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S. HRG. 110–1161 

OVERSIGHT ON 

PASSENGER VEHICLE ROOF STRENGTH 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, 

INSURANCE, AND AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 4, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

MARGARET L. CUMMISKY, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LILA HARPER HELMS, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director 

CHRISTINE D. KURTH, Republican Staff Director, and General Counsel 

PAUL NAGLE, Republican Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, INSURANCE, AND 

AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire, 

Ranking 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on June 4, 2008 ................................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Pryor .................................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator McCaskill ............................................................................. 13 

WITNESSES

Claybrook, Hon. Joan B., President, Public Citizen ............................................. 67 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 69 

Coburn, M.D., Hon. Tom, U.S. Senator from Oklahoma ...................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Garcia, Dr. David A., Independent Contractor and Public Speaker .................... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20 

Gillan, Jacqueline S., Vice President, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety 118 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 119 

Ports, Jr., James F., Deputy Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, DOT; accompanied by Stephen R. Kratzke, Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, NHTSA, DOT ....................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

Oesch, Stephen L., Senior Vice President, Insurer and Government Relations, 

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety ............................................................. 28 

Letter, dated June 18, 2008 to Senator Pryor ................................................ 154 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

Stanton, Michael J., President and CEO, Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. ................................................................................. 114 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 116 

Strassburger, Robert, Vice President, Vehicle Safety and Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. ............................................................ 57 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 59 

APPENDIX

Article, dated March 14, 2008, entitled, ‘‘Why the NHTSA Proposal for 

FMVSS 216 on Roof Crush Must Include At Least a Strength-to-Weight 

Ratio of 4.0 and Dynamic Roolover Testing, and Must Not Include ‘‘Preemption’’ Which Would Deprive Injured Victims,’’ by Byron Bloch, Independent 

Consultant in Auto Safety Design and Vehicle Crashworthiness .................... 152 

Letter to Senator Pryor from Brandon Bloch, Concerned Driver ........................ 151 

Response to written questions submitted to James F. Ports, Jr. by: ..................

Hon. Claire McCaskill ...................................................................................... 166 

Hon. Mark Pryor ............................................................................................... 163 

Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV ............................................................................ 168 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT ON 

PASSENGER VEHICLE ROOF STRENGTH 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, INSURANCE, AND

AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Pryor, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS 

Senator PRYOR. Let’s go ahead and call the meeting to order. 

I’d like to welcome everyone here today, especially Senator 

Coburn. We’re going to let him go first. But, let me just give, if I 

may, give a brief opening statement. I know that Senator Coburn 

has other commitments he has to get to. 

Today we’re going to talk about automobile safety, and we’ll focus 

on the NHTSA rulemaking on vehicle roof strength standards to 

protect automobile passengers in the event of rollover accidents. 

The hearing will look at the biomechanics and what actually occurs in a rollover, the relationship between the vehicle roof 

strength and the occupant injury risk, the history and efficacy of 

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s roof strength 

standard in improving vehicle safety, and a review of the January 

30, 2008, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The agency’s deadline for issuing the final rule is July 1 of this year—which 

is just in—what, I guess 4 weeks from now or less—with a legally 

permissible extension, if necessary. 

Just in terms of background, this agency has the responsibility 

of trying to make our vehicles safer, and thousands of Americans 

are killed and injured each year in motor vehicle accidents. The 

agency reported that—42,642 highway-related fatalities and 

2,575,000 injuries in 2006. Of the 42,000 fatalities, about 10,000— 

a little more than 10,000 were killed by rollover crashes, and 2,007 

people sustained injuries due to rollover crashes. 

The majority of rollovers occur when a driver loses control of the 

vehicle, causing the vehicle to begin sliding sideways. Typically, 

something triggers the vehicle to begin rolling. The trigger could be 

a tripping object, such as a curb or a guardrail, or even soft and 

uneven ground at the side of the roadway, like the shoulder. Another trigger for rollover could be an attempt by the driver to make 

2 

an overly aggressive turn of the vehicle, either at a high velocity 

or at a tight turning radius. 

‘‘Roof crush’’ describes the vehicle’s roof as it is deformed during 

a rollover crash. When the vehicle’s structural integrity is reduced, 

window glass can break and the doors can open, which can further 

weaken the roof structure. According to some analysts, a collapsing 

roof can compromise all the vehicle’s safety features, including its 

seatbelts, window glazing, side-curtain airbags, and door retention. 

Partial or complete ejection of the occupants can result. And when 

a vehicle roof buckles inwards, occupants’ heads are exposed to the 

risk of head and neck injuries. 

On September 1, 1973, NHTSA issued its first roof crush standard that took effect for passenger cars. The standard currently applies to passenger cars and multipurpose passenger vehicles, 

trucks, and buses with a gross weight rating of 6,000 pounds or 

less. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216 establishes a minimum roof strength standard for these vehicles. The purpose of the 

standard is to reduce deaths and injuries due to the crushing of the 

roof into the occupant compartment in a rollover crash. 

One thing we’ll talk about today is testing, and testing involves 

applying a metal plate at a constant speed to one side of the vehicle’s roof. Compliance with the standard is contingent upon the roof 

withstanding a force of 1.5 times the vehicle’s weight before 5 

inches of crush have occurred. That’s the current standard. 

SAFETEA–LU, which became law in August of 2005, directed the 

Secretary of Transportation to initiate a rulemaking to revisit this. 

The law clarified that the rulemaking proceeding would apply to 

vehicles with a weight of 10,000 pounds or less. 

Congress encouraged NHTSA, in its rulemaking proceeding, to 

consider dynamic tests that realistically duplicate the actual forces 

transmitted during the rollover crash. I’m sure we’ll hear some testimony about that. The law also directed the agency to issue a final 

rule by July 1, 2008. And actually, I met with NHTSA yesterday, 

and they hope—they think that they can finish this by 2008, but, 

you know, they’re not 100-percent confident of that, but I know 

they’re trying very hard. If the agency determines that it cannot 

meet the deadline, the agency has to notify the proper Congressional committees of jurisdiction and establish a new deadline. 

And so, everybody’s working hard. This is a very, very important 

hearing. We do have many, many fatalities in this country that are 

the result of roof crush during a crash, and it’s something that I 

hear a lot about at home, and I know my colleagues do, as well. 

And so, we’re going to have several witnesses today. I’m not going 

to go through the list right now. 

But, I do want to open this by thanking my colleague from Oklahoma, Dr. Tom Coburn, who is also Senator Tom Coburn, for those 

of you who don’t know, and he has approached me on the floor and 

in the hallways here several times about how important this is to 

him as a medical professional and based on some personal experience that he has had in his home State of Oklahoma. 

So, Senator Coburn, welcome to the subcommittee, and we are 

honored to have you here, and we’d love to hear your opening statement. 

3 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOM COBURN, M.D., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA 

Senator COBURN. Senator Pryor, thank you, and thank your 

staff, for making available this forum to address not only the process, but the safety. 

And, like many other people who are going to appear before you 

today—I’m not an expert on automobile safety or manufacturing, 

but, like everyone here, I’m very much interested in seeing a reduction in rollover fatalities and injuries. 

A few months ago, I met with one of my constituents from Oklahoma. His name’s Kevin Moody. He’s been a tireless advocate, calling for increased vehicle roof strength standard. In 2003, Kevin’s 

son, Tyler, was killed when the SUV he was driving rolled over, 

causing the vehicle’s roof to crush down on him. Unfortunately, 

Kevin couldn’t be here today to testify, but I hope that my testimony in this hearing will honor his efforts and the life of his son, 

Tyler. 

There are many different factors that lead to vehicle occupant fatalities and serious injuries in rollover accidents, but today we’re 

here to discuss the vehicle roof strength safety standard known as 

FMVSS 216. And, as you outlined, Mr. Chairman, SAFETEA–LU 

included language requiring NHTSA to have a standard by July 1, 

2008. 

I would just take an aside. I don’t think it’s as important that 

they get this done by July 2008 as much as it is important as they 

get it right. So, I don’t think the timing is as important as them 

getting it right. 

An update of this standard will be the first substantial change 

since 1973. Since the early 1970s, advancing technologies create a 

great many vehicle safety improvements, which our manufacturers 

have incorporated, that have saved a lot of lives. These include 

anti-lock brakes, airbags, and Electronic Stability Control. Technology has also resulted in better materials and design engineering 

that can be used to produce stronger vehicle roofs. 

While many automobile manufacturers have used these technologies to increase roof strength of their vehicles well above the 

Federal standard, there are still many vehicles that are produced 

that have roofs that will easily crush in the event of a rollover. 

Congress initiated the rulemaking process because NHTSA was 

still using the same test and performance criteria that they used 

when the roof standard was originally set up in 1973. It’s hard to 

find anyone in private or public sector that’s doing things the same 

today that they were in 1973. NHTSA’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking has acknowledged these new testing methods and the improved roof strength in today’s technology embodied vehicles. It 

does not appear that they’re ready to make, however, with a rulemaking, a leap to the 21st century from the 20th century. 

I want to touch, for a minute, on the public health problem that’s 

caused by vehicle rollovers. According to NHTSA’s own numbers, 

10,000 people are killed each year in rollover crashes, which is onethird of—at least—close to one-third of accident fatalities. They’re 

the number one killer—automobile crashes are—of people between 

the age of 1 and 34. It is the number one cause of death. Including 

to—the loss of life, 24,000 people a year are seriously injured in 

4 

rollovers, leading to millions of dollars of healthcare expenditures, 

but, more important, marked impairment of people’s lives. 

Spinal cord injuries are also very common, as the occupant’s 

head makes contact with the roof or the ground. Of the 12,000 spinal cord injuries that occur each year, over 5,000 occur in automobile accidents. Although exact numbers are not kept, the number of spinal cord injuries that result from rollover accidents can 

be conservatively estimated to be around 2,600 per year. 

As a physician, I see having vehicles with stronger roofs as an 

effective healthcare prevention measure to reduce the number of 

quadriplegic, paraplegic, and other serious injuries that result from 

roof crush. 

I’m not here to offer a policy solution to address roof crush, but, 

after studying this issue, I believe that there are three things that 

will translate into safer cars and a more informed public: 

The first is greater transparency into NHTSA’s rulemaking process. Senator Obama and I created and passed the Transparency 

and Accountability Act, two years ago. The way we get accountability from government is transparency. And I have some great 

heartburn with the transparency in this rulemaking process. The 

rulemaking introduced by NHTSA examines the costs and benefits 

of increasing roof strength-to-weight ratio from 1.5 to 2.5. However, 

NHTSA did not provide any information as to why the 2.5 

strength-to-weight ratio was chosen, as opposed to 3, 3.5, or 4.0. 

In January, in a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 

NHTSA does discuss these stronger strength-to-weight ratios, but 

they limit their analysis to the cost and weight each standard 

would add to vehicles, and largely ignore the safety benefits. 

NHTSA also mentions that if every single rollover crash—rollover 

death resulting from roof crush were prevented, the total lives 

saved would be 476. That doesn’t fit with the other numbers that 

they publish. However, they provide no evidence for how they came 

up with that figure—there is no transparency in it—which most 

automobile safety experts say is difficult to quantify. 

Another provision lacking proper rationale in the proposed rule 

is one that would give the new roof strength standard preemption 

from any common law or tort law. Twenty-six state Attorneys General wrote to NHTSA expressing that this would be a major setback to vehicle safety, yet NHTSA has not offered any explanation 

for why the rights of a vehicle purchaser to seek a common law 

remedy for harm done to them should be taken away. 

When the final rule is released, NHTSA needs to provide the 

public with transparency into why they believe these regulations 

are to be adopted, not just offer the regulations. With a budget of 

over $830 million a year, there is no excuse for NHTSA not to provide clear and precise evidence for how vehicle safety standards 

were decided. 

The second thing that I think is important is that—the increase 

in the efforts to inform consumers about the safety of vehicles in 

rollovers. In my almost 10 years of experience as a Member of Congress, I’ve found the best way to connect the government to the 

people is through an open and transparent government. That’s how 

we hold our elected officials accountable. The 2005 highway bill 

contained a provision known as ‘‘Stars on Cars.’’ And that requires 

5 

all new cars to post NHTSA’s five-star safety rating system result 

on car stickers. This was a great policy for Congress to adopt, because it takes critical safety information that might not be accessible to consumers, especially those without Internet access, and 

clearly displays it for the consumer to consider. 

The three five-star rating categories are a 35-mile-per-hour frontal crash test, an offside—offset side-impact test, and a rollover resistance test. I believe that as part of NHTSA’s comprehensive plan 

to address rollover safety, they should create a five-star rating system for roof strength that should appear on all car stickers. Automobile consumers need to know that there are significant differences in vehicle roof strengths among cars and trucks in the 

same class. For example, the Volvo XC90, that has the strongest 

roof in the midsized sport utility class, with a 4.6 strength-toweight ratio—that is twice the roof strength of the Jeep Grand 

Cherokee, which has a vehicle roof strength-to-weight ratio of 2.3. 

The final point I would make is, Congress should challenge 

NHTSA to produce results through reduced deaths and serious injuries. It’s not just enough to offer a new standard. It is to have 

metrics on the standards, and that the standard make a difference 

in American lives. 

A performance goal for the comprehensive rollover plan is never 

mentioned by NHTSA. As part of Congress’s oversight of NHTSA, 

we should be setting performance measures that translate into 

real-world results, like a reduction in deaths caused by rollover accidents. 

After the creation of NHTSA in the late 1960s, the number of 

automobile deaths began to decrease. From 1975 to 1992, the number of vehicle occupant deaths per 100,000 people declined by 23 

percent. Since 1992, the number of occupant deaths per 100,000 

people has only decreased by 1.5 percent. Congress should be asking NHTSA to get the decline of fatalities back at a similar rate 

that was achieved in the 1970s and 1980s. 

With one-third of all vehicle deaths occurring in rollover accidents, if NHTSA’s comprehensive plan to address the rollovers is 

at all successful, we should be able to see a substantial decrease 

in rollover deaths. The metric is important; the rule isn’t. What the 

rule accomplishes should be our goal. 

In 2008, as I said, we’ll spend $830 million of taxpayer money 

at NHTSA. That’s a substantial investment that should be tied to 

results in terms of reduction in accidents and accidental deaths. 

Specifically in regards to vehicle roof strength, if NHTSA cannot 

conduct a transparent and effective rulemaking process, I believe 

Congress should consider legislation that will set an adequate roofstrength standard without going through an ineffective rulemaking 

process. 

Thank you very much for your time. I don’t—doubt that you have 

any questions for me. 

This isn’t—this is something we can fix, and we fix, at small cost. 

Small relative cost, we can make a major difference in individuals’ 

lives, and we can give great information to the consumers about 

what they’re buying. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Coburn follows:] 

6 

1 NHTSA, http://www.safercar.gov/portal/site/safercar/menuitem.13dd5c887c7e1358fefe0a2f 

35a67789/?vgnextoid=6539e66aeee35110VgnVCM1000002fd17898RCRD. 2 National Spinal Cord Injury Database, http://www.spinalcord.uab.cdu/show.asp?durki= 

116979. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TOM COBURN, M.D., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA

I would like to thank Senator Pryor and your staff for holding this timely oversight hearing. Unlike the many other people on this panel I am not an expert on 

automobile manufacturing or safety, but like everyone here I am very interested in 

seeing a reduction in rollover accident fatalities. A few months ago I met with one 

of my constituents from Oklahoma, Kevin Moody, who has been a tireless advocate 

for calling for an increased vehicle roof strength standard. In 2003, Kevin’s son 

Tyler was killed when the SUV he was driving rolled over causing the vehicle’s roof 

to crush down on him. Unfortunately Kevin couldn’t be here today to testify, but 

I hope that my testimony and this hearing will honor his efforts and the life of his 

son Tyler. 

There are many different factors that lead to vehicle occupant fatalities and serious injuries in rollover accidents, but today we are here to discuss the vehicle roof 

strength safety standard known as FMVSS 216. In 2005, Congress passed the 

SAFETEA–LU surface transportation reauthorization bill which included language 

requiring the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to update 

FMVSS 216 by July 1, 2008. The update to FMVSS 216 will be the first substantial 

change to this vehicle safety standard since its inception in 1973. Since the early 

1970s, advancing technology has created many vehicle safety improvements, such as 

anti-lock brakes, air bags, and electronic stability control. Technology has also resulted in better materials and design engineering that can be used to produce 

stronger vehicle roofs. While many automobile manufactures have used these technologies to increase the roof strength of their vehicles well above the Federal standard, there are many vehicles that have roofs that will easily crush in the event of 

a rollover. Congress initiated the rulemaking process through SAFETEA–LU because NHTSA was still using the same test and performance criteria that they used 

when the roof strength standard was originally introduced in 1973. It is hard to find 

anyone in the private or public sector that is doing things today the same way they 

did things in the early 1970s. Although the NHTSA’s notice of proposed rulemaking 

has acknowledged new testing methods and the improved roof strength in today’s 

technology embodied vechicles, it does not appear that NHTSA is ready to make the 

leap from 20th century to the 21st century. 

I also want to touch on the public health problem that is caused by vehicle rollovers. Ten thousand people are killed each year in rollover crashes, which is onethird of all automobile accident fatalities.1 Automobile accidents are the number one 

killer of people age one to thirty-four. In addition to the losses of life, twenty-four 

thousand people a year are seriously injured in rollovers leading to millions of dollars of healthcare expenses and reduced quality of life. Spinal chord injuries are 

very common in rollover crashes as the occupant’s head makes contact with the roof 

or the ground. Of the twelve thousand spinal chord injuries that occur each year, 

over five thousand occur in automobile accidents.2 Although exact numbers are not 

kept, the number of spinal chord injures that result from rollover accidents can be 

conservatively estimated to be twenty-six hundred a year. As a physician, I see having vehicles with stronger roofs as an effective healthcare prevention measure to reduce the number of quadriplegic, paraplegic, and other serious injuries resulting 

from roof crush. 

I am not here today to offer a policy solution to address roof crush, but after 

studying this issue I believe that the following three things will translate into safer 

cars and a more informed public. 

1. Greater transparency into the NHTSA rulemaking process. The notice of proposed rulemaking introduced by the NHTSA in August of 2005 examines the cost 

and benefits of increasing the roof strength-to-weight ratio requirement from 1.5 to 

2.5. However, NHTSA did not provide information as to why the 2.5 strength-toweight ratio was chosen as opposed to a 3.0, 3.5, or 4.0 strength-to-weight ratio. In 

January 2008, in a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, NHTSA does discuss these stronger strength-to-weight ratios, but they limit their analysis to the 

cost and weight each standard would add to vehicles and largely ignore the safety 

benefits. NHTSA also mentions that if every single rollover death resulting from 

roof crush were prevented the total lives saved would be 476. However they provide 

no evidence for how they came up with that figure, which most automobile safety 

experts say is very difficult to quantify. 

7 

3Department of Transportation, http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx. 

Another provision lacking proper rationale in the proposed rule is one that would 

give the new roof strength standard preemption from any common law or tort law. 

Twenty-six state Attorneys General wrote to NHTSA expressing that this would be 

a major set back to vehicle safety, yet NHTSA has not offered any explanation for 

why the rights of a vehicle purchaser to seek a common law remedy for harm done 

to them should be taken away. 

When the final rule is released, NHTSA needs to provide the public with transparency into why they believe these regulations are to be adopted. With a budget 

over $830 million there is no excuse for NHTSA to not provide clear and precise 

evidence for how vehicle safety standards were decided. 

2. Increase efforts to inform consumers about the safety of vehicles in rollovers. In 

my almost 10 years of experience as a Member of Congress, I have found that the 

best way to connect the government to people is through an open and transparent 

government. In 2006 I co-authored the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act with Senator Obama, which lead to the creation of usaspending.gov, a website that enables the public to find out information on all government expenditures, including contracts, grants, and loans. When taxpayers have better knowledge 

about how their tax dollars are being spent they are better able to hold their elected 

officials accountable. I believe the same holds true with the Federal Government’s 

automobile safety testing and safety data. 

The 2005 highway bill contained a provision known as ‘‘stars on cars’’ that requires all new cars to post NHTSA’s five-star safety rating system results on car 

stickers. This was a great policy for Congress to adopt because it takes critical safety information that might not be accessible to consumers, especially those without 

Internet access, and clearly displays it for the consumer to consider. The three five 

star rating categories are a 35-mph frontal crash test, an offset side-impact test, and 

a rollover resistance test. I believe that as a part of NHTSA’s compressive plan to 

address rollover safety, they should create a five star rating system for roof strength 

that would also appear on car stickers. Automobile consumers need to know that 

there are significant differences in vehicle roof strengths among cars and trucks in 

the same class. For example, the Volvo XC90 has the strongest roof in the mid-sized 

sport utility class with a 4.6 strength-to-weight ratio. That is twice the roof strength 

of the Jeep Grand Cherokee, which has a vehicle roof strength-to-weight ratio of 2.3. 

3. Finally, Congress should challenge the NHTSA to produce results through reduced deaths and serious injuries caused by rollovers. In their notice of proposed 

rulemaking, NHTSA states that roof crush is only one factor in rollover fatalities 

and that their comprehensive plan to address rollovers looks at all the factors involved. However, a performance goal for the comprehensive rollover plan is never 

mentioned. As part of Congress’ oversight of NHTSA we should be setting performance measures that translate into real world results, like a reduction in the deaths 

caused by rollover accidents. After the creation of NHTSA in the late 1960s, the 

number of automobile deaths began to decrease. From 1975 to 1992 the number of 

vehicle occupant deaths per 100,000 people declined by 23 percent. Since 1992 the 

number of vehicle occupant deaths per 100,000 people has only decreases by 1.5 percent.3 Congress should be asking NHTSA’s to get the decline of fatalities back at 

a similar rate that was achieved in the 1970s and 1980s. With one-third of all vehicle deaths occurring in rollovers accidents, if NTHSA’s comprehensive plan to address the rollovers is at all successful, we should see a substantial decrease in rollover deaths. In 2008 we will spend $830 million of taxpayer money to fund operations, research, and grants within NHTSA. That substantial investment should be 

tied to results in terms of a reduction in accidents and accident deaths. Specifically, 

in regards to vehicle roof strength, if NHTSA can not conduct a transparent and 

effective rulemaking process, I believe Congress should consider legislation that will 

set an adequate roof strength standard without going through an ineffective rulemaking process. 

Thank you very much for your time and I again thank the Chairman for holding 

this important oversight hearing. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. I do have one follow-up, if I may, and 

that is, you mentioned, early in your testimony, that we have this 

deadline of July 1 of this year. You think it’s more important that 

we get it done right than get it done fast. And that’s my sense, as 

well. I’d love to get it done by the end of this month, but if we 

can’t, it’s more important to get it done right. What is your sense— 

8 

I mean, I can’t really speak for the Senate, I know you can’t either—what’s your sense of Senators—I think most Senators would 

agree that it’s more important to get it done right and not rush 

through this and come out with a bad result. Is that what you’re 

hearing? 

Senator COBURN. I would agree with that, but I’d—also say is, 

if we have a little increase in roof strength that doesn’t result in 

a major decrease in fatalities and injuries, we’ve done nothing. And 

so, the roof strength-to-weight ratio is important. And you didn’t 

see any explanation for that in why NHTSA chose the standards 

that they chose. And, again, the metrics, the measurement of the 

success of the rulemaking, will be the marked decrease in the number of fatalities and injuries. 

And so, the question has to be, is, at what cost—I know there 

is a cost. The higher up we go, the more it costs. There has to be 

a point at which we see major benefit with a minimal amount of 

cost, and that ought to be part of the transparency of the NHTSA 

rulemaking process. And why we don’t see a 4.5 or a 3.5 and the 

expected benefits from that is beyond me. With the kind of budget 

that they have, they have plenty of resources to get this right. And 

so, I think getting it right is much more important than getting it 

done by July 1, 2008. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. Well, thank you for your interest in this, 

and thanks for your leadership on this. And when NHTSA comes 

up here to testify in a few minutes, we’ll ask them some of—— 

Senator COBURN. Well, I—let me thank Mr. Moody. Being in the 

Senate and listening to constituents, I was unaware of this issue. 

And I’m not a big-government person, I don’t want us involved, and 

most people—but, this is something we can fix, this is something 

we can make a difference on, and I look forward to your leadership 

on it, and I thank you. 

Senator PRYOR.—thank you. Thank you for your help, and 

thanks for all that you’re doing. 

Well, we are now going to introduce all the witnesses, so I’d ask 

you all to come up, and—I’ll call your name. While you all get situated, however she says to get situated. So, how does that sound? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator PRYOR. Oh, I’m sorry. I’m sorry, I misread my note here. 

We’re going to have NHTSA first, in the first panel. 

Mr. James Ports who is the Deputy Administrator, National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Great, come on up and 

take your seat—and what I would ask everyone to do is, if we could 

please keep our opening statements to 5 minutes—I don’t like to 

gavel people down, but we have a lengthy third panel, and we’ll 

have good questions of both panels, and we think we’re going to 

have other Senators come here. Several have said they would be 

here, but there are a lot of Committees and other things going on 

today. So, hopefully we’ll have others here and we’ll ask questions. 

The last thing I’d say on that is, don’t feel like, in your opening 

statement, you have to cover every single thing because we’re going 

to leave the record open, and you can always submit your written 

statement, and it’ll be part of the record. 

So, Mr. Ports, go ahead. 

9 

STATEMENT OF JAMES F. PORTS, JR., DEPUTY 

ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY 

ADMINISTRATION, DOT; ACCOMPANIED BY 

STEPHEN R. KRATZKE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR 

FOR RULEMAKING, NHTSA, DOT 

Mr. PORTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first introduce, to 

my left, Mr. Steve Kratzke. He is the Associate Administrator for 

Rulemaking. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss this important issue of 

rollover protection, and particularly roof-crush safety. 

Every death and serious injury that occurs on our Nation’s highways is a tragedy. As you know, rollover crashes account for about 

one-third of the nearly 30,000 light-vehicle occupant fatalities that 

occur each year. I share the same feelings of concern and empathy 

as you do for the individuals and families who have been tragically 

affected by these dreadful crashes, and I extend my deepest condolences to them. 

The agency developed and is implementing a comprehensive plan 

to address rollover crashes. Our three-pronged strategy begins with 

preventing the rollover from ever happening. NHTSA has mandated that all passenger vehicles be equipped with electronic stability control by 2012, and has added a rollover rating to the agency’s five-star vehicle safety ratings. 

We also know that we cannot prevent each and every rollover, 

so we also do our best to keep occupants in the vehicle during the 

crash. Safety belts are the most effective crashworthiness countermeasure, reducing ejected rollover fatalities, reducing the probability of ejection by 91 percent in fatal crashes. NHTSA also has 

strength requirements for door latches and a forthcoming 

SAFETEA–LU proposal for ejection mitigation. 

Finally, in addition to rollover crash prevention and ejection mitigation, we strive to better protect the occupants kept inside the vehicle during a rollover through enhanced roof-crush resistance. 

As you mentioned, in 1973 the United States became the first 

country to adopt a roof-strength requirement. Since that time, Canada and Saudi Arabia have also adopted a similar requirement. No 

other government anywhere in the world has any requirement for 

roof strength. 

Each of these initiatives must work together to address the various aspects of the rollover problem. We are in the final stages of 

completing our August 2005 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to upgrade roof-crush requirements of light passenger vehicles. Among 

the major provisions, the NPRM proposed to extend application of 

the standard to heavier vehicles, increase the roof strength requirements so that the vehicle would sustain a load equal to 2.5 times 

the unloaded weight, and require a new headroom criterion. 

In response to extensive public interest to the NPRM, a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was published, this past 

January. The SNPRM modified our original proposal to include for 

consideration a two-sided test requirement, as well as solicited 

comments to allow the agency the potential to go beyond the 2.5 

strength-to-weight ratio. We also requested comments on our exVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
10 

tensive testing that the agency conducted of current production vehicles. 

Because we’re still in the rulemaking on this standard, we may 

not be able to discuss specific decisions related to the estimates of 

lives saved, the stringency of the requirements, or other issues related to the final rule. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your consideration and this subcommittee’s ongoing efforts to improve highway safety. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ports follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES F. PORTS, JR., DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DOT 

Mr. Chairman, I am Jim Ports, Deputy Administrator of the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to discuss the important issue of rollover protection, and particularly roof crush safety. 

Every death and serious injury that occurs on our Nation’s highways is a tragedy. 

Rollover crashes account for about one-third of the nearly 30,000 light vehicle occupant fatalities that occur each year. I share the same feelings of concern and empathy as you for the individuals and families who have been tragically affected by 

these dreadful crashes, and extend my deepest condolences to them. 

I am proud to say that NHTSA has taken significant steps to reduce the deaths 

and serious injuries that occur due to rollover crashes. Rollover crashes are complex 

and chaotic events. They can range from a single quarter turn to eight or more 

quarter turns, with the duration of the rollover crash lasting from one to several 

seconds. The wide range of rollover conditions occurs because these crashes largely 

occur off road where the vehicle motion is highly influenced by roadside conditions. 

Also, rollover crashes tend to occur at higher speeds than other crash types due to 

the energy required to initiate them. 

The agency developed a comprehensive plan to address these crashes and has 

made great strides to implement these strategies. It is important to realize that 

each initiative in NHTSA’s comprehensive program addresses a different aspect of 

the rollover problem. Our strategy is to first reduce the occurrence of rollover crashes; second, keep occupants inside the vehicle when rollovers do occur; and finally, 

to better protect the occupants kept inside the vehicle during the rollover. Each of 

these three initiatives must work together to address the various aspects of the rollover problem. 

The most effective way to reduce deaths and injuries in rollover crashes is to prevent the rollover crash from occurring. Two agency efforts have been taken to reduce the occurrence of rollover crashes—mandating that all passenger vehicles be 

equipped with Electronic Stability Control and incorporating a rollover rating into 

the agency’s 5-star vehicle safety ratings (known as the New Car Assessment Program). 

In April 2007, NHTSA published a final rule establishing requirements for Electronic Stability Control, or ESC, in passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, 

trucks, and buses weighing less than 10,000 pounds. ESC systems use automatic 

computer-controlled braking of individual wheels to assist the driver in maintaining 

control in critical driving situations. ESC is the most significant safety advancement 

since the introduction of seat belts. The agency estimates that this technology will 

save up to 9,600 lives in all types of crashes annually once all light vehicles on the 

road are equipped with ESC. These safety benefits will occur in all types of crashes 

where the driver would lose control of the vehicle and the vehicle would crash off 

the road or into another vehicle. However, the lion’s share of these benefits will be 

in rollover crashes, where it is estimated that ESC systems will reduce about onehalf (4,200 to 5,500) of the approximately 10,000 deaths each year resulting from 

rollover crashes. 

NHTSA incorporated a rollover static stability factor into its New Car Assessment 

Program (NCAP) in 2001. This consumer information program uses market forces 

to encourage manufacturers to make safety improvements not the least of which has 

been the voluntary adoption of ESC systems in many vehicles, including sport utility vehicles. In the 7 years since incorporation into NCAP, we estimate that the risk 

of rollover in a single vehicle crash for an average sport utility vehicle has been reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
11 

duced by nearly 20 percent, and that an average pickup rollover risk has been reduced almost 10 percent. 

When a rollover crash does occur, it is critical to keep the occupant inside the vehicle. The fatality rate for an ejected vehicle occupant is three times as great as that 

for an occupant who remains inside the vehicle. Our crash data show that about 

one-half of the people killed in vehicles that rolled over were completely ejected, and 

another 10 percent of those killed were partially ejected. So mitigating ejections offers potential for significant safety gains. Safety belts are the most effective crashworthiness countermeasure in reducing ejected rollover fatalities. In fact, seat belts 

reduce the probability of ejection by 91 percent in fatal crashes in passenger cars 

and light trucks. In addition to our successful efforts to increase seat belt use, 

NHTSA also has strength requirements for door latches and a forthcoming 

SAFETEA–LU proposal for ejection mitigation. 

Finally, in addition to rollover crash prevention and ejection mitigation, we strive 

to better protect the occupants kept inside the vehicle during the rollover through 

enhanced roof crush resistance. In 1973, the United States became the first country 

to adopt a roof strength requirement. Since that time, Canada and Saudi Arabia 

have also adopted a similar requirement. No other government anywhere in the 

world has any requirement for roof strength. 

Each initiative in NHTSA’s comprehensive program to address the different aspects of the rollover problem is important because each initiative has a different target population for which that initiative will be effective. Each of these three initiatives must work together to address the various aspects of the rollover problem. 

However, it is important to understand which portion of the rollover problem can 

be addressed by each of these three initiatives so that there is a clear and correct 

understanding of the safety benefits potentially associated with each of the different 

types of actions to reduce rollover deaths and injuries. 

In August 2005, NHTSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to 

upgrade the roof crush requirements of light passenger vehicles. Among the major 

provisions, the NPRM proposed to extend application of the standard to heavier vehicles, increase the roof strength requirements so that a vehicle would sustain a 

load equal to 2.5 times its unloaded weight, and require a new headroom criterion. 

The agency has received a large number of comments from industry, public interest 

groups, and other parties addressing significant issues related to this proposed rule. 

In response to extensive public interest and safety advocate comments on the 

NPRM, a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) was published on 

January 30, 2008. The SNPRM modified our original proposal to include consideration of a two-sided test requirement, as well as soliciting comments to allow the 

agency the potential to go beyond a 2.5 Strength-to-Weight Ratio (SWR). Subsequent to issuance of the NPRM, the agency conducted extensive testing of current 

production vehicles to, among other things, determine the effects of two-sided testing and to assess the roof strengths of vehicles currently on the market. These test 

results were released in the SNPRM. 

Since issuance of the NPRM in 2005, NHTSA has collected and analyzed additional crash data, tested the strength of vehicle roofs in the vehicle fleet, completed 

cost and lead-time studies, and completed other analyses important for the final 

rule development. The agency is in the final stages of its work to issue the final 

rule. Because we are still in rulemaking on this Standard, we are not able to discuss 

specific decisions related to estimates of lives saved, stringency of the requirements, 

or other issues related to the final rule. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your consideration and this subcommittee’s ongoing 

efforts to improve highway safety. I would be pleased to answer any questions. 

Senator PRYOR. Great. 

Let me open, if I may, with some questions. First, let me follow 

up on what Senator Coburn asked, a few moments ago. You know, 

basically, he said that there is not enough transparency in your 

process, and one of the things that is hard for John Q. Public and 

Members of the U.S. Senate to understand is all the criteria that 

you use. One of the things he asked about was, when you laid out 

some of what you’re trying to accomplish here, you talked about a 

goal of trying to keep the costs down, et cetera, but I assume that 

your ultimate goal is safety. Is that fair to say? 

Mr. PORTS. Yes, sir, and thank you for that question. NHTSA’s 

mission is all about safety, it’s about reducing fatalities and injuVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
12 

ries on our Nation’s highways. So, it is a top priority of this agency. 

Before we began the NPRM process in 2001, we solicited comments 

from the public because we wanted to gain their insight on some 

of the issues that were out there and the potential things that we 

should look at. From that public comment period, we began the 

NPRM process and issued that proposal in 2005. After receiving 

public comment again on that NPRM, we decided that we should 

do more testing and analyze more data. It was through that testing—there is—well, actually, it was through these public comments—the public comments that we received from all the stakeholders, the extra testing that we did, that we thought it was prudent to publish an SNPRM, the supplemental notice, in January of 

this year. We are now in the process of reviewing all the public 

comments from that process, from the supplemental budget—I 

mean, supplemental proposal, and analyzing that data, and we will 

include all of those comments in our final rule. 

Senator PRYOR. I do agree with what Senator Coburn said a few 

moments ago—that if new rules don’t make a major difference, in 

terms of safety and preventing fatalities and injuries—then we 

really haven’t accomplished much. And I do agree with that. And 

I would hate for this agency to go through this exercise and then, 

in the end, not really change the outcome out there on the streets 

and highways of this country. 

I have another concern. He mentioned the preemption issue, and 

he said that he did not think it would be prudent for NHTSA to 

somehow foreclose the car owner’s rights with your rulemaking. 

Could you give us a status report on that? 

Mr. PORTS. Yes, Senator, thank you for that question. I know 

that preemption is a very important topic. 

NHTSA has a comprehensive approach to rollover, and saving 

lives and reducing injuries in a rollover crash. And through this 

process, a concern was raised that increasing the roof resistance 

too much could potentially increase a vehicle’s rollover propensity 

if we added weight to the roof structure. Other things being equal, 

raising the roof’s center of gravity could upset the balance between 

the efforts of increasing the roof strength and the rollover propensity, defeating the purpose of this rule. 

It was in light of that concern that we simply asked the question. 

And the reason that we asked that question was because we wanted public input from all the stakeholders. I think it’s important 

that we, as an agency, be transparent in this process and put the 

information out there so that the public does have an opportunity 

to comment. We’ve done that, we’ve received numerous comments 

from all the stakeholders, raising both factual and legal issues, and 

we’re continuing to analyze those comments, and we are also doing 

extra testing based on that information. 

All of those additional—and let me backtrack just a hair. We will 

carefully consider all of those comments before we make a final decision on this proposal, but all that information will be put in our 

final rule. 

Senator PRYOR. I’m going to turn this over to my colleague, Senator McCaskill, here in just a moment, but let me go ahead and 

add my comments to your stack. I think it would be a mistake to 

do the preemption. I think that if NHTSA chooses that path, my 

13 

guess is there would be a serious effort in the House and the Senate to try to change that. And I think you’d save everybody a lot 

of headaches and create less uncertainty by just not pursuing a 

preemption on this matter. I mean, you heard Senator Coburn, and 

I think you’d get that on both sides of the aisle. 

Senator McCaskill? 

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to talk a little bit—you just mentioned ‘‘upset the balance,’’ and I want to talk with you about preemption. 

I’m having a hard time figuring out what preemption has to do 

with a standard rule for safety. The last time we had a rule was 

30-some years ago, correct? 

Mr. PORTS. Are you talking about the roof-crush rule? 

Senator MCCASKILL. The safety standard, wasn’t it 30-some 

years ago? 

Mr. PORTS. In 1973, yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, what you’re basically saying, by proposing preemption, is, ‘‘You need to wait around for 30 years, and 

not have any redress in any court—any state court in America, 

until we get around to it again.’’ I mean, don’t you see the value 

at NHTSA of the innovation that has occurred as a result of people 

accessing the courts in this country? I mean, Ford has done a great 

job with some of the technology; they’re building, now, SUVs in 

Kansas City with some patented technology that’s going to make 

a difference, and that came about, in part, because they were 

spurred to action by the legitimate claims in the courts across this 

country about their safety standards. I mean, does that not worry 

you, that we’re not nimble enough to update the rules, except every 

30 years, and that we’re going to tell every state in the Nation that 

their laws, as it relates to rights of people to go to court, are going 

to be crushed? 

Mr. PORTS. Thank you, Senator, I appreciate the follow-up to 

that question on preemption. 

The reason that we talked about upsetting the balance is because 

the concern was raised that if we increase the standard, that manufacturers may simply raise weight to the roof and raise the center 

of gravity, which would increase the vehicle’s propensity to roll 

over. Part of our strategy, as I mentioned in my, opening statement, was that we have a comprehensive plan to first prevent the 

rollover, and we were not sure if this roof-crush rule would upset 

that balance or not, so what we did was, we asked the question of 

all the stakeholders, would this upset the balance? And what we’re 

doing in this process is, we are receiving numerous comments from 

the stakeholders. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But, what does that have to do with—I 

mean, whether or not they’re going to add more weight to the roof, 

what does that have to do with wiping out everyone in America’s 

rights to use their state courts? What’s that got to do—I don’t understand the relationship there. What is the direct relationship between the balance, in terms of the weight of the roof, and the balance, in terms of every American’s right to go to their courthouse 

14 

in their state and have people from their community decide whether or not somebody has messed up or not? 

Mr. PORTS. Thank you—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. That’s what I don’t understand. I mean— 

and when did NHTSA start including preemption language in all 

of their rules? When did this come about? This is a relatively new 

thing, isn’t it? 

Mr. PORTS.—thank you, Senator. 

My understanding of the preemption language is that we included it as part of the public discussion. At this time, we have not 

made any decisions on whether it will be included in our final rule 

or not. I would also state, however, that if it’s a manufacturing defect, tort suits are not preempted, even with this language. So, your 

constituents may still have that right to sue in a case where a defect—a manufacturing defect is alleged. 

So, we are going to, as I mentioned, analyze all those comments—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Mr. PORTS.—and then, and only then, will we make a decision 

to move forward on preemption, or not. And that, again, will be in 

our final rule. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me see if I can cut to the chase here. 

I reviewed your proposed rules on everything from child restraint 

to locking mechanisms; and unfortunately, the evil boilerplate preemption language appears in every single one of them. Where did 

this come from? Why, all of a sudden, does NHTSA feel compelled 

to crush the rights of states? I mean, the irony is, this administration is supposed to be all about a small Federal Government and 

the rights of states. When and how did NHTSA make the decision 

to start including boilerplate preemption language in every rule 

you’re proposing? 

Mr. PORTS. I appreciate that follow-up. That helps me. 

The preemption language that you’re talking about, the 

boilerplate language, is simply, if an issue of preemption should 

come up—or, if a balance is tipped, then preemption may be warranted. However, my understanding of the way these final rules 

are laid out, the preemption language is not included. So, it is literally up to a court to decide if that balance has been disrupted. 

Senator MCCASKILL. If we’re not going to include them, then you 

could relieve a lot of heartburn by not putting them in the proposed 

rules. But, we have to assume, if, all of a sudden, preemption language is popping up like spring flowers, that there is a plot somewhere in this administration to see if they can’t wipe out the rights 

of Americans across this country to access their local courts. And 

there are people in this Congress that are pretty upset about it, 

and we’re going to work hard to make sure this administration 

doesn’t get away with it. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Let me follow up on that, if I may, and that is—you said that 

if your rule, or maybe if the language in the preamble is codified 

into a rule, that there could still be tort liability for manufacturing 

defects. Is that right? 

Mr. PORTS. I’m sorry, I’m—I want to—— 

15 

Senator PRYOR. You said that—— 

Mr. PORTS.—make sure I heard that question—— 

Senator PRYOR.—there could still be tort liability for manufacturing defects. Is that what you said? 

Mr. PORTS. Yes, sir, Senator. My understanding, from what the 

NHTSA lawyers have told me, is that if there is a manufacturing 

defect alleged, that state tort lawsuits are not preempted—— 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Mr. PORTS.—by this language. 

Senator PRYOR. Well—but, what—I guess what you’d be preempting, then, is design defects. That’s what you’re going after 

here, is design defects. And those are two different things, because 

a manufacturing defect is where, during the manufacturing process, something wasn’t put together correctly, or there was a faulty 

material, or something in there that caused it to fail. Design defect 

is different, that’s when the actual design of the vehicle is flawed, 

or the design of the tire or the design of the seatbelt, whatever it 

may be, is flawed. 

And, I’ll tell you this, again—I just want to give NHTSA warning 

on this—I think that if you all pursue this preemption effort, I 

think you’ll have bipartisan opposition in the Senate. You heard 

Dr. Coburn, who’s not a big lawsuit guy, you know. You heard his 

reaction to this, and there will be others like that, as well. And I 

would strongly encourage NHTSA to back off of that because I 

think that’s a big mistake. 

First, I don’t think the American public is there. I don’t think it’s 

in the public interest to do that. But, second, I think you all are 

overstepping your bounds, as the executive versus the legislative, 

and I think that’s a problem. But, third, I think that what you’ll 

see is a reaction from the Congress that you won’t like, and I think 

it’s easier—again, I said it earlier—just to avoid the headache and 

not get into that preemption issue. I think it’s a big mistake here. 

Let me ask you another couple of questions. I know my time is 

short here, and I don’t know if Senator McCaskill has any other 

follow-ups, but let me just ask a couple of questions. 

One of the concerns that I have, and I think others do as well, 

is that right now the test is on one part of the vehicle, and I understand that NHTSA is contemplating having a test that would actually cover two sides of the roof. Can you give us a status report on 

that? Can you comment on that? 

Mr. PORTS. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that. 

As you mentioned, the test that we have right now is a quasistatic test which can test both sides of the vehicle, the driver side 

and/or the passenger side of the vehicle. So, it protects both sides, 

because the manufacturer does not know which side we would test. 

And then, through the—through all the comments in the NPRM 

that we received, we did additional testing, and in the supplemental notice, we asked for comment on two-sided tests, as you 

just mentioned. 

Senator PRYOR. And so, you’re just at the comment stage on that 

and you’re not sure what NHTSA’s going to do yet. NHTSA has not 

made a decision on a one-sided test or a two-sided test. 

Mr. PORTS. Senator, that is correct, we have not made decisions. 

16 

Senator PRYOR. Now, I know that Congress mandated, and it at 

least encouraged NHTSA, to consider dynamic tests that realistically duplicate the actual forces transmitted during a rollover 

crash. Is that on the table for consideration? 

Mr. PORTS. Senator, thank you very much. Appreciate that. 

Yes, NHTSA has done considerable whole-vehicle dynamic testing for the past 20 years. Some of the testing that we’ve considered 

is the 208 dolly test, the SAE inverted drop test, and the JRS, or 

the Jordan Rollover System. NHTSA’s assessment of those dynamic 

tests continues, and we will be including that in the final rule. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. So, you’re not saying the final rule will include a dynamic test but at least you’re going to discuss it in the 

final rule? 

Mr. PORTS. Yes, Senator. What Congress has asked us to do is 

to look at it and assess it, and we have done that. We’ve done a 

very comprehensive test. We sent some of our three—three of our 

top technical experts to meet with JRS, for example, and through 

that process we’ve learned a lot, and all of that information will be 

included in the final rule. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Do you anticipate that NHTSA will come out 

with separate rules for cars and trucks, or do you think you’ll have 

one rule? 

Mr. PORTS. Senator, we’re striving for one rule and one standard. 

Senator PRYOR. And on these tests that you’re doing and this 

rulemaking you’re going through right now has NHTSA decided to 

just use the 50th-percentile male dummy for all the tests? Is that 

what you’re using for the tests? 

Mr. PORTS. When we put out the supplemental notice, we 

asked—or we disclosed that we were talking about the 50-percentile dummy. There have been numerous comments to use the 

95-percentile dummy. We are assessing those comments, and we 

will absolutely have those comments in our final rule. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. My, just, general question would be, does it 

make sense, engineering sense and sense in the world of physics, 

et cetera, to use different sized dummies during your test, or 

should you just have one dummy size? 

Mr. PORTS. Senator, let me refer that question to Steve Kratske, 

our expert, our technical expert, and he may be able to shed some 

light on that subject. 

Mr. KRATSKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Typically, in our crashes for frontal crash or side crash we have 

used different-sized dummies because we want to be certain that 

it’s not just targeting a particular level. In a quasi-static test, 

you’re really trying to just get to vehicle performance. We don’t 

have injury criteria now for the different sizes. So, in lieu of that, 

what we’ve proposed is just touching the head, so it’s a measure 

of the distance available in the vehicle. 

Senator PRYOR. Senator McCaskill, did you have any other questions? 

Senator MCCASKILL. I just have one, on follow up. 

I’m going to sound like a broken record here, but it’s why I’m 

here today and it’s what I really feel passionately about. And I do 

want to get on the record your acknowledgment that on April 6th, 

2007, NHTSA issued a final rule on Electronic Stability Control 

17 

which includes the boilerplate preemptive language in the preamble without any subject of notice or comment. And I want to 

make sure that you acknowledge that that is, in fact, true as it relates to the boilerplate language on preemption. The final rule was 

issued that included the boilerplate on preemption without any opportunity for anyone to comment about the preemption. 

Mr. PORTS. Senator, I appreciate that. I am not positive right 

now, at this moment, whether that was included in the NPRM or 

not. What I’d be happy to do is go back and ask that question and 

share that information with you, your staff, and the rest of the 

Committee. I’d be more than happy to get that information for you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. If you can figure out where this is coming 

from, what directive is this, who is saying that you’ve got to include 

this preemption in every rule, when did this come down, and where 

did it come from? Did it come from the White House? Who is responsible for this path that you have chosen at NHTSA on preemption? 

I think we’re anxious to figure out why all of a sudden this became an issue. It’s not in the rule—it’s in the preamble. What it’s 

doing here is it is sending a shot across the bow to lawyers across 

this country that, ‘‘You’re going to have to fight to be able to file 

a lawsuit on behalf of people who are hurting, people who have 

been dramatically injured,’’ because you all are including this in 

there. It doesn’t provide certainty, it provides a stew, rich for litigation. And that’s not what we’re looking for here. We’re looking for 

certainty, so we don’t have needless excessive litigation. Everybody 

ought to be in that camp. 

So, I would be anxious, if you could share with us some kind of 

indication as to why this began and who’s responsible for it beginning. 

Mr. PORTS. Senator, I appreciate that. As I mentioned, I don’t 

have that answer for you, at this moment, and we’d be glad to get 

that for you. 

But, as it relates to this rule, we put it in the NPRM, in the supplemental notice, to make sure that everyone in the public had the 

opportunity to discuss this matter. So, we didn’t simply wait until 

the final rule to surprise anyone. 

Our goal is to be transparent, and our goal at NHTSA, to save 

lives and prevent injuries, is one that we take seriously. And so, 

when we look at a rule, we look at each and every rule as a standalone event, and that’s how we make our decisions in this agency. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I know your lawyer is here, and I do 

know that comment does not generally come to the preamble, that 

the preamble is not part of the rule that’s open to discussion and 

that NHTSA didn’t say ‘‘Should we?’’ But instead it said ‘‘This is 

it,’’ in the preamble, ‘‘we’re going to have preemption.’’ And so, I 

will let you know, and I’m not trying to be mean to you, but I am 

far from satisfied with the answers you’ve given. I think you obviously are not in a position to say. But, the way this thing is happening, it doesn’t look like this is all about getting the input of the 

public. It looks like this is, frankly, being railroaded through in a 

way in which people can’t comment—in a way that people can’t 

have an impact, and proof of that is the fact that you issued a final 

rule with it in there, in the preamble. 

18 

So, if you would do whatever you can to address these questions 

in the coming days, I can assure you that I am one of many in the 

Senate who feels very strongly about this and we’re anxious to get 

to the bottom of it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator PRYOR. With that, let me say that we are going to leave 

the record open for 2 weeks, and I’d ask you to get your answers 

back to Senator McCaskill—just get them back to the committee, 

and we’ll share with the Senator as soon as you get them back. 

And other Senators will have questions who are not here today, 

and I have a few to follow up on, as well, so we would ask you to 

try to get us timely responses and detailed responses within the 

next 2 weeks. 

I don’t have time to go into it, but one of the questions I am 

going to ask you about in the written question’s is a status report 

on Section 10303 of SAFETEA–LU, specifically the tire research 

component—a question on tire aging. I know that’s a little bit off 

the subject, but that’s an important question I think the Senate 

Committee would like a status report on. So, we’ll cover that then. 

Thank you for being here, and now I’m going to call up the third 

panel. Thank you. 

All right, as we’re changing places here, I’ll go ahead and call out 

the names of the panel. I’m not going to give a lengthy introduction, so— 

First, we’d like to hear from Dr. David Garcia. He’s an Independent Contractor and Public Speaker. Next, we’d like to have 

Mr. Stephen Oesch, Senior Vice President, Insurer and Government Relations, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. Next, we’ll 

have Mr. Rob Strassburger, Vice President, Vehicle Safety and 

Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. Next, we’ll 

have Ms. Joan Claybrook, President of Public Citizen. Next, we’ll 

have Mr. Michael J. Stanton, President and CEO, Association of 

International Automobile Manufacturers. And next, we will have 

Ms. Jacqueline Gillan, Vice President, Advocates for Highway and 

Auto Safety. 

So, what I’d like to ask everyone to do is, if possible, keep your 

opening statements to 5 minutes. Those first couple of panels took 

a little bit longer than we anticipated, and we would appreciate it 

if you all kept your comments to 5 minutes, and then I’m sure we’ll 

have a lot of questions. 

So, Dr. Garcia, are you ready? Why don’t we go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID A. GARCIA, INDEPENDENT 

CONTRACTOR AND PUBLIC SPEAKER 

Dr. GARCIA. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Senator. 

I think a lot has been said here this morning, and thank you for 

your questions and being so direct on the right questions that need 

to be asked. So, I think it’s going to shorten a lot of the things I 

need to say, because you have asked the tough questions. So, I’m 

going to focus more on what I have to say about the victims in this 

country. 

Today, I graciously received from you 5 minutes to defeat a voracious—it’s this one, right here? I’m used to this already, this happens a lot of times. 

19 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. GARCIA. Hello? Can you hear me? OK. 

Today, I graciously received from you 5 minutes to defeat a voracious and insatiable giant that, in biblical proportions, continues to 

devour our Nation’s sons and daughters, fathers and mothers, husbands and wives, friends and foes alike, while many, in apathy, 

simply choose to watch. That giant is none other than ‘‘roof-crush’’ 

which is occurring on our Nation’s highways and back roads, and 

more voraciously and insatiably than the biblical giant mercilessly 

continues to run his course. I aim, today, with a God-given minute, 

to defeat for the last time this ruthless giant. 

Tyler Moody, Kevin Moody’s 18-year-old son, died in 2003 from 

positional asphyxia, when, not even knowing what hit him, the roof 

of the Ford Explorer he drove literally crushed the life out of him. 

The statistics would never tell you that Tyler once saved a life. 

Today, you can save more than 10,000 lives and 24 catastrophic injuries a year. 

If Tyler’s death is not enough, think about Arizona Border Patrol 

Agent David Webb, who, while responding to a routine narcotics 

call, died from roof crush when the right rear tire of his Chevrolet 

Tahoe blew out, causing his vehicle to overturn. Celia Webb is 

Agent Webb’s widow, and her presence here today speaks for her 

husband. 

If David’s death is not enough, think about Christopher Cowan, 

whose Chevy Silverado rolled over on a flat, grassy terrain, and the 

roof completely collapsed to the belt line, also crushing the life out 

of him. 

If Christopher’s death is not enough, think about Kimberly 

Schute, who broke her neck when her Jeep Grand Cherokee’s roof 

buckled at its ‘‘weak link’’ and came crushing down on her head. 

And think about what happened to Agent Luis Pena when the roof 

of his Ford F–250 patrol vehicle crushed and dislocated his 

vertebrae, injuring his spinal cord, thus rendering him a quadriplegic. Luis Pena has a wife, Jennifer, and two children. He and 

his family also speak out with their presence here today. 

If Kimberly and Luis’s inability to walk is not enough, think 

about Loa Griesbach, a teenage ventilator-dependent quadriplegic 

who will forever struggle for every breath that she needs, because 

of the complete collapse of her Suburban’s roof. 

If Loa’s inability to breathe is not enough, and in light of the fact 

that the automobile industry takes the position that there is no 

correlation between roof crush and head and spinal cord injuries, 

think about the 14 Marines who were in their Ford E–350 Club 

Wagon that overturned when the vehicle’s rear tire delaminated. 

All of the Marines who died or sustained serious injuries were sitting on the side where the roof crushed. 

I am David Garcia, and I may not be a king or a war hero, but 

one of the many hundreds of thousands of individuals that roof 

crush has claimed. I was not driving an SUV, I was driving a Ford 

Escort. It is only by God’s grace that I’m able to stand up today, 

even if metaphorically speaking, for Tyler, David Webb, Christopher, Kimberly, Luis, Loa, the marines, and all the victims who, 

for one reason or another, cannot afford the privilege to speak for 

themselves. The automobile industry should not go on doing busiVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
20 

1 An American Auto Safety Tragedy—ROOF CRUSH available at http://www.peoplesafein 

rollovers.org/An%20American%20Auto%20safety%20Tragedy.pdf. 

ness as usual, and we should demand that the facts surrounding 

roof crush should not continue to be a proprietary secret. 

How many times must a father lose a child? And how many families must be broken apart for it to become obvious that roof crush 

kills and maims people for life? 

Others will speak or submit the necessary supportive materials 

that are of concern to us here. However, it is necessary to underscore that the 26 state Attorneys General, maybe from your own 

states, who are extremely versed in the rule of law, rightfully oppose the preemption clause that will strip away the rights of injured victims while passing on the $34-billion-a-year bill to your 

constituents. What NHTSA is proposing regarding preemption is 

unjust, and if you consider the mandate, it is not legal. Yet, they 

plan to do this, 30 days from now. 

As if behind our backs, NHTSA continues to promote and legislate what I believe is an FMVSS 216 mirage. Thus, understanding 

that it would take an act of Congress for NHTSA to do the right 

thing on behalf of the American people, we propose a bill that will 

mandate that NHTSA and the automobile industry will do the 

right thing, and we have a summary of that bill behind us. 

The reason why we need a new standard is not a secret. NHTSA 

did not get it right, back in 1971. We are at another crossroad in 

automobile roof safety, and we are about to make the same mistake 

all over again. It is time that NHTSA and the automobile industry 

join the global momentum that was making vehicles that not only 

provide better gas mileage, but that truly are designed to protect 

occupants in a rollover, and they should be prevented from legalizing a roof standard that has not, does not, and will not work. 

Every day, people die physically and spiritually in rollover accidents. I have a responsibility, before man and God. And even 

though I know nothing about healing broken bones and spinal 

cords, I do know a thing or two about healing broken spirits. Despite my condition, by the grace of God, I have been given much, 

and you, too, have been greatly blessed. Therefore, if you believe 

in what I believe in, then just as much is required of you as it is 

required of me. It is the sole purpose of why I made the long journey here today. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. David Garcia follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID A. GARCIA, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

AND PUBLIC SPEAKER

Distinguished Members of the Committee: 

Today, I graciously receive from you 5 minutes to defeat a voracious and insatiable giant that, in biblical proportions, continues to devour our Nation’s sons and 

daughters; fathers and mothers; husbands and wives; friends and foes alike,1 while 

many in apathy simply choose to watch. That giant is none other than roof crush, 

which is occurring on our Nation’s highways and back roads, and more voraciously 

and insatiably than the biblical giant, mercilessly continues to run its course. I aim 

today with a God-given minute to defeat for the last time this ‘‘roofless’’ giant. 

21 

2Kevin, Veronica and Michelle Moody’s letter to Senators, engraved in marble, dated September 6, 2007. 3Paula Lawlor’s letter to Senators dated June 4, 2008. 

4Paula Lawlor’s submission to NHTSA Docket 2005–22143 dated November 21, 2005. 

Tyler Moody, Kevin Moody’s 18-year-old son, died in 2003 from positional asphyxia,2 when, not even knowing what had hit him, the roof of the Ford Explorer 

he drove literally crushed the life out of him. The statistics would never tell you 

that Tyler once saved a life. Today you can save more than 10,000 lives and 24,000 

catastrophic injuries a year. 

If Tyler’s death is not enough, think about Arizona Border Patrol Agent, David 

Webb, who, while responding to a routine narcotics call, died from roof crush when 

the right rear tire of his Chevrolet Tahoe blew out, causing his vehicle to overturn. 

Celia Webb is agent Webb’s widow, and her presence here today speaks for her husband. 

If David’s death is not enough, think about Christopher Cowan whose Chevy 

Silverado rolled over on a flat, grassy terrain and the roof completely collapsed to 

the beltline, also crushing the life out of him. 

If Christopher’s death is not enough, think about Kimberly Schute who broke her 

neck when her Jeep Grand Cherokee’s roof buckled at its ‘‘weak link’’ and came 

crushing down on her head. And think about what happened to Agent Luis Pena, 

when the roof of his Ford F–250 patrol vehicle crushed and dislocated his vertebrae, 

injuring his spinal cord, thus rendering him a quadriplegic. Luis Pena has a wife, 

Jennifer, and two children. He and his family also speak out with their presence 

here today. 

If Kimberly and Luis’s inability to walk is not enough, think about Loa Griesbach, 

a teenage ventilator dependent quadriplegic, who will forever struggle for every 

breath that she needs because of the complete collapse of her Suburban’s roof. 

If Loa’s inability to breathe is not enough, and in light of the fact that the automobile industry takes the position that there is no correlation between roof crush 

and head and spinal cord injuries,3 think about the 14 Marines, who were in the 

Ford E–350 Club Wagon that overturned when the vehicle’s rear tire delaminated. 

All of the Marines who died or sustained serious injuries were sitting on the side 

where the roof crushed. 

I am David Garcia, and I may not be a king or a war hero, but one of the many 

hundreds of thousands of individuals that roof crush has claimed. I was not driving 

an SUV, I was driving a Ford Escort. It is only by God’s grace that I am able to 

stand up today, even if metaphorically speaking, for Tyler, David Webb, Christopher, Kimberly, Luis, Loa, the Marines and all the victims, who, for one reason 

or another cannot afford the privilege to speak for themselves. The automobile industry should not go on doing business as usual, and we should demand that the 

facts surrounding roof crush should not continue to be a proprietary secret. How 

many times must a father lose a child, and how many families must be broken apart 

for it to become obvious that roof crush kills and maims people for life? 

Others will speak or submit the necessary supportive materials that are of concern to us here. However, it is necessary to underscore that 26 State Attorney Generals, maybe from your own states who are extremely versed in the rule of law, 

rightfully oppose the preemption clause 4 that would strip away the rights of injured 

victims, while passing on the $34 billion a year bill to your constituents. What 

NHTSA is proposing regarding preemption is unjust, and if you consider their mandate, it is not legal. Yet, this will happen in less than 30 days unless you promptly 

act. 

As if behind our backs, NHTSA continues to promote and legislate, what I believe 

is an FMVSS 216 mirage. Thus, understanding that it would take an act of Congress for NHTSA to do the right thing on behalf of the American people, we are 

proposing a bill that will mandate that NHTSA and the automobile industry: 

1. Conduct two-sided sequential static roof crush tests as currently done, but 

increase the applied force to at least 3.5 times the maximum unloaded vehicle 

weight and prohibit any part of the roof or test device from contacting the 

dummy. 

2. Develop repeatable dynamic tests on rollovers and disseminate test results 

to the public. 

3. Establish a roof strength safety rating consumer information program and 

make the strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) of all vehicles available to consumers. 

4. Initiate a study to determine the advantages and disadvantages of retrofitting vehicles with the 10 percent lowest SWR. If there is a benefit, require 

22 

5Deadly By Design by Paula Lawlor and Todd Tracy. 6 Record of April 28, 2005 meeting with Office of Management and Budget. 

7Paula Lawlor’s submission to NHTSA Docket 2005–22143 dated November 21, 2005. 

manufacturers of these vehicles to develop retrofit kits and make these kits 

available to the public. 

