistan. To help fight corruption, the Afghan 

government established the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) in 2009. The MCTF is the principal Afghan 

government agency responsible for investigating and processing major anti-corruption, kidnapping, and 

organized crime cases. U.S. government agents, primarily from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI), mentor and train Afghan investigators from the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the National 

Directorate of Security (NDS) who are assigned to the MCTF. In particular, the MCTF conducts 

corruption investigations of high-level Afghan government officials. U.S. agents provide Afghan 

counterparts with investigative and legal advice and training without being directly involved in 

investigations or prosecutions. The U.S. government has provided the MCTF with at least $15.5 million 

in assistance through fiscal year 2010 and expects to provide $24 million during fiscal year 2011.

This report is part of a series of audits by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction addressing U.S. government efforts to strengthen anti-corruption capabilities of the 

Afghan government. Specifically, we (1) determined the nature and extent of U.S. assistance for the 

MCTF and (2) evaluated whether U.S. assistance was provided in accordance with applicable laws and 

regulations.

To determine the extent of U.S. assistance to the MCTF, we reviewed various documents including 

inter-agency agreements and billing statements, and specific agency-reported expenditures. To 

determine whether U.S. assistance to the MCTF was provided in accordance with applicable laws and 

regulations, we reviewed applicable laws and regulations and met with U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.,

from the Department of Justice, the FBI, and the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International 

Law Enforcement and Narcotics (INL) to discuss their responsibilities, activities, progress, and funding for 

the MCTF. We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., from September 2010 

to July 2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A discussion of our 

scope and methodology is in appendix I.

BACKGROUND

Corruption within Afghan society has been widely described as pervasive, entrenched, and systemic. For 

example, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan the third most corrupt country in the world in 

2010—a 2010 Transparency International survey indicated that 39 percent of Afghans believed that 

their government has been ineffective in fighting corruption.

To help fight corruption, the Afghan government established the MCTF in 2009 as a joint initiative 

between Afghanistan’s MOI and NDS. The MOI planned for the MCTF to be the prototype of the Afghan 

version of the FBI. The MCTF is staffed by MOI and NDS investigators who work together to investigate 
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force Page 2

crimes and develop cases for prosecution by the Afghan Attorney General’s Office. The task force

consists of three investigative units that focus on senior-level corruption, organized criminal networks, 

and high-profile kidnappings. (See appendix II for more details on how the MCTF is organized.) 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has provided the majority of funding for U.S. assistance to support 

the MCTF. The source of DOD funds for the MCTF is the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and 

authorization to use the funds rests with DOD’s Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

(CSTC-A).1

The Economy Act (31 U.S.C. 1535) provides the authority for federal agencies to enter into funding 

agreements with each other The act provides that an agency may place an order with a major 

organizational unit within the same agency or another agency for goods or services if:

Other U.S. government agencies, including INL, the FBI, and the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), have also provided assistance to the MCTF. U.S. and international law 

enforcement personnel, primarily from the FBI, have been posted to Afghanistan to mentor and train 

Afghan investigators assigned to the MCTF. Mentoring consists of providing Afghan counterparts with 

investigative and legal advice without being directly involved in investigations or prosecutions. Training 

consists of formal classroom training concerning investigative techniques and best practices. Current 

plans call for the U.S. government to continue providing direct funding assistance to the MCTF until 

December 2012, at which time the Afghan government would assume funding.

a) amounts are available;

b) the ordering agency decides that the order is in the best interest of the U.S. government;

c) the agency to fill the order is able to provide or get by contract the ordered goods or services; 

and,

d) the agency determines ordered goods or services cannot be provided by contract as 

conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise.

According to a DOD official, to provide funds from DOD for goods and services to support the MCTF, 

DOD needed to sign interagency agreements with the FBI and INL. First, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense2

 1 CSTC-A executes the overall Afghan National Security Forces Development Program and has authority over DODfunded efforts to organize, train, and equip the Afghan security forces, including the Afghan National Police, of 

which the MOI portion of MCTF is a part. CSTC-A does not fund the NDS personnel assigned to MCTF. 

signed memoranda of agreement (MOA) with the FBI and INL in 2009. According to a DOD 

official, MOAs were required because CSTC-A is procuring goods and services outside of DOD. The MOA 

provided a budget planning estimate; it did not provide authority to commit any funding. The FBI signed 

an MOA in August 2009, and INL signed one in October 2009. Second, to obligate DOD funds, the FBI 

and INL signed memoranda of understanding (MOU) with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

(DSCA). The MOU is the obligating document once DSCA and the agency involved sign the document. 

