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i 

73–437 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–111] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST 

FOR MISSILE DEFENSE 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 6, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

TIM MORRISON, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 6, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request for Missile Defense ................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 6, 2012 .......................................................................................... 33 

TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 2012 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 5 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Ahern, David G., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Portfolio Systems 

Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics ............................................................................................ 11 

Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense .................................................................................. 13 

O’Reilly, LTG Patrick, USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency .......................... 9 

Roberts, Dr. Bradley H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Nuclear 

and Missile Defense Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense ....................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Ahern, David G. ................................................................................................ 72 

Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael ................................................................................. 84 

O’Reilly, LTG Patrick ....................................................................................... 57 

Roberts, Dr. Bradley H. ................................................................................... 45 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta ...................................................................................... 43 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Seven Slides Used by Mr. Turner ................................................................... 99 

November 18, 2011, Letter from Mr. Turner and Mr. Sessions to Mr. 

Kendall ........................................................................................................... 107 

February 12, 2012, Letter from Mr. Kendall to Mr. Turner ......................... 109 

November 17, 2011, Letter from Members of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to Secretary Panetta ................................................................ 110 

January 23, 2012, Letter from James Miller to Mr. Turner ......................... 112 

November 23, 2011, Letter from Mr. Turner to Secretary Panetta ............. 114 
Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD—Continued 

December 12, 2011, Letter from Secretary Panetta to Mr. Turner .............. 116 

December 29, 2011, Letter from Christine Fox to Mr. Turner ..................... 117 

Status of Morale at MDA ................................................................................. 118 

SBX Annual Cost Breakdown FY06–FY13 ..................................................... 125 

PB13 Aegis BMD SM–3 Missile Buy-Deliver Plan ........................................ 126 

FY 2009–2013 [MDA] Major Accomplishments and Changes ...................... 127 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 153 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 161 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 156 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 144 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 131 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 6, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:05 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to today’s hearing on the fiscal year 2013 national defense authorization 

budget request for missile defense. 

We have a great team of witnesses today for this important topic. 

We have the Honorable Brad Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, U.S. Department of Defense. 

We have General Patrick O’Reilly, director of the Missile Defense 

Agency. 

General, I note that this will be your last appearance before us, 

as your term is up this December. We thank you for your 22 years 

of service to the United States. And General, I hope that you will 

always think fondly of the times that you have been before us. We 

appreciate your dedication and certainly your hard work. 

We have the Honorable Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational 

Test and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

We have Mr. David Ahern, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Since entering office, the Obama administration has demonstrated a lack of interest, quite frankly, and support for missile 

defense, specifically the defense of the homeland of the United 

States. In its first budget submission to Congress, President 

Obama slashed $1.16 billion out of the missile defense budget, 

more than a 10 percent reduction in one single year. 

If you turn your attention to the screen, you will see the fiscal 

year 2009 Future Year’s Defense Plan, the FYDP, from the Bush 

administration, slide one, and the fiscal year 2010, FYDP, fiscal 

year defense plan from the Obama administration, slide two. The 

President’s fiscal year 2013 submission is, in fact, lower than the 

President’s own fiscal year 2010 budget request by over $100 million, slide three. 
2 

[The slides referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning 

on page 99.] 

Mr. TURNER. Remember, slide one shows that the fiscal year 

2010 request from the Obama administration was $1.6 billion less 

than the previous President recommended, and slide two shows it 

was less even than President Obama’s only budget request for fiscal year 2010. 

What’s more, the Missile Defense Agency fiscal year 2013 FYDP 

projection for fiscal year 2013 to 2016 is $3.6 billion less than even 

President Obama’s fiscal year 2012 fiscal year defense plan projection for fiscal year 2013 to 2016 just last year and is $2 billion less 

than the previous administration’s projection for fiscal year 2013. 

[See slide 4, Appendix page 102.] 

And, where the President has requested support for missile defense, it has been to support regional missile defenses, to the exclusion of national missile defense. According to the MDA [Missile Defense Agency] budget charts, the United States and the Obama administration will spend approximately $4 or $5 on regional missile 

defense, including the European Phased Adaptive Approach, EPAA, 

for every $1 on national missile defense. This trend continues over 

the FYDP, slides five and six. That is a ratio, again, of $4 or $5 

for regional for every $1 for national missile defense. 

Let me give a caveat to say that every one of these slides comes 

right from the MDA or MDA numbers, the Missile Defense Agency, 

other than slide six, which was put together by staff based on the 

MDA budget outline breakdowns for fiscal year 2013. 

I note the so-called hedge we see on line five is the IIB [Standard 

Missile 3 Block IIB] and PTSS [Precision Tracking Space System] 

systems, which the MDA budget outlined for fiscal year 2013 labels 

an EPAA [European Phased Adaptive Approach] regional contributor, on slide seven. 

[The slides referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning 

on page 103.] 

Mr. TURNER. As we know, the administration is contributing the 

EPAA to NATO free of charge. Such a contribution could cost the 

U.S. as much as $8.5 billion over the course of the FYDP fiscal 

year 2013 to 2017, possibly even more. According to the GAO, responding to a request regarding the EPAA from Mr. Langevin and 

me in 2009, the response was, ‘‘the limited visibility into the cost 

and schedule for EPAA reflect the oversight challenges with the acquisition of missile defense capabilities that we have previously 

reported.’’ 

Senator Sessions and I were concerned enough about these challenges related to the EPAA that we wrote to Mr. Frank Kendall, 

the President’s nominee for the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in November of last year to ask 

for help in remedying what GAO has found concerning an inability 

to cost or to provide costs for the EPAA system. 

And I am going to ask that this letter be placed into the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 107.] 

Mr. TURNER. Three months later, less than 3 weeks ago, we were 

told that DOD would work to develop such a cost. I hope so, but 
3 

I also understand that we won’t have it until July. Still troubling, 

as we continue to ask for these numbers. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 109.] 

Mr. TURNER. We need these costs because if we look ahead to the 

budget, we have to understand how we are helping the administration deliver on what it says is the number one priority, which is 

the defense of the homeland. I have to say, I am not sure how we 

are going about doing this in this budget. 

The final budget of the previous administration, the fiscal year 2009 budget request, requested $1.5 billion for national missile defense, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, GMD, system. But the 

President’s budget request fiscal year 2013 seeks $900 million, 

$260 million less than the fiscal year 2012 request, which was 

itself a decrease of $185 million from fiscal year 2011. 

At the same time, we have had two test failures of the GMD system, and I understand that we won’t see return flight tests for the 

CE2 kill vehicle for 2 months more than projected, to July 2012, 

and the return to flight intercept tests for the CE2 kill vehicle will 

be delayed 3 months, to December 2012. 

Yet the nuclear missile programs of Iran and North Korea continue to expand. Secretary Gates referenced a potential new North 

Korean mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile in June of 2011 at 

the Shangri-La conference saying, with the continued development 

of long-range missiles and potentially a road-mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and their continued development of nuclear 

weapons, North Korea is in the process of becoming a direct threat 

to the United States. A road-mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile [ICBM] would be a profound leap forward in North Korea’s ballistic missile technology. 

I remind my colleagues of the classified briefing that we had on 

the subject just last November. 

Yet we cut GMD. And General O’Reilly, this budget continues to 

underfund national missile defense. 

General, I appreciate your comment in my office the other day 

that more of your time is spent on GMD than any other program. 

But I have to say that your time doesn’t appear to be a substitute 

for the administration’s shortchanging of the programs in its budgets as evidenced by the last two test failures. 

And now I see that we are going to mothball Missile Field 1 and 

the Sea-Based X-Band [SBX] Radar. 

And, General, I know that you‘ll say that we are not mothballing 

the SBX system. But the $10 million request simply does not fund 

keeping this radar in a ready status, able to be deployed and defend the homeland in a moment’s notice. 

I am grateful that the administration appears ready to finally 

brief the hedging strategy for homeland missile defense, but I note 

that this strategy is long overdue. 

Dr. Roberts, we have discussed this. Dr. Miller and you essentially promised previously that we would have this within weeks of 

your last appearance before us last year. 

I trust the strategy will answer this committee’s concern. But I 

note that there is no money in the budget request to do anything 

approximating a real hedge. No money to employ additional GBIs 
4 

beyond the test articles being purchased this year. No money to dig 

more holes at Fort Greely or Vandenberg or even to maintain all 

of the silos that we have. 

And when five members of the subcommittee and I wrote to Secretary Panetta in November asking about the hedging strategy, the 

response we got back indicates that while Iran and North Korea 

are developing and perhaps readying the deployment of significant 

numbers of ICBMs, the Obama administration is concentrating on 

building communications terminals and crossing its fingers about 

reliability improvements. 

I have the letter of the response that we received, the letter that 

we sent to Secretary Panetta. And I will make both these letters 

a part of the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 110.] 

Mr. TURNER. I note that we are not even—from, General, your 

comments earlier—testing these systems against actual ICBM targets for 3, possible 4, more years. And we have discussed that in 

my office, and I know you will have some discussion today. 

I don’t even see a dollar figure for an East Coast site, which 

NORTHCOM recommended before the EPAA was announced and 

in which the Institute for Defense Analyses and the National Academies of Sciences recently recommended, not even a cent for environmental impact study work, which would consume at least 18 

months of time. 

Why don’t we knock this out at least a part of the way so we 

have an option to proceed if we are wrong about the threat of Iran 

and we need to move more quickly? 

Let me note something else of interest to the subcommittee. The 

administration made a series of promises to the Congress in its 

2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the 1251 plan. 

Dr. Roberts, I know you are intimately familiar with those promises. 

When the President decided to break his promise to fully fund 

that plan, he re-evaluated his policy and decided that we could afford more risk and delay the B61 gravity bomb, the W76 warhead 

and indefinitely delay the CMR [Chemistry and Metallurgy Research] facility in New York—in New Mexico, excuse me. However, when the President decided to cut $3.6 billion out of 

his own missile defense budget, we lose 6 GBI silos in Alaska; we 

mothball the SBX; we cut the number of TP2 radars we are procuring; we cut 3 THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] 

batteries and over 60 THAAD interceptors, yet we continue with 

the EPAA without delay. In fact, we increase the budget for the 

PTSS system and other EPAA systems like the IIB missile, which 

according to the MDA budget outlined for fiscal year 2013, on slide 

seven, which I will make a part of the record, our regional system 

is in support of EPAA. 

[The slide referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 105.] 

Mr. TURNER. Now, I don’t think we should have to choose between regional missile defense and national missile defense. 

But I don’t think it’s a good idea, as apparently the President 

does, to gut our GMD system or for the President to cut his own 

missile defense budget by $3.2 billion over the next several years 
5 

or to underfund missile defense by $2 billion this year alone, based 

on the level of funding that the Bush administration had projected 

that we would need to fund missile defense, slide one and three. 

Let me dwell on this graphic long enough to note that many of 

these cuts occurred while the Obama administration first came to 

office. It isn’t possible to blame all of these cuts on the Budget Control Act or even the sequestration or the deal on raising the debt 

limit, as the President has recently attempted to do for many of the 

cuts that are falling on national defense. 

The President’s missile defense policy must be re-evaluated. National missile defense must be adequately funded, as opposed to the 

lip service that has been recently paid by the Obama administration. 

This is an important hearing as we look to the budgets, we look 

to the issue of, what is the policy? What are we pursuing? Why are 

we pursuing these policies and these levels of funding? And that 

nexus is, of course, the subject matter of our hearing. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, when I was first starting in the Congress, I was 

taught about DIME, diplomacy, intelligence, military, economics, 

and that that is what equals national security for this country. 

We see in recent days the whole despair over what’s going on 

with the euro and the questioning of it and our own markets suffering because of that. 