The reason why we need a new standard is not a secret: NHTSA did not get it 

right back in 1971.5 We are at another crossroad in automobile roof safety, and we 

are about to make the same mistake all over again. It is time that NHTSA and the 

automobile industry joined the global momentum toward making vehicles that not 

only provide better gas mileage, but that truly are designed to protect occupants in 

a rollover, and they should be prevented from legalizing a roof strength standard 

that has not, does not, and will not work. The technology is not out of this world. 

The 2006 Volkswagen Jetta, 5.1; the 2007 Scion TC, 4.6; the 2006 Volvo XC90, 4.6; 

the 2006 Honda Civic, 4.5; and even the Ford 500, which has an SWR of 3.9 not 

only exceed the 1.5 FMVSS 216 standard, but also exceeds the proposed 2.5 SWR. 

To legally encourage a 2.5 SWR, is inconsistent with the momentum and innovation 

that we are seeing, and would only encourage automobile manufacturers to lax 

when it comes to vehicle safety. A request was formally made to the Office of Management and Budget 6 and to NHTSA, in 2005,7 to evaluate the cost/benefit at 3.5 

SWR, but to this date it has not been done. This cost/benefit analysis is of utmost 

importance in realizing the actual lives saved and the value placed on each life 

saved. 

Every day people die physically and spiritually in rollover accidents. I have a responsibility before man and God, and even though I know nothing about healing 

broken bones and spinal cords, I do know a thing or two about healing broken spirits. Despite my condition, by the grace of God I have been given much, and you too 

have been greatly blessed. Therefore, if you believe in what I believe in, then just 

as much is required of you as is required of me. It is the sole purpose of why I made 

the long journey here today. Thank you. 

DR. DAVID A. GARCIA, 

Endicott, New York. 

Attachments: Tyler Joseph Moody 

David Webb 

Christopher Cowan 

Kimberly Schute 

Luis Pena, Jr. 

Loa Griesbach 

14 Marines—Those Injured or Dead: 

Major Trevor Kleineahlbrandt 

Captain David W. Lucas 

Staff Sergeant Frank E. Weathers 

Sergeant Armando Avila 

Sergeant Michael Vasquez 

David Garcia 

Improving the Safety of Vehicle Roofs 

23 

ATTACHMENTS


604garca1.eps 604garca2.eps
24 


604garca3.eps 604garca4.eps
25 


604garca5.eps 604garca6.eps
26 


604garca7.eps 604garca8.eps
27 

IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF VEHICLE ROOFS

Whereas 10,000 people in the United States die in rollover crashes each year; 

Whereas rollover crashes constitute 3 percent of passenger vehicle crashes, but 

about one-third of the fatalities; 

Whereas 24,000 people are seriously injured in the United States in rollover 

crashes each year; 

Whereas an internal NHTSA study The Role of Vertical Roof Intrusion and PostCrash Headroom in Predicting Roof Contact Injuries to the Head, Neck, or Face During FMVSS No. 216 Rollovers; An Updated Analysis became publicly available on 

January 31, 2008 and concluded: ‘‘A statistically significant relationship existed between both vertical roof intrusion and post-crash headroom on the one hand and 

maximum injury severity on the head, neck, or face injury from roof contact on the 

other hand.’’; and 

Whereas the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) sponsored study Roof 

Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes, dated March 2008 concluded: ‘‘Increased vehicle roof strength reduces the risk of fatal or incapacitating driver injury 

in single-vehicle rollover crashes.’’: Now, therefore, be it 

(a) To amend title 49, United States Code § 30101(1) to require Federal Motor 

Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216; Roof Crush Resistance to incorporate the following—— 

(1) Increase applied force to 3.5 times the maximum unloaded vehicle 

weight; 

(2) Prohibit any roof component or test device from contacting a seated 50th 

percentile male Hybrid III dummy under the specific applied force; and 

(3) Conduct two-sided sequential tests on each vehicle retaining the current 

test procedure. 

(4) MOTOR VEHICLES COVERED.—This subsection applies to motor vehicles, including passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, and trucks, 

with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less. 

(5) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (a) shall take effect no later than 4 

years after the date of enactment of this Bill. 

(b) To amend title 49, United States Code § 30101(2) to require ROLLOVER 

TESTS FOR ROOF STRENGTH.—— 

(1) DEVELOPMENT.—No later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Bill, the Secretary of Transportation shall—— 

(A) develop a repeatable dynamic test on rollovers of motor vehicles for 

the purpose of a consumer information program of vehicle roof 

strength; and 

(B) carry out a program of conducting such tests. 

(2) TEST RESULTS.—As the Secretary develops a test under paragraph 

(1)(A), the Secretary shall conduct a rulemaking to determine how best to 

disseminate test results to the public. 

(3) MOTOR VEHICLES COVERED.—This subsection applies to motor vehicles, including passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, and trucks, 

with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less. 

(c) To amend title 49, United States Code § 30117(a)(1) to require a ROOF 

STRENGTH SAFETY RATING PROGRAM.—No later than 90 days after the 

date of enactment of this Bill, the Secretary of Transportation shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to establish a roof strength safety rating consumer 

information program and make publicly available the SWR (Strength-to-Weight 

Ratios) of all vehicles, to provide practicable, readily understandable, and timely 

information to consumers for use in making informed decisions in the purchase 

of vehicles. No later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Bill, the 

Secretary shall issue a final rule establishing a roof strength safety rating program and provide consumer information which the Secretary determines would 

be useful to consumers who purchase vehicles. 

(1) MOTOR VEHICLES COVERED.—This subsection applies to motor vehicles, including passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, and trucks, 

with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less. 

(d) To amend title 49, United States Code § 30101(2) to require SAFETY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO RETROFIT VEHICLES WITH LOW 

SWR.—— 

28 

(1) SAFETY RESEARCH.—No later than 12 months after the date of enactment of this Bill, the Secretary of Transportation shall initiate and complete a study compiling information on the advantages and disadvantages 

of retrofitting vehicles with the 10 percent lowest SWR (Strength-to-Weight 

Ratios) to increase their SWR, determining the benefits, if any, of retrofitting, and submit a report on the results of that study to Congress. 

(2) DEVELOPMENT.—If Congress believes there is a benefit to retrofitting 

vehicles with the 10 percent lowest SWR, then no later than 12 months 

after the date of enactment of this Bill, the Secretary of Transportation 

shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to require the manufacturers 

of vehicles with the 10 percent lowest SWR to develop retrofit kits to 

strengthen the roofs of those vehicles. No later than 18 months after the 

date of enactment of this Bill, the Secretary shall issue a final rule requiring the manufacturers of vehicles with the 10 percent lowest SWR to develop retrofit kits to strengthen the roofs of those vehicles and make the 

retrofit kits publicly available. 

(3) MOTOR VEHICLES COVERED.—This subsection applies to the previous 10 model years prior to the date of the enactment of this Bill. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

I’m sorry, Mr. Oesch? 

Mr. OESCH. Yes, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. I mispronounced that earlier. 

Mr. OESCH. That’s quite all right. 

Senator PRYOR. Go ahead. Thank you. 

Mr. OESCH. No one ever gets it, sir. 

[Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. OESCH, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

INSURER AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, 

INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY 

Mr. OESCH. I am Steve Oesch, with the Insurance Institute for 

Highway Safety. 

The Institute is a nonprofit research and communications organization that is dedicated to identifying ways to reduce the deaths, 

injuries, and property damage on our Nation’s highways. We are 

sponsored by automobile insurers. I’m here today to share with you 

the results of our recent research looking at the relationship between roof strength and injury risk in rollover crashes. 

A key to providing protection to occupants in any type of crash, 

be it front, side, or rollover, is to ensure that the occupant compartment, the safety cage around the occupants, is well maintained so 

that the airbags and the lap/shoulder belts can provide protection 

in the event of a crash. 

You’ll see, in my written testimony, some examples of the 40- 

mile-an-hour frontal offset crashes that we’ve done. You’ll see the 

test results for the Pontiac Transport, that the occupant compartment collapsed around the occupants, therefore increasing the risk 

of injury. In sharp contrast, you’ll see the test results for the 2005 

Chevrolet Uplander, and the occupant compartment is well maintained so that the airbags and lap/shoulder belt could provide protection in that crash. 

Prior to our recent research on roof strength, several studies had 

reported no relationship between roof strength and injury risk in 

rollover crashes. These earlier studies defy logic, because, as I just 

explained, in every other crash configuration, the basic principle of 

occupant crash protection means that you preserve the safety cage 

29 

so the airbags and lap/shoulder belts can provide protection in the 

event of a crash. 

Thus, there is no logical reason to assume that in a rollover 

crash you would want to design a vehicle that would allow excessive intrusion. In fact, if you look at NASCAR vehicles, they’re designed with roll cages. And I’ve included in my written testimony 

an example of a very violent crash in which the vehicle rolled over 

numerous times; the driver was well protected, because there was 

a roll cage in that vehicle. 

Our study was a two-part analysis involving vehicle testing and 

examination of the outcome of real rollover crashes. We looked at 

11 mid-sized four-door SUVs, and we subjected them to a test 

that’s similar to the test that’s conducted by automobile manufacturers to determine whether the vehicle complies with the Federal 

standard. I’ve included in my testimony two demonstration tests— 

one ivolved the Nissan Xterra, the vehicle with one of the strongest 

roofs in our study, and we subjected it to a force of 10,000 pounds. 

As you can see in the photograph, the Nissan Xterra withstood that 

force with only 2 inches of crush. In contrast, if you look at the 

2000 model year Ford Explorer in that same test, we crushed it 

down to 10 inches, and it was not able to resist the 10,000 pounds 

of force. Such a striking difference in the amount of roof crush illustrates why you would expect to have higher injury risk in SUVs 

with weaker roofs. 

Having established this difference in roof strength, we then 

looked at real-world crashes. We examined more than 23,000 crashes that occurred during the period 1997 to 2005 involving the vehicles that we tested. We then looked at the difference in the roof 

strength between those vehicles, and what we found was, no matter what measure of roof strength that we used, a constant relationship emerged; it showed that SUVs with stronger roofs had 

lower injury risks, just exactly what you would expect. We are 

going to continue to do additional research on other classes of vehicles. We expect to see that same relationship. 

As to the proposed Federal standard, our study clearly shows the 

relationship between increased roof strength and reduced injury 

risk in rollover crashes. We support the use of the current roofcrush procedures set forth in existing Federal standard. Our study 

supports—shows that you—going to a strength-to-weight ratio of at 

least three times vehicle weight would be warranted by the data. 

But, as we point out, if we even went from 1.5 times the vehicle 

weight, which is the existing standard, to 2.5 times the vehicle 

weight, which is the proposal from the National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration, there would be a reduction in rollover serious and fatal injuries by 28 percent. So, increasing the roof 

strengths, naturally, beyond that 2.5 times vehicle weight would 

reduce the risk even further. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I want to thank you 

very much for the opportunity. And I would like to acknowledge 

that two of the authors of the study, Mr. Matt Brumbelow and Mr. 

Eric Teoh, accompany me today, and I want to credit them with the 

very important research they did showing this relationship between increased roof strength and lower injury risk. 

Thank you. 

30 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Oesch follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. OESCH, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, INSURER AND

GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety is a nonprofit research and communications organization that identifies ways to reduce the deaths, injuries, and property damage on our Nation’s highways. We are sponsored by U.S. automobile insurers. Thank you for inviting IIHS to testify on the findings of our recent research 

on the relationship between roof strength and injury risk in rollover crashes. 

Principles of Vehicle Crashworthiness 

A key to protecting occupants in front, side, rear, or rollover crashes is ensuring 

that compartments, or ‘‘safety cages,’’ surrounding the occupants remain intact so 

lap/shoulder belts and airbags can provide protection during the crashes. If an occupant compartment allows excessive intrusion of the door, instrument panel, footwell, 

roof, or other vehicle structure, it compromises the ability of vehicle restraint systems to protect the occupants. 

This is demonstrated by comparing 2 vehicles IIHS evaluated in 40 mph frontal 

offset crash tests. The occupant compartment in the 1997 Pontiac Transport was 

compromised, thus increasing the potential for occupant injury. In sharp contrast 

is the occupant compartment in the 2005 Chevrolet Uplander, which withstood the 

forces of the frontal impact and remained intact, allowing the lap/shoulder belt and 

airbag to provide good occupant protection. 


604oesch0.eps
31 

1 Brumbelow, M.L.; Teoh, E.R.; Zuby, D.S.; and McCartt, A.T., 2008. Roof strength and injury 

risk in rollover crashes. Arlington, VA: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. 2 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2008. Comment to the National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration in response to comments by Padmanaban and Moffatt on the Institute’s 

study, ‘‘Roof Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes,’’ May 13. Arlington, VA. 3 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2008. Strength of roofs on SUVs influences risk of 

occupant injury in rollover crashes, new Institute study finds. Status Report 43:1. Arlington, VA. 

Prior to our recent research on roof strength, several studies had reported no relationship between roof strength and injury risk in rollover crashes. These earlier 

findings defy logic because, as I just explained, in every other crash configuration— 

whether front, side, or rear—the basic principles of occupant protection dictate that 

the compartment be designed to resist intrusion so lap/shoulder safety belts and airbags can provide protection to occupants. There is no logical reason to assume that 

in a rollover crash, you would design a vehicle to permit excessive intrusion. This 

is the reason NASCAR vehicles are equipped with roll bars to prevent roof crush 

in violent rollover crashes such as the one experienced by Michael McDowell at the 

Texas Motor Speedway in 2008. He walked away from this crash uninjured. 

Findings of IIHS’s Study of SUV Roof Strength 

Our study, described in the attached documents,123 is a 2-part analysis involving 

vehicle testing and examination of the outcomes of real-world rollover crashes. Eleven midsize 4-door SUV roof designs were subjected to a test similar to the one conVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE

604oesch0a.eps 604oesch2a.eps
32 

ducted by automakers to comply with Federal roof strength requirements. Researchers applied force to the roofs until crush reached 10 inches, measuring the peak 

force required for 2 inches of crush, 5 inches of crush, and 10 inches. There was 

a range of performance among the SUVs tested, and 2 demonstration tests illustrate 

the differences. 

These photographs show what happened when the 2000 Nissan Xterra, the SUV 

with the strongest roof in IIHS tests, and the 2000 Ford Explorer, which has one 

of the weakest roofs, were subjected to a force of up to 10,000 pounds. The Xterra 

resisted a force of 10,000 pounds after only 2 inches of crush, while the Explorer 

crushed all the way to 10 inches without reaching this level of resistance. Such a 

striking difference in the amount of roof crush illustrates why higher injury risk 

would be expected in SUVs with weaker roofs. 

Having established the range of roof strength among the SUVs in the IIHS study, 

the researchers then focused on almost 23,000 rollover crashes of the same SUVs 

that occurred in the real world during 1997–2005. Logistic regression was used to 

assess the effect of roof strength on the likelihood of serious or fatal driver injury 

in the on-the-road rollover crashes of the SUVs. The regression controlled for stateto-state differences, vehicle stability, and driver age, and the results denote the injury risk, given the strength of an SUV’s roof. No matter what measure of roof 

strength the researchers used, a consistent relationship emerged: SUVs with stronger roofs had lower injury risks. 

There are important strengths of our study. We looked only at midsize SUVs because they are similar vehicles with similar drivers and a high risk of rolling over. 

This allowed researchers to limit the number of variables in the analysis and conVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE

604oesch0b.eps 604oesch0bb.eps
33 

centrate on the ones that would ensure that results were not biased by factors such 

as differences in driver age, types of use, etc. Another strength is that we used several different measures of roof strength, all of which confirmed that injury risk is 

lower among vehicles with stronger roofs. This makes logical sense, and the data 

confirm it. 

Based on our research, we expect that the study’s finding of reduced injury risk 

with increased roof strength will hold for other types of vehicles, although the magnitude of the injury risk reductions may differ among vehicle groups. To further establish this, we plan to conduct another series of roof crush tests involving a different class of vehicles—small passenger cars—that also has a high rollover rate. 

Dynamic Rollover Test 

A dynamic rollover test using instrumented test dummies would be a gold standard for assessing occupant protection in rollover crashes. However, we are not certain that the procedures for a dynamic test are reasonably repeatable, and we are 

not sure how to conduct such a test to obtain the most relevant information. Realworld rollover crashes vary widely. They often are preceded by violent events as vehicles leave the road and begin to roll over. The positions of occupants at the time 

a rollover begins are uncertain, so it is difficult to position test dummies to represent where occupants would be in real-world rollover crashes. Current dummies 

designed for front, side, and rear testing have not been shown to behave in a 

human-like manner in rollover crashes. 

Proposed Federal Roof Crush Standard 

IIHS’s study clearly shows the relationship between increased roof strength and 

reduced injury risk in rollover crashes. We support the continued use of the current 

roof crush procedures set forth in the existing Federal standard on roof crush resistance. However, our study supports requiring vehicles to have a strength-to-weight 

ratio of at least 3.0. We estimate that a 1-unit increase in peak strength-to-weight 

ratio—for example, from 1.5 times vehicle weight, as specified in the existing Federal standard, to 2.5 times, as proposed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration—would reduce the risk of serious or fatal injury in a rollover crash by 

28 percent. Increasing roof strength requirements beyond 2.5 times vehicle weight 

would reduce injury risk even further. 

ROOF STRENGTH AND INJURY RISK IN ROLLOVER CRASHES—March 2008 

by Matthew L. Brumbelow, Eric R. Teoh, David S. Zuby, and Anne T. McCartt 

Abstract 

Vehicle rollover is a major cause of fatality in passenger vehicle crashes. Rollovers 

are more complicated than planar crashes, and potential injury mechanisms still are 

being studied and debated. A central factor in these debates is the importance of 

having a strong vehicle roof. Minimum roof strength is regulated under Federal 

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 216, but no study to date has established 

a relationship between performance in this or any other test condition and occupant 

protection in real-world rollover crashes. The present study evaluated the relationship between roof strengths of 11 mid-size SUV roof designs and the rate of fatal 

or incapacitating driver injury in single-vehicle rollover crashes in 12 states. Quasistatic tests were conducted under the conditions specified in FMVSS 216, and the 

maximum force required to crush the roof to 2, 5, and 10 inches of plate displacement was recorded. Various measures of roof strength were calculated from the test 

results for evaluation in logistic regression models. In all cases, increased measures 

of roof strength resulted in significantly reduced rates of fatal or incapacitating driver injury after accounting for vehicle stability, driver age, and state differences. A 

one-unit increase in peak strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) within 5 inches of plate 

displacement, the metric currently regulated under the FMVSS 216 standard, was 

estimated to reduce the risk of fatal or incapacitating injury by 28 percent. 

Introduction 

During the past two decades automobile manufacturers have made important advances in designing vehicle structures that provide greater occupant protection in 

planar crashes (Lund and Nolan 2003). However, there has been little consensus regarding the importance of roof strength in rollover crashes, as well as the best 

method for assessing that strength. In 2006 one-quarter of fatally injured passenger 

vehicle occupants were involved in crashes where vehicle rollover was considered 

the most harmful event (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2007). Many fatally injured occupants in rollovers are unbelted, and some are completely or parVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
34 

tially ejected from the vehicle (Deutermann 2002). There is disagreement concerning 

how structural changes could affect ejection risk or the risk of injury for occupants 

who remain in the vehicle, regardless of belt use. 

Some researchers have concluded there is no relationship between roof crush and 

injury risk as measured by anthropometric test devices (ATDs) (Bahling et al., 1990; 

James et al., 2007; Moffatt et al., 2003; Orlowski et al., 1985; Piziali et al., 1998), 

whereas others have reached the opposite conclusion using data from the same 

crash tests (Friedman and Nash, 2001; Rechnitzer et al., 1998; Syson 1995). These 

disparate conclusions have led to distinct hypotheses about the primary source of 

rollover injury: either a diving mechanism in which injury occurs independently of 

roof crush, or a roof intrusion mechanism in which injury is caused by structural 

collapse. These hypotheses often are seen as being mutually exclusive, but both assume that keeping occupants in the vehicle and preventing head-to-roof contact reduces injury risk. According to Bahling et al., (1990), ‘‘the absence of deformation 

may benefit belted occupants if it results in the belted occupant not contacting the 

roof.’’ 

Federal Regulation of Roof Strength 

Although many researchers have studied potential rollover injury mechanisms, 

evaluation of the Federal regulation governing roof strength has been lacking. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 216 was introduced in 1971 to establish a minimum level of roof strength and is the only regulation governing rollover 

crashworthiness for passenger vehicles (Office of the Federal Register 1971). FMVSS 

216 specifies a quasi-static test procedure that measures the force required to push 

a metal plate into the roof at a constant rate. It requires a reaction force equal to 

1.5 times the weight of the vehicle be reached within 5 inches of plate displacement. 

In 1991 the standard was extended to apply to light trucks and vans with gross vehicle weight ratings less than 6,000 pounds (Office of the Federal Register 1991). 

In 2005 NHTSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) announcing its 

intent to upgrade the roof strength standard (Office of the Federal Register 2005). 

According to the proposal the test procedure would remain largely unchanged but 

the level of required force would be increased to a strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) 

of 2.5. The maximum 5-inch plate displacement limit would be replaced by a requirement that the minimum strength be achieved prior to head-to-roof contact for 

an ATD positioned in the front outboard seat on the side of the vehicle being tested. 

Using two different analysis methods, NHTSA estimated 13 or 44 lives per year 

would be saved by the proposed standard, equivalent to less than 1 percent of rollover fatalities. These estimates were based on an evaluation of 32 crashes in the 

National Automotive Sampling System/Crashworthiness Data System (NASS/CDS), 

after assuming that the following occupants, among others, would not benefit from 

the proposed upgraded standard: occupants in arrested rolls, ejected occupants, 

unbelted occupants, occupants in rear seats, and occupants without coded intrusion 

above their seating positions. 

In 2008 NHTSA issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking announcing 

the results of additional research tests (Office of the Federal Register 2008). The 

proposal indicated the agency may consider adopting a sequential two-sided test. 

Final decisions about the minimum SWR for either a one- or two-sided test are 

pending results of an updated benefits analysis. 

Previous Research Relating Roof Strength to Crash Injury Outcomes 

NHTSA’s benefits analysis in the 2005 NPRM assumed that roofs designed to 

meet a higher strength requirement in the quasi-static test are better able to maintain occupant headroom during rollover crashes in the field. This link has never 

been shown, nor has any measure of roof strength been found to predict injury risk. 

The agency’s own assessment found most vehicles ‘‘easily exceeded’’ the requirements of FMVSS 216, even vehicles produced before introduction of the standard 

(Kahane 1989). Demonstrating that a test promotes crashworthy designs is difficult 

without either a sample of vehicles not meeting the test requirements or a range 

of performance among vehicles that pass. Kahane found that some hardtop roof designs without B-pillars sustained more crush before meeting the minimum strength 

requirement, and that fleet-wide fatality risk in non-ejection rollover crashes declined during the 1970s, a time period corresponding to a shift toward roof designs 

with B-pillars. These findings did not establish a relationship between roof strength 

and injury because test results for specific vehicles were not compared with injury 

rates for those vehicles. 

Only two studies directly investigated the relationship between peak roof strength 

and injury outcome for occupants in real-world rollover crashes (Moffatt and 

Padmanaban 1995; Padmanaban et al., 2005). Vehicles were evaluated using the 

35 

quasi-static procedure outlined in FMVSS 216, but every vehicle was tested to a full 

5 inches of plate displacement to measure roof strength in excess of the minimum 

SWR. An earlier study by Plastiras et al., (1985) did not incorporate measures of 

peak roof strength and used a severely limited sample of crashes. 

Moffatt and Padmanaban (1995) constructed a logistic regression model to investigate the effects of age, gender, belt use, alcohol use, crash environment (rural/ 

urban), number of vehicle doors, vehicle aspect ratio (roof height divided by track 

width), vehicle weight, roof damage, and roof strength on the likelihood of fatal or 

incapacitating driver injury in single-vehicle rollover crashes. Crash data consisted 

of single-vehicle rollovers in databases of police-reported crashes in four states. Multiple vehicle types were included. The study reported no relationship between roof 

strength and the likelihood of fatal or incapacitating injury. Although more severe 

roof damage was associated with higher likelihood of injury, the study found roof 

strength did not predict the likelihood of severe roof damage. 

Padmanaban et al., (2005) conducted a follow-up study that expanded the vehicle 

sample and differed in a few other respects, but the findings were similar. Driver 

factors such as belt use, age, and alcohol use were reported as important predictors 

of injury risk, whereas roof strength was not related to the risk of fatal or incapacitating injury, or to the risk of fatal injury alone. Both studies also found that vehicles with higher aspect ratios had lower rates of fatal or incapacitating injury. 

These findings call into question the effectiveness of the FMVSS 216 regulation. 

The standard was established to ‘‘reduce deaths and injuries due to the crushing 

of the roof,’’ but according to this research, roof strength assessed under the regulated test conditions has no relationship to injury likelihood. Furthermore, the 

Moffatt and Padmanaban (1995) study found no relationship between roof strength 

and roof damage in rollover crashes. This finding suggests two possibilities: either 

the Federal standard is not evaluating roof strength in a mode relevant to realworld rollovers, or the methods used in these studies have allowed other factors to 

obscure this relevance. Differences among vehicle types and state reporting practices 

are two examples of factors that may have confounded the results for roof strength. 

The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether there is any relationship between performance in the quasi-static test specified by FMVSS 216 and injury risk in rollover crashes. By restricting the analysis to midsize four-door SUVs 

the study sought to minimize other factors that may confound an analysis of roof 

strength, such as the differences in crash severity, vehicle kinematics, occupant kinematics, and driver demographics associated with vehicles of different types. Vehicle 

stability, occupant age effects, and differences between states were controlled statistically in the analyses. The study estimated the effects of raising the minimum SWR 

requirement and also compared alternative strength metrics calculated from the roof 

test data. 

Methods 

Logistic regression was used to evaluate the effect of roof strength on driver injury risk in single-vehicle rollover crashes involving midsize four-door SUVs. Roof 

strength data for 11 SUV models were obtained from quasi-static tests in which 

roofs were crushed with up to 10 inches of plate displacement. Using data from police-reported crashes in 12 states, driver injury rates by make/model were calculated 

as the proportion of drivers in single-vehicle rollover crashes who were coded as 

having fatal or incapacitating injury. 

Vehicle Selection and Roof Strength Testing 

Certain vehicle safety features might affect the rate of injuries in rollover crashes 

and thereby confound the analyses of roof strength. Side curtain airbags and electronic stability control (ESC) are two such features. In a single-vehicle rollover crash 

the presence of side curtain airbags may reduce the risk of full or partial occupant 

ejection or reduce the risk of injury for occupants remaining in the vehicle. ESC 

does not influence injury risk once a rollover has begun, but it most likely affects 

the type of rollover crashes in which ESC-equipped vehicles are involved. All models 

with side curtain airbags or ESC as standard features were excluded. None of the 

remaining vehicles had optional ESC installation rates exceeding 3 percent, and 

only one had an optional curtain airbag installation rate higher than 5 percent 

(Ward’s Communications, 2006). Potential confounding from the inclusion of 2002– 

04 Ford Explorers, 15 percent of which had curtain airbags, was addressed in a 

manner described below. Although it would have been desirable to evaluate roof 

strength effects for vehicles with these safety features, which soon will be standard 

across the fleet, there were insufficient data to do so. 

Roof strength data from vehicle manufacturers typically do not enter the public 

domain and therefore are not readily available to independent researchers. AddiVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
36 

tionally, compliance testing rarely is extended beyond the crush distance required 

to demonstrate the minimum SWR of 1.5. To study the range of roof strengths in 

the vehicle fleet, testing must continue beyond this level to measure peak force. The 

required test data were available for three midsize SUVs from NHTSA research related to the proposed standard upgrade. These data were included in the study. 

Roof strength data for additional vehicles were obtained from tests conducted by 

General Testing Laboratories, under contract with the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. The eight midsize SUVs with the most rollover crashes in the state 

databases used for the study were tested. Six of these models were not current designs, so it was necessary to test used vehicles. Tested vehicles had no previous 

crash damage and were equipped with the original factory-installed windshield and 

side windows. It has been suggested that the windshield and its bond to the vehicle 

frame can contribute up to 30 percent of the strength measured in the test (Friedman and Nash 2001). 

In total, tests of 11 roof designs provided the data for the study. Some of these 

designs were shared by corporate twins, so the number of vehicle models in the 

study exceeds 11. 

Static Stability Factor 

Moffatt and Padmanaban (1995) and Padmanaban et al., (2005) found that vehicles with larger aspect ratios had lower rates of serious driver injury. The authors 

did not discuss the implications of this finding, although the 2005 study suggested 

it was not due to any increased headroom of taller vehicles. Assuming identical suspension properties, taller and narrower vehicles are less stable than wider shorter 

ones, leading to rollovers at lower speeds and with less severe tripping events. It 

is possible that these lower speed rollovers are less likely to cause serious injury, 

meaning that when rollovers do occur, less stable vehicles may have lower severe 

injury rates simply because they roll more easily. Harwin and Emery (1989) reported this from a sample of 3,000 rollover crashes in Maryland. The present study 

included static stability factor (SSF) as a predictor in the logistic regression. SSF 

is a better measure of stability than aspect ratio because the height of the center 

of gravity is measured instead of the height of the roof. NHTSA uses SSF to assign 

rollover risk ratings to the vehicle fleet, and these publicly available data were used 

in this study. 

Roof Strength Metrics 

Because performance in the FMVSS 216 test has not been shown to affect injury 

risk, it is not clear that a baseline SWR within 5 inches of plate displacement better 

predicts injury outcome than other strength metrics that can be calculated from the 

same test data. The energy absorbed by the roof may be more relevant to injury 

risk than the peak force it can withstand, or the roof’s performance over a plate displacement other than 5 inches could better predict injury risk. The contribution of 

vehicle mass to rollover crashworthiness also is unknown. 

In the present study the following metrics were evaluated: peak force, SWR, energy absorbed, and equivalent drop height. SWR is peak force divided by vehicle 

curb weight, and equivalent drop height is energy divided by curb weight converted 

to inches. The term ‘‘equivalent drop height’’ is used because this metric can be considered the height from which the vehicle could be dropped on its roof to produce 

the same level of crush as observed in the test (under an ideal condition where the 

roof deforms identically in the dynamic and quasi-static conditions). Each of the 

metrics was calculated within 2, 5, and 10 inches of plate displacement. Two inches 

was chosen based on the highly linear characteristic of the force-deflection curves 

up to this displacement. Ten inches represented the maximum deflection in 10 of 

the 11 tests. 

Because there were 11 tested roof designs, the evaluations using peak force and 

energy absorption had 11 available values for comparison. The use of curb weight 

for calculating SWR and equivalent drop height produced many more unique values. 

Corporate twins were separated where curb weights differed, and two-wheel drive 

vehicles were separated from four-wheel drive versions due to their lower weights 

and varying SSF values. These 31 vehicles produced 28 unique values of SWR and 

equivalent drop height. Table 1 lists the vehicle test data used in the analysis. Appendix A reports the other metrics for these vehicles as well as the other models 

for which these data can be applied. The results for the 1996–2001 Ford Explorer 

and Mercury Mountaineer reflect the use of averaged values obtained from two 

tests. The Mitsubishi Montero Sport was omitted from the 10-inch displacement 

evaluations because NHTSA’s test of this vehicle did not continue beyond 7.4 inches. 

This omission did not substantially affect the results; the Montero Sport had the 

smallest exposure of all vehicles in the study. 

37 

Table 1.—FMVSS 216 Roof Strength Test Results 

Model years Make Model 

Peak roof strength (lbf) 

2 in 5 in 10 in 

1996–2004 Chevrolet Blazer 4,293 7,074 7,337 

2002–2005 Chevrolet TrailBlazer 6,896 8,943 8,943 

1998–2003 Dodge Durango 6,409 9,138 9,138 

1996–2001 Ford Explorer 5,901 7,072 8,196 

2002–2004 Ford Explorer 6,895 9,604 12,372 

1996–1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee 5,497 8,455 8,455 

1999–2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee 5,073 6,560 7,090 

2002–2005 Jeep Liberty 8,226 10,374 10,544 

1997–2004 Mitsubishi Montero Sport 6,063 10,069 N/A 

2000–2004 Nissan Xterra 9,431 11,996 11,996 

1996–2000 Toyota 4Runner 5,269 8,581 8,581 

Rollover Crash Data 

Data for single-vehicle rollover crashes were obtained from the State Data System. The system is maintained by NHTSA and consists of data from police-reported 

crashes submitted to the agency by certain states. Qualifying states had data available for some part of calendar years 1997–2005, had event and/or impact codes allowing single-vehicle rollovers to be identified, and had available information on vehicle identification numbers sufficient for determining vehicle make, model, and 

model year. Twelve states met these criteria: Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, 

Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, 

and Wyoming. All of these states use the KABCO injury coding system, where ‘‘K’’ 

represents fatal injuries and ‘‘A’’ represents incapacitating injuries as assessed by 

the investigating police officer. 

Logistic Regression 

Logistic regression was used to assess the effect of roof strength on the likelihood 

of fatal or incapacitating driver injury. The final models controlled for state, SSF, 

and driver age. Controlling for state is necessary because of differences in reporting 

methods, terrain, urbanization, and other factors that could result in state-to-state 

variation in injury rates. The potential influence of SSF on rollover crash severity 

was discussed previously, and age has been found to affect injury risk (Li et al., 

2003). A separate model was fit for each roof strength metric at each plate displacement distance, yielding 12 models. The effect of roof strength was assumed to be 

constant across all states. Because rollovers resulting in fatal or incapacitating injuries are fairly rare events, the odds ratios resulting from these models are reasonable approximations of relative risks and are interpreted accordingly. 

Other covariates initially were examined in the models. These included coded belt 

use, driver gender, vehicle drive type (two- vs. four-wheel drive), and vehicle age. 

Driver gender, drive type, and vehicle age did not have significant effects on injury 

likelihood and were excluded from the final model. Coded belt use did affect injury 

risk in rollover crashes, and there was concern that belt use may confound the observed effects of roof strength. To study this possibility, separate models were fit 

for drivers coded as belted, unbelted, and unknown despite the unreliability of this 

information from police reports. 

Tests that provided data for the 2002–04 Ford Explorer and 2000–04 Nissan 

Xterra were conducted with an alternative tie-down procedure that NHTSA was investigating for a change to the laboratory test procedure specified by the Office of 

Vehicle Safety Compliance (NHTSA 2006). At least one manufacturer has expressed 

concern that this tie-down procedure produces different results than the procedures 

used in its own compliance tests (Ford Motor Company 2006). The test procedure 

employed by General Testing Laboratories for this study differed from both the alternative being investigated by NHTSA and the procedure used by Ford. Two supplemental analyses addressed these procedural variations. First, results for the Explorer and Xterra were excluded and the data were modeled again. This also addressed any potential confounding resulting from the 15 percent installation rate of 

side curtain airbags in the 2002–04 Explorer. Second, a sensitivity analysis was conducted. This consisted of 10 separate regression models in which the roof strength 

inputs to the model varied by up to 10 percent above or below the measured 

strength. These values were sampled from a distribution using a random number 

generator. 

38 

One difficulty associated with using fatal and incapacitating injury counts as the 

measure of crash outcome is the subjectivity with which police can code incapacitating injuries. To check potential error from police judgment, separate models were 

fit for fatal injuries alone to ascertain that they followed the same pattern as models 

including incapacitating injuries. 

Estimated Lives Saved 

The present study has direct bearing on any future upgrades to FMVSS 216. Most 

of the study vehicles would require stronger roofs if the SWR requirement increased 

from 1.5 to 2.5 without any other modifications to the test procedure. To estimate 

the number of lives saved by such a change, data were extracted from the Fatality 

Analysis Reporting System for 2006. Fatalities were counted for occupants in front 

outboard seating positions in single-vehicle rollover crashes for each of the study vehicles. For vehicles with SWRs below 2.5, the increase required to achieve this level 

of strength was used to scale the effectiveness estimates of the final logistic regression model, producing vehicle-specific effectiveness values. These values were applied to the number of fatalities in each vehicle to produce an estimate of total lives 

saved. A second estimate was calculated using a target SWR of 3.16, the highest 

level achieved by any of the study vehicles. No compliance margin was included in 

these estimates; it was assumed that the roof strength values would not be greater 

than the target strength value. 

Results 

Figure 1 shows the unadjusted relationship between the rate of fatal or incapacitating driver injury and peak SWR within 5 inches of plate displacement, the metric 

used in FMVSS 216. The circles represent the raw injury rate data; circle sizes are 

proportional to the total number of rollover crashes in the state databases for each 

study vehicle, and hence to that vehicle’s contribution to the weighted regression 

line that is plotted. The slope of the line represents an injury rate 24 percent lower 

than average for an SWR one unit higher than average, but no adjustment was 

made for potentially confounding factors. 

After controlling for state effects, SSF, and driver age the logistic regression models estimated changes in the odds of fatal or incapacitating driver injury for greater 

roof strength. Lower injury rates were associated with higher values of peak force, 

SWR, energy absorption, and equivalent drop height at 2, 5, and 10 inches of plate 

displacement. All of these findings were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 

The model for peak SWR within 5 inches predicted that a one-unit increase in SWR 

would reduce the risk of fatal or incapacitating driver injury by 28 percent. These 

findings were based on 22,817 rollover crashes in the 12 states. 


604oesch4.eps
39 

Table 2 lists the odds ratios for fatal or incapacitating driver injury for higher roof 

strength values. Odds ratios less than one indicate that greater roof strength is associated with lower injury risk. The units vary by metric. Peak force is given in 

English tons, SWR in increments of vehicle weight, energy absorption in kilojoules, 

and equivalent drop height in inches. One-unit differences in these metrics do not 

represent equivalent changes in roof strength, so the point estimates in the first column should not be directly compared against one another. To facilitate comparison, 

the second column lists the range of roof strength test performance for the study 

vehicles, and the third column lists the effect associated with a difference of this 

amount. For example, the lowest peak force within 2 inches of plate displacement 

was 4,293 lbf (2.15 tons), observed in the test of the Chevrolet Blazer. The highest 

peak force was 9,431 lbf (4.72 tons) for the Nissan Xterra, or 2.57 tons greater than 

the force in the Blazer test. A strength difference of 2.57 tons was associated with 

a 49 percent lower injury risk for the stronger roof. 

The effects of driver age and SSF also are listed in Table 2. SSF values ranged 

from 1.02 to 1.20 for the study vehicles, so the effect of a 0.1 unit increase in SSF 

was evaluated. Results did not show a clear trend in injury risk by SSF. The effect 

of age was very consistent and statistically significant. Each 10-year increase in 

driver age was estimated to increase injury risk, given a single-vehicle rollover had 

occurred, by 12–13 percent. 

Table 2.—Results of Logistic Regression Models for Risk of Fatal or Incapacitating Driver Injuries 

Strength 

metric 

Plate 

displacement 

Roof strength SSF Driver age 

Odds ratio 

for 

1 unit 

increase Range 

Odds ratio 

for 

observed 

range 

Odds ratio 

for 

0.1 unit 

increase 

Odds ratio 

for 

10 year 

increase 

Peak force 2 in 0.77* 2.15–4.72 0.51* 1.05 1.13* 

(tons) 5 in 0.82* 3.28–6.00 0.58* 1.06 1.12* 

10 in 0.74* 3.55–6.19 0.46* 1.06 1.13* 

2 in 0.55* 1.05–2.48 0.43* 0.98 1.13* 

SWR 5 in 0.72* 1.64–3.16 0.61* 0.96 1.12* 

10 in 0.57* 1.77–3.16 0.45* 0.93 1.13* 

Energy 2 in 0.34* 0.45–0.97 0.57* 1.01 1.13* 

absorbed (kJ) 5 in 0.71* 2.58–4.51 0.52* 1.08 1.13* 

10 in 0.82* 6.28–8.96 0.59* 1.06 1.13* 

Equivalent 2 in 0.56* 0.96–2.25 0.48* 0.95 1.13* 

drop height (in) 5 in 0.85* 5.56–10.5 0.45* 0.98 1.13* 

10 in 0.89* 13.6–20.5 0.44* 0.93 1.13* 

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level. 

Eighty-three percent of drivers in the study were coded as belted. Logistic regression models using only these drivers produced estimates for the effectiveness of roof 

strength in preventing injury that were very similar to those of the regression models for all drivers. All estimates were statistically significant. Ten percent of drivers 

were coded as unbelted, and regression models restricting to these crashes found 

small effects of roof strength on injury risk that were not statistically significant. 

Police reported unknown belt use for the remaining 7 percent of drivers. Roof 

strength effect estimates for these crashes were similar to the overall model, although not all were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Results are listed in 

Table 3. 

40 

Table 3.—Results of Logistic Regression Models for Risk of Fatal or Incapacitating Driver 

Injuries By Police-reported Belt Use 

Plate 

displacement 

Odds ratios for 1 unit increases in roof strength, 

by police reported belt use 

All drivers Belted Unbelted Unknown 

Peak force 2 in 0.77* 0.79* 0.93 0.79 

(tons) 5 in 0.82* 0.82* 1.00 0.90 

10 in 0.74* 0.76* 0.94 0.81 

2 in 0.55* 0.59* 0.85 0.54* 

SWR 5 in 0.72* 0.73* 0.99 0.78 

10 in 0.57* 0.59* 0.90 0.59 

Energy 2 in 0.34* 0.40* 0.64 0.34 

absorbed (kJ) 5 in 0.71* 0.73* 0.95 0.79 

10 in 0.82* 0.85* 0.95 0.86 

Equivalent 2 in 0.56* 0.62* 0.79 0.54* 

drop height (in) 5 in 0.85* 0.86* 0.98 0.86 

10 in 0.89* 0.91* 0.97 0.88* 

*Statistically significant at 0.05 level 

The two supplemental analyses addressing test procedure differences produced results comparable with the overall results in Table 2. The odds ratio for fatal or incapacitating driver injury associated with a one-unit higher SWR at 5 inches of plate 

displacement, originally 0.72, was 0.74 for the regression model excluding the Explorer and Xterra and ranged from 0.67 to 0.78 for the 10 regression models with 

varying roof strengths. These results remained statistically significant at the 0.05 

level. 

Of the 22,817 rollover crashes in the state data set, 1,869 drivers sustained incapacitating injuries and 531 sustained fatal injuries. Because these injuries were 

split among 12 different states and up to 28 unique SWR values, fatality counts 

were quite small. Nevertheless, results from the fatality models were similar to results from the models that also included incapacitating injury, and in 11 of 12 cases 

were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Results are presented in Table 4. 

Table 4.—Results of Logistic Regression Models of Risk 

of Driver Fatality 

Plate 

displacement 

Odds ratio for 

1 unit increase 

Peak force 2 in 0.61* 

(tons) 5 in 0.80* 

10 in 0.58* 

2 in 0.36 

SWR 5 in 0.76 

10 in 0.43* 

Energy 2 in 0.11* 

absorbed (kJ) 5 in 0.54* 

10 in 0.62* 

Equivalent 2 in 0.35* 

drop height (in) 5 in 0.79* 

10 in 0.80* 

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level. 

In 2006, 668 occupants in front outboard seating positions were killed in singlevehicle rollover crashes involving the study vehicles. It was estimated that 108 of 

these lives (95 percent confidence interval: 63–148) could have been saved by increasing the minimum SWR required by FMVSS 216 from 1.5 to 2.5. Increasing the 

minimum SWR to 3.16 could have saved 212 lives (95 percent confidence interval: 

130–282). 

41 

Discussion 

The present study demonstrates that roof strength has a strong effect on occupant 

injury risk. This is in contrast to previous research relating roof test results to injury rates in field rollover crashes (Moffatt and Padmanaban 1995; Padmanaban et 

al., 2005). To fully investigate these differences, the detailed roof strength data from 

the previous studies would need to be compared with the data reported here. Unfortunately, these earlier data are confidential and a precise reason for the difference 

in results cannot be established. Nevertheless, the differing methods employed by 

the studies offer some potential explanations. 

One of the biggest differences is that confounding effects associated with vehicle 

type largely were ignored in earlier research. Passenger cars, minivans, pickups, 

and SUVs all were included, and vehicles were classified by aspect ratio (roof height 

divided by track width). The substantial differences in driver demographics, rollover 

kinematics, and other factors associated with these vehicle types were unlikely to 

be captured with a measurement based solely on two exterior vehicle dimensions. 

The only consideration of vehicle type was a secondary analysis in the Moffatt and 

Padmanaban (1995) study in which sports cars were grouped with pickups and 

SUVs, while non-sports cars were grouped with minivans. This attempted to control 

for the likelihood of drivers engaging in risky driving maneuvers, but likely only 

served to exacerbate differences in rollover crashes. Sports cars typically are the 

least rollover prone of all vehicles, with low centers of gravity and wide track 

widths. By grouping sports cars with SUVs and pickups, the authors combined vehicles requiring very severe roll-initiation events with vehicles requiring less severe 

initiation. Calculations using data reported by Digges and Eigen (2003) showed that 

for belted non-ejected occupants in rollover crashes, more than 20 percent of those 

in passenger cars were exposed to two or more roof impacts, whereas less than 10 

percent of SUV and pickup occupants were in rollovers this severe. 

Another difference was that these two previous studies did not control for differences among the states used in the analysis. NHTSA analyses of rollover crashes 

using state data controlled for these differences (Office of the Federal Register 

2000), and the present study did so as well. 

Belt Use and Ejection 

Schiff and Cummings (2004) found that police reports overestimate belt use as 

compared with NASS/CDS, which is regarded as a more reliable source of this information. The authors found the most disagreement in cases where occupant injuries 

were least severe; for uninjured occupants coded as unbelted in NASS/CDS, police 

reported positive belt use 47 percent of the time. Because of this discrepancy, including restraint use as a predictor of injury would produce regression models that 

overestimate the true effect of belt use and reduce the apparent effect of other variables, such as roof strength. 

The present study did not include police-reported belt use in the final regression 

model. Preliminary models separately analyzed drivers coded as belted and 

unbelted. Regression models for drivers with reported belt use estimated roof 

strength effects nearly identical to the effects estimated for all drivers. This is not 

surprising given the high percentage of reported belt use, but it does imply that belt 

use is not confounding the results of the final regression model. The models for drivers reported as unbelted did not find a significant relationship between roof strength 

and injury risk. Roof strength may have less of an effect on injury risk for unbelted 

drivers, but results are inconclusive given the limited sample of drivers reported as 

unbelted and the inaccuracy of restraint use from police reports. 

Thirty-eight percent of drivers who police said were unbelted also were reported 

as ejected. Digges et al., (1994) reported that 42 percent of unrestrained occupants 

who were ejected exited the vehicle through a path other than the side windows, 

such as the door opening or the windshield. Increased roof strength potentially can 

reduce the integrity loss that can lead to doors opening or windshields being displaced. As the number of vehicles with side curtain airbags increase, the likelihood 

of ejection through the side windows should decrease. However, weak roofs could 

compromise the protection afforded by these airbags if they allow the roof rails to 

shift laterally and expose occupants to contacts with the ground. 

Injury Causation 

In finding that vehicles with stronger roofs are more protective of occupants, this 

study does not directly address injury mechanisms. It is possible the occupant protection provided by increased roof strength mitigates crush injuries by maintaining 

head clearance, reduces diving injuries by changing vehicle kinematics, or some 

combination of the two. 

42 

The possibility that roof strength influences vehicle kinematics was identified by 

Bahling et al., (1990). The authors observed substantial differences in rollover tests 

of production and rollcaged sedans. The production vehicles had a greater ‘‘velocity 

and duration of the roof-to-ground impact of the trailing roofrail’’ due to more roof 

deformation earlier in the roll. In addition, the actual number of far-side roof impacts among the rollcaged vehicles was less than half the number among the production vehicles. For far-side occupants, these changes produced a dramatic reduction in the number and average magnitude of neck loads surpassing 2 kN. 

Various Roof Strength Metrics 

The present study evaluated roof strength with multiple metrics calculated from 

NHTSA’s quasi-static test data. Logistic regression analyses found rollover injury 

risks were significantly lower for vehicles with stronger roofs, regardless of which 

strength assessment was used. Based on this finding, it is difficult to determine 

whether any one metric may be more predictive of injury outcome than the others. 

To permit an indirect comparison of the metrics, the one-unit effect estimates were 

converted to estimates for strength level increases equal to the range of study vehicle roof strengths. However, it is not known how much the relationship between 

these ranges would change with samples of other vehicles. For the vehicles in this 

study, such comparisons showed a range of predicted injury risk reductions but did 

not reveal any single combination of strength metric and plate displacement distance that stood out above the others. 

For the study vehicles, higher peak roof strengths and SWRs within 2 and 10 

inches of plate displacement predicted greater reductions in injury risk than roof 

strengths within 5 inches of displacement. The federally regulated metric of SWR 

evaluated within 5 inches predicted the smallest reduction in injury risk of all 12 

metric and displacement combinations. Across all three displacement distances, 

higher values of equivalent drop height predicted the most consistent reductions in 

injury risk but the differences from other metrics were not large. Future analyses 

of the quasi-static test condition’s relevance to real-world rollovers should further 

evaluate the equivalent drop height metric. 

The metrics that accounted for vehicle curb weight were somewhat better predictors of injury risk than the metrics that did not. The importance of weight may be 

stronger across the entire vehicle fleet, where the range of curb weights is much 

wider than for the study vehicles. More than 80 percent of the rollover crashes in 

this study occurred among vehicles with curb weights between 3,800 and 4,200 

pounds. 

Other Covariates 

All of the logistic regression models estimated significant injury risk increases of 

12–13 percent for each 10-year increase in driver age. The findings for SSF were 

not statistically significant. Although the full range of SSF values for the study vehicles was 1.02–1.20, 74 percent of the rollover crashes in this study involved vehicles with SSF values between 1.06 and 1.09. This could explain the inconclusive injury risk estimates because such small variation in SSF values may be outweighed 

by other differences that affect vehicle stability and cannot be captured in SSF calculations, such as wheelbase or suspension and tire properties. A stronger trend 

may exist across the wider range of SSF values found in the entire fleet, with the 

most stable vehicles typically having values of 1.50 (Robertson and Kelley 1989). 

Implications of Testing Used Vehicles 

The analyses required vehicle models that have been in the fleet for enough years 

to accumulate sufficient crash data, so it was necessary to test used vehicles. According to vehicle manufacturers and NHTSA, roof strengths of used vehicles may 

not be equivalent to those of new vehicles (Office of the Federal Register 2006). Vehicles in the present study had no crash damage or corrosion that could have affected test results. Factory-installed windshields and side glazing still were present. 

However, it is possible that different results would have been obtained for new models. To some extent, this concern was addressed with the sensitivity analysis. The 

injury risk findings did not vary substantially when roof strength values were varied up to 10 percent. 

Test results for the study vehicles may better represent the roof strengths of vehicles involved in rollover crashes than results for vehicles used in compliance testing 

and those used in earlier research. Previous studies included tests of production vehicles, prototypes, and vehicles ‘‘representative of production’’ that were ‘‘deemed 

satisfactory for compliance . . . [based on] engineering judgment’’ (Moffatt and 

Padmanaban 1995). The authors did not specify how many values were obtained 

from production vehicles. 

43 

Relevance To Proposed FMVSS 216 and Estimated Lives Saved 

The estimated number of lives saved by increasing the regulated SWR to 2.5 is 

considerably higher than the estimated 13 and 44 lives saved indicated in NHTSA’s 

2005 NPRM, despite the fact the agency’s estimates cover the entire passenger vehicle fleet. Estimates presented here are limited to the 11 study vehicles for two reasons: peak roof strength values for other vehicles mostly are unknown, and the effectiveness of roof strength in reducing injury may vary across vehicle types. Another difference in the estimates comes from the NPRM’s modified plate displacement criterion, which allows roof intrusion for each vehicle until head contact with 

an ATD. The NPRM details 10 research tests in which plate displacement ranged 

from 3.2 to 7.3 inches at roof contact with the ATD. Because the present study 

looked at midsize SUVs with a narrow range of headroom values relative to the entire fleet, results could not directly address the headroom criterion proposal. 

The number of rollover fatalities in the future will be affected by other changes 

to the vehicle fleet in addition to roof strength, such as wider availability of ESC 

and side curtain airbags, especially those designed to inflate in rollovers. Nevertheless, an upgraded standard requiring an SWR value of 2.5 likely would produce 

much greater reductions in fatal and incapacitating injuries than estimated by 

NHTSA. Further increasing the minimum SWR requirement beyond 2.5 would prevent even more deaths and serious injuries. 

Conclusions 

Increased vehicle roof strength reduces the risk of fatal or incapacitating driver 

injury in single-vehicle rollover crashes. This finding contradicts those from two previous studies on the topic, but the present study more tightly controlled potential 

confounding factors. The study focused on midsize SUVs, but there is no obvious 

reason similar relationships would not be found for other vehicle types, although the 

magnitudes of injury rate reductions may differ. Any substantial upgrade to the 

FMVSS 216 roof strength requirement would produce reductions in fatal and incapacitating injuries that substantially exceed existing estimates. 

Acknowledgment 

This work was supported by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. 

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45 

Appendix A: Table A1.—All Study Vehicle Make and Model Combinations With Roof Strength and SSF Data; Vehicles Grouped 

by FMVSS 216 Test Result; Only 4 Door Models Were Included in the Study 

First 

model 

year 

Last 

model 

year Make Model 

Drive 

type SSF 

SWR Energy absorbed (J) 

Equivalent drop 

height (in) 

2 in 5 in 10 in 2 in 5 in 10 in 2 in 5 in 10 in 

1996 2004 Chevrolet Blazer 2wd 1.02 1.16 1.91 1.98 447 2,575 6,282 1.1 6.2 15.0 1996 2004 Chevrolet Blazer 4wd 1.09 1.06 1.75 1.81 447 2,575 6,282 1.0 5.6 13.7 1996 2001 GMC Jimmy 2wd 1.02 1.14 1.89 1.96 447 2,575 6,282 1.1 6.1 14.8 1996 2001 GMC Jimmy 4wd 1.09 1.05 1.73 1.79 447 2,575 6,282 1.0 5.6 13.6 1996 2001 Oldsmobile Bravada 4wd 1.09 1.05 1.74 1.80 447 2,575 6,282 1.0 5.6 13.6 2002 2005 Chevrolet Trail Blazer 2wd 1.16 1.58 2.04 2.04 729 3,482 7,647 1.5 7.0 15.5 2002 2005 Chevrolet Trail Blazer 4wd 1.18 1.52 1.97 1.97 729 3,482 7,647 1.4 6.8 14.9 2002 2005 GMC Envoy 2wd 1.16 1.58 2.04 2.04 729 3,482 7,647 1.5 7.0 15.5 2002 2005 GMC Envoy 4wd 1.18 1.52 1.97 1.97 729 3,482 7,647 1.4 6.8 14.9 2002 2004 Oldsmobile Bravada 2wd 1.16 1.56 2.02 2.02 729 3,482 7,647 1.5 7.0 15.3 2002 2004 Oldsmobile Bravada 4wd 1.18 1.50 1.94 1.94 729 3,482 7,647 1.4 6.7 14.7 1998 2003 Dodge Durango 2wd 1.20 1.46 2.08 2.08 694 3,405 7,483 1.4 6.9 15.1 1998 2003 Dodge Durango 4wd 1.16 1.39 1.98 1.98 694 3,405 7,483 1.3 6.5 14.3 1996 2001 Ford Explorer 2wd 1.06 1.50 1.79 2.07 710 2,966 7,064 1.6 6.6 15.8 1996 2001 Ford Explorer 4wd 1.06 1.40 1.68 1.96 710 2,966 7,064 1.5 6.3 14.9 1997 2001 Mercury Mountaineer 2wd 1.06 1.48 1.77 2.05 710 2,966 7,064 1.6 6.6 15.6 1997 2001 Mercury Mountaineer 4wd 1.06 1.40 1.68 1.96 710 2,966 7,064 1.5 6.3 14.9 2002 2004 Ford Explorer 2wd 1.10 1.64 2.29 2.95 838 3,713 8,780 1.8 7.8 18.5 2002 2004 Ford Explorer 4wd 1.14 1.57 2.18 2.81 838 3,713 8,780 1.7 7.5 17.7 1996 1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee 2wd 1.07 1.53 2.35 2.35 577 2,971 6,443 1.4 7.3 15.8 1996 1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee 4wd 1.07 1.45 2.23 2.23 577 2,971 6,443 1.3 6.9 15.0 1999 2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee 2wd 1.09 1.33 1.72 1.86 661 2,645 6,376 1.5 6.1 14.8 1999 2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee 4wd 1.11 1.27 1.64 1.77 661 2,645 6,376 1.5 5.9 14.1 2002 2005 Jeep Liberty 2wd 1.10 2.12 2.68 2.72 962 3,896 8,959 2.2 8.9 20.5 2002 2005 Jeep Liberty 4wd 1.12 1.99 2.51 2.56 962 3,896 8,959 2.1 8.4 19.2 1997 2004 Mitsubishi Montero Sport 2wd 1.07 1.56 2.59 N/A 667 3,473 N/A 1.5 7.9 N/A 1997 2004 Mitsubishi Montero Sport 4wd 1.11 1.46 2.42 N/A 667 3,473 N/A 1.4 7.4 N/A 2000 2004 Nissan Xterra 2wd 1.09 2.48 3.16 3.16 967 4,514 8,708 2.3 10.5 20.3 2000 2004 Nissan Xterra 4wd 1.12 2.30 2.93 2.93 967 4,514 8,708 2.1 9.7 18.8 1996 2000 Toyota 4Runner 2wd 1.08 1.51 2.45 2.45 612 2,896 6,618 1.5 7.3 16.7 1996 2000 Toyota 4Runner 4wd 1.06 1.39 2.26 2.26 612 2,896 6,618 1.4 6.7 15.4 

46 

INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAYS SAFETY

Arlington, VA, May 13, 2008 

Hon. NICOLE R. NASON, Administrator, 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 

Washington, DC. 

Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; 49 CFR Part 571, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Roof Crush Resistance; Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0015 

Dear Administrator Nason: 

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) has conducted a study that 

demonstrates a direct relationship between roof strength and injury risk reduction 

in rollover crashes (Brumbelow et al., 2008). We included this study in our previous 

comment to the docket (IIHS, 2008) because of its relevance to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) rulemaking under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 216. 

Finding that stronger roofs reduce the risk of injury in rollover crashes, the IIHS 

study contradicts two previous studies on the topic (Moffatt and Padmanaban, 1995; 

Padmanaban et al., 2005). Two authors of these earlier studies have submitted a 

comment and additional analysis to NHTSA (Padmanaban and Moffatt, 2008), questioning the IIHS study and concluding that ‘‘stronger roofs are not safer roofs.’’ 

The comments by Padmanaban and Moffatt (2008) contain misleading statements 

about the IIHS study that are detailed in item 6 of the attached document, ‘‘Logical 

and Statistical Errors in Comments by Padmanaban and Moffatt on the Insurance 

Institute for Highway Safety Study, ‘Roof Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover 

Crashes.’ ’’ In addition, the analytical tactics recommended and used by 

Padmanaban and Moffatt depart in fundamental ways from appropriate use and interpretation of statistical results (see item 4). Of most concern is their insistence 

on including ejection, belt use, and alcohol use as control variables in their analysis 

when, in fact, these variables are either direct outcomes of roof crush strength or 

affected by the dependent variable, injury risk. Inclusion of them in the analysis obfuscates the real effects of roof strength on injury risk (see items 1–3). 

These concerns are detailed in the attachment. We would be happy to discuss the 

issues further if NHTSA has questions. 

Sincerely, 

ADRIAN K. LUND, PH.D., 

President. 

cc: Docket Clerk, Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0015 

ATTACHMENT

Logical and Statistical Errors in Comments by Padmanaban and Moffatt on 

the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety Study, ‘‘Roof Strength and 

Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes’’ 

1. Ejection is an outcome of rollover and is influenced by roof strength. Including 

ejection as a predictor of death or serious injury in a rollover crash masks a major 

benefit of roof strength. 

Padmanaban and Moffat argue that IIHS should have included a number of additional variables in the predictive model of injuries and deaths in rollovers. One of 

these variables is ejection. Their argument is that ejection greatly increases the risk 

of injury while ‘‘ejection is . . . likely to be unrelated to roof strength’’ (pg. 1). 

a. This argument is illogical. Roof strength may not affect injury risk once a 

person is ejected, but a strong roof may prevent occupants from being ejected 

in the first place. Preventing an occupant compartment from collapsing obviously can reduce ejection risk by preventing broken glazing and deformed structure, which create ejection paths. 

b. This argument is testable. Using the midsize SUVs in the IIHS study, IIHS 

researchers investigated the relationship between roof strength and ejection 

risk with an additional analysis. The risk of ejection was 31 percent lower for 

each 1-unit increase in peak roof strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) measured 

within 5 inches of plate displacement (p-value of 0.004). Appendix A reports details of this analysis. Clearly, ejection risk is not ‘‘unrelated to roof strength.’’ 

c. By treating ejection as a risk factor unrelated to roof strength, when reduced 

ejection risk is one of the benefits of stronger roofs, Padmanaban and Moffatt 

bias their analysis against finding a relationship between roof strength and injury risk. 

47 

d. Padmanaban and Moffatt’s concern about ejection implies that roof strength 

does not matter if ejected occupants are not counted. However, a new IIHS 

analysis limited to drivers coded by police as not having been ejected reveals 

that stronger roofs reduced injury risk among these drivers. Many of the fatal 

and incapacitating injuries in the overall analysis were sustained by ejected 

drivers, but risk reductions for drivers not ejected were statistically significant 

and very similar to the overall analysis. Appendix B reports the full results. 

2. Belt use cannot be used in a model evaluating roof strength and injury likelihood because information about belt use in crashes is inaccurate, incomplete, and 

subject to influence by the injury outcomes. 

Another variable that Padmanaban and Moffat argue should be included as a control (predictor) variable in the IIHS study is police-reported belt use. According to 

Padmanaban and Moffat, ‘‘It is well known that the majority of rollover KA injuries 

and fatalities are to unbelted occupants, mostly ejectees’’ (pg. 2) and, later, ‘‘. . . 56 

percent of the fatalities and 28 percent of the serious/fatal injuries were unbelted 

and completely ejected’’ (pg. 5). As a result, Padmanaban and Moffat conclude that 

belt use should have been a predictor variable. However, because this variable is 

difficult to know with precision, inclusion as a predictor variable can bias any analysis of roof strength. 

a. The principal source of bias in belt use codes is that police-coded belt use is 

subject to distortion by crash outcomes. No official typically is present to observe belt use prior to a crash. Instead, police must judge belt use based on information gathered after the crash including statements by occupants about 

their own belt use, statements by witnesses to the crash and, significantly, the 

presence of injuries and whether police believe they are consistent or inconsistent with belt use. In other words, Padmanaban and Moffat include in their 

analysis a variable that is itself subject to influence by the outcome (injury severity and pattern) to be predicted. In addition, occupant statements about belt 

use are influenced by the fact that it is illegal in most states to be unbelted. 

