United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 20-1259

DORJEE THILE,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND,*

U.S. Attorney General,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Lynch and Selya, Circuit Judges,

and Katzmann,** Judge.

Gary J. Yerman and The Yerman Group, LLC on brief for 

petitioner.

Robbin K. Blaya, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, 

and John S. Hogan, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, Civil Division, on brief for respondent.

* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), 

Attorney General Merrick B. Garland has been substituted for former 

Attorney General William P. Barr.

** Of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting 

by designation. 
March 19, 2021

 
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KATZMANN, Judge. Dorjee Thile seeks relief from removal 

on the grounds of asylum, withholding of removal under the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and protection under the 

United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). He contends that 

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) erred in affirming an 

Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision to deny his applications. He 

bases his petition for relief on a claim that the BIA erroneously 

disregarded his testimony and other evidence of his Chinese 

citizenship. We deny Thile's petition for review.

I. DETERMINATION UNDER REVIEW

Thile arrived in the United States on February 9, 2010,

in Los Angeles, California. He was admitted to the United States 

on an Indian passport with a temporary visitor visa obtained at 

the United States embassy in Brisbane, Australia. On July 1, 

2010, Thile applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under CAT. Thile completed an asylum interview on 

August 10, 2010. The Department of Homeland Security thereafter 

issued Thile a Notice to Appear, which alleged that he was a native 

and citizen of India and charged him with removability for 

remaining in the United States longer than his visa permitted. 

Thile admitted the factual allegations and conceded the charge of 

removability but denied that he was an Indian citizen. Rather, 

he claimed that he was of Tibetan nationality with Chinese 

citizenship.
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Thile's petition for review is based on the following

testimony by Thile and supporting information in his asylum 

application: Thile stated that he was born and grew up in Kham, 

Tibet. He was a farmer in Tibet and married his wife in 1992, 

with whom he has three children. Because Thile was raised by an 

uncle after his father passed away when Thile was a child, he 

claimed he did not possess his birth certificate. Thile is a 

Buddhist and claims that he was unable to freely practice his 

religion because of the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Further, he 

reported that his family faced discrimination based on their 

opposition to the Chinese government's occupation of Tibet. He 

testified that in August of 2002 he distributed flyers with his 

friend that mentioned the Dalai Lama and freedom for Tibet. Thile 

claims his friend was then arrested in connection with the flyer 

distribution, and Thile decided to flee Tibet fearing arrest, 

torture, and/or being killed by police. He first fled to Nepal, 

and then further traveled to Darjeeling, India where his aunt 

lived. He claims that he discarded his Chinese identity card 

before entering India in order to avoid being deported.

Thile testified that he resided in India for more than 

six years, from October 2002 to May 2009. He claims that he was 

arrested in India on March 10, 2009, during a protest connected to 

events in Tibet. He further claims he was detained for two days, 

during which he was physically mistreated and threatened with 
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deportation. Thile then decided to leave India but claims that 

he did not possess a Chinese passport because the Chinese 

government did not issue passports to Tibetans, and that he was 

unable to obtain a passport from either Nepal or India. He 

explained that he obtained a fraudulent Indian passport from a 

broker so that he could travel to Australia. Thile remained in 

Australia for nine months, during which time he obtained a visa 

from the United States embassy using the same fake Indian passport 

and based on documents indicating that he was an Indian citizen. 

He then traveled to the United States, after which he claims that 

he returned the Indian passport to the broker in India as arranged. 

Thile moved to New York and then to Boston in 2013, where he 

continues to participate in activities with the Tibetan community.

Based on this testimony and Thile's evidence, including 

a photocopy of his Chinese household register, a photocopy of his 

marriage certificate, a photocopy of his children's birth 

certificates, a letter from the Office of Tibet in New York 

certifying Thile as a Tibetan refugee, and evidence of country 

conditions of Tibetans in China, on November 4, 2015, the IJ 

granted Thile a continuance to obtain the original household 

register or other original documents regarding his Chinese 

citizenship so that he could meet his burden of proving his Chinese 

citizenship. More than two years later, at his next hearing on 

March 29, 2018, Thile newly provided only a Tibetan Green Book, a 
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document issued in India indicating he was a Tibetan national, but 

no evidence that he was a Chinese citizen. The IJ explained that 

"the respondent [has not] produced any documentation to show that 

he made any efforts to get these documents . . . . He simply has 

not addressed this topic in terms of his submission to date." 