So I think that the work that we do with our European allies is 

incredibly important. And we have decided that the types of 

threats that exist today are imminent enough that they could hurt 

our European allies. So if we think some discussion over the euro 

is hurting our own economy, imagine what our economy would look 

like if, in fact, there was some sort of missile attack on any of our 

European allies. 

So I think it is incredibly important that we continue that work, 

and I think we have a good program to do that. 

And I think it is just as important that we look at our national, 

at our homeland and try to understand what types of threats are 

out there and prepare for those. Obviously, we already have some 

preparation. 

But unfortunately, our recent tests indicate that we need to be 

better at this. And I have always been one of those people who 

thinks it is important that we get the testing right and understand 

what we should have before we begin to acquire any more of that. 

So I don’t think it is a reflection, quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, 

of the Obama administration not liking national missile defense or 

ground-based systems. I think they are just trying to do a much 

better job of making sure that what we have actually will work 

under the conditions that may come up. 
6 

I would like to thank the gentlemen before us, once again, for 

coming before us and explaining the President’s budget and the 

programs, where they stand since the last time we saw each other. 

You know, cost is really of a concern right now in this Congress 

and to the American people. Congress is just a reflection of what 

goes on with the American people. And they have stated quite 

clearly that they are worried about how we spend our money here 

in Washington, DC. So if we are weathering a serious economic crisis, then we have to do a lot more with less. 

And I applaud you all in front of us for really doing that. And 

I have seen you in the last couple of years really address that 

issue. 

So, since 1999, we have invested over $90 billion. And the fiscal 

year 2013 budget request for missile defense is nearly $10 billion. 

Now more than ever, it is a time for smart investments driven by 

strategy to meet our current and our future security needs. 

We have to focus on the proven technology against the most likely short- and medium-range threats. We have to make careful investments to prepare for the developing threats, and we need to leverage our international cooperation to increase the opportunities 

for burden sharing. This means ensuring the development of mature, operationally proven and reliable technology before producing 

and deploying it. 

In the immediate term, for example, in the GMD program, which 

stands at about a 45 percent test success rate, it means determining the causes of the recent test failures and that they are adequately resolved and corrected before buying additional costly 

interceptors. 

And I am pleased—in particular, General O’Reilly, for your work 

and your rigorous analysis to correct these problems as we move 

forward. Smart investments also mean enhancing discrimination 

and reliability by making improvements to our existing capacity. 

And this approach will improve our shot doctrine and maximize the 

use of our available interceptors. We can no longer afford costly investments that are wasteful or unnecessary. And as the Ballistic 

Missile Defense Review stated, the commitment to new capabilities 

must be sustainable over the long term. So I am actually encouraged that this administration is implementing a layered defense to 

protect the homeland, our deployed troops, and our allies. 

We must partner with our allies for effective burden sharing and 

providing an effective defense. And I commend the administration 

again for strengthening the international cooperation that we have 

on missile defense. We have seen significant progress in working 

closely with NATO as we implement the first phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, which protects our forwarddeployed troops and our NATO partners. 

We are sustaining robust cooperation with Israel and Japan and 

our other allies. We are identifying increased opportunities for burden sharing, which becomes even more important at this time 

when everybody is looking for more money. 

As we develop defenses against the threats from Iran and North 

Korea, we continue to seek cooperation with Russia. And we are 

trying to engage China in this also, and we are trying to reduce 

a risk of a miscalculation or a misperception that will remain cru-
7 

cial in preserving strategic stability and avoiding a potentially dangerous nuclear arms race. 

A return to a nuclear weapons build-up, I believe, would prove 

unnecessarily dangerous and very expensive. 

And again, I welcome this discussion, and I welcome the gentlemen before us. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

We appreciate the witnesses have given us written testimony, 

and we would ask now if each would summarize their written testimony in a period of 5 minutes, and then we will turn to questions 

from the Members. 

We will begin with Dr. Roberts. 

STATEMENT OF DR. BRADLEY H. ROBERTS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Dr. ROBERTS. Thank you, Chairman Turner, Ranking Member 

Sanchez, members of the committee. I am grateful for the opportunity to be here today and directly address the perceptions and 

misperceptions of the administration’s policy and investment strategy here. 

I would like to focus in on this question of the overall balance 

in our investment strategy and in our missile defense strategy. I 

would like to address the misperception that the President has a 

lack of interest in homeland defense. In fact, I think he has a very 

specific interest in the strengthening of homeland defense. 

And I want to, first of all, make the case for regional missile defense. 

As you, Mr. Chairman, observed, this shouldn’t be an either/or 

question. We should be doing enough of both. 

But I think we shouldn’t forget the case for doing more on regional missile defense today. We see this as following from a need 

and an opportunity. The need is the fact that we live in an era of 

missile proliferation. We project power forward globally. We have 

security commitments in regions where missiles are proliferating. 

We must protect our forces. We must protect our allies. They must 

participate in protecting themselves. To not do that calls into question the very foundation of our security role in the international environment today. 

So if that’s the need, the opportunity arises from the fact that 

the missile defense business over the last 10 to 15 years put a lot 

of resources into developing real capability that is now available for 

us to put against the problem of regional missile defense. So we’ve 

put in place a program to ramp up these regional defense capabilities over the years ahead, and we hope that it will, again, gain the 

support of this committee. 

This ramping up is something we are doing in partnership with 

allies. They are not along for a free ride. We’ve given them many 

opportunities to strengthen their own self-defense, and many are 

rising to this challenge. Even as we accomplish this ramping up in 
8 

regional defense, we remain firmly committed to a strong homeland 

defense and to some ramping up in this area as well. 

In anticipation of future threat developments, we are committed 

to strengthening the homeland posture and to ensuring that it remains overwhelmingly advantageous in the way it is today for the 

United States, even in the face of future missile proliferation. 

Therefore, the question is not whether we should continue to 

strengthen homeland defense. I believe we are in agreement about 

this. The question is, how? 

We do have a strategy for strengthening homeland defense. And 

it’s a two-step process. It is the strengthening of the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense system in this decade and the shift to the SM– 

3 as a complementary second layer in the next decade. 

A simple way to grow the homeland defense posture is just to put 

more GBIs into the ground, whether at one of the existing sites or 

a new one. Here is our case for the blended approach of GBIs and 

SM–3 IIBs, four main elements: For regional defense, we now have 

two layers of protection. The homeland deserves the same. Depth 

and redundancy are better than reliance on a single system. 

Secondly, effectively exploiting the full missile defense battlespace requires forward and rear basing of interceptors. A shootlook-shoot capability is more effective and more efficient with forward placement of the first shooter. 

Third, forward placement of the first shooter becomes even more 

important if and as proliferators field missile defense countermeasures. 

And lastly, a ramp-up of SM–3 IIB capability will be much more 

affordable than a ramp-up of GBIs. With the SM–3 IIB projected 

to be roughly one-third the cost of the GBI, we can grow a capability at triple the rate for every dollar invested. Now until the 

SM–3 IIB becomes available in the 2020 time frame, our focus is 

on improving the performance of the GMD system. 

One way to do this is again the simple way, more GBIs in the 

ground. And our hedge plan of 2 years ago set aside some funds 

for this purpose, additional silos, additional GBIs, and the current 

budget proposes a bit more money for more GBIs. 

But again, the simple way isn’t necessarily the best way to solve 

this problem. Working closely with MDA, we have determined that 

significant improvement is possible in the performance of the existing system with the current inventory. Indeed, the performance can 

be at least doubled. In essence, we can double the number of 

ICBMs the current force is capable of defeating without adding a 

single new GBI. Especially in a time of physical austerity, this 

more cost-affordable approach should be the basis of our pathway 

forward. 

These conclusions about how best to strengthen the homeland defense posture flow from the work we have had underway in the Department for well over a year—and I do recognize it has been well 

over a year, and we made a promise to you a year ago, and we look 

forward to making good on that promise before markup. 

But we have had this work underway. We have arranged a return later this month for a classified discussion of the elements of 

that work, including threat information, hedge options, and decisions reflected in the current budget on how to sustain the hedge. 
9 

So, in sum, we promised in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review a 

balanced approach that would reflect all of the developments in the 

threat environment, not just a selection of them, and an affordable 

approach, as we were enjoined to do by you, who created the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and an affordable approach that ensures stronger protection for the homeland, stronger protection for 

our forces abroad, stronger protection for our allies. And we believe 

the current budget effectively supports these commitments and 

hope that it will benefit from your support. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Roberts can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. TURNER. General. 

STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK O’REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

General O’REILLY. Good afternoon, Chairman Turner, Ranking 

Member Sanchez, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the 

Missile Defense Agency’s, or MDA’s, $7.75 billion fiscal year 2013 

budget request to continue to develop protection against the proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missiles of all ranges. 

MDA’s highest priority is the protection of our homeland against 

the growing threat of ICBMs. We have made significant progress 

in enhancing our current homeland defense over the past year, including activating a forward-based TPY–2 radar in Turkey and an 

upgraded early-warning radar at Thule, Greenland, to track intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, from the Middle East; upgrading three existing ground-based interceptors, or GBIs; activating a second command and control node, and completing our 

newest missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska. 

However, further enhancement of our homeland defense is paced 

by the resolution of a technical issue identified in the last GBI 

flight test and the need for a successful intercept with the newest 

version of the GBI Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle by the end of this 

year. A successful non-intercept GBI flight test this summer will 

confirm our resolution of the previous flight test issue. 

We propose almost half of the President’s 2013 budget request 

for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, or GMD, program, the 

SM–3 IIB interceptor, the Precision Tracking Space System, and 

other programs that support homeland defense, including the completion of the hardened power plant at Fort Greely; construction of 

the GBI Inflight Interceptor Communication System at Fort Drum, 

New York; upgrading the Clear, Alaska, Early Warning Radar; test 

preparation and targets for two- and three-stage GBIs; enhancing 

the reliability of 3 existing GBIs; resumption of the production of 

new GBIs; and the procurement of 5 additional GBIs for a total of 

57. Most important, our GBI enhancements will effectively double 

the firepower of our 30 operational GBIs over the next 6 years. 

As our highest priority, we do not believe the United States 

should be reliant on only one missile defense interceptor system to 

protect our homeland. Thus, it is critical we continue the SM–3 IIB 

interceptor program currently in concept development to greatly 
10 

enhance our homeland defense by 2020 by providing a forwardlocated mobile and land-based first layer of missile defense against 

ICBMs, independent of the second layer provided by the GMD system. 

Furthermore, the development of the PTSS will provide unprecedented capability to track large raid sizes of ballistic missiles of all 

ranges throughout their entire flight without solely depending on 

the large number of radars with limited ranges hosted by other nations. 

The combination of GMD, SM–3 IIB, PTSS, and other programs 

will provide effective and adaptable missile defense for our homeland to counter the uncertainty of ICBM capability from today’s regional threats or decades into the future. 

However, the greatest growth in the ballistic missile defense 

threat is the proliferation of regional missiles. Our progress in regional defense over the past year was highlighted by the on schedule deployment of the first phase of the Phased European Adaptive 

Approach, comprising a command-and-control node at Ramstein Air 

Force Base, Germany, a forward-based radar in Turkey, and an 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, or BMD, ship in the Mediterranean 

Sea. The demonstration of that architecture by an Aegis ship intercepting a 3,700-kilometer target last April, the installation of BMD 

capability into four additional Aegis ships, the Army material release of the first THAAD battery, and THAAD’s simultaneous 

intercept of two targets last October. 

This year, we will install BMD capability into five additional 

Aegis ships, conduct three SM–3 IB flight tests to demonstrate resolution of the previous flight test failure; and material release of 

a second THAAD battery. 

Our 2013 budget request will deliver a third THAAD battery, 3 

additional Aegis BMD upgrades, for a total of 32 BMD-capable 

ships. 