A result of these twin biases is that belt use in crashes can be overestimated, 

especially for occupants with lesser injuries whose claims of belt use are more 

believable (Schiff and Cummings, 2004). Models including belt use as a predictor of injury severity not only introduce general inaccuracy but also overestimate the effect of belt use on reducing injury, simultaneously masking the effects of any other variables. 

Evidence of the bias toward overestimating belt use in the dataset used in the 

IIHS study is provided by comparisons with NHTSA’s National Occupant Protection Use Survey (NOPUS), which records rates of belt use for the general 

population observed during daylight hours. During the calendar years of the 

IIHS study, NOPUS data show driver belt use averaging 70–75 percent, which 

is lower than the 83 percent recorded by police for drivers in the rollover crashes in the IIHS study. It is unlikely that drivers involved in single-vehicle rollover crashes, many of which occur at night when belt use rates are lower 

(NHTSA, 2005, 2007), were wearing belts more often than the general population during daylight hours. 

b. Because of these problems, IIHS did not include belt use as a predictor. However, IIHS did examine whether the effects varied by coded belt use. As reported in the study, additional statistical models were run for occupants coded 

as belted (83 percent), for those coded as unbelted (10 percent), and for those 

coded as unknown (7 percent). 

i. For those coded as belted, the pattern of effects of roof strength varied 

little from the overall analysis. This is not surprising because most drivers 

in the study were coded as belted. In addition, if belt use is miscoded, as 

argued above, then many of the drivers actually were unbelted, again 

meaning that this analysis is very similar to the overall analysis. 

ii. For those coded as unknown, the pattern also was quite similar to the 

overall analysis. Again, this is not surprising because the unknown group 

also included both belted and unbelted occupants. 

iii. Effects estimated for those coded as unbelted were much smaller, but 

this would be expected from the twin biases noted in item 2.a. It is likely 

many of those coded as unbelted received their codes because their injuries 

were serious and inconsistent with belt use. This bias would occur for both 

weak and strong roofs, masking the effect of roof strength by assigning 

higher weight to the (overestimated) effect of belt use. 

48 

The conclusion from these separate analyses is that coded belt use does not 

affect the estimated effect of roof strength on injury severity, except in a 

way that would be expected from the biases and inaccuracies inherent in 

police-coded belt use. 

3. Like police-coded belt use, police-coded alcohol involvement in crashes is incomplete, inaccurate, and may be related to the injury severity. Besides, Padmanaban 

and Moffatt offer no justification other than the empirical relationship, which could 

be spurious, for including alcohol use codes in the prediction equation. 

a. Results of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) tests are the most objective 

measures of the presence of alcohol, but only a small percentage of crash-involved drivers typically are tested. Queries of the state databases used in the 

IIHS study show that about 11 percent of the drivers studied were tested. 

Padmanaban and Moffatt report using a combination of BAC test results and 

‘‘had been drinking’’ codes. They do not specify in their comments to NHTSA 

what percentage of the codes resulted from actual BAC tests, what codes were 

used for those not tested, or the extent of missing data. In response to an IIHS 

inquiry, they provided this additional information: 

i. Of drivers identified in their analysis as positive for alcohol use, about 

18 percent were tested. About 13 percent tested positive, and 5 percent 

were coded as having positive alcohol use despite negative BAC tests. Thus 

5 percent were coded as positive for alcohol despite chemical tests to the 

contrary. 

ii. For drivers without BAC test results, Padmanaban and Moffatt determined alcohol use from a variety of codes regarding police judgment of alcohol use or factors contributing to the crashes. When alcohol was not listed 

as a factor, alcohol use was coded as negative. 

b. It is incorrect to assume that all of the drivers not tested were alcohol-free 

based on police not listing alcohol as a contributing factor to the crashes. According to Moskowitz et al., (1999), police most often cite breath odor in determining alcohol involvement in traffic offenses, but the ability to detect this odor 

is unreliable even under controlled laboratory conditions. 

c. It is likely that reported alcohol use is spuriously related to injury outcome 

because more seriously injured people are more likely to undergo close examination. About half of the states included in the IIHS study mandate BAC testing 

of fatally injured drivers (NHTSA, 2004), creating inherent reporting bias because the likelihood of testing is correlated with injury outcome. Padmanaban 

and Moffatt do not report or account for this bias. 

d. It is likely that factors such as crash severity, vehicle damage, and driver 

age and gender have some influence on whom police choose to test for alcohol 

as well as which crashes they judge to be influenced by alcohol. Previous research has found that driver age and gender affect which drivers at sobriety 

checkpoints are judged not drinking (Wells et al., 1997). 

e. Although alcohol clearly increases crash likelihood, Padmanaban and Moffatt 

offer no explanation of how alcohol increases the likelihood of K/A injury, given 

that a crash already has occurred. Absent convincing evidence that alcohol increases the susceptibility of human tissue and bones to injury, the primary determinants of whether an injury occurs to alcohol-impaired or sober occupants 

are the forces experienced during the crash. It might be argued that sober drivers’ rollover crashes would be more severe, and their injurious forces greater, 

than those of drinking drivers because more extreme circumstances would be 

required for the sober drivers to lose control of their vehicles or leave the road. 

But this argument leads to the opposite of the effect claimed by Padmanaban 

and Moffatt. Any empirical relationship to the contrary observed between alcohol and K/A injury likelihood is likely to be spurious and related to the absence 

of objective evidence of alcohol involvement after a crash has occurred. 

4. Padmanaban and Moffatt’s docket submission is based on unsound and inconsistent statistical treatment. It contains numerous misstatements and omissions that 

undermine its conclusions. 

a. They either misunderstand or misconstrue the fundamental concepts of statistical estimation and significance testing. The object of a study of roof strength 

is to obtain the best estimate permitted by the data. In this context, statistical 

significance is only a way of representing how often one expects to be wrong 

in concluding that the observed estimate is indicative of a real non-zero effect. 

Padmanaban and Moffatt claim that if the estimated effect of roof strength on 

49 

injury risk is found to be ‘‘not significant, then the lives saved [by strengthening 

roofs] could just as well be zero or negative’’ (pg. 2). This trivializes the process 

of statistical estimation in a way that is fundamentally misleading. 

i. It is misleading to treat any estimate with a p-value slightly above 0.05 

as if it were drastically different from estimates with p-values slightly 

below 0.05. For example, among the effects estimated for reductions in the 

likelihood of driver death with increased roof strength, the p-value for SWR 

within 5 inches of crush was slightly greater than 0.06. This means that 

if one were to conclude that an effect this large is different from zero, one 

would expect to be wrong about 6 times out of 100 (a p-value of 0.05 would 

lower the error risk only slightly, to 5 times in 100). This 6 percent error 

risk also means that the likelihood of seeing effects as large as that estimated for roof strength when the true effect is zero or negative is only 

about 3 in 100. Padmanaban and Moffatt misrepresent the logic of statistical estimation and misconstrue the implications of significance testing. 

ii. This illogical approach leads them to ignore the overwhelming consistency of the results of the IIHS study. Their docket submission suggests that 

a single IIHS estimate for injury risk reduction that was not significant at 

the 0.05 level contradicts and invalidates the overall finding that stronger 

roofs reduce injury risk. Of the 12 estimates for K/A injury risk related to 

roof strength measured in 4 different ways and at 3 different crush distances, all were significant at p < 0.0001. For the 12 estimates for K injury 

risk, 9 were significant at p < 0.0001, 2 at p < 0.05, and 1 at p < 0.07. 

Robustness of an empirical pattern when measured in different ways is 

much more important than the fact that 1 of 24 tests did not meet an arbitrary level of p < 0.05. 

b. The docket submission does not include sample sizes for any of Padmanaban 

and Moffatt’s 7 statistical models. In response to subsequent requests by IIHS, 

they indicated sample sizes ranging from 1,352 to 20,010. These details should 

have been included in the discussion of their statistical modeling, especially 

given their ill-advised reliance on levels of statistical significance for interpretation of results. For example, they emphasize that odds ratios in the IIHS study 

were not statistically significant for the subset of drivers that police coded as 

unbelted, asserting that this means roof strength is not beneficial for these occupants. However, these drivers account for only 10 percent of the total sample, 

limiting the power to detect statistically significant effects. 

c. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not give parameter estimates for the predictors 

of injury risk they chose to include in their comment. Without these, it is unknown whether the effects being estimated by their models are consistent or realistic relative to some underlying reasonable theory. Subsequent IIHS inquiries 

produced some, but not all, of the parameter estimates (see item 5.a.i. below). 

d. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not present p-values for their additional parameters in the model that looked at fatality risk, saying only that roof SWR was 

not significant at a p-value of 0.10. It is possible that some variables previously 

claimed to be major factors (alcohol, belt use, ejection status) in injury outcome 

were not significant in this model. 

5. Padmanaban and Moffatt’s docket submission is based on questionable engineering judgment. 

a. They stress the importance of aspect ratio (height divided by track width) in 

previous research and criticize IIHS for excluding it. In their reproduction of the 

IIHS study, they find it statistically significant. This is problematic for 4 reasons: 

i. Based on data provided to IIHS, their models predict greater injury risk 

in SUVs with larger aspect ratios. This directly contradicts their previous 

studies, which reported decreased injury risk for vehicles with larger aspect 

ratios. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not explain or even disclose this fact 

in their submission to NHTSA. 

ii. They do not offer a hypothesis for how the shape of these SUVs, as defined by aspect ratio, would affect injury risk. This also is true of their previous research, although they have stated that it is unrelated to differences 

in headroom. If the small geometric differences between these midsize 

SUVs are important in the rollover crash dynamics, more meaningful measurements would include maximum vehicle width or vehicle width at the 

height of the roof. 

50 

iii. The range of aspect ratios given for these vehicles is very small. Height 

and track width vary by up to only about 2 inches. 

iv. There is enough variation in the specified height and track width measurements between model years of several of the study vehicles to invalidate 

whatever data were used. 

b. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not seem to understand the IIHS motivation for 

including static stability factor (SSF) in the statistical models, stating that ‘‘the 

purpose of the IIHS study and of ours was to evaluate the likelihood of serious/ 

fatal injuries given a rollover and not the likelihood of rollovers.’’ The IIHS 

study clearly explains why SSF may be correlated to crash severity: By definition, more stable vehicles require more severe events to cause them to roll over. 

c. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not explain why vehicle weight should be included in two different places in their statistical models. They include it both 

as an independent variable and in the calculation of SWR. 

6. Padmanaban and Moffatt misrepresent the IIHS study. 

a. They say they ‘‘agree [with the IIHS study] that SWR within 5 inches is the 

most useful and universally accepted roof strength metric,’’ but the IIHS study 

makes no such claim. Its calculations of lives saved use this metric simply because FMVSS 216 uses the same metric. SWR within 5 inches of plate displacement is 1 of 12 roof strength metrics IIHS evaluated, and several of the other 

metrics predict greater reductions in injury risk across the range of tested vehicles. Even with their problematic predictors, it is possible that Padmanaban and 

Moffatt would have found statistically significant results with different roof 

strength metrics. 

b. Padmanaban and Moffatt claim that the regression line in Figure 1 of the 

IIHS study is the ‘‘primary finding’’ and later in their submission to NHTSA 

dedicate much time to discussing this line. However, they separately state their 

understanding that the plot is included ‘‘solely to present a visual representation of their raw data. [IIHS does] not rely upon it in any way for their conclusions.’’ This second statement is correct, and it is disingenuous to criticize the 

statistical fit of a plot presented for visualization and understood to be uncorrected for known confounding factors. 

c. They claim IIHS used the estimate for the reduction of fatal and incapacitating injury in the lives-saved calculations because the fatality estimate alone 

was not statistically significant (see items 4.a.i. and 4.a.ii. above). However, the 

former estimate was used because it is based on more observations (of injuries) 

and therefore likely to be more accurate. For the other 11 roof strength metrics, 

little variation was observed between effect estimates for K/A injury and for 

fatal injury, so the choice was well founded. 

d. Padmanaban and Moffatt say their analysis does not ‘‘differ significantly 

from [IIHS] raw data counts’’ but do not give any details. Responses to subsequent requests from IIHS indicate their analysis includes 2,807 fewer drivers 

overall and 100 more drivers with fatal or incapacitating injuries. These differences are not explained. Padmanaban and Moffatt fail to demonstrate that 

their data and analysis replicate the IIHS study before including additional predictor variables. If their initial analysis cannot replicate IIHS’s, then none of 

their subsequent claims are applicable to the current discussion. 

7. Padmanaban and Moffatt’s docket submission and associated analysis cannot 

be fully evaluated due to the lack of detailed information about data sources, methods, and results. 

In contrast, IIHS methods and findings are fully described in the study. IIHS staff 

further assisted JP Research in understanding the construction of the statistical 

models used in the study. All information necessary to reconstruct the IIHS study 

is available to the public. 

a. For some additional predictor variables, unexplained discrepancies exist between the data counts in the state files and the counts JP Research reported 

to IIHS. For example, JP Research reports that ejection status was known for 

all but 2,198 drivers, whereas IIHS observed that ejection status was coded as 

unknown or completely missing for 8,713 drivers in the state data files. It would 

be useful to know how JP Research obtained the ejection status for their analyses. 

b. The docket submission includes statements about the methods used in their 

two previous studies that were not disclosed in that research. For example, the 

51 

submission claims that both earlier studies controlled for ejection and rural/ 

urban land use, but their 2005 study mentions neither among the factors included in the logistic regression models. The docket comment says ‘‘all our previous models also controlled for states, though it was not explicitly stated in the 

reports’’ (pg. 3). It is impossible to judge the credibility of any study when important details are omitted about how the research was conducted. 

c. Padmanaban and Moffatt report access to the results of other roof strength 

tests of the IIHS study vehicles that differ substantially from the IIHS results. 

These other results are not public, so it is impossible to determine their relevance. Previous research by Padmanaban and Moffatt included confidential 

tests conducted by vehicle manufacturers on non-production vehicles (Moffatt 

and Padmanaban, 1995; Padmanaban et al., 2005), and we do not know the nature of any additional test data on IIHS study vehicles. 

d. As detailed above, Padmanaban and Moffatt exclude several important facts 

that were revealed to IIHS only after follow-up inquiries to JP Research (see 

items 3.a., 4.b., 4.c., 5.a.i., 6.d. and 7.a.). 

Appendix A—Relationship Between Roof Strength and Ejection Risk 

To address Padmanaban and Moffatt’s claim that ejection is ‘‘likely to be unrelated to roof strength,’’ IIHS conducted a logistic regression analysis of ejection likelihood based on roof strength. Vehicle and crash data were the same as in IIHS’s 

analysis of vehicle roof strength and injury risk (Brumbelow et al., 2008). Figure 1 

shows the relationship in the raw data between peak roof SWR within 5 inches of 

plate displacement and ejection rate before adjusting for any potentially confounding 

factors. Of 22,817 rollover crashes of study vehicles, police coded 13,086 drivers as 

not ejected, 1,018 as fully or partially ejected, and the rest were coded as unknown 

or had missing values. Only the drivers with known ejection status were included 

in this analysis. Table 1 presents results of the logistic regression model controlling 

for the effects of state, driver age, and vehicle SSF. For a 1-unit increase in peak 

SWR, ejection risk was reduced 32 percent. For each 10-year increase in driver age, 

there was an 11 percent decrease in ejection risk. Both of these results are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. An increase in SSF of 0.1 was predicted to increase ejection risk by 4 percent, but this result was not statistically significant at 

the 0.05 level. 


604oesch5.eps
52 

Table 1.—Results of Logistic Regression Model for Risk of Ejection 

Parameter Odds ratio 

Roof SWR within 5 inches (1-unit increase) 0.68* 

Driver age (10-year increase) 0.89* 

SSF (0.1-unit increase) 1.04 

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level. 

Appendix B—Relationship Between Roof Strength and Injury Risk for 

Drivers Coded as Not Ejected 

The logistic regression model described in Appendix A demonstrates that reducing 

the risk of driver ejection is one benefit of stronger roofs. Also of interest is how 

stronger roofs benefit drivers who remain inside a vehicle during a rollover crash. 

Police coded 13,086 drivers in the IIHS study as not ejected. Figure 2 shows the 

relationship between the rate of fatal or incapacitating injury among the nonejected 

drivers and the peak roof SWR measured within 5 inches of plate displacement for 

each of the vehicles. The figure plots the raw data before adjusting for any confounding factors. Controlling for state effects, SSF, and driver age, a logistic regression model estimated a 27 percent reduction in the risk of fatal or incapacitating 

driver injury for a 1-unit increase in peak SWR within 5 inches of plate displacement. Nearly identical to the risk reduction estimated for all drivers in the IIHS 

study (see Table 2), this result is not surprising because nonejected drivers represent 93 percent of all drivers with known ejection status. A 10-year increase in 

driver age was predicted to increase the risk of K/A injury by 18 percent. A 0.1- 

unit increase in SSF was associated with a 6 percent increase in K/A injury risk. 

The odds ratios for SWR and driver age were significant at the 0.05 level, but the 

odds ratio for SSF was not. 

Table 2.—Results of Logistic Regression Model for Risk of Fatal or Incapacitating Injuries 

for Drivers Coded as Nonejected by Police and for All Drivers 

Parameter 

Odds ratio for 

drivers coded 

as nonejected 

Odds ratio for 

all drivers 

Roof SWR within 5 inches (1-unit increase) 0.73* 0.72* 

Driver age (10-year increase) 1.18* 1.12* 

SSF (0.1-unit increase) 1.06 0.96 

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level. 


604oesch6.eps
53 

References 

Brumbelow, M.L.; Teoh, E.R.; Zuby, D.S. and McCartt, A.T., 2008. Roof strength and injury 

risk in rollover crashes. Arlington, VA: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. 

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. 2008. Comment to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning proposed changes to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216, 

Roof Crush Resistance; Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0015, March 27. Arlington, VA. 

Moffatt, E.A. and Padmanaban, J., 1995. The relationship between vehicle roof strength and 

occupant injury in rollover crash data. Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine, 245–67. Des Plaines, IL: Association for the 

Advancement of Automotive Medicine. 

Moskowitz, H.; Burns, M. and Ferguson, S., 1999. Police officers’ detection of breath odors 

from alcohol ingestion. Accident Analysis and Prevention 31:175–80. 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2004. State laws and practices for BAC testing and reporting drivers involved in fatal crashes. Report no. DOT HS–809–756. Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation. 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2005. Connecticut’s day and night safety belt 

use. Report no. DOT HS–809–954. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation. 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2007. Daytime and nighttime seat belt use 

at selected sites in New Mexico. Report no. DOT HS–810–705. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation. 

Padmanaban, J. and Moffatt, E.A., 2008. Comment to the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration concerning proposed changes to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216, 

Roof Crush Resistance; Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0015, March 27. Mountain View, CA. 

Padmanaban, J.; Moffatt, E. A. and Marth, D.R., 2005. Factors influencing the likelihood of 

fatality and serious/fatal injury in single-vehicle rollover crashes. SAE Technical Paper Series 

2005–01–0944. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers. 

Schiff, M.A. and Cummings, P., 2004. Comparison of reporting of seat belt use by police and 

crash investigators: variation in agreement by injury severity. Accident Analysis and Prevention 

36:961–65. 

Wells, J.K.; Greene, M.A.; Foss, R.D., Ferguson, S.A. and Williams, A.F., 1997. Drinking drivers missed at sobriety checkpoints. Journal of Studies on Alcohol 58:513–17. 

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety—Status Report—Vol. 43, No. 2, March 15, 2008 

ROLLOVER

Rollover in your SUV, and you want the roof to hold up so you’re protected from 

injury, including harm from the roof caving in on you. Every passenger vehicle 

meets Federal requirements for roof strength, measured in a test, and some exceed 

the requirements by substantial amounts. The question has been whether stronger 

roofs actually reduce injury risk in real-world rollover crashes. Some studies have 

concluded that the strength of a vehicle’s roof has little or no effect on the likelihood 

of injury, but a new Institute study indicates that roof strength definitely influences 

injury risk. 

Researchers tested SUVs in a procedure similar to what the government requires 

automakers to conduct to assess roof strength and then related the findings to the 

real-world death and injury experience of the same SUVs in single-vehicle rollover 

crashes. The main finding is that injury risk went down as roof strength increased. 

Injury rates vary considerably among vehicles in rollovers, and there are still a 

lot researchers don’t know about these crashes. For example, is injury risk primarily 

from the sudden crushing of the roof? Is it because people crash into the roof when 

the vehicle is upside down? Or does the main risk come from full or partial ejection 

of occupants when vehicle doors and windows break open during rollover crashes? 

‘‘We don’t know just what happens to people in these crashes or what the injury 

mechanisms are. What we do know from the new study is that strengthening a vehicle’s roof reduces injury risk, and reduces it a lot,’’ says Institute president Adrian 

Lund. 

Extent of the rollover problem: About 35 percent of all occupant deaths occur in 

crashes in which vehicles roll over. This problem is worse in some kinds of vehicles 

than others. About 25 percent of occupant deaths in crashes of cars and minivans 

involve rolling over. The proportion jumps to 59 percent in SUVs. 

Of course, the best way to prevent these deaths is to keep vehicles from rolling 

over in the first place, and electronic stability control is helping. It’s reducing rollover crashes, especially fatal single-vehicle ones, by significant percentages. 

‘‘But until these crashes are reduced to zero, roof strength will remain an important aspect of occupant protection,’’ Lund points out. 

What the U.S. government requires: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216 

establishes minimum roof strength for passenger vehicles. Compliance testing involves the application of a metal plate to one side of a roof at a constant speed. The 

roof must withstand a force of 1.5 times the weight of the vehicle before reaching 

54 

5 inches of crush. Thus, a vehicle weighing 4,000 pounds has to withstand 6,000 

pounds of force while sustaining 5 or fewer inches of crush. 

This requirement, in effect since 1973 for cars and 1994 for other passenger vehicles, is in the process of an upgrade. One of the government’s main proposals, issued 

in 2005, is to boost the specified force to 2.5 times vehicle weight (see Status Report, Jan. 28, 2006; on the web at iihs.org). Last month the government indicated it may 

consider further altering the standard by testing both sides of vehicle roofs instead 

of applying the force to one side only. When the changes were proposed in 2005, 

the Institute voiced general support but noted the ‘‘surprising lack of evidence’’ connecting the requirements of the standard to real-world rollover crash outcomes. 

The new Institute study provides some missing evidence. Across 11 SUVs at 3 different degrees of roof crush—2, 5, and 10 inches—the strongest roofs are associated 

with injury risks 39 to 57 percent lower than the weakest roofs. Peak roof strength 

at 2 and 10 inches of crush is more highly related to injury risk than at 5 inches. 

Based on these findings, the researchers estimate that if the roofs on every SUV 

the Institute tested were as strong as the strongest one, about 212 of the 668 deaths 

that occurred in these SUVs in 2006 would have been prevented. 

‘‘These are big risk reductions, bigger than what the government or anybody else 

has established,’’ Lund says. 

The researchers estimate that a 1-unit increase in peak strength-to-weight ratio— 

for example, from 1.5 times vehicle weight to 2.5, as the government proposed in 

2005—reduces the risk of serious and fatal injury in a rollover crash by 28 percent. 

Increasing roof strength requirements beyond 2.5 times vehicle weight would reduce 

injury risk even further. 

New findings vs. previous studies: Before the Institute’s study, there was no conclusive evidence about the specific contribution of a vehicle’s roof strength to occupant protection. The government estimated that proposed changes in Federal roof 

strength requirements would save 13 to 44 lives per year. 

‘‘This was based on assumptions that were conservative in the extreme,’’ Lund explains. ‘‘For example, the government assumed zero benefit for unbelted occupants. 

We don’t know exactly what the benefit of an upgraded roof strength standard 

would be for these occupants, but it would be likely to exceed zero.’’ 

Meanwhile two studies sponsored by automakers, one in 1995 and the other a decade later, found no relationship at all between roof strength and injury risk in rollovers. Findings of the first study prompted General Motors to tell The Detroit News 

in 2002, ‘‘Good science, long established and well reviewed in the technical literature, has conclusively demonstrated that there is no relationship between roof 

strength and the likelihood of occupant injury given a rollover.’’ Four years later, 

Ford told the government that ‘‘substantial and compelling real-world crash data 

and laboratory testing have confirmed that simply increasing roof strength will not 

measurably reduce the risk of injury or death to vehicle occupants in rollovers.’’ 

A main problem with these studies is that they included all kinds of passenger 

vehicles with their substantial differences in driver demographics, rollover propensity, and other factors that confound the results. In contrast, the Institute’s new 

study focuses on one kind of vehicle, midsize 4-door SUVs, and tightly controls for 

other factors that could confound the results. While the findings are about a limited 

number of SUVs, the researchers conclude that the overall finding of reduced injury 

risk as roof strength increases would hold for other kinds of vehicles, although the 

magnitude of the injury rate reduction may differ among vehicle groups. 

Lund adds that the findings ‘‘prompt us to expand our research on roof strength 

with an eye to supplying consumers with comparisons of how well vehicles protect 

people in rollover crashes. A dynamic test with dummies instrumented to measure 

injury risk in rollovers would be desirable, but there is a sticking point. First we 

have to understand how the movement of dummies in controlled tests could reflect 

how real people move in real-world rollovers. Meanwhile, simpler roof strength 

measurements could provide useful consumer information.’’ 

Details of the study: The Institute study is a two-part analysis involving vehicle 

testing and examination of the outcomes of real-world rollover crashes. Eleven 

midsize 4-door SUVs were subjected to a test similar to the one run by automakers 

to comply with Federal roof strength requirements (the manufacturers’ own test 

data aren’t public information). The 11 SUVs exclude features that might affect injury rates in rollovers such as side curtain airbags and electronic stability control 

(see p. 2). To assess the range of roof strength among the SUVs, researchers applied 

force to the roofs until crush reached 10 inches, measuring the peak force required 

for 2 inches of crush, 5 inches, and 10 inches. Because crush in a rollover can depend on vehicle weight as well as roof strength, the researchers calculated strengthto-weight ratios for each degree of crush. They also measured the amount of energy 

absorbed by each roof at each degree of crush and, again taking vehicle weight into 

55 

account, the height from which the vehicle would have to be dropped to produce 

equivalent energy absorption. 

By almost any of these measures, the strongest roof was on the 2000–04 Nissan 

Xterra while one of the weakest was on the 1999–2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee. Within 5 inches of crush, the Jeep withstood a force as high as 6,560 pounds, which 

amounts to 1.64 times the weight of the 4-wheel-drive version and 1.72 times the 

weight of the 2-wheel-drive. The corresponding figure for the Xterra was 11,996 

pounds, or 2.93 times the weight of the 4-wheel-drive and 3.16 times the 2-wheeldrive. 

Having established the range of roof strength among the SUVs, the researchers 

studied almost 23,000 real-world rollovers of the same 11 SUVs during 1997–2005. 

This information was collected from 12 states with sufficient data on police-reported 

crashes to comply with study criteria. 

Logistic regression was used to assess the effect of roof strength on the likelihood 

of driver injury in the rollover crashes of the 11 SUVs. The regression controlled 

for state-to-state differences in methods of reporting crashes, terrain, urbanization, 

etc.; vehicle stability; and driver age. Results indicate the various injury risks given 

the various SUV roof strengths. 

‘‘No matter what measurement of roof strength we used or whether we measured 

at 2 or 5 or 10 inches of crush, we found a consistent relationship between roof 

strength and injury risk,’’ Lund points out. 

The relationship between roof strength-to-weight ratio and injury risk was stronger at 2 inches than at 5 inches, the crush specified for testing under the Federal 

standard (the government doesn’t require automakers to assess roof strength at 2 

or 10 inches). At 5 inches, the predicted injury risk for people in SUVs with roof 

strength-to-weight ratios as strong as the Xterra’s would be 39 percent lower than 

for people in vehicles with roof strength like the Grand Cherokee’s. At 2 inches of 

crush, the difference in predicted injury risk is 51 percent. 

The 11 SUV designs in the study include the 1996–2004 Chevrolet Blazer, 2002– 

05 Chevrolet TrailBlazer, 1998–2003 Dodge Durango, 1996–2001 Ford Explorer, 

2002–04 Ford Explorer, 1996–98 Jeep Grand Cherokee, 1999–2004 Jeep Grand 

Cherokee, 2002–05 Jeep Liberty, 1997–2004 Mitsubishi Montero Sport, 2000–04 

Nissan Xterra, and 1996–2000 Toyota 4Runner. 

For a copy of ‘‘Relationship between roof strength and injury risk in rollover 

crashes’’ by M.L. Brumbelow et al., write: Publications, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 1005 N. Glebe Rd., Arlington, VA 22201, or e-mail publica 

tions@iihs.org. The rate of neck injury complaints is 15 percent lower in cars and SUVs with 

seat/head restraint combinations rated good compared with poor. The results for serious injuries are more dramatic. Thirty-five percent fewer insurance claims for neck 

injuries lasting 3 months or more are filed for cars and SUVs with good seat/head 

restraints than for ones rated poor. 

These are the main findings of a new Institute study of thousands of insurance 

claims filed for damage to vehicles, all 2005–06 models, that were struck in frontinto-rear impacts. Conducted in cooperation with State Farm and Nationwide, the 

study is the first time seat/head restraint ratings based on dynamic tests conducted 

by the Institute have been compared with real-world neck injury results. 

‘‘In stop and go traffic, you’re more likely to get in a rear-end collision than any 

other kind of crash, so you’re more likely to need your seat and head restraint than 

any other safety system in your vehicle,’’ says David Zuby, the Institute’s senior vice 

president for vehicle research. ‘‘This is why it’s so important to fit vehicles with 

seats and head restraints that earn good ratings for saving your neck.’’ 

The Institute has been measuring and rating head restraint geometry since 1995. 

The higher and closer a restraint is, the more likely it will be to prevent neck injury 

in a rear collision. In 2004 the Institute added a dynamic test simulating a rear 

crash to refine the ratings. Vehicles are rated good, acceptable, marginal, or poor 

based on both restraint geometry and test results (see Status Report, Nov. 20, 2004; 

on the web at iihs.org). The same rating system is used internationally by a consortium of insurer-sponsored organizations, the International Insurance Whiplash Prevention Group. 

An estimated 4 million rear collisions occur each year in the United States. Neck 

sprain or strain is the most serious injury in one-third of insurance claims for injuries in all kinds of crashes. The annual cost of these claims exceeds $8 billion annually. 

While findings about real-world neck injury in vehicle seats rated good and poor 

are clear, those for seats rated acceptable and marginal aren’t as clear. There wasn’t 

any reduction in initial neck injury complaints for acceptable and marginal seats, 

compared with poor, though long-term neck injuries were reduced. 

56 

‘‘The long-term injuries are the very ones we want to reduce because they’re the 

most serious,’’ Zuby points out. ‘‘While many neck injuries involve moderate discomfort that goes away in a week or so, about one of every four initial complaints still 

was being treated 3 months later. These longer term injuries involve more pain and 

cost more to treat. They’re being reduced about one-third in vehicles with seat/head 

restraints rated good compared with poor. Serious neck injuries also are being reduced in seats that are rated acceptable or marginal. 

Improvements: More and more passenger vehicles are being equipped with seats 

and head restraints rated good. When the Institute started evaluating and comparing the geometry of the head restraints in 1995 model cars, only a handful were 

rated good and 80 percent were poor. Then the automakers responded, and by 2004 

about 4 of every 5 head restraints had good or acceptable geometry (see Status Report, Nov. 20, 2004; on the web at iihs.org). Similarly, the dynamic performance of 

seat/head restraint combinations is improving. Only 12 percent of 2004 model cars 

had combinations rated good, but by the 2007 model year the proportion had increased to 29 percent (see Status Report, Aug. 4, 2007; on the web at iihs.org). 

These improvements are being driven not only by ratings of seat/head restraints 

published by the Institute and other insurer-sponsored groups but also by a U.S. 

standard that will require the restraints to extend higher and fit closer to the backs 

of people’s heads by the 2009 model year. In the United States, automakers also 

have been spurred by the Institute’s TOP SAFETY PICK award. To win this designation, a vehicle has to earn good ratings in all three tests—front, side, and rear. 

How the injuries occur: When a vehicle is struck in the rear and driven forward, 

its seats accelerate occupants’ torsos forward. Unsupported, an occupant’s head will 

lag behind this forward torso movement, and the differential motion causes the neck 

to bend and stretch. The higher the torso acceleration, the more sudden the motion, 

the higher the forces on the neck, and the more likely a neck injury is to occur. 

Factors that influence neck injury risk include gender and seating position in addition to the designs of seats and head restraints. Women are more likely than men 

to incur neck injuries in rear crashes, and front-seat occupants, especially drivers, 

are more likely to incur such injuries than people riding in back seats. 

The key to reducing whiplash injury risk is to keep an occupant’s head and torso 

moving together. To accomplish this, the geometry of a head restraint has to be adequate—high enough and near the back of the head. Then the seat structure and 

stiffness must be designed to work in concert with the head restraint to support an 

occupant’s neck and head, accelerating them with the torso as the vehicle is pushed 

forward. 

About the study: To correlate seat/head restraint ratings with real-world neck injury risk, researchers studied about 3,000 insurance claims associated with rear 

crashes of 105 of the 175 passenger vehicles (2005–06 models) for which the Institute has ratings based on both restraint geometry and seat performance in dynamic 

tests. The claims were filed with State Farm Mutual Insurance and Nationwide Insurance, which together account for more than 20 percent of the personal auto insurance premiums paid in the United States in 2005. The researchers modeled the 

odds of a neck injury occurring in a rear-struck vehicle as a function of seat ratings 

(good, acceptable, marginal, or poor), while controlling for other factors that also affect neck injury risk, such as vehicle size and type and occupant age and gender. 

The percentage of rear-struck drivers with neck injury claims was 16.2 in vehicles 

with seats rated good, based on dynamic testing. Corresponding percentages were 

21.1 for seats rated acceptable, 17.7 for marginal seats, and 19.2 for poor ones. Neck 

injuries lasting 3 months or more were reported by 3.8 percent of drivers in good 

seats, 4.7 percent in acceptable seats, 3.6 percent in marginal seats, and 5.8 percent 

in seats rated poor. 

‘‘What these data show is that we’re pushing seat designs in the right direction,’’ 

Zuby says, ‘‘Results for acceptable and marginal seats weren’t as clear as for good 

seats. Initial neck injury claims weren’t significantly lower than for poor seats. Still 

we saw reductions in claims for serious neck injuries in acceptable and marginal 

seats as well as in good ones.’’ 

This is the third study the Institute has conducted that indicates the superiority 

of seat/head restraint combinations rated good for reducing neck injury risk. In 1999 

the Institute found that head restraints rated good for geometry alone had lower 

insurance claims for neck injuries. In 2003 Institute researchers expanded the data, 

finding that modern features such as head restraints that automatically adjust in 

rear-end collisions and seats that absorb energy also reduce insurance claims. 

For a copy of ‘‘Relationship of dynamic seat ratings to real-world neck injury 

rates’’ by C.F. Farmer et al., write: Publications, Insurance Institute for Highway 

Safety, 1005 N. Glebe Rd., Arlington, VA 22201, or e-mail publications@ iihs.org. 

57 

Importance of ESC and Side Airbags 

Vehicle roof strength is crucial to occupant protection in rollover crashes. Other 

features are effective, too, in both preventing such crashes in the first place and protecting people when their vehicles do roll. Researchers estimate that electronic stability control, or ESC, reduces the risk of a fatal single-vehicle rollover by about 69 

percent for all passenger vehicles and 72 percent for SUVs in particular. Side curtain airbags are expected to reduce the risk of death in the rollovers that still occur. 

‘‘These technologies are essential,’’ Institute president Adrian Lund points out, 

‘‘but electronic stability control doesn’t completely eliminate rollover crashes, and 

side airbags aren’t the only protection occupants need if they do roll over. This is 

why we have to pay attention to the roof. If a vehicle’s roof is strong enough to absorb the energy of a rollover without caving in on its occupants, injury risk goes 

down.’’ 

Electronic stability control monitors vehicle response to driver steering and applies the brakes on individual wheels to maintain the path that’s indicated by the 

steering wheel position (see Status Report, June 13, 2006; on the web at iihs.org). 

This technology is standard or optional on about two-thirds of all current passenger 

vehicle models. Side airbags are standard or optional in about 80 percent. 

Strong vs. Weak 

The difference in roof strength was obvious when the Nissan Xterra and Ford Explorer, both 2000 models, were subjected to a crushing force of up to 10,000 pounds. 

The Xterra’s roof crushed about 2 inches, and damage is hardly visible except for 

a cracked windshield. Meanwhile the Explorer’s roof crushed 10 inches, caving far 

into the occupant compartment even before reaching 10,000 pounds of force. 

Rollovers in Which Drivers Died Demonstrate Need for Strong Roofs on 

SUVs 

The drivers of these SUVs died when their vehicles overturned. It’s a big problem—more than half of all occupant deaths in SUVs occur in rollover crashes. New 

research indicates that strengthening vehicle roofs would reduce this problem. If the 

roof on every SUV were as strong as the best one the Institute tested, injury risk 

in rollover crashes could be reduced 39 to 57 percent. These are very big risk reductions, bigger than the Federal Government or anybody else has established. 

Injuries in Rear Crashes 

These vehicles didn’t sustain a lot of damage when they were struck from behind, 

but the drivers were treated for injuries suffered in the impacts. Neck sprains and 

strains are the most serious problems reported in about 1 of 3 insurance claims for 

injuries. This problem could be reduced by equipping vehicles with seat/head restraints rated good, based on Institute tests. Twenty-nine of all recent model cars 

and 22 perent of other passenger vehicles have systems rated good for protection 

against neck injury. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Mr. Strassburger? 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT STRASSBURGER, VICE PRESIDENT, 

VEHICLE SAFETY AND HARMONIZATION, ALLIANCE OF 

AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As an engineer, I’m here today representing the thousands of 

auto engineers who are working around the clock to make cars 

safer. We show up to work each day to make a difference. 

At the Alliance, safety is our highest priority, and therefore, we 

support Congress’s comprehensive plan to further reduce rolloverrelated risk, injury risk, including strengthening roofs. 

Rollovers are a significant safety problem. In 2006, roughly 

10,000 people died in rollover crashes, but government data also 

show that rollover rates are declining. In fact, over the last 10 

years, the SUV rollover fatality rate is down by about 30 percent, 

and we want them to go even lower. 

58 

There are many reasons for this decline, including the voluntary 

introduction, installation of advanced safety technology, such as 

electronic stability control, side-curtain airbags, safety belts with 

pretensioners, safety belt reminders, increased safety belt usage, 

and consumer information. We are proud of our successes in voluntarily introducing safety advancements that help drivers avoid rollovers and enhance occupant protection in rollover crashes. 

Rollovers are complex, violent events that require a number of 

solutions. Congress wisely recognized this when it adopted its comprehensive plan in SAFETEA–LU, which we supported. As the 

committee exercises oversight of the proposed roof-strength rule, it 

is important to keep in mind that the proposal is one element of 

this comprehensive plan. If there is no rollover crash, there will be 

no rollover fatality or injury. Therefore, our first priority must be 

to reduce the occurrence of rollovers. 

As directed by SAFETEA–LU, NHTSA adopted an electronic stability control rule last spring which the agency estimates will prevent at least half of all rollovers. Alliance members are proud of 

the fact that we began installing this technology on vehicles well 

before the rule was finalized. Over 80 percent of model year 2008 

cars and trucks have ESC available already. Our goal is to make 

ESC available on 100 percent of the fleet well in advance of the 

model year 2012 requirement. 

Should a rollover occur, however, the priority becomes keeping 

occupants inside their vehicles. While safety belt use remains the 

lynchpin safety technology, SAFETEA–LU directs NHTSA to implement supplemental occupant ejection mitigation technologies. 

Here again, automakers are ahead of the regulatory curve, with 

over three-quarters of new vehicles having side-curtain airbags 

available. 

Turning to the specific issues associated with this rulemaking, 

the relationship between roof strength and rollover injury risk is 

controversial. There are more than three decades of risk analysis 

debating whether or not there is a causal relationship between 

these parameters. A new analysis by IIHS, just described by Mr. 

Oesch, asserts a causal relationship between roof strength and injury risk. While we welcome the IIHS’s input to try to shed light 

on this controversial issue, we cannot agree with the conclusions of 

their study, for the reasons described in the Alliance’s written 

statement. 

On the issue of testing, the Alliance agrees with NHTSA that dynamic rollover tests for assessing roof strength are not practicable 

or repeatable. Repeatability is a problem with dynamic tests, as 

slight differences from one test to the next can significantly change 

the test outcome. 

In conclusion, Alliance members have demonstrated that motor 

vehicle safety is our number one priority, through voluntary and 

public policy initiatives and through expenditure of many millions 

of dollars in safety research and development. 

With regard to rollover safety, in particular, Alliance members 

have voluntarily implemented technologies that will help drivers 

avoid rollovers in the first place and better—and help them better 

survive them when they occur. 

59 

Reducing injuries and fatalities from auto crashes is a significant 

public health challenge. We appreciate the leadership shown by the 

members of this subcommittee to address these issues, and we look 

forward to continuing to work with you to make our roads the 

safest in the world. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I would be happy 

to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Strassburger follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT STRASSBURGER, VICE PRESIDENT, VEHICLE SAFETY

AND HARMONIZATION, ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS

Introduction 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. My name is Robert 

Strassburger and I am Vice President of Vehicle Safety and Harmonization at the 

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers 

(Alliance) is a trade association of ten car and light truck manufacturers, including 

BMW Group, Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Mazda, Mercedes-Benz, Mitsubishi Motors, Porsche, Toyota and Volkswagen. Within Alliance 

membership, safety is our highest priority. Ours is a high-tech industry that uses 

cutting-edge safety technology to put people first. In fact, automakers invest more 

in research and development than any other industry, including pharmaceuticals 

and computers, according to the National Science Foundation. In 2005 alone, automakers invested $40 billion, roughly $2,400 for every car and light truck sold in the 

U.S. that year. We support NHTSA’s comprehensive plan to further reduce rolloverrelated injury risks, including strengthening vehicle roofs, and we are proud of our 

successes in voluntarily introducing critical safety advancements that help drivers 

avoid rollovers and enhance occupant protection in rollover crashes. 

Industry, Consumers and Motor Vehicle Safety 

Advancing motor vehicle safety remains a significant public health challenge—one 

that automakers are addressing daily, both individually and collectively. Most of the 

new, significant safety features currently available on motor vehicles in the U.S.— 

antilock brakes, stability control, side airbags for head and chest protection, side 

curtains, pre-crash occupant positioning, lane departure warnings, radar use for collision avoidance were implemented voluntarily by manufacturers, not as a result of 

any regulatory mandate. The industry is engaged in high-tech research and implementation of new safety technologies, such as autonomous braking systems and vehicle safety communications systems for crash avoidance. Claims that vehicle safety 

will not be advanced in the absence of regulatory requirements simply do not reflect 

the reality of the current marketplace. Before addressing specific measures to address rollover crashes and injuries, it is important to understand the industry’s approach to motor vehicle safety. There are several principles to which the industry 

adheres. 

First, we consider motor vehicle safety to be a public health challenge. Collisions 

result in a human toll—approximately 42,000 fatalities and 3 million injuries per 

year—and account for an estimated $230 million in direct economic loss. This is why 

we work to improve safety. The causes of these fatalities, injuries, and crashes vary 

between driver behavior or attention errors, to roadway and vehicle hazards. Addressing the causes of motor vehicle crashes therefore requires a comprehensive and 

system-wide approach that encompasses driver, vehicle, and environmental factors. 

Second, as with any public health challenge, it is essential to base policy and improvement initiatives on sound science and a robust understanding of crash and injury causation and effective countermeasures. It is also important to use good 

science in identifying and prioritizing specific opportunities for improvement. To do 

so, high-quality data about the occupant and injury morphology, the environment 

in which collision events occur (roadways), and the vehicle are necessary. Therefore, 

we support the collection and analysis of collision data and the prioritization of collision problems by measures of harm (numbers of fatalities, serious injuries, total economic cost, lost days of productivity, etc.). Such understanding and information 

should inform and prioritize public policy initiatives aimed at enhancing motor vehicle safety. 

Third, safety resources should be expended so as to maximize the safety benefits, 

wherever possible, per dollar expended on safety. 

60 

Alliance Members’ Voluntary Actions To Mitigate Rollover Injuries and 

Fatalities—Rollover Crashes 

According to crash data collected and compiled by the NHTSA, rollovers comprise 

approximately 3 percent of all light passenger vehicle crashes and account for almost one-third of all occupant fatalities in light vehicles. Rollover fatalities are 

strongly associated with the following factors: 

Factor Percentage 

Single Vehicle Crash 83 

Rural Crash Location 60 

High-speed (55 mph or higher) Road 72 

Nighttime 66 

Off-road tripping/tipping Mechanism 60 

Young (under 30 years old) Driver 46 

Male Driver 73 

Alcohol-related 40 

Speed-related 40 

NHTSA has estimated that approximately 64 percent of about 10,000 occupants 

fatally injured in rollovers each year are injured when they are either partially or 

completely ejected during the rollover. Approximately 53 percent of the fatally injured are completely ejected, and 72 percent are unbelted. Most of the fatally injured are ejected through side windows or side doors. Those who are not ejected, 

including belted occupants, are fatally injured as a result of impact with the vehicle 

interior. 

Further, agency data indicate that in 95 percent of single-vehicle rollover crashes, 

the vehicles were tripped, either by on-road mechanisms such as potholes and wheel 

rims digging into the pavement or by off-road mechanisms such as curbs, soft soil, 

and guardrails. Eighty-three (83) percent of single-vehicle rollover crashes occurred 

after the vehicle left the roadway. Five (5) percent of single vehicle rollovers were 

‘‘untripped’’ rollovers. They occurred as a result of tire and/or road interface friction. 

Comprehensive Plan to Abate Rollover Injuries and Fatalities 

NHTSA’s proposal to upgrade its safety standard on roof crush resistance is just 

one part of a comprehensive agency plan for reducing the serious risk of rollover 

crashes and the risk of death and serious injury when rollover crashes do occur. The 

other parts of this plan are: 

• Vehicle actions reducing the frequency of rollovers—for example, by improving 

vehicle stability and control; 

• Vehicle actions reducing occupant ejections—for example by introducing side 

curtain air bags and increasing safety belt use; and 

• Consumer education. 

With the adoption of the provisions of SAFETEA–LU, Congress ratified this comprehensive plan. Section 10301 of this act directed NHTSA to complete rulemakings 

to ‘‘reduce vehicle rollover crashes and mitigate deaths and injuries associated with 

such crashes.1’’ The objective of this plan is to, first, help vehicle operators avoid 

driving situations that may lead to a rollover—a loss of directional control followed 

by a tripping of the vehicle by a curb, or soft earth, etc., and second, reduce injury 

to vehicle occupants during rollover events when they occur. NHTSA has taken or 

is taking the following actions to implement this plan: 

Comprehensive Rollover Fatality & Injury Mitigation Actions 

Action Congressional 

Mandate Federal Register Cite Implementation Date 

Dynamic Rollover NCAP Pub. L. 106–414 68 Fed. Reg. 59250 MY 2004 

Door Latches and Locks Pub. L. 109–59 72 Fed. Reg. 5385 MY 2010 

Electronic Stability Control Pub. L. 109–59 72 Fed. Reg. 17236 MY 2012 

Side Impact Protection Pub. L. 109–59 72 Fed. Reg. 51908 MY 2013 

Roof Strength Pub. L. 109–59 Due 07/01/08 tbd 

Occupant Containment Pub. L. 109–59 Due 10/01/09 tbd 

Alliance Members Have Voluntarily Taken a Number of Actions in 

Furtherance of NHTSA’s Comprehensive Plan 

The Alliance supports NHTSA’s comprehensive plan to further reduce the risks 

related to vehicle rollovers, including (1) reducing the occurrence of rollover crashes, 

61 

(2) keeping occupants inside the vehicle when rollovers occur, and (3) enhancing protection of occupants inside the vehicle during a rollover. Alliance members are committed to making progress on the introduction of systems that will lead to reductions in rollover injuries. Members have voluntarily taken a number of proactive 

steps in furtherance of these goals. These actions are described briefly below. 

Reducing the Occurrence of Rollover Crashes 

Electronic Stability Control 

By far, the most effective strategy for reducing rollover injuries is crash avoidance. Electronic Stability Control (ESC), a proven crash avoidance system, was voluntarily introduced by Alliance members and the volume of vehicles with ESC is 

rising rapidly. As of Model Year 2008, 81 percent of the new light vehicle models 

on sale are available with ESC (61 percent standard; 20 percent optional). The percentage of MY 2008 SUVs with ESC available is even higher. Ninety-five percent 

of MY 2008 SUVs are available with ESC (93 percent standard; 2 percent optional). 

This is well in advance of MY 2012 when such systems will be required. 

ESC systems use automatic, computer-controlled braking of individual wheels to 

assist the driver in maintaining control (and the vehicle’s intended heading) in situations where the vehicle is beginning to lose directional stability (e.g., where the 

driver misjudges the severity of a curve or over-corrects in an emergency situation). 

In such situations (which occur with considerable frequency), intervention by the 

ESC system can assist the driver in maintaining control of the vehicle and keeping 

it on the roadway, thereby preventing fatalities and injuries associated with runoff-the-road crashes that frequently involve rollover or collision with various objects 

(e.g., trees, highway infrastructure, other vehicles). NHTSA estimates that ESC will 

prevent roughly half of all rollovers in passenger cars and light trucks. 

Lane Departure Warning Systems 

Some Alliance members have begun to install lane departure warning (LDW) systems. When a drowsy or otherwise impaired or distracted driver begins to drift out 

of the lane of travel, either into another lane or off the road, the LDW system alerts 

the driver by vibrating the steering wheel or seat, emitting an audible or visual 

warning, or by other means. Some systems can also brake selected wheels to nudge 

a vehicle back in lane. The potential benefit of LDW systems is to prevent headon crashes, sideswipes, and run-off-the-road crashes which can lead to rollovers or 

impacts with off-road objects. LDW systems may be able to reduce such events by 

25 to 30 percent. 

Keeping Occupants Inside the Vehicle During a Rollover and Enhancing Protection 

of those Occupants 

Enhanced Side Impact Protection 

In December 2003, auto manufacturers committed to a plan developed by an 

international group of safety experts for enhancing the crash compatibility of passenger cars and light trucks. The plan established new performance criteria for further enhancing occupant protection in front and side crashes between cars and light 

trucks. It also defined research programs to investigate future test procedures and 

performance criteria. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) facilitated 

the development of this plan with the sponsorship of the Alliance. By September 

2009,100 percent of each participating manufacturer’s applicable vehicles will be designed to these criteria. However, participating auto manufacturers began implementing the front-to-front and front-to-side performance criteria immediately upon 

industry’s agreement. Manufacturers’ recent progress in implementing this commitment is described below. 

Approximate Percentage of Production 

[Designed in Accordance w/Performance Criteria] 

Crash Mode Production Year 

2005 

Production Year 

2006 

Production Year 

2007 

Front-to-Side 33% 53% 71% 

Front-to-Front 62% 75% 81% 

The front-to-side crash component of the commitment established performance criteria to further enhance head protection for people riding in passenger vehicles that 

are struck in the side. As of Model Year 2008, 76 percent of the new light vehicle 

models on sale are available with side curtain air bags (63 percent standard; 13 perVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
62 

cent optional). The percentage of MY 2008 SUVs with side curtain air bags available 

is even higher. Ninety-seven percent of MY 2008 SUVs are available with side curtain air bags (91 percent standard; 6 percent optional). Side curtain air bags provide 

some ejection mitigation benefits in rollovers. 

Occupant Containment Systems 

Ejection is the most common source of serious injuries and fatalities in rollover 

crashes. With input from a separate rollover sensor, side curtain air bags can be 

designed to also deploy as rollover airbags in the event of a rollover. Rollover air 

bags stay inflated longer to help keep occupants inside the vehicle during a rollover. 

The Alliance estimates that approximately one-quarter of the side curtain air bags 

available on MY 2008 models are fitted with rollover air bags. 

Safety Belt Reminder Systems 

Safety belt use is critical to reducing rollover-related fatalities and injuries. While 

safety belts are, overall, 45 percent effective in reducing fatalities in passenger cars 

and 60 percent effective in light trucks and SUVs, their greatest benefit occurs in 

rollovers. NHTSA data show that safety belts are 74 percent effective in reducing 

fatalities that occur in passenger car rollovers, and are 80 percent effective in reducing rollover fatalities in light trucks and SUVs. Thus, any comprehensive program 

to address fatalities in rollovers must begin with improving safety belt use, especially since the data show that approximately 72 percent of the people killed or injured in single-vehicle rollovers are unbelted. 

Alliance members are voluntarily installing vehicle-based technologies to encourage safety belt usage. Research on one system deployed in the United States by an 

Alliance member found a statistically significant 5 percentage point increase in safety belt use for drivers of vehicles equipped with that system compared with drivers 

of unequipped vehicles. NHTSA estimates that a single percentage point increase 

in safety belt use nationwide would result in an estimated 280 lives saved per year. 

Beginning in model year 2004, all members of the Alliance began voluntarily deploying various vehicle-based technologies to increase safety belt use. Eighty-five percent of model year 2006 cars and light trucks were equipped with safety belt reminder systems. 

Other Actions to Mitigate Rollover Injuries and Fatalities 

Primary Enforcement Belt Use Laws 

Alliance members’ support (totaling $33 million) of the Air Bag and Seat Belt 

Safety Campaign conducted from 1996–2007, helped to achieve a more than 20 percentage point increase in the national safety belt use rate, to a highest-ever level 

of 82.4 percent in 2007. The Campaign’s work let to the national adoption of the 

Click It or Ticket program, supported by national and state advertising and significant commitments from the law enforcement community. In addition, the Campaign 

worked throughout its tenure for the adoption of primary enforcement seat belt laws 

in the states. States with primary enforcement laws have average safety belt usage 

rates approximately 11 percentage points higher than states having secondary enforcement laws. In 1996, when the Campaign started, only 11 states covering 38 

percent of the Nation’s population had primary enforcement laws. Currently, 26 

states and the District of Columbia have these laws, covering more than two-thirds 

of the population. Impressively, the latest data shows that 12 states, led by Hawaii 

at 97.6 percent, have belt use rates above 90 percent. Unfortunately, three states 

still have belt use rates below 70 percent. 

Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving 

Because approximately 40 percent of the fatalities occurring in rollovers annually 

are alcohol-related, abating drunk driving will also help to reduce rollover fatalities 

and injuries. In November 2006, the Alliance joined with the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), the Governors 

Highway Safety Association, The Century Council, the Distilled Spirits Council of 

the United States (DISCUS), and the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 

to support MADD’s Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving. The Campaign is pursuing the adoption of state laws mandating the installation of alcohol ignition interlocks (breathalyzers) on vehicles driven by convicted drunk drivers. In New Mexico—the first state to adopt such a mandate—alcohol-involved crashes are down 30 

percent, injuries are down 32 percent, and fatalities are down 22 percent. 

NHTSA’s Roof Strength Rulemaking 

Turning to the matter at hand, as part of a comprehensive plan for reducing the 

serious risk of rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious injury in those 

crashes, NHTSA has proposed to amend the agency’s safety standard on roof crush 

63 

resistance—FMVSS 216—in several ways. First, NHTSA has proposed to extend the 

application of the standard to vehicles with a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) 

of 10,000 pounds or less (the current rule limits applicability to vehicles with a 

GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less). Second, the agency has proposed to increase the 

applied force to 2.5 times each vehicle’s unloaded weight, and to eliminate the existing 5,000 pound limit on the force applied to passenger cars. Third, the agency has 

proposed to replace the current limit on the amount of allowable roof crush with 

a new requirement prohibiting roof contact with the head of a seated test dummy 

representative of a mid-size adult male occupant. A summary of the current and 

proposed roof strength requirements is given below. 

FMVSS 216, ‘‘Roof Crush Resistance’’ 

Existing Standard NPRM SNPRM 

Applicability GVWR ≤ 6,000 lbs. GVWR ≤ 10,000 lbs. GVWR ≤ 10,000 lbs. 

Applied Force Limit 5,000 lbs. None None 

Strength-to-Weight 1.5 2.5 2.5 ∼ 3.0 

Performance Criteria 5 in. Platen Travel No head contact 

(50th Male Dummy) 

No head contact 

(Head Positioning 

Fixture) 

Sides Tested One side at a time 

(Driver & Passenger) 

One side at a time 

(Driver & Passenger) 

Two sides sequentially 

(Driver & Passenger) 

Leadtime na 3-years 3-years 

Phase-in na None None 

Carry-forward Credits na None None 

The Alliance supports NHTSA’s efforts to implement a multi-part comprehensive 

plan to mitigate rollover injuries and fatalities. The Alliance agrees with the agency 

that, by itself, the proposed changes to the roof crush resistance standard will have 

a limited effect (compared to other elements of the comprehensive plan) in reducing 

rollover related casualties. The Alliance has undertaken various studies and analyses to help inform this rulemaking. These demonstrate that the proposed rule 

should be modified in several aspects as described below. We conclude with our recommendations for the final rule. 

Injury Patterns of Occupants Involved in Rollovers 

The Alliance sponsored research to examine the injury patterns of occupants involved in rollover crashes. Like NHTSA, the research sponsored by the Alliance analyzed real-world rollover injury data in order to determine the number of occupant 

injuries that could be attributed to roof intrusion. This research examined only front 

outboard occupants who were belted, not fully ejected from their vehicles, whose 

most severe injury was associated with roof contact, and whose seating position was 

located below a roof component that experienced vertical intrusion as a result of a 

rollover crash. Using the National Automotive Sampling System/Crashworthiness 

Data System (NASS/CDS), the first phase of this research developed a statistical estimate of the number of belted occupants seriously injured in rollovers through various injury sources. The second phase of this research involved an in-depth review 

of each of the cases identified during the first phase to explore injury patterns. A 

comprehensive review of 278 NASS/CDS rollover cases was performed. A few of the 

significant findings of this study are: 

• Injury Causation. Review of a wide range of rollover crashes, from those resulting in significant roof deformation and no injury to those resulting in significant 

injuries with minimal deformation, indicates that rollovers are complex events 

and that a single parameter (such as roof performance) cannot explain the injury potential for occupants. 

• Vehicle Headroom. The NASS/CDS rollover data show no relationship between 

vehicle headroom and the risk of serious head/neck/face injury for belted occupants. 

• Roof Strength-to-Weight Ratio. The NASS/CDS rollover data show no relationship between vehicle roof strength-to-weight ratio (as measured by FMVSS 216) 

and the risk of serious head/neck/face injury for belted occupants, even after 

controlling for rollover class, driver age, and belt use. 

• Two Occupants. The detailed reviews include numerous examples of variability 

in injury outcome for occupants in the same vehicle, even when other factors 

(age, height, belt and ejection status, magnitude of vertical roof deformation at 

occupant positions, etc.) are essentially the same. In particular, these cases 

64 

show no difference between far-side/near-side occupants and associated injury 

risk. 

The auto industry has been conducting research into rollover related injury for 

many years and an understanding of injury causation is essential to understanding 

the relevance of roof strength. Decades of real-world crash data analysis and laboratory testing has established that roof deformation and injury in rollover crashes are 

related to the severity of the crash, but that does not mean roof deformation causes 

injury. 

Roof Strength and Rollover Injury Risk 

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) recently published a study 

that examined the relationship between roof strength and rollover injury risk. IIHS 

conducted independent tests of roof strength among a group of midsize SUVs and 

analyzed the relationship between different measures of roof strength and injury 

risk in real-world rollover crashes. IIHS researchers concluded that there is a strong 

relationship between roof strength and injury risk in a rollover crash; the stronger 

the roof the lower the injury risk. See IIHS Figure 1 below. Based on this finding 

they are recommending that the NHTSA consider increasing the minimum strengthto-weight (SWR) ratio beyond the currently proposed value of 2.5 within 5 inches 

of roof crush, to an SWR of 3.0–3.5. 

The Alliance welcomes the IIHS’s input in trying to shed light on this important 

but controversial issue, but the IIHS’s recommendations for even greater roof 

strength requirements than those currently being proposed by NHTSA are not warranted based on these data. The IIHS data do not demonstrate a relationship between roof strength and injury causation in rollovers. 

In its analysis, the IIHS assumed that the ratio between roof strength and vehicle 

weight, or SWR, is monotonic (consistently decreasing) over the entire range of SWR 

for the samples it examined. Further analyses of these data casts doubt on the acceptability of these assumptions. Using the IIHS data on roof strength, and the 

same analytical approach, a statistical analysis commissioned by the Alliance closely 

replicated the IIHS analysis with police-reported crash data obtained from 9 of the 

12 states used in the IIHS study (Some of the state data used by IIHS are not publicly available.). The analysis then tested whether there was good evidence that a 

straight line provided the best explanation of the relationship. Using a widely accepted statistical procedure, the data for SUVs from the central group of roof 

strength values was reanalyzed, followed by data from the lowest and the highest 

groupings. If a linear relationship is evident across the full range of values then the 

findings from the central group of the data should essentially predict those from the 

upper and lower groups. They did not—see Figure 2 below. Furthermore, limiting 

the analysis to higher roof strength vehicles (SWR ≥ 2.0), arguably closer in value 


604stras1.eps
65 

to the IIHS recommended SWR of 3.0–3.5), yielded no relationship between roof 

strength and injury risk. 

The IIHS findings exceed the conclusions that can reasonably be drawn from their 

data and analysis, and the IIHS conclusions are at odds with an understanding of 

injury causation. They are assuming that a linear (straight line) relationship exists 

across the range of roof strength values for which they have test results. The evidence is that it does not. That being the case, it is not acceptable to use these limited data to predict benefits for roofs stronger than those currently seen in the fleet. 

Another limitation of the analyses that limit its extrapolation to the passenger vehicle fleet as a whole is that only a limited set of midsize SUVs were tested. 