DSCA processes accounting for the funding, but does not make any decision on how the funding is used. 

DSCA signed MOUs with the FBI and INL in September 2009 and October 2009, respectively. Figure 1 

illustrates the flow of DOD funding through the FBI and INL to support MCTF.

2 The agreements were signed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central 

Asia.
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force Page 3

Figure 1: Budgeting, Funding, and Approval Process for Assistance to the MCTF

Source: SIGAR analysis of interagency agreements provided by DOD, FBI, and INL.

U.S. AGENCIES HAVE PROVIDED AT LEAST $15.5 MILLION TO HELP ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN 

MCTF FACILITIES AND TRAIN AND MENTOR AFGHAN INVESTIGATORS

The U.S. government has provided at least $15.5 million to assist the MCTF through fiscal year 2010, 

including refurbishing and maintaining its facilities and training and mentoring its investigators. 

Regarding funding for MCTF facilities, in April 2010 the task force moved to its current location at Camp 

Falcon, a U.S.-funded facility located near Kabul International Airport. DOD provided $1.9 million to 

refurbish MCTF facilities. DOD also provided $6.2 million to maintain and operate MCTF facilities at 

Camp Falcon through a contract managed by INL. Through its contract with DynCorp International, INL 

operates and maintains MCTF’s Camp Falcon facilities, including providing housing, life support, and 

security for MCTF personnel and international advisors. Regarding funding for U.S. mentors, DOD 

reimbursed the FBI for $2.3 million in costs associated with providing U.S. agents to the MCTF. The FBI 

also used about $4.6 million of its own funding for additional U.S. mentors above the number covered 

by DOD’s funding. DEA reported providing approximately $500,000 for specialized mentoring and 

training for MCTF investigators. Table 1 provides a breakdown, as of September 30, 2010, of U.S. 

assistance to the MCTF. U.S. assistance to the MCTF is projected to total $24 million during fiscal year 

2011. 
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force Page 4

Table 1: U.S. Obligations and Disbursements for the MCTF, as of 

September 30, 2010 ($ in millions)

Funding Agency Purpose Obligated Disbursed

DOD Facility refurbishment 

and start-up costs $1.9 $1.9

DSCA through INL Food and lodging 

services $6.2 $6.2

DSCA through FBI Training and 

mentoring $3.9 $2.3

FBI

Costs of additional 

agents not covered by 

DOD agreement

$4.6 $4.6

DEA (estimated) Specialized mentoring 

and training $0.5 $0.5

Total $17.1 $15.5

Source: SIGAR analysis of DOD, FBI, INL, and DEA data.

Note: Totals do not include salary support for MCTF investigators funded through the Law 

and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan. Although the United States is a major contributor to 

Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, we were unable to determine the amount of U.S. 

contributions used specifically to fund the salaries of MCTF personnel because Law and Order 

Trust Fund for Afghanistan funds from various donors are commingled.

The FBI developed a 5-year strategic plan to guide the MCTF’s development and to assess the FBI’s 

performance against goals and targets from 2009 through 2014. As part of its 5-year plan, the FBI was 

to fill 11 U.S. positions during 2010, including 1 assistant legal attaché and 10 FBI mentors. As of 

November 2010, the FBI had assigned 1 assistant legal attaché, and 4 1-year and 9 short-term mentors 

to the MCTF with DOD funding. Further, the FBI funded 6 additional mentor positions at its own cost. 

Although the number of FBI mentors at Camp Falcon varied throughout the year due to scheduled leave, 

redeployments, etc., the number of positions filled collectively exceeded the staffing objective for 2010. 

The 5-year plan also called for a total of 180 Afghan personnel to be assigned to the MCTF (120 from 

MOI and 60 from NDS). As of November 2010, there were 163 Afghan personnel assigned to the MCTF 

(100 from MOI and 63 from NDS). FBI mentors were required to vet all Afghan personnel assigned to

the MCTF by conducting polygraph examinations to verify that they had no known ties with terrorist, 

extremist, or anti-government organizations. 
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force Page 5

The FBI’s 5-year plan included the provision of specific training objectives for MCTF investigators in basic 

and specialized investigative skills. Table 2 illustrates the FBI’s coursework objectives for 2010. 

Table 2: FBI Training Objectives for MCTF Investigators in Fiscal Year 2010

Basic objectives Specialized objectives

Interview and interrogation

Basic investigator training

Source development

Law enforcement safety and survival

Kidnapping investigations

Transnational organized crime

Public corruption

Law enforcement executive development 

seminar

Source: FBI 5-year plan for the MCTF.