Finally, this year and in 2013, we will conduct the largest, most 

complex integrated layered regional missile defense test in history 

by simultaneously engaging up to five cruise and ballistic missile 

targets with Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot interceptor systems. A forward-based AN/TPY–2 radar and a command-and-control system 

operated by soldiers, sailors, and airmen from multiple combatant 

commands. 

To meet the Department’s affordability goals, the 2013 missile 

defense budget request was prioritized and reviewed by the Missile 

Defense Executive Board with participation of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, combatant commands, the services, the Department of State, 

and ultimately was approved by the Secretary of Defense. As a result of these reviews, we terminated the Airborne Infrared Sensor 

Program, revised THAAD battery production to a total of 6, and 

AN/TPY–2 production to a total of 11 radars, and limited the SeaBased X-Band Radar to flight test operations with availability for 

contingency operations. 

Although we terminated the Airborne Laser Test Bed program, 

we are maintaining the Nation’s directed energy expertise as we 

pursue the demonstration of the next-generation high-energy laser 

on a high-altitude, unattended air vehicle in this decade. 
11 

Additionally, through our efficiency initiatives, we awarded in December a new 7-year GMD contract with a price of almost $1 billion less than the previous independent government process. 

Mr. TURNER. General, if you could summarize. You have now exceeded the time by more than Dr. Roberts exceeded the time. So 

I just would like to ask you to conclude. 

General O’REILLY. Okay. I will summarize, and I am available 

for questions. 

[The prepared statement of General O’Reilly can be found in the 

Appendix on page 57.] 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Ahern. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. AHERN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PORTFOLIO SYSTEMS ACQUISITION, 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS 

Mr. AHERN. Good afternoon, Chairman Turner, Ranking Member 

Sanchez, members of the committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss certain aspects of the Department’s missile defense efforts. 

Let me begin with a few remarks about MEADS, the Medium 

Extended Air Defense System. As I testified last year, MEADS is 

a cooperative development program managed by a NATO program 

office. It was conceived in the mid-1990s as a flagship program for 

international cooperative development to develop a ground-based 

air and terminal ballistic missile defense capability. The program 

experienced a number of technical and management challenges, 

which led the Department and our MEADS partners to agree to restructure the program as a reduced scope of effort, titled the Proof 

of Concept, in order to close out the development within the original funding limits set by the MEADS’ MOU [memorandum of understanding]. By completing the Proof of Concept, the U.S. will fulfill our commitments to our partners under the current MOU by 

demonstrating MEADS elements and associated technologies that 

are fully realized, that would add to the set of capabilities available 

to advance U.S. air and missile defense architectures. 

The program has made progress, but we recognize the schedule 

is aggressive, and we will watch major milestones carefully to ensure the Proof of Concept is fully completed within the planned 

funding. The MEADS lightweight launcher successfully completed 

a PAC–3 missile shot during a test at White Sands. The MEADS 

X-band fire-control radar is in near-field testing and calibration in 

preparation for far-field radiation testing this summer to support 

first intercept flight test at the end of this calendar year. An additional intercept flight test is scheduled in mid calendar 2013. 

The NDAA Act for 2012 requires that the Secretary of Defense 

submit to the Congress a plan to use the fiscal year 2012 authorized and appropriated for MEADS as the final obligations to either 

implement a restructured program of reduced scope or to pay for 

contract termination costs. Despite having agreed to a restructured 

program just last October, the Department has once again consulted at the highest levels with our partners about developing a 

plan to further restructure the program using fiscal year 2012 

funding alone. In response, the German and Italian armaments di-
12 

rectors recently cosigned a letter reiterating that their nations remain fully committed to their MEADS MOU obligations and expect 

that all partners will fulfill their MOU obligations to continue with 

a Proof of Concept as previously agreed. 

While we have consulted with our partners, the contracted Proof 

of Concept work has continued. The U.S. provided the available fiscal year 2012 funds, currently 25 percent of the fiscal year 2012 appropriation. I expect the plan required by the NDAA to be delivered in early April. While we are developing a plan that complies 

with the fiscal year 2012 NDAA legislative requirement, the Department believes that completing a MEADS Proof of Concept is 

still the better course of action. 

The Department’s fiscal year 2013 budget request includes sufficient funds to meet our MEADS MOU obligations. Secretary Panetta has made clear that we would work with Congress to secure 

those funds. And I ask for your support so that we can live up to 

our MOU commitments. 

With regards to the Department’s management and oversight of 

the Missile Defense Agency, the USD(AT&L) continues to exercise 

full authority and responsibility for comprehensive and effective 

oversight of MDA and its programs through the Missile Defense 

Executive Board, or the MDEB. 

Since I testified before you last year, the MDEB has conducted 

seven meetings, and USD(AT&L) has issued six acquisition decision memoranda. Through the MDEB, the Department maintains 

early and continued visibility into MDA programs and is able to 

provide the necessary guidance to achieve missile defense priorities 

within cost and schedule constraints. 

In the past year, MDEB meetings have included reviews, as General O’Reilly mentioned, of the MDA budget request and assessment of the effects of a reduced budget on the BMDS program. 

Progress reviews of regional phased adaptive approaches and endorsement of MDA and military department management and 

funding responsibility guidance, including a process to define and 

schedule transfer of responsibilities. The MDEB also reviewed and 

endorsed or provided direction regarding the U.S. Strategic Command’s prioritized capabilities list and the agency’s fiscal year 2011 

budget execution. 

In summary, the Department’s missile defense activities continue 

at a high pace. We have made hard choices in this portfolio in the 

fiscal year 2013 budget, including a request for 2013 funding for 

MEADS. The Department will continue to seek ways to wring out 

the maximum capability from our investments in air and missile 

defense. 

We are grateful for the continued support of Congress, which has 

been critical to the success to date in developing and fielding missile defenses. 

Thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to answering 

any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ahern can be found in the Appendix on page 72.] 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Gilmore. 
13 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Mr. GILMORE. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, I’ll briefly summarize my written statement. 

During the last year, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 3.6.1 and 

the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system demonstrated 

progress in testing toward achieving intermediate-range and shortrange threat class capability, respectively. Aegis intercepted an 

IRBM flying a 3,700-kilometer flight path, and it did so using 

launch on remote, which is a capability that is important to the 

European Phased Adaptive Approach. 

THAAD demonstrated in an operational test that was the most 

realistic operational test of a missile defense system conducted to 

date, because it used the soldiers who would deploy with the first 

THAAD battery to conduct the test; it demonstrated successfully 

and intercepted two simultaneously launched short-range ballistic 

missiles. 

GMD suffered a second consecutive flight test failure, flying the 

Capability Enhancement II Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle. A failure 

review board has investigated the cause of that failure, determined 

the cause, and MDA has identified mitigating steps that need to be 

taken and is taking those steps and planned, as General O’Reilly 

said, is planning to conduct two flight tests this year to demonstrate that those fixes have been effective. The flight tests have 

been delayed somewhat because the analysis that has been done of 

manufacturing techniques has identified additional problems that 

need to be corrected. And there is no point in conducting the test 

until those problems have actually been corrected. 

The Integrated Master Test Plan that I work with General 

O’Reilly to develop each year on a 6-month cycle—there is a review 

at the intermediate part of the year, and then there is a final 

version of the IMTP developed for submission to Congress—has 

maintained the test sequence and test pace for a ground-based missile defense—that is defense of the homeland—this year in comparison with last year. And in fact, all of the major GMD test 

events that were planned in the first IMTP, with which I was involved back in 2010, have been maintained in this IMTP. 

The flight test pace of about one per year is the best that we 

have been able to do on average over about a decade. That is because these tests are extremely complex. There is over a terabyte 

of data that is collected during these tests that has to be analyzed. 

I am all for testing at the most rapid pace possible, but you have 

to assess and analyze the results of the tests in order to learn from 

them. It takes a good deal of time to learn from these tests and 

to plan them. And as I said, they are extremely complex. 

And in that regard, I would note that when the Bush administration declared the limited deployment option [LDO] capability 

achieved with five GBOs and silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, on 30 

September 2004 and, on 31 December 2004, when NORTHCOM accepted the LDO capability with eight GBIs and silos at Fort Greely, 

there had been no successful flight tests at all of the GBI and kill 

vehicle that were used in that limited deployment option. 
14 

The first flight test of the GBI and kill vehicle that were actually 

deployed occurred on 1 September 2006, about 2 years after the initial deployment was declared. That was a zero offset fly-by that did 

not achieve a kill. 

The first actual intercept with a kill occurred on 28 September 

2007. At that time, the test plans that existed all—and they didn’t 

go out nearly as many years as the IMTP does in terms of planning 

ahead for the testing that is needed in order to collect all the data 

that will be needed to demonstrate the operational performance of 

the system. At that time, none of the test plans involved an ICBM 

intercept. They involved IRBM intercepts for targets fired from Kodiak that were side shots at closing velocities that are substantially 

lower than would occur during an ICBM test. 

We now have ICBM tests planned. The first one will be in the 

fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015. That will be a salvo shot, two 

GBIs and an incoming ICBM target. One year later, there will be 

a multiple simultaneous engagement of two ICBMs. So, in my 

view, the test plan that we have, which is for GMD, which is the 

same test plan that we had a year ago, is a robust and rigorous 

test plan. We can argue about the pace at which it could be 

achieved. But as I have noted, it is the best—the one-per-year test 

pace is about the best that we have been able to achieve over a decade because of the complexity of the tests. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilmore can be found in the Appendix on page 84.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Gentlemen, I appreciate your comments. And I think it has been very helpful because it illustrates 

some of the issues of where the divergent views are on policy. 

Dr. Roberts, you said something akin to, well, the simple way 

would be—and I think it was dot dot dot, fill in more GBIs. And 

I want to give an analogy. The simple way for the defense would 

be, load your gun. The long way would be, develop a study of a new 

gun. The smart way would be, load your gun and study. So what 

I am concerned with is, is that we are depending too much upon 

the study phase instead of the current defense phase. 

Your statement of the next decade for the SM–3 IIB is where we 

diverge. Senator Lieberman, as you know, famously called this a 

paper system. I think we are concerned that we may be throwing 

paper wads of designs of SM–3 IIBs rather than throwing actual 

interceptors that could make a difference for the defense of our Nation. 

General O’Reilly, you said—I think as an accomplishment, we 

have upgraded our radar for identifying ICBM launches from the 

Middle East. You are obviously accomplishing upgrades of looking 

for things at the time that we are looking at upgrades for encountering them if they should be there. 

The issue, Dr. Roberts, of the hedge, our concern with the hedge 

is not just an assignment that has not been returned to us. It is 

an administration that we think is unconvinced it needs a hedge. 

And so, ergo, our concern about being able to have that policy debate back and forth of reviewing what the administration’s view is 

of a hedge and then the view of what Congress would be for the 

need of a hedge. 
15 

Dr. Roberts, I have a great deal of respect for you. You have been 

incredibly both kind and helpful in all of our discussions, including 

to this whole committee, in both briefing us and giving us information, so we understand where we are and understanding the administration’s policy. I would like to engage you in a series of questions that go to try to get on the record some issues and concerns 

with respect to the threat. 

I want to give you two statements that have been obviously on 

the record and then have a discussion with you on what information that we can discuss in an unclassified manner, again, looking 

to your discernment of where that line is, of what we can say about 

North Korea capability. And let me start by saying that last week 

at the committee’s hearing on the Pacific Command posture, I 

asked Admiral Willard about the development by North Korea of 

a road-mobile intercontinental missile defense. Specifically, I had 

started with the statement from Secretary Gates where he had 

said, with the continued development of long-range missiles and 

potentially a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile and their 

continued development of nuclear weapons, North Korea is in the 

process of becoming a direct threat to the United States. 

So I asked Dr. Willard to respond, and he said in our hearing 

last week, ‘‘There is development within North Korea of a roadmobile intercontinental ballistic missile system that we have observed. We have not observed it being tested yet, to my knowledge.’’ That, of course, was his unclassified statement in a hearing. 