Based upon the record and Thile's testimony, the IJ 

determined that Thile had not proven that he is a Chinese citizen 

without Indian citizenship, but rather that the record evidence 

"tends to show that the respondent is a citizen of India and the 

documents in the record do not support a finding that in India the 

respondent has suffered either past persecution or has a wellfounded fear of future persecution." Further, the IJ determined 

that because he had not established past persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution in India, Thile did not meet the higher 

burdens for withholding of removal or protection under CAT.

Thile appealed the IJ's ruling to the BIA, which affirmed

on all grounds. Specifically, the BIA concluded that the IJ 

"correctly found that the respondent submitted insufficient 

evidence to establish his Chinese citizenship in light of other

record evidence showing that he is a citizen of India," and that 

the IJ did not err in determining that Thile did "not establish[]

past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution" in India, 

He now petitions for review of the BIA's decision.
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II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 over this 

timely appeal from a decision of the BIA following proceedings in 

Boston, Massachusetts. "Judicial review of immigration cases 

normally focuses on the final order of the BIA. But where, as 

here, the BIA accepts the IJ's findings and reasoning yet adds its 

own gloss, we review the two decisions as a unit." Moreno v. 

Holder, 749 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Xian Tong Dong v. 

Holder, 696 F.3d 121, 123 (1st Cir. 2012)). We consider questions 

of law de novo. Ye v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2017). We 

consider factual findings "under the deferential 'substantial 

evidence' standard, reversing only if a 'reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.'" CastilloDiaz v. Holder, 562 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B)) (other citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Thile applied for asylum and withholding of removal 

under the INA and the CAT. Each applicant bears the burden of 

proving that he or she meets the criteria for asylum and 

withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)(stating 

that applicant bears burden of proving qualification for asylum); 

8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (stating that alien bears burden of 

proving withholding of removal); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (stating 

that applicant bears the burden of proving eligibility for 
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withholding of removal under the CAT). Our caselaw dictates that 

this burden can be met by specific, credible testimony or by 

"easily obtainable corroborating documentation" where "testimony 

is not itself compelling." Chhay v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1, 6 (1st 

Cir. 2008) (first citing Sela v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 44, 46 (1st

Cir. 2008); then citing Eke v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372, 381 (7th 

Cir. 2008); then citing Pan v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 

2007); then citing Hayek v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 501, 508 (1st Cir. 

2006); and then citing REAL ID Act § 101(a)(3)). Even where the 

petitioner is otherwise credible, we will uphold a decision of the 

BIA where there are explicit findings that corroboration was 

reasonable and the failure to provide corroboration was not 

adequately explained. Id.; cf. Soeung v. Holder, 677 F.3d 484, 

488–89 (1st Cir. 2012) (vacating dismissal of petition where BIA 

made "no finding at all on the adequacy of Soeung's explanation 

for failing to provide the required corroboration"). "Although 

the threshold of eligibility for withholding of removal is similar 

to the threshold for asylum, withholding requires a higher 

standard." Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2009)

(citation omitted).

Thile alleges various errors on the part of the BIA in 

affirming the IJ's decision. First, he contends that the BIA 

erred in affirming the IJ's determination that he did not meet his 

burden of proving himself a citizen of China and for not presuming 
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or addressing the credibility of his testimony. Second, Thile 

argues that he is eligible for asylum based on a well-founded fear 

of persecution in both China and India. We address each of these 

contentions in turn.

A. CITIZENSHIP AND CREDIBILITY

Thile first contends that the BIA's affirmance of the 

IJ's finding that he failed to produce sufficient evidence to 

establish Chinese citizenship rather than Indian citizenship was 

flawed because Thile "should be found to have established his 

Chinese citizenship through his credible testimony and 

corroborating evidence." Further, Thile claims that the BIA erred 

in not presuming him credible or further analyzing his credibility 

in light of the IJ's failure to state an explicit credibility 

finding. Both of these arguments fail.

In order to be eligible for asylum, an applicant must 

demonstrate that he or she is a refugee, defined by statute as:

any person who is outside any country of such person's 

nationality or, in the case of a person having no 

nationality, is outside any country in which such person 

last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling 

to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself 

or herself of the protection of, that country because of 

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion . . . 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Thus, a threshold determination to any 

decision on an asylum application is establishing the "country of 

such person's nationality" or, for those without nationality, the 
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"country in which such person last habitually resided." Id.; see

Wangchuck v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 

2006) ("[P]etitioner's nationality, or lack of nationality, is a 

threshold question in determining his eligibility for asylum"

(quoting Dhuomo v. BIA, 416 F.3d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 2005)). 

Substantial evidence supports the determination that Thile did not 

meet his burden to establish that China was either his country of 

nationality or the country in which he last habitually resided.