Alliance Cost/Weight Analysis 

Alliance members studied strategies for increasing the strength-to-weight ratio 

(SWR) of exemplar large sport utility vehicles and large pickup trucks by simulating 

the modifications of existing designs with design changes that are capable of being 

produced in mass-production volumes with current technology. These studies confirmed NHTSA’s general concern that near-term design changes for existing vehicle 

models would add substantial weight to the vehicle, potentially adversely affecting 

two of NHTSA’s safety priority issues: reducing rollover events and improving vehicle-to-vehicle compatibility. A summary of these studies follows. 

Summary of Alliance Cost/Weight Analysis 

Vehicle Type Baseline Vehicle 

Weight 

Effect of Modifications to Reach: † 

SWR 2.520 SWR 3.020 WR 3.520

Large SUV 5,600 to 7,200 lbs. +60 to 67 lbs. +150 to 270 lbs. +250 to 540 lbs. 

Costs na Variable: $38–$58 

Fixed: $40M–$75M 

Variable: $60–$90 

Fixed: $80M–$90M 

Variable: $110–$130 

Fixed: $80M–$180M 

Large Pickup 5,800 to 8,900 lbs. +38 to 68 lbs. +85 to 260 lbs. +120 to 520 lbs. 

Costs na Variable: $55–$185 

Fixed: $10.5M–$77M 

Variable: $100–$200 

Fixed: $10.8–$218M 

Variable: $165–$525 

Fixed: $11M–$660M 

† The nomenclature SWR2.520 means NHTSA’s proposal: a SWR of 2.5 times the vehicle’s unloaded vehicle 

weight, plus a 20 percent compliance margin. 

Strength-to-Weight Ratio at and above 2.5 and the Impacts on Safety 

The Alliance’s analysis demonstrates that increasing SWRs above 2.5 necessitates 

significant mass increases that negatively impact safety, if insufficient leadtime is 

provided. The average weight penalty, for a large SUV, for increasing the SWR from 


604stras2.eps
66 

1.5 to 2.5 (NPRM) would be 60 to 67 lbs., and for a large truck the corresponding 

average weight penalty would be 38 to 68 lbs. A NHTSA requirement for singlesided testing at a SWR of 3.0 or 3.5 or two-sided testing (SNPRM) will add substantial mass increases to vehicle roof structures, particularly for heavier vehicles. For 

instance, for a large SUV, increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.0 would add an average 

weight penalty of 150 to 270 lbs. and increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.5 would add 

an average weight penalty of 250 to 540 lbs. Similarly, for a large truck, increasing 

the SWR from 1.5 to 3.0 would add an average weight penalty of 85 to 260 lbs. and 

increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.5 would add an average weight penalty of 120 

to 520 lbs. The added weight associated with increasing roof strength may also adversely affect vehicle crash compatibility. 

Increase in Vehicle Mass and Effect on CAFE Performance 

NHTSA has recently proposed substantial increases in the Corporate Average 

Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for passenger cars and light trucks. The agency’s 

fuel economy rulemaking is being issued pursuant to the Energy Independence and 

Security Act of 2007 (EISA), which Congress passed in December 2007. EISA mandates the setting of separate maximum feasible standards for passenger cars and 

for light trucks at levels sufficient to ensure that the average fuel economy of the 

combined fleet of all passenger cars and light trucks sold by all manufacturers in 

the U.S. in model year (MY) 2020 equals or exceeds 35 miles per gallon. That is 

a 40 percent increase above the average of approximately 25 miles per gallon for 

the current combined fleet. 

Increasing SWR above 2.5 necessitates significant mass increases that negatively 

impact fuel economy. As indicated above, the average weight penalty, for a large 

SUV, for increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 2.5 (NPRM) would be 60 to 67 lbs., and 

for a large truck the corresponding average weight penalty would be 38 to 68 lbs. 

A NHTSA requirement for single-sided testing at a SWR of 3.0 or 3.5 or two-sided 

testing (SNPRM) will add substantial mass increases to vehicle roof structures, particularly for heavier vehicles. For instance, for a large SUV, increasing the SWR 

from 1.5 to 3.0 would add an average weight penalty of 150 to 270 lbs. and increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.5 would add an average weight penalty of 250 to 540 

lbs. Similarly, for a large truck, increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.0 would add an 

average weight penalty of 85 to 260 lbs. and increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.5 

would add an average weight penalty of 120 to 520 lbs. The added weight will also 

reduce fuel economy and increase vehicle lifetime fuel consumption. Because every 

100 lbs. added to a vehicle reduces its fuel economy by 1–2 percent, a 3.5 SWR could 

reduce a large pickup truck or SUV’s fuel economy by up to 10 percent. 

Two-sided vs. One-sided Testing 

NHTSA has indicated that it is considering two-sided testing to evaluate the 

strength of the second side of the roof of vehicles whose first side had already been 

tested. In this testing, after the force was applied to one side of the roof over the 

front seat area of a vehicle, the partially crushed vehicle was repositioned and force 

was then applied on the opposite side of the roof over the front seat area. The variability and challenges in repeatability of roof strength testing in a one-sided test 

would be amplified in a two-sided test and manufacturers would have to select compliance margins to compensate for this resultant increased variability. The setup of 

vehicles relative to the platen can vary substantially from testing facility-to-testing 

facility and within a single testing facility. The configuration of the load application 

device and the load measurement system can be quite different between testing facilities. Depending upon the structural architecture of the vehicle, these variations 

and differences can manifest themselves as variations in measured roof strength. 

Performance Criteria—Headroom vs. Platen Travel 

The Alliance recommends that NHTSA maintain the use of 5 inches of platen 

travel as the deformation criterion in the final rule. The Alliance does not support 

a ‘‘no head contact’’ criterion, whether it is determined by the use of a test dummy 

representative of an average adult male (as in the NPRM) or via the use of a 

headform-positioning device with an associated contact force measured by a load cell 

attached to the headform. A ‘‘no head contact’’ criterion only serves to further increase both test-to-test variability and testing complexity without providing any additional engineering data beyond that which can be obtained using a 5-inch platen 

travel limit. 

Besides the fact that a ‘‘no head contact’’ criterion offers no engineering value 

with respect to assessing a vehicle’s roof strength performance, such a criterion does 

not recognize the well-established, scientific body-of-knowledge concerning occupant 

kinematics in a rollovers. In rollover events, rotational and gravitational forces combine to result in restrained and unrestrained occupants moving inside vehicles in 

67 

an uncontrolled and unpredictable manner and thus are subject to injury risk from 

incidental impact with the vehicle interior, other occupants, and the ground, independent of roof-to-ground contact or roof deformation. Use of any variant of a head 

contact criteria for determination of roof strength or the ratio of roof strength to vehicle mass (SWR) does not correlate or relate to occupant injury. 

Recommendations 

The table below summarizes the Alliance recommendations for the final rule for 

FMVSS 216. Where the Alliance recommendation differs from NHTSA’s proposal 

bolded text has been used. 

FMVSS 216, ‘‘Roof Crush Resistance’’ 

Existing Standard NPRM SNPRM Alliance Recommendation 

Applicability GVWR ≤ 6,000 lbs. GVWR ≤ 10,000 lbs. GVWR ≤ 10,000 lbs. 

Applied Force Limit 5,000 lbs. None None 

Strength-to-Weight 1.5 2.5 ∼ 3.0 2.5 

Performance Criteria 5 in. Platen Travel No head contact 

(50th Male Dummy 

or Head Positioning 

Fixture) 

5 in. Platen Travel 

Sides Tested One side at a time 

(Driver & Passenger) 

One side at a time 

(Two sides 

sequentially) 

One side at a time 

(Driver & Passenger) 

Leadtime na 3-years 3-years 

Phase-in na None Yes 

Carry-forward Credits na None Allow 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Ms. Claybrook? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOAN B. CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT, 

PUBLIC CITIZEN 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. We at Public Citizen, appreciate the opportunity to testify today. 

Every day there are 29 fatalities from rollover crashes. If there 

were 29 fatalities from an airplane crash every day, I think this 

Congress would be in a revolutionary state about what to do to 

remedy that. And yet, for the past 7 years, the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration has diddled in its rulemaking activities and come up with a terrible proposal that is not going to really 

make any difference. It’s going to save between 44 and 476 lives 

out of 10,600, which is, in itself, an indicator of the lack of capacity 

of this rulemaking to make any difference. 

Rollover crashes, it’s really important to say, are highly survivable. That’s the most important thing to know, because the physics 

of rollover crashes are indisputable. They occur over a 4- to 6-second time interval, which is a very long period of time, whereas, 

other crashes are milliseconds. There is time for the body to adjust 

to the rollover; it just has to be protected when that occurs. Consequently, the forces acting on the occupants are mild, and the 

focus then becomes threefold. Do the restraints properly and safely 

keep the occupant in the survival zone of the vehicle? Does the vehicle structure maintain occupant survival space? And do the portals of ejection—i.e., the side windows and doors—stay intact, and 

thus, prevent exposure to partial ejection, a hideous and terrible 

consequence of rollovers? These questions can best be answered by 

a dynamic test standard. 

Public Citizen recommends the following. First, NHTSA should 

issue one unified, dynamic rollover injury prevention crashVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
68 

worthiness standard for rollover, for all aspects of rollover. We 

know it’s practicable. The Volvo XC90, built by one small auto 

manufacturer, shows that a vehicle that protects occupants in most 

rollover crashes can be built and sold successfully. In order to do 

this, of course, the deadline for this rulemaking needs to be extended. 

NHTSA needs to go back to the drawing board and re-envision 

its rollover crashworthiness program. Instead of tackling the rollover problem in a piecemeal way, which is what it’s doing now, it 

should issue a comprehensive rollover crashworthiness standard 

that mimics real-world crash conditions using an injury prevention 

metric that addresses the three elements of rollover occupant protection: ejection prevention, adequate and effective restraint, and 

assurance that occupants are not killed or injured by an intruding 

roof. These dynamic tests should cover belts and belt pretensioners, 

door locks, door retention, side-curtain airbags, glazing, ejection potential, and roof crush. That could all be done in one test. Such a 

dynamic standard would subsume the ejection final rule, which is 

required by the 2005 legislation and is due by October 1, 2009. 

NHTSA, for that standard, is now merely looking at a totally inadequate quasi-static head-form test. 

NHTSA has known of the problem of rollover since 1970, when 

it first, with the airbag rule, issued a voluntary dynamic rollover 

test. I want to repeat that. A dynamic rollover test was developed 

in 1970, called the dolly rollover test, which industry has been 

using for years in its own internal testing. 

And now there is a vastly improved privately designed system 

called the Jordan Rollover System. Two brilliant engineers, in California one of whom is here in the audience—Don Friedman—developed this; the other, Acen Jordan, is a renowned developer of test 

equipment and has done many designs for industry. 

We recommend, as well, that the language on preemption restricting victims access to the courts be removed. And, in the interim, we recommend that a new consumer information program be 

designed using a static test with a much improved requirement so 

that, in the interim, while the redesign of the test is going on, consumers at least can get some information, using the static test, 

about the performance of the airbags. 

This is totally feasible. All of the other standards of significance 

that NHTSA has issued are dynamic tests. The front crash is a dynamic test. The side is a dynamic test. The rear is a dynamic test. 

Why not a rollover dynamic test? It makes no sense. 

In my statement, I mention a number of criteria that have not 

been met by NHTSA that are in the SAFETEA–LU requirements, 

including the word ‘‘upgrade’’—this is not an ‘‘upgrade’’—‘‘tested on 

both sides,’’ ‘‘consider dynamic testing,’’ and then there are a number of technical difficulties that I mention. 

I’d like to conclude with a brief 17-second film showing the Jordan Rollover System, so that the committee can see how well it 

works. 

This has no signal. Well, technology always intervenes, doesn’t 

it? 

Well, I’ll just say that this system is inexpensive. The vehicle is 

put on a spit. The vehicle is upside-down, it’s lowered so that the 

69 

1 36 FR 166 (January 6, 1971). 

2 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS 810 837. September 2007. 

3 National Transportation Safety Board, Aviation Accident Statistics. Available at http:// 

www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Stats.htm. 

roof has contact with a roadway running underneath, at whatever 

miles per hour it is designed to be. This test can be done with a 

vehicle in white, which is very inexpensive, before it’s all painted, 

with the engine, and so on. It can be adjusted to any angle and way 

that you want to test it. And it very much mirrors the real world 

of a rollover crash. And without a dynamic test, it’s not possible to 

really figure out how this vehicle is going to perform. The JRS has 

done over 80 rollover tests, and it is a remarkable system. And it 

is shameful—it is shameful that NHTSA has not really—they said 

they had done testing with the JRS; they have done no testing with 

the JRS. So, it’s been most unfortunate. 

Senator PRYOR. Well, I’ll tell you what, if we get the video working here in a minute, we’ll go back—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Thank you very much. 

Senator PRYOR.—to it, but—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator PRYOR.—you bet. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. I appreciate the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOAN B. CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT, PUBLIC CITIZEN

Chairman Pryor and members of the subcommittee, I am grateful to be here today 

to discuss the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s utter and complete 

failure to provide the public with the protection that it needs in rollover crashes. 

I am Joan Claybrook, president of Public Citizen, and I have worked on auto safety 

issues for more than 40 years, first as a congressional staffer during the drafting 

of NHTSA’s organic act, then as the special assistant to the first administrator of 

NHTSA, later as the administrator of NHTSA during the Carter administration, 

and ever since then as an advocate for the public. 

In 1969, there were just 1,400 deaths in rollover crashes—at the time, pickup 

trucks were predominately work vehicles, and SUVs marketed as passenger-carrying vehicles had not entered the product mix.1 As Congress has learned over the 

years, the rollover problem we now face is a direct result of the industry’s marketing 

campaign to make SUVs the station wagon of the future. 

Rollover crashes should be highly survivable. The forces felt by an occupant who 

has a rollover pretention restraint and who does not contact the roof are not as violent as those experienced in a frontal impact crash. The physics of rollover crashes 

are indisputable: rollover crashes occur over a 4–6 second time interval, whereas 

other crashes are over milliseconds. Consequently, the forces acting on occupants 

are relatively mild and the focus becomes threefold: (1) whether the restraint properly and safely keeps the occupant in the survival zone of the vehicle; (2) whether 

the vehicle structure maintains the occupant survival space; and (3) whether the 

portals of ejection, e.g., side windows, stay intact thus preventing exposure to partial 

ejection. 

In 2007 there were 10,698 fatalities in rollover crashes, accounting for 33 percent 

of all highway occupant fatalities.2 By contrast, there have been fewer than 100 fatalities in plane crashes in the past 3 years combined.3 If there were as many fatalities in plane crashes as there are in just rollover crashes, there would be overwhelming public outcry for the FAA to more strictly oversee the airline industry. 

Motor vehicle accidents are the number one killer of people aged 3 to 33, and rollover crashes account for a disproportionate and unnecessary number of these 

deaths. 

To say that this is a national crisis ignores the fact that this has been a problem 

for almost twenty years, and yet, I am back before the Senate, asking that you revisit this issue again—for the sake of the over 10,500 families who lose a loved one 

each year in crashes that should be survivable and for the tens of thousands of others whose lives are irreversibly damaged by paralysis. Since 1991, when Congress 

70 

4Pub. L. 102–240. December 18, 1991. 

5See 57 FR 242 (January 3, 1992) and 59 FR 33254 (June 28, 1994). 

6 59 FR 33254. 

7See 60 FR 43031, 43061(August 18, 1995). 

8Pub. L. 106–414. November 1, 2000. 

9Pub. L. 109–59. August 10, 2005. 

10 66 FR 53376, 53385 (October 22, 2001). 

first acted in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) 4 and 

instructed NHTSA to take action, more than 155,000 Americans have died in rollover crashes. These figures are appalling and reflect a clear lack of action on the 

part of the auto industry and, unfortunately, NHTSA. 

After 20 years of pushing for a response from NHTSA to the problem of far too 

many rollover fatalities, we recommend that the agency do the following: 

• Issue a comprehensive rollover crashworthiness standard that dynamically tests 

the performance of seat belts and belt pretensioners, door locks and door retention, side curtain airbags, glazing retention, ejection potential and roof crush resistance. The agency must abandon the current useless rulemaking and do it 

right. 

• Until the agency can issue a dynamic crash test standard, it should provide 

widely publicized consumer information about roof strength using a static test 

that consists of two sequential platen tests. First, the platen is applied at a 10 

degree pitch angle and a 25 degree roll angle for the first side, and then at a 

40 degree roll angle for the second side. The roof should be able to reach a 3.5 

times gross vehicle weight rating strength-to-weight ratio. 

History 

In 1970, NHTSA first addressed rollovers as a voluntary part of the airbag rule, 

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208, with a dynamic dolly rollover 

test. It was never made mandatory, but was used by industry internally to test their 

vehicles for decades. In 1971, NHTSA issued the mandatory static roof crush standard, FMVSS 216, but the final rule at GM’s urging was seriously cut back from a 

two-sided test to a weak one-sided test which resulted in almost no improvement 

in roof strength. This standard is still in effect today. 

It wasn’t until a large number of consumers were driving pickup trucks and SUVs 

that fatalities due to rollover started to rise that Congress called for a reevaluation 

of rollover. It has taken nearly twenty years more for the agency to address rollover 

fatalities than when Congress first called for action, and the work is still not done. 

Seventeen years ago Congress first acted to address this problem. In 1991, Congress passed the ISTEA, which directed NHTSA to develop a stability standard, and 

issue a rule by May 1994 to reduce head injury from contact with the upper interior 

of a vehicle. The stability standard has never been issued and was abandoned after 

an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in 1992. The rulemaking action was terminated in 1994, and American drivers are still waiting for a meaningful, comprehensive approach to rollover fatalities.5

Frederico Pen ̃ a, then Secretary of Transportation, announced a plan to replace the 

terminated rulemaking with a comprehensive regulatory and information regime. 

This would include the consumer information on rollover propensity, as well as an 

upgrade of the side-impact and door retention standard and an examination of an 

upgrade to the roof crush standard.6 The head injury rule was issued as a final rule 

in August 1995 7 and became effective in September 1995, with a phase-in through 

September 1998. The standard required padding on the door pillars, roof interiors 

and windshield headers for cars, pickup trucks and SUVs. 

In May 2000, following an expose ́ by Houston television reporter Anna Werner of 

station KHOU, highlighting litigation relating to some of these very problems, 

NHTSA opened an investigation into the 47 million Firestone ATX and ATX II Wilderness tires Ford used on the Explorer. There were more than 200 deaths and 700 

injuries just in rollover crashes of Ford Explorers equipped with the faulty Firestone 

tires. In August, there was a voluntary recall of 6.5 million of these tires. The FordFirestone experience prompted Congress to pass the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act,8 which required a dynamic 

rollover test for consumer information. The dynamic test NHTSA used for this purpose only measures rollover propensity, it does not provide any information about 

rollover crashworthiness. In 2001, NHTSA issued its ANPRM on roof crush; however, nothing came of the rulemaking effort until just before the Safe, Accountable, 

Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU) 9

was signed into law in 2005.10

71 

11 72 FR 17236, 17322 (April 6, 2007). 12See ‘‘DOT Proposes Anti-Rollover Technology for New Vehicles,’’ Press Release. National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration. September 14, 2006. 13 70 FR 49223, 49248 (August 23, 2005). 14 73 FR 5484, 5493 (January 30, 2008). 

NHTSA decided to disseminate consumer information about rollover propensity 

through the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP). From 2001–2003, NHTSA 

based its NCAP rollover ratings on a measure of the vehicle’s geometry, meant to 

estimate the relation between a vehicle’s center of gravity height and track width, 

which is referred to as the static stability factor (SSF). In 2004, NHTSA added two 

dynamic rollover test maneuvers which estimate a vehicle’s on-road, untripped rollover threshold. Although important, NHTSA’s action failed to address the roughly 

95 percent of rollover crashes that are tripped—that is when a vehicle starts to slide 

laterally and is tripped by mechanisms such as curbs, soft soil, pot holes, guard 

rails, or wheel rims digging into the pavement. 

But in light of NHTSA’s failure to provide consumers information about occupant 

protection in rollover crashes, inadequate information about rollover propensity, no 

improvement in the roof strength standard since it took effect in 1973, and no requirement for belt performance in rollover crashes, rollover fatalities continued to 

increase, with 10,590 fatalities in 2004. In 2005, Congress passed the SAFETEA– 

LU, which mandated rollover prevention, occupant ejection mitigation, and roof 

crush occupant protection upgrades. 

In 2006 NHTSA issued its rollover prevention rule to much fanfare,11 with 

NHTSA Administrator Nicole Nason calling electronic stability control the ‘‘the 

greatest life saving improvement since the safety belt.’’ 12 By contrast, the proposed 

upgrade to the roof crush resistance standard was published just 8 days after 

SAFETEA–LU was signed into law.13 In response to the voluminous debate in the 

2005 docket—containing 281 documents from the auto industry, public interest 

groups, and private engineers—as well as the results of additional two-sided static 

tests conducted by the agency, and results of independent dynamic tests conducted 

by the Center for Injury Research, NHTSA issued a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) in January of 2008.14

This latest proposal failed to correct the significant deficiencies in the 2005 proposal—NHTSA still neither mandates testing on both sides of the roof, nor has it 

considered dynamic testing, as the 2005 law requires. It also continues the 

misplacement of the test device that makes it easier to pass the test, but not protect 

occupants. Further, NHTSA’s latest proposal was not accompanied by a new regulatory impact analysis, as the White House Executive Order 12,866 requires. Therefore, there is no estimate of the relative benefits of the regulatory options provided 

in the proposal, making fully-informed public comment impossible. 

In its 2005 NPRM, NHTSA estimated that its proposed increase in roof strength 

would save between 13 and 44 lives. The ‘‘target population’’ of potentially avoided 

fatalities estimated in NHTSA’s 2008 proposal is 476. These estimates show that 

NHTSA has neither looked at the problem of rollover fatalities in a new light nor 

made a real attempt to correct the problem. In the face of more than 10,000 fatalities a year, an ‘‘upgraded’’ rule that barely addresses 5 percent of the fatalities is 

just gross negligence. 

Furthermore, the agency has callously included language that expresses the agency’s view that injured parties should not be compensated by automakers whose vehicles comply with this weak Federal standard even if those vehicles fail to protect 

occupants with catastrophic failure of structural components of the roof. 

So now three Congressional mandates later, NHTSA has failed time and again 

to address the rollover crisis. There have been more than 155,000 rollover fatalities—that’s almost three times the number of U.S. Armed forces killed in Vietnam— 

and more than 17 years to develop the standards and practices needed to prevent 

these unnecessary deaths, since Congress first intervened. It is a tragedy that I am 

here before the Committee again, asking for Congress to send a message to the 

agency: Issue a comprehensive rollover occupant protection standard that actually 

saves lives. 

Rollover Crashes Wreak Unspeakable Havoc on Too Many Families 

Jonathan Arreola was just 19 when his 2000 Toyota 4Runner rolled over in California. The roof crushed in on his head, fracturing his skull and ending his life. His 

sister, who was 7 when he died, told her mother that she feels bad that her brother 

will never meet her kids when she gets older. This has left a void in his family’s 

life. His mother asks: ‘‘With a top heavy SUV, how can a company not be mandated 

72 

15 Id. at 5487. 16Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 

(SAFETEA–LU), Sec. 10301(a). (Pub. L. 109–59). 

to test this factor?’’ The sad truth is that Congress did mandate that companies test 

this factor—but NHTSA callously decided not to. 

Before the rollover crash that left Patrick Parker a quadriplegic, automobile safety was one of the last things on Patrick’s and his wife Dena’s mind. They had other 

things to think about at their Texas dream home in a rural part of the state: paying 

the bills, taking care of their house, finding time to relax on weekends. But their 

lives changed the tragic day that Patrick swerved to avoid a deer while driving to 

work. He missed the deer he saw, but he hit a second and his pickup truck flipped. 

Though he was wearing his safety belt, the roof crushed to nearly the level of the 

hood of the truck, breaking his neck. His Ford pickup cab was designed with doors 

that opened from the center to facilitate removal of tools and other equipment from 

the rear of the cab. But this type of door weakened the roof because there was no 

B-pillar by his shoulder. 

In an instant, Patrick lost so much. The hunting and outdoor activities he once 

loved he can now only enjoy as memories. Months of intensive physical therapy have 

failed to improve his condition, and he now gets around his 30-acre ranch in a motorized wheelchair. His devoted wife Dena has struggled with him, helping him each 

morning for the 3 hours it takes him to get up, eat breakfast, take a shower, and 

get dressed. His best time of day, he explains, is when he goes to sleep and no 

longer feels the pain. At least his successful lawsuit means the Parkers do not have 

to leave their beloved ranch. 

The sad fact is that this story gets retold day after day, year after year, with 29 

fatalities each day, and more than 300 catastrophic injuries per week. Families will 

keep being broken until there is a comprehensive dynamic rollover standard that 

covers belt performance, door and glazing retention, and roof crush. 

Need for Dynamic Testing 

A rollover crash is a complex and dynamic event, with many interrelated hazards 

that all contribute to the risks vehicle occupants face. However, despite its complexity, the remedies are well-known and proven. It is NHTSA’s responsibility to understand these crash dynamics and set a performance standard using a test that, 

as well as being practicable and repeatable, protects occupants from the impact of 

crash forces. A test of the strength for a vehicle roof that is neither inverted nor 

in motion cannot demonstrate the risk to occupants in a real-world rollover, where 

occupants are both inverted and in motion. 

In order to be realistic and meaningful, any performance test must be two-sided. 

The risk to vehicle occupants varies depending on whether the occupant is seated 

in the ‘‘near side’’ or the ‘‘far side’’ of the vehicle. Imagine looking at a vehicle as 

it rolls sideways, in slow motion: as it rolls over, first one side of the vehicle roof 

will make contact with the ground; then, the other side will make contact; and, depending on the speed of the vehicle crash, this sequence might repeat several times. 

In the first impact, the vehicle’s windshield and windows often break, weakening 

the roof structure by as much as 30 percent, which means the ‘‘far’’ side occupant 

is protected by a roof up to 30 percent weaker than the occupant on the ‘‘near’’ side, 

that hit the ground first. In real-world crashes, this leads to a situation where the 

far seated occupant often suffers fatal injuries, while the near seated occupant 

walks away with only minor injuries. 

NHTSA conducted 26 two-sided quasi-static tests as part of its evaluations for the 

January 2008 SNPRM. The agency found ‘‘the strength of the roof on the second 

side of some vehicles may have been increased or decreased as a result of the deformation of the first side of the roof.’’ 15 The agency must explain in more specific detail what the implications of these results are in terms of occupant protection. The 

test results fail to show what happens dynamically when the first side of the roof 

striking the ground is followed by the second side of the roof striking the ground. 

This was what Congress meant to capture when it mandated NHTSA in SAFETEA– 

LU to ‘‘establish performance criteria to upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 

Standard No. 216 relating to roof strength for driver and passenger sides,’’ 16 to develop performance criteria that account for the different forces that are experienced 

on the two sides of the vehicle. 

The agency has not revisited nor studied the representativeness of the pitch and 

roll angles used in the test. Underpinning the technical details is the core concern: 

making the test represent occupant risk as a result of the changing crash forces in 

a rollover crash. The roof structure is supported by pillars which join the roof and 

glazing components connected to the frame of a vehicle. They are typically described 

73 

17 Carl Nash and Allan Paskin, ‘‘A Study of NASS Rollover Cases and the Implication for Federal Regulation.’’ 19th Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 2005, Paper No. 05–0415. 18See Comments of Autoliv at Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0015, at 0079.1 (March 31, 2008), 

available through www.regulations.gov. 

in alphabetical order from the windshield to the back window—so the front windshield supporting pillar is known as the A-pillar, the pillar that is beside the driver’s seat back is known as the B-pillar, and the pillar which supports the rear windshield is the C-pillar. Some vehicles have no B-pillar, and some, like station wagons 

or SUVs may have a D-pillar which supports the rear glazing, and the C-pillar is 

behind the second row windows. 

When a vehicle rolls in a real-world crash, the weight of the engine pulls the front 

of the vehicle down, such that much of the impact is borne by the A-pillar, which 

almost always causes the windshield glass to break.17 The static test that NHTSA 

has been using since 1973 pushes a flat metal plate against the roof of one side of 

the vehicle at 5 degrees of pitch and 25 degrees of roll. This places an unrealistic 

burden on the B-pillar, allowing automakers to design vehicles which pass NHTSA’s 

roof strength standard on the strength of the B-pillar, when the A-pillar gets the 

brunt of the force in real-world rollovers. Without being stringently tested by 

NHTSA’s roof crush test, A-pillars in the vehicle fleet are weak, exposing occupants 

to significant danger of head or neck injury in rollovers. 

A dynamic test provides more realistic evaluation about the changing forces a roof 

experiences in a rollover crash. Use of a dynamic test would allow NHTSA to develop a performance standard of occupant protection that could include measurements of dynamics of the crash dummy. In the current static test, the dummy is 

not in motion, and therefore, no measurements are taken of neck deflection, or other 

injury potential measures that would more accurately portray risk to occupants in 

real crashes. 

Another benefit of dynamic testing is that NHTSA could test multiple elements 

of rollover crashworthiness all at the same time in one test. For example, under 

SAFETEA–LU, Congress mandated that NHTSA initiate rulemaking on performance standards to reduce complete and partial ejection of occupants. One dynamic 

test standard should include rollover performance standards for safety belts, including performance of belt pretensioners, side curtain airbag performance, window 

glazing retention, and door locks and door retention, in addition to roof crush. 

NHTSA was also required to complete an upgrade of the FMVSS 206 standard, pertaining to door locks and retention. All of these elements could be tested using a 

dynamic test, making this type of testing efficient, as many different performance 

standards can be tested on the same apparatus, and theoretically, even in the same 

test, cutting the cost and time for the tests. 

Although GM and Nissan have both recently made public new rollover test facilities, neither company has released test results to the public, so Public Citizen is unable to comment on whether or how these automakers could reconfigure existing 

test apparatus to test for roof strength or a comprehensive dynamic standard. 

NHTSA is empowered and, in fact, obligated, to investigate these test methods and 

assess whether they could be used for other purposes, or request test results for research purposes in developing a test that would work best for roof strength testing. 

Autoliv, a major supplier of safety systems for light duty vehicles, including seat 

belts and airbags, commented that the static platen test may not be able to measure 

the response of ‘‘active’’ roof systems. As an alternative, Autoliv recommends that 

NHTSA ‘‘[e]stablish an alternate dynamic rollover test or drop test for vehicles with 

active roof structures.’’ 18 Autoliv specifically cites problems with the potential for 

delay between subsequent tests on either side of the vehicle, stating that ‘‘[t]he duration of this test may well exceed the time in which certain active roof structures 

can be effective,’’ (that is, dynamic testing). 

NHTSA has since the very beginning been committed to dynamic testing. Even 

in 1971, the agency proposed an optional dynamic rollover test—the dolly rollover 

test. The agency uses dynamic tests for frontal, side, and rear impact crashworthiness tests.[i] This type of testing provides crucial information about how injuries occur, which provides automakers with information about how to design vehicles that protect occupants in real-world crashes. The automobile safety advances 

we’ve had in the past thirty years would not be possible without dynamic testing. 

NHTSA’s opposition to dynamic rollover testing is neither scientifically based, nor 

is it consistent with its approach to vehicular testing. 

Need for One Unified Rollover Standard 

NHTSA needs to go back to the drawing board and re-envision its rollover crashworthiness program. Instead of tackling the rollover problem in a piecemeal way, 

74 

it should issue a single, unified rollover crashworthiness standard that tackles the 

three elements of rollover occupant protection: prevent ejection, provide adequate restraint, and ensure that occupants are not injured or killed by an intruding roof by 

issuing a dynamic two-sided roof strength standard that measures occupant injury 

potential. 

A single standard need not be more complicated or expensive to administer—and 

could even be more cost effective while better protecting public safety. NHTSA does 

it for other crash modes: frontal- and side-impact crashes are both tested in a way 

that considers all of the occupant protection systems at the same time. In a frontal 

impact crash, occupants are protected by seat belts, airbags, steering components, 

and front crumple zones. Testing all these systems together led to improvements in 

occupant protection—airbags work better when occupants are belted, steering columns collapse toward the dashboard, and front crumple zones provide crash force 

dispersion so that when crash forces get to the occupant they have been diminished. 

Better occupant protection design doesn’t happen overnight—just ask Volvo, 

which took considerable care in developing an SUV that took a whole-vehicle approach to safety design. 

The Volvo XC90 approaches occupant protection with both crash avoidance and 

crashworthiness in mind. It is equipped with an electronic stability control system 

that includes the most state-of-the-art rollover prevention equipment available, significantly beyond the minimal system described in the 2007 NHTSA rulemaking to 

mandate the inclusion of electronic stability control systems in all vehicles, with the 

phase-in to be complete for all vehicles in model year 2012. The XC90 was also designed to protect occupants in the event of a rollover. These occupant safety features 

include a strong roof, laminated glass in the windshield and side windows,[ii] side 

curtain airbags, and seat belt pretensioners. All of these features—both crash avoidance and occupant safety features—work together to make rollover crashes more 

survivable. 

The Volvo can achieve a strength-to-weight (SWR) ratio of nearly 4 in the 1973 

FMVSS 216 static test, which is almost three times what NHTSA currently mandates. A dynamic test of the XC90 measured an SWR of just 2, suggesting that the 

platen test fails to represent realistic crash forces. Most contemporary vehicles that 

Xprts, LLC of Santa Barbara, California has tested can barely reach an SWR of 1 

in a modification of NHTSA’s test, the M216 test.[iii] This also shows that manufacturers can currently ‘‘game’’ the system, by developing vehicles with a strong B-pillar, which bears the majority of the force in the agency’s proposed platen test, rather than developing vehicles that adequately protect vehicle occupants in rollover 

crashes with stronger A-pillars and other features we have discussed. 


604clay1.eps
75 

19See Erin E. Hutter, ‘‘Improving Roof Crush Performance of a Sport Utility Vehicle’’ (Ohio 

State U., 2007), NHTSA–2008–015–0005, at 63. 20 72 FR 17235, 17322 (April 6, 2007). 21 Id. at 17236. 

The XC90 is not simply proof of the concept that safer vehicles are possible; it 

is also proof that safety does not have to break the bank. The total cost for upgrading a Ford Explorer to have the roof strength performance of the XC90 is a mere 

$81, plus one penny, per vehicle.19

The Volvo XC90 documents submitted by Ford Motor Company in the Duncan 

case in Florida several years ago are in the agency’s possession, but Ford has objected to their release in the public docket. However, the agency is well aware from 

this information how the XC90 performed in rollover tests and how Volvo went 

about designing a comprehensive approach to rollover occupant protection. NHTSA 

should use this knowledge in developing the final rule. 

SAFETEA–LU set a statutory deadline for the roof crush rulemaking to be complete by July 1, 2008. However, NHTSA may contact the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and House of Representatives Committee on 

Energy and Commerce and request an extension. The work that NHTSA has done 

to meet its obligation under SAFETEA–LU is wholly inadequate. The agency needs 

extend the deadline for this standard and to go back to the drawing board to issue 

a real, life-saving, comprehensive rollover standard. 

Electronic Stability Control 

In April 2007, NHTSA issued its final rule on electronic stability control (ESC).20

The agency has time and again praised ESC as being the biggest breakthrough in 

auto safety since air bags; however, at this time, there is not enough real-world data 

on the effectiveness of ESC. The agency estimated that ESC would prevent 71 percent of single-vehicle passenger car rollover and 84 percent of single-vehicle light 

truck rollover.21

The agency’s estimates are based on a study of a broad range of vehicles that already had ESC installed by model year 2006. Electronic stability control is a blanket 

term for a variety of combinations of technologies, which typically use braking intervention controlled by a computer algorithm to allow the driver to maintain stability 

and stay on the road. Each manufacturer installs a proprietary form of ESC, or even 

multiple systems for different vehicles, making it difficult to estimate the effectiveness of any one system. The effectiveness of the ESC rule is likely to be less than 

what NHTSA estimated, due to the fact that NHTSA required an ESC system so 

minimal that every vehicle with ESC exceeds the technology required by NHTSA. 

Furthermore, estimates of the effectiveness of ESC are irrelevant in the crashes 

that ESC does not prevent. If a vehicle is involved in a maneuver that overwhelms 

the ESC, then drivers will still lose control, leave the roadway, their vehicles will 

be tripped and roll over. It is for occupants in vehicles that do rollover that NHTSA 

must provide crashworthiness, as part of a comprehensive response. 

Deficiencies in NHTSA’s Rulemaking 

Both the 2005 NPRM and 2008 SNPRM have failed to meet the requirements set 

by SAFETEA–LU to provide a meaningful upgrade to the 1971 standard. The proposals together have the following deficiencies: 

• NHTSA’s proposed test procedure has no scientific basis; 

• in the two-sided tests NHTSA conducted, there was not a uniform test protocol, 

confounding the public and the agency from drawing meaningful conclusions 

from these results; 

• there was no consistent limit on dummy head contact; 

• the agency had no analytical basis for the first and second side tests; 

• NHTSA produced no new regulatory impact analysis for the 2008 SNPRM, nor; 

• did NHTSA make a specific recommendation for regulatory action. 

NHTSA’s 2005 NPRM Failed to Make a Substantial Upgrade. 

NHTSA has failed to make a meaningful effort to upgrade the roof crush standard. It has not proposed an injury criterion for occupants in rollover crashes, nor 

has it upgraded the insufficient static test to account for crash dynamics in realworld rollovers. 

Instead, NHTSA proposed that the static platen test be applied to a vehicle’s roof 

at a force equal to 2.5 times the vehicle’s weight, a small upgrade to the 1.5 times 

vehicle weight standard that has been in effect since the 1970s.[iv] NHTSA has not 

76 

22Don Friedman, ‘‘Deficiencies of NHTSA’s Current and Proposed Static, One-Sided Test of 

Roof Strength, FMVSS 216,’’ at 22, (April 11, 2005). 23Donald Friedman and Carl Nash. ‘‘Advanced Roof Design for Rollover Protection,’’ 17th Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 2001, Paper No. 01–S12–W–94. 24 Id. 25 73 FR 5487. 26Don Friedman, ‘‘Deficiencies of NHTSA’s Current and Proposed Static, One-Sided Test of 

Roof Strength, FMVSS 216,’’ at 22, (April 11, 2005). 

attempted to account for the fact that in a real-world crash, a vehicle’s roof can contact the ground several times, losing strength with each impact. NHTSA’s proposed 

test does not account for multiple impacts. Also, the two sides of a vehicle’s roof will 

contact the ground at different angles, but NHTSA’s proposed test only applies force 

at one angle. NHTSA’s one-sided test does not comply with Congress’s mandate in 

SAFETEA–LU that NHTSA issue an upgrade in roof protection for both the ‘‘driver 

and passenger sides.’’ 

NHTSA’s proposed test would retain a pitch angle of 5 degrees, which is not reflective of the pitch angle in real-world rollovers. SUVs and pickups are front-heavy 

and pitch forward during a rollover to an angle of 10 degrees or more. NHTSA has 

not published additional research about whether the pitch and roll angles are representative of real-world crash data. Through the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) and the National Automotive Sampling System (NASS), NHTSA has a 

wealth of data to conduct such analyses. 

The proposed rule wrongly allows the strength provided by the window to be 

measured as part of the roof strength test. Vehicle windshields are frequently broken or separated from their bonding in rollovers, yet NHTSA’s proposed test allows 

vehicles to be tested with windows intact, as in the 1970s standard. NHTSA has 

found that roof strength is reduced by about one-third after bonded windshields are 

broken.22 The minimal estimated benefit—of just 13 to 44 lives—to occupants for 

NHTSA’s 2005 proposal alone illustrates the assertion of Donald Friedman and Carl 

Nash in the 2001 Enhanced Safety of Vehicle Conference that FMVSS 216 ‘‘provides 

poor emulation of the conditions of actual rollovers that result in serious injury.’’ 23

Friedman and Nash further explain: 

If the force of FMVSS 216 were applied at a greater roll angle, a typical roof 

would be as much as 30 percent weaker. However, a greater roll angle more 

accurately simulates what occurs in a real rollover. 

Dynamic roof loading in rollover almost always fractures or separates the windshield from its frame when the roof first contacts the ground.[v] Without the 

strength provided by its windshield, the roof is much more likely to deform and 

buckle upon its subsequent impact with the ground.24

The agency has subsequently learned the same lesson: it found in its two-sided 

testing program that roof deformation on the first side results in cracked or broken 

glazing, and says that ‘‘the first side test generally produces a weakening of the 

structure.’’ 25

The proposed test, which applies a slow constant force to a vehicle’s roof, does not 

account for roof buckling as a source of injury. Yet roof intrusion occurs at speeds 

up to 22 mph and can cause devastating spinal and thoracic as well as head, face 

and neck injuries to both restrained and unrestrained occupants. The forces on a 

vehicle’s roof during a rollover are always changing, and include lateral deformation, which cannot be replicated with a test that only pushes in a single direction. 

Even the two-sided static test proposed by the agency will fail to replicate the everchanging forces across the entire roof. 

NHTSA proposes to change its requirement that a roof sustain the force of 1.5 

times the vehicle weight sustaining no more than five inches of roof crush to a headroom requirement. The proposed rule requires that a vehicle’s roof not contact a 

dummy’s head when crushed during testing. But the degree of roof crush, irrespective of headroom, is important in protecting occupants from ejection. If the roof of 

a vehicle resists more than three inches of crush, the side windows are much less 

likely to break, preventing ejection.26 Also, with less roof crush, safety belts better 

retain their original geometry, doors are more likely to stay shut, and side curtain 

airbags retain their correct positioning, all of which are critical to reduce ejection 

potential. 

The ‘‘no-head-contact’’ substitute requirement is flawed. Ensuring headroom during NHTSA’s proposed static test does not ensure headroom in a real-world rollover, 

as occupants will be thrown toward the roof and within the range of roof intrusion 

allowed under the flawed NHTSA proposal. Worse, the proposal only requires mainVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
77 

27 70 FR 49225. 28 Real-world rollover performance of an XC90 showing good structural integrity was recorded 

in NASS–2003–79–57. 29 73 FR 5490. 30 Herbst, Brian, Stephen Forrest, et al., ‘‘Fidelity of Anthropomorphic Test Dummy Necks in 

Rollover Accidents,’’ 16th Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 1998, Paper No. 98– 

S9–W–20. 

tenance of headroom sufficient for a 50th percentile male, neglecting taller occupants. 

The proposed rule will only minimally increase roof strength. NHTSA estimated 

for the 2005 NPRM that the proposed standard would save at most 44 lives, or less 

than half of 1 percent of the lives lost each year in rollover crashes. Nearly 70 percent of the current vehicle fleet would require no improvement to meet the standard 

proposed in 2005. The agency’s SNPRM, which is really just a series of options, fails 

to correct the problem, and the estimated costs for vehicles requiring improvement 

is a measly $10.61.27

Manufacturers can, and do, make vehicles that adequately protect occupants in 

rollovers. One example is the Volvo XC90, which shows good performance in realworld rollover crashes,28 and has a 3.5 SWR and a high-strength, non-buckling, 

steel rollover and side impact structure. As described above, Volvo took a comprehensive, whole-vehicle approach to designing the XC90 to protect occupants in 

rollover—something that a dynamic NHTSA standard would encourage all manufacturers to do for every vehicle. 

NHTSA’s Supplemental Notice Fails to Improve the Deficiencies of the 2005 Proposal 

The SNPRM does not serve as a replacement for the 2005 proposal, but merely 

adds for consideration the results of the 26 two-sided platen tests NHTSA completed.[vi] However, NHTSA leaves it up to the industry to make the case again, 

as it did in 1971, that a one-sided test was sufficient to measure roof strength. 

NHTSA solicits comments on: ‘‘the cost implications associated with different stringency requirements and different design strategies.’’ 29 But NHTSA didn’t provide 

a new regulatory impact analysis for its supplemental notice, making it almost impossible for commenters to provide precise feedback to the agency. 

The agency’s 2008 SNPRM is procedurally inadequate as it makes no specific regulatory recommendation. This is exacerbated by the absence of a regulatory impact 

analysis. It has not given the public enough information to assess the relative benefits of different regulatory options it lays out in the proposal, and therefore competent comment is impossible. 

In spite of multiple appeals in person to agency officials, communications at congressional and agency headings, hundreds of pages of documents, and even a visit 

from NHTSA researchers to the Jordan Rollover System facility in California to witness a live dynamic rollover test, the agency has not fully ‘‘considered’’ dynamic testing for its rule. Even changing from a one-sided to two-sided platen test will not 

accurately assess risk to occupants in rollover crashes.[vii] 

In addition to not effectively addressing the need for dynamic testing, the agency 

has also failed to re-envision the platen test to focus primarily on occupant protection, and a key change that must be made is the ‘‘no-head-contact’’ requirement. The 

agency proposes replacing the limit of five inches of platen travel in the existing 

standard to a requirement that at 2.5 times SWR the roof not make contact with 

a 50th percentile Hybrid III male dummy. The use of a 50th percentile male dummy 

ignores injury potential to tall occupants, and the biofidelity of the Hybrid III 

dummy head for rollover has been questioned: ‘‘The human head traveled farther 

downward and over a longer period of time, while the Hybrid III head rebounded 

faster after translating downward a smaller distance.’’ 30

The standard should be written from an injury prevention perspective, rather 

than limiting inches of roof crush. The ‘‘no-head-contact’’ provision should be abandoned in favor of a post-crash headroom requirement that maintains a survival 

space around occupants. This would avoid the problem of significant variation in allowable roof crush in vehicles with different amounts of headroom. Considering the 

standard from this perspective would also promote the development of vehicles that 

protected occupants in the event of rollover. 

As we have stated above, the platen test described by the agency cannot adequately predict the potential for occupant injury in real-world rollover crashes. If 

the agency retains inches of platen travel as a measure of injury potential in the 

interim while it works to develop a dynamic test for occupant protection, then it 

should lower the allowable intrusion and require a minimum level of residual headroom. This course of action is preferable because the agency found ‘‘positive postcrash headroom’’ (residual space over the occupant’s head after the rollover) reduced 

78 

31 70 FR 49237. 32 73 FR 5487. 

the likelihood of suffering a roof contact injury to the head, neck, or face. This real 

world data shows quantifiable benefits of limiting headroom reduction.31

Since 1978, there have been more than 300,000 rollover fatalities. There is no excuse—Congress told NHTSA to fix this problem 17 years ago, and NHTSA has delayed and delayed. While there has been a 7.5 percent decrease in overall highway 

fatalities since 1991, rollover fatalities have increased almost 20 percent over the 

same period. This is unconscionable—NHTSA’s mission is to protect Americans on 

the highways, and with respect to rollover crashes, the agency has been grossly negligent. 

Results of NHTSA’s Two-Sided Testing Suggest Need for More Inquiry 

For the SNPRM, NHTSA conducted 26 two-sided tests.[viii] In 22 of the 26 tests, 

the peak force measured for the second side at five inches of platen travel was less 

than that of the first side, suggesting that the deformation experienced by the test 

on the first side changed the strength of the second side. In 4 of the 26 cases, the 

peak force measured for the second side was greater than that for the first side. 

NHTSA says ‘‘[w]e concluded that the strength of the roof on the second side of 

some vehicles may have been increased or decreased as a result of the deformation 

of the first side of the roof.’’ 32

The agency does not provide further explanation for why the roof strength on the 

second side may have increased or decreased. The auto industry has long argued 

that they design vehicles such that the roof strength is the same on both sides, and 

therefore there is no need for a two-sided test. NHTSA’s conclusion that it cannot 

be predicted how the roof strength will change refutes the industry claim that a vehicle will performs the same on both sides in the platen test. 

The results of NHTSA’s two-sided testing, it concluded, justify that the agency 

‘‘consider’’ two-sided testing. However, NHTSA was already directed by SAFETEA– 

LU to produce an upgrade to FMVSS 216 that ‘‘relat[es] to roof strength for driver 

and passenger sides.’’ The results of NHTSA’s two-sided testing confirm what observers of vehicles involved in rollover crashes could ascertain by looking at them— 

that the amount of intrusion is not the same on the far side. This makes a stronger 

recommendation to the agency than ‘‘considering’’ two-sided testing. The agency is 

now obligated to determine how to best conduct two-sided testing that estimates the 

risk to occupants in rollover crashes. 

Two-sided Dynamic Testing Is Possible 

The Jordan Rollover System shows that a cost-effective dynamic test is possible. 

The Jordan Rollover System (JRS) is a flexible, efficient, dynamic test that can 

be used to test for roof crush, but can also be used to test ejection and injury potential. The device was developed by Acen Jordan and Don Friedman, a test designer 

and a mechanical engineer. Acen Jordan worked on the Experimental Safety Vehicle 

and the Research Safety Vehicle and developed test sleds that are widely used by 

the industry. Don Friedman worked on the Sidewinder missile development, the 

Lunar Rover, air bags, offset frontal crash testing and rollover crash safety, and was 

selected to design NHTSA’s Research Safety Vehicle in a competition with large 

auto companies. 

The way the JRS device is designed provides adequate flexibility for the agency 

to use the device in a number of different ways. The test is efficient, because multiple safety systems could be tested in a single test, which would reduce the burden 

on the agency and auto companies to conduct compliance testing. The most important element of the test device is its ability to better approximate real-world roll 

dynamics in a controlled manner, unlike other dynamic tests. 

The JRS can be used to test roof crush resistance under a variety of metrics. Donald Friedman has conducted tests using the JRS for research purposes using a protocol that measures intrusion velocity and dynamic roof crush. The test apparatus 

can be used in a number of different configurations to suit whatever metric the 

agency chooses for a compliance standard. The agency can change the test protocol, 

and the basic mechanism in the test device serves to rotate the vehicle in such a 

way to realistically replicate rollover crashes. 

A dynamic rollover test conducted on a device like the JRS could simultaneously 

test multiple rollover safety standards in the same test. This should include performance standards for safety belts in rollovers, including performance of belt 

pretensioners, side curtain airbag performance, and window glazing and door retention as well as roof crush. 

79 

33Priorities for EU Motor Vehicle Safety Design. European Transport Safety Council. 2001. 34Machey, John M. and Charles L. Gauthier, Results, Analysis and Conclusions of NHTSA’s 

35 MPH Frontal Crash Test Repeatability Program, Office of Marketing Incentives, National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.: 1984. SAE 840201. 

The agency has a responsibility to consider a dynamic test that mirrors real-world 

crashes. This test has the potential to give the agency valuable information for the 

development of performance standards, as well as efficient compliance testing for 

rollover occupant protection. 

The JRS can provide valuable information for the design of safer vehicles. The 

JRS can be configured to collect information about roll dynamics, which can then 

be used by manufacturers to improve vehicle design to enhance safety. As with frontal, side and rear impact crashes, the use of dynamic testing has provided industry 

with information that allows for the improvement of vehicle design to withstand 

crashes of that type. As a result, there has been a reduction in fatalities, particularly in frontal and side impact crash modes.33

A similar approach must be taken with respect to rollover crashes. Occupant protection, through reduced roof crush as well as ejection mitigation, would effectively 

reduce rollover fatalities. Vehicle design decisions must be made with the use of representative data about rollover dynamics. Improvements in vehicle design to improve performance on a test that is not representative will not serve to improve occupant safety and is a waste of resources. A dynamic test, like the JRS, can provide 

manufacturers with the information needed to improve occupant protection. 

The information gathered from dynamic testing such as the JRS can be used to 

write meaningful performance standards for ejection mitigation equipment. Rollover 

performance of belts, side curtain airbags, window glazing, and door locks will all 

play a critical role in preventing ejection. This performance standard must be developed in accordance with SAFETEA–LU requirements to issue a performance standard for ejection mitigation equipment by October 1, 2009. 

As part of their desperate attempt to fend off legitimate product liability litigation 

against them, several automobile manufacturers have challenged the validity of the 

JRS as a legitimate vehicle test instrument. They have inappropriately used the 

Daubert test defined by the Supreme Court to control the use of junk science in 

trials involving testimony of technical experts. 

Unfortunately, some judges have acquiesced to these industry objections even 

though the JRS is fully based on traditional scientific principles: Newtonian physics, 

and analysis of rollover crash investigations and data, and the biomechanics of 

human injury. This has potentially affected the roof crush rulemaking in that the 

industry now claims that these successful challenges to the JRS demonstrate that 

the JRS is not an objective instrument for conducting rollover roof crush or occupant 

protection testing. 

The Center for Injury Research (CfI R) has invested substantial private resources 

in developing and demonstrating the JRS—conducting the research that NHTSA 

should have been conducting over the past decade—to provide the basis for more 

realistic and reliable evaluation of vehicle rollover occupant protection performance. 

Automaker litigators should not be permitted to derail this important work as part 

of their questionable courtroom tactics, and 30 years’ opposition to effective testing 

of occupant protection in rollover crashes. 

Dynamic Test Results Using the Jordan Rollover System 

A total of 81 JRS tests have been conducted by Xprts, LLC since January 2003. 

The Center for Auto Safety, with the support solicited of the Santos Family Foundation by Public Citizen has conducted both quasi-static (M216 two-sided tests at a 

10 degree pitch angle) and dynamic tests (JRS) of the roof crush performance of the 

Volvo XC90. The vehicles used for the test were donated by State Farm Insurance. 

The XC90 performed exceptionally well in all tests, demonstrating that it has been 

practicable for at least the past 5 years to build production vehicles with adequately 

strong roofs, in combination with other safety features to achieve superior rollover 

protection. As far as we can determine, no one has been seriously injured or killed 

in a rollover of an XC90 in the years it has been on the highway. 

When briefed on the JRS, NHTSA asked for a demonstration of repeatability of 

tests conducted on the JRS. The Santos Family Foundation provided support for a 

series of tests that were conducted on three Subaru Foresters. The result of the repeatability series showed that the tests were in agreement to at least the same degree as NHTSA’s and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety tolerances for dynamic testing: a variation of about 10 percent.34 No other dynamic test device, specifically the CRIS system used by industry, can provide the repeatability of the JRS. 

80 

35See Submissions of Center for Auto Safety, Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0015 at 0061, 0062, 

and 0063. (March 27, 2008). 36David Shephardson, ‘‘GM to Put Rollover Bags in All Models’’ The Detroit News, (December 

5, 2006). 37 Hans Greimel, ‘‘The upside of upside down: Better belts.’’ Automotive News. (February 25, 

2008). 38 Robert C. Lange as quoted in The Detroit News, ‘‘GM, NHTSA Unfairly Treated in Series,’’ 

(March 19, 2002). 

Under a new Santos Family Foundation grant, additional tests have also been 

conducted on three vehicles provided by State Farm that were the same models tested by NHTSA: the 2007 Toyota Camry, 2006 Hyundai Sonata and 2006 Chrysler 

300. The results of these tests are that the residual roof crush for the 2.5 SWR 

Chrysler 300 leaves negative headroom on both JRS tests at 5.6 and 7.4 inches of 

residual crush at the A-pillar. By contrast the 3.2 SWR Hyundai Sonata had just 

2.6 inches of residual crush [ix] at the A-pillar on the first roll. The 4.3 SWR Toyota 

Camry had the least residual roof intrusion on the first roll at 1.6 inches but 4.3 

on the second roll. These results have been submitted to NHTSA’s docket for the 

SNPRM.35 Further tests of vehicles in this series are currently being conducted. 

The Industry Is Rapidly Moving To Adopt Dynamic Testing as Well 

The industry has recently resumed dynamic rollover testing. In the 1970s GM 

conducted drop tests. The Malibu tests, also conducted by GM were conducted using 

the FMVSS 208 dolly rollover procedure, where a vehicle is rolled off of a dolly rolling at around 30 mph.[x] Ford has conducted tests using the Controlled Rollover Impact System, in which a vehicle carried at the back of a tractor/trailer is rotated 

until it reaches a steady state roll before the vehicle is dropped on its roof. However, 

this device has been misused primarily to support the industry’s claim that roof 

crush does not cause occupant head or neck injury. 

Recently, the auto industry has been developing dynamic testing for purposes 

other than assessing roof strength. General Motors unveiled its new rollover test facility in December of 2006. The rollover tests chosen by General Motors are deliberately designed to avoid measuring roof crush. In one test, the vehicle is driven 

on a ramp, and then tips onto its side.36 This test can be used to evaluate the deployment of side curtain airbags, which General Motors has publicly announced it 

will be installing in all its vehicles by 2012, but fails to provide any information 

about roof crush. Ford has also conducted dolly rollover tests of the Ford Explorer.[xi] The vehicle never fully inverts, and so the test fails to realistically represent a rollover crash. Nissan also recently announced publicly that it has developed an apparatus that is capable of fully inverting a car.37 The stated purpose of 

this apparatus is to test seat belt performance. 

Neither GM crash test results nor Nissan car flip results are available to the public, so Public Citizen is unable to comment on whether or how these automakers 

could reconfigure existing test apparatus to test for roof strength. NHTSA could investigate these test methods and assess whether they could be used for other purposes, or request test results for research purposes in developing a test that would 

work for roof strength testing. 

Roof Crush Causes Injury 

For more than three decades the auto industry, led by General Motors, has conducted a campaign to convince courts of law, NHTSA, and the public that ‘‘there 

is no relationship between roof strength and the likelihood of occupant injury given 

a rollover.’’ 38 GM conducted an extensive two-part test program, referred to as 

Malibu I (unrestrained occupants) and Malibu II (fully belted occupants) that it 

claimed supported its thesis. In half of the tests of each series, the vehicles were 

equipped with full roll cages emulating a strong roof. However, although the company published and presented research papers making that claim, it would not release the underlying data and film until forced to do so in a major lawsuit. In fact, 

the company only this year released high quality, complete copies of the film recorded in these tests. 

Analysis of the extensive data, film and analyses of the Malibu tests has demonstrated that in fact roof crush is directly related to neck injury which occurred 

only in tests of production roof Malibus. Film of these tests show definitively how 

these injuries are a direct result of the roof failures and that when the roofs are 

strong, with rollcages, the test dummies in the vehicles indicate the potential of only 

minor to moderate injuries from which an individual would fully recovery. We have 

submitted this evidence to NHTSA and attach a letter from the CfIR as an appendix 

to this testimony. 

81 

39Martha Bidez, John E. Cochran, Jr., et al., ‘‘Occupant Dynamics In Rollover Crashes: Influence of Roof Deformation and Seat Belt Performance on Probably Spinal Column Injury.’’ Annals 

of Biomedical Engineering, Vol. 35, No. 11. (2007) pp. 1973–1988. See Comments of Martha 

Bidez at Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0015, at 0030 (March 17, 2008). 40See Comments of Public Citizen at Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0015, at 0076.1 (March 27, 

2008). 

CfIR has conducted further research using the JRS which shows how the Hybrid 

III dummy which is commonly used for crash testing can be used effectively in dynamic rollover testing. They have shown that changes in neck instrumentation and 

the positioning of the dummy to be more like the position of actual occupants in 

a rollover can overcome the limitations of the Hybrid III which has a very simple 

neck structure that only poorly represents the complexities of the human neck. 

Again, these developments are discussed in detail in the CfIR letter to the committee. 

Martha Bidez, a biomechanical engineer, has done a detailed study of the Ford 

Autoliv tests of the Ford Explorer. She concludes: 

During each of the three FMVSS 208 dolly rollover tests of Ford Explorer SUVs, 

the far-side, passenger [anthropomorphic test dummies] exhibited Peak neck 

compression and flexion loads, which indicated a probably spinal column injury 

in all three tests. . . . In all three tests, objective roof/pillar deformation occurred prior to the occurrence of Peak neck loads . . . and Peak neck loads were 

predictive of probable spinal column injury.39

Dynamic testing is needed to study the dynamic motion of occupants in rollover. 

The role of properly functioning restraints, ejection, and biomechanical factors such 

as neck preflexion must be taken together to get a complete picture of occupant risk 

in rollover crashes. 

Docket 

The public dockets for different stages of the roof crush rulemaking have resulted 

in hundreds of public comments from the auto industry, public interest groups, independent engineers, legal experts, and interested citizens. With tens of thousands of 

affected families each year, the problems of rollover and roof crush are of significant 

public concern. 

After the close of the docket for the 2005 NPRM, the debate didn’t stop—over 100 

more submissions were made from December of 2005 until the opening of the docket 

for the SNPRM in January 2008. These submissions provided the agency with substantial additional materials, including multiple submissions from the auto industry, as well as multiple submissions from the public interest community about dynamic testing. 

Overview of Additional Comments From the Auto Industry 

Additional auto industry comments to the 2005 docket can be found at docket 

number NHTSA–2005–22143 at the following: July 25, 2006 (#232), August 3, 2006 

(#233), August 11, 2006 (#234), September 7, 2006 (#236 and #237). Public Citizen, 

Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates) and the Center for Auto Safety 

responded with a letter on August 3, 2006 requesting a meeting to discuss these 

submissions. 

These late submissions deal with industry objections to the proposed tie down procedure, a request for authority to use FMVSS 220 for long roofline vehicles, and concerns about low roofline vehicles. The manufacturer submissions represent several 

considerations that are significantly different than the proposed rule and, if incorporated into the final rule, would result in an even greater deviation from NHTSA’s 

legal obligations. Some of these major changes would make compliance easier to 

achieve, because the standards to which a vehicle would comply could effectively be 

tailored to that vehicle, allowing more vehicles to pass—at a significant cost to public safety. Further, the late submissions of industry expose the failure of the platen 

test to adequately represent real-world crashes. Public Citizen has directly addressed these issues in comments to the SNPRM Docket.40

Overview of Additional Contact With Public Interest Groups 

Several meetings have occurred since the close of the 2005 docket on issues related to the need for significant revisions to the NPRM, and to reiterate the need 

for dynamic testing, two-sided testing. Meetings were also held with representatives 

from the Center for Injury Research and Xprts, LLC to present research findings 

of the dynamic test apparatus—the Jordan Rollover System (JRS). These meetings 

and comments can be found in NHTSA docket NHTSA–2005–22143 at: October 18, 

82 

41See Comments of DV Experts at Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0015, at 0010 (March 4, 2008). 42 70 FR 49245. 43Geier v. Honda Motor Corp. 529 U.S. 861, 884. (2000). 

2006 (#240), February 6, 2007 (#251), May 14, 2007 (#266), August 21, 2007 (#271), 

September 18, 2007 (#276), January 1, 2008 (#280) and February 19, 2008 (#281). 

We wish to emphasize that the agency was given ample opportunity to inquire 

and consider dynamic testing. However, the agency’s response has thus far been to 

give lip service to the idea of dynamic testing, but take no steps to evaluate it. 