So, Dr. Roberts, an unclassified answer, is it deployed? 

Dr. ROBERTS. There is no unclassified answer to that question. 

Mr. TURNER. What can you tell us in an unclassified basis to give 

us some fidelity into the Admiral’s statement or Secretary Gates’ 

statement about the development of the road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile system that Secretary Gates has indicated 

he is worried about and Dr. Willard says that there is development 

of that has been observed, although it has not yet been tested? 

Dr. ROBERTS. I wish there was something I could say about that 

in an open forum, but that information remains classified and a 

part of what we would like to discuss on the 29th. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you agree with Secretary Gates’ statement that 

with the continued development of long-range missiles and potentially a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile and their continued development of nuclear weapons, North Korea is in the process of becoming a direct threat to the United States? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Yes. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. The reason why I push this is because—and 

back to your statement, again, of showing that the divergence of 

the policy issue, is the concern that the development of the SM– 

3 IIB is a next decade development? 

And General O’Reilly, you indicated that you are going to be doubling the numbers, effective numbers of our GBIs. But we all know 

from the budget that no one sees a physical doubling of our GBIs, 

which takes me to the next question, which gets us back to the 

hedge. At what point would North Korea deploy enough ICBMs— 

or maybe export them to Iran so that we have to look at North 

Korea and Iran—where there are ICBMs that are deployed, where 

under our current shot doctrine—I mean, let’s not take General 
16 

O’Reilly’s statement of increased effectiveness—at what numbers 

would our current GBI inventory be sufficient if they had, let’s say, 

10 ICBMs between North Korea and Iran pointed at the United 

States; would we consider that what we currently have in GBI inventory insufficient to need to pursue a hedge or sufficient? Dr. 

Roberts? General O’Reilly? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Again, I think we are both constrained by the fact 

of classification. The performance characteristics of the GMD system, shot doctrine, classified. The rate at which shot doctrine will 

improve, classified. The rate at which the threat is growing, classified. So we are eager to have that conversation with you but not 

in this forum. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, one thing that we can have in a unclassified 

discussion, because General O’Reilly has specifically said it in this 

hearing, that it would double our numbers. We know, on an unclassified basis, the numbers that are in the ground. So we would know 

on an unclassified basis that we don’t have—I mean, regardless of 

shot doctrine, we don’t have two ICBMs for one GBI, right? We can 

say that on an unclassified basis, right? 

Dr. ROBERTS. It is physically impossible to get to two with one. 

Mr. TURNER. Yes. So there is going to be a point at our inventory 

of that ICBM inventory that might be pointed at us versus inventory that we currently have where we are bypassed, right? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Correct. 

Mr. TURNER. And I can say on an unclassified basis, certainly the 

current inventory of those, if that were exceeded, that that would 

be a limit? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Correct. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Roberts, you know and we all know that there 

is concern about cooperation with the systems that North Korea 

and Iran are developing, both between them, with others, and concerns as to how information is being shared, how these systems are 

being developed. 

The concern of sharing is a concern of rapid advancement. Part 

of the issue that we face as we look to the SM–3 IIB being available in the next decade is an assumption of the current graph of 

capabilities of the countries that we are looking at. Does it concern 

you that there might be this sharing that could result in rapid development and then a greater increase of a need for a hedge? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Of course. 

Mr. TURNER. Will that be part of the hedge document that you 

are going to deliver to us prior to the markup? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Yes. 

Mr. TURNER. Great. 

General O’Reilly, the Precision Tracking Space System. Last November, I wrote to Secretary Panetta asking a series of questions 

about the Precision Tracking Space System. I asked specifically, 

the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, CAPE, Office review 

of the cost be undertaken. While I was told that CAPE would get 

back to me on this review, I have yet to receive an actual response. 

I will make the correspondence part of the record that we sent. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 114.] 

Mr. TURNER. Can you tell me the status of this review. 
17 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. We have provided data, and we are 

participating with the CAPE. They are in the lead on doing an 

independent cost estimate of our numbers that we have used in our 

evaluation of the PTSS. 

Mr. TURNER. General O’Reilly, if Congress provides the funding 

for this system to go forward, the system which is projected to cost 

$1.5 billion in the FYDP alone, can you detail when it will have 

discrimination capability? Will it have it at deployment? 

General O’REILLY. It will have some discrimination capability at 

deployment. It contributes—our approach to discrimination is 

many layers of assessments, using different frequencies, different 

radars, different capability. It will provide a critical one because it 

will be watching the deployment itself. It will see a missile over its 

entire flight. We are working on advanced capabilities that go beyond that. 

Mr. TURNER. How long will the satellites remain in orbit? And 

are you expecting to have to replenish this system once, twice? 

How many satellites will it take over a 10-year period, over a 20- 

year period? 

General O’REILLY. The minimum capability for the system is 

nine. We want to put 20—or 12 on orbit to give ourselves a redundancy and a self-healing capability if something happened to them. 

Our initial estimate of the life or time on orbit is 3.5 years, but 

that is done very conservatively; like our current two satellites that 

are up, they are both very healthy. And at this point, under their 

original estimate using the same techniques we just talked about, 

they both would have finished their on-orbit life. So the number I 

just gave you I believe is very conservative, and that is what our 

history shows. 

Mr. TURNER. So over a 10-year period, you would be estimating 

at least twice? 

General O’REILLY. As we stagger them out, yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. General O’Reilly, I have a memorandum from General William Shelton. As you know, he helped the Congress work 

on the issue of protecting our GPS system earlier this year. This 

memo, dated December 30, 2011, states that General Shelton is interested in the space situational awareness possibilities and the 20 

new satellite low-orbit constellation. Can you briefly describe the 

SSA benefits of this system? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, because of the design where it is operating on the Equator looking north, it has a great capability to see 

the ascending satellites as they are rotating around the Earth and 

other objects. So the capability for a missile defense system like 

this will spend most of its time doing functions other than missile 

defense. 

What’s driving the design of the PTSS is the need to track a missile over its entire flight. But that itself is an inherent capability 

to be contributing significantly to space situational awareness and 

early warning. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, the purpose of my question is to ask you to 

assure Congress that before you proceed too far down the road of 

this PTSS concept, that you will work with the Air Force Space 

Command to fully exploit the SSA capabilities of the system, in-
18 

cluding SSA requirements that General Shelton may feel appropriate, while the design phase is taking place. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. And that is how I responded back to 

General Shelton, exactly that way. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I ask my questions, I wanted to make a brief statement 

and put it into the record. 

It is about the hold that is placed on the reprogramming request 

for the Army budget due to the concerns by the committee majority 

about receiving information on EPAA MILCON cost and life cycle 

cost of the architecture. 

And while I agree that the cost information is important and I 

understand that Chairman Turner and Senator Sessions are waiting for a broader response to their request for the CAPE analysis, 

I am concerned that prolonging this hold will further withhold approval of the Army’s intent to build barracks for our United States 

soldiers stationed in Turkey. A further delay could result in our 

U.S. soldiers having to endure yet another long and cold winter of 

extreme weather conditions at the site in tents ill-suited for that 

purpose. And I hope that the majority will consider releasing the 

hold soon because I think that we will have an opportunity to address any outstanding concerns in our bill. 

Dr. Roberts and General O’Reilly, the Ballistic Missile Defense 

Review stated that the U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible 

enough to adapt as the threats change. Given the updated intelligence community’s assessments of the threat from Iran and from 

North Korea, is the proposed PA plan, starting with the EPAA in 

Europe and the current proposed hedging policy, is it still adequate 

to respond to the threat? Why? Or why not? 

Dr. ROBERTS. In our view, the balanced approach we set out is 

still active to deal with the threat, in part because both approaches 

are scalable. In fact, we cannot project—the intelligence community 

cannot tell us the numbers of missiles that we’ll face, the numbers 

and the different inventory types, whether short, medium, intermediate, or long range. There is a great deal of uncertainty about 

when new threats will emerge and how significantly they will 

emerge in terms of raw quantitative capability. So we have approaches to the defense of the homeland and approaches to the defense of the regions that are flexible and responsive. I should explain that this is in part what accounts for the slowness with which 

we have provided the costing information on EPAA. 

EPAA is sometimes characterized as a defense acquisition program. It is not. It is sometimes characterized as an architecture. 

It is not. It is an approach. It is an approach for the flexible use 

of capabilities over the coming decade, and that flexibility extends 

not just within a region but across the regions. So we have some 

uniquely associated assets with each of the regional approaches, for 

example, radars in Turkey and in the future Romania. 

But most of the assets are mobile, relocatable, sea-based, would 

swing from one region to another in time of crisis. And, indeed, the 

naval vessels are multi-mission vessels, so how do they get accounted in accounting of EPAA? So, in our view, we have the flexi-
19 

bility in these two approaches that’s required, given the uncertainty in future threat development. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. General, do you have any comment to that? 

General O’REILLY. Congresswoman, I just want to stress the fact 

that we emphasize in our design of these systems the ability to 

surge them so you can go to a rapidly increase in the capability in 

any one region if, in fact, you have to. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. Thank you, General. 

General O’Reilly and Dr. Gilmore, what is the cause for delaying 

the intercept flight test by 90 days where it slips from fourth quarter fiscal year 2012 to fourth quarter fiscal year 2013? Is that just 

enough time to ensure that we are getting it right and in the 

meantime would you be able to use additional GMD funds for fiscal 

year 2013? 

General O’REILLY. The delay in the flight test for the first intercept by 90 days was driven by an assessment done by myself and 

the senior engineers from the aerospace companies involved. As we 

looked at the results emerging from the last flight test in the Failure Review Board, we did identify a component that had an error 

that was not apparent. You couldn’t test it with the facilities on the 

ground. So we have reestablished new specifications that we believe will be robust, and we will prove that in a flight test this 

summer. 

But we also found that not only are the specifications needed to 

be revised for these devices but the stringency in which they were 

produced, and it was in the review of the factories and the plants 

themselves that we saw that we needed more stringent production 

processes. Unfortunately, these devices are the very first ones you 

use when you build up enhanced kill vehicle, and so by replacing 

them with production representative devices actually will cause a 

delay because we had to start over the production of these KVs. 

What was important to me was not only were we going to fly for 

this next test the design that we have determined we need, but 

they are built exactly like they’ll be built in production. So we have 

a production representative missile, and it gives us the confidence 

based on the results of a successful intercept that, in fact, we can 

put the rest of the production line into operation. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. 

Mr. GILMORE. We want to do the tests with the most production 

representative system that we can so that we can understand how 

the fueling systems will operate, and so I support the delay in 

order to make certain that this particular part can be fully production representative. 

The first test will be done with an existing part. It will demonstrate mitigations to the problems that were discovered in the 

earlier flight test with the existing part. But, as General O’Reilly 

said, they are building a new part and they have to make certain 

that they are building it to the right tolerances under the right 

conditions; and so the intercept test, I agree, should be postponed 

until we can have a fully production representative part in the test. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

My next question for Dr. Roberts and for General O’Reilly, the 

September 2011 Defense Science Board Task Force report on the 

Science and Technology Issues of Early Intercept Ballistic Missile 
20 

Defense expressed concern about the overall effectiveness of U.S. 

missile defenses. For example, the report points out that the radars 

deployed in the context of the EPAA have limited capability; and 

the report also points out that the DOD has not been able to demonstrate the ability to reliability discrimination between warheads, 

decoys, and other debris. And we have also received the National 

Academy of Sciences report and the Institute for Defense Analyses 

report. So what are we doing to increase the reliability and improve discrimination to improve our shot doctrine? 

General O’REILLY. As I said earlier, the most effective way, we 

believe, for discrimination, which is identifying a reentry vehicle 

[RV] amidst many other objects, is to interrogate that cluster 

through many different frequencies and many different sensor systems. You want more than one. And also to observe how those objects are coming off a missile as it is finishing its boost phase. So 

one advantage we saw for the PTSS system is it will observe very 

early in flight, which today there are locations where a groundbased radar would not have that range in order to see that deployment. 