As of November 2010, FBI mentors, in conjunction with international mentors, had instructed courses in 

all of the above categories. Some courses were taught multiple times. In all, the mentors taught 

48 courses with 1,098 graduates. MOI and NDS leaders stated that the FBI’s mentorship and training 

were invaluable in developing their investigators’ skills. Similarly, each of the international mentors 

spoke highly of the FBI’s efforts in developing and conducting training courses.

ALTHOUGH U.S. ASSISTANCE WAS GENERALLY PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE 

LAWS AND REGULATIONS, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY COULD BE IMPROVED

In accordance with the Economy Act, DOD provided funding to the FBI and INL through interagency 

agreements to support the MCTF. However, we found several problems with the accountability over 

U.S. assistance to the MCTF. First, DSCA and the FBI had not de-obligated $1.6 million in expired, 

unused DOD funds. Second, INL has not complied with the terms of its interagency agreement with 

DOD that require quarterly reporting on DOD’s funds. Third, CSTC-A and INL do not yet have a system to 

charge and collect reimbursements from international partners receiving services at MCTF facilities.

DOD and FBI Had about $1.6 Million in Unexpended Obligations No Longer Available for the 

MCTF 

DSCA provided the FBI with $3.9 million for mentoring and training activities at the MCTF through fiscal 

year 2010; however, according to the FBI it had expended only $2.3 million as of September 30, 2010, 

leaving a balance of about $1.6 million. According to the MOA between DOD and the FBI, the funding 

expired on September 30, 2010.3

 3

The MOA between DOD and FBI states that “the [fiscal year] 2009-2010 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 

currently expires for new obligations on September 30, 2010. In accordance with P.L. 111-32, these funds must be 

obligated by that date. If obligated on a contract, the period of performance must not exceed one year. Any 

unused funds will be returned prior to September 30, 2010 or September 30 of the appropriate fiscal year. The FBI 

will keep complete records and exercise due diligence in the use of funds provided under this MOA.” 

DOD’s Financial Management Regulation requires DOD agencies to 

reconcile the obligation status of funding provided and de-obligate any unused funds, as needed, prior 
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force Page 6

to the expiration of the availability of those funds in order to ensure that funds are put to better use.4

INL Has Not Provided DOD Required Reporting for $6.2 Million in DOD Funds Used for MCTF 

Operations and Maintenance

This regulation requires that funds be de-obligated by both the requesting and servicing agencies (in 

other words, by DSCA and the FBI). DSCA did not de-obligate the unexpended obligations before they 

expired because the FBI had not submitted its final billing by September 30, 2010. Consequently, we 

found that $1.6 million in obligated funds were no longer available for MCTF assistance and should be 

de-obligated. 

DOD provided INL with $6.2 million for operations and maintenance of MCTF facilities at Camp Falcon; 

however, INL has not provided DOD with a full accounting for these funds, as required by their MOA. 

Specifically, the agreement required INL to provide DOD and CSTC-A with quarterly reports of goods and 

services provided, including accounting or audit information concerning the funding received. However, 

DOD and CSTC-A officials stated that they had not received any such reporting from INL. An INL official 

stated that INL had been submitting quarterly reports to DOD regarding the overall DynCorp 

International contract, but that those reports did not include accounting data specifically for operations 

and maintenance of Camp Falcon. An INL official indicated that INL would begin to include this 

information in future quarterly reporting to DOD. According to officials from DOD and CSTC-A, further 

funding to INL was suspended until INL accounted for the $6.2 million that it received from DOD. 

DOD and INL Not Charging International Law Enforcement Partners for Services at Camp 

Falcon

The MOA between DOD and INL states that any personnel using Camp Falcon facilities who are not 

Afghan National Police or their mentors should provide reimbursement for facilities and services used. 

Therefore, according to CSTC-A and INL, all non-U.S. international personnel using the Camp Falcon 

facilities should be charged for those services. In November 2010, there were seven non-U.S. 

international personnel from the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and Canada living at the MCTF 

Camp Falcon facility. As of March 2011, INL and CSTC-A had not yet developed a system for charging 

non-U.S. international personnel at Camp Falcon. As a result, the U.S. government has not been 

reimbursed for some of the costs of assistance to the MCTF. An Army Budget Office analysis in October 