NHTSA was offered the opportunity by CfIR to test a number of vehicles on its JRS 

or the option to buy the test device for its testing, but the agency took no initiative 

to do either.[xii] As a result, it has issued a 1970s SNPRM instead of an advanced, 

21st century one. An Australian engineering group, which has worked on developing 

roof strength regulations in Australia responded to NHTSA’s assessment of dynamic 

testing criticizing NHTSA for citing ‘‘repeatability issues [with dynamic testing] and 

other pseudo-science references reflect a callous preference for bureaucratic process 

over function.’’ 41

NHTSA Is Attempting To Block Injured Consumers’ Access to the Court 

NHTSA asserts in the preamble to the 2005 NPRM that its final rule should preempt state tort law jury verdicts. The agency argues that a court liability decision 

is equivalent to a state performance requirement for greater levels of roof crush resistance that would ‘‘frustrate the agency’s objectives by upsetting the balance between efforts to increase roof strength and reduce rollover propensity.’’ 42 Their view 

is a massively overbroad reading of the Supreme Court decision in Geier v. Honda, 

which provided protection from product liability litigation to an automaker who had 

not installed an airbag in its vehicle, where the relevant safety standard rule had 

given manufacturers a choice among various technologies and giving automakers 

that choice was seen as a key component of the rule.43

Given that the agency’s rule, in its own estimation, will save merely 7 percent 

of the affected population, its statements on preemption, and the risk that the agency will destroy any incentive to exceed its de minimis standard or to save the remaining 93 percent of affected occupants is a serious dereliction of the agency’s 

mandate. This power grab by Federal authorities would leave victims uncompensated and remove incentives to improve safety designs beyond the weak new proposed rule—imposing a ceiling on safety and stripping victims like Marcia Arreola 

and Patrick Parker of their right to seek compensation for harm done to them. 

The agency has not made a compelling case for preemption based on any scientific 

or policy basis. NHTSA states a higher standard would make vehicles more rollover 

prone from the heavier roof; however, the Volvo XC90 far exceeds NHTSA’s standard and yet is one of the safest SUVs on the road. The use of advanced high 

strength steels and other lightweight materials can strengthen roofs without a 

weight increase. NHTSA’s data show the impact of weight increases on raising a 

vehicle’s center of gravity is immeasurably small, and rollover and stability control 

systems can more than compensate for any small increase in weight. 

NHTSA does not suggest that it would be unsafe to exceed the standard, nor does 

it provide penalties or disincentives when vehicles do so. NHTSA has provided no 

examples of vehicles with elevated rollover risks due to the weight of the roof. If 

rollovers are significantly more survivable because of a stronger roof, the actual risk 

of injury is reduced even if there is a marginal increase in rollover propensity. The 

tort system provides the best incentive for automakers to make design decisions 

that will not increase rollover propensity—an outcome NHTSA’s design-neutral 

standard does not guarantee. NHTSA is compounding public risk by reducing automaker accountability. 

When NHTSA suggests a higher standard would interfere with its ‘‘comprehensive’’ package of rollover safety measures, the agency gets it exactly backward. A 

weak roof deforms such that the geometry of safety belts is compromised, making 

them far less effective. Without a strong roof, side windows will shatter and allow 

side impact air bags to flop out through the broken window, providing little protection and increasing the risk of deadly full or partial ejection. A stronger, not a weaker, roof is required for a successful, truly comprehensive approach to rollover injury 

reduction. 

Meanwhile, the agency’s static roof crush standard fails to measure the comprehensive interaction between safety systems in a real-world rollover crash. A dynamic test comprehensively measures the safety protection from the roof, windows, 

doors, belts and airbags working together. The agency’s main duty to Congress and 

the public is to improve motor vehicle safety. Because liability law enhances safety 

83 

by providing continual incentives to improve, the agency’s action violates its core 

mission. 

Those in a position to prevent injury or death should be held responsible for that 

injury or death when they fail to act. It is far more cost-effective, and the most responsible way to reduce the number lawsuits brought against is to avert harm in 

the first place. Adequate regulatory protection is also the ethical duty we owe to 

others out of respect for human life. Victims of roof crush cases deserve justice because automakers have known for years (since the late 1960s at least) how to prevent injuries in rollover crashes but have not designed vehicles to prevent this 

harm. In fact, the 1928 Ford Model A had superior roof protection than today’s vehicles. Instead, auto companies cut costs to maximize profits, impose gag orders to 

cover up harm, and lobby regulators to weaken new rules. Victims of misconduct 

should be fairly compensated by the perpetrator. When those who can prevent 

harm, yet choose not to, and then are let off the hook, they, rather than society 

should pick up the tab, paying medical bills and higher insurance costs, etc., caused 

by the wrongful actions of a few. 

In addition, improved motor vehicle safety—and particularly rollover occupant 

protection—would have major positive economic implications. Using NHTSA’s own 

economic estimates of the cost of injury, the more than 10,000 fatalities and more 

than 17,000 serious injuries cost society more than $50 billion annually. Even if 

building cars with strong roofs cost manufacturers as much as $100 per vehicle, that 

would amount to a total annual cost of only $1.5 billion, which would be more than 

justifiable if it only reduced rollover casualties by 10 percent. In fact, appropriate 

changes in vehicle performance to reduce rollover casualties would save a majority 

of the more than $50 billion cost of these crashes. 

Consumer justice attorneys stand with citizens, both the weak and the strong, to 

ensure that injured people are compensated by wrongdoers. NHTSA has not upgraded its ‘‘temporary’’ roof crush vehicle safety standard, issued in 1971, for 34 

years, while the death toll from rollover crashes continued to mount at an astounding rate. In light of the egregious failure of NHTSA to protect the public many of 

these attorneys are calling for a substantial upgrade to the standard against their 

own interest, as these type of cases are a bread and butter issue for some of them. 

NHTSA’s new proposal is deeply flawed, and will save few lives. In contrast, tort 

law establishes a duty of care that protects citizens when the government is too slow 

to act, when minimum standards are insufficient to prevent harm, or when standards are inadequately enforced. The tort system also brings to light useful information—most of the information about the harm from roof crush, its all-too-long history and its prevention has come from cases brought by injured plaintiffs. 

This rule is not the only one in which NHTSA has interfered with harmful preemption language. Attached is a list of 51 regulations or proposed regulations in 

which language has been included which would make it more difficult for injured 

parties to seek redress, of these 20 of the regulations or proposals were issued by 

NHTSA. 

While most citizens do not have a real voice in the regulatory decisions, they do 

understand what is fair. Juries charged with articulating ethical standards for a 

community define a common sense standard for reasonable care. They cannot be lobbied by either side and are generally free of political coercion. Our reliance on the 

collective wisdom of ordinary people to hold companies who cause harm accountable 

is a crucial democratic safeguard and a fundamental right of all citizens. 

Conclusions 

NHTSA has not produced an adequate upgrade to FMVSS 216 to meet its mandate under SAFETEA–LU. As part of a comprehensive approach to reducing rollover 

fatalities, NHTSA should offer an upgrade to its roof strength standard that produces a meaningful estimation of the risk to occupants in rollover crashes from intrusion of the roof. The agency must produce a regulatory impact analysis that estimates the relative benefits of different compliance options. The Senate Committee 

on Commerce, Science, and Transportation has the authority to agree to an extension of the rulemaking period to give the agency yet another chance to produce a 

roof strength proposal that protects occupants in deadly rollover crashes. 

But the agency should give substantial thought to reimagining the standard. Roof 

strength is only part of developing comprehensive vehicle design approaches to protecting occupants in rollover crashes, which kill more than 10,000 people every year. 

The objective of FMVSS 216 is to prevent occupant injury by maintaining the structural integrity of the vehicle when it rolls over. Significant progress has been made 

in reducing injury from frontal, rear and side impact crashes with dynamic test 

standards. This standard should govern occupant protection from one more direction—the top. Adoption of a dynamic test would give valuable information about 

84 

how occupants are injured in rollover crashes, which would in turn produce the industry, NHTSA, and the public information to design safer vehicles. A dynamic test 

can be used to test other elements of occupant protection, such as side curtain air 

bags, seat belt performance and belt pretensioners. 

In the meantime, NHTSA immediately has the authority to provide consumer information through the New Car Assessment Program. It could use a modified 

version of the quasi-static platen test to estimate the roof strength, and provide this 

information, along with information on such things as whether a vehicle had rollover-triggered safety belt pretensioners and side curtain air bags, and whether a vehicle had more effective safety belt use reminders to provide a preliminary rating 

of the rollover occupant protection provided by current production vehicles. We will 

shortly make such a proposal to the agency. 

Public Citizen would like to see the most expedient possible conclusion to the roof 

strength standard upgrade practicable; however, we support an upgrade to the 

standard that is significantly more protective than the existing standard. NHTSA 

must exercise its authority to set an extended deadline for this rulemaking, which 

is permitted under SAFETEA–LU, although the law mandates the standard be 

issued by July 1, 2008. NHTSA should go back to its 2003 plan and complete research programs into developing a more representative two-sided test for occupant 

protection in rollover crashes, and that research must include state-of-the-art dynamic testing. 

NHTSA cannot produce a final rule until it has first returned to the drawing 

board and produced a notice of proposed rulemaking that outlines a two-sided testing regime that provides a scientifically-based estimate of risk to occupants in rollover crashes. This new proposal must: 

• Be accompanied by research for each regulatory option and an assessment of 

the relative life-saving, injury-averting benefits to the public from each option; 

• include dynamic testing, including the possibility of using a dynamic test to assess roof performance in addition to the performance of seat belts, door locks 

and latches, and windows; 

• protect the public, including persons not represented by a 50 percent male 

dummy, using a performance test that does its utmost to mimic real-world 

crash conditions while using an injury prevention metric; and 

• consider the significant benefit of combining all rollover occupant protection 

measures under a single comprehensive dynamic test standard resembling 

FMVSS 208. 

In the meantime, the agency should immediately issue a consumer information 

standard that will allow consumers to make a meaningful assessment of the potential safety concern of vehicles on the market. This consumer information standard 

should include an estimate of roof strength that is based on an improved two-sided 

platen test, as well as highlighting other safety equipment such as belt 

pretensioners and side curtain airbags. 

Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for this opportunity today to testify 

on these critical needs of children for improved motor vehicle safety. I am eager to 

address your questions. 

Footnotes 

[i] Frontal impact protection is governed by FMVSS 208, side impact by FMVSS 214, and rear 

impact by FMVSS 223. In addition to these tests, FMVSS 301L and 301R are dynamic tests 

for fuel system integrity. FMVSS 212 is a dynamic test which assesses windshield mounting. 

[ii] In later model years, laminated glazing was removed from side windows in the XC90 for 

‘‘cost’’ reasons. 

[iii] The M216 test subjects vehicles to two sequential platen tests. The platen is applied at 

a 10 degree pitch angle and a 25 degree roll angle for the first side, and a 40 degree roll angle 

for the second side. This test provides sequential measurements, which give information about 

the ‘‘sequential effect’’—that is the difference in loading on the near versus far sides. 

[iv] The 1971 standard limited the force to 1.5 times gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) with 

a 5,000 pound ceiling. At that time, many passenger cars exceeded 5,000 pounds GVWR, so they 

could meet a standard of less than even 1.5 SWR. 

[v] This is consistent with what NHTSA researchers found in the two-sided roof crush tests 

conducted for the SNPRM ‘‘We note that in all 26 tests, the windshield cracked before completion of the first side test.’’ (73 FR 5487.) 

[vi] The agency did not use a consistent test procedure for all the tests, which makes it impossible to compare the results of the tests. 

[vii] Secretary of Transportation Mary Peters was questioned by Senator Mark Pryor during 

the October 18, 2007 oversight hearing of the Department of Transportation held before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Senator Pryor asked Secretary Peters several questions about the roof crush rulemaking, including whether the yet-to-be-released 

SNPRM would include two-sided testing and whether it considered ‘‘any different types of testVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
85 

ing.’’ Secretary Peters responded that she believed that inquiry into different types of testing 

was the purpose of the SNPRM. 

[viii] NHTSA does not provide an explanation in the SNPRM as to how it selected the 26 vehicles for two-sided testing. 

[ix] When a vehicle is tested dynamically, there may be a larger amount of peak dynamic 

crush, that is the greatest extent to which the roof crushes in when in contact with the simulated road. When the vehicle is turned back upright, the roof may spring back to a small extent. 

The ‘‘residual’’ crush is the amount of roof crush that is measured after the roof springs back. 

[x] The dolly rollover test was proposed as an optional requirement as part of the 1971 rulemaking, but has not been used for Federal compliance testing. 

[xi] These tests were conducted at Autoliv ASP in Auburn Hills, Michigan on 8/10/99 (Autoliv 

Test B190042); 12/9/98 (AutolivTest B180219); 8/11/99 (Autoliv Test B190043); and 12/10/98 

(Autoliv Test B180220). 

[xii] NHTSA has not made public records of any dynamic testing it has conducted if any has 

been conducted since it issued its ANPRM on roof crush in 2001. 

APPENDIX I 

The Sad History of Rollover Prevention—30 Years, Thousands of Deaths 

and Injuries, and Still No Safety Performance Standard 

Rollover crashes are responsible for a full one-third of all vehicle occupant fatalities, yet meaningful Federal action to reduce these crashes has been delayed for more 

than three decades. 

April 1973 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issues an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on a rollover resistance 

standard ‘‘that would specify minimum performance requirements for the resistance of vehicles to rollover in simulations of extreme driving conditions 

encountered in attempting to avoid accidents.’’ No safety standard has ever 

been issued. 

1986 NHTSA analysis shows that rollover crashes are the most dangerous collision 

type for passenger vehicles. 

Sept. 1986 Rep. Tim Wirth, the Chairman of the House Commerce Committee petitions 

NHTSA to issue a rollover standard based on Static Stability Factor (SSF)— 

a geometric measurement concerning the relationship between vehicle 

height and track width. 

Dec. 1987 Rep. Tim Wirth petition denied by NHTSA on the basis that SSF does not accurately predict rollover propensity. SSF was later adopted in the year 2000 

as the basis for the agency’s rollover resistance consumer information program, but not as a minimum safety standard. 

Feb./July 1988 The Center for Auto Safety (CAS) and the Safety First Coalition (SFC) petition 

NHTSA to initiate a defect investigation on the highly rollover-prone Suzuki 

Samurai. 

June 1988 Consumers Union petitions NHTSA to protect occupants against ‘‘unreasonable risk of rollover.’’ 

Sept. 1988 NHTSA grants Consumers Union petition and states that it is already undertaking research into rollover safety and that the petition is consistent with 

the agency’s ‘‘steps to address the rollover problem.’’ NHTSA simultaneously 

denies the CAS and SFC petitions to investigate the Samurai. 

1988–1993 NHTSA conducts an investigation and data analysis of more than 100,000 single-vehicle rollover crashes. 

Oct. 1991 Congress requests report from NHTSA regarding rollover and roof crush 

standards (FY92 DOT Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 102–143, S. Rept. 102– 

148). 

Dec. 1991 Congress requires NHTSA rulemaking to prevent unreasonable risk of rollover. An ANPRM or Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was required 

no later than May 31, 1992 and completion of a rulemaking action on rollover within 26 months of publication of the ANPRM. Yet Congress allowed 

the rulemaking to be considered completed when NHTSA either published a 

final rule or announced that the agency would not promulgate a rule. 

Jan. 1992 NHTSA publishes an ANPRM proposing multiple options for establishing a 

reasonable metric baseline for acceptable rollover propensity. The ANPRM 

states that NHTSA is considering regulatory action to reduce the frequency 

of rollovers and/or the number and severity of injuries resulting from vehicle 

rollovers. A Technical Assessment Paper was also published discussing testing activities, results, crash data collection and data analysis (NHTSA– 

1996–1683–4). 

86 

April 1992 NHTSA issues Report to Congress, Rollover Prevention and Roof Crush, highlighting the research and its plans to address rollover prevention and survival. 

Sept. 1992 NHTSA delivers the agency’s planning document, Planning Document for Rollover Prevention and Injury Mitigation, at Society of Automotive Engineers 

Conference, giving an overview of the rollover problem and the action 

NHTSA was examining to address it, including vehicle measures for rollover 

resistance; improved roof crush resistance to prevent head and spinal injury, 

and improved side window glazing and door latches to prevent occupant 

ejection. 

June 1994 Rollover standard rulemaking terminated following a cost-benefit analysis that 

used out-dated late 1980s data regarding the prevalence of light trucks in 

the vehicle population and ignored the significant trend of increasing rollover-prone vehicles, namely SUVs, as a percentage of new vehicle sales and 

an increasing presence on the highway. 

June 1994 Secretary of Transportation, Federico Pen ̃ a, announces NHTSA’s plans to substitute a ‘‘comprehensive regulatory and information strategy’’ for the rollover propensity standard. This strategy included (1) a safety sticker to be 

placed on all vehicles that includes their rollover likelihood rating (watered 

down following Industry complaint, it now only mentions a generic likelihood of rollover); (2) the consideration of new standards for side windows 

and door latches (promulgated after SAFETEA–LU); and (3) examination of 

an upgraded roof crush standard (NPRM 2005 and SNPRM 2008). 

July 1994 NHTSA issues a notice of rulemaking on a vehicle safety consumer information label for rollover stability. 

July 1994 Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates) and Insurance Institute 

for Highway Safety (IIHS) petition NHTSA to reconsider decision to terminate rulemaking on rollover standard. 

Sept. 1994 Congress requires National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study of vehicle safety 

consumer information (FY95 DOT Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 103–331, see 

H. Rept.103–543, Part 1); NHTSA suspends rulemaking on vehicle rollover 

safety consumer information labeling until study is completed. 

Aug. 1995 Responding to a 1991 ISTEA requirement that NHTSA initiate and complete a 

rulemaking to address ‘‘improved head impact protection from interior components of passenger cars (i.e., roof rails, pillars, and front headers),’’ the 

agency issues a final rule amending FMVSS 201 to require passenger cars 

and light trucks with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less to provide greater 

protection when an occupant’s head hits upper interior components (such as 

A-pillars and side rails) during a crash. A rulemaking intended to address 

roof crush is thereby transformed into a rule on interior padding. 

March 1996 NAS issues study of vehicle safety information, Shopping for Safety, on 

NHTSA’s proposed consumer information program, stating that consumers 

need more information then they are currently provided and that a safety 

label, like the one currently used for displaying fuel economy, should be displayed on all new passenger vehicles sold at U.S. dealerships listing standardized safety ratings. 

May 1996 NHTSA issues Status Report for Rollover Prevention and Injury Mitigation, 

with a description of NHTSA’s planned development of a dynamic rollover 

propensity test. 

June 1996 NHTSA re-opens 1994 rulemaking docket on a rollover consumer warning 

label. 

June 1996 NHTSA denies Advocates/IIHS July 1994 petition for reconsideration of decision to terminate rulemaking on rollover prevention standard, stating that a 

standard based on static vehicle measurements would eliminate a ‘‘very popular vehicle type’’—the compact SUV and was not justified on cost-benefit 

grounds. 

Aug. 1996 Consumers Union petitions NHTSA to develop a standard that would produce 

meaningful, comparative data on the emergency-handling characteristics of 

various SUVs and to provide test results to the public as consumer information. 

May 1997 NHTSA grants CU petition, stating: ‘‘NHTSA will initially focus on exploring 

whether it can develop a practicable, repeatable and appropriate dynamic 

emergency handling test that assesses, among other issues, a vehicle’s propensity for involvement in an on-road, untripped rollover crash.’’ 

April 1998 NHTSA issues an NPRM on a SUV rollover warning label for the vehicle visor. 

87 

Mar. 1999 NHTSA issues final rule on revised SUV rollover warning label, requiring a 

rollover warning sticker on the vehicle’s visor or window that says ‘‘Warning: Higher Rollover Risk’’ and instructions to avoid abrupt maneuvers and 

excessive speed, and to buckle up, are written beneath the heading. 

June 2000 NHTSA proposes rollover consumer information based on static stability factor 

(SSF) measurements as part of the agency’s New Car Assessment Program 

(NCAP) that provides comparative vehicle performance information on the 

agency’s website, but declines to require that the information be placed on 

the window sticker at the point-of-sale. 

Oct. 23, 2000 Congress funds NAS study of NHTSA proposed rollover information rating 

based on SSF. 

Nov. 2000 Following the Ford Explorer/Firestone tire tragedy, Congress requires dynamic 

testing of vehicle rollover be added to NHTSA’s consumer information rating 

program with testing to begin by November, 2002 (TREAD Act, Sec. 12, Pub. 

L. 106–414). 

Jan. 2001 NHTSA begins publishing rollover ratings based on a vehicle’s static stability 

factor (SSF) on the agency’s website. 

July 2001 NHTSA issues request for comments on developing dynamic test as basis for 

rollover rating consumer information program beginning in 2003. 

Sept. 2001 According to a Louis Harris poll commissioned by Advocates for Highway and 

Auto Safety, 85 percent of Americans support a Federal rollover prevention 

minimum standard. 

Feb. 2002 NAS study, Rating System for Rollover Resistance, An Assessment, issued. The 

report recommends that NHTSA expand the scope of its program, consider 

metrics other than stars, and develop an overall measure of vehicle safety to 

be integrated into the vehicle label. The NAS also points that NHTSA 

should evaluate the appropriateness of a rollover rating program in the absence of a minimum standard (the other consumer information ratings, for 

frontal and side impact crashes, reward performance above a minimum compliance standard). 

Oct. 2002 NHTSA issues NPRM on dynamic test procedure for rollover consumer information. 

Feb. 26, 2003 Senate Commerce Committee holds a well-publicized hearing on SUV safety 

where Senators, auto industry representatives, the administrator of NHTSA 

and spokespeople from consumer safety groups speak about the rollover prevention and survivability. 

April 2003 NHTSA publishes Characteristics of Fatal Rollover Crashes and reports the 

following: 

• Rollovers are more likely to result in fatality than other crashes are; 

• Rollovers constitute about one-fifth of all fatal crashes; 

• SUVs have the highest rollover fatality rate at 11.06 per 100,000 registered SUVs, followed by pickups at 7.52, vans at 4.09 and cars at 3.48 (for 

1999). 

June 2003 NHTSA issues Initiatives to Address the Mitigation of Vehicle Rollover —reporting that rollover mitigation is one of its four major priority areas, but 

proposing few concrete actions or deadlines. The other three priority areas 

include vehicle compatibility, safety belt use and impaired. 

July 2003 NHTSA issues Motor Vehicle Traffic Crash Injury and Fatality Estimates: 

2002 Annual Report, finding that rollover crashes accounted for 82 percent 

of the total fatality increase between 2001 and 2002. The report also reveals 

that in 2002, 10,666 occupants were killed in rollovers—one-third of all occupant deaths. 

Oct. 2003 In accordance with the TREAD mandate, NHTSA adopts a ‘‘fishhook’’ maneuver as the dynamic test procedure to be combined with SSF in rollover consumer information ratings and to be used beginning with its 2004 model 

year tests. 

Feb. 4, 2004 NHTSA issues first round of rollover ratings for 14 vehicle models and their 

corporate twins, based on a new dynamic test/SSF measurement. While the 

dynamic test provides an indication of on-road performance, the absence of a 

standard, or performance ‘‘floor’’ means that every vehicle starts with at 

least one star, and inflates the performance results on the tests (i.e., with a 

two-star ‘‘floor,’’ vehicles now earning three stars would receive substantially 

lower ratings). 

88 

Feb. 12, 2004 Senate passes S. 1072, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003 (SAFETEA 2003), which includes safety provisions 

concerning rollover that would: 

• Mandate a rollover prevention standard that would assure the improvement of the basic design characteristics of vehicles under 10,000 lbs. to increase their resistance to rollover (NPRM 6–30–04, final rule not later than 18 

months following NPRM); 

• Require the consideration of additional technologies that would increase 

handling and reduce the likelihood of instability (NPRM 6–30–04, final rule 

not later than 18 months following NPRM); and 

• Assign NHTSA to study Electronic Stability Control systems and report to 

Congress on their findings (due 12–31–05). 

Aug. 10, 2005 S. 1072 is amended and re-introduced by the next Congress and passed into 

law as the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity 

Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU) is signed into law. SAFETEA–LU 

requires an upgrade of several rollover protection standards including: 

• Crash avoidance (electronic stability control); 

• ejection prevention; 

• door locks and door retention; and 

• roof crush resistance. 

Aug. 18, 2005 NHTSA issues an NPRM on the roof crush resistance upgrade (73 FR 49223, 

49248). 

Nov. 21, 2005 Close of the formal comment period for the NPRM. Over 120 documents are 

submitted to the docket after its close. 

Aug. 3, 2006 Public Citizen, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety and the Center for 

Auto Safety submit a joint letter asking for a chance to respond to late industry comments to the docket. 

Dec. 13, 2006 Representatives from Public Citizen, the Center for Auto Safety, the Center for 

Injury Research and Xprts, LLC meet with NHTSA to discuss concerns 

about the 2005 NPRM, including dynamic testing. 

Feb. 23, 2007 Representatives from NHTSA travel to Goleta, California to see a test conducted using the Jordan Rollover System. 

Oct. 18, 2007 Transportation Secretary Mary Peters responds to questions asked by Senator 

Mark Pryor of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation regarding the roof crush rulemaking. Sen. Pryor asks specifically 

whether the SNPRM would include two-sided testing or address ‘‘different 

types of testing.’’ Secretary Peters responded that she believed the purpose 

of the SNPRM was to address different types of testing. 

Jan. 30, 2008 NHTSA issues its SNPRM on roof crush resistance. 

Mar. 27, 2008 End of formal comment period for 2008 SNPRM on roof crush resistance. Public Citizen submitted formal comments including response to late industry 

submissions to the 2005 NPRM docket, as well as concerns about the new 

proposal. 

Jun. 4, 2008 Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee holds hearings to 

investigate NHTSA’s proceedings on the mandated upgrade of the roof crush 

rule. 

Jul. 1, 2008 Statutory deadline in SAFETEA–LU for completion of roof crush rulemaking, 

if NHTSA does not seek an extension. 

APPENDIX II 

Legislative Language from the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 

AppendixTransportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 

SEC. 10301. VEHICLE ROLLOVER PREVENTION AND CRASH MITIGATION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 301 is amended by adding at the end 

the following: 

§ 30128. Vehicle rollover prevention and crash mitigation 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall initiate rulemaking proceedings, for the 

purpose of establishing rules or standards that will reduce vehicle rollover 

crashes and mitigate deaths and injuries associated with such crashes for motor 

vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of not more than 10,000 pounds. 

(b) ROLLOVER PREVENTION.—One of the rulemaking proceedings initiated 

under subsection (a) shall be to establish performance criteria to reduce the ocVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
89 

currence of rollovers consistent with stability enhancing technologies. The Secretary shall issue a proposed rule in this proceeding by rule by October 1, 2006, 

and a final rule by April 1, 2009. 

(c) OCCUPANT EJECTION PREVENTION.—— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall also initiate a rulemaking proceeding 

to establish performance standards to reduce complete and partial ejections 

of vehicle occupants from outboard seating positions. In formulating the 

standards the Secretary shall consider various ejection mitigation systems. 

The Secretary shall issue a final rule under this paragraph no later than October 1, 2009. 

(2) DOOR LOCKS AND DOOR RETENTION.—The Secretary shall complete 

the rulemaking proceeding initiated to upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 

Standard No. 206, relating to door locks and door retention, no later than 30 

months after the date of enactment of this section. 

(d) PROTECTION OF OCCUPANTS.—One of the rulemaking proceedings initiated under subsection (a) shall be to establish performance criteria to upgrade 

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216 relating to roof strength for 

driver and passenger sides. The Secretary may consider industry and independent dynamic tests that realistically duplicate the actual forces transmitted 

during a rollover crash. The Secretary shall issue a proposed rule by December 

31, 2005, and a final rule by July 1, 2008. 

APPENDIX III 

Summary of 2005 NPRM and 2008 SNPRM on FMVSS 216 

NHTSA’s 2005 Proposed Rule NHTSA’s 2008 Proposed Rule 

Extend application of standard for multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and 

buses up to 10,000 pounds 

Extend application of standard for multi-purpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses 

up to 10,000 pounds 

Require vehicle subject to 2.5 times their unloaded vehicle weight Require vehicle subject to 2.5 times their unloaded vehicle weight 

Option to introduce 2-sided test 

Eliminate the limit of 22,240 Newton maximum force limit for passenger cars Eliminate the limit of 22,240 Newton maximum force limit for passenger cars—upgrades to 2.5 times GVWR 

Headroom requirement would be set that no 

roof component be allowed to contact a 

seated 50th percentile male dummy 

Headroom requirement would be set that no 

roof component be allowed to contact a 

seated 50th percentile male dummy 

Current test procedure would be retained— 

test configuration would be a 5–25 degree 

configuration and would not change load 

plate configuration 

Current test procedure would be retained— 

test configuration would be a 5–25 degree 

configuration and would not change load 

plate configuration 

Second-side test would use the same angle as 

first side 

Testing would occur with windshields in 

place 

Testing would occur with windshields in 

place 

Agency plans to evaluate whether both sides 

need be tested; agency believes changing 

the test plate angle is not necessary 

Agency completed 26 two-sided platen tests, 

request comments on whether two-sided 

test balances with cost of vehicle design 

changes that would be required if vehicles 

had to pass two-sided test 

Dynamic test would be rejected due to the 

fact the agency is ‘‘unaware of any dynamic 

test procedures that provide a sufficiently 

repeatable test environment’’ 

No mention of dynamic testing 

Agency proposes removal of secondary plate 

positioning 

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1 70 FR 49223, 49248 (August 23, 2005) at 49245–46. 

APPENDIX IV 

Preemption Language from 2005 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

‘‘F. Civil Justice Reform 

This NPRM would not have any retroactive effect. 49 U.S.C. 30161 sets forth a 

procedure for judicial review of final rules establishing, amending, or revoking Federal motor vehicle safety standards. That section does not require submission of a 

petition for reconsideration or other administrative proceedings before parties may 

file suit in court. State action on safety issues within the purview of a Federal agency may be limited or even foreclosed by express language in a congressional enactment, by implication from the depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field, or by implication because of a conflict with a congressional enactment. In this regard, we note that section 30103(b) of 49 U.S.C. provides, ‘‘When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State 

or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard 

applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle 

equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this 

chapter.’’ Thus, all differing state statutes and regulations would be preempted. 

Further, it is our tentative judgment that safety would best be promoted by the 

careful balance we have struck in this proposal among a variety of considerations 

and objectives regarding rollover safety. As discussed above, this proposal is a part 

of a comprehensive plan for reducing the serious risk of rollover crashes and the 

risk of death and serious injury in those crashes. The objective of this proposal is 

to increase the requirement for roof crush resistance only to the extent that it can 

be done without negatively affecting vehicle dynamics and rollover propensity. The 

agency has tentatively concluded that our proposal would not adversely affect vehicle dynamics and cause vehicles to become more prone to rollovers. In contrast, the 

agency believes that either a broad State performance requirement for greater levels 

of roof crush resistance or a narrower requirement mandating that increased roof 

strength be achieved by a particular specified means, would frustrate the agency’s 

objectives by upsetting the balance between efforts to increase roof strength and reduce rollover propensity. 

Increasing current roof crush resistance requirements too much could potentially 

result in added weight to the roof and pillars, thereby increasing the vehicle center 

of gravity (CG) height and rollover propensity. In order to avoid this, we sought to 

strike a careful balance between improving roof crush resistance and potentially 

negative effects of too large an increase upon the vehicle’s rollover propensity. We 

recognize that there is a variety of potential ways to increase roof crush resistance 

beyond the proposed level. However, we believe that any effort to impose either 

more stringent requirements or specific methods of compliance would frustrate our 

balanced approach to preventing rollovers from occurring as well as the deaths and 

injuries that result when rollovers nevertheless occur. First, we believe that requiring a more stringent level of roof crush resistance for all vehicles could increase rollover propensity of many vehicles and thereby create offsetting adverse safety consequences. While the agency is aware of at least several current vehicle models that 

provide greater roof crush resistance than would be required under our proposal, requiring greater levels of roof crush resistance for all vehicles could, depending on 

the methods of construction and materials used, and on other factors, render other 

vehicles more prone to rollovers, thus frustrating the agency’s objectives in this rulemaking. Second, we believe that requiring vehicle manufacturers to improve roof 

crush resistance by a specific method would also frustrate agency goals. The optimum methods for addressing the risks of rollover crashes vary considerably for different vehicles, and requiring specific methods for improving roof crush resistance 

could interfere with the efforts to develop optimal solutions. Moreover, some methods of improving roof crush resistance are costlier than others. The resources diverted to increasing roof strength using one of the costlier methods could delay or 

even prevent vehicle manufacturers from equipping their vehicles with advanced vehicle technologies for reducing rollovers, such as Electronic Stability Control. 

Based on the foregoing, if the proposal were adopted as a final rule, it would preempt all conflicting State common law requirements, including rules of tort law.’’ 1

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APPENDIX V 

Associated Press List of Rulemakings Containing Preemption Language 

FEDERAL REGULATIONS LIMIT CONSUMER LAWSUITS

By The Associated Press—May 13, 2008 

A list by agency of 51 Federal health and safety regulations proposed or adopted 

since 2005 that could make it more difficult for consumers to sue businesses for 

faulty products: 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

2005 

June 22: proposed, designated seating positions and seat belt anchorage. 

Aug. 19: proposed, roof crush strength. 

Sept. 12: proposed, rearview mirror. 

2007 

Feb. 6: adopted, door locks and door retention. 

April 6: adopted, electronic stability control. 

May 4: adopted, head restraints. 

July 12: final, tire pressure monitoring. 

July 24: adopted, test procedures for installing child restraints to a child restraint anchorage system. 

Sept. 5: adopted, occupant head protection in interior impact. 

Sept. 11: adopted, side impact. 

Sept. 25: proposed, occupant crash protection. 

Oct. 9: proposed, electric-powered vehicles. 

Oct. 9: proposed, brake hoses. 

Nov. 2: adopted, occupant crash protection, fuel system integrity. 

Nov. 21: proposed, school bus passenger seating. 

Dec. 4: adopted, cargo carrying capacity. 

Dec. 4: adopted, lamps, reflective devices. 

Dec. 20: proposed, platform lifts for motor vehicles. 

2008 

Jan. 23: supplemental proposed, child restraint systems. 

April 30: adopted, changes in vehicle identification number requirements. 

Consumer Product Safety Commission 

2006 

March 15: adopted, mattress flammability standards. 

Federal Railroad Administration 

2006 

Oct. 11: adopted, continuous welded rail. 

Oct. 12: proposed, railroad operating standards. 

Oct. 27: adopted, occupational noise exposure. 

2007 

Aug. 1: proposed, passenger equipment safety standards. 

Sept. 4: proposed, electronically controlled pneumatic brake systems. 

Federal Railroad Administration/Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

2008 

April 1: proposed, improving safety of railroad tank cars. 

April 16: interim, enhancing rail transportation safety. 

Food and Drug Administration 

Drug regulation: 

2006 

Jan. 24: adopted, prescription drug labeling. 

Aug. 1: adopted, over-the-counter allergy medicine. 

Aug. 29: proposed, skin bleaching drug products. 

Dec. 12: proposed, over-the-counter drug labeling. 

Dec. 26: proposed, over-the-counter analgesics. 

2007 

March 6: adopted, over-the-counter dandruff products. 

92 

March 29: adopted, over-the-counter laxatives. 

Aug. 27: proposed, sunscreen labels. 

Dec. 19: adopted, over-the-counter contraceptives. 

2008 

Feb. 1: adopted, lip protectant over-the-counter drug products. 

Jan. 16: proposed, labeling changes for approved drugs, biologics and medical devices. 

Food regulation: 

2006 

March 29: adopted, dietary sweeteners. 

May 22: adopted, soluble fiber. 

July 25: adopted, raw fruits and vegetables. 

Dec. 13: adopted, dietary supplements. 

2007 

Jan. 5: proposed, calcium content claims. 

Jan. 12: adopted, lean meat claims. 

Feb. 6: proposed, soluble fiber, expand the use of health claims. 

Sept. 17: interim, dietary sweeteners, adds a noncarcinogenic sugar. 

Nov. 27: proposed, fatty acids. 

2008 

Feb. 25: interim, soluble fiber, additions to list of eligible sources. 

Department of Homeland Security 

2006 

Dec. 21: proposed, rail transportation security. 

2007 

April 9: interim, chemical facilities. 

APPENDIX VI 

SAFETY BRIEFING ON ROOF CRUSH


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HOW A STRONG FEDERAL ROOF CRUSH STANDARD CAN SAVE MANY LIVES AND WHY

THE TEST MUST INCLUDE BOTH SIDES OF THE ROOF

Public Citizen www.citizen.org 

The Importance of Far Side Safety in Rollover Crashes 

The current National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) static test 

applies a platen on only one side of the vehicle. 

Yet a NHTSA study from July 2004 (Roof Crush Analysis Using 1997–2001 NASS 

Case Review) stated ‘‘[g]enerally, it was found that roof deformation was most severe on the side of the vehicle opposite the side that makes first contact with the 

ground.’’ 

Of the 6,000 to 7,000 of people seriously injured or killed by roof crush every year, 

NHTSA officials have said that only a small number of lives (between 50 and several hundred) would be saved by the new standard. 

A slight upgrade of the one-sided test would, in fact, be very ineffective in saving 

lives. 

The Problem of Far Side Impacts: 

In rollovers the roof is mainly crushed and people are seriously injured on the 

far side, opposite to the direction of roll (or near side). 

Far Side Occupants at Much Higher Risk from Roof Crush than Near Side 


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The second, far side impact in a rollover crash is different from the first impact 

in a number of ways. It has a different and more severe pitch angle and greater 

roll angle. The strength provided by the windshield and its bonding is gone after 

the first impact when both break, meaning that the roof is substantially weakened 

when the second or far side impact occurs. 

For this reason, a one-sided test fails to diagnose a major cause of injury to occupants in rollovers, and far side roof strength is far more important than near side. 

While near side tests pass vehicles that can support 11⁄2 times the vehicle’s weight 

in a static test, on the far side in a sequential test, many vehicle roofs cannot actually 

support even the weight of the vehicle. This is the reason for roof collapse in actual 

rollover crashes. 

In addition, a strong roof prevents breakage of the glass. Dynamic testing confirms that if the roof crushes less than 4 inches, the side window glazing is generally preserved, limiting ejection. In images of a Volvo XC90 in a multiple roll dynamic test available on the Public Citizen Website (www.citizen.org), the windows 

remain totally intact, even after multiple rolls. 

A one-sided test would not measure the roof crush on the far side in the images 

below: 

The Importance of A-Pillar Strength in Rollover Crashes 

The current National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) static test 

applies a large platen on only one side of the vehicle’s roof at a pitch angle of 5°, 


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and a roll angle of 25°. The roof must be strong enough that with a force of 1.5 times 

the vehicle’s weight pushing on it, it does not crush more than 5 inches. The 1.5 

times figure is called the Strength-to-Weight Ratio, or SWR. 

Based on agency officials’ statements and reports it appears NHTSA is planning 

a minimal change to the standard, increasing the Strength-to-Weight-Ratio (SWR) to 

about 2.5 and permitting the roof to crush until it contacts a dummy’s head. The 

pitch angle and roll angle would not change, and the test would also still be performed on only one side of the roof. 

NHTSA officials have said that only a small number of lives—50—would be saved 

by the new standard, although roof crush in rollover kills 6,000 to 7,000 people a 

year, and 27,000 people annually are killed or seriously injured in rollover crashes. 

This type of NHTSA rule would save few lives, in part because data show the average roof strength of on-road vehicles is already 2.3 SWR, and that many, if not most, 

vehicles now made can meet the anticipated NHTSA proposal. NHTSA tests in 2003 

of recent models found that 8 of 10 vehicles would pass the anticipated new standard. 

A major reason for the low benefits is that NHTSA’s test conditions permit a very 

weak A-pillar (beside the windshield). In addition to testing only the near side of 

the vehicle, the NHTSA test is unrealistic when compared to actual rollovers for three 

critical reasons: 

1. It uses the wrong pitch angle—5°. SUVs and pickups are significantly frontheavy and typically pitch forward during a rollover crash at an angle of 10° or 

even more—not 5°. In the test, the low pitch angle for the platen allows the 

B-pillar (beside the dummy’s shoulder) to take up the load, whereas in an actual rollover the force is concentrated on the more forward A-pillar that holds 

the windshield. 


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2. The dummy’s head position is unrealistic—In the NHTSA test, the test dummy’s head is positioned straight up, where as in actual rollover crashes the occupant’s head is tossed forward—essentially in-line with the collapsing A-pillar 

section of the roof. 

3. The test does not measure the speed of the roof’s intrusion—When a weak Apillar buckles, it collapses into occupant survival space at a speed that inflicts 

injury. 

A weak A-pillar also allows side window glass to break, allowing occupants’ bodies, head and arms to be ejected through the side openings, with devastating results. 

Due to all these factors, the NHTSA test is very poor at predicting the performance 

of vehicles in real world rollover crashes. A dynamic test which simulates actual rollovers is needed. 

Roof Strength is Critical to Ejection Risk in Rollovers 

Ejection is the most dangerous possibility for an occupant caught in a rollover 

crash. Between 1992 and 2002, two-thirds of people killed in rollovers were partially 

or fully ejected, and 20 percent of these were belted. There is no existing standard 


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for belt performance in rollovers. The total number of people seriously injured or 

killed in rollover crashes in a single year is 27,000. 

NHTSA ignores roof-strength/ejection link. NHTSA’s roof crush analysis excludes 

ejection risks. Yet NHTSA data shows 45 percent of partially or fully ejected occupants contacted the inside of vehicle, including the roof, prior to ejection. 

Roof strength is critical to ejection risk in a rollover: When a weak roof collapses, 

the supporting pillars deform, warping and shattering the windshield and side windows and unlatching the doors. This opens many potential portals through which 

occupants can be ejected. 

Centrifugal forces exacerbate risk: The centrifugal forces of the rolling violently 

pull occupants outside of the vehicle, and without pretensioners, belts are too slack 

to hold occupants in place. 

Industry documents prove ejection-roof strength relationship: In 1982, General Motors began a study of rollover occupant ejection and roof strength. GM engineer Ivar 

Arums found that the roof lost about one-third of its strength when the bonded 

windshield broke. Arums estimated a 23 percent reduction in ejections with tempered glass and a stronger roof. However, GM failed to tell NHTSA about these results. 


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Dynamic tests show the adequate roof strength prevents window breakage: Testing 

with the use of the dynamic rollover testing device the Jordan Rollover System 

(JRS) indicates that if the roof does not distort more than 3 or 4 inches, the rollover 

will not break the windows, and occupants cannot be ejected. 

Summary: Roof Strength is Backbone of Rollover Safety, Dynamic Tests 

Needed to Reflect Actual Rollover Risks 

Far Side Occupant Risks Ignored by NHTSA: In rollover crashes, the roof is mainly crushed and people are seriously injured on the far side. This impact occurs at 

a more severe pitch and roll angle, after the roof has been substantially weakened 

by windshield breakage from the first impact. NHTSA’s current static test is a onesided test, and fails to measure roof crush or occupant risk on the far side. 

Weak A-Pillars Ignored by NHTSA: NHTSA’s test conditions permit a very weak 

A-pillar (the pillars beside the windshield). SUVs and pickups are significantly 

front-heavy and typically pitch forward during a rollover crash at an angle of 10° 

or even more—not 5°, as in the NHTSA test. The low pitch angle in the test allows 

the B-pillar (behind the dummy’s shoulder) to take up the load, whereas in an actual rollover the blow is concentrated on the A-pillar. Also, in NHTSA’s test the test 

dummy’s head position is unrealistic, positioned straight up instead of tossed forward as it would be in an actual rollover crash. Finally, NHTSA’s static test ignores 

the speed of the A-pillar collapse, which is up to 22 mph—fast enough to injure or 

kill an occupant. 

Ejection/Roof Strength Relationship Ignored by NHTSA: A vehicle’s roof strength 

is closely tied to the risk of ejection during a rollover. If the roof is too weak, the 

supporting pillars deform and collapse when the vehicle’s roof strikes the ground in 

a rollover, warping and shattering the windshield and side windows and unlatching 

the doors. This opens many potential portals through which occupants can be ejected. 

An effective roof strength test would prevent thousands of deaths and serious injuries. A standard that limits crush to about 4 inches in a dynamic test, such as the 

dolly rollover which is currently an optional test part of Federal Motor Vehicles 

Safety Standard 208, would reduce ejections at least 50 percent—preventing at least 

6,500 deaths and serious injuries, or 125 per week. Roof intrusion injury would also 

be greatly reduced, preventing another 100 deaths and serious injuries each week 

and bringing the total number to 10,000 each year. In order to minimize rollover 

deaths, a vehicle needs a stronger roof, in addition to advanced window glazing and 

rollover-sensitive belt and airbag systems—as is featured on Volvo’s XC90 SUV. 

NHTSA should make the now-voluntary FMVSS 208 dolly rollover test mandatory. 

And at a minimum, a two-sided test with greater pitch and roll angles should be 

required by the agency, and verified with dynamic testing. 

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APPENDIX VII 

CENTER FOR INJURY RESEARCH

Goleta, CA, June 1, 2008 

Hon. MARK PRYOR, 

Chairman, 

Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety, 

Washington, DC. 

RE: OVERSIGHT HEARING ON PASSENGER VEHICLE ROOF STRENGTH

Dear Chairman Pryor: 

The probability of serious to fatal injury in a motor vehicle rollover is a strong 

function of roof crush. If all vehicles in the fleet had an FMVSS 216 SWR of 

3.5 or greater, the number of incapacitating and fatal injuries to occupants in 

rollovers could be cut in half. 

We have a high degree of confidence in this conclusion based on the mutually consistent research and testing from three independent public, non-profit organizations 

(the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Center for Injury Research and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety) using three different methodologies and data sets. Their specific results are: 

• NHTSA found that the probability of serious to fatal injury in rollovers on public roads is five times as high when residual roof crush goes beyond nominal 

head room (i.e., is greater than 4 to 5 inches) in actual rollovers. 

• CfIR found that there is a reasonable correlation between residual roof crush 

in the dynamic Jordan Rollover System (JRS) test and a vehicle’s roof strengthto-weight ratio (SWR) in the government’s test. We have also found that roofs 

with less residual crush also had lower peak roof intrusion speeds and that 

when appropriately instrumented and oriented dummies were used in such 

tests, they showed lower head and neck injury measures. As discussed later, we 

also found that the probability of side window failure (and therefore ejection) 

was a function of the degree of residual roof crush (and therefore a function of 

SWR). 

• IIHS found a statistically significant correlation between the FMVSS 216 

strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) and the risk of incapacitating and fatal injury 

in actual rollovers of mid-sized SUVs. Their analysis showed that an increase 

in the SWR standard from 1.5 to 2.5 would reduce the risk by 28 percent for 

these vehicles. If that relationship holds more broadly, increasing the strength 

to 3.5 would reduce the risk of such injuries by more than half. 

It is interesting that although IIHS studied all rollovers of only a specific class 

of vehicles, and we tested a wide range of vehicles primarily for their ability to reduce head and neck injuries as well as ejections, the reduction in casualties in the 

IIHS study and the reduction in roof crush in our testing, per unit of SWR increase, 

was proportional. 

These findings should be tempered by the fact that the current FMVSS 216 quasistatic test of roof crush resistance has serious limitations as a measure of rollover 

occupant protection. The FMVSS 216 test stresses a roof only in a specific direction; 

it stresses only one side of the roof, and does not apply forces with the dynamic 

shock of an actual roof impact in a rollover. Furthermore, this test invites manufacturers to design vehicles that can pass the test rather than vehicles that protect occupants. 

NHTSA has traditionally preferred dynamic testing with dummies for frontal and 

side impact regulatory and consumer information testing. This philosophy should 

carry over to rollover testing. Such testing can provide substantially enhanced data 

on all aspects of rollover performance and permit development of more efficient designs for rollover occupant protection. 

For these reasons, JRS tests or some equivalent dynamic tests should be used 

by NHTSA and automakers to evaluate rollover occupant protection performance. 

More than 250,000 rollovers in the United States each year result in more than 

10,000 fatalities and 20,000 serious injuries. Motor vehicle crashes are a leading 

cause of death to young people. The fatality rate in rollovers is six times that of 

police-reported frontal and side impacts and they inflict quadriplegia or serious, permanent head injuries on more than 6,000 of our fellow citizens. 

107 

Occupant protection in passenger car, light truck and van rollovers remains the 

most critical unsolved problem in motor vehicle safety. This submission for the hearing record is intended to provide your committee with information and perspective 

that will assist in its further formulation of Federal motor vehicle safety policy. 

One of us (Nash) has shown, using National Accident Sampling System data, that 

between two-thirds and three-quarters of all rollovers do not involve significant complicating factors such as major collisions, so that the life savings from stronger roofs 

would be roughly 3,500 people each year, and serious injury savings would be as 

many as twice that number. This conclusion applies to all rollover injuries to the 

current population of belted, unbelted and ejected occupants. 

It must be emphasized that the IIHS studies found a correlation between roof 

strength and lower rates of all types of injury to occupants regardless of restraint 

status and ejection. NHTSA and CfIR found that higher roof strength reduces the 

potential for direct head and neck injury from roof intrusion, and CfIR found that 

the potential for side window failure which provides an avenue for ejection (which 

itself is correlated with higher injury rates) is also a direct function of roof crush. 

The Nature of Rollover Injury 

In the late 1960s NHTSA recognized that the two critical mechanisms of rollover 

occupant injury are direct injury from roof intrusion and the increased potential for 

injury to partially or completely ejected occupants. The auto racing industry successfully addressed these issues for rollovers that are much more violent than typical 

public road rollovers by providing strong roll cages, highly effective occupant restraints, and driver head protection padding with helmets. This demonstrates that 

the human body can sustain the basic forces of a rollover if it is properly protected. 

The same principles of occupant protection can be afforded the public using protective features that are low in cost and that do not restrict an occupant any more than 

a conventional safety belt. 

Occupant ejection can be controlled by ensuring the integrity of the occupant compartment: in particular by reducing side window breakage. Although safety belt use 

is important, even an unrestrained occupant cannot be ejected unless there is a 

major opening such as a broken window in the occupant compartment. 

Rollovers are a sequence of low energy impacts easily tolerated by the human 

body in an occupant compartment that resists crush, contains its occupants, and 

is appropriately padded. 

The Biomechanics of Rollover Injury 

There is no specific biomechanics issue concerning injury to ejected occupants. 

Once ejected, an occupant is subject to uncontrolled impacts with the ground and 

other external objects, or to being crushed by the vehicle itself. Virtually all experts 

in the field agree that good occupant restraint can reduce complete ejection, but partial ejection to belted occupants can result if side windows fail and particularly if 

the weak roof of a vehicle moves so that the resulting envelope of the vehicle no 

longer protects an occupant’s head. 

If an occupant is unrestrained but not ejected, he or she may tumble about the 

interior of the vehicle, but injuries are inflicted only if the occupant encounters hard 

or sharp objects in the interior of the vehicle. Again, there are no specific biomechanics issues, and experts generally agree that injury to occupants can be reduced by good restraints that are used. 

The critical biomechanics issue arises when considering direct head or neck injuries to a restrained occupant from an intruding roof component. There is a significant body of biomechanical data from tests using human cadavers that show not 

only the mechanisms of neck injury from forces typical of rollovers, but the injury 

tolerance of humans. These data show that a typical injury mechanism is from a 

force on the head that results in a combination of compression loading of the neck 

and flexion (forward bending) of the neck. This type of injury is observed all too 

often in restrained vehicle occupants in rollovers who are seated under a part of the 

roof that has crushed extensively. The evidence from biomechanics research also 

shows that the speed of a head impact (such as by an intruding vehicle roof) is at 

least as important as the extent of roof crush. 

Achieving a dynamic rollover test using anthropometric test dummies has been 

hampered by the fact that the neck of the existing dummy that is in common use— 

the Hybrid III—has poor biofidelity. Nevertheless, existing biomechanics research 

provides a basis for establishing neck injury criteria, and our recent work using 

dummies in the JRS shows how the Hybrid III can be used to better measure the 

potential for real world neck injury in dynamic tests. 

108 

Our JRS test protocol overcomes the lack of biofidelity of the Hybrid III dummy 

and shows a clear relationship between the speed and extent of roof crush and 

human head and neck injury. 

Testing for Rollover Occupant Protection 

It is clear that we can test a vehicle roof’s resistance to crush and the speed of 

roof intrusion under various conditions. The test used in FMVSS 216 is an oversimplified version of such a test, and there are various dynamic tests that provide a 

much more realistic measure of roof performance in a rollover. 

Virtually all experts in this field agree that dynamic tests have the potential to 

provide a better indication of a vehicle’s rollover performance than the quasi-static 

test specified in FMVSS 216. The forces on a roof during a rollover vary substantially in both magnitude and direction during a rollover, and only a dynamic test 

can emulate those forces. The gold standard for automotive crash testing is dynamic 

testing using anthropometric test dummies to measure the potential for injury. 

Quasi-static tests cannot provide direct information on the potential for human 

injury in a rollover, nor can they be used to evaluate the performance of designs 

and features other than roof strength that affect rollover occupant protection. The 

mechanism of injury and the protection of occupants in rollover can only be studied 

with repeatable, dynamic rollover tests. Instrumented anthropometric test dummies 

that have a high degree of biofidelity, and injury criteria that have been derived 

from biomechanics research can provide more definitive indications of the rollover 

occupant injury potential. 

Although NHTSA has been generally committed to dynamic testing for crashworthiness and occupant crash protection since 1970 in all crash modes, it took decades to implement such testing for frontal and side impact crashes. The agency has 

yet to seriously consider dynamic testing for its rollover occupant protection regulations. It has said that it would take too long to develop a rollover occupant protection standard based on dynamic testing. 

In 1970, NHTSA specified a dynamic test, the dolly rollover test specified in 

FMVSS 208, to measure the potential for occupant ejection in a rollover. The first 

major dynamic test program—dolly rollover tests using instrumented Hybrid III 

dummies to measure the potential for occupant injury—was General Motors’ Malibu 

tests, conducted in 1983 (Malibu I with unrestrained dummies) and 1987 (Malibu 

II with restrained dummies). Half of the vehicles in these tests had roll cages emulating strong roofs and half were unmodified production vehicles. 

In the early part of this decade Ford Motor Company sponsored the development 

of the Controlled Rollover Impact System (CRIS), a complex dynamic test of vehicle 

response to the forces of a rollover. We have developed a simpler, less expensive, 

better controlled and highly repeatable dynamic test called the Jordan Rollover System (JRS). 

The primary debates concerning dynamic testing concern test protocols and conditions, how a dummy is used to measure the potential for injury, and the interpretation of such measures. 

The industry has primarily relied on the Malibu tests to support its claims that 

occupant injury is not related to roof crush. We and others disagree based on analysis of the data and film from the same Malibu tests that has been grudgingly released in bits and pieces over the past decade. We have attached video from these 

tests, rendered to show what happens to the dummies in an inertial frame of reference (that is, with the horizon held steady). This film shows the relatively benign 

ride of the dummy in the Malibu with a strong roof (roll cage) while roof crush in 

the production Malibu produces devastating distortion of the dummy occupant’s 

neck. In four cases, instrumentation on the restrained dummies demonstrated that 

the forces on the neck were sufficient to severely injure a human under the same 

conditions. 

CRIS has been used to support Ford and General Motors defense positions in 

product liability cases rather than for the development of improved rollover occupant protection. Tests using this system have been designed to ensure that dummies 

in the test vehicles show high neck loads typical of diving injuries regardless of roof 

performance. 

We have used the Jordan Rollover System to conduct dynamic tests, some with 

Hybrid III dummies, to better understand the mechanism of occupant injury and to 

determine how anthropometric dummies can be used to more accurately indicate the 

potential for neck injury in a rollover. 

CfIR has demonstrated the value of the JRS as a dynamic test of rollover occupant protection and that it meets all of NHTSA’s stated requirements for use in regulations and consumer information programs: reliability, repeatability, ability to 

predict injury and to replicate real world injury patterns. Despite this, except for 

109 

tentative oral expressions of appreciation of the JRS, NHTSA has not acknowledged 

our submissions, requested more data, nor formally accepted or rejected the JRS as 

either a research tool or test instrument. 

The agency never definitively responded to a 2005 proposal to conduct JRS research tests at nominal cost nor to a 2007 proposal to join us in defining the JRS 

test protocol for testing current production vehicles that had been tested as part of 

NHTSA’s roof crush resistance program. With a major grant from the Santos Family 

Foundation through the Center for Auto Safety, we are currently conducting a series 

of JRS tests of the same contemporary vehicles tested by NHTSA. The vehicles have 

been contributed by the State Farm Insurance Company. 

NHTSA should have a comprehensive rollover occupant protection program, using 

dynamic testing that covers the two primary causes of injury: direct injury from roof 

intrusion and ejection. Yet it has been unwilling to seriously consider a rollover 

standard based on dynamic testing, and seems determined to propose only a modest 

upgrade of its current standard based on a quasi-static roof crush resistance test. 

Although we have demonstrated that the Jordan Rollover System dynamic test 

meets all of the criteria NHTSA has set forth, the agency has refused to acknowledge that a legitimate dynamic test of rollover occupant protection exists that 

could be the basis for its rulemaking. NHTSA remains stubbornly committed to 

static testing with arbitrary SWR criteria and will not even acknowledge that 

the body of JRS dynamic rollover test results demonstrate that the minimum 

quasi-static SWR criteria should be significantly higher than 2.5 or that a dynamic rollover test can substantially more accurately evaluate roof crush and 

predict injury potential. 

Jordan Rollover System Test Results 

CfIR’s dynamic research with the Jordan Rollover System (JRS) demonstrates 

that serious injury in a rollover results from rapid, irregular roof intrusion into the 

head of an occupant where that intrusion imposes both compression and flexion 

forces on the occupant’s neck. Such forces result from roof intrusion of more than 

about 4 inches into the occupant survival space at a rate of more than 10 feet/second 

(7 mph). A static roof crush test cannot predict the severity or type of injury. 

Figure 1 shows the residual roof crush from JRS testing as a function of FMVSS 

216 SWR of vehicles including those identified as common to NHTSA’s and IIHS’s 

static tests and analyses. The red line represents the results of two roll JRS dynamic tests. 

Figure 1 & 2: Residual roof crush post JRS tests of vehicles versus SWR (left) and 

IIHS Injury rate (right) of mid size SUVs versus SWR. 

Figures 1 and 2 above, illustrate the coordination between the research of rollover 

roof crush from JRS testing and IIHS’s statistical injury rate (using incapacitating 

injuries and fatalities to belted, unbelted and ejected drivers) of mid size SUVs 

versus SWR. 

The combined results of NHTSA, CfIR and IIHS data indicates that the current 

fleet of vehicles which has an average SWR of around two represents a 10 percent risk of incapacitating injury and death (as also identified by NHTSA crash 

data) and that a future fleet of vehicles averaging an SWR of 4 would represent 

a 5 percent risk. 

Our most recent JRS test program involving contemporary vehicles with dummies 

included a Jeep Grand Cherokee (SWR = 1.8), a Chrysler 300 (SWR = 2.5), a 

Hyundai Sonata (SWR = 3.2), a Toyota Camry (SWR = 4.3), and a VW Jetta (SWR 

= 5.2). The video tapes of these tests are attached to this submission in a DVD forVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE

604cfir1.eps
110 

mat disk. They show the progressively milder stress to the dummy neck in the vehicles with stronger roofs. 

As an example, we tested a 2006 Hyundai Sonata with an SWR of 3.2 which is 

25 percent higher than what has been proposed by NHTSA. We used a Hybrid III 

dummy equipped with both upper and lower neck sensors and a lateral high speed 

camera to observe neck compression and flexion, with the dummy neck in a realistic 

orientation. Figure 3 shows the Sonata in the JRS fixture before the test and Figure 

4 shows it inverted with the initially trailing (far) side roof at maximum crush. 

Figure 5 shows a rear view of the occupant inside the Sonata before the test and 

Figure 6 shows the dummy when the vehicle is inverted at the time of maximum 

roof crush. The compression/flexion forces at this impact would be sufficient to cause 

a serious cervical spine injury to a human under the same circumstances. 


604cfir2.eps
111 

Figure 7 shows a sequence of side views of the dummy as the roof crushes into 

the occupant survival space in this test. 

Figure 7: Side view of the head impact in a sequence of 8 millisecond frames during which the neck is subject to severe compression/flexion forces from roof intrusion. 

A dynamic test provides detailed injury measures and the ability to assess real 

world human injury as a function not only of roof strength but of vehicle geometry and protective features such as padding, pretensioning of belts and activation of window curtain air bags. 

Ejection and Roof Crush 

An occupant can be ejected only if there is an avenue through which he or she 

can leave the occupant compartment. A restrained occupant is unlikely to be fully 

ejected unless there is a serious failure of the belt system. A restrained occupant 

can be partially ejected if a side window or sun roof is broken, and particularly if 

the roof collapses in such a manner that the envelope of the occupant compartment 

no longer contains the occupant’s head. Nearly half of all rollover fatalities and serious injuries result from partial or complete ejection. We have observed that vehicle 

windows are unlikely to break if the roof structure over them is not significantly 

distorted. In the Malibu tests, a substantially higher proportion of side windows 

broke in the production vehicles than in the vehicles with roll cages emulating a 

strong roof. 

In the JRS tests that have been conducted, we have also observed a correlation 

between window failures and lower vehicle strength to weight ratios. Figure 8 shows 

the JRS data (left axis) and data on ejections from the IIHS study of mid-sized 

SUVs (right axis). 


604cfir3.eps
112 

Figure 8: Data on window breakage in JRS tests shown with ejection data from 

the IIHS study of accident data on mid-sized SUVs. 

These data confirm the fact that a dynamic test can provide a more reliable, 

comprehensive picture of a vehicle’s rollover occupant protection capability. Vehicle geometry also has a significant effect on the dynamics of a rollover. The performance of safety belts, padding, seats and windows under rollover conditions 

cannot be assessed with a static test. 

Current Rulemaking: The January 2008 SNPRM 

Both NHTSA and IIHS have analyzed crash data to demonstrate an obvious correlation between roof strength as measured in the FMVSS 216 test: a higher SWR 

will generally reduce rollover injuries. That relationship, while definitive, does not 

address the question of how greater roof strength reduces injury. The JRS can show 

specifically how injuries result from poor roof performance and the degree to which 

a strong roof can control ejection. 