So step one is to watch the deployment of the objects. You can 

learn a lot from that. 

Step two is to employ advanced technologies from space and radars that we are developing today. We can describe in more detail 

at a higher level of classification. But between the combination of 

that and the opportunity to study these over a long period of time. 

And, finally, when you are in the terminal phase, the best way 

we know to defeat a discrimination is, especially in a regional context, is as they start reentering the Earth’s atmosphere and above 

100 kilometers you start to see movement of lightweight replicas 

and so forth. And that is why the THAAD system, for example, is 

designed to intercept both in and outside the Earth’s atmosphere, 

so that it can watch the stripping away of lighter objects, and it 

is a very effective way of identifying where the RV is. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My question is for Dr. Roberts and General O’Reilly. 

Section 1244 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2012 prohibits the transfer of classified ballistic missile defense information to the Russian Federation. What instruction has 

the White House given DOD for implementing Section 1244’s prohibition? 

Dr. ROBERTS. We have received no special instruction. We have 

the legislation in front of us. We understand our obligation. We 

fully intend to comply with the requirement of the law. We intend 

not to share information with Russia that would in any way endanger our national security, and we intend to keep the Congress informed in this area. 

Mr. BROOKS. Is the administration negotiating a Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement with Russia? 

Dr. ROBERTS. I honestly don’t know the status of that effort, so 

let me take that question and come back to you with a response 

and follow-up, if I may. 
21 

Mr. BROOKS. When you say you don’t know the status of it, does 

that mean you don’t know if they are doing it or you don’t know 

the current status of it, but it is being done? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The former. 

Mr. BROOKS. General O’Reilly, would you like to add anything, 

any insight in that regard, either with respect to the National Defense Authorization Act’s prohibition of transfer of classified ballistic missile defense information to the Russian Federation and, 

most particularly, the very expensive hit-to-kill technology that 

American taxpayers have paid for over the course of many years? 

General O’REILLY. Congressman, I am the classifying authority 

for the Missile Defense Agency in these technologies, and so we 

have a very strict way of determining and abiding by what is classified, primarily to protect any vulnerabilities or capability that are 

not apparently available easily. And I have never received a request to release classified information to the Russians; and so, as 

far as I can tell from my position, there is abidance to this requirement, and I have not seen personally, have no knowledge of anyone 

transferring that type of technology or proposing to. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, what causes us concern is that there have 

been many reports in the news media about the potential of this 

kind of information being transferred to the Russian Federation; 

and with those kind of media reports—and we all understand how 

they may be right, they may be wrong—nonetheless, they raise 

issues. 

The President in his signing statement with respect to Section 

1244 stated, and I quote, I will treat the provisions as nonbinding, 

end quote. Do you know why the President in a signing statement 

with respect to this prohibition of that kind of technological transfer to Russia would state, quote, I will treat the provisions as nonbinding, end quote? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The White House’s concern is that it not be compromising diplomatic negotiations. 

I would like to make the general point that we are keenly aware 

of the advantages that flow to our national defense from the sophisticated technologies that have been developed for missile defense over the last 20 years. There is no value in handing those 

away to anybody and risk in doing so. 

That said, we are not the first administration to seek cooperation 

with missile—with Russia on missile defense. We are not the first 

administration to believe that that cooperation could be well-served 

by some limited sharing of classified information of a certain kind 

if the proper rules are in place to do that. The Bush administration 

headed down precisely the same path. 

Now, we are not naive. Cooperation with Russia in this area is 

not going well, progress will be difficult, but we will keep you fully 

informed. 

Mr. BROOKS. You mentioned the phrase ‘‘compromising diplomatic negotiations.’’ If there is no risk of our hit-to-kill technology 

being shared with Russia, then how could those negotiations be 

compromised? 

Dr. ROBERTS. That is a good question, sir; and I am afraid I don’t 

have a good answer for you. 
22 

I do have an additional piece of information, which is that we are 

currently negotiating a DTCA, we are making no progress in doing 

so, and that this is a process that started under the Bush administration, not one that we initiated. 

Mr. BROOKS. For the record, when you say ‘‘DTCA,’’ I know in 

defense there are a tremendous number of acronyms, you are referring to the Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BROOKS. Can you give us any assurances that in the negotiations of this Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement with Russia that the administration is not in any way, shape, or form apt 

to include transfer of our hit-to-kill technology to Russia? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Apt to include? Sir, we have no plans, no ambition, 

no expectation. Hit-to-kill is our technology, and it serves our interests well to keep it in our hands. 

Mr. BROOKS. Is the White House and are you in a position where 

you can commit to this Congress that that information will not be 

shared with the Russian Federation? 

Mr. TURNER. Your time has expired. Please answer. 

Dr. ROBERTS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General O’Reilly, Secretary Ahern, and Director Gilmore, I want 

to thank you all for your testimony here today before this subcommittee. 

I have, obviously, a long-standing interest in our missile defense 

program; and I certainly am cognizant of its complexities and the 

many technical challenges still yet to overcome. However, at the 

same time, I strongly understand the crucial importance of this 

program to our defense posture. 

General O’Reilly, last year, the House NDAA bill zeroed out the 

Precision Tracking Space System, PTSS. Why do we need PTSS 

and what capability for homeland defense would we lose without 

this capability? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, as we look at the proliferation of ballistic 

missiles around the world, as we have discussed in here, we see 

pursuit of long-range ICBMs. But if you look at the sheer number 

of shorter-range ICBMs, estimates are that there is over 6,000 of 

them in smaller countries around the world and hundreds of 

launchers. So we believe that the raid size is something that is a 

particular concern to our deployed forces around the world, raid 

size meaning the number of simultaneously launched missiles. The 

PTSS system is designed with that in mind so that it can handle 

three or four times more and track more ballistic missiles simultaneously than can be tracked with radars. 

Also, as we deploy radars around the world, there is an involved 

process of negotiation and the difficulties of logistics and so forth 

to support them; and with a satellite system we would have pervasive coverage of the Northern Hemisphere, of the latitudes where 

we are most concerned about continuously, and we would want to 

be able to leverage that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Is it duplicative of existing or future capabilities? 

You know, can other sensors fulfill similar functions? 
23 

General O’REILLY. Sir, there is no sensor that can fill the function of tracking a missile over its entire flight from space in the 

broad field of views which we need to cover an entire theater where 

we could see missiles simultaneously launched. This will be the 

only sensor able to do that in a broad field of view and have the 

right frequencies on board, the sensors, in order to track a missile 

as it gets cold after it is launched all the way to before it starts 

reentering the Earth’s atmosphere. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. While I still have time, as you know, I have a 

long-standing interest in directed energy; and I am of the opinion 

that in the outyears we are going to need the capabilities of directed energy, that kinetic weapons alone will never be able to handle the type of raid sizes that we are going to have to protect 

against as we go forward. I am talking decade and beyond. 

How does the fiscal year 2013 budget request preserve some of 

the important investments made on a directed energy program, 

and what updates can you give the committee on progress we are 

making on directed energy? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, with the funding levels that we have received for 2012, we have grounded the airborne laser test platform. 

But, before we did, we intercepted two missiles at the speed of light 

from over 50 miles away, proving that the atmosphere could be 

compensated and other issues. 

We learned an awful lot from the ABL. We have a tremendous 

brain trust in our country now; and our first concern is to preserve 

that expertise, unique, high-energy laser expertise in industry and 

in the government team. 

So where we want to move next is basically the third generation 

of an airborne laser system; and we have fundamental research at 

Lawrence Livermore National Lab, MIT Lincoln Labs, and some of 

our industry partners that we believe can give us a compact capability that advance us beyond the 1996 capability that we used in 

an airborne laser system. And by ‘‘small’’ I mean the size of a typical couch, to actually produce the amount of power that we have 

seen previously only in very, very large aircraft; and that makes 

the deployment of directed energy much more flexible. And so we 

have sustained those two programs at Lawrence Livermore and at 

MIT Lincoln Labs, and we have basically a horse race of who can 

hit the efficiencies which we are looking for. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you have a timeline of when that will have 

some determining—— 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we have set up a very definitive list of 

milestones, technical milestones so we can monitor the progress. If 

they achieve the milestones they are currently looking at, it will be 

in the middle of this decade or sooner. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. My time has expired. I have a lot more 

questions, many more questions, but I will submit those for the 

record. 

And, General, thank you for the job that you and your team are 

doing. I was impressed by how thorough you are, and again appreciate you and the rest of the members of the panel here for testifying. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 
24 

Mr. TURNER. Before we move on, I just want to take a moment 

to recognize our former chair’s work in directed energy, and I agree 

with his statements and appreciate his focus on that. 

Turning to Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and also let me build 

on that same issue. 

Because I share exactly the same sentiments that Representative 

Langevin just cited; and I have his same concern that we should 

harvest from the advancements in technology that were made, even 

though we are seeing the retirement of the airborne platform. And 

I would be extremely disappointed and concerned that we are not 

using all the arrows in our quiver to not exploit those possibilities. 

So you can assure us that we are doing everything we can to harvest and exploit and build on what we have learned in the past? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, our funding request was about half of 

what we requested last year for this area, so we did retire the aircraft earlier. And I am very concerned about the criticality, the 

critical mass of knowledge that we have in this area; and we have 

structured our budget this year so that we can maintain the maximum amount of people as well as making progress. But my first 

focus and my continued concern is on maintaining the personnel in 

this business that have been working on it for 20 to 30 years, most 

of whom are Ph.D.s. It is state-of-the-art technology, and it is a tremendous accomplishments we have had, and we want to make sure 

we apply those lessons learned. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Because it was obvious to me that with the advances we are going way beyond the objections people had by saying, oh, keeping aircraft in the air 24/7 was logistically impossible. 

And, I mean, we were beyond that. Weren’t we to the point where 

we could do seaborne platforms and things like that that were 

much logistically easier? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, one of the advantages we found is, is the 

higher you go in altitude the smaller the package needs to be to 

actually compensate for the atmosphere and give you your pointing 

and so forth. So there was a tremendous amount of learning, and 

we have maintained the program office at Albuquerque and our 

aerospace companies that have been involved. 

So, yes, sir, there was a tremendous amount of firsts, scientific 

firsts, we had never done before; and we have learned a tremendous amount that we are anxious to apply to the next generation. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. That is more reassuring. 

For both Dr. Roberts and General O’Reilly, have you seen anything in Iran’s ballistic missile developments, including space 

launch technology, in the last 3 years that would change the decision that this administration made in 2009 to adopt the phased 

adaptive approach? Because, as you know, that was based in part 

on a revised assessment made at that time that Iran’s short- and 

medium-range missiles were more of a threat than anything longer 

range. So has there been anything that has changed in the last 3 

years that would change that decision you made 3 years ago? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The short answer would be no, but that’s because 

I think we view the decision of 3 years ago a little differently, 

meaning we looked out at the threat environment and saw from 

Iran both a rapid increase in short-, medium-, and later expected 
25 

intermediate-range missiles. And, at the same time, we could see 

ICBM capabilities aborning in one form or another, at least the 

technologies maturing that would take them in that capability direction at some point. 

And so we look ahead to the threat environment and see the requirement to protect our forces from short- and medium-range and 

intermediate-range ballistic missile attack by Iran and to provide 

the means for the protection of our allies and for them to join us 

in that process. 

We also look ahead to the possibility that in the future we will 

have a rapid increase in the number of ICBMs deployed in Iran, 

the deployment of countermeasures; and this is a part of the reason 

we are less persuaded that the GBI pathway is the full solution set 

to this problem. 