Thile claimed in his asylum interview and testified 

before the IJ that he was a citizen of China. He submitted what 

he claimed to be copies of his Chinese household register, his 

children's birth certificates, his marriage certificate, his 

Tibetan Green Book, and a letter from the Office of Tibet in New 

York in support of this claim. However, the IJ also reviewed

evidence on the record that Thile was a citizen of India. For 

example, Thile was admitted to the United States with an Indian 

passport. As the IJ noted, he traveled to Australia, obtained a 

United States visa, and was admitted into the United States with 

an Indian passport that was at each step accepted as genuine. 

Thile admitted that he resided in India for more than six years. 

Further, the IJ noted that record evidence indicated that Tibetans 

are able to obtain citizenship in India.

As has been noted, the IJ granted a continuance in

Thile's case so that he could obtain additional evidence of his 
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Chinese citizenship. After more than two years, the only new 

evidence Thile produced was his Tibetan Green Book that was issued 

in India and did not indicate anything about the current status of 

Thile's citizenship in either China or India, but rather indicated 

that he was born in Tibet. He provided no additional evidence of 

attempts to obtain evidence of his Chinese citizenship nor any 

explanation for his continued lack of evidence other than that the 

documents were unavailable. Accordingly, the IJ made a 

determination based on photocopies of original documents, 

allegations of inconsistencies within those documents, original 

documents that were inconclusive as to his citizenship, Thile's 

admittance into the United States on an Indian passport, and 

Thile's own testimony. Taking this evidence into consideration, 

the IJ and BIA concluded based on substantial evidence that Thile 

had not carried his burden of proving his Chinese citizenship in 

the face of record evidence showing that he was an Indian citizen. 

He had ample opportunity to produce evidence or explain why he 

could not produce evidence of his Chinese citizenship, and yet did 

not do so. Thus, because Thile did not sufficiently corroborate 

his claims, we reject this aspect of Thile's appeal. Chhay, 540 

F.3d at 6–7.

Thile further claims that the BIA should have presumed 

his testimony credible and that, had it done so, the BIA would 

have concluded that Thile was a citizen of China. The INA requires 
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that Petitioners provide corroborating evidence "unless the 

applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain 

the evidence." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). While credible 

testimony alone can satisfy a Petitioner's burden of proof, where 

[Petitioner's] testimony is not itself compelling[,] the 

absence of easily obtainable corroborating documentation 

can be the final straw. The substantial evidence test 

applies in these purlieus, and a reviewing court must 

accept the IJ's determinations with respect to the 

persuasiveness vel non of the alien's testimony, the 

availability of corroborating evidence, and the effect 

of non-production unless the record compels a contrary 

conclusion. 

Chhay, 540 F.3d at 6 (first citing Sela, 520 F.3d at 46; then 

citing Eke, 512 F.3d at 381; then citing Pan, 489 F.3d at 83; then 

citing Hayek, 445 F.3d at 508; then citing REAL ID Act §101(a)(3), 

(e); and then citing Kho v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 

2007)). An IJ can require corroboration even without making an 

adverse credibility determination. See id.; Balachandran v. 

Holder, 566 F.3d 269, 273 (1st Cir. 2009); Diab v. Ashcroft, 397 

F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2005). That was precisely the case here. 

The IJ found that, regardless of the credibility of Thile's 

testimony regarding his birth and original citizenship in China, 

other record evidence indicated that he became a citizen of India. 

Thus, the IJ concluded that "[Thile's] own testimony about being 

a citizen of China is not sufficient to convince this court that 

he did not later acquire Indian citizenship during the many years 

that he resided in India." The BIA's affirmance of the IJ's 
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finding that Thile did not prove his Chinese citizenship, on the 

basis of a lack of corroborating evidence, was not in error. 

Where, as here, the record contains conflicting evidence regarding 

petitioner's citizenship and Thile could not explain his lack of 

attempt to obtain further evidence to show his Chinese citizenship, 

there was no need for the BIA to address Thile's credibility. See

Morgan v. Holder, 634 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 2011) ("The lack of a 

credibility determination is a cause for concern only when a claim 

turns on the veracity of the alien. . . . But a credibility 

determination is superfluous when the alien's testimony, even if 

taken at face value, is insufficient to compel an entitlement to 

relief." (citing Kho, 505 F.3d at 56; Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 387 