The current roof crush standard, established in 1971, specifies that a large platen 

be slowly pressed into a front corner of the roof at a shallow angle. In the test, the 

resistance force must exceed 1.5 times the vehicle weight before it reaches a depth 

of 5 inches (the limit before the ‘‘non-encroachment zone’’ or ‘‘occupant survival 

space’’ is violated). 

In its 2005 proposal, NHTSA presented a highly flawed analysis as the basis for 

its proposed roof crush resistance standard. The proposal was that the minimum resistance force be raised to 2.5 times a vehicle’s weight, that non-encroachment zone 

be defined according to interior headroom, and that the standard be expanded to 

cover heavier vehicles. It did not update its analysis in its 2008 SNPRM, with the 

only substantive change in its proposal being the possibility of sequentially testing 

both sides of the roof. It has ignored or misinterpreted its own research and has 

paid only perfunctory attention to data submitted to the rulemaking docket. 

A major problem with the simple quasi-static test is that manufacturers are inclined to design vehicles to meet the standard, not necessarily to protect occupants. 

Many anomalies in design cannot be detected in a static test. As an example, several Toyota models have SWR in excess of 4, but reviews of detailed rollover investigations of Toyota rollovers shows that these vehicles have very weak windshield 

headers that often buckle in actual rollovers. We have observed this problem in our 

JRS testing, but it did not show up in FMVSS 216 testing. 

Occupant compartment design affects occupant safety in all crash modes. Some 

manufacturers have indicated that they added strength to the roof areas of their vehicles in order to improve frontal or side impact performance. Figure 9 shows a correlation between side impact performance and roof crush resistance in the FMVSS 

216 test. 


604cfir4.eps
113 

NHTSA has asked for cost data for SWR 3 and 3.5. Government and industry cal- culations and estimates have ranged from 20 to 200 pounds and from $50 to $270 

per vehicle. In fact, industry cost estimates have historically been substantially 

higher than the actual costs incurred in implementing standards. Furthermore, the 

cost of improved roof crush performance should be shared with the benefit of achieving better frontal and side impact performance. It is also the case that the economic 

losses from rollovers, as estimated using NHTSA’s own economic cost of vehicle 

crashes, is thousands of dollars per vehicle, so that even modestly effective improvements can be easily justified on an economic basis. 

The agency has mostly wasted the last 7 years since its request for information 

concerning the upgrading of rollover occupant protection. This should not be considered an excuse for a slapdash rule as has been proposed that will have only a marginal impact on rollover casualties. The Congress must oversee and direct this agency to take appropriate steps to promulgate rollover occupant protection standards 

that truly meet the need for motor vehicle safety using the best available data and 

scientific and technological developments in biomechanics, vehicle design, and testing. 

Figure 9: Side impact star rating versus SWR. 

CfIR research has demonstrated that it has a dynamic test device and protocol 

that provides a better and more specific indication of actual rollover occupant protection performance. We have demonstrated why dynamic testing will facilitate the 

design of vehicles that provide protection more efficiently: at lower additional cost 

and weight; and that the improvement of rollover occupant protection is highly costbeneficial. This conclusion will continue to hold even when all light vehicles are 

equipped with electronic stability controls that reduce (but do not eliminate) rollovers. 

NHTSA needs the direction and support of the Congress in setting research priorities and the most effective and efficient standards in this area. We look forward 

to your leadership to ensure that the tragedy of rollover injuries and fatalities can 

be sharply curtailed by improved vehicle safety performance. 

Increased roof strength per se is not likely to cost very much (in weight and dollars) in light of the vehicle improvements necessary to do well in dynamic testing 

for injury reduction in offset frontal and side impact crashes. 

What is CfIR? 

Since the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) opened its 

current roof crush resistance rulemaking in 2001, the Center for Injury Research 

(CfIR) has been in the forefront of rollover occupant protection research and testing, 

and has been a major participant in NHTSA’s rulemaking. CfIR is a non-profit organization founded by a former General Motors executive and a retired NHTSA Senior 

Executive. 


604cfir5.eps
114 

In response to NHTSA’s 2001 request for data, CfIR has submitted 34 comments 

consisting of data from more than 50 quasi-static tests and nearly 100 dynamic rollover tests. We have also provided extensive analysis and interpretation of government and industry roof crush tests, rollover accident data, and the biomechanical 

potential for occupant injury in rollovers. 

Should the Committee staff need more information or clarification, we plan to attend the hearing and will be available in Washington on Monday and Tuesday June 

2 and 3. 

Sincerely, 

DONALD FRIEDMAN

CARL E. NASH, PH.D. 

DVD video Disk Attachments: 

Malibu II Test 3—Production 

Malibu II Test 2—Rollcaged 

JRS Jeep Grand Cherokee (SWR = 1.8) 

JRS Chrysler 300 (SWR = 2.5) 

JRS Hyundai Sonata (SWR= 3.2) 

JRS Toyota Camry (SWR = 4.3) 

JRS VW Jetta (SWR= 5.2) 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Let’s go ahead and proceed to Mr. Stanton. 

And, like I said, maybe after Mr. Stanton and Ms. Gillan testify, 

maybe we’ll have the video clip working. 

Mr. Stanton, go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. STANTON, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE 

MANUFACTURERS, INC. 

Mr. STANTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m Mike Stanton. I’m with the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers. And thank you for the opportunity to be 

here today. 

In 2005, Congress directed NHTSA to address rollover crashes 

and related safety concerns through rulemaking to mandate the installation of electronic stability control systems, reduce occupant 

ejection, improve door lock performance, require the installation of 

side impact protection airbags, increase safety belt use, and improve roof strength, while also enhancing NHTSA’s consumer information program through vehicle labeling. 

NHTSA is well along in implementing these measures. In addition to the roof-strength final rule that we anticipate to be issued 

soon, NHTSA has already issued a final rule for ESC, has upgraded its side impact rule, and has issued a final rule to upgrade 

existing door lock and door retention regulations to help prevent 

occupant ejections. It is our understanding that the agency plans 

to propose new occupant retention requirements later this year. 

Regarding the NHTSA roof-strength rulemaking, AIAM has provided comments in response to the agency’s Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking and also the supplemental notice. Our primary concern is that the agency provides adequate lead time for manufacturers to comply with the new roof crush requirements. Although 

we cannot yet fully quantify the impact of the agency’s recently 

proposed two-sided test on current and future vehicles, as a general 

matter manufacturers would need to redesign the roof structure 

and all related components to comply with the new test requirements. 

115 

The SNPRM references a study indicating that weight increases 

may be avoided if sufficient time is provided in the final rule to 

allow for the necessary design and weight modifications to be incorporated at the time of full or major model changes. Changes implemented under these circumstances or other circumstances would 

tend to involve the addition of weight, which conflicts with 

NHTSA’s new CAFE greenhouse gas standards. 

If roof-related changes can be implemented at the time of full 

model change, high-strength materials and more sophisticated 

structures may be used to achieve a more favorable overall result. 

Therefore, we strongly urge the agency to provide sufficient lead 

time so that modifications to roof structure and related components 

may be implemented at the same time as major model changes. 

Since many major changes are on a 5- or 6-year cycle, we suggested, depending upon the requirements in the final rule, 3-year 

lead time and at least a 3-year phase-in period. Provisions for earning—early credits would also be appreciated. 

In our comments on the SNPRM, we also noted the agency has 

proposed a number of significant changes from the 2005 proposal. 

Among these is the adoption of a two-sided test, but an updated 

cost-benefit analysis with the new changes is not yet available. 

Among the factors that we noted that are critical to the selection 

of optional test requirements in the final rule are, first, the need 

to consider actual maximum weight capacity of vehicle designs; 

two, incorporation of the safety benefits of ESC and side-curtain 

airbags; three, adjustments to a more realistic fuel price; four, a 

more definitive determination of the frequency of multiple roof contact crashes for various vehicle classes, and the safety significance 

of these crashes; and, finally, number five, consideration of compliance lead time in relation to vehicle design cycles. 

The potential use of a new test device to measure head contact 

intrusion also presents a degree of uncertainty regarding the 

achievement of an optimal tradeoff between costs and benefits. 

Therefore, we requested that the agency provide an opportunity for 

comment on a full cost-benefit analysis reflecting the elements of 

the final rule. We cannot provide a detailed assessment of the roofstrength performance requirements until we have had the opportunity to review such an updated analysis, and this is consistent 

with what was being said earlier, it’s more important to get it right 

than it is to get it done in the next 30 days. 

Our comments also provided suggestions related to the proposed 

tests in order to improve the repeatability of the test results. Repeatability of compliance test results is critical so that manufacturers can be reasonably assured that their vehicles will meet the new 

standards when tested by the government. In particular, with regard to the test repeatability, we would oppose the required use of 

a dynamic test for assessing roof strength. We have seen no indication that such a test could be made repeatable to meet legal requirements, nor have we seen any indication that such a test would 

provide safety benefits beyond those of the tests that the agency 

has proposed. 

Thank you, sir. This concludes my testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stanton follows:] 

116 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. STANTON, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, INC. 

Good Morning. My name is Michael Stanton, and I am President and CEO of the 

Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, or AIAM. AIAM represents 

14 international motor vehicle manufacturers who account for 33 percent of all light 

duty motor vehicles produced in the United States. Fifty-five percent of all vehicles 

sold in America by AIAM members are produced in the United States. Nationwide, 

AIAM member companies have invested $39.3 billion in U.S.-based production facilities, have a combined domestic production capacity of 4.1 million vehicles, directly 

employ 92,700 Americans, and generate almost 600,000 U.S. jobs in dealerships and 

suppliers nationwide. AIAM appreciates the opportunity to present its views to the 

Subcommittee on the important matters of vehicle rollover crashes and enhanced 

roof strength. 

To summarize our position, AIAM supports Congress’ direction to NHTSA to issue 

upgraded roof strength requirements as part of a comprehensive strategy to address 

vehicle rollover crashes. We also support the agency’s methodology in assessing the 

costs and benefits associated with various possible regulatory approaches, by focusing on the ‘‘target populations’’ that could potentially benefit from various remedial 

measures. AIAM continues to urge NHTSA to provide manufacturers adequate leadtime to comply with the upgraded requirements so that roof structure redesign may 

be incorporated in full vehicle model changes. We also urge the agency to take all 

appropriate steps to assure that the new roof crush test procedure is fully repeatable. 

Rollover crashes are relatively rare events, yet they have disproportionately large 

safety impacts. On an annual basis, rollovers account for only about 3 percent of 

vehicle crashes, yet they account for approximately 10,000 occupant fatalities. This 

represents about one-third of all light vehicle crash fatalities. Therefore, a comprehensive effort to prevent rollovers and improve occupant safety in rollovers is an 

entirely appropriate priority for Congress, NHTSA, and vehicle manufacturers. 

In its August 2005 proposal to upgrade roof crush standards, NHTSA identified 

several factors that relate to fatalities in rollover crashes, such as high vehicle 

speed, night driving, a preponderance of young, male drivers, alcohol use, and failure to use safety belts. Most rollover crashes are single vehicle, run-off-road crashes 

that occur at highway speeds. According to NHTSA statistics, nearly three-fourths 

of the people killed in rollover crashes are unbelted, with about two-thirds of the 

fatalities in all rollovers involving occupants being ejected from the vehicle. 

Congress has mandated a comprehensive approach to addressing rollover crashes. 

In the 2005 SAFETEA–LU law, Congress directed NHTSA to address rollover crashes and related safety concerns through rulemaking to mandate the installation of 

Electronic Stability Control systems (ESC), reduce occupant ejection, improve door 

lock performance, require the installation of side impact protection air bags, increase safety belt use, and improve roof strength, while also enhancing NHTSA’s 

consumer information program through vehicle labels. NHTSA is well along in implementing the measures specified in the SAFETEA–LU law. In addition to the roof 

strength final rule that we anticipate will be issued soon, NHTSA has already 

issued a final rule for ESC to prevent rollovers, has upgraded its side impact rule, 

and has issued a final rule to upgrade existing door lock and door retention regulations to help prevent occupant ejections. It is our understanding that the agency 

plans to propose new occupant retention requirements later this year. 

Consistent with the Congressional direction, NHTSA proposed a comprehensive 

response to vehicle rollovers. This response begins with the preferred approach of 

preventing the occurrence of rollovers, through such measures as mandating the installation of ESC, the development of other electronic crash avoidance systems such 

as road departure warning systems, and the 2004 enhancement of the agency’s New 

Car Assessment Program (NCAP) which provides consumers information on the rollover propensity of specific models. NHTSA also noted that enhanced enforcement of 

impaired driving laws and speed limits would reduce the frequency of rollovers. The 

agency also presented a series of measures that could mitigate rollover crash injuries, such as the installation of side curtain air bags, improved door and latch systems, improved occupant restraint systems, and enhanced roof structures. 

AIAM fully supports this comprehensive approach to addressing vehicle rollovers, 

as envisioned in SAFETEA–LU and pursued by NHTSA. It is clear there is no single, ‘‘silver bullet’’ that will eliminate rollover crashes and their consequences, given 

the multiple causative factors and injury mechanisms. We believe the installation 

of ESC will provide substantial safety benefits—by helping drivers maintain control 

of their vehicles, ESC will help drivers avoid running off the road and rolling over 

in the first place. The new occupant ejection mitigation rule is likely to require enVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
117 

hancements to side air bag systems such as increasing the size of the air bags and 

assuring that the air bags remain inflated for longer periods of time to help prevent 

ejection. This has the potential to address some of the two-thirds of rollover fatalities involving occupant ejection. Continued efforts in the areas of alcohol countermeasures and speed enforcement will also provide significant benefits. Additionally, 

states and the industry have undertaken efforts to increase safety belt use, and in 

2007 safety belt use in the United States was 82 percent. 

AIAM supports NHTSA’s approach for analyzing the costs and benefits of the various rollover mitigation initiatives. The agency’s methodology focuses on a ‘‘target 

population’’ of injuries and fatalities that potentially could be addressed by a particular remedial measure, in an attempt to sort out the separate effects of these 

measures. Of the SAFETEA–LU rulemaking initiatives, AIAM believes that equipping vehicles with ESC is likely to provide the most significant reduction in serious 

or fatal injuries in vehicle rollovers. In fact, NHTSA estimates that ESC has the 

potential to prevent more than two-thirds of passenger car and SUV rollovers that 

would otherwise occur in single vehicle crashes. Manufacturers are working to install ESC in vehicles ahead of regulatory deadlines, and for Model Year 2008, AIAM 

members offer over 170 models with ESC as either standard or optional equipment. 

Regarding the NHTSA roof strength rulemaking, AIAM has provided comments 

to NHTSA in response to the agency’s August 2005 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

and the January 2008 Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM). A 

primary concern of AIAM is that the agency provide adequate lead-time for manufacturers to comply with the new roof crush requirements. Although we cannot yet 

fully quantify the impact of the agency’s recently proposed two-sided test on current/ 

future models, as a general matter manufacturers would need to redesign the roof 

structure and all related components to comply with the new test requirements. The 

NHTSA SNPRM references a study indicating that weight increases may be avoided 

if sufficient lead-time is provided in the final rule to allow for necessary design and 

weight modifications to be incorporated at the time of full or major model changes. 

Changes implemented under other circumstances would tend to involve the addition 

of weight, which conflicts with NHTSA’s new CAFE/greenhouse gas standards and 

a market environment of sky-rocketing fuel prices. If roof-related changes can be implemented at the time of a full model change, high-strength materials and more sophisticated structures may be used to achieve a more favorable overall result. 

Therefore, AIAM has strongly urged the agency to provide sufficient lead-time in the 

final rule so that modifications to roof structure and related components may be implemented in accordance with the timing of full or major model changes. Since many 

full or major model changes are on five, six, or more year redesign cycles, we suggest, depending on the requirements in the final rule, 3 years lead time in addition 

to at least a three-year phase-in period. Provisions for earning credits for early compliance should also be adopted. 

In our comments on the SNPRM, we also requested that there be a Small Volume 

Manufacturer (SVM) provision that would delay compliance to the 100 percent date 

for manufacturers that produce less than 5,000 vehicles for the United States market. NHTSA has included a SVM provision in major recent rulemakings (FMVSS 

208, 214, and 301 for example) to allow low volume/single line manufacturers sufficient time to redesign and test their vehicles. Without such a provision, the smaller 

companies would, in effect, have to meet the requirements for 100 percent of their 

vehicles at the beginning of the phase-in period. 

In our comments on the SNPRM, we also noted the agency has proposed a number of significant changes from the 2005 proposal. Among these is the adoption of 

a two-sided test, but an updated agency cost-benefit analysis reflecting the new 

changes is not currently available. Among the factors that we noted that are potentially critical to the selection of optimal test requirements in the final rule are: (1) 

the need to consider actual maximum weight capacity of vehicle designs; (2) incorporation of the safety benefits of ESC and side curtain airbags; (3) adjustment to a 

more realistic fuel price; (4) a more definitive determination of the frequency of multiple roof contact crashes for various vehicle classes and the safety significance of 

these crashes; and (5) consideration of compliance lead-time in relation to vehicle 

design cycles. The potential use of a new test device to measure head contact/intrusion also presents a degree of uncertainty regarding the achievement of an optimal 

trade-off between costs and benefits. Therefore, AIAM requested that the agency 

provide an opportunity for comment on a full cost-benefit analysis reflecting the elements of the final rule. We cannot provide a detailed assessment of the roof strength 

performance requirements until we have had the opportunity to review such an updated analysis. 

The AIAM comments also provided suggestions related to the proposed tests in 

order to improve the repeatability of compliance test results. Repeatability of comVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00121 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
118 

pliance test results is critical, so that manufacturers can be reasonably assured that 

their vehicle designs will meet the new standards when tested by the government. 

In particular with regard to the test repeatability concern, we would strongly oppose 

the required use of a dynamic test for assessing roof strength. We have seen no indication that such a test could be made adequately repeatable to meet legal requirements, nor have we seen any indication that such a test would provide safety benefits beyond those of the tests that the agency has proposed. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Ms. Gillan? 

STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE S. GILLAN, VICE PRESIDENT, 

ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY 

Ms. GILLAN. Thank you, Senator Pryor. Good morning. My name 

is Jackie Gillan. I’m Vice President of Advocates for Highway and 

Auto Safety. 

First, let me thank the subcommittee for holding today’s hearing. 

Every year, on average, there are more than 10,000 deaths and 

over 200,000 injuries as a result of rollover crashes. For years, consumer health and safety groups pressed the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration to act on this critical safety problem, 

but the agency demurred. We then turned to Congress for help in 

demanding agency accountability, and you listened, and you acted. 

Because of the bipartisan leadership on this committee, the 2005 

SAFETEA–LU bill included some of the most important vehicle 

safety measures ever signed into law. 

Congress showed great vision by crafting a comprehensive and 

coordinated approach to rollover crash safety that includes rollover 

prevention, an occupant ejection standard, and an upgrade of the 

roof-strength standard. That approach could ultimately save thousands of lives and prevent tens of thousands of injuries if implemented in the manner Congress intended. 

Unfortunately, I am here to inform you that NHTSA has not 

seized this opportunity to significantly advance safety. In each safety rule required by SAFETEA–LU, the agency has done considerably less than it could have or should have. As a result, 

SAFETEA–LU rulemakings will not achieve the potential level of 

safety envisioned by Congress or expected by the public. 

I am here today to urge Congress to make it clear to NHTSA 

that the current roof-strength proposal is unacceptable and should 

not be issued as a final rule in July. The roof-strength standard 

was issued nearly 40 years ago, and will not likely be upgraded 

and improved for many, many years to come. If NHTSA’s weak and 

ineffective proposal becomes final, generations of new vehicles will 

meet a weak standard that will put millions of Americans at risk 

of death or serious injury because NHTSA didn’t get it right. We 

can do better—and, in fact, we must do better—to ensure that in 

the future, individuals like Dr. Garcia will be adequately protected 

in a rollover crash and avoid serious, costly, and lifelong injuries. 

Let me just quickly go over some of the numerous problems with 

the agency’s proposal. 

One of the most fundamental faults of the proposed rule is that 

it relies on a static-force test for roof strength and proposes only 

a marginal improvement from the old standard. Most vehicles sold 

in the United States already meet the proposed rule, while some 

models greatly exceed it and provide superior lifesaving protection. 

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Instead of a static-force test, Advocates strongly support the use of 

a dynamic test that reproduces the real-world experience of vehicle 

roofs crashing into the ground, and how occupants and safety systems respond to those forces. 

During a rollover crash, passenger vehicle roofs flex and recoil. 

Another failed feature of the proposed rule is that NHTSA ignores 

this and does not require a minimum intrusion limit or survival 

space over the heads of occupants. Instead, the agency has proposed a no-head-contact requirement. In addition, this no-head-contact requirement is compromised by the use of a 50th-percentile 

male test dummy, because anyone taller that is not protected by 

the proposed rule will suffer injury. 

Let me briefly address the aspect of that rule as a mother of a 

teenaged son. The 50th-percentile male test dummy has a seated 

height of nearly 35 inches. Last night, I measured my son, whose 

overall height is about 5 feet 10 inches. He exceeds the seated 

height of the test dummy; therefore, the proposed upgrade of the 

roof-strength standard, which should protect him against deadly 

roof crash in a rollover crash, will fail him and most of his friends. 

In January, NHTSA issued a Supplemental Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking. This notice is an even stronger indictment of the inadequacy of the agency’s proposed rule, and is plagued with procedural problems. For example, NHTSA’s research program, testing 

both sides of the roof, relied on flawed methodology that resulted 

in inconsistent data, and the agency cannot rely on these tests to 

issue a final rule. 

Furthermore, the agency drastically underestimates the potential 

benefits of a stronger rule, and the Insurance Institute for Highway 

Safety study shows that they are completely wrong on that count. 

The supplemental notice proposes several regulatory benefits 

that are not supported by benefit-cost analysis. Instead of giving 

the public an opportunity to comment on these, NHTSA asserts a 

‘‘just trust us’’ rationale, without affording the public any chance 

to review, challenge, or comment on their assertions. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, Advocates strongly supports an upgrade to the roof-crush standard that will save lives and provide 

strong occupant protection in rollover crash. However, this rule is 

too important, too many deaths have already occurred, and too 

many lives are at stake for the agency to rush ahead to issue a defective, deficient, and dangerous rule. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gillan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE S. GILLAN, VICE PRESIDENT, 

ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY

Introduction 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation. I am Jacqueline Gillan, vice-president, of Advocates for 

Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates). Founded in 1989, Advocates is an alliance 

of consumer, health and safety organizations, and insurance companies and associations working together to make our roads and highways safer. Advocates encourages 

the adoption of Federal and state laws, policies, programs, and regulations that save 

lives and reduce injuries in motor vehicle crashes on our Nation’s highways. 

Our organization has worked closely with the members and staff of the full Committee and has been integrally involved in generating many of the motor vehicleVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
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related safety provisions contained in Section 10301 of SAFETEA–LU, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. 

L. 109–59 (Aug. 10, 2005). The vehicle safety-related rules required in title X, subtitle C of SAFETEA–LU were developed and adopted by this Committee in a bipartisan effort to improve public safety on our highways. Congress showed great vision 

in that legislation by crafting a comprehensive approach to rollover crashes that addresses both vehicle crash avoidance and crashworthiness, and requires both an upgraded roof strength regulation and a standard to reduce occupant ejections. Collapsing roofs and occupants thrown from their vehicles are the two leading reasons 

why rollover crashes are so deadly. The Congressional plan in SAFETEA–LU to address all major, interrelated aspects of rollover crash losses in a comprehensive and 

coordinated way ultimately could save thousands of lives and prevent tens of thousands of injuries annually if implemented in the manner Congress intended. 

Unfortunately, I am here to inform you that despite clear, explicit Congressional 

direction to mitigate the problem of rollover crash deaths, the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the agency within the U.S. Department of 

Transportation that is charged with implementing the SAFETEA–LU provisions, 

has not seized this opportunity to strengthen its standards related to rollover protection by proposing optimally effective occupant protection countermeasures. Despite legislative instruction to address the necessary safety measures in a coordinated manner to prevent deaths and severe injuries in rollover crashes, the sad 

truth is that NHTSA is taking an inadequate and piecemeal approach to rollover 

safety. The agency has divided the rollover crash event into isolated, disconnected 

safety problems and devised improvements intended to achieve only marginal gains 

in safety. 

To date, NHTSA has not followed the strong bipartisan leadership of Congress 

that directed vigorous agency responses to chronic vehicle safety problems. Instead, 

the agency has fashioned weak and incomplete regulatory responses to SAFETEA– 

LU rulemaking initiatives. In taking this understated approach to major safety 

issues affecting the lives of millions of vehicle occupants, NHTSA has failed to provide the necessary safety protection for current and future generations of drivers 

and passengers. This is true not only in its the proposed roof strength rule, the subject of today’s hearing, but also in its earlier efforts to reduce side impact losses, 

a rule that is still pending, as well as in its research approach to ejection prevention, and even in the final rule on electronic stability control systems, which was 

published in 2007. In each case, the agency has so far done considerably less than 

it could have to advance safety and occupant protection. As discussed later in this 

statement, in each of these regulatory areas NHTSA has opted for marginal improvements in safety technology and benefits rather than adopt existing, state-ofthe-art safety performance, test procedures, and technologies that would secure significantly greater safety benefits. As a result, SAFETEA–LU rulemakings will not 

achieve the potential level of safety envisioned by Congress. 

NHTSA has not heeded Congress on roof strength. The agency has proposed a 

weak rule to improve roof strength that cannot achieve the legislative goal of ensuring enhanced, equal protection of front seat occupants, both the driver and passenger. I am here today to urge Congress to make it clear to NHTSA that the current rulemaking proposal is unacceptable and that the agency needs to dramatically 

rethink and revise its proposal in order to fulfill its statutory obligations and protect 

the American public. 

Rollover Crash Background 

There is perhaps no more terrifying or lethal motor vehicle crash than a rollover. 

When a rollover crash occurs, a car, pickup truck, or sport utility vehicle (SUV) is 

out of control in the fullest sense. A driver has no power to stop this catastrophic 

event. The tires are no longer gripping the road and evasive maneuvers using steering and braking are no longer possible. In a rollover crash the driver and other vehicle occupants are at the mercy of the laws of physics and are protected by only the 

effectiveness of safety systems that have been designed into their vehicle. 

The outcome of rollover crashes is absolutely horrific. According to a NHTSA status report on rollover occupant protection research, rollovers are only 2 percent of 

all annual motor vehicle crashes, but resulted in 10,698 deaths in rollover crashes 

in 2006. 2006 Annual Assessment of Motor Vehicle Crashes, NHTSA, Sept. 2007, updated January 2008, at 95. A total of 32,092 vehicle occupant deaths occurred that 

year in motor vehicle crashes, so rollover crashes alone account for more than onethird of annual occupant fatalities. Traffic Safety Facts 2006, NHTSA, National Statistics Summary, at 1. 

These figures are staggering and completely unacceptable. Yet, NHTSA, the agency entrusted with protecting people in their passenger vehicles, has been reluctant 

121 

to take any action on its own initiative to reduce the tens of thousands of deaths 

in rollover crashes that occur year, after year, after year. Although the agency has 

received petitions for a rollover stability standard since the 1980s, NHTSA did not 

see fit to establish such a standard. In 1991, Congress required the agency to consider the issue and the agency opened rulemaking in 1992 (57 FR 242, Jan. 1, 1992), 

but terminated that effort in 1994 (59 FR 33254, June 28, 1994). 

Despite the involvement of roof crush in many rollover crashes, NHTSA took no 

action through the remainder of the 1990s to address the issue with a proposed rule 

strengthening the standard, even after its acknowledgement of the extent and severity of losses from rollovers. At the same time, with increased sales of narrow wheelbase, high center of gravity Light Trucks and Vans (LTVs), including pickup trucks 

and SUVs, the number of rollover crash deaths in these types of vehicles rose dramatically. 

More than 120,662 people have died in rollover crashes and over 2.9 million have 

been injured since NHTSA terminated its rulemaking action in 1994. NHTSA Data 

Run, 1994–2006, prepared for Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, National 

Center for Statistics and Analysis, NHTSA, May 27–28, 2008. 

In short, NHTSA has not been diligent in responding to the enormous threat 

posed by rollover crashes. Although electronic stability control systems showed great 

promise in preventing rollovers, NHTSA took no action to require that technology 

until directed to do so by Congress in SAFETEA–LU. And, again, with respect to 

roof strength, even though roof crush is a major factor in rollover crashes, it was 

not until the enactment of SAFETEA–LU that the agency published its weak proposed rule. 

1971 Roof Strength Standard 

The current roof strength standard, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 

(FMVSS) No. 216, Roof Crush Resistance, was originally adopted in 1971 (effective 

Sept. 1, 1973), and after 37 years, it remains the only standard that addresses vehicle crashworthiness in a rollover. This outdated standard still relies on 1960s thinking to provide protection to occupants in 21st century vehicles. The standard is extraordinarily weak, requiring that a plate press on one front corner of the roof at 

only 1.5 times the weight of the vehicle—the gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR)— 

but only up to 5,000 pounds for passenger cars. 23 CFR § 571.216S4(a). 

The standard is even weaker for LTVs. In the early 1990s, NHTSA extended the 

test still using only 1.5 times the vehicle weight, to these other types of passenger 

vehicles—but only up to 6,000 pounds GVWR. 55 FR 15510 (Apr. 17, 1991). Incredibly, the agency excused all LTVs over 6,000 pounds from even being tested. As a 

result, there is no standard for roof strength for large SUVs, big pickup trucks, and 

large passenger vans. Id., § 571.216S4(b). 

Many researchers have documented the major role that roof crush plays in rollover crash deaths and injuries, and that a stronger standard could prevent many 

deaths and serious injuries. Despite this research, the standard has remained essentially unchanged despite the thousands of annual deaths and injuries from rollover 

crashes. Against this backdrop NHTSA has proposed an upgrade to the roof 

strength standard that, by the agency’s own reckoning, will save very few lives in 

rollover crashes. 

The 2005 Proposed Rule is Badly Flawed 

The 2005 NHTSA notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on roof strength, 70 FR 

49223 (Aug. 23, 2005), is badly flawed in several fundamental ways. First, the 2005 

NPRM retains the static plate (platen) test developed four decades ago and fails to 

require a dynamic, real-world rollover crash test that adequately models what actually happens to passenger vehicles and their roofs in rollover crashes. Second, the 

proposal only requires vehicles be tested at 2.5 times the weight of the vehicle which 

is a 2.5 strength-to-weight ratio (SWR). This represents only a marginal increase 

in roof strength, a level already met by two-thirds of the current makes and models 

in production today. 

In addition, the proposed rule actually weakened the existing standard by removing any limit on the amount of permitted intrusion of the roof into the occupant 

compartment. Instead, the agency substituted a strict ‘‘no head contact’’ criterion 

with the top of the head of a 50th percentile male test dummy. Id. at 49232. If there 

is any amount of space, no matter how small, between the roof and the head of the 

test dummy, the vehicle passes; any roof contact with the dummy’s head and the 

vehicle fails. Taking this course of action would allow vehicles that already have 

very low roofs close to the heads of drivers and passengers to continue to be manufactured and sold as long as the roof did not actually touch the head of the dummy 

during the static test. 

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This means, however, that occupants taller than the 50th percentile male test 

dummy are provided no assurance of any head protection from a collapsing roof in 

a rollover crash. Indeed, NHTSA’s minimalist contact/no contact criterion guarantees that taller people, including as much as half of all male drivers, will be at 

greater risk of being struck by a collapsing vehicle roof in a rollover crash. 

The 2008 Supplemental Proposed Rule (SNPRM) is Defective 

NHTSA published a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM), 73 FR 

5484 (Jan. 30, 2008), in part to address the issue of affording protection on both 

the driver’s and passenger’s sides of the vehicle in response to Section 10301 of 

SAFETEA–LU. The SNPRM supplied additional test results and summarily mentioned alternative regulatory options. Yet, the SNPRM builds on the weak foundation laid in the prior 2005 NPRM, since it augments and encompasses but does not 

replace the prior proposal. Thus, references in this statement to the SNPRM include 

both the prior 2005 NPRM as well as the 2008 SNPRM. 

The SNPRM is both substantively unacceptable and legally inadequate. The fundamental flaws in the agency’s approach include: the failure to consider a dynamic 

test in place of the old, 1971-era static test; the inadequacy of the agency’s testing 

procedure for each side of passenger vehicle roofs; the gross underestimation of safety benefits from a stringent roof strength standard; and the failure to provide benefit/cost analyses for suggested alternative roof strength options, including the lack 

of a benefits assessment for specific alternative regulatory proposals included in the 

agency rule. These problems fatally undermine the SNPRM, and as a result require 

the agency to rethink and revise its approach to roof strength, including documentation of specific proposed regulatory alternatives, and issuance of a new proposal before a final rule is adopted. NHTSA cannot move forward to a final rule on the basis 

of the SNPRM. My statement addresses each of these problems in turn. 

No Consideration of a Dynamic Test 

It appears that NHTSA refused to credit new developments on potential dynamic 

tests and to explore them carefully as Congress urged the agency to do in Section 

10301 of SAFETEA–LU: ‘‘The Secretary may consider industry and independent dynamic tests that realistically duplicate the actual forces transmitted during a rollover crash.’’ These are not idle words—Congress expected that NHTSA would examine and review a new generation of dynamic roof strength tests now in use by manufacturers and independent researchers. However, the agency has not indicated in 

the SNPRM that it actually acquired or conducted comparison tests on any of the 

dynamic test systems in use today. 

Advocates supports the use of a dynamic test that shows the real-world behavior 

of passenger vehicle roofs crashing into the ground, and how occupants respond to 

those terrific forces, including the performance of active and passive restraint systems, seating systems, door locks and latches, and vehicle windows (glazing). Realworld, dynamic testing is the best means of modeling what occurs in actual rollovers 

and determining what safety countermeasures should be proposed. 

NHTSA’s proposal to press down only on the front corner of a vehicle roof with 

a plate at an undemanding force level does not reproduce real-world crash forces. 

This compliance test can show nothing about occupant kinematics, that is, how people in actual rollover crashes respond to rollover forces and are injured, or how the 

multiple in-vehicle safety systems contribute to protecting occupants from death and 

severe injury. Instead, the agency has proposed an inadequate approach to improving resistance of passenger vehicle roofs to deformation and intrusion that can result in severe or lethal head and neck trauma. 

Before NHTSA issues a final rule it must test and evaluate the current technologies used for dynamic rollover testing to determine roof strength performance. 

This should include actual testing of the Jordan Rollover System (JRS), the Controlled Rollover Impact System (CRIS), used for in-house testing by a least one manufacturer, and other similar test devices. Until the agency conducts its own tests 

and acquires first-hand experience with these dynamic test devices, it has not fulfilled its obligation under SAFETEA–LU and to the public. 

Since NHTSA continues to rely on the static test as the basis for rulemaking, Advocates has analyzed the substantive and procedural problems we have found in the 

SNPRM. Advocates’ comments filed with the agency SNPRM rulemaking docket 

analyzed these problems in detail and those comments are submitted for the hearing record. This statement addresses the major problems we found. 

NHTSA’s Testing Procedure is Inadequate 

In the SNPRM, NHTSA provides new static roof test results that reveal a fundamental flaw in the agency’s testing methodology. In conducting testing on both the 

driver and passenger sides of existing vehicle makes and models, NHTSA has unVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00126 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
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dermined its ability to use the results of its new round of tests by adopting a flawed 

testing protocol. This is not just a minor matter of technical procedure but a basic 

mistake in gathering scientific databased on sound testing methodologies. In conducting tests on each side of vehicle roofs, the agency failed to heed its own proposed standard of a 2.5 times vehicle strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) when conducting the tests on the first side of the roof. Instead of conducting a first-side test 

to a specific minimum strength level in accordance with its own proposed test regime to lay the foundation for testing the second side of the roof, NHTSA simply 

continued applying pressure to the plate on the first side of the roof regardless of 

the strength level achieved. The agency stopped the test only when the roof touched 

the head of the test dummy, or the windshield cracked, or 5 inches of crush had 

been attained. In doing so, NHTSA made it impossible to use the test of the first 

side of the roof to obtain consistent results regarding how the second side would perform when crushed with the plate. Not surprisingly, the actual second side test results were inconsistent and varied widely. Some vehicles had stronger roofs, that 

is, resisted crush better when the second side was tested, while others were weaker, 

sometimes substantially weaker, when the plate was pressed on the other corner of 

the roof. 

Since NHTSA appears committed to the static force platen test, it is essential that 

any first-side test must be properly conducted to demonstrate how a roof will perform when a subsequent crushing force is applied to the second side of the roof. By 

allowing any amount of force application to be used and plate intrusion limited by 

either a maximum of 5 inches, or windshield cracking, or dummy head contact, the 

agency rendered its tests worthless for determining how first-side roof crush affected 

second-side crush. The crux of the matter is whether both sides of a vehicle roof 

meet a standard using a demanding force application level, such as 3.5 or 4.0 times 

the vehicle weight, controlled by limits on maximum intrusion and minimum residual headroom. NHTSA must redo properly the first test to determine how well the 

first-side crush response predicts the response of the second side. So far, the agency 

has no basis from the data generated for consideration in the SNPRM to adopt a 

standard that ensures that both the driver and the passenger have a high level of 

protection from roof crush and intrusion. NHTSA has to conduct these tests at different strength-to-weight ratios based on the SNPRM, from an SWR of 2.5 up to 

4.0 and offer a specific choice based on a realistic assessment of benefits and costs. 

Until the agency performs these new tests and offers documentation to support one 

or more specific regulatory alternatives for notice and comment, it cannot move forward to a final rule. 

No Requirement for Survival Headroom 

Another essential safety aspect that is lacking in the proposed rule is a requirement for minimum residual headroom—to ensure that in real-world rollovers there 

is survival space maintained over the heads of occupants after the dynamic response 

of the roof to rollover forces. One of the cardinal rules of safety design in recent 

years has been the importance of maintaining the integrity of the passenger compartment in a crash. This philosophy has been used to improve crash survivability 

in frontal and side impacts and should be applied to protect against roof crush and 

intrusion. 

Research analysis shows that even though the roof actually comes down onto the 

heads of occupants in a simulated rollover crash, the vehicle roof can, nevertheless, 

show some post-crash space over the head of occupants. Passenger vehicle roofs flex 

and recoil in real-world rollovers. A dynamic test could show what actually happens 

in the interaction between a deformed roof and the vehicle occupants during a rollover crash. To account for this movement of the roof, a static roof strength test must 

require residual headroom to assure an adequate level of occupant safety when the 

roof deforms in a rollover. A residual survival space or headroom requirement is 

only a surrogate for the safety margin that could be provided through a dynamic 

test, but far better than the minimal ‘‘no contact’’ criterion proposed in the SNPRM. 

The no-contact/contact, pass/fail criterion is an inherently defective approach to approximating what is needed to protect occupants in actual rollover crashes, and it 

cannot ensure that the roof will not actually injure occupants in real-world rollover 

crashes. A given vehicle can pass both the strength and no-contact criteria of the 

supplementary proposed rule, yet that same roof can still injure or kill occupants. 

Thus, a regulation based on a static test should include a minimum headroom requirement to ensure occupant survival space. 

Reliance on Windshield and Windows to Improve Static Test Results 

Another aspect of the proposed standard that is objectionable is the fact that the 

static test is conducted with the vehicle windshield in place and the vehicle side 

124 

windows rolled up. In many rollover crashes, the windshield frequently pops out of 

its frame when force is applied to the front of the roof in a rollover. In addition, 

window glazing made of tempered glass shatters during the initial contact in a 

crash if it is not retracted. Nevertheless, the proposed roof strength rule continues 

to rely on an artificial test protocol that involves testing the roof with the windshield in place and all side windows in a closed position. Testing a vehicle roof with 

the added strength of the window glazing in place provides an artificial result and 

a false sense of security. Passing the static strength test conducted in this manner 

provides no assurance that the same vehicle will not suffer glazing failure roof deformation and intrusion in a real-world rollover crash. 

The SNPRM Implies a Severe Underestimation of Safety Benefits 

NHTSA has revised downward its estimate in the SNPRM of the population that 

would benefit from stronger roofs from the number presented in the 2005 NPRM 

on the basis of yet-unrealized claims about the influence of electronic stability control systems on rollover crash occurrence. After NHTSA successively whittles down 

the number of lives that are relevant to a stronger roof crush resistance standard 

through one rationalization after another, the agency concludes that stronger roofs 

would affect the lives of only 476 people. 73 FR 5485. This is not the number of 

lives saved, but rather the target population within which the agency believes that 

benefits of saving lives can occur with a stronger roof standard. In the 2005 proposed rule, NHTSA estimated that the target population was 595 fatally injured occupants who could be affected by a stronger standard. 70 FR 49229. But within that 

target population estimated for the 2005 proposed rule, the agency guessed that as 

few as only 13 or 44 lives would be saved annually from stronger roofs. Id. at 49242. 

As a result, the agency’s unstated benefits estimate for a 2.5 SWR standard, given 

a smaller target population calculated for the SNPRM, would inevitably be even 

lower, in fact, lower almost to the vanishing point. 

An agency benefits assessment of a stronger roof crush resistance standard must 

also be forged in light of the important study performed by the Insurance Institute 

for Highway Safety (IIHS). IIHS’s analysis, contained in its publication, Roof 

Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes (March 2008) (IIHS Roof Strength 

Study), demonstrates that real-world benefits can accrue to many occupants who are 

not part of the agency’s benefits target population because other crashworthiness 

system features operate to save lives in tandem with much stronger roofs. IIHS Roof 

Strength Study at 13. 

IIHS found that increasing the SWR to about 3.16 would save 212 lives in singlevehicle rollovers. Id. at 11. This figure of 3.16 SWR is as far as IIHS’s data analysis 

would permit it to judge benefits in lives saved. However, the IIHS submitted comments to the SNPRM docket stating that a standard at 3.5 SWR could save even 

more lives. Even at just 3.16 SWR, IIHS estimates that the number of lives saved 

would be almost double the number for a standard indexed to 2.5 SWR. Advocates 

firmly believes that benefits would further increase at some unknown but nevertheless exponential rate if the agency raised the static test requirement to at least 4.0 

SWR along with adopting all of Advocates’ other suggested revisions, including the 

need for a maximum intrusion limit and a minimum survival-headroom limit, that 

we have shown to be necessary. 

It is also true that NHTSA acknowledges the limitations of its own benefits assessment. The agency has only 32 crash cases from which it has previously inferred 

benefits, as pointed out in the IIHS Roof Strength Study at 2. Such a small number 

of cases has several data shortcomings. The agency itself states that ‘‘the characteristics of this limited sample may not accurately represent the full benefits from the 

proposed roof crush resistance upgrade.’’ 70 FR 49242. The agency is correct. It 

should place no confidence in its meager estimate of lives saved from stronger roofs 

cited in the 2005 NPRM or the updated target population figure used in the 2008 

SNPRM. 

NHTSA Makes No Determination of Cost Estimates in the SNPRM 

Finally, with regard to cost estimates for more protective vehicle roofs, there is 

no definitive analysis accompanying the SNPRM. The agency cites high cost figures 

provided by industry sources, including claims that a standard based on a SWR of 

3.5 would cost an additional $130 for a large SUV to comply with, could be even 

50 percent higher (73 FR 5488), and might require an unbelievable additional 540 

pounds of extra weight for an SUV that meets such a standard. 

On the other hand, NHTSA also refers to a ‘‘tear-down’’ study conducted by Ohio 

State University that examined the Volvo XC90 and the Ford Explorer SUVs. 73 

FR 5489, Improving Roof Crush Performance of a Sport Utility Vehicle, Ohio State 

University (2007). The inexpensive but highly effective roof strengthening of the 

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XC90 was applied to upgrade a Ford Explorer to the roof crush resistance of the 

Volvo. It was determined that achieving equivalent roof strength ‘‘would increase 

material and tooling costs by $81 and weight by 15 kilograms (33 pounds).’’ Id. Another study conducted by the National Crash Analysis Center of The George Washington University, Cost, Weight, and Lead Time Analysis Roof Crush Upgrade, 

‘‘found that strengthening the 2003 Ford Explorer to 3.0 SWR would raise the vehicle’s price by $33 to $35 and increase its weight by 5 to 10 kilograms (10 to 23 

pounds).’’ Id. 

The SNPRM provides no insight, however, regarding the agency’s view of these 

varying costs. Since there is no adequate cost analysis presented for public review 

and comment, it was impossible for the public to provide the agency with informed 

comments on the potential costs and benefits of the different options that the agency 

indicated it was considering. NHTSA cannot proceed to a final rule without first 

presenting the public with an in-depth benefit/cost analysis of the different regulatory alternatives it is considering and stating which alternative it is proposing and 

supporting that choice. 

The SNPRM is Procedurally Inadequate 

It is apparent that NHTSA has not laid the necessary foundation in the rulemaking record in order to issue a final rule. As already mentioned, even though 

NHTSA offers several new alternative SWRs as potential candidates for testing roof 

crush resistance, it provides no assessment of the costs and benefits of the potential 

alternatives that it states could be chosen for a final rule. The alternatives laid out 

in the SNPRM range from a choice of a 1-side test at 2.5 SWR up to a 2-sides test 

at 3.5 SWR. Lacking credible test results and benefits analyses for selecting one alternative over another, NHTSA simply asserts a ‘‘just trust us’’ rationale. The 

SNPRM states that ‘‘regardless of which alternative is adopted in the final rule, the 

agency will ensure that the final rule is cost beneficial . . . .’’ 73 FR 5490. 

This pronouncement is breathtaking in the context of agency rulemaking where 

publication of a benefit/cost analysis prior to adoption of a final rule is a baseline 

requirement of established rulemaking procedure. NHTSA must provide supporting 

documentation from test data and a benefits-cost analysis tailored to justify the regulatory alternatives it is considering. The agency must allow the public an opportunity to review and comment on its detailed regulatory analyses before it determines which option to adopt. NHTSA cannot proceed from the preliminary assessment of new, potential regulatory alternatives mentioned in the SNPRM without a 

full, detailed rulemaking proposal of those regulatory alternatives. 

NHTSA’s Flawed Approach to SAFETEA–LU 

At the outset of this statement I mentioned the crucial topic of NHTSA’s approach 

to the SAFETEA–LU passenger vehicle safety-related rulemakings. That approach 

is neither as forward-looking or comprehensive as Congress intended, nor is it justified under the circumstances. 

For example, NHTSA’s use of the 37-year-old static test for improving roof 

strength will inhibit the development of other safety regulations. Choosing an 

anachronistic, static test for roof crush resistance denies the agency the advantages 

of determining the value of improving other key safety design and performance features of passenger vehicles in rollovers. The isolated approach of simply applying 

a plate pushed against a front corner of a vehicle roof immediately undermines a 

systems engineering approach to rollover safety. It eliminates the possibility of the 

agency studying the effects of a dynamic roof strength test on other vehicle safety 

systems including door latches, locks, and hinges to resist failure leading to occupant ejection. Because it is a static, not a dynamic test, it also forgoes showing occupant kinematics and injury responses in actual rollovers. It dispenses with any possibility of determining restraint system effectiveness in achieving occupant containment and reducing occupant excursion within the vehicle cabin when rollovers 

occur. After all, these systems operate dynamically and not in isolation from each 

other. Rather, they work synergistically and nearly simultaneously to reduce injury 

to occupants by preventing excessive excursion or by providing forgiving surfaces to 

cushion occupant impacts with injury-inflicting vehicle interior features. NHTSA 

has instead chosen a roof crush resistance test approach that cannot provide any 

information in these areas and therefore impedes the development of other safety 

standards. 

The SNPRM proposal continues the use of the static plate test stands in stark 

contrast to other major vehicle safety standards that have evolved from static or 

quasi-static to fully dynamic compliance tests, including different frontal crash tests 

and lower and upper interior side-impact crash tests. The need for full evaluation 

of rollover crashes under real-world test conditions was emphasized in comments 

126 

filed by a group of international crash safety researchers, DVExperts International 

Pty. Ltd. (DVExperts). DVExperts stressed that ‘‘[e]ach of the other mandated 

crashworthiness standards rely on a systems approach to crashworthiness. A dynamic test [of roof strength] is necessary to evaluate the performance of the rollover 

protection system, which is made up of the restraints, airbags, glazing, and roof 

strength.’’ DVExperts at 4. 

This crucial point about the negative influence of a static test for roof strength 

on other crashworthiness standards should not be taken lightly. A bare-bones static 

test can directly impact the quality of allied rulemaking actions that NHTSA must 

undertake to fulfill Section 10301 of SAFETEA–LU, including the actions the agency must take to prevent partial and complete occupant ejection. Partially ejected occupants, as well as occupants who are unbelted but remain within the occupant 

compartment, would certainly benefit from a stronger roof strength rule that is 

based on a realistic dynamic test. It is likely that non-ejected, unbelted occupants, 

for example, could suffer fewer severe and fatal head, face, and neck injuries by preserving more rollover survival space which, in turn, would reduce the chances of an 

occupant striking rigid roof structures such as headers, rails, and sunroof frames, 

as well hitting the roof proper apart from these framing structures. 

It is clear that a static test for determining roof strength in rollovers has farreaching consequences for other crashworthiness safety countermeasures that Congress has charged NHTSA with improving and ensuring a high level of effectiveness. This raises the question of what shortcomings will be built into an agency proposed rule on ejection prevention. If the agency chooses a test using a surrogate 

measure for showing whether different features of vehicle interiors can prevent partial or complete occupant ejection, this again will not be a test of how people actually are ejected in different kinds of crashes, especially in rollover crashes. 

NHTSA’s shortsighted approach to effective standards may have compromised the 

potential safety benefits of electronic stability control (ESC) systems technology 

adopted in a final rule in 2007. 72 FR 17236 (April 6, 2007). ESC systems help prevent vehicle departure from their intended paths, and ultimately help to reduce rollover crashes due to loss of vehicle control. While requiring ESC on all new vehicles 

after September 1, 2011, the agency did not require that the most effective ESC systems be installed. The performance standard issued by the agency did not require 

ESC systems to include automatic braking, traction control, a performance criterion 

for vehicle understeer, or roll stability control for SUVs. The agency rule not only 

set the performance requirements below the current state-of-the-art level for ESC 

technology, it requires less sophisticated ESC systems than some manufacturers are 

already installing in production models. That ensured that less advanced ESC systems would remain in the marketplace for years to come. While the mandatory installation of ESC systems in all vehicles will save many lives, the adoption of a 

stronger, more sophisticated performance standard by NHTSA would have made the 

rule even more effective. 

Another example of NHTSA opting for halfway measures is the still pending rulemaking on improving side impact protection for occupants, 69 FR 27990 (May 17, 

2004), a rulemaking that Congress in SAFETEA–LU required NHTSA to complete 

by July 1, 2008. Although NHTSA took the right approach in the 2004 proposed rule 

to ensure full side impact protection for front seat occupants by essentially requiring 

upper and lower air bags, the agency failed to require the same demanding test for 

rear seat occupants that would lead to a similar use of side impact air bags. Advocates’ comments to the rulemaking docket point out in detail how the agency has 

shortchanged providing equal protection for rear seat occupants, and we emphasized 

that the agency’s proposed rule does not protect children under the age of 12 regardless of their seating position. 

Congress, in response to this unacceptable agency action to deny improved side 

impact protection to rear seat occupants, included language in SAFETEA–LU to correct this omission. The Senate specifically directed that the Secretary shall complete 

a rulemaking proceeding to establish a standard ‘‘designed to enhance passenger 

motor vehicle occupant protection, in all seating positions, in side impact crashes.’’ 

(Emphasis supplied.) The proposed rule issued in 2004 will not adequately protect 

rear seat occupants, especially with regard to head and neck injuries; does not protect children; and does not sufficiently address the special, additional injury-prevention needs of older occupants in side impact crashes. It remains to be seen if 

NHTSA heeds explicit legislative instruction on providing enhanced side impact occupant protection in all seating positions. 

Conclusion 

Advocates is compelled, in light of the problems with the pending rule, to recommend that NHTSA not issue a final rule upgrading Standard No. 216 by the statVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
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utory deadline of July 1, 2008. It is clear that the roof crush resistance supplementary proposed rule is incomplete, not properly documented, does not provide 

much greater safety for occupants, and is not ready to be issued as a final rule. Congress foresaw the possibility that the agency might require more time than allotted 

in SAFETEA–LU. As a result, Section 10301 grants the Secretary unilateral authority to delay a rule under the rollover protection provision that the Secretary determined could not be issued on time. In this instance, the Secretary should make such 

a determination and set a new, later date for issuing a final rule. Although Advocates has fought for many years to get this standard substantially upgraded, we 

would rather have NHTSA get it right than issue a weak and ineffectual rule that 

will surely remain in place unchanged for decades to come. 

Recently, the White House Chief of Staff, Joshua Bolton, issued a memorandum 

to the heads of all departments and agencies regarding the issuance of regulations 

in the final year of the administration. Memorandum: Issuance of Agency Regulations at the End of the Administration (May 9, 2008). He emphasized that regulatory 

agencies have a responsibility to continue to ensure that regulations issued during 

the final year are ‘‘in the best interests of the American people.’’ Bolton Memorandum at 1. 

Mr. Chairman, I can state without hesitation that it would not be in the best interests of the American people for NHTSA to issue the roof strength rule in its 

present guise. The Bolton Memorandum went on to state that agencies should provide an appropriately open and transparent process including ‘‘robust public comment, and a careful evaluation of and response to those comments.’’ Bolton Memorandum at 2. The roof strength rule lacks the necessary test results and benefit/ 

cost analysis that must be presented to the public before the agency can issue a 

final rule. This rule is too important, too many deaths have already occurred, and 

too many lives are at stake for the agency to rush to issue a defective, deficient and 

dangerous rule. 

That concludes my testimony, and I would be pleased to answer any questions 

that you may have. 

1971 Roof Crush Standard—37-year Old Antiquated Standard Has Not Kept Pace With Changes 

in Technology or Vehicle Fleet 

Dec. 8, 1971 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issues final rule establishing roof crush standard to take effect in 1973. 

Mar. 22, 1973 Center for Auto Safety petitions NHTSA to apply Federal motor vehicle safety 

standards, including roof crush standard, to light trucks and multipurpose 

passenger vehicles with gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 

pounds or less. 

Sept. 1, 1973 Roof Crush Resistance standard, FMVSS No. 216, takes effect for passenger 

cars. 

Apr. 17, 1991 NHTSA issues final rule, effective Sept. 1, 1993, extending application of roof 

crush resistance standard amended to light trucks, vans, buses, and multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs) with GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less, specifically declining to extend the standard to light trucks, vans, buses and 

MPVs with a GVWR of up to 10,000 pounds. 

Dec. 18, 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) requires application 

of passenger car safety standards to light trucks, vans, buses, and MPVs 

with GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less, and ISTEA also directs NHTSA to commence rulemaking proceeding on a standard to prevent rollover crashes. 

Jan. 3, 1992 NHTSA issues advanced notice of proposed rulemaking to establish a rollover 

prevention standard. 

Sept 23, 1992 NHTSA releases Planning Document for Rollover Prevention and Injury Mitigation listing alternative actions agency could take to address rollover problem, including research into improved roof crush resistance to prevent head 

and spinal injury. 

Jan. 22, 1993 NHTSA delays by 1 year, until Sept. 1, 1994, effective date for application of 

roof crush standard to light trucks, vans, buses, and multi-purpose passenger vehicles with gross vehicle weight rating of 6,000 pounds or less. 

June 23, 1994 NHTSA terminates rulemaking on rollover stability standard, Secretary of 

Transportation instead announces that agency will address factors involved 

in preventing rollover casualties including roof strength requirements. 

May 6, 1996 Petition for rulemaking including a request that the agency require ‘‘roll 

cages’’ as standard equipment on passenger cars filed with NHTSA. 

Jan. 8, 1997 NHTSA grants petition requesting rulemaking to require ‘‘roll cages.’’ 

128 

1971 Roof Crush Standard—37-year Old Antiquated Standard Has Not Kept Pace With Changes 

in Technology or Vehicle Fleet—Continued 

Apr. 27, 1999 Roof crush standard procedure for placement of test device modified to accommodate vehicles with raised and highly sloped roofs, change in standard did 

not address underlying roof crush testing and strength requirements. 

Sept. 2000 In wake of Firestone tire/Ford Explorer rollover fatalities, NHTSA Administrator states that agency needs to improve roof crush safety standard. 

Oct. 22, 2001 NHTSA publishes notice and request for comments on roof crush resistance, 

describing agency roof crush research and testing as part of rollover program 

over past 30 years. 

Sept. 17, 2002 NHTSA Administrator states that roof crush intrusion potentially contributes 

to serious or fatal injury in 26 percent of rollover crashes. 

July 15, 2003 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concludes roof crush contributed 

to severity of driver injuries and diminished passenger survivable space in 

Henrietta, Texas crash of 15-passenger van. 

July 2003 NHTSA estimates that 1,339 serious or fatal injuries caused by roof crush intrusion are suffered by belted occupants each year. NHTSA lists proposed 

rule to upgrade roof crush resistance as possible 2004 action, and final rule 

as possible 2005 action, in Vehicle Safety Rulemaking Priorities and Supporting Research 2003–2006. However, no proposed rule is issued by the 

close of 2004. 

Aug. 10, 2005 SAFETEA–LU legislation enacted, requires that NHTSA issue a proposed rule 

by December 31, 2005, to establish performance criteria to upgrade vehicle 

roof strength for driver and passenger sides, and may consider dynamic tests 

that realistically duplicate actual forces transmitted during a rollover crash, 

and issue a final rule by July 1, 2008. 

Aug. 23, 2005 NHTSA issues decidedly weak upgrade of roof crush resistance standard that 

will not substantially improve roof strength in most vehicles, eliminates 

minimum headroom clearance requirement following testing and fails to require testing on both driver and passenger sides as provided in SAFETEA– 

LU. NHTSA proposed only a marginal increase in vehicle roof strength 

quasi-static piston test that even the agency estimates would save only either 13 or 44 lives. Most production vehicles already meet the proposed test 

criteria, and the proposal does not meet the 2-sided test requirements in 

SAFETEA–LU. 

Nov. 2005 Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, Public Citizen, Insurance Institute for 

Highway Safety and numerous other organizations file comments critical of 

NHTSA’s proposed rule. 

Jan. 30, 2008 NHTSA issues supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM). The initial agency proposed rule did not address the need for improving roof 

strength on both sides of the vehicle. The SNPRM discusses varying options 

regarding degree of strength-to-weight (SWR) ratio that could be required 

but presents no specific revised proposal and provides no economic or safety 

analysis of any of the options raised in the SNPRM. 

Mar. 27, 2008 Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, Public Citizen, Insurance Institute for 

Highway Safety and numerous other organizations file comments regarding 

SNPRM. Advocates points out both safety and procedural problems exist. 

IIHS study of vehicle roof strength finds roof strength has strong effect on 

occupant injury risk, refuting prior industry studies. 

June 4, 2008 Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety holds hearing on NHTSA’s proposed 

upgrade of roof strength rule. 

ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY

Washington, DC, March 27, 2008 

Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0015 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards—Roof Crush Resistance 

Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 FR 5484 (Jan. 30, 2008) 

I. Introduction 

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has published a 

supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) proposing a revised roof 

129 

1The preamble of the supplemental proposed rule does not cite this specific statutory mandate 

and only alludes to it in relation to the abbreviated public comment period that the agency 

claims was selected, in part, due to ‘‘the need to comply with a statutory deadline.’’ 73 FR 5486. 2For all practical purposes, multiples of unladen vehicle weight and values for strength to 

weight ratio (SWR) are used interchangeably by NHTSA and in these comments, although technically the two metrics are not identical. 3 Although the proposed text of the amended regulation contains alternatives for a 1-side or 

a 2-sides test, it still specifies a maximum force application of only 2.5 times unladen vehicle 

weight. Agency consideration of a 3.0X or 3.5X test is discussed only in the preamble of the 

SNPRM. 73 FR 5490. 4See, comments of DVExperts International Pty. Ltd., March 4, 2008 (DVExperts), NHTSA– 

2008–0015–0010.1, at 4. 

crush resistance standard (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216). 73 FR 

5484 (Jan. 30, 2008); 49 CFR § 571. On August 23, 2005, NHTSA published a notice 

of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) while Congress was considering a mandate to the 

agency to upgrade the roof crush resistance standard. 70 FR 49223 (Aug. 23, 2005). 

Section 10301(a) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity 

Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU) (Pub. L. 109–59, Aug. 10, 2005) directed 

the Secretary to initiate a rulemaking proceeding ‘‘to establish performance criteria 

to upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216 relating to roof strength 

for driver and passenger sides[]’’ and to ‘‘issue a . . . final rule by July 1, 2008.’’ 1

Codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30128(d). 

The SNPRM, a quasi-static test of roof crush resistance, is essentially identical 

to the compliance protocol currently required in Standard No. 216 except for the 

current regulatory requirement of an intrusion limit and the substitution of a no 

head contract pass/fail criterion. Windshield glazing, as well as closing moveable 

glazing and locking doors, are required in conducting the roof crush resistance test. 

The SNPRM also adds a requirement to secure moveable and immoveable roof 

structures and to remove all ‘‘nonstructural components,’’ such as roof racks. 73 FR 

5484, 5492–5493. In contrast to the 2005 NPRM for amending Standard No. 216 

that proposed a test of only one side of a passenger vehicle roof at 2.5 times unladen 

vehicle weight, 70 FR 49223, the supplemental proposal offers the potential adoption of a 2.5 times (2.5×), 3.0×, or 3.5× unladen vehicle weight platen force application near the front corners of the roofs of passenger vehicles less than 10,000 

pounds gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR).2 The agency is also considering whether an amended Standard No. 216 would require only a test of one side of a passenger vehicle roof (1-side test) or of both sides (2-sides test). The platen application 

would measure only peak forces, no intrusion limit would be specified in the amended standard, and a successful compliance test would hinge only on intrusion at the 

required platen force application without any roof component or portion of the platen contacting the head of a 50th percentile male anthropomorphic test device (ATD, 

test dummy). 73 FR 5491–5493.3

II. The Supplemental Proposed Rule Will Not Adequately Protect 

Occupants in Rollover Crashes 

The proposed rule crush resistance rule as presented is seriously inadequate in 

several ways. 

• The proposed compliance procedure is only a component test and cannot demonstrate actual roof crush resistance in rollover crashes.4 Compliance with 

NHTSA’s regulation as proposed would have no predictive value for determining 

what the actual impact response of a given passenger vehicle roof will be in rollover crashes of 2 quarter-turns or more. 