If we come to a point where Iran and North Korea are beginning 

to produce ballistic missiles, deploy them in significant numbers, 

we need to be able to compensate for that. Indeed, we need to stay 

ahead of it. When they are at the point of having countermeasures, 

we have to be capable of doing what all these advisory bodies have 

told us to do, which is make sure you have the technologies to exploit the full battlespace. 

Now, what does that mean? That means that you are not just 

stuck working in the mid-course phase and that you are not just 

stuck with terminal defense. You need to get out as far forward 

into this zone of operation as possible. 

So my characterization of our decision of 3 years ago is that we 

looked into the future and saw significant potential threat developments across the full suite of capabilities, and we needed to have 

a strategy in place that would meet both sets of threats, and that 

is why we are wedded to this two-step GBI/SM–3 approach. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you all. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and, for the witnesses, thank you very much for your work, your service, and your 

testimony. 

I am going to continue on the directed energy issue. I personally 

think it is very exciting and has great potential in many different 

theaters and applications. 

My question goes to General O’Reilly. The research programs at 

MIT Lincoln Labs and Lawrence Livermore, are they at the same 

level of funding this year as last year, or do you intend to change 

the level of funding up or down? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, they are at a lower level of funding this 

year, given the—last year, we went through a transition where we 

ended up with about half the budget we had requested in this area, 

and we have been—and at that point we did lose personnel off the 

program, so we have laid out a more stable workforce. We believe 

right now the most prudent thing to do is maintain stability in 

these programs. 

At the same time as I retire the airborne laser platform, I do have an environmental remediation bill, about $13 million a year; 

and given that the funding is around $50 million right now, that 

is also taxing us from our ability to fund these two research programs that you are referring to. 
26 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So will there be layoffs and diminution in the 

pace and the intensity of the programs at either laboratory? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, last year, it occurred at both locations as 

we went through the—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And for the coming year? 

General O’REILLY. At this level right now, we are maintaining 

where we were at the end of last year, which is lower than we had 

originally requested. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How much money do you need to maintain the 

appropriate pace? I am assuming that the present pace is not appropriate, not the desirable pace. 

General O’REILLY. It is not as much the—it is the pace, sir, but 

the concern also is the expertise, maintaining the expertise and allowing them to move as quickly as scientifically and engineeringwise as possible. 

We are also working with DARPA [Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency] and other organizations to combine our funding to 

maximize. But on the order, for example, at Lawrence Livermore, 

we’re about 8 million less than what we had planned this time last 

year in order to have a stable funding. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Some of that expertise is going to be lost? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. They were not able—they may be 

able to maintain it in the lab—I am not sure—but they weren’t 

able to maintain all of the personnel that were on the program at 

that time. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So for us to fully fund, we need about another 

$8 million? 

General O’REILLY. That was at the level that the director at 

Lawrence Livermore and I felt would pace it at a technical pace, 

rather than one that was restricted by personnel. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It seems to me that this directed energy issue 

is extremely important, has extraordinary potential, without getting into the details. And so for $8 million out of a nearly $10 billion budget item, is it possible to move some money from somewhere, for example, to stretch out one or another of the multi-billion dollar programs? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we look at the execution of our program 

during the year and ensure that our contracts are executing as we 

had funded them. There is always opportunity to look for this. We 

would have to, obviously, come back for reprogramming actions as 

we watch, again, the progress that we make based on what was 

planned. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Let me speak directly to our chairman, Mr. 

Turner—excuse me—if I might. 

It seems to me that we are shorting an extremely important program in the directed energy that many members of your subcommittee are interested in; and it would be, it seems, for $8 million to maintain the desired level at Lawrence Livermore and perhaps something similar at Lincoln Labs that we ought to move 

some money around or cause it to be moved around so that we 

could find enough money, $8 million out of a $10 billion allocation 

per year, for this entire system to make sure that this directed energy program moves—— 
27 

And I think I am out of time. But, anyway, you know where I 

am going—or want to go. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. 

I will try to be brief with this, and I think that maybe some of 

these will be questions that you will answer under a different setting. 

But one of my primary concerns somewhat gets back to the workforce issue that Mr. Garamendi was speaking about, especially 

with regard to sequestration. The more advanced the weapons system is, the more likely it is that you have an extremely specialized 

workforce, not only a workforce that is employed by us, but vendors, much more likely to have a single-source vendor for certain 

supplies that we have to have for our missile systems. 

And I don’t want you to divulge anything here, General, since 

you determined what is and isn’t classified. Would you speak to the 

issue of sequestration and the loss of the specialized workforce if 

we are not able to undo sequestration? And when we get behind 

closed doors, I think maybe some of the suppliers and the actual 

equipment that we might lose that would do irreparable harm to 

the systems that we have. 

And then, if you would, just speak, if you will, to our relationship 

with Israel in making sure that there are adequate systems in 

place to defend them should they come under a serious missile attack. 

General O’REILLY. Thank you, Congressman. 

First of all, the concern in the area—I have the exact concern 

you have. If we have sequestration and a dramatic reduction in our 

programs, it will be most hardest felt in the supplier base. 

And it is not only the availability of the supplies. As we were discussing before, it is the manufacturing processes. And a lot of these 

components that we use—and we use over 2,000, for example, on 

a ground-based interceptor—those components themselves are built 

in a certain way that give it its reliability; and the loss of the workforce in many of these cases I would say would be close to nonrecoverable. Or, if it is recoverable, it is going to be a very painful 

process. 

So, sir, just to summarize again, I think it would be a significant 

impact to our capability. We may be able to keep the designs, but 

it is actually the flow of supplies and it is actually the processes 

and the personnel, the thousands of people that are working on 

these programs that would be very hard to reconstitute. 

From the point of view of the Israeli programs, sir, we are actively involved. We co-manage the Arrow program, especially the 

Block 4, which has recently been very successful; the David’s Sling 

Weapon System, where the Israeli program office and us are in full 

agreement on how we manage it. It is managed very rigorously 

now. And the Arrow-3 missile program. All of these programs are 

very aggressive with technology. 

We are in great admiration of their technical ability, because we 

have not seen the Israelis not being able to overcome a problem. 

But it is the pacing of it. They have made a lot of progress over 

the last couple years, and we are about to sign some new agree-
28 

ments to extend our mutual cooperation in the development of 

their interceptors. 

Last year, I was asked to provide the funding and some oversight 

on the production of the Iron Dome system; and it has proven to 

be a combat-effective system, well over 60 percent capability and 

actually beyond that. 

So we work very closely to the Israelis, and we have also expanded our ability to test and hardware in the loop, so that we can 

assure ourselves with the Israelis that our systems work together 

and can quantify how theirs and our systems work. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, General. And, again, as we go forward, 

I would like to, you know, make sure that when we are in a classified setting we talk about the potential loss of those vendors and 

those specialized parts, certainly not in here, and making sure that 

we do what is necessary in this subcommittee and in the full committee to make sure that we don’t risk the loss of any of those 

things that we absolutely have to have to ensure the viability of 

these systems. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time. 

Mr. TURNER. I am going to recognize Mr. Larsen. 

I am going to ask Mr. Scott, if you would, please to take the 

gavel for a brief moment. I need to step out. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, forgive me, I have a cold, and so I will struggle 

through my questions here if you will just be patient with me. 

First, General O’Reilly, can you talk—can you tell us who did the 

independent reviews on the GMD contract and what history that 

you have using those agencies or organizations for the independent 

reviews? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we used the two organizations. 

First of all, the contractor came in with his proposal, and us— 

my agency was the first level of review with the independent review of the cost-estimating approach that the contractors used 

when they proposed, and we do have support from the defense auditing agencies and the Defense Contract Management Agency on 

the labor rates and the estimations of the amount of time it would 

take. 

Then what also has been put into place going back a few years 

is the OSD has another set of reviewers that go through and do an 

estimate looking at our independent review to make their own 

judgment on whether or not they believe that the costs are reasonable and accurately portrayed by the proposers. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay, and then can you say who is doing those reviews after you are done? Who at OSD, not which person. 

General O’REILLY. It is under the Office of the Secretary of Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, and it is an interdepartmental 

group. It has representation from several organizations besides the 

review I do with the Defense Audit Agency and the Defense Contract Management Agency. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ahern, on MEADS [Medium Extended Air Defense System] 

we had a conversation here in the other room last year about it. 

In your testimony, you discuss the proof of concept. Can you just 
29 

explain to me what you mean in your testimony by the ‘‘proof of 

concept’’? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. 

The plan is to demonstrate that the effectiveness of the fire control radar, the launchers, the TOC [Tactical Operations Center], 

the operational center through—well, we have had one launch, as 

I mentioned earlier, and then two launches, one in the end of this 

year and one the end of the next year. So the proof of concept 

phrase means that we are able to demonstrate that this AESA [Active Electronically Scanned Array] radar connected through software, the TOC, to the launcher, using the MSE [Missile Segment 

Enhancement] missile, is an effective missile defense system. 

Mr. LARSEN. And at that point is that forming the basis of the 

technologies that would then be spun out in MEADS? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir, exactly. That really is the value; and it enabled the Germans, the Italians, and also the United States as we 

went forward to take advantage of that technology in a plug-andplay sense or the technologies as basic technologies themselves. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. And the budget request, though, also that includes an additional $400 million to close this out; is that correct? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. The proof of concept was 12 and 13. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah, right. 

Mr. AHERN. And basically to bring us up to conclusion on our 

MOU commitment, the funding commitment, and the MOU and to 

give us the opportunity to, as you said, complete the exploration of 

those technologies and the proof of concept. 

Mr. LARSEN. And your written testimony reflects, I guess, comments from the letter from the Italians and the Germans about expectations they have about the United States completing that obligation; is that correct as well? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. Those letters are a jointly signed letter. It 

is a jointly signed letter. 

Mr. LARSEN. It is a jointly signed letter. 

Mr. AHERN. And I have had several meetings with my counterparts, and they do expect that from us, yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Well, much like last year when we had 

this conversation in the hearing, I expect we are going to continue 

to have it as we go through the markup as well, but look forward 

to hearing back from you if we have further questions on it. 

Mr. AHERN. Absolutely, sir. And, as I said last year, I am committed to keeping you all informed on how we are progressing in 

the proof of concept. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah, thanks. 

Finally, Mr. Gilmore, if you could just review for me, because I 

didn’t quite put things together, on your testimony you mentioned 

that we can expect about one test per year, but I wasn’t quite sure 

because we do more than one test. 

Mr. GILMORE. That was in ground-based missile defense. 

Mr. LARSEN. But we do more than one test per year, so can you 

clarify what you meant? 

Mr. GILMORE. Well, for ground-based missile defense you can expect about one test per year. The total number of tests that were 

done throughout—that are planned throughout the missile defense 

program in fiscal year ’12 is 28, 13 flight tests and 15 ground tests. 
30 

Mr. LARSEN. Right, yeah. Okay. 

Mr. GILMORE. So there are many more tests than that, but when 

it comes to the pace at which you can do the ground-based missile 

defense tests that employ ground-based interceptors and threat 

representative targets, it has been about, for the last decade, one 

per year. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. I will have some follow-up questions. 

Mr. GILMORE. And in fact that is what is planned in the IMTP 

now through fiscal year ’22 is the pace of one per year. And again 

that is consistent with what we have been able to do over the last 

decade. 

Mr. LARSEN. Great. I will have some questions for you for the 

record just for follow-up. Appreciate it very much. Thank you. 

Mr. GILMORE. Okay. 

Mr. SCOTT [presiding]. Mr. Ruppersberger. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yeah, good afternoon, and I am glad you 

are here. My questions probably will be to you, Dr. Roberts, or to 

you, General O’Reilly. 