F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2004))). Contrary to Thile's claim, the BIA 

did not "fully discount[] Petitioner's testimony without providing 

proper reasoning," but instead made a decision based on the record 

evidence and without needing to make an adverse credibility 

finding. Thus, we deny Thile's petition for review of the BIA's 

determination that Thile failed to prove his Chinese citizenship.1

1 Thile further argues in regard to this issue that the BIA 

and IJ misstated and incorrectly characterized the record by 

observing that the DHS found Petitioner's Chinese identification 

card number to be fraudulent. We note that neither the BIA nor 

the IJ made findings on the legitimacy of the photocopied household 

register or of the Chinese identification card number, but rather 

relied on a lack of corroboration and original documents in the 

face of conflicting evidence in determining that Thile did not 

prove his Chinese citizenship. The BIA merely observed in a 
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B. APPLICATION FOR ASYLUM, WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL, AND CAT 

PROTECTION

As explained by the IJ, even if Thile retained his 

Chinese citizenship, he would not be able to base his application 

on a fear of returning to China because the firm resettlement 

principle bars such a claim. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2017) ("An alien 

is considered to be firmly resettled if, prior to arrival in the 

United States, he or she entered into another country with, or 

while in that country received, an offer of permanent resident 

status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement 

. . . .")2; see Bonilla v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 72, 78 (1st Cir. 

2008). By failing to corroborate his Chinese citizenship and 

failing to overcome substantial record evidence that he acquired 

footnote, "[t]he Immigration Judge also noted that the DHS found 

the Chinese government identification card [number] submitted by 

the respondent to be fraudulent, which he does not challenge on 

appeal." In fact, the IJ stated that Thile "was asked if he knew 

that the asylum officer regarded [his Chinese identification card 

number] as fraudulent[,]" which he denied being told. Evident 

from a full reading of the IJ and BIA's opinions is that this 

reference is to information about Thile's Chinese identification 

card number within the photocopy of his household register. This 

is not a mischaracterization of the record constituting error, but 

rather a shorthand for the evidence on the record brought about by

a lack of original documentation in the record as to Thile's 

Chinese identity card.

2 The Department of Homeland Security issued a new definition 

of firm resettlement which superseded the definition cited here. 

Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear 

and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274 (Dec. 11, 2020) 

(codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.15). This new regulation does not 

apply retroactively, and thus is inapplicable here.
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Indian citizenship, Thile may not base his applications on a fear 

of returning to China. Thus, we examine his claim for asylum as 

a refugee from India, in that it was Thile's admitted last country 

of residence3 and the country to which he indicated he was a citizen 

upon his entry to the United States. In so doing, we can easily 

decide Thile's remaining arguments regarding his eligibility for 

asylum.4

First, Thile is not entitled to asylum as a Tibetan 

facing removal to India. In order to be eligible for asylum, an 

applicant must prove his status as a refugee "who is unable or 

unwilling to return to . . . [the country of that person's 

nationality or last habitual residence] because of persecution or 

a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 

opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42). The IJ determined, and the BIA 

affirmed, that Thile did not meet either the past or well-founded 

fear of future persecution prongs of his asylum claim. We agree. 

3 Neither Thile nor the Government argues that Thile became a 

resident of Australia.

4 The Government argues that Thile's contention regarding his 

eligibility for asylum on the basis of his treatment in China is 

not properly before us because the BIA did not issue a 

determination on that basis. We need not address this claim 

because we affirm the BIA's determination that Thile did not meet 

his burden of proving that he is a Chinese citizen. Therefore, 

he is not entitled to asylum or related relief on any claim that 

he may have faced or would face harm from the Chinese government.
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The record does not indicate that Thile either faced or would face 

persecution in India on the basis of his Tibetan nationality, his 

religion, or his political beliefs in regard to Tibet. As the IJ 

noted, the record does not support that he was seriously harmed 

during his two-day detention in India, and the record includes no 

evidence of what harm Thile suffered aside from Thile's own 

conclusory testimony that he "was mistreated physically, very 

badly." Thile's description of a "single incident of physical 

harm [that] was an isolated event and [in which] the resulting 

injuries were not sufficiently severe to require medical 

attention" does not rise to the level of persecution. Cabas v. 

Holder, 695 F.3d 169, 174 (1st Cir. 2012). Nor does the record

evidence regarding treatment of Tibetans in India support that 

there is a current pattern or practice of persecution of Tibetans 

in India. 

Having not met the persecution prong for asylum, Thile

is not able to meet the higher threshold for his counterpart claim 

of withholding of removal. See Scatambuli, 558 F.3d at 58. And 

since his CAT claim, as framed, depends on the same underlying 

claim of persecution, Thile is also unable to make out that claim. 

Thus, we also deny his petition as to the BIA's affirmance of the 

denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal.
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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Thile's petition for review 

is DENIED.