• The agency has not shown the relationship between the quasi-static test metric 

at the 3 different proposed application forces (2.5×, 3.0×, 3.5×) to differences in 

real-world rollover occupant injury response. 

• The proposed quasi-static test cannot show roof dynamic flexion or recoil and 

cannot show occupant excursion even when front seat occupants are belted. 

Both of these rollover dynamics can substantially reduce survival space and result in head and face roof impacts despite a given vehicle demonstrating Standard No. 216 compliance. 

• The SNPRM quasi-static platen application procedure is not a real-world test 

because it directs manufacturers to close all moveable glazing, secure moveable 

or unmovable roof structures, and remove roof racks before testing for compliance. These actions increase the probability of compliance even though new vehicles will often be factory-equipped with roof racks, other roof structures, and 

will be operated with opened moveable glazing. 73 FR 5492. 

130 

5FMCSS 216, Upgrade Roof Crush Resistance, Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, August 2005 (2005 PRIA), at IV–7. 6The target population in the SNPRM has been further reduced to 476 belted, non-ejected 

occupants. 7See, M. Bidez, et al., ‘‘Occupant Dynamics in Rollover Crashes: Influence of Roof Deformation 

and Seat Belt Performance on Probable Spinal Column Injury,’’ Annals of Biomedical Engineering, 35:11 (Nov. 2007), 1973–1988. 8 ‘‘The energy absorbed by the roof may be more relevant to injury risk than the peak force 

it can withstand, or the roof’s performance over a plate displacement other than 5 inches would 

better predict injury risk. M. Brumbelow, et al., Roof Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover 

Crashes, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, March 2008 (IIHS Roof Strength Study), at 

5. 9The Role of Vertical Roof Intrusion and Post-Crash Headroom In Predicting Roof Contact Injuries to the Head, Neck, or Face During FMVSS No. 216 Rollovers—An Updated Analysis, DOT 

HS 810 847, October 2007 (2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study). 10 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study at 11. 

• A roof meeting the most stringent regulatory alternative proposed in the 

SNPRM does not ensure that a belted occupant will avoid serious head-faceneck injury. In fact, this is implied by the agency’s own 2005 benefits analysis 

based solely on a 2.5×, 1-side test: the lives saved—13 or 44, 70 FR 49225— 

were only a small fraction of the population defined (596) 5 as even susceptible 

of benefiting from the proposed rule.6

• The upright, safety belt-retrained ATD—the Hybrid (H)III 50th percentile male 

test dummy—has no dynamic function or injury measurement for the proposed 

compliance test. Its use cannot show the dynamic response of safety belts to 

translational forces and occupant inversion that can result in occupant contact 

with an intruding roof even if the vehicle passes the quasi-static platen test 

using the dummy head contact/no-contact compliance test criterion.7

• Use of only a 50th percentile male ATD for the compliance test immediately denies equal safety protection to taller occupants. 

• The proposed quasi-static compliance test disregards dramatic differences in occupant injury response and morbidity related to occupant age, and ignores the 

fact that older occupants are much more prone to death and injury in rollover 

crashes than younger occupants. 

• The SNPRM offers several regulatory alternatives without support from a costbenefit analysis projecting lives saved and injuries averted or reduced in severity for each regulatory combination of SWR with a 1-side or 2-sides test. The 

failure to supply a cost-benefit analysis for each regulatory alternative denies 

the public an opportunity to evaluate the agency’s comparative estimates of 

costs and benefits before submitting comments supporting one or more of the 

regulatory alternatives of the SNPRM. 

III. The Proposed Quasi-Static Platen Test of Roof Crush Resistance Is 

Weak 

The SNPRM relies on the belief that roofs designed to meet a higher strength requirement in a quasi-static test of applied plate force are more resistant to crush 

and intrusion and will maintain sufficient occupant headroom and survival space 

during real-world rollovers. But no correlation of the proposed 2.5× SWR metric 

based solely on no head contact without an intrusion limit has been made with actual occupant fatality and injury data of passenger vehicles in rollover crashes.8

NHTSA’s proposed surrogate measure of adequate roof strength—contact or no contact with the head of a 50th percentile test dummy—proves nothing about how any 

vehicle complying with the proposed quasi-static platen test will actually resist roof 

deformation and intrusion during rollover crashes and cannot predict occupant injuries in rollover crashes. 

NHTSA has not shown in the SNPRM that passenger vehicle roofs that resist intrusion at greater, specific SWR force applications in such a quasi-static test also 

result in fewer occupant severe injuries or deaths. One major deficiency in the recent roof intrusion study published by NHTSA 9 is the fact that intrusion cannot be 

correlated with specific injury predictions even for the very conservative benefits 

target population except at a gross level of analysis. The 2007 NHTA Vertical Roof 

Intrusion Study only shows that ‘‘coefficient estimates for intrusion were negative 

indicating that an increase in intrusion tended to be associated with an increase in 

the level of injury severity; the coefficient estimates for post-crash headroom were 

positive, indicating that an increase in headroom tended to be associated with a decrease in the level of injury severity.’’ 10

This implies that, in general, stronger, more intrusion-resistant passenger vehicle 

roofs providing more post-rollover survival space will protect more front-seat occuVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
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11DVExperts at 5 (emphasis supplied). In its 2005 proposed rule, NHTSA specifically asked 

for comments on an energy absorption criterion added to the requirements of Standard No. 216 

because two commenters argued that a peak force requirement alone is insufficient to prevent 

roof collapse after initial peak force is attained. The agency stated that it would have to conduct 

additional analysis to evaluate energy absorption to establish test parameters. 70 FR 49236. 

However, two and one-half years have elapsed since the agency asked for further comments on 

an energy management criterion for the standard, and there is no indication that the agency 

has conducted the additional analysis necessary to test vehicles for roof energy management in 

rollover crashes. 12 IIHS Roof Strength Study at 5. 13 Id. at 10. 14 Id. at 11. The finding in the IIHS Roof Strength Study that occupant injury is strongly related to a higher SWR and the amount of intrusion is consistent with Advocates’ prior comments 

that responded to the 2005 proposed rule. Advocates supported a SWR of at least 3.0X and, preferably, 3.5× and the restoration of an intrusion limit of a maximum of 3 inches, the platen test 

conducted without the windshield and with retracted side glazing. See, comments of Advocates 

for Highway and Auto Safety dated Aug. 23, 2005 (Advocates’ 2005 Comments), to Docket No. 

NHTSA–2005–22143–0136, at 4–5, 13. 

pants from severe injuries and deaths. Yet, NHTSA has failed to provide any evidence in the SNPRM that a roof crush resistance standard based on the platen test 

can be correlated with substantial improvements in the real-world prevention of 

head, face, and neck injuries in rollover crashes. 

This crucial point is emphasized in recent comments filed with the docket: 

The proposed standard raises the force level required to generate roof crush, but 

it does not necessarily result in increased energy resistance or reduced roof crush 

in a rollover. Individual vehicles with different peak loads can have similar energy resistance capabilities and therefore similar degrees of roof crush in a rollover, and, inversely, individual vehicles with identical peak loads can have dramatically different energy resistance capabilities and dramatically different degrees of roof crush. For this reason, simply requiring a minimum force level 

does not ensure that roofs will be able to resist a significant amount of energy 

in a rollover nor maintain the necessary structural integrity. Consideration for 

structural energy management is critical if the Agency’s goal is to reduce roof 

intrusion.11

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) has recently published an important study supporting the concept that more highly crush resistant passenger 

roofs will provide enhanced protection of front seat occupants from head, face, and 

neck injuries if based on a more stringent quasi-static test. The IIHS Roof Strength 

Study indicates that vehicle roof energy management is a major parameter relating 

to occupant injury.12 NHTSA needs to evaluate these findings in light of its demurral on using an intrusion limit and energy absorption criterion to adopt a roof crush 

resistance standard based on the platen test of Standard No. 216. The IIHS Roof 

Strength Study comprised 22,817 single-vehicle rollover crashes involving drivers 

suffering both incapacitating injuries and deaths in 11 sport utility vehicle (SUV) 

models in police-reported crashes in 12 states. These crashes were matched with 

roof strength results from using the quasi-static platen test in which 8 midsized 

SUVs’ roofs were crushed at 2, 5, and 10 inches of platen displacement. The highest 

SWR achieved by any of the study vehicles undergoing the platen test was 3.16. The 

study performed logistic regression analyses of the 12 states’ single-vehicle rollover 

crashes, controlling for the state in which the crashes occurred, Static Stability Factor (SSF), and driver age. The results of the analyses found that lower incapacitating and fatal injury rates were associated not only with higher values of peak 

force and SWR, but also for energy absorption. 

These findings support the need for NHTSA to adopt several, interacting metrics 

to a roof crush resistance compliance test that relies on a quasi-static platen test 

of intrusion. Using only a SWR multiple, such as 2.5×, 3.0×, etc., without an intrusion limit, no energy management requirement, and only a head no-contact/contact 

(pass/fail) criterion cannot provide sufficient assurance that a complying vehicle will 

provide substantially enhanced roof crush resistance, which, in turn, will produce 

lower rates of severe injury and death in rollover crashes. The IIHS Roof Strength 

Study found consistent trends in odds ratios for reduced risk of fatal or incapacitating driver injuries that were correlated with reduced platen displacement, higher 

SWRs, and higher energy absorption.13

Using the logistic regression models of driver fatality risk to calculate the odds 

ratio for a full 1-unit increase in peak force, SWR, and energy absorption, the study 

found that the lowest driver fatality risk was associated with a 2-inch peak force 

platen displacement, 2 inches SWR, and 2 inches energy absorption.14 Overall, the 

132 

15 Id. at 13. 16 A SWR of at least 4.0× is recommended by DVExperts. Advocates supported a SWR of at 

least 3.0× and desirably 3.5× in its comments filed in response to the 2005 proposed rule, but 

this stance was based on the agency eliminating reliance on the windshield and closed side glazing for the quasi-static compliance test. Since FMCSA appears to be resolute in allowing both 

to be used in complying with an amended Standard No. 216, Advocates has increased its recommended minimum SWR to at least 4.0×. See, Advocates’ 2005 Comments at 15–16. 17DVExperts cites the roof crush resistance achievement of the Volvo XC90. Volvo requires 

that a minimum force level of 3.5X SWR be reached within 2 inches of platen displacement, 

but then maintained to within 7.9 inches, followed by a force level of 4.3X SWR maintained 

within 11.8 inches of platen displacement. DVExperts at 3–5. Volvo’s test requirements result 

in a roof in a rollover crash that progressively becomes stronger as the forces of a rollover test 

roof crush resistance. 18 Advocates continues to support the use of a 95th percentile male ATD in the test protocol 

if NHTSA continues to insist on the use of a dummy in the platen test. However, the use of 

the ATD has no relationship to any injury measure. For all practical purposes, the ATD used 

in the proposed platen test is a manikin. See, Advocates’ 2005 Comments at 12; DVExperts at 

6. 19 Advocates urges the agency to reconsider barring the use of windshields in conducting the 

platen test. 

logistic regression analyses found that rollover injury risks were significantly lower 

for vehicles with stronger roofs regardless of which strength assessment was used. 

However, the IIHS Roof Strength Study could not determine whether any one metric is more predictive of injury outcomes than others.15 This implies that NHTSA 

should act prudently and adopt several different metrics to ensure that the quasistatic platen test results in substantial safety benefits in injury prevention. 

In order to be cautious in using a non-dynamic, surrogate measure of real-world 

vehicle roof responses to rollover impact forces, NHTSA should seriously consider 

establishing multiple measures for conducting a quasi-static platen compliance test 

if the agency continues to insist that it cannot adopt a dynamic compliance test. 

Given the agency’s continued insistence on the quasi-static compliance test, Advocates supports the following as the main features of the test protocol, including the 

minimum number of metrics and their values: 

• A SWR of no less than 4.0× 16

• An intrusion limit of no more than 2 inches with maintenance of force level instead of simply achieving peak force.17

• A residual headroom limit of no less than 2 inches from the top of the head 

of a 50th percentile male ATD.18

• Moveable side glazing should be retracted or otherwise positioned to open side 

portals.19

Surprisingly, NHTSA takes no action in the SNPRM to factor in the amount of 

intrusion that should be permitted in a quasi-static platen test apart from an ATD 

head no-contact requirement, despite the fact that its own 2007 Vertical Roof Intrusion Study found ‘‘a statistically significant relationship between intrusion and injury for belted occupants . . .’’ and that, ‘‘together with other factors . . . will likely 

lead to slightly higher benefits than was estimated in the NPRM.’’ 73 FR 5490. 

When this finding is framed by the more specific finding of the IIHS Roof Strength 

Study linking the level of force applied to a vehicle roof with the amount of intrusion for the extent and severity of occupant injury, NHTSA must appreciate that 

a revised roof crush resistance standard must incorporate an intrusion limit to accompany a SWR force level in the final rule. The agency cannot simply disregard 

its own finding that ‘‘a statistically significant relationship between intrusion and 

injury’’ has been determined through its own further investigation by offering a roof 

crush resistance regulation that has no specific intrusion limit other than avoidance 

of ATD head contact. This would be a capricious choice that is contrary to the evidence in the rulemaking record provided by NHTSA itself, IIHS, and DVExperts 

that a specific intrusion limit figure is necessary to produce injury prevention benefits. 

IV. Without Requirements for an Intrusion Limit, Minimum Residual 

Headroom Space, and Sustained Force, the Proposed Quasi-Static 

Platen Test Can Be Easily ‘‘Gamed’’ By Manufacturers 

Requirements that limit maximum intrusion, specify a minimum residual headroom space, and use sustained force and energy absorption as components of a 

strengthened quasi-static roof crush resistance test can substantially reduce the 

ability of manufacturers to manipulate other features of roof and roof support design 

that will translate into passing the compliance test. These measures will not nullify 

133 

20 ‘‘There are ways to ‘trick’ the quasi-static simple test and achieve artificially high loads, by 

incorporating a strong B-pillar, for example, meanwhile ignoring the critical areas that bear 

loads in real world rollovers such as the A-pillar and windscreen header.’’ DV Experts at 4. 21See, DVExperts at 6. 

the ability of manufacturers to ‘‘game’’ a quasi-static compliance test of roof components, as recognized by other commenters to the docket, but the use of more, specific 

test metrics for determining compliance will limit the ability of manufacturers to introduce compensatory design features to pass the platen test.20 The simpler NHTSA 

renders the compliance test requirements, the easier it is for manufacturers to compensate for weak forward roof crush resistance by artful choices of other design 

changes. Test manipulation is strongly facilitated by NHTSA’s binary compliance 

criterion of dummy head contact/no-contact while dispensing with a platen intrusion 

limit. The use of the HIII head for the criterion is gratuitous since the ATD has 

no injury response measurements even if head contact occurs. Even if the ATD had 

injury response measurement corridors, such as measurement of neck axial compression, flexion, or shear, complying with the quasi-static test shows nothing about 

how an occupant would actually respond in a real-world rollover crash because occupant kinematics in a rollover are categorically different from the static, belted ATD 

seated in an upright position used for such a binary compliance decision.21

If the agency chooses a quasi-static test at 2.5×, 3.0×, 3.5×, or some other SWR 

figure, the test should specify (a) a maximum intrusion limit of no more than 2 

inches and (b) that limit must be reached at a distance no less than 2 inches from 

a 50th percentile ATD head, although Advocates urges the agency to require a 

greater residual head space that will respond to the safety needs of the 95th percentile of front seat male occupants. However, a choice of a lower SWR will substantially counter the benefits of a stringent intrusion limit and residual headroom requirement. NHTSA’s crash data investigation showed that 9 percent of occupants 

with post-crash headroom above the tops of their heads nevertheless still experienced roof contact injuries to the head, neck, or face, while 34 percent suffered such 

injuries when headroom was below the tops of their heads. 70 FR 49237. This clearly shows that increasing residual headroom will commensurately increase benefits 

because of lower rates of head, face, and neck injuries, especially in connection with 

a more demanding SWR than 2.5×. Removing an intrusion limit and substituting a binary criterion of head contact/ 

no contact will allow manufacturers to design to maximum intrusion that falls just 

short of head contact, a design choice that can allow considerable intrusion reducing 

the margin of safety for preventing severe head, face, and neck injuries in actual 

rollovers. In real-world rollovers, manufacturers of low roofline vehicles can pass a 

head non-contact regulatory compliance platen test with only a small margin that 

will disappear in real-world rollovers due to excursion even of belted occupants, 

transient roof dynamic flexion and recoil, and roof structural failures that cannot 

be replicated in a quasi-static test. Measurable residual headroom found post-crash 

does not ensure that roof contact and consequent head, face, and neck injuries even 

to belted occupants did not occur. 

A regulation based solely on a simplistic ‘‘no contact’’ compliance criterion cannot 

reach the agency’s goal of ‘‘quantifiable benefits of limiting headroom reduction,’’ 

and it allows manufacturers to manipulate the test for compliance that will continue 

to result in unacceptable occupant head, face, and neck injuries in rollovers. A no 

head contact criterion with no intrusion limit and no required minimum residual 

space above the heads of occupants simply indulges manufacturers to continue to 

produce compliant, low roofline vehicles with little margin before head contact, margins that easily will be exceeded in real-world rollover crashes with a high risk of 

severe injury. 

Failure to specify an intrusion limit, which should be considerably less than 5 

inches, and basing the test on peak force resistance rather than sustained resistance 

has no real-world correlation with multiple quarter-turn rollover crashes. A roof 

that might sustain, say, a 2.5× SWR load in the first impact of each side might subsequently fail in the second set of impacts in vehicles that suffer multiple full rolls. 

NHTSA tested several passenger vehicles with an inverted drop test and concluded 

that the quasi-static test of Standard No. 216 was as accurate in reproducing roof 

deformation as a drop test in producing deformation similar to real-world crashes. 

70 FR 49231. All of these vehicles presumably complied with existing Standard No. 

216, including the 5-inch intrusion limit. Yet, NHTSA also found a high percentage 

of vehicles that complied with the quasi-static test requirements of No. 216 but also 

suffered roof intrusion beyond 5 inches in real-world rollover crashes. Specifically, 

the agency found that 32 percent of cars and 49 percent of light trucks under 6,000 

pounds exceeded 5.9 inches of vertical roof intrusion, and 55 percent of light trucks 

134 

with a GVWR greater than 6,000 pounds and less than 10,000 pounds suffered 

vertical roof intrusion exceeding 5.9 inches. Id. at 49236. 

This shows that, in fact, complying with a quasi-static test that claims to reproduce real-world deformation does not predict whether any given complying vehicle 

will nevertheless suffer roof intrusion exceeding the limits of such a standard. The 

agency’s subsequent review of heavier passenger cars near or above 3,333 pounds 

GVWR, id. at 49237, found that several of these withstood 1.5× vehicle weight in 

the platen test. But this compliance result clearly has no predictive value for whether any of these vehicles would not suffer severe roof crush in real-world rollover 

crashes, including crashes that resulted in greater than 5 inches of vertical intrusion. NHTSA cannot substantially improve roof strength while also dramatically reducing occupant deaths and injuries based solely on a higher SWR value and an 

ATD no-contact compliance criterion. 

V. SAFETEA–LU Requires NHTSA to Upgrade Passenger Vehicle Roof 

Strength In Standard No. 216 for Both Driver and Passenger Sides 

NHTSA is required by law to upgrade ‘‘roof strength for [both the] driver and passenger sides.’’ SAFETEA–LU, Sec. 10301(a), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30128(d). In 

order to accomplish this, the agency must require a compliance procedure that demonstrates the strength of both sides of a passenger vehicle roof. This makes eminent 

sense because NHTSA cannot predict which side of a rolling vehicle will receive the 

first impact, and because vehicles in multiple quarter-turn rolls can suffer impacts 

to both sides of the roof. As a result, Congress understood that the agency must ensure that both sides of a passenger vehicle roof are strengthened in any upgrade 

of Standard No. 216, and a 2-sides test is the only realistic means for ensuring this 

goal of enhancing real-world occupant protection in rollovers. 

It is clear from the agency’s tabulated results of 1-side and 2-sides testing in the 

SNPRM, 73 FR 5486–5487, Tables 2 and 3, that compliance with the quasi-static 

test at the adopted force level for 1-side cannot determine whether the vehicle would 

comply with a sequential test of the 2nd side if tested with the platen. Even the 

agency’s summary analysis of tests conducted for the 2005 proposed rule showed 

that first side test results cannot be used to predict second side test results using 

the platen test. In testing the second side of a Crown Victoria, local peak force was 

reduced 17 percent between 50–90 mm of crush in contrast with the first side test. 

70 FR 49239. But a platen test of both sides of a Land Rover Freelander produced 

an increase in force during the second side test over that of the first side starting 

at approximately 40 mm of plate movement. As contrasted with the Lincoln LS test, 

local peak force was increased by 20 percent on the second side for the Freelander, 

whereas the Lincoln LS suffered a decrease in force beginning at 40 mm of platen 

intrusion, resulting in a 20 percent decrease in peak force for the second side. Id. 

As a consequence, NHSTA concluded that ‘‘some vehicles may have weakened or 

strengthened far side roof structures as a result of a near side impact.’’ 70 FR 

49239. NHTSA found similar disparities in the test results for 1-side and 2-sides 

tabulated in SNPRM, showing that 1-side peak force roof responses cannot be relied 

on to gauge second side responses, especially in light of the fact that increases, rather than decreases, in peak force in the second side tests were the exception rather 

than the rule. See, Table 3, 73 FR 5487. 

Although NHTSA asserts in the SNPRM that it is actively considering whether 

to adopt a 1-side or a 2-sides compliance test, e.g., id. at 5490, the agency is arguably less able to relate the results of a 1-side test to real-world roof crush resistance 

in rollovers and occupant injury responses than even the use of a quasi-static 2- 

sides test. The statutory mandate cannot be satisfied with a 1-side platen test. 

VI. The Proposed Platen Test Impedes Development of Other, Crucial 

Safety Performance Features for Reducing Injury in Rollover Crashes 

Contrary to NHTSA’s assertion that the SNPRM is ‘‘part of a comprehensive plan 

for reducing the serious risk of rollover crashes,’’ 73 FR 5484, NHTSA’s refusal to 

consider a dynamic test for determining roof crush resistance to intrusion in rollover 

crashes denies the agency the advantages of determining other key safety design 

and performance features of passenger motor vehicles in rollovers. Instead, the 

agency has chosen to perpetuate an outdated, simplistic method of applying localized force to the corners of an upright passenger vehicle roof near the A-pillars as 

a surrogate for the dynamic forces acting on vehicle roofs in real-world rollovers. 

Perpetuating this anachronistic approach evades a systems engineering response 

to rollover crash occupant safety, an approach that would rely on a dynamic test 

protocol that simultaneously demonstrates occupant kinematics and injury responses in actual rollover crashes. The proposed platen test cannot show the effects 

of actual rollover crashes on vehicle safety systems, including door latch/lock and 

135 

22These important benefits of a dynamic roof crush resistance standard are also emphasized 

in the comments of DVExperts at 2. 23 Id. at 4. 24 NHTSA projected in its 2007 final rule on ESC benefits of between 4,200 and 5,500 deaths 

prevented annually when full fleet implementation of ESC (beginning with Model Year 2012) 

occurs. 72 FR 17236 (April 6, 2006). Of the approximately 10,800 annual rollover crash fatalities, this means that ESC will not prevent as many as 60 percent of rollover fatalities. Even 

if many of those dying in rollover fatalities suffer fatal injuries because of ejection or because 

of trauma suffered to other body regions than the head, face, and neck, a strong roof crush resistance standard can ensure that many additional lives can be saved in rollover crashes that 

cannot be prevented by ESC alone. 25 In contrast, the IIHS Roof Strength Study did not find that belt use was confounding the 

results of its final regression model. Preliminary models for drivers with reported belt use estimated roof strength effects nearly identical to the effects estimated for all drivers. Id. at 12. 26See, 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study at 3. 27 Id. 28The IIHS Roof Strength Study emphasizes that the agency’s benefits estimates are based 

on only 32 National Accident Sampling System/Crashworthiness Data System (NASS/CDS) rollover crashes. Id. at 2. 

hinge strength to resist failure leading to ejection and restraint system effectiveness 

in sustained rollover events to maintain occupant containment and to reduce occupant excursion.22 Restraint system performance, door component retention effectiveness, and occupant injury mechanisms in rollover crashes shown in compliance tests 

of a dynamic roof crush resistance standard would be immensely valuable in helping 

the agency to accelerate the adoption of more effective crashworthiness standards 

governing the safety performance of these vehicle systems. Instead, NHTSA has chosen a roof crush resistance test approach that cannot provide any information in 

these areas and therefore delays the development of standards based on dynamic 

tests in these areas. In fact, choosing a quasi-static platen test undermines the 

agency separately establishing both active and passive restraint system and seating 

system standards for rollover protection on the basis of dynamic testing. 

The proposal to continue the use of the quasi-static platen test stands in stark 

contrast to the evolution of other major safety standards from quasi-static to fully 

dynamic compliance tests, including Standards Nos. 201, 208, and 214. This is recognized in comments filed with the docket: ‘‘Each of the other mandated crashworthiness standards rely on a systems approach to crashworthiness. A dynamic 

test is necessary to evaluate the performance of the rollover protection system, 

which is made up of the restraints, airbags, glazing, and roof strength.’’ 23 The agency has previously documented the increases in benefits of lives saved and injuries 

reduced as a consequence of more stringent, effective vehicle design factors and safety performance resulting from dynamic testing, yet it has paradoxically ignored its 

own record showing the benefits of dynamic testing in the SNPRM. 

VII. A Strong, Effective Roof Crush Resistance Standard Can Achieve 

Benefits Substantially Greater Than Previously Estimated By NHTSA 

Although NHTSA contends that its revised estimate of the number of head injuries prevented by stronger roofs and the impact of electronic stability control (ESC) 

in reducing rollover crashes will erode benefits of a strengthened roof crush resistance standard,24 the benefits analysis provided by the agency in the 2005 proposed 

rule artificially restricted potential benefits of reduced head, face, and neck injury 

to only belted, non-ejected front seat occupants.25 The agency’s target population for 

an amended Standard No. 216 is produced by its statistical approach to avoiding 

confounders in determining potential benefits and its compliance with the Office of 

Management and Budget’s proscription on double-counting benefits for any proposed 

rule.26

This method of isolating the purported target population for the benefits of a 

stronger roof crush resistance standard is largely an artifact of the agency’s statistical analysis 27 and thereby substantially underestimates potential benefits of a 

stronger Standard No. 216. Furthermore, even NHTSA has recognized that it has 

a very limited set of cases—32 crashes—from which to infer benefits,28 some of the 

relevant cases within the sample lacked data elements, and certain individual cases 

were assigned very large sample weights. As a result, NHTSA admits that ‘‘the 

characteristics of this limited sample may not accurately represent the full benefits 

from the proposed roof crush resistance upgrade.’’ 70 FR 49242. 

The agency’s analysis in the 2005 NPRM pointed out that about 64 percent of the 

10,000 occupants fatally injured in rollovers each year are killed when they are either partially or completely ejected during the rollover. This means that about 6,400 

fatally injured occupants die from ejection. NHTSA further states that about 53 percent of these fatally injured individuals are completely ejected, and 72 percent of 

136 

29Status Report, IIHS, 43:2, March 15, 2008. 30 IIHS Roof Strength Study at 13. 31 NHTSA concluded from the evaluation of only 32 crashes in the NASS/CDS that, after excluding convertibles as a class, no benefits of more crush-resistant passenger vehicle roofs would 

accrue to occupants in one quarter-turn passenger vehicle rollovers, fixed object roof impacts, 

ejected occupants, unbelted occupants, rear seated occupants, and occupants with no coded roof 

intrusion over their seating positions. PRIA, Sec. IV; IIHS Roof Strength Study at 2. 32 IIHS Roof Strength Study at 11. 33See, id. at 13. 34DVExperts at 2–3. 

these are unbelted. 72 FR 49227. This amounts to about 3,480 fatally injured occupants who are only partially ejected. 

These partially ejected occupants, as well as occupants who are unbelted but who 

remain within the occupant compartment, might benefit from a stronger roof crush 

resistance rule even though they do not fall within the agency’s artificially restricted 

potential benefits population of only front-seat occupants who are belted and not 

ejected at the time of rollover crashes. It is likely that non-ejected, unbelted occupants could suffer fewer severe and fatal head, face, and neck injuries by preserving 

more rollover survival space gained by highly crush resistant roofs that reduce the 

chances of impacting rigid roof structures such as headers, rails, and sunroof 

frames, as well as with the roof proper apart from these framing structures. This 

inference appears to have at least partial support in the agency’s concession that 

‘‘seriously and fatally injured occupants who had a non-MAIS roof contact injury 

may also derive some benefit from decreased roof intrusion.’’ Id. at 49229. 

This inference that many occupants not part of NHTSA’s benefits target population may avoid severe injury or death from roof crush in rollovers is also supported by IIHS in its recent Status Report 29 and the IIHS Roof Strength Study that 

properly point out that real-world benefits can accrue to occupants who are not part 

of the agency’s benefits target population because other crashworthiness system features can have increased effectiveness in tandem with much stronger roofs.30 Some 

of the occupants excluded from NHTSA’s benefits target population 31 could nevertheless avoid death in rollover crashes if roofs were appropriately strengthened. In 

contrast to the agency’s very low benefits estimates, the IIHS Roof Strength Study 

found that after controlling for major confounders, even amending Standard No. 216 

to increase the SWR to 2.5× could save 108 lives of the 668 front outboard seat occupants who were killed in single-vehicle rollovers in 2006, and that increasing the 

SWR to 3.16× could have saved 212 lives.32

The increase to 3.16× SWR from 2.5× SWR is less than one full unit, yet the number of lives saved is almost double the number of a standard indexed to 2.5× SWR. 

Advocates believes that further increases in lives saved by each half-unit SWR increase in roof strength would rise at some unknown but nevertheless exponential 

rate. Adding a stringent maximum intrusion limit, such as 2 inches, and a minimum residual headroom space as compliance requirements would probably increase 

these gains by substantial amount while probably also increasing the exponent for 

each half-unit step in SWR magnifying the number of lives saved. These gains could 

move upward at even at greater rate given the additional strength supplied by 

windshield retention when a high SWR with stringent limits on intrusion and residual headroom space interact to ensure higher rates of windshield retention and resistance to cracking.33 Even introducing fleet-wide effects of ESC benefits in preventing rollover fatalities, estimated at about 60 percent effectiveness for passenger 

vehicles, cannot reduce real-world benefits to only the untenably small numbers estimated in the 2005 proposed rule. 

NHTSA also cannot reduce benefits in any final rule based on the exaggerated 

figures provided by the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance) for the 

weight and cost of complying with 2.5×, 3.0×, or 3.5× roof crush resistance standard. 

The Alliance estimates that it would cost an additional $130 for a large SUV to comply with a 3.5× alternative and that, based on NHTSA’s cost studies, ‘‘total costs 

could be 50 percent higher.’’ 73 FR 5488. Similarly, the Alliance estimates that the 

additional weight of the extra countermeasure design changes to meet a 3.5X SWR 

standard could be as much as 540 pounds. These inflated estimates are consistent 

with past Alliance claims that, in each instance, are intended to dissuade NHTSA 

from adopting a substantially stronger or a more demanding standard in a key 

crashworthiness safety area. Even NHTSA’s own study of the comparative costs and 

weight needed to upgrade a Ford Explorer to the roof crush resistance level of a 

Volvo XC90 SUV ‘‘would increase material and tooling costs by [only] $81 and 

weight by [only] 15 kilograms (33 pounds).’’ Id. at 5489. These figures are cited and 

supported by comments already submitted to the docket.34 The Alliance cost and 

137 

weight figures for substantial strengthening of passenger motor vehicles to better 

resist roof crush have no credibility, and NHTSA should continue to reject them. 

VIII. The SNPRM Is Procedurally and Substantively Inadequate 

A. The SNPRM Has No Supporting Cost-Benefit Analysis to Justify a Final Rule 

The SNPRM has no cost-benefit analysis of the various combinations of test requirements (1-side at 2.5×, 2-sides at 3.0×, etc.) suggested by NHTSA as potential 

regulatory outcomes. The failure to provide the costs and safety benefits of different 

alternative combinations of SWR with 1-side or 2-sides testing denies the public an 

opportunity to evaluate NHTSA’s justification for a final rule choosing one of these 

alternatives to amend Standard No. 216. Without the ability to review and critique 

alternative costs and benefits for different regulatory alternatives, the public is unable to show that a more demanding SWR (that is, a peak force requirement greater 

than 2.5×) on both sides of a vehicle roof is needed to appropriately reduce occupant 

deaths and injuries or to challenge an agency cost-benefit analysis that NHTSA believes supports its regulatory choice. 

NHTSA states that a number of major factors will substantially change both benefits and costs of a final rule. 73 FR 5488. Among these are major revisions to the 

benefits population that is the target of the SNPRM because the agency has modified its analysis of the cause of death in rollover crashes, resulting in a reduction 

by one-third the number of annual fatalities attributable to head injury that were 

estimated in the 2005 Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis. Id. At 5485. Moreover, NHTSA states that the installation of ESC on new passenger motor vehicles 

as a result of the April 2007 ESC final rule, 72 FR 17236 (April 2007), ‘‘will significantly reduce both the target population and the safety benefits associated with 

FMVSS No. 216.’’ 73 FR 5488. Further, the agency forecasts increased costs if a 2- 

sides regulation were adopted. However, figures for the costs and benefits of these 

major impacts on various regulatory alternatives are not provided for public review 

and comment. Instead, NHTSA asserts that ‘‘regardless of which alternative is 

adopted in the final rule, the agency will ensure that the final rule is cost beneficial. 

. . .’’ Id. at 5490. This conclusory assertion does not fulfill the agency’s obligation 

to present the public with the regulatory alternatives it is considering. 

B. The SNPRM Is Not a Proposed Rule 

The SNPRM is incomplete and does not fulfill the requirements for a proposed 

rule. Without a cost-benefit analysis, without proposing a specific regulatory alternative for comment, and without an assessment of how the rule can be improved 

at a minimum with the addition of a specific intrusion limit figure and, desirably, 

with an energy absorption criterion, the supplementary proposal is only equivalent 

to an advance notice of proposed rulemaking seeking initial data, views, and arguments for various combinations of prescriptive requirements for a range of regulatory alternatives. NHTSA cannot move from this notice to a final rule without proposing a specific regulation and without a cost-benefit analysis of all regulatory alternatives, especially in light of major changes in costs and benefits that the agency 

anticipates because of the new considerations indicated in the foregoing paragraphs 

of Section VIII of these comments. That cost-benefit analysis must include an assessment of each regulatory alternative, including the alternative proposed by 

NHTSA for amending Standard No. 216. The cost-benefit analysis must also comprise an assessment of the injury prevention benefits of an energy management criterion, a maximum residual headroom limit, and the addition of a specific vertical 

intrusion limit to a SWR value governing an amended standard. 

The SNPRM regulatory alternatives comprise several different possible combinations of SWR with a 1-side or 2-sides platen test, with a simple no head contact criterion. These are the principal components of a prospective final rule. It is clear that 

the agency cannot proceed to a final rule on the basis of this SNPRM given its own 

finding in its recent 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study, as buttressed by 

the more detailed findings of the IIHS Roof Strength Study, that the number of fatalities and the extent of severe injuries are directly linked to the interaction of roof 

crush resistance with the amount of intrusion. 

C. NHTSA Has Authority to Establish a New Deadline for Issuing a Final Rule 

Contrary to NHTSA’s claim that it has to accelerate its rulemaking action to meet 

a statutory deadline by dispensing with a new assessment of costs and benefits for 

this SNPRM, SAFETEA–LU provides an opportunity for the Secretary to inform 

Congress that the enacted regulatory deadline cannot be met and to select a new 

138 

35SAFETEA–LU specifically provides the Secretary and NHTSA with discretion on meeting 

statutory deadlines for regulatory action: 

(e) DEADLINES.—If the Secretary determines that the deadline for a final rule under this 

section cannot be met, the Secretary shall—— 

(1) notify the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House 

of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce and explain why that deadline cannot 

be met; and 

(2) establish a new deadline. 

SAFETEA–LU, § 10301(a), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30128(e). 36 ‘‘As the number of vehicles with side curtain airbags increase, the likelihood of ejection 

through the side windows should decrease. However, weak roofs could compromise the protection afforded by these airbags if they allow the roof rails to shift laterally and expose occupants 

to contacts with the ground.’’ IIHS Roof Strength Study at 13. 37DVExperts emphasizes this at 2, 8. 

deadline.35 There are major unresolved issues and a lack of an adequate cost-benefit 

analysis impacting the supplementary proposed rule. There is no need or justification for NHTSA to short-circuit the rulemaking process by requesting comments 

without a complete cost-benefit analysis showing the impacts of different regulatory 

alternatives, including alternatives that must include evaluation of the benefits of 

an intrusion limit. The SNPRM openly compromises the public in responding to a 

specific proposed regulation with required supporting materials justifying the agency’s choice. It is indefensible for the agency to issue a final rule without any justification in the SNPRM why, at a minimum, the agency needs to forego an adequate cost-benefit analysis of the regulatory alternatives it is considering, in light 

of the explicit discretion that Congress provided for NHTSA to set new rulemaking 

deadlines. It is too important to a major opportunity to advance public safety to 

rush the adoption of a rule that clearly is not ready, especially when Congress has 

provided the agency ample flexibility in giving full consideration to all options for 

improving rollover safety by requiring stronger roofs. 

IX. Conclusion 

The proposed rule as modified by the SNPRM is still inherently deficient at several major junctures. NHTSA is prepared to adopt a compliance test that, even if 

indexed to a higher SWR, is arguably weaker than the current standard because 

it lacks a maximum intrusion limit. The benefits of the agency adopting a much 

more demanding SWR figure, such as at least 4.0×, accompanied by a stringent intrusion limit of 2 inches and a minimum residual headroom limit of 2 inches, would 

result in many more lives saved each year even despite the growing contribution 

of ESC to reducing rollover crashes. 

In part, those annual lives saved from reduced head, face, and neck trauma would 

be further augmented by lives saved from reduced occupant ejections because much 

stronger roofs would produce less portal deformation leading to loss of glazing and 

door component retention failures that result in open ejection paths. NHTSA may 

not be able to count these benefits in its artificially constrained cost-benefit analysis, but these benefits are real and they would be produced as corollary benefits 

from a much stronger roof crush resistance standard, even one based on a quasistatic roof component test. It is hard to understand why NHTSA, while continuing 

to demur on the adoption of a dynamic roof crush resistance standard, would pass 

up an opportunity not only to save many more lives from reduced head, face, and 

neck trauma due to weak roofs in rollover crashes, but also to gain the additional 

lives saved from reduced ejections. The agency can acknowledge that ejection benefits would be forthcoming just from a stronger roof crush resistance regulation even 

if it also had to state that such benefits could not be quantified in this rulemaking 

action. 

A much stronger roof strength standard would also increase the effectiveness of 

upper interior air bags and curtains because front pillars, headers, and side rails 

would resist deformation far better and thereby increase the lifesaving benefits of 

these upper interior passive restraint systems.36 This is particularly true if the 

agency also moves forward with upper interior head impact protection systems that 

are required to have sustained inflation throughout the protracted amount of time 

that a rollover crash can consume before the vehicle comes to a stop.37 A weak roof 

strength standard undermines future agency efforts to combine different strategic 

responses to occupant compartment safety that provide the safety management synergism that a well-reasoned, systems engineering approach can provide. Even the 

IIHS Roof Strength Study and DVExperts appreciate the effect of a much stronger 

roof crush resistance standard on other, mutually dependent and interacting safety 

systems within the occupant compartment. NHTSA should not forswear these prospective benefits, much less undermine its future rulemaking actions in these and 

139 

38 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study at 16. 39 IIHS Roof Strength Study at 14. 40 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study at 16. 

other crashworthiness design and performance areas, by refusing to adopt a much 

more demanding roof crush resistance standard along the lines suggested by Advocates in the foregoing comments. 

Advocates also wants to emphasize here that NHTSA apparently regards any 

quasi-static test method for determining roof crush resistance to be essentially occupant age-neutral in its effects, despite its own 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion 

Study finding a statistically significant correlation of roof crush with front seat occupant age.38 Unfortunately, that unstated assumption clearly is not the case. The 

IIHS study also found strong correlations of significant injury risk increases—12 to 

13 percent—for each 10-year increase in driver age.39 To date, NHTSA has offered 

a proposed roof crush resistance regulatory proposal that disregards the substantial 

greater propensity to injury of older vs. younger vehicle occupants, despite the fact 

that the 8 adjusted models of its 2007 Vertical Roof Intrusion study found that occupant age was one of the 4 statistically significant variables.40 Given the rapid 

‘‘squaring’’ of the demographic pyramid in the U. S., with disproportionately large 

increases each year in both the number and percentage of older passenger vehicle 

occupants, NHTSA has an obligation to err on the side of caution by adopting a 

standard that will afford substantially increased protection to older front-seat occupants who are more prone to severe injuries and death in rollover crashes where 

roof crush is the main cause of head, face, and neck trauma. The SNPRM foists 

starkly inequitable safety impacts on older Americans. If the agency does not adopt 

a standard that affords substantial protection to older vehicle occupants in rollover 

crashes involving roof crush, the agency will be imposing substantially more severe 

injuries and societal costs on a rapidly aging U.S. vehicle occupant population. 

NHTSA cannot issue a final rule based on the SNPRM. The SNPRM is essentially 

procedural window-dressing without advancing a specific, substantive regulatory 

proposal for public review and comment. The proposal is incomplete without a specific assessment of injury and fatality prevention from the various regulatory alternatives on which the agency requests comments, without the consideration of a specific roof vertical intrusion limit and energy absorption criterion, and without an assessment of the different costs and benefits of these alternatives. The agency cannot 

issue a final rule without prior notice and comment that provides the public an opportunity to assess NHTSA’s cost-benefit analysis and its injury and fatality claims 

for different regulatory alternatives taking these considerations into account. A final 

rule issued on the basis of the SNPRM and the existing rulemaking record would 

be subject to challenge. NHTSA should instead avail itself of the explicit statutory 

permission granted the agency to establish a later date for completing roof crush 

resistance rulemaking in order to provide a more reasonable and effective regulatory 

proposal with ample opportunity for public comments on the merits. 

Respectfully submitted, 

GERALD A. DONALDSON, PH.D., 

Senior Research Director. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

And thank you all for testifying today. 

Let me go ahead and start, if I may. I think, in Mr. Stanton’s 

testimony, he said that he was opposed to the dynamic test. I just 

want clarification, if I can, from Mr. Strassburger. Are you all 

equally as opposed to dynamic testing? 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. We are opposed to dynamic testing, for the 

reasons I indicated. Despite decades of trying, there is yet still no 

dynamic test that is repeatable and reproducible such that it gives 

us the engineering data that we need to be able to design our vehicles. If a test gives us the three different answers to the same question, which of those answers do we, as engineers, use to design our 

vehicles? 

Senator PRYOR. And is that—— 

140 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. The quasi-static test works well, it is representative of the deformation that we see in real-world crashes, 

and it should be retained. 

Senator PRYOR.—and is that true with the vehicle test that Ms. 

Claybrook talked about, the Jordan Rollover—— 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. Our—— 

Senator PRYOR.—dynamic test? 

Mr. STRASSBURGER.—our concerns with the Jordan Rollover Test 

are exactly the same; it’s not repeatable, it’s not reproducible. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Let me ask, if I may, Mr. Strassburger, 

about doing the test on both sides of the roof instead of just one 

side. Currently, NHTSA just tests one side. What’s your association’s position on testing both sides? 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. Here again, we think that the quasi-static 

test, where the agency, at its option, can test either side of the vehicle, should be retained. We, again, have concerns about the reproducibility and the repeatability of the two-sided test. It adds additional test complexity, it adds additional test variability, but it 

doesn’t give us additional engineering data to design our roofs. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Stanton, do you have a position on the twosided test? 

Mr. STANTON. Yes, Senator, it’s not terribly deep, in that we— 

we looked at the one-sided test, and you can test either the right 

or the left side, so you’ve got to build both sides the same way, but 

then when NHTSA came out with the SNPRM on the two-sided 

test, we just, quite honestly, didn’t know enough. We looked at it, 

and we said it shows some promise, but, as of right now, we’re not 

in a position to endorse it or to say that it’s not a good test, either. 

Senator PRYOR. So—— 

Mr. STANTON. We would like to see additional data on that. 

Senator PRYOR.—OK. So, you’re opposed to it, for the time being, 

at least. 

Mr. STANTON. No, we’re not opposed to it. We’re—we just need 

additional information to find out whether or not it would be better 

and provide better data than the single-sided test. 

Senator PRYOR. All right. 

Mr. Strassburger, on that two-sided test, it seems to me that 

doing a two-sided test would give you more data to work with, and 

it seems to me that when there is a rollover, often times the integrity of the roof is compromised with that first crush. To me, it 

seems it would be important to know what happens when there is 

a second crush on the other side of the roof. Why I am wrong about 

that? 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. It would seem to give you more data, but in 

the limited amount of data that the agency has provided, some of 

that data was in conflict with each other; they provided just two 

test series where they tested the same vehicle twice, and in each 

instance there was conflicting test data that was—— 

Senator PRYOR. But you’re—— 

Mr. STRASSBURGER.—generated by those tests. 

Senator PRYOR.—but you’re basing that on NHTSA’s data that 

they provided. What about your data? Because I know the auto 

manufacturers have a lot of data on this, as well. 

141 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. It is part of the rulemaking record, and I 

don’t believe we provided any data that we had on two-sided tests. 

Senator PRYOR. No, I understand you haven’t provided it to 

NHTSA. But, your companies have internal data, I’m sure, on this 

kind of testing, on the two-sided testing. 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. If they do, none of that has come to the Alliance. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. We don’t have that data. 

Senator PRYOR. Well, there again, I think that the public’s perception will be that a two-sided test is a better test than a onesided test. If the public knows that that’s available, I think the 

public would want to see a two-sided test. 

While I have you, Mr. Strassburger, let me ask this. Is there a 

strength-to-weight ratio that most closely resembles a rollover, or 

are there just too many variables in a rollover? 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. All of the—there are too many variables. 

There—the technical literature is rich with debate on the relationship—the causal relationship between roof strength and injury 

risk. To this date, even with the most recent IIHS study, we don’t 

see a causal relationship with injury risk and roof strength. And 

we have concerns about the IIHS study. We’ve looked at it, haven’t 

finished reviewing it. But, when we apply standard statistical tests 

to test the rigor of the assumptions that the IIHS study has adopted, their conclusions don’t hold up. 

Senator PRYOR. But, you would agree, as a general matter, that 

the stronger you make the roof, the less likely it is for you to have 

a serious injury or fatality in a rollover accident, wouldn’t you? 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. Intuitively, you would think that, but the 

data does not show that. And, at the end of the day, we’re not 

going to improve motor vehicle safety through good intentions or 

because we think we will do so. We need to have some certainty 

or some reasonable expectation that things are going to change in 

the real world with the changes that we make. 

Senator PRYOR. Ms. Claybrook, do you agree with what Mr. 

Strassburger just said? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. No, I don’t, for a number of reasons. First of all, 

on the dynamic test device, of course, the industry hasn’t ever attempted to use this, and neither has NHTSA. But, if you look at 

real-world crashes, which are referred to as other similar instances 

in the literature, and you look at the tests that occur with the JRS 

on the same model vehicle, you see they’re quite similar. The JRS 

test device does mimic what happens in the real world. 

There have been repeatability tests done. They have come out 

very close when the same vehicle has been tested again and again. 

Of course, this has all been done privately by a few individuals, 

and I believe that NHTSA should put some money into this, since 

it doesn’t have any other test device that is dynamic that has this 

quality and capacity and is inexpensive. 

The industry—for example, General Motors has a new test system, that they announced with great fanfare, that—where they test 

the vehicle. It tests the side head airbag, but it very specifically 

doesn’t test for roof crush, because they don’t want to have any 

data. And, of course, the trade association doesn’t have the data. 

142 

It’s the companies, as you point out, that have whatever data they 

have collected. 

The CRIS device that Ford has is like the dolly rollover test, only 

more sophisticated, but it doesn’t control the vehicle after it’s 

thrown off the back of the vehicle in a way where they can assure 

repeatability. The brilliance of the JRS device is that it is totally 

controlled testing. And we now have the film. So, if it would be possible—— 

Senator PRYOR. Yes, let’s go ahead and watch that. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK.—to take a look at that—it’s 17 seconds. Oh, we 

did, and now we don’t? OK. Well— 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. CLAYBROOK.—hopefully—— 

Senator PRYOR. It wasn’t meant to be. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK.—hopefully, at some point, we’ll get to see that 

better. 

The other issue that has been raised is that the auto companies, 

since the early 1970s, have taken the position that if the roof 

crushes in, your head is already damaged because you hit the roof 

first. This has been shown, technically, in a number of papers and 

analyses, to be malarkey. And it’s also, just by your own thought 

process, pretty much malarkey. But, if you look at who gets injured 

in crashes, if you look at just the crashes—at the vehicle after the 

crash, and who gets injured, it’s the people sitting where the roof 

crushed in that are the ones who have the head injury and are 

quadriplegics and paraplegics. So, it’s very obvious that when the 

roof crushes, the person sitting under it is often harmed. 

The other issue about roof crush is this. When the vehicle is upside-down, the backbone of the vehicle is the roof. And so, the belt 

system isn’t going to work right if the roof crushes in. The side 

head airbag isn’t going to work right if the roof crushes in. The 

doors are going to come open if the roof crushes in. The windows 

are going to pop out or crack. The windshield is going to be damaged if the roof crushes in. The roof controls all those elements. 

And what causes ejection is when there is no side window or when 

there is—the windshield itself is not there, or when the doors open. 

If the belt has a pretensioner for rollover, which most of the vehicles today do not, and this should be required, that’s not going to 

work properly if the roof crushes in. The roof is like the chassis 

when the vehicle is right-side-up. In rollover crashes the roof is the 

critical element in the performance of this vehicle and the survival 

space, as it’s called, for the occupant inside. 

These industry arguments are just arguments, they’re—— 

Senator PRYOR. Let—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK.—not facts. 

Senator PRYOR.—let me ask this, Ms. Claybrook. If, assuming the 

NHTSA decides not to do the dynamic test, and I know you want 

them to do a dynamic test, but assuming they decide not to, does 

it make sense for NHTSA to then do the two-sided roof test? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. It should do a two-sided roof test, but it also 

should change where the platen is placed and the force that is 

used, because right now when a rollover occurs, the engine makes 

the vehicle tilt forward, when it’s upside-down, which means that 

the occupants tilt forward, which means that the most critical part 

143 

of the vehicle is the roof over the A-pillar, which holds the windshield. And so, when the windshield cracks on the first corner roll, 

then there is a 30 percent reduction in the strength of the roof, and 

that’s the reason you have to have, a two-sided test. It should be 

done without the windshield in there, so that you really get what 

the true forces are that are experienced in that crash. 

The way the current test is designed, the B-pillar is the part— 

the pillar by your shoulder—is the one that gets the most pressure, 

and the A-pillar does not get a sufficient test. In addition to a twosided test, the platen should be smaller and at a sharper angle, it 

should exert more force, it should be moved forward, and the windshield shouldn’t be there. That, if you’re going to do a quasi-static 

test, is the one that would make a lot of sense. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Dr. Garcia, let me ask you—I don’t know if you’re familiar with 

this proposed preemption that they’re trying to do, where, basically, NHTSA would try to limit the ability to go to court after one 

of these. Do you have an impression of what that would do out 

there in the real world, what the preemption clause would do? 

Dr. GARCIA. Right. It would definitely impact negatively the 

American people. I spent a lot of years—I came from a very poor 

background—to go to school. If I didn’t have the ability to go to 

court and make my case, my life would have been totally lost by 

now, with no resources. 

I mean, this impacts a lot of different situations. You know, the 

healthcare issue—I mean, you have to understand what it is to live 

with an injury like the one I have. Dr. Pena, behind me, is also living with it. You cannot take away that right. I went to court, and 

we won. We proved to a jury that the roof was defective. You cannot take away the right of the individual to go in there and have 

their day in court. 

So, it will have an impact on the—not just on me, but potential 

people who will become injured. I mean, we’re not just here just for 

us. We’re already injured. We’re here for people like you. We’re 

here for your children, for this to finally come to an end. And closing the doors to the courtroom, I don’t think that that is just. I 

think that’s cruel and unusual punishment when you do that. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Oesch, do you have a position on the preemption clause? 

Mr. OESCH. We don’t, sir, but I would like to address two other 

things, if you—— 

Senator PRYOR. Sure. 

Mr. OESCH.—don’t mind. 

Senator PRYOR. Sure. 

Mr. OESCH. Thank you. 

You were right, when just a moment ago what you said intuitively was exactly what our study showed; that is, with increased 

roof strength, there was lower injury risk. Mr. Strassburger referred to a study that was commissioned by the Alliance, questioning those results. We’ll be sharing with the Alliance, and we’d 

like to share with this committee, with your permission, our analysis of that study. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

144 

INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY

June 18, 2008 

Hon. MARK PRYOR, 

Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety, 

U.S. Senate , 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Pryor: 

On June 4, 2008, the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and 

Automotive Safety held an oversight hearing on passenger vehicle roof strength. I 

testified on behalf of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) regarding 

a study we recently completed revealing that increased roof strength in the quasistatic test mandated under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 216 reduces the risk of fatal or incapacitating driver injury in rollover crashes (Brumbelow 

et al., 2008). While seemingly intuitive, this finding contradicts previous studies, 

funded by automobile manufacturers, that reported no relationship between FMVSS 

216 results and injury risk in real-world rollover crashes (Moffatt and Padmanaban, 

1995; Padmanaban et al., 2005). 

In testifying on June 4, the Alliance for Automobile Manufacturers (AAM), represented by Mr. Robert Strassburger, maintained its position that stronger roofs do 

not reduce injury risk and questioned IIHS’s study based on a critique AAM commissioned from M. Laurentius Marais of Wecker Associates (AAM, 2008). However, 

Marais’ critique does not support AAM’s statements concerning the IIHS study. In 

addition, the critique misrepresents IIHS’s research and is, itself, based on problematic statistical analyses. 

AAM Claims Not Supported by the Marais Analysis 

During the roof strength hearing, Mr. Strassburger said, ‘‘intuitively you would 

think that [stronger roofs reduce injury risk] but the data do not show that.’’ He 

stated that the conclusions of the IIHS study ‘‘don’t hold up’’ and that ‘‘we don’t see 

a causal relationship with injury risk and roof strength.’’ However, these comments 

are not supported by Marais’ analysis, which also indicates an overall decrease in 

injury risk as roof strength increases. Rather than contradicting the relationship, 

Marais concluded that ‘‘the IIHS Study’s 28-percent result cannot be validly extrapolated to roof strength in the relevant range from SWR 2.5 to 3.0–3.5 and beyond.’’ 

Thus, Marais focused on whether the data in the IIHS study indicate that injury 

risk decreases by exactly the same amount for each incremental change in roof 

strength. This was not the research question the IIHS study was designed to address. Criticizing the study on this basis can be compared with criticizing a finding 

that hotter temperatures increase the incidence of heat stroke by saying that the 

data do not show the same rate of increase between 80 and 100 degrees as from 

90 to 110 degrees. 

Marais began his critique of IIHS’s study by attempting to duplicate the research. 

He was unable to obtain data from 3 of the 12 states used in the IIHS study, somewhat reducing his sample size. Even with data from the 9 remaining states, it is 

not clear that Marais correctly duplicated the IIHS study, as Figure 1b in his analysis shows injury rates 36–43 percent higher than when IIHS counts are limited to 

the same 9 states. Despite this discrepancy, Marais’ logistic regression with these 

data estimated a 27 percent reduction in the risk of fatal or incapacitating driver 

injury for a 1-unit increase in roof strength-to-weight ratio (SWR), which is similar 

to the IIHS study’s estimate of a 28 percent risk reduction for the same increase 

in roof strength. This is the best estimate of the relationship between roof strength 

and injury risk with the data available. It answers the question IIHS research was 

designed to address, showing that roof strength as measured under FMVSS 216 is 

strongly related to the risk of injury in real-world rollovers. 

Methods Used by Marais Are Inappropriate 

Marais’ main criticism of the IIHS study is based on his application of a ‘‘rainbow 

test’’ meant to determine whether the vehicles with the lowest and highest roof 

strengths show injury risk reductions of the same magnitude as vehicles with intermediate roof strengths. However, for such a test to be conclusive the low, intermediate, and high strength groups must each have enough data to be analyzed separately and produce meaningful results. This is not the case here, and Marais’ manipulations of the data confirm only that this is a small dataset (11 roof designs), 

not that there is a level of roof strength above which there is no benefit of increased 

strength. 

145 

Beyond the criticisms resulting from his flawed ‘‘rainbow test,’’ Marais performed 

2 logistic regression analyses attempting to show the relationship of roof strength 

and injury risk for only those vehicles with the strongest roofs. The first was limited 

to vehicles with roof SWR values of at least 2.0, and the second included vehicles 

with roof SWRs at or above 2.5. These predicted injury risk increases of 2 and 3 

percent, respectively, for each 1-unit SWR increase. Marais concluded there is ‘‘no 

statistically reliable indication of a reduction in the risk of injury in the range of 

SWR from 2.5 to 3.5.’’ But these conclusions are highly sensitive to the SWR cutoff 

points Marais selected, as demonstrated by 3 additional logistic regression analyses 

of the IIHS study data. Cutoff values of 1.9, 2.0, and 2.1 produced injury risk predictions of a 32 percent decrease, 13 percent decrease, and 21 percent increase, respectively. 

Furthermore, if Marais had estimated the risk of fatality alone (excluding incapacitating injuries) using his selected cutoff values of 2.0 and 2.5, he would have 

found risk reductions of 53 and 40 percent, respectively, for 1-unit increases in 

SWR. These comparisons demonstrate the potential bias from statistical analyses 

that use arbitrarily selected cutoffs in small datasets and confirm that these data 

are not sufficient to answer Marais’ question of whether or not the effect of roof 

strength changes. The best estimates from the available data are those that consider all the vehicles in the IIHS study. 

Marais Analysis Misplaces Burden of Proof 

The IIHS study clearly shows that stronger roofs reduce injury risks, in contrast 

to previous research funded by members of AAM. If AAM believes there is a level 

of roof strength that is no longer beneficial for occupant protection, or that actually 

increases the risk of injury in rollover crashes, the burden of proof is on AAM to 

provide data demonstrating such a trade-off. The Marais analysis fails to do this. 

It is true that the available data do not allow precise estimates of the benefit of 

roof strength for vehicles stronger than those IIHS has tested, and IIHS has not 

attempted to make such estimates. However, the large benefit that has been found 

for the vehicles studied is sufficient evidence that increasing the minimum roof 

strength requirement to SWR 3.0 or 3.5 would save many more lives than the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration previously has estimated. 

Sincerely, 

STEPHEN L. OESCH, 

Senior Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer. 

References 

Alliance for Automobile Manufacturers. 2008. Comment to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216, Roof Crush Resistance. Docket Document No. NHTSA–2008–0015–0090.1, June 4, 2008. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Department of Transportation. 

Brumbelow, M.L.; Teoh, E.R.; Zuby, D.S. and McCartt, A.T., 2008. Roof strength and injury 

risk in rollover crashes. Arlington, VA: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. 

Moffatt, E.A. and Padmanaban, J., 1995. The relationship between vehicle roof strength and 

occupant injury in rollover crash data. Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine, 245–67. Des Plaines, IL: Association for the 

Advancement of Automotive Medicine. 

Padmanaban, J.; Moffatt, E.A. and Marth, D.R., 2005. Factors influencing the likelihood of 

fatality and serious/fatal injury in single-vehicle rollover crashes. SAE Technical Paper Series 

2005–01–0944. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers. 

Mr. OESCH. We can show that, in fact, our study demonstrates there is a consistent relationship between increased roof strength and lower injury risk. And that 

is why it is important for the Federal agency to adopt a standard that is going to 

require a high strength-to-weight ratio. 

Senator PRYOR. And then, did you have a second point? 

Mr. OESCH. Yes, sir. I just wanted to address, very quickly—and 

it’s addressed in my testimony—the dynamic test. We think the dynamic test is, in fact, a gold standard. We don’t think, however, 

that we currently know enough about that test to be able to establish all the test conditions. In addition the test dummies that are 

currently used in the other types of testing are not appropriate for 

the rollover crash. So, at this time, we would urge that there be 

additional research done on that issue. 

Thank you, sir. 

146 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Strassburger, do you have a position on the 

preemption clause? 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. With respect to the preemption, we were surprised to see it in the proposal by the agency. We have submitted 

comments to the agency regarding that proposal. And should the— 

and we expect, as the agency goes through its final steps in the 

rulemaking and weighs all the input, it will make appropriate decisions, and we will abide by those decisions. 

Senator PRYOR. And in your comments, did you support it or oppose it? 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. In our comments, we specifically addressed 

whether or not the agency had authority to adopt such a preemption. The—we also commented, I believe, on the—some of the 

tradeoffs that the agency was looking to address with the preemption and their concern that it might lead to additional fatalities if 

it were absent. If those factors remain in place at the end of this 

rulemaking period, then we expect the agency will make appropriate decisions. 

Senator PRYOR. I want to go a little bit out of order. Ms. Gillan, 

do you have a view on the preemption clause? 

Ms. GILLAN. Senator, we don’t have an official position on the 

preemption clause, but I will tell you, I’ve worked on highway safety and motor vehicle safety for over 20 years, inside and outside 

the Federal Government and through various administrations, and 

this is the first time that I’ve experienced or seen this kind of language put in these regulatory proceedings. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Stanton, do you have—— 

Mr. STANTON. Yes, we—in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 

we commented, but we treated it as the need for a national standard. It’s very important, when you’re building automobiles to sell 

in 50 states, that the same requirements apply to all the automobiles. So, we took it as a design standard and commented on 

that. And we would support that very strongly, that there be a single design standard for our vehicles. 

Senator PRYOR.—OK. I would comment, though, that there has 

never been one before, in the history of the auto industry, but I understand what you’re saying. 

Mr. STANTON. Well, we don’t—Senator, I think it goes to the 

point of, when we build a vehicle, and we meet national standards, 

we want to make sure that states don’t set standards that are different than the national standard. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. But, preemption—the part of the preemption clause I was talking about was really preempting state 

law—— 

Mr. STANTON. Yes. No—— 

Senator PRYOR.—on tort claims. 