I want to talk about the Precision Tracking Space System. Jim 

Langevin just asked some questions. Basically, the first thing, this 

is a satellite system that, from my understanding, will have the capability to track ballistic missiles in flight across 70 percent of the 

Earth. It is my understanding also that this is the only system that 

would be able to defend the United States in the event of numerous 

raids. Can you discuss that? Is that the situation? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, the satellite system itself is designed 

from the very beginning to handle very large raid sizes, many tens 

of missiles being launched simultaneously. We find that that leads 

you to a different architecture and a fundamentally different design; and working with the Applied Physics Lab at Johns Hopkins, 

they are leading the design and developing this capability. We believe that by using existing technology and the right architecture, 

you can, in fact, do that. And this satellite system doesn’t replicate 

the current systems that are up there. It basically leverages them 

to spot the missiles being launched, and then the satellite system 

takes over and does the tracking over the rest of the way. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me ask you this: In your position—you 

have a lot of expertise in this area—do you feel the threat of ballistic missiles is going to continue across the globe, that a system 

like this is necessary for our homeland defense? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Why? 

General O’REILLY. First of all, because of the pervasive nature of 

it. It can cover comprehensively large areas where, example, if we 

have an intercept to ensure we hit the right target if there is multiple targets up there. Its ability to see throughout the entire—— 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Almost like a long dwell. In other words, 

probably, from my understanding, it will give us capacity for over 

73 percent of the globe; is that correct? 

General O’REILLY. Of land mass, yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Of land mass, okay. 

General O’REILLY. It is primarily looking north, at the Northern 

Hemisphere. 
31 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Now, you also mentioned Johns Hopkins 

Applied Physics Lab. It is my understanding that they are doing 

the initial design and research. They also have usually been on 

time and on budget. Is that your experience with them? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. They are one of the best we have ever 

seen in looking at their track record of satellite development. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay. Then in order to build this program, 

if it is funded, then they will throw it out to competition, is that 

not correct? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. After we finish the preliminary design and go into the critical design, at that point we will have a 

competition for the production of it. But we own the intellectual 

property is a big difference from the way we are approaching this 

satellite program. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay. You know, when you have a situation with space—and we have to maintain our space. We are the 

most powerful country in the world, and one of the main reasons 

we invested the money in the beginning for space and we know we 

have to continue to be strong in space, especially with the China/ 

Russia threat. Competition is extremely important, in my opinion, 

to keep the cost down. When Johns Hopkins finishes their design, 

if they get the funding, then they are going to put out to actually 

build the program, and they will competitively build it; is that correct? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. We will actually do the competition, 

the Missile Defense Agency, based on the Johns Hopkins design; 

and it’s to the advantage of the bidders to be as close to that design 

as possible because that will keep the—— 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But it is also to our advantage because it 

brings the cost down. 

General O’REILLY. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Which is extremely important. 

Now the Precision Tracking Space System I believe is a necessity 

for our country, especially so we are not outgunned by the Irans, 

the South Koreas, the rogue states. Last year, the funding for this 

program was cut from this committee. The good news, we were able 

to restore it in conference. Now I just want to make sure that 

doesn’t happen again. What would be the consequences to our national security if this program, which has been in existence for 2 

years, we have already spent the money, would be cut? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the major impact would be we’d lose the 

ability to assure ourselves that we can track missiles very early in 

flight, which is key to intercepting early and being on the right end 

of a defensive position, and so we would lose that ability. We would 

lose the assurance that we would always have the ability to track 

missiles no matter where they are launched in the Northern Hemisphere. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. We don’t have that capacity now, correct? 

General O’REILLY. No, sir, not over their entire flight that we can 

use for an intercept. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Is this the only system that we are moving 

forward with now that would provide this to us? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 
32 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. So, again, I am going to ask you the question. If in fact this system were not funded and we would stop the 

system 2 years in, do you feel it would affect our national security? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Explain why. 

General O’REILLY. Because we would then have to rely on our existing radar systems that are either on our current weapon—our 

interceptor systems, and it is a much shorter range, so we would 

not see the missiles until they are much later in flight. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. We would basically save money, correct? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Basically, we would have a lot more coverage than we have now? 

General O’REILLY. That is correct, yes. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Right. What would be the percentage of difference between the coverage with this program and what we have 

now? 

General O’REILLY. Currently, we have a handful of radars, so it 

is hard to even compare. Probably we cover about less than 10 percent of what the PTSS could cover. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. All right. So less than 10 percent. From 73 

percent to 10 percent, that’s significant. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today. 

Members have the ability to submit questions to you within 1 

week, over the next week. 

And, with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 6, 2012 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 6, 2012 

(131) 

* The new Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense in Europe announced by the 

President on September 17, 2009, is likely to create increased force structure and inventory deContinued 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Which countries have made what contributions to NATO missile defense? 

a. What procedures are in place, or will be needed, to sell or export SM–3 missiles 

to NATO allies in the event they seek to purchase them to support their own, or 

NATO’s, missile defense activities? 

Dr. ROBERTS. All NATO Allies are providing financial support for the implementation of European missile defense by agreeing to pay for the expansion of Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) with NATO common funding. 

Within NATO, Allies are stepping up as contributors to the NATO missile defense 

effort. Germany and the Netherlands currently field Patriot PAC–3, Greece and 

Spain operate Patriot PAC–2, and France and Italy have the SAMP/T system, which 

has capabilities similar to those of the Patriot. In addition, the Netherlands has approved plans and funding to upgrade the SMART–L radar on four air defense frigates, giving the ships a BMD Long-Range Search and Track (LRS&T) capability. 

Germany is testing and intends to operationalize an Airborne Infrared System 

(ABIR) system, which could support NATO BMD. In addition, France has proposed 

a concept for a single geosynchronous infrared shared-early warning satellite, and 

is developing transportable, midcourse radar for BMD and early warning. Germany 

and the Netherlands have also proposed an interceptor pooling concept where several Allies would purchase SM–3 interceptors that could then be used in support 

of NATO missile defense. 

Furthermore, Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have all agreed to host U.S. 

assets in support of NATO missile defense. These host governments will bear the 

costs of providing perimeter defense and security for the U.S. assets and infrastructure. 

Existing Foreign Military Sales procedures within the Department of Defense can 

be used by NATO Allies to explore the procurement of SM–3 missiles and associated 

infrastructure, including the weapons system to support their use. 

Mr. TURNER. Please list the countries the U.S. has approached about contributing 

to defray the costs of the EPAA and their responses? What specific requests has the 

U.S. made to which countries? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The EPAA is the U.S. contribution to a NATO missile defense effort. 

As with every other NATO mission, other nations do not pay for the national contributions of individual Allies. Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have all agreed 

to host U.S. assets in support of NATO missile defense. 

In addition, NATO Allies are providing financial support for the implementation 

of European missile defense by agreeing to pay for the expansion of Active Layered 

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) with NATO common funding. We also 

welcome Allied national contributions to NATO missile defense. 

Mr. TURNER. What analysis has been done to understand how a IIB missile that 

cannot fit into the current 8-pack VLS system will affect Navy force requirements 

and deployment systems and schedules? Please provide that analysis. 

Dr. ROBERTS. The SM–3 Block IIB is in the concept phase. MDA and industry are 

exploring a full range of performance, risk, and cost alternatives. This space is being 

done to support concepts that range from small diameter missile concepts (22 

inches) compatible with the existing MK 41 VLS eight pack module, and higher performing large diameter missile concepts (potentially up to 27 inches) that would require a modification to a five cell VLS reload module. A design criteria imposed on 

the concept development contractor teams is that there will be no modifications to 

the VLS system. 

Mr. TURNER. What is the current planning for other than Europe PAAs? What 

will costs and architectures look like? Force requirements? Burden sharing? 

a. Why hasn’t the following report required pursuant to directed report language 

in the FY10 House-passed NDAA been provided? * 
132 

mands. Furthermore, as noted in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) released on February 1, 2010, the Phased Adaptive Approach is to be tailored to other geographic regions such 

as East Asia and the Middle East, which is also likely to create significant force structure and 

inventory demands. As acknowledged in the BMDR, ‘‘regional demand for U.S. BMD assets is 

likely to exceed supply for some years to come.’’ 

Until these regional missile defense architectures are completed, the committee is concerned 

that the Department’s missile defense force structure and inventory requirements, and the resulting resource implications will be difficult to quantify. In addition, certain missile defense capabilities, such as Aegis ballistic missile defense ships, will remain high demand, low density 

assets that must be carefully managed across the combatant commands so that no one theater 

accepts greater risk at the expense of another. 

The committee is aware that the Department is developing regional missile defense architectures based on the PAA and also developing a comprehensive force management process. The 

committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, to provide a report to the congressional defense committees by December 1, 2010, 

describing: (1) the regional missile defense architectures, including the force structure and inventory requirements derived from the architectures, and (2) the comprehensive force management process, and the capability, deployment, and resource outcomes that have been determined 

by this process. 

(House Report 111–491—NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 2011) 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated that the United States 

would seek to develop regional phased adaptive approaches to missile defense for 

the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions. These approaches will be tailored to the 

threats and circumstances unique to that region. The United States will consult 

closely with Allies and partners as we develop these approaches. As the work on 

the phased adaptive approaches for other regions is ongoing, we are unable to provide specific details on the approaches at the present time. 

(Anticipate the Report will be provided April 2012). 

Mr. TURNER. Will the U.S. seek to deploy an additional TPY–2 in Japan? Couldn’t 

such a deployment be used to provided additional sensor coverage useful for the defense of the United States? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Work on bolstering missile defenses in the Asia-Pacific is ongoing. 

The United States will consult closely with our allies and partners as we develop 

proposals for consideration for a Phased Adaptive Approach for the Asia-Pacific region that contributes to Homeland and regional defense. This approach will be tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to this region. 

Mr. TURNER. Who will make the decision to revise the current GMD shot doctrine? 

a. If DPRK deploys 5 road mobile ICBMs, does the U.S. have enough GBIs under 

current assumptions of shot doctrine? What if it deploys 10? Or 20? 

b. Does the DPRK presently have nuclear warheads capable of being mounted on 

its ballistic missiles? 

Dr. ROBERTS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. What is the plan to retain Cobra Dane capability? Which agencies 

will pick up the costs? If this has not been decided yet, who are the POCs involved 

in making the decision? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Department of Defense (DOD) agreed to assume ownership of 

the radar from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) beginning in Fiscal Year 

2013 (FY13). DNI and DOD are currently working out all of the transition details. 

The DNI will pay operation and maintenance (O&M) costs through FY14. The U.S. 

Air Force and the Missile Defense Agency are conducting an assessment of necessary O&M funding requirements for post transition which will be used to inform 

an agreement to pay for O&M costs thereafter. 

Mr. TURNER. If the DPRK deploys 20 ICBMs by 2020, and the IIB is delivered 

and deployed on time, please explain where they will be deployed to protect CONUS 

from a North Korean ballistic missile? a. Does this mean they will need to be seabased at initial deployment? b. If they can’t fit in the existing 8-pack VLS configuration space, how many ships will have to be outfitted with how many interceptors 

to deal with the threat? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The SM–3 Block IIB is in the concept definition phase, and the 

exact configuration number of missiles and location (land-based and/or sea-based) to 

defend CONUS from a North Korean ICBM attack has yet to be determined. The 

industry concept development teams have been given a goal to provide sea-based 

flexibility. MDA has commenced discussions with Navy regarding potential operations to examine trade space for shipboard deployment, which will determine the 

total number of missiles deployable per sea-based asset. Due to reductions to the 
133 

budget request for the SM–3 IIB program in FY2012, the IIB will not be available 

until the 2021 timeframe. 

Mr. TURNER. Has the Administration seen evidence/intelligence of foreign support—including materiel—for the North Korean, road mobile ICBM? a. Please detail 

what the Administration is doing to cut that off? 

Dr. ROBERTS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Why would an East Coast site have to use GBIs? What analysis has 

been done of the potential of employing either IIA or IIB missiles? Please provide 

that analysis or indicate if it has not been done. 