2010 determined that basic life support costs for U.S. forces in Afghanistan averaged about $100 per 

day. At this rate, charges for the seven non-U.S. international personnel utilizing Camp Falcon facilities 

could total as much as $210,000 per year.5

 4

According to DoD Financial Management Regulation Volume 11A, Chapter 3, section 030404, funds must be 

de-obligated by both the requesting and servicing agency to the extent that the servicing agency or unit filling the 

order has not (1) provided the goods or services, or (2) entered into an authorized contract with another entity to 

provide the requested goods or services. 5 Calculation: $100 x 7 personnel x 300 days (assuming most expatriates spend about 65 days per year out of 

country).
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force Page 7

CONCLUSION

During the MCTF’s first year of operation, U.S. assistance has contributed to advances in the MCTF’s

capability and capacity. Despite identifying some areas for improving financial accountability and 

reporting, SIGAR found that FBI mentors and trainers were meeting interim objectives in the areas of 

staffing and training. The MCTF’s future success will depend on its continued support from the 

international community, and more importantly, the Afghan government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To improve accountability over U.S. assistance to the MCTF, we recommend that the Assistant Secretary 

of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs:

1. Provide an accounting, as required by the MOA between the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

and INL, of the $6.2 million already transferred to INL to cover operations and maintenance 

costs for the MCTF Camp Falcon facility. 

To ensure that the U.S. government is reimbursed, as appropriate, for some of the costs of assistance to

the MCTF, we recommend that the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs, in consultation with the Commanding General of CSTC-A: 

2. Develop and implement a system to bill, collect, and appropriately use such funds received from 

non-U.S. international personnel receiving services at the MCTF Camp Falcon facility.

COMMENTS

The FBI, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, CSTC-A, and INL provided written comments on a draft of this report. 

Those comments are included in appendices III, IV, V, and VI, respectively. The FBI, DSCA, and DOD also 

provided technical comments to the draft report, which we incorporated into the final report, as 

appropriate. 

In its comments, the FBI concurred with SIGAR’s observations regarding the staffing and mentoring that 

it provided to the MCTF. Our draft of this report included a recommendation that the FBI de-obligate its 

unused MCTF funds. Because the FBI subsequently did so, we deleted the recommendation. 

In their comments, the U.S. Embassy and INL indicated that INL had implemented the first 

recommendation by submitting an accounting of the expenditures covering operations and 

maintenance costs for the MCTF Camp Falcon facility. However, in reviewing the documentation

provided, we determined that it did not present information on the goods or services provided with the 

$6.2 million or indicate how the funds were allocated, as required by the MOA. 

The U.S. Embassy and INL’s comments also supported the second recommendation, indicating that 

CSTC-A and INL had taken some actions to address it. In addition, CSTC-A concurred with this

recommendation and indicated that, as of April 29, 2011, the Department of State has taken over full 

responsibility for Camp Falcon operations and maintenance.
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force Page 8

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s review of U.S. funding to support Afghanistan’s Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF). The 

objectives of the audit were to (1) determine the nature and extent of U.S. assistance for the MCTF, and 

(2) evaluate whether U.S. assistance was provided in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

To determine the extent of U.S. assistance to the MCTF, we reviewed various documents including 

inter-agency agreements and billing statements, and specific agency-reported expenditures for the 

period May 27, 2009 to September 30, 2010. The inter-agency agreements, and their amendments, 

between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and between 

DOD and the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

(INL), committed various funding amounts for MCTF support. The billing statements provided evidence 

of expenditures by the FBI and INL in support of the MCTF. Further, we reviewed specific agencyreported expenditures in support of the MCTF from the FBI, the DOD Combined Security Transition 

Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). To verify the 

accuracy of computer-generated expenditure data, we compared data provided by the requesting 

agency (DOD) with data from the servicing agencies (FBI and INL), traced reported amounts to source 

documents, and reconciled any differences. To determine the nature of FBI’s assistance to the MCTF, 

we reviewed planning documents that the FBI created including a MCTF 5-year development plan and a 

MCTF Concept of Operations. Further, we reviewed FBI-published monthly progress reports, which 

included data on MCTF activities and investigator training. From October 2010 to December 2010, we 

conducted fieldwork in Kabul, Afghanistan. We met with U.S. officials in Kabul, Afghanistan, and several 

times with officials from Department of Justice, the FBI, INL, and the DOD CSTC-A to discuss their 

responsibilities, activities, progress, funding, and challenges in standing up and strengthening the MCTF. 

We visited the MCTF facility at Camp Falcon in Kabul, Afghanistan, and observed the newly renovated 

facility where the MOI and NDS conduct MCTF operations. 