Mr. STANTON.—and we did not comment on that part. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes, which is a little different. 

I saved you for the last on this, Ms. Claybrook, because you’re 

a former NHTSA Administrator. And during your tenure there, did 

the agency ever try to do preemption? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. No, Mr. Chairman, we did not. In fact, just the 

opposite. We actually thought that there was great value to having 

the individual lawsuits. And the reason why is that NHTSA standVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00150 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
147 

ards are broad performance standards, and they don’t deal with 

lots and lots of issues that arise in the course either of manufacturing or in the course of designing vehicles. And so, the proposed 

rollover rule encourages a court to find preemption even if the 

standard doesn’t address the particular item that is defective. So, 

that’s one big problem. 

But, I would like to address the design issue here, if I have one 

second to do that. The position of the auto industry is that if a 

court makes a decision and says that, even though there is a Federal standard, there is negligence by the company, in terms of the 

way that they have designed the vehicle, they view that decision 

as the equivalent of a state standard. And so, they think that the 

lawsuit ought to be preempted, because the Federal Government 

has addressed this issue. But, the Federal Government really 

hasn’t addressed this issue broadly. Even if it has, as Senator 

McCaskill pointed out, sometimes that standard’s so out of date 

that it’s almost irrelevant. And why should that preempt people 

who are injured from getting compensation. 

If people are injured because of the failure of a safety system in 

a car, particularly a safety system, then they should be able to recover, because they have been injured by the negligence of the company in designing or manufacturing it. 

And it is not as though, in this roof-crush area, that the companies haven’t known for years of these deficiencies. In fact, NHTSA’s 

1971 proposed standard had a two-sided test, causing General Motors to test their vehicles, and they found they couldn’t meet it, so 

they came back in to NHTSA and said, ‘‘Well, you don’t really need 

a two-sided test, because both sides of the vehicle are the same,’’ 

ignoring the fact, of course, that when one side’s crushed in, the 

other side doesn’t work as well. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes, let me ask a little bit of a follow up on that, 

but also go in a little different direction because there is disagreement that I’ve read in the written testimony, and talking to folks 

in the industry and talking to the advocacy groups. There’s a disagreement on how much strengthening the roof actually costs. I 

think NHTSA maybe has a view, and others have views. I’ve not 

been able to come up with a definitive number on that, and I know 

that part of that depends on what standard the roof has to meet. 

Let me ask this, if I can. If you all can give me your estimates, 

your best estimate, or best, maybe, rule of thumb, on what it would 

cost to actually strengthen these roofs to a level where you make 

a major improvement in roof-crush safety. I assume, Dr. Garcia, 

you would not have an opinion on that. So, I’ll start with Mr. 

Oesch. 

Mr. OESCH. We have not evaluated that issue, sir. We’ve concentrated on looking at the relationship, between roof strength and 

injury reduction, and have conclusively shown: stronger roofs, less 

injury. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Mr. Strassburger, I know that part of what you consider, when 

you talk about that, is not just the materials in the roof itself, but 

you consider the engineering costs and retooling costs for redesign. 

So, how does that translate into cost per vehicle? 

148 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. First of all, Senator, let me say, in our normal deliberations within the Alliance, we don’t consider costs at all. 

To the extent that we’ve provided cost information to—in this rulemaking, it has been at the request of the agency to develop such 

information. 

My testimony does provide both variable-cost and fixed-cost information, as well as mass changes or weight changes to vehicles 

in two instances, one for a large SUV and another for a large pickup truck. And to quickly summarize here, when we’re looking at 

a—going to a strength-to-weight ratio of 2.5, for those vehicles 

we’re looking at a weight increase of the large SUV of between 60 

and 67 pounds, and a variable cost, or per-vehicle cost, of about $38 

to $58 a vehicle, versus a large pickup truck, where we’re looking 

at between 38 and 68 pounds and a variable cost of between $55 

and $185 a vehicle. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. Those have been submitted to, not only this 

record, but to the agency, as well. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes. We’re going to leave the record open, by the 

way, for those of you who want to submit studies and documents, 

et cetera. So, we encourage you to do that. 

Ms. Claybrook, do you have a sense of what it would cost to 

strengthen the roofs in such a way that you would have a major 

increase in safety? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Well, Public Citizen does not have the capacity 

to do those individual kind of calculations. There was a study by 

Ohio State University that was submitted to the docket which 

shows that an after-market upgrade of the Ford Explorer to provide the same level of protection as the Volvo XC90 was about $81. 

And that’s an after-market effort, it’s not mass production. So, you 

really have to reduce that significantly. We would say between $40, 

max, to $50 is probably a high end for production vehicles, and we 

view that as being relatively inexpensive, in the scheme of things. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Stanton, did you have an opinion on that? 

Mr. STANTON. Yes, we did. We didn’t comment on the cost, but 

we did comment on the lead time, and—which is extremely important. And, as I said in my statement, you know, 3-year lead time 

and 3-year phase-in, major redesigns of these vehicles, if we can do 

it during a major redesign, we can keep the costs down and we can 

do it right. 

Ms. GILLAN. Senator—— 

Senator PRYOR. Ms. Gillan? 

Ms. GILLAN.—advocates does not do studies about costs, but, in 

addition to the study that Joan Claybrook cited—and I have this 

in my testimony—the Ohio State University Study—we also cite 

another study, conducted by George Washington University, where 

they found that strengthening the 2003 Ford Explorer to 3.0 

strength-to-weight ratio would raise the vehicle price by $33 to $35. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Well, like I said, that’s an issue—I mean, that’s a practical consideration that we need to think about. And the estimates are all 

over the board. I think that’s an important consideration. 

We actually have a roll call vote going on right now, so what I’m 

going to do is conclude the hearing here in just one moment. 

149 

I would like to thank all three panels of witnesses. I appreciate 

your time and effort, not just to get here, but all your preparation 

and the materials that you’ve already submitted for the record. 

We are going to leave the record open for 2 weeks. I anticipate 

that Senators will ask questions and submit those in writing to 

you, so we would ask you to get those back to us and give us thorough answers, if you possibly can, within the next 2 weeks. 

And then, like I said, a couple of you have mentioned, a study 

or other additional documents that you’d like to submit for the 

record. Certainly, we’ll take those. 

Again, I want to thank you all for being here today, and tell you 

how much we appreciate it. It’s an important matter for the Senate 

committee to look at and to familiarize ourselves with. 

And I do think one of the messages, at least, that came through 

loud and clear today is that it’s more important to get this right 

than to get it done fast. And I think pretty much everybody—in one 

way or another—almost everybody has said that today. We’ll work 

with NHTSA and encourage them to do the right thing, even if it 

does take a little extra time. We want to affect the best public policy. 

So, again, thank you for your time, and I appreciate you all being 

here. 

And we will conclude the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(151) 

A P P E N D I X 

Hon. MARK PRYOR, 

Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety, 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

REQUIRE NHTSA TO UPGRADE ROOF STRENGTH SWR TO AT LEAST 4.0— 

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD RE: HEARING OF JUNE 4, 2008 NHTSA 

RULEMAKING ON PASSENGER VEHICLE ROOF STRENGTH

To the Hon. Senator Pryor: 

As a 27-year-old member of the driving public, I am especially concerned about 

issues of auto safety. In 2006, nearly 43,000 Americans were killed in auto accidents. A large proportion of those (over 7,000) were in the 25–34 year old age group. 

Auto accidents claim more teen and young adult lives each year than any other 

cause of death. And roof crush accidents account for an estimated 25-percent of 

those. For these reasons I am concerned that the government and auto industry 

may not be working hard enough to ensure our vehicles are safe in rollover accidents. 

I attended the hearing you conducted on June 4, 2008, and listened carefully to 

all of the testimony. At this time, I would like to submit my own comments for your 

consideration and for the official record. 

While NHTSA and the auto manufacturers are attempting to ‘‘upgrade’’ the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard for roof strength to require a vehicle’s strengthto-weight ratio (SWR) of 2.5 or 3 times the weight of the vehicle, they make excuses 

why the requirement cannot be at least 4.0 times the weight of the vehicle. I own 

and drive a 2005 Toyota Scion tC with a roof SWR of 4.6. Therefore I would like 

to refute three of NHTSA and the automaker’s claims as to why they cannot increase 

roof strength: 

1. Automakers claim: Requiring stronger roofs will take years of research and 

development. WRONG. My 2005 Toyota Scion tC already has a strong roof with 

a SWR of 4.6. 

2. Automakers claim: Requiring stronger roofs will add weight to a vehicle, 

thereby decreasing its fuel economy. WRONG. My 2005 Toyota Scion tC, with 

its strong roof, weighs about 2,900 lbs. and gets a respectable 20/25 miles per 

gallon. It is lighter than some of its competitors and gets better gas mileage 

. . . and has a stronger roof at the same time. 

3. Automakers claim: Requiring stronger roofs will add excessive cost to a vehicle. WRONG. My 2005 Scion tC has a base price of $16,100. It is among the 

most economical vehicles available for purchase . . . even with its strong roof. 

As you can see, the reasons offered by automakers as to why vehicle roofs cannot 

be strengthened are just poor excuses. If Toyota can mass-produce an inexpensive, 

fuel-efficient car in 2005 with a roof strength-to-weight ratio of 4.6, why can’t 

NHTSA create a better roof crush standard and why can’t automakers design and 

manufacture stronger roofs today? The technology is clearly feasible and available 

to provide stronger roofs in more mass produced cars on the road. 

While NHTSA and the automakers work together to delay and weaken our roof 

crush standard and the safety of our vehicles, more young people will continue to 

die and be permanently injured in rollover accidents. 

Please work quickly to upgrade the roof crush standard to require at least a 4.0 

SWR. 

152 

Thank you for accepting my submission. 

Sincerely, 

BRANDON BLOCH, 

Concerned Driver. 

WHY THE NHTSA PROPOSAL FOR FMVSS 216 ON ROOF CRUSH MUST INCLUDE AT

LEAST A STRENGTH-TO-WEIGHT RATIO OF 4.0 AND DYNAMIC ROLLOVER TESTING, 

AND MUST NOT INCLUDE ‘‘PREEMPTION’’ WHICH WOULD DEPRIVE INJURED

VICTIMS

by Byron Bloch—March 14, 2008, www.AutoSafetyExpert.com 

If vehicle testing is to have validity, it must be relevant to what happens in realworld accidents. As an experienced auto safety professional for about 40 years, I 

have documented the U.S. roof crush safety standard and its failure to ensure safe 

roofs. The U.S. fatality toll in rollovers used to be about 1,000 per year in the 1970s, 

and now it has climbed upward to over 10,000 per year in the U.S. Whats wrong 

with vehicle roofs, and why has the U.S. safety standard failed to ensure that vehicles would have safe roof structures ? And why is NHTSA, a regulatory agency, now 

trying to grant preemption from liability to automakers, and thereby deprive injured 

victims in rollover accidents of their right to seek justice for needlessly unsafe and 

defective roofs? 


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The matrix of crash testing by some European automakers is a proclaimed effort 

to represent what happens in real-world collision accidents. As stated by GM-Opel 

in 1993, ‘‘Because test standards are often too theoretical, the test program for Opel 

models focuses on reality—on real accidents on European roads.’’ But in the U.S., 

each of the FMVSS safety standards typically uses only a single crash test or staticload test as a minimum compliance test that’s often unrealistic to what happens in 

real-world accidents. And the compliance test does not get upgraded or strengthened 

for 20 or 30 years, if at all. 

However, beginning in the 1970s, many European automakers adopted dynamic 

rollover tests as their own requirement, possibly in anticipation that the U.S. compliance test would soon be upgraded, and also because they understood the validity 

of such realistic testing to represent what happens in actual rollover accidents. 

After more than three decades of delay, there is now a controversy about finally 

upgrading FMVSS 216. The U.S. automakers (GM, Ford, Chrysler) are urging a 

slight increase in the ‘‘slow push’’ force requirements . . . but with the highly-controversial proviso that compliance would grant automakers automatic preemption 

from any future product-liability claims if someone was severely or fatally injured 

by an allegedly too-weak roof in a rollover accident. This would deprive injured carcrash victims of their rights to seek compensation via litigation, and would shift the 

medical and rehabilitation cost burdens to the states or nation. 

The ‘‘Upgrading’’ of FMVSS 216 to a ‘‘Slow Push’’ Test at 2.5 or 3 Times the 

Vehicle Weight Is Grossly Inadequate, Far Too Minimal, and Well Below 

the State-of-the-Art 

All other accident scenarios have U.S. safety standards that require dynamic crash 

testing . . . frontal impact, side impact, and rear impact. So why is rollover the only 

accident scenario that is not matched to dynamic testing? 

• FMVSS 216 only requires a ‘‘slow push’’ test on a portion of the roof. Presently, 

only one frontal corner of the roof is tested, but the proposed new ‘‘upgraded’’ 

regulation will likely include testing of first one side, and then the opposite side. 

This is supposed to account for such potentially adverse factors as the breakage 

and/or separation of the windshield, which typically contributes a small percentage to the roof strength. 

• FMVSS 216 is only a ‘‘minimum requirement’’ and when it was introduced back 

in 1973, it was supposed to be replaced with a dynamic dolly rollover test by 

1978. But that never happened. 

• FMVSS 216 does not require any dynamic rollover test, which would simulate 

what happens in real-world accidents. Such a dynamic rollover test would also 

evaluate the effectiveness of the seatbelt restraint devices, the interior surfaces 

and any injury-mitigation padding, the side window glass and its propensity for 

breakage, the effectiveness of inflatable side-curtain airbags, and the maintenance of proper seat anchorage and seat strength. 

• FMVSS 216 does not measure intrusion or penetration into the occupants’ ‘‘survival space’’ as the roof deforms and crushes downward and laterally and rearVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00157 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE

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ward during the rollover. However, the pending upgrade to FMVSS 216 does 

include concern for the roof contacting the head of a seated dummy. But the 

new NHTSA proposal utilizes only a 50th-percentile average-size male test 

dummy, whereas the use of 95th-percentile size male test dummies would cover 

the greater range of at-risk sizes in the population. 

• FMVSS 216 has been unchanged since 1973, while fatalities in rollovers have 

increased from about 1,000 previously in the early-1970s to now almost 11,000 

per year in the U.S. Although rollovers account for about 2-percent of all accidents, they account for about 40-percent of all fatalities. This is certainly an indication that the so-called ‘‘safety standard’’for Roof Crush Resistance, FMVSS 

216, has not prompted sufficiently strong roofs in the vast majority of cars, 

pickups, SUVs, and vans here in the U.S. 

Back in 1971, General Motors initially commented on the then-proposed new 

standard called ‘‘Roof Intrusion Protection’’. GM pointed out these main considerations: (with emphasis added) 

• ‘‘To help reduce the possibility of head and neck injuries in the event of occupant 

contact with the roof in any type of accident, most 1971 General Motors passenger car models incorporate a new double steel roof with a contoured inner 

panel.’’ 

• ‘‘In 1967 General Motors initiated development of a static roof crush test device 

and procedure similar to that proposed by the Administration. Although we 

know of no safety relationship correlating such a laboratory procedure with occupant protection in actual rollovers, we have found it to be a useful development 

tool in evaluating the effects of structural changes.’’ 

• ‘‘General Motors recommends that any laboratory test procedure for roof 

strength be based on performance requirements . . . using the concept of an interior ‘non-enchroachment zone’ for the front seat that is not dependent on ram 

travel.’’ 

Thus, GM was pointing out that the static-load or ‘‘slow push’’ type of roof test had 

no safety relationship with actual rollover accidents. Yes, it was a repeatable 

type of test to evaluate different roof designs in a laboratory context, but it did not 

evaluate what would happen in rollover accidents. Only a dynamic rollover test 

would do so, and thats likely why many European automakers also began in the 

early-1970s to also include dynamic rollover tests, such as the lateral dolly rollover 

test, in developing and testing their vehicles. Many European cars over the years 

have thus had stronger roofs. 

Ironically, NHTSA itself had contracted for a series of dynamic rollover tests ‘‘to 

evaluate a vehicle rollover procedure’’ and to assess ‘‘the repeatability of rollovers over 

a wide range of automobiles and small trucks.’’ As noted in the Abstract and Conclusions of this NHTSA project: DOT–HS–800–615: 

‘‘A series of tests were performed using a number of different sizes and configurations of recent models of motor vehicles to verify the rollover procedure called 

for in the ‘Occupant Crash Protection Standard.’ ’’ 

‘‘The tests proved the adequacy of this procedure to produce repeatable rollovers 

and to demonstrate the applicability over a large range of vehicle sizes and configurations.’’ 

‘‘Based on the results obtained from the tests conducted, it is concluded that the 

same make, model, and weight vehicle will roll the same number of times and 

sustain equivalent damage if rolled at the same speed.’’ 

So back in 1971, NHTSA had test data and knowledge that the static-load test 

wasn’t realistic enough to correlate with real-world rollover accidents, and that dynamic lateral dolly rollover tests were repeatable. And remember, FMVSS 216 is only 

a ‘‘minimum requirement’’ and when it was introduced back in 1973, it was supposed to be replaced with a dynamic dolly rollover test by 1978. 

Dynamic rollover tests could and should have been phased in by the mid-to late1970s. But that never happened. And now, with rollover fatalities in the U.S. approaching 11,000 per year, it is finally time to correct that oversight and needless 

delay. 

NHTSA Tests of Current Production Roofs Show Variance in Strength-toWeight Ratios . . . With Many Stronger Roofs in the 4 to 5 Range . . . 

So it Is Wrong to Settle for Only 3 

During the past 3 years, 2005–2007, NHTSA conducted 35 tests in which the force 

was applied via an angled platen downward onto the driver’s side of the roof. These 

were essentially FMVSS 216 type tests, and the strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) was 

155 

recorded. Force was applied until there was 127 mm (5 inches) of travel, unless 

head contact occurred first. 

More than half of the vehicles . . . cars, SUVs, pickups, and vans of mostly 2005– 

2007 vintage . . . had a strength-to-weight ratio of 3 or less. And 11 of those vehicles 

would have failed the proposed NHTSA upgrade of FMVSS 216 at the proposed 2.5 

SWR compliance test level. 

However, 24 vehicles would have passed with each having a SWR above 2.5 and, 

therefore, according to a most unusual provision in the NHTSA proposal, those vehicles and their automakers would be exempt from any product-liability lawsuits alleging a defectively designed roof arising out of a rollover accident. The proposed 

NHTSA liability exemption would apply even if the roof strength had been needlessly compromised by designed-in structural weaknesses, and had buckled and collapsed and thereby caused fatal or quadriplegic injuries. 

The legal-liability pre-emption provision is being severely challenged, including by 

key members of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee (Sen. Patrick Leahy, Sen. 

Arlen Specter), who don’t believe that NHTSA has the legal authority, to grant such 

legal liability exemptions. In the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 

1966, which is the controlling Law enacted by Congress, there is a specific provision 

directly addressing this point: 

‘‘Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter 

does not exempt a person from liability at common law.’’ 

Thus, it is clear that Congress expressly prohibited against any exemption from liability at common law. By now trying to include such unwarranted preemption for 

vehicles whose roofs would comply with a minimum SWR of only 2.5 or 3 (or even 

4) NHTSA is clearly disregarding or violating the applicable law. 

Stronger Roofs With SWR of 4 to 5-Plus Are Now in Production and Are Clearly Feasible, Economical, and State-of-the-Art 

Importantly, in these NHTSA tests, there were 8 vehicles that had a strength-toweight ratio of 4 up to 5.1. These production vehicles, mostly by Toyota, Volvo, and 

VW, thus prove that it is practical to have a significantly stronger roof without any 

major cost or weight burdens. As examples, the 2006 VW Jetta had a SWR of 5.1, 

the 2007 Toyota Scion tC had a SWR of 4.6, the 2006 Volvo XC90 was 4.6, the 2006 

Honda Civic was 4.5, and the 2007 Toyota Camry was 4.3. 

The adjacent series of photos shows the FMVSS 216 ‘‘slow push’’ roof crush test 

of a 2007 Toyota Camry 4-Door Sedan, which weighs about 3,200 pounds. It has a 

roof crush Strength-to-Weight Ratio (SWR) of 4.3 which is well above the minimal 

requirement of either 2.5 or 3.0 that NHTSA is now considering to apply to future 

vehicles. In other words, the current Toyota Camry, and many other vehicles, are 

already well above the level that NHTSA is considering for future vehicles. 


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The preceding photo shows the Toyota Camry’s roof crush at the full load of 13,960 

pounds (62,097 Newtons) as applied by the angled platen to the driver’s side of the 

roof, to the platen travel displacement of 5 inches. The photo below shows the headroom for the ‘‘head on a stick’’ test device, representing the driver, was still sufficiently maintained. As noted, the Camry’s Strength-to-Weight Ratio was 4.3. 

A public-information rating system for roof strength should be based on the tested 

strength-to-weight ratio (SWR), so that prospective customers could select a vehicle 

with a stronger SWR of 5 over a competitive vehicle with a weaker SWR of only 

3. This would also help stimulate the design and adoption of even stronger roofs in 

more vehicles. 

Rollover Accident Case Examples Show How Roofs Actually Fail, and Why 

They Were ‘‘Defectively Designed’’ Even Though They Complied With 

FMVSS 216 

Here are just two examples showing how terribly weak the roofs are in too many 

vehicles, all of which meet the archaic FMVSS 216 so-called ‘‘Safety Standard’’. In 

many such rollover accidents, FMVSS 216 was a failure. 

Rollover—Roof Crush Accident Case A 

This rollover accident occurred in 1996, in Louisiana. A young man was driving 

a 1989 Ford Escort 2-door hatchback when, to avoid another vehicle that had cut 

into his lane, the Escort left the road and rolled over at about 35 mph on the grassy 

center median. 


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In the rollover accident, the Ford Escort’s roof buckled and crushed downward into 

his ‘‘survival space’’, causing forces that fractured his cervical vertebrae, rendering 

the seatbelted driver into a quadriplegic. The right-front passenger, seated where 

the roof did not buckle down, was basically uninjured. 

In the 2007 trial in Louisiana, I testified about the roof’s defective design, including its open-section windshield header with large hole cutouts, and A-pillar with 

minimal reinforcement of only the lower six inches. I noted that though the vehicle 

complied with FMVSS 216, its roof structure was clearly inadequate. The jury decided a verdict for the Plaintiff. 

Rollover—Roof Crush Accident Case B 

This rollover accident occurred in 2002, on a highway in New Jersey. A 1999 Toyota RAV4 Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) was impacted in its side by an adjacent vehicle, causing the RAV4 to rollover. The roof buckled and crushed downward into the 

‘‘survival space’’ of the right-front passenger, causing fracture of his cervical 

vertebrae, rendering him a quadriplegic. The driver, seated where the roof did not 

buckle down,was basically uninjured. 

In the 2007 trial in New Jersey, I pointed out the roof’s windshield header was 

a weak open-section design with large hole cutouts and structural discontinuities. I 

showed safer alternative designs, including from a Toyota Camry with a stronger 

closed-section header that would have helped to reduce excessive roof crush. 

I noted that while the RA V4 roof complied with the FMVSS 216 ‘‘slow push’’ test, 

its roof structure was structurally inadequate and was prone to buckling and collapse. Toyota pointed out they had designed the vehicle roof to comply with FMVSS 

216, and did not do dynamic rollover tests. The jury decided a verdict for the Plaintiff. 

The two photos below show the poor-design ‘‘open section’’ windshield header, and 

then a comparison between the Toyota Camry’s stronger ‘‘closed section’’ windshield 

header (in green) versus the weaker ‘‘open section’’ header of the Toyota RAV4 SUV 

(in red). 


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Affirmed: Roof Crush Causes Quadriplegic and Fatal Injuries . . . Even 

Though Some Automakers Say it Doesn’t 

In a rollover accident, it is imperative to maintain the occupants’ ‘‘survival space.’’ 

It is a well-established principle in vehicle safety and crashworthiness that a vehicle 

should be designed so as to prevent or minimize intrusion or penetration into the 

passenger compartment ‘‘survival space’’ in all types of foreseeable collisions . . . including front impact, side impact, rear impact, rollover, and underride. Automakers 

and vehicle safety specialists often refer to the critical need to provide a strong ‘‘roll 

cage’’ vehicle construction to protect the passengers. 

However, in trying to rationalize why their vehicles have a particular roof strength 

that is allegedly too weak, some automakers argue that roof crush simply does not 

cause injuries to the head or cervical spine. In actual accident cases that lead to 

product liability litigation, the defendant automaker will often claim that the 

amount of roof crush is irrelevant to the cause of the plaintiff’s quadriplegic or fatal 

injuries. The automaker’s experts will cite the ‘‘Malibu series of rollover tests’’ as 

‘‘proof’’ that roof crush does not cause head and spinal injuries. Thus, some automakers try to divert or negate the issue of a needlessly weak roof structure that 

buckled and crushed downward in the particular accident. 

In contradiction to the automaker’s strategy and the ‘‘Malibu tests’’, there is a long 

history of authoritative and empirical studies and tests that prove that, in fact, the 

extent of roof crush is definitely the cause of the severity of injuries to the occupant’s head and cervical spine in the rollover accident. The evidence is overwhelming 

in support of the strong causal relationship between roof crush and such injuries. 

In NHTSA’s original NPRM in 2005 to amend FMVSS 216, NHTSA stated: 

‘‘In sum, the agency believes that there is a relationship between the amount 

of roof intrusion and the risk of injury to belted occupants in rollover events.’’ 


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Following is an overview of some of the major studies that affirm the direct relationship between the extent of roof crush to the cause of the injuries to the head 

and neck of the occupant in a rollover accident. 

In 1982, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a 

report on ‘‘Light Vehicle Occupant Protection—Top and Rear Structures and Interiors.’’ (SAE Report 820244.) This comprehensive NHTSA analysis pointed out a significant correlation: 

‘‘. . . accident statistics show that the degree of roof intrusion is highly associated with occupant injury severity and rate.’’ 

In 1992, the major report ‘‘Vehicle and Occupant Response in Rollover Crash 

Tests’’ was issued as a coordinated effort by NHTSA and by The Armstrong Laboratory, of the Department of the Air Force. In its series of 24 rollover crash tests to 

study vehicle and occupant dynamics, roof crush varied from about 4 to 20 or more 

inches. The test dummies were instrumented to measure head and neck forces. 

Among the conclusions: 

‘‘Most of the tests resulted in significant roof crush. Often the body was trapped 

by the roof crush. In these cases, the head/neck system was vulnerable to large 

loads from the roof. ‘‘ 

In many of the rollover tests, the dummies received major compressive and lateral 

loads to their necks and there were major forces to the cervical spine, with many in 

the 1,000 to 3,000 pounds range. 

In the 1994 ‘‘Rollover Crash Study on Vehicle Design and Occupant Injuries’’ 

major report by Rechnitzer and Lane, from Monash University of Australia, the 

findings included this correlation: 

‘‘In mass data and other crash collections, the weight of evidence is in agreement 

with a relationship between roof crush and occupant injury. There is a convincing relationship between rollover and spinal cord injury. Finally, there is 

strong evidence of a connection between local roof crush and spinal cord injury.’’ 

The Monash project analyzed many actual vehicle rollover accidents and injuries, 

including this example that shows how the passenger in the right-front seat was 

rendered a quadriplegic . . . because of cervical/spinal trauma . . . due to loading 

on head during rollover and roof crush. One of the Monash case examples is illustrated directly below, and I’ve added an arrow to show how the compressive load 

was exerted as the inverted vehicle’s roof buckled and crushed inward into the survival space. 


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160 

In 2005, a study by Bidez, Cochran, and King evaluated ‘‘Roof Crush as a Source 

of Injury in Rollover Crashes.’’ The authors evaluated the data from instrumented 

dummies in a series of rollover tests of Ford Explorer SUVs, as conducted by 

Autoliv. Their conclusions included the following: 

‘‘Roof crush into the survival space of restrained dummies was the direct cause 

of neck loads, which were predictive of catastrophic neck injury in rollover crashes.’’ 

‘‘In the absence of significant roof crush into the occupant survival space, no 

dummy neck loads predictive of catastrophic injury were observed in this test series.’’ 

In 2007, NHTSA published the study ‘‘The Role of Vertical Roof Intrusion and 

Post-Crash Headroom in Predicting Roof Contact Injuries to the Head Neck, or Face 

During FMVSS No. 216 Rollovers; An Updated Analysis.’’ The report analyzed 

NASS CDS data for the 1997–2005 period, and conducted estimates from 24 different statistical models, 12 for intrusion and 12 for headroom. In all 24 statistical 

models, the relationship between injury severity and the explanatory variable of intrusion or headroom was statistically significant. 

In its conclusion, this latest NHTSA report stated: 

‘‘This report shows that a statistically significant relationship existed between 

both vertical roof intrusion and post-crash headroom on the one hand, and maximum injury severity of head, neck, or face injury from roof contact.’’ 

These many authoritative studies all point out and affirm the direct causal relationship between roof crush and spinal cord injuries. Importantly, roof 

crush also has a direct bearing on causing windshield and side window glass retention and breakage (re: potential occupant ejection), on seatbelt restraint integrity 

(such as shifting the shoulder belt upper anchorage on the B-pillar), and causing 

roof pillar interior surfaces and edges to buckle and exacerbate head trauma). 

Strong roof structures, if integrated with the total ‘‘safety cage’’ body construction, 

will also thereby offer benefits in reducing intrusion and increasing side impact protection. For many reasons, therefore, it is imperative for NHTSA to mandate a 

strong roof structure, and for automakers to maximize their designs and testing to 

ensure strong roofs in 40–50–60 mph dynamic rollovers that represent real-world 

accidents. 

General Motors Finally Establishes U.S. Rollover Crash Test Facility in 

2006 . . . for Dynamic Rollover Testing . . . and NHTSA Should Require 

Such Testing in FMVSS 216 

Up until 2006, General Motors in the U.S. did very little in rollover testing. Instead, they relied primarily on compliance with the ‘‘slow push’’ test of FMVSS 216, 


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and their vehicle roofs have been in the weak 1.9 to 2.6 strength-to-weight ratio 

(SWR), as tested by NHTSA. 

Historically, back in the 1950s, General Motors showed how their passenger cars 

could survive dynamic rollover tests at 50 mph with only minimal roof deformation. 

(Shown in photo below.) GM called this the ‘‘supreme test’’ as validation of their 

strong ‘‘turret top’’ roof structure design. But then GM did very little rollover testing 

in the U.S. in the following 1970 though 2000 era. In that same era, GM-Opel in 

Europe began conducting dynamic rollover tests for improving rollover safety in 

their European vehicles. 

After decades of not conducting dynamic rollover tests in the U.S., GM in 2006 

opened a $10-million state-of-the-art rollover crash test facility at their proving 

grounds in Milford, Michigan. When the facility was launched, NHTSA Administrator Nicole Nason was quoted as saying ‘‘The work at this facility will contribute 

to fewer deaths and injuries from rollover crashes.’’ 

Her praise is in contrast to NHTSA’s present plans (in Spring 2008) to amend 

FMVSS 216 to only require a ‘‘slow push’’ test on either one or two frontal corners 

of the roof . . . but to not also require dynamic rollover testing to validate the performance of the roof and the other crashworthiness measures en total. 

For their new facility in 2006, GM announced that multiple types of dynamic rollover tests will be conducted, including these descriptions in the GM press release: 


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Trip Over—The most frequent type of rollover, accounting for nearly 70 percent of 

rollovers. A driver loses control, slides sideways, and has the motion of the vehicle 

arrested by hitting a curb or sliding off of the road. 

Ditch Fall-over—This simulates a driver driving off of the side of a road onto a 

steep embankment and over-correcting. The ditch fixture has four 5,500-pound panels that can be positioned to simulate different angles of descent. 

Corkscrew Ramp Flip-over—This simulates a driver at high speed striking a rigid 

object like a center median and flipping over and remaining in the original lanes 

of travel (as opposed to going into oncoming traffic). The test speed in a demonstration was 46 mph. 

Dolly Rollover—This test has been used in rollover research for more than 35 years 

and is conducted with the vehicle being pulled sideways on a platform at a 23 degree angle. 

GM reportedly intends to conduct dynamic rollover tests of 150 to 200 vehicles each 

year. But the key will be how rapidly and effectively the test knowledge is transferred into their mass-produced vehicles . . . with stronger roof structures, more effective side-curtain airbags, safer side window glazing, more effective seatbelt restraints, interior energy-absorbing padding. In short, a more crashworthy vehicle to 

better protect occupants in rollover accidents. But will GM share this critical safety 

information with NHTSA and with the American motoring public? 

To Be Truly Effective, the New NHTSA Roof Crush Safety Standard Must 

Require SWR of at Least 4, Plus Dynamic Rollover Testing at 40 mph 

. . . With Phased-in Upgrades 

It is clear that sole reliance on a ‘‘slow push’’ test at a 2.5 or 3 strength-to-weight 

ratio (SWR) will not be sufficient to ensure safe roof performance in real-world rollover 

accidents. The auto industry has already shown that it is entirely feasible and economical to have roofs with a SWR of at least 4 to 5 (as in the current VW Jetta, 

Toyota Scion tC, Volvo XC90, among others). 

It is also clear that the auto industry has, for 30-plus years, been conducting valid 

and repeatable dynamic rollover tests, especially by European automakers. These 

have typically been lateral dolly rollover tests in the 30 mph-plus range. NHTSA 

likes to point to a series of unusual rollover tests it conducted with an ‘‘elevated’’ 

dolly rollover apparatus as not ensuring sufficient repeatability, and then proceeds 

to dismiss all dynamic rollover testing, rather than affirming the proven merits of 

rollover testing done by many European automakers over the years. 

Such dynamic rollover tests are critically needed to ensure effective performance of 

the total system of side curtain airbags, seatbelts with pre-tensioners, windshield 

and side window glass integrity, interior padding, and other crashworthy measures. 

If a ‘‘slow push’’ test is included in an upgraded FMVSS 216, it must be a sequential two-sided test that ensures a strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) of at least 4, and 

with no injury-causation intrusion into the survival space of a seated 95th-percentile 

male test dummy that would cause a severity of head trauma or neck loads. 

The strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) of the tested vehicle should be required to be 

legibly displayed on the data sheet affixed to each vehicle’s window, and be available from NHTSA and the automakers. A publicly-available ranking list of SWR for 

each vehicle will enable the public to compare the relative roof strengths of competitive vehicles, and thereby help stimulate the automakers to make continuous improvements. 

In addition to any ‘‘slow push’’ test, NHTSA must also require a dynamic rollover 

test to validate that all systems perform safely. A lateral dolly rollover at 40 mph 

would demonstrate validation of the total performance of the roof, seatbelt system 

with pre-tensioners, windshield integrity and retention, side window glass integrity 

and retention, interior padding, seat anchorage and seatback integrity, and other 

measures for optimal occupant protection and vehicle crashworthiness. 

There is no legal or ethical basis for NHTSA, as a regulatory agency, to include 

pre-emption for any roof that complies with its incredibly minimal and unrealistic 

‘‘slow push’’ test that requires a strength-to-weight ratio of only 2.5 or 3, or for any 

other test. The injured citizen’s rights to seek justice through the courts is an inherent constitutional right in most civilized societies, and an administrative regulatory 

agency is not empowered to rescind those rights. 

It is also of interest that various recent political appointees to NHTSA, including 

within its office of Chief Counsel, have come from the automakers, including Chrysler. Specifically who added that unwarranted preemption language to the NHTSA 

proposed roof crush rule . . . in an unjustified (and likely illegal) attempt to grant 

automatic preemption of liability to automakers? 

After a reasonable phase-in of 3 to 5 years, the requirements should then be increased to a SWR of 5, and dynamic rollovers at 50 mph. And thereafter, NHTSA 

163 

should consider increasing the roof strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) to 6, and require 

validation of the roof’s performance and all related safety systems in dynamic rollover testing at 60 mph. The goal is to eliminate deaths and severe injuries in rollover accidents. 

In summation, NHTSA should upgrade FMVSS 216 to require: 

Initially Beginning with Model Year 2012 

Roof Strength-to-Weight Ratio (SWR) of at least 4.0 In Sequential Two-Sided 

Roof Crush Test And Also Validation by Lateral Dolly Rollover at 40 mph With 

Instrumented Seatbelted Test Dummies (95th Percentile) To Record Forces to 

the Head and Cervical Spine, and Note Effects on Seatbelt Restraints, Window 

Glazing, etc. 

Subsequently Beginning with Model Year 2016 

Roof Strength-to-Weight Ratio (SWR) of at least 5.0 In Sequential Two-Sided 

Roof Crush Test And Also Validation by Lateral Dolly Rollover at 50 mph With 

Instrumented Seatbelted Test Dummies (95th Percentile) To Record Forces to 

the Head and Cervical Spine, And Note Effects on Seatbelt Restraints, Window 

Glazing, etc. 

Upgrading to a ‘‘6–60’’ requirement may be needed, a roof SWR of at least 6.0 and 

dynamic lateral dolly rollover testing at 60 mph, especially if the continuing feedback from real-world rollover accidents demonstrates that additional lives can be 

saved and severe injuries prevented if the roofs were mandated to be even stronger. 

The compassionate and attainable goal is the elimination of severe injuries and fatalities in rollover accidents. The significant upgrading of FMVSS 216, as recommended herein, can be of significant help by mandating and encouraging automakers to design, develop, test, and implement notably stronger roof structures on 

an expedited basis. 

The present rate of over 10,000 deaths per year in rollover accidents is much too 

high a burden to the individual victims and their families, and to our Nation and 

other nations that will be encouraged to adopt our standard. 

This is a goal that is technically and economically feasible., and must be encouraged and supported by a strong NHTSA safety standard . . . as respectfully recommended herein. 

Respectfully submitted, 

BYRON BLOCH, 

Consultant in Auto Safety Design 

and Vehicle Crashworthiness, 

www.AutoSafetyExpert.com 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK PRYOR TO

JAMES F. PORTS, JR. 

Question 1. Has the NHTSA conducted adequate testing and data collection on the 

alternative SWRs of 3.0 and 3.5 to know what impact they might have on roof 

strength and passenger safety? 

Answer. Yes. The Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis conducted in support 

of the August 2005 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking included an assessment of the 

2.5 and 3.0 SWR (What is SWR) alternatives. Since that time, the agency has conducted additional roof crush testing and collected additional real world crash data 

to supplement our evaluation. Much of this was published in conjunction with the 

January 30, 2008 SNPRM. NHTSA will finalize our analysis, including the 3.0 and 

3.5 SWR alternatives, in the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis for the final rule. 

Question 2. Will the NHTSA share its research data conducted in testing the 

SWRs of 2.5 and higher for one-sided testing and two-sided sequential testing? 

Answer. Yes. The majority of our testing to date was published with the NPRM 

and SNRPM. Any additional tests conducted since those publications will be made 

publicly available with the final rule. 

Question 3. Will the NHTSA share with the Committee its complete results on 

all costs estimated with each SWR and the estimated lives saved with each SWR 

for both one sided and two sided tests? 

Answer. The Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis published with the NPRM 

in August 2005 included costs and estimated lives saved for one-sided testing, but 

the agency had only limited two-sided testing available at that time. Such an analysis was not conducted for the SNPRM. The Final Regulatory Impact Analysis 

(FRIA) is now being completed in support of the final rule. The FRIA will be pubVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:24 Aug 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00167 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75609.TXT JACKIE
164 

lished along with the final rule and will include a full analysis of estimated lives 

saved and costs for each SWR alternative under consideration by the agency for 

both one- and two-sided testing. 

Question 4. What is NHTSA’s opinion of establishing a ‘‘star’’ rating system for 

judging vehicle roof strength? 

Answer. Establishing a star rating system as a part of the agency’s New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) for roof strength may be worth consideration, but first 

we are focused on completing the upgrade to the roof strength standard. Once we 

have decided upon that requirement, there may be merit in investigating enhancements to our NCAP rollover ratings including roof strength. Any such rating would 

need to reflect the real world risks based on crash data. 

Question 5. Should it be up to Congress or the Administration to decide when an 

industry receives immunity from tort lawsuits? 

Answer. We recognize that the first and most important step in considering the 

possible implied preemptive effect of a Federal regulation and its authorizing statute is ascertaining congressional intent. In the case of the Federal vehicle safety 

standards and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, the Supreme Court considered the intent reflected in that Act’s preemption provision and 

its savings clause in Geier v. Honda, 529 U.S. 861 (2000). It held that they are best 

read together as allowing the normal operation of the ordinary principles of implied 

preemption with respect to those standards. 

While this decision was reached in the context of a standard that included express 

alternative compliance options and agency statements about the desirability of manufacturer experimentation with different types of technology, the Court did not suggest that implied preemption was unique to this particular standard. Since implied 

preemption turns upon the existence of an actual conflict, our task, as the agency 

charged with carrying out the purposes of the Act and technical expertise regarding 

the subject matter and purposes of the Federal vehicle safety standards, is to assess 

whether conflicts do or do not exist. In most cases, we find that they do not exist. 

Question 6. When and how did the agency decide to change its longstanding position (that tort law complements Federal regulations) as it began to illustrate in preambles to regulations since 2005? 

Answer. Given the public interest in preemption issues and the dependence of implied preemption on the existence of an actual conflict, we have sought in recent 

years to provide a fuller and more standardized discussion of preemption in our vehicle safety rulemaking notices and to focus those discussions on whether there is 

an actual conflict. In most cases we do not identify any conflict. Again, in the absence of a conflict, there cannot be any implied preemption. 

Question 7. With the preemption clause, is the NHTSA effectively preventing roof 

crush victims from using state tort laws to hold a manufacturer accountable for 

poorly designed or manufactured roof structures? 

Answer. In our notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), we identified potential 

State tort law actions that we believed could frustrate the agency’s objectives by upsetting the balance between efforts to increase roof strength and reduce rollover propensity. We wanted to raise the possibility of preemption during the rulemaking 

process, when there is a chance to obtain and consider public comments, rather than 

after the fact during possible litigation. 

The legal theory underlying roof crush lawsuits is that the vehicle has a defect. 

Plaintiffs may allege both design defects and manufacturing defects. The concerns 

we raised in the NPRM that could lead to preemption were not related to alleged 

manufacturing defects, i.e., situations where it is alleged that a vehicle was not 

manufactured in accordance with the manufacturer’s design specifications. 

We received many comments about the issue of preemption, and we are continuing to analyze the comments. We will fully consider all of the comments as part 

of the rulemaking process. 

Question 8. Please describe some of the effects weak roof strength has on other 

safety devises such as glazed windows, seat belts, side curtain airbags, and door retention devises. 

Answer. Detrimental effects of roof crush on vehicle occupant protection systems 

will mainly affect the greenhouse (above the window sill) portion of the compartment. The primary occupant protection systems located in this region for belted occupants are the seat belt shoulder belt anchors and rollover side air bag curtains. 

• Seat belt restraint system—seat belts reduce occupant ejection by 91 percent in 

the real world. This estimate is with the current roof crush requirements and 

factors in the effect of any B-pillar deformation or other reductions in structural 

165 

* This document is retained in Committee files. 

integrity. The lap belt portion of the seat belt restricts the excursion of an occupant in a rollover and is not affected by roof intrusion. 

• Side air bag curtains—agency data have not shown reduced effectiveness of rollover side curtain air bags due to roof crush. Rollover sensors of such systems 

are designed to deploy during the first 1⁄4 turn roll of the vehicle. Thus, the rollover side curtain air bags deploy to provide protection prior to the occurrence 

of any roof crush. 

Question 9. Do you believe keeping a passenger inside a rolling vehicle is the 

safest event for a passenger in a rollover? 

Answer. Yes. As we have noted in our comprehensive plan, the first two priorities 

in protecting occupants are to first prevent the occurrence of the rollover, and if a 

rollover does occur to then ensure that the occupant is not ejected. The safest way 

to mitigate injuries in a rollover event is seat belt use since they are 91 percent 

effective in reducing occupant ejection. The fatality rate for an ejected vehicle occupant is substantially greater than for an occupant who remains inside of the vehicle. 

Question 10. How many people are ejected in rollover events? 

Answer. According to on our 2006 crash data files, NHTSA estimates that 15,120 

occupants were ejected in rollover crashes that year. 

Question 11. What is the survivability rate for ejections in rollovers? 

Answer. According to on our 2006 crash data files, NHTSA estimates that the survivability rate for ejected occupants in rollovers was about 60 percent that year 

(8,956/15,120). 

Question 12. Does the current system in place provide consumers with enough 

knowledge on tire health and is it easy for consumers to know the age of a tire or 

the health of a tire? 

Answer. New labeling requirements for tires will become effective September 1, 

2009. These new requirements will ensure that the production date of a tire is displayed on the outboard side wall of the tire. We think that this will make it easier 

for consumers to determine the age of their tires. Additionally, the agency has improved its consumer information material and has placed it at its main portal for 

vehicle safety consumer information, www.safercar.gov. This new section devoted 

entirely to tires, includes information on how to identify the age of the tire, and how 

to avoid conditions such as under-inflation or overloading that can lead to reduced 

tire integrity. 

Question 13. Where is the NHTSA in meeting Section 10303 of SAFETEA–LU 

Tire Research on tire aging? 

Answer. As required by SAFETEA–LU, the Department of Transportation delivered to Congress a report in August 2007 (copy enclosed).* In that report, we indicated that additional work needed to be done before we could make a regulatory decision on tire aging. That work is ongoing and is considering many factors including 

tire aging as a casual factor in crashes, solutions such as a tire expiration date, and 

the potential safety benefits of a regulatory tire aging requirement. We expect to 

complete that work in 2009. 

Question 14. Are there other ways of improving knowledge of tire age to consumers and those performing maintenance on vehicles? 

Answer. NHTSA has taken steps to improve the public’s general awareness of 

proper tire maintenance including tire age. These include the periodic issuance of 

press releases and public service announcements, the inclusion of information related to tire age in our existing brochures, and the development of improved consumer friendly information on our www.safercar.gov website. We have also begun 

to work with key interested stakeholders such as the Rubber Manufactures Association and the National Automobile Dealers Association to develop material specifically focused at those who perform maintenance on tires. We will also continue to 

look for additional outreach programs and partners. 

Question 15. Is RFID a viable technology for improving tire age and tire safety 

identification for consumers? 

Answer. Radio frequency identification (RFID) may prove to be a viable technology to improve tire safety, particularly when a tire recall is involved. However, 

there are issues related to the standardization of the RFID chips for this purpose 

and, for the system to be most effective, tire dealers and vehicle service centers 

would need to purchase scanning tools and have access to a national database containing tire information. It is unclear at this point what additional safety benefits 

166 

may be possible in the future. NHTSA continues to follow up the evaluation and 

applications of this technology. 

Question 16. Is the NHTSA content with their current tire age identification system? 

Answer. We believe that changes to the tire identification requirements for tire 

marking (effective September 1, 2009) will make it easier for consumers and service 

personnel to identify the date of manufacture and thus the age of a tire. 

Question 17. Are all ESC technologies equal? 

Answer. In 2007, NHTSA promulgated a final rule requiring that all electronic 

stability control systems operate using the same principles and the same system 

definition that would prevent the elimination of key sensor measurements in favor 

of software estimations. We know of no data showing significant performance differences in ESC systems in current production vehicles. 

Question 18. How does ESC prevent rollovers in multiple vehicle accidents or 

when something triggers the tripping of the vehicle (i.e., pothole, curb, soft soil, or 

guardrail)? 

Answer. ESC prevents rollovers by eliminating a substantial number of loss-ofcontrol crashes where the vehicle leaves the roadway. In cases where ESC cannot 

prevent vehicles from leaving the roadway, our data indicate that ESC acts to allow 

the vehicles to leave the road at a lower speed or facing less sideways. By mitigating 

the danger factors even if vehicles leave the roadway, ESC helps the vehicles to roll 

over less often. 

However, if a crash with another vehicle is the cause of the rollover or the cause 

of road departure, we would not expect ESC to provide any benefit. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL TO

JAMES F. PORTS, JR. 

Question 1. The agency included language in the preamble to the NPRM on roof 

crush which would preempt state law claims, if the preamble language is relied 

upon by courts. If an automobile manufacturer has the technology to improve safety 

above the Federal standard, and the addition of such technology is a reasonable cost 

for either the manufacturer or the consumer, doesn’t the manufacturer have an obligation to the American public to install this technology? If the manufacturer does 

not do so, shouldn’t an injured American have the ability to hold that manufacturer 

accountable? 

Answer. In responding to this question, I note that it raises issues both about 

Federal preemption of State tort law and also about how State tort law should operate in situations where it is not preempted. While I can respond to your question 

as it relates to Federal law, the issue of how State tort law should operate where 

it is not preempted is a matter that is up to the individual States. 

In our notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), we identified potential State tort 

law actions that we believed could frustrate the agency’s objectives by upsetting the 

balance between efforts to increase roof strength and reduce rollover propensity. We 

wanted to raise the possibility of preemption during the rulemaking process, when 

there is a chance to obtain and consider public comments, rather than after the fact 

during possible litigation. 

We raised the concern that some potential State tort laws could result in adverse 

safety consequences. We cited, for example, the possibility that a State tort law requiring greater levels of roof strength could lead to added weight to the roof and 

pillars of a vehicle, increasing the center of gravity and rollover propensity. 

We received many comments about the issue of preemption, and we are continuing to analyze the comments. We will fully consider all of the comments as part 

of the rulemaking process. 

Question 2. As discussed during the hearing, the agency is now including 

boilerplate language in all of its rules in an effort to preempt state tort claims. In 

each case, the agency relies upon the Geier v. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), 

decision to preempt state tort claims. Why is the agency suddenly relying upon the 

narrow Geier v. Honda Motor decision to make these claims, when it did not even 

reference that case in preambles to rules between 2000 and 2005? Why would the 

agency state that it believes its rules preempt state tort law when there is not even 

a potential conflict between state and Federal law in question? Doesn’t the Supreme 

Court decision in Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 511 (1996) require the existence 

of a conflict prior to asserting preemption? 

Answer. There may be a misunderstanding about our discussions of implied preemption of state tort law in our vehicle safety rulemaking notices. In most of our 

167 

notices discussing that issue, we examined whether there might be a conflict, but 

did not find any. Without a conflict, there is, of course, no implied preemption. As 

we cannot perfectly predict the nature of the tort law decisions that might emerge 

in the future, we have stated that we cannot completely exclude the possibility that 

a conflict might be identified in the future. 

Question 3. The rules listed below contain preemption language in the final rules. 

In addition, the agency also has included preemption language in the preamble to 

final rules without first providing for notice and comments in the proposed rules. 

How can the agency justify not providing notice and consultation to state and local 

associations, when this will clearly impact the ability of state courts to respond to 

the health and safety needs of its citizens? 

This has occurred in the following instances: 

• February 6, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Door locks and door 

retention (72 Fed. Reg. at 5397). 

• April 6, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Electronic Stability Control (72 Fed. Reg. at 17300). 

• May 4, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Head Restraints (72 Fed. 

Reg. at 38023–24). 

• July 12, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (72 Fed. Reg. at 38023–24). 

• July 24, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Occupant Crash Protection (72 Fed. Reg. at 40257). 

• September 5, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Side Impact Protection (72 Fed. Reg. at 50905). 

• September 11, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Side Impact Protection; Electric Powered Motor Vehicles (72 Fed. Reg. at 51953). 

• December 4, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Cargo Carrying Capacity (72 Fed. Reg. at 68458). 

• December 4, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Lamps, Reflective 

Devices, and Associated Equipment (72 Fed. Reg. at 68265). 

Answer. We believe that it is desirable to seek public comment in connection with 

those vehicle safety standard proposals in which we identify a possible conflict between one of our standards and potential tort law decisions. However, we did not 

identify any conflict with respect to any of the nine notices listed in this question. 

As previously noted, there cannot be any implied preemption in the absence of a 

conflict. 

Question 4. Please explain why the agency has included a significant change in 

policy from prior versions of NHTSA rules to recently proposed versions, as indicated in the two examples below. Please also indicate who directed these changes. 

Were these changes made at the request of the Office of Management and Budget 

and/or the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which reviews the rules 

prior to publication. 

Example 1: 

Dec. 14, 2004: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Head restraints. The 

preamble language states: ‘‘The final rule is not intended to pre-empt state tort 

civil actions.’’ 

May 4, 2007: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety standards: Head restraints—final 

rule. The preamble language states: ‘‘Federal pre-emption questions can arise 

both in the courts’ application of state common law—often state tort law—or in 

the application of a state statute or state or local regulation, ordinance or similar measure. In a state tort suit, the question may be whether imposing liability 

for particular activities would be consistent or inconsistent with Federal law or 

a Federal regulatory program.’’ 

Example 2: 

Dec. 27, 2002: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Platform lift systems for 

accessible motor vehicles—final rule. The preamble language states: ‘‘The final 

rule is not intended to pre-empt state tort civil actions.’’ 

Dec. 20, 2007: Federal motor vehicle safety standards: Platform lifts for motor 

vehicles; Platform lift installations in motor vehicles—proposed rule. The preamble language states: ‘‘In addition to the express pre-emption noted above, the 

Supreme Court has also recognized that state requirements imposed on motor 

vehicle manufacturers, including sanctions imposed by state tort law, can stand 

168 

as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of a NHTSA safety standard. When such a conflict is discerned, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution makes their state requirements unenforceable. See Geier v. American 

Honda Motor Co. (2000). NHTSA has not outlined such potential state requirements in today’s rulemaking, however, in part because such conflicts can arise 

in varied contexts, but it is conceivable that such a conflict may become clear 

through subsequent experience with today’s standard and test regime. NHTSA 

may opine on such conflicts in the future, if warranted.’’ 

Answer. Given the public interest in preemption issues and the dependence of implied preemption on the existence of an actual conflict, we have sought in recent 

years to provide a fuller and more standardized discussion of preemption in our vehicle safety rulemaking notices and to focus those discussions on whether there is 

an actual conflict. In neither of the two documents identified in this question (the 

head restraint final rule issued in May 2007 or the platform lift proposal issued in 

December 2007) did we identify any conflict. Again, in the absence of a conflict, 

there cannot be any implied preemption. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV 

TO JAMES F. PORTS, JR. 

Question 1. I am interested in the role laminated glass, which is required in windshields, plays in providing structural support to vehicle roofs. Has NHTSA examined this during its testing protocols for the roof crush rule? What research do you 

have on the structural benefits to vehicle roofs of laminated glass windshields? 

Answer. Yes. NHTSA has analyzed the contribution that the windshield laminated glass makes relative to the measured strength of the roof. In the agency’s 

two-sided testing, the windshield was generally broken during the first side test. In 

the January 2008 Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we stated that on 

average the peak roof strength for the second side test was reduced by 8.7 percent 

from the first side test. The windshield provides some of that load bearing capacity. 

NHTSA will address this issue more thoroughly in the roof crush final rule. 

Question 2. How will the agency address rear windows and occupant safety? Laminated glass is not required in rear windows. But, if it was, would that also provide 

additional strength to vehicle roofs? Has NHTSA considered this in developing its 

roof crush standards? 

Answer. Rear occupant protection due to roof crush will be addressed in the final 

rule. NHTSA has examined the contribution of rear window glass to the strength 

of the roof in our proposed test requirements. The agency has observed less influence on the roof strength performance due to the rear window than occurs with the 

windshield. 

Question 3. For years NHTSA and others have urged parents to put young children in the rear seat for maximum protection in a motor vehicle crash. Would laminated glass help protect rear seat occupants from ejection in a crash? 

Answer. The agency is currently developing its proposal for ejection mitigation. 

SAFETEA–LU mandates establishment of performance standards to reduce complete and partial ejections of vehicle occupants from outboard seating positions. Rear 

seat outboard seating positions will be included in NHTSA’s proposal. The performance requirements being developed anticipate side curtain and advanced glazing 

technologies as being likely countermeasures for ejection mitigation. 

Question 4. Laminated glass is not required in side windows. Although laminated 

glass is not required in side windows, has NHTSA looked at any potential benefits 

it may provide in providing additional strength to vehicle roofs? 

Answer. As was the case for the windshield, in the agency’s two-sided testing the 

side windows were generally broken during the first side test. In the January 2008 

Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we stated that on average the peak 

roof strength for the second side test was reduced by 8.7 percent from the first side 

test. The side window load bearing capacity is included in that reduction. The roof 

crush final rule will establish a strength performance requirement, but not any particular technology to attain that performance. 

Question 5. A crushed roof can break the tempered glass now in the side windows 

thereby creating an opening in which an occupant could be ejected during rollovers 

or other crashes. In developing its roof crush standards, has NHTSA looked at multiple benefits to occupant protection, such as occupant ejection? 

Answer. Yes, in developing its comprehensive rollover approach to prevent the 

crashes, mitigate ejections, and protect those occupants who remain within the compartment, the agency has given extensive consideration to the target populations 

169 

* These documents are retained in the Committee files. 

that would benefit from each of the strategies and how each of these three initiatives must work together to address the various aspects of the rollover problem. The 

agency’s target population estimates for roof crush were published in both the August 2005 NPRM and the January 2008 SNPRM. The roof crush final rule is targeting the group that is most effected when roof structures are compromised. Seat 

belts are 91 percent effective in reducing ejections, and this is the target population 

that most benefits from an increased roof strength. Unbelted occupants in a rollover 

crash are violently tossed about the compartment of the vehicle and are more effectively addressed in the agency’s ejection mitigation initiative. Our analysis of potential benefits for unbelted occupants due to increased roof strength, public comments 

on this issue, and any modifications to the target population will be described in 

the final rule. 

Question 6. Recently NHTSA updated its regulatory status report to include a 

timeline for an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the occupant ejection 

mitigation rulemaking as required by SAFETEA–LU. According to the status report 

an ANPR will be issued in the fall of 2008. I am interested in the testing methodology and results NHTSA will be using to develop the ANPR and how a ‘‘systems’’ 

approach combining both laminated side glass and side air curtains can provide the 

most potential benefit in preventing or mitigating occupant ejections. 

• The SAFETEA–LU statute requires NHTSA to establish a performance standard to ‘‘reduce complete and partial ejections’’. Please provide test results (data, 

pictures, video footage, etc.) that illustrate how side curtain airbags and laminated glass perform as possible countermeasures for partial ejections as both 

stand alone technologies and as a combined system. Please include information 

illustrating how the individual technologies alone provide lesser performance 

than a combined system. 

• In response to questions at his confirmation hearing, DOT Deputy Secretary, 

Admiral Thomas Barrett, has stated that both ‘‘side curtain and advanced glazing technologies are possible countermeasures that manufacturers could employ 

to meet the testing protocol.’’ Please provide test results (data, pictures, video 

footage, etc.) that demonstrate the performance of these possible countermeasures as stand alone technologies and as a combined system. 

• In response to questions at her confirmation hearing, DOT Secretary Peters 

stated: ‘‘NHTSA has conducted tests of side curtain air bags in combination 

with laminated glass. These tests have shown some level of improved performance over individual technologies.’’ Please provide test results (data, pictures, 

video footage, etc.) that illustrate how the combined technologies provide improved performance including information illustrating how the individual technologies alone provide lesser performance. 

• The DOT Secretary Peters further stated: ‘‘NHTSA is addressing full and partial ejections for all vehicle occupants. Research serving as the basis for the proposal has used both child and adult dummies in belted and unbelted conditions.’’ Please provide test results (data, pictures, video footage, etc.) that illustrate the performance of possible countermeasures as stand alone technologies 

and as a combined system for individuals of varying size and age. 

Answer. NHTSA is completing work on development of requirements for ejection 

mitigation, and we expect to publish a proposal this fall. The proposal will have performance requirements but not specific technologies necessary to meet them. Docket 

NHTSA–2006–26467 contains a testing procedure guideline for research into the 

performance of ejection mitigation countermeasures. While NHTSA may deviate 

from this guideline for the ejection mitigation proposal, it does reflect procedures 

that the agency has been using in our research. Testing by the agency has involved 

side curtain window airbags, advanced glazing materials, and combinations of these 

technologies. Two of our most recent publications presenting the results of agency 

ejection mitigation research are attached,* and document testing of prototype and 

production side curtain air bags alone and in combination with laminated side windows. Additional research and analysis supporting the agency’s performance requirements will be released with the proposal. 

Question 7. Airbag manufacturers have reported that the function of airbags can 

be supported by laminated glass because the laminated glass can provide a reaction 

surface for the airbag. Please provide test results (data, pictures, video footage) that 

illustrate how glass can support side airbag deployment by serving as a reaction 

surface. 

170 

*These documents: NHTSA’s Crashworthiness Rollover Research Program—by Stephen Summers, Donald T. Wilkie, and Lisa K. Sullivan, National Highway Traffic Safety Admmistration, 

U.S. Department of Transportation; and J. Stephen Duffy and Michael Sword, Transportation 

Research Center, Inc.; PowerPoint Presentation—Status of NHTSA’s Ejection Mitigation Research—dated May 9, 2005, presented at SAE Government/Industry Meeting-by J. Stephen 

Duffy, Transportation Research Center, Inc.; Recalls for Side Air Bag Deployment Malfunctions 

Improper/Reduced/No Deployment Since CY 2003—dated June 10, 2008; and Investigations of 

Side Air Bag Malfunctions Improper/Reduced/No Deployment Since CY 2003—dated June 10, 

2008, are retained in the Committee files. 

Answer. While some frontal air bags use the laminated windshield as a reaction 

surface for air bags in frontal occupant protection, not all do so. Side curtain air 

bags have evolved from solely side impact occupant protection systems to a countermeasure designed for rollover protection. The newer systems designed for rollover 

protection have increased coverage of the window opening and stay inflated for 

longer periods of time. In addition, they are tethered at the lower part of the window pillars to provide tension across the bottom edge of the curtain, thus mitigating 

the need for a reaction surface in rollover crashes. 

Question 8. In the recent past, NHTSA has launched several investigations into 

deployment issues associated with airbag systems on production vehicles (e.g., 

BMW, Nissan). Please provide data regarding the need for redundancy in occupant 

ejection prevention systems including the incidence of airbag malfunction. 

Answer. Agency examination of the crash data has shown no indication that side 

curtain air bag systems developed for rollover crashes are not sufficiently robust to 

provide the intended occupant protection. Through our enforcement efforts we have 

continued to monitor all vehicle systems for potential malfunctions. Past investigations for non-deployment concerns, including the BMW/MINI Cooper, Nissan Armada and Quest vehicles, resulted in either an extended warranty program, a service campaign or were closed with no further action. The agency’s investigations did 

not identify any crashes, injuries or fatalities associated with malfunction of the side 

air bag system. A table of side air bag defect investigations since 2003 is attached.*

A second table * provides manufacturer voluntary safety recalls of side air bags. 

Æ