To determine whether U.S. assistance to the MCTF was provided in accordance with applicable laws and 

regulations, we reviewed applicable laws and regulations and met with U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.,

from the Department of Justice, the FBI, and INL to discuss their responsibilities, activities, progress, and 

funding for the MCTF. We did not assess the applicability of Afghan law on U.S. government efforts 

regarding the MCTF. Also, we did not audit the contract between INL and DynCorp or interview any 

DynCorp officials because the Department of State’s Office of Inspector General was beginning a 

contract audit of DynCorp during the time of our fieldwork in Afghanistan. Instead we relied on 

interviews with INL officials in Kabul, Afghanistan to obtain some of the information that we required.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to July 2011, in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards and under the authority of Public Law 110-181, as amended, 

the Inspector General Act of 1978, and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008. These standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. 
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force Page 9

APPENDIX II: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MAJOR CRIMES TASK FORCE (MCTF)

Figure I shows the organizational structure of the MCTF, as of November 2010. This figure is followed by 

a description of each MCTF unit. 

Figure I: MCTF Organizational Structure 

Source: FBI

MCTF Deconfliction Analysis Unit

The mission of the Deconfliction Analysis Unit is to coordinate the flow of intelligence in the MCTF units. 

The Deconfliction Analysis Unit acts as repository for all intelligence information received by the MOI 

and NDS from various informant sources. The unit then processes and analyzes the information to 

secure the identity of the informant source that reported the information. The information is then 

recorded on an intelligence intake form and re-distributed to the relevant MOI and NDS unit(s) for 
SIGAR Audit-11-12 Anti-Corruption / Major Crimes Task Force Page 10

action regarding the information. The Deconfliction Analysis Unit also provides information on cases 

that need to be de-conflicted between the various MOI and NDS units. According to the FBI, all of these 

activities are done in accordance with MOI and NDS internal policies and Afghan law. 

MCTF Corruption Investigation Unit 

The mission of the Corruption Investigation Unit is to conduct criminal investigations to substantiate 

senior level corruption allegations throughout the Afghan Government. The MCTF Corruption 

Investigation Unit combines the strengths of the MOI and NDS to form a joint law enforcement task 

force to effectively combat high level corruption. Corruption Investigation Unit mentors meet daily with 

their MOI and NDS MCTF counterparts to improve coordination and communication between technical 

assets and street level investigators. Additionally, Corruption Investigation Unit mentors provide 

specialized law enforcement training to MOI and NDS investigators on a daily basis through consultation 

on pending investigations and advice on the use of sophisticated investigative techniques.

MCTF Kidnapping Investigation Unit 

The mission of the MCTF Kidnapping Investigation Unit is to identify, locate and secure the safe release 

of kidnapping victims; to detect, identify, locate, deter and/or arrest individuals and to disrupt groups 

and enterprises engaged in kidnapping, threats of kidnapping, and attempted kidnappings throughout 

Afghanistan; to coordinate and maintain liaison with other Afghan law enforcement/intelligence 

agencies with overlapping or concurrent kidnapping jurisdiction; to maintain reports of nationwide 

kidnapping and kidnapping trends; and to carry out other investigative and law enforcement activities 

within its jurisdiction and in accordance with Afghan law at the direction of the Director of the MCTF 

and/or Minister of the Interior.

MCTF Organized Crime Unit 

The mission of the MCTF Organized Crime Unit is to investigate violations of Afghan criminal law. The 

MCTF Organized Crime Unit is assigned to investigate cases, develop sources, gather evidence and 

present to prosecutors cases that target dangerous individuals and highly sophisticated criminal 

enterprises. According to the FBI, the cases are investigated and developed within the framework of 

rules and procedures established by the Ministry of the Interior and National Directorate of Security, 

which adhere to Afghan Law. 

MCTF Training Unit

The training unit develops, facilitates and delivers enhanced investigative and operational instruction for 

MCTF Ministry of Interior (MOI) and National Directorate of Security (NDS) investigators in support of 

the mission to detect and investigate serious and complex Afghan crimes. The training unit takes a lead 

role in ensuring the continued evaluation and assessment of training in the promotion of an accountable 

and professionally focused MCTF investigative capability.
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APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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APPENDIX IV: COMMENTS FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY IN KABUL
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APPENDIX V: COMMENTS FROM NATO TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED

SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN
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APPENDIX VI: COMMENTS FROM BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW 

ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS
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(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-032A.)
SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance 

oversight of programs for the reconstruction of 

Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective 

audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to 

provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, 

analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, 

U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make 

informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs;

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management 

processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing 

Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all 

released reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its 

Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and 

reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202