Dr. ROBERTS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. How is morale in MDA today? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The results of the 2011 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (EV 

survey), sponsored by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), reflect an improvement in 41 of 84 areas, as compared to 2010 responses, which indicated overall 

job satisfaction in MDA. In key areas (e.g., overall satisfaction, training, salary, ethical conduct, diversity and equal employment opportunity etc.), MDA was 7–14 percentage points above the government wide average. Among the most improved agencies in the EV survey, MDA was number 32 of 154 government-wide. This improvement in morale was achieved despite the involuntary realignment of approximately 

75 percent of the MDA National Capital Region workforce during Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission (BRAC) implementation. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on pages 118–124.] 

Mr. TURNER. Will both existing sensors and interceptors be evaluated as part of 

your Hedge report? 

a. Will your plan assume use of existing discriminating radar for defense of the 

west and east coast CONUS regions? 

b. Will your plan provide an investment strategy which will optimize sensor and 

interceptor performance to accommodate early deployment options as well as the 

longer term such as phase 4 of PAA? 

c. What about the implementation of air launched weapons as part of the boost 

phase solution? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Yes, the hedge strategy is focused on increasing the capacity and 

effectiveness of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, including sensors and interceptors. Our homeland defense plans and the hedge strategy are focused on increasing the capacity and effectiveness of the GMD system, including 

sensors and interceptors. Yes, our homeland defense plans and hedging strategy are 

designed to maintain and enhance the future protection provided by the GMD system, and the Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) Block IIB. Potential implementation of air 

launched weapons is being assessed in the ongoing Airborne Weapons Layer Cost/ 

Benefit Analysis (AWL C/BA). The AWL C/BA is a joint effort by the Air Force and 

the Missile Defense Agency, and is planned for completion in the fall of 2012. 

Mr. TURNER. Will the IIB be deployed in land- and sea-based modes in 2020? In 

what quantities? Based on past experience with the GMD and SM–3 IA, and the 

recent test failure of the IB, what is the projected shot doctrine for the IIB likely 

to be? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The SM–3 Block IIB will be designed and developed to be 

deployable in Aegis BMD assets both land- and sea-based. Initial fielding will occur 

in the 2021 timeframe with a planning factor of 24 SM–3 Block IIBs for each Aegis 

system with an anti-ICBM mission. Operational questions regarding shot doctrine 

and rules of engagement should be directed to the Combatant Commanders and 

Joint Staff. 

Mr. TURNER. What requirements changed to support reducing THAAD battery 

purchases by 3 and THAAD interceptor purchases by 66? 

Dr. ROBERTS. We had to prioritize due to affordability and chose to purchase Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries at a slower rate; however, our 

commitment to missile defense remains unchanged. 

THAAD production continues and can be extended without re-start costs in FY 

2014 if necessary. The regional protection provided by Aegis BMD ships and Patriot 

batteries provides some overlap with the protection that could be provided by a 

THAAD deployment. 

Mr. TURNER. Why is MDA procuring 6 fewer TPY–2 radars under the FY13 budget and FYDP? What assumptions changed since last year? 

Dr. ROBERTS. We had to prioritize due to affordability and chose to conclude the 

procurement of additional AN/TPY–2 Radars in FY 2013. However, our commitment 

to missile defense remains unchanged. 
134 

TPY–2 Radar production continues through FY 2013 and can be extended without 

re-start costs in PB14 if necessary. The recent Foreign Military Sales case with the 

United Arab Emirates also keeps the TPY–2 radar production line open, providing 

future production opportunities. 

In addition, the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) could reduce the need 

to use TPY–2 radars as forward-based sensors when it becomes available. 

Mr. TURNER. How much would an EIS on an East Coast missile defense site cost? 

Would it make sense to do an EIS on more than one location, e.g., Ft. Drum and 

Loring AFB? 

Dr. ROBERTS. MDA’s estimate for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is 

approximately $8 million. The actual cost would depend on the final number of candidate sites and the locations within the sites analyzed to meet National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements. Environmental conditions that also impact 

costs include endangered and threatened species habitats, cultural resources, natural resources, and proximity to developed areas. 

If an EIS is conducted, it is preferable to assess more than one location, based 

on sitting study input of viable alternatives. 

Mr. TURNER. What was the cost estimate of the EPAA when the Obama Administration decided to make it a U.S. contribution to NATO? What is it today? 

Dr. ROBERTS. As requested by Congress, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) is completing a detailed estimate 

of unique EPAA costs. 

The mobile and relocatable nature of the assets associated with the phased adaptive approach complicates the analysis of which costs are attributed solely to EPAA 

because BMD forces can be (and are) redeployed and sourced to different theaters 

and regions depending on when and where crises or conflicts may arise. 

Mr. TURNER. Please list the specific exceptions to the National Disclosure Policy 

related to missile defense? Missile defense and Russia? Russia? 

Dr. ROBERTS. U.S. national disclosure policy does not specifically address U.S. 

missile defense information. However, it makes clear that classified military information is a national security asset that shall be protected and shall be shared with 

foreign governments only when there is a clearly defined benefit to the United 

States. 

Mr. TURNER. Please describe the role of the NORTHCOM Commander in producing the hedging strategy? Has he been involved at every step? How many of the 

iterations of the strategy has he seen and commented on? 

Dr. ROBERTS. U.S. Northern Command has been involved in the development of 

the hedge strategy, including participation in interagency meetings and meetings of 

the Missile Defense Executive Board. 

Mr. TURNER. Why is a DTCA needed with Russia? 

a. What would such an agreement permit by way of U.S. and Russian missile defense cooperation? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement (DTCA) being negotiated would provide an overarching agreement for the legal framework under 

which the United States and the Russian Federation could conduct bilateral defense 

cooperative research and development projects with individual implementing agreements. 

The Department is continuing to examine projects that would benefit the United 

States through the Defense Technology Cooperation Sub-Working under the Defense 

Relations Working Group. The DTCA itself does not authorize any specific project. 

Mr. TURNER. In light of the limited number of GBI’s in inventory, what is the 

COCOM inventory management strategy and is it consistent with MDA? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Commander, U.S. Northern Command is responsible for determining the most effective management of the GBI inventory. MDA provides technical analysis, including reliability data for the GBIs, for U.S. Northern Command’s 

consideration in developing shot doctrine and inventory management. 

Mr. TURNER. Which countries have made what contributions to NATO missile defense? a. What procedures are in place, or will be needed, to sell or export SM–3 

missiles to NATO allies in the event they seek to purchase them to support their 

own, or NATO’s, missile defense activities? 

General O’REILLY. Our international allies are making significant contributions to 

the NATO territorial missile defense mission by hosting key EPAA assets within 

their respective countries. Turkey is hosting an AN/TPY–2 under Phase I of EPAA, 

Romania and Poland will host Aegis Ashore Sites beginning in Phase II and III respectively, and beginning in 2014, four multi-mission Arleigh Burke-class guidedmissile destroyers with BMD capability will be forward deployed to Rota, Spain in 

support of EPAA. 
135 

As a result of a decision taken by NATO nations at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the 

Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program is being expanded to include the territorial missile defense mission. The ALTBMD Program is 

a NATO common funded command and control system that will enable real-time information exchanges between NATO and national missile defense systems. NATO 

will issue force goals for territorial missile defense in 2013 and invite nations to 

pledge missile defense assets for territorial missile defense. To date, the Netherlands, France and Germany, have all made political commitments to provide missile 

defense systems for territorial missile defense of Europe. The Netherlands, has offered to provide up to four frigates with upgraded SMART–L radars, beginning in 

2017 for the NATO territorial missile defense mission. France has offered to provide 

satellite capabilities for early detection and warning as well as a long-range early 

warning radar for territorial missile defense. Germany has also committed to provide PATRIOT batteries for the same. Many other NATO nations are discussing upgrading shipboard sensors to enable BMD detection, tracking and cueing functions. 

We fully expect as NATO establishes force planning goals for territorial missile defense, that other NATO nations will offer their national missile defense systems, 

both land and sea-based for territorial missile defense of NATO Europe. 

Existing Foreign Military Sales procedures within the Department of Defense can 

be used by NATO allies to explore the procurement of SM–3 missiles and associated 

infrastructure, including the weapons system to support their use. 

Mr. TURNER. Please list the countries the U.S. has approached about contributing 

to defray the costs of the EPAA and their responses? What specific requests has the 

U.S. made to which countries? 

General O’REILLY. MDA has not approached NATO Allies about contributing to 

defray the cost of EPAA. EPAA is the U.S. contribution to NATO territorial missile 

defense. 

NATO Allies are addressing their own ability to contribute to NATO territorial 

MD. The Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) Program is 

a NATO common funded command and control system that will enable real-time information exchanges between NATO and national missile defense systems. NATO 

will issue force goals for territorial missile defense in 2013 and invite nations to 

pledge missile defense assets for territorial missile defense. 

MDA has had discussions with Denmark regarding conducting a technical analysis of the L-band radar aboard their new frigates to determine inherent BMD capability these ships may possess to support territorial missile defense. In the near 

term, MDA will conduct a joint technical interchange meeting with Denmark to determine the scope, timeline and next steps for such an effort. 

At the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence (MoD), MDA has met with 

Dutch government officials to discuss a multi-national NATO-led effort to analyze 

L-band radars aboard ships from NATO countries (including Germany, Denmark, 

and the United Kingdom) to determine inherent BMD capability and what upgrades 

may be necessary to increase this capability. Through a foreign military sales case, 

MDA has conducted a technical analysis with the Dutch Navy that resulted in the 

Dutch MoD commitment (and parliamentary approval) to upgrade the SMART–L radars aboard their four frigates for BMD surveillance and track functions. 

Additionally, the U.S. continues to support the United Kingdom’s efforts to understand the potential for their Type-45 Destroyer to contribute to BMD operations in 

a coalition environment. 

Finally, it should be emphasized that our international allies are making significant contributions to the NATO territorial missile defense mission by hosting key 

EPAA assets within their respective countries. Turkey is hosting an AN/TPY–2 

under Phase I of EPAA, Romania and Poland will host Aegis Ashore Sites beginning 

in Phase II and III respectively, and beginning in 2014, four multi-mission Arleigh 

Burke-class guided-missile destroyers with BMD capability will be forward deployed 

to Rota, Spain in support of EPAA. 

Mr. TURNER. What analysis has been done to understand how a IIB missile that 

cannot fit into the current 8-pack VLS system will affect Navy force requirements 

and deployment systems and schedules? Please provide that analysis. 

General O’REILLY. The SM–3 Block IIB is in the concept phase and the exact configuration, number of missiles, and location (land-based and/or sea-based) to defend 

CONUS has not been determined. To ensure that missile trade studies explore the 

full range of performance, risk, and cost alternatives, MDA and industry are exploring a broad trade space, allowing concepts to range from small diameter missile concepts (22 inches) compatible with the existing MK 41 VLS eight pack module, and 

higher performing large diameter missile concepts (27 inches) that would require a 

modified five cell VLS module. However, all industry concept development teams 
136 

* The new Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense in Europe announced by the 

President on September 17, 2009, is likely to create increased force structure and inventory demands. Furthermore, as noted in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) released on February 1, 2010, the Phased Adaptive Approach is to be tailored to other geographic regions such 

as East Asia and the Middle East, which is also likely to create significant force structure and 

inventory demands. As acknowledged in the BMDR, ‘‘regional demand for U.S. BMD assets is 

likely to exceed supply for some years to come.’’ 

Until these regional missile defense architectures are completed, the committee is concerned 

that the Department’s missile defense force structure and inventory requirements, and the resulting resource implications will be difficult to quantify. In addition, certain missile defense capabilities, such as Aegis ballistic missile defense ships, will remain high demand, low density 

assets that must be carefully managed across the combatant commands so that no one theater 

accepts greater risk at the expense of another. 

The committee is aware that the Department is developing regional missile defense architectures based on the PAA and also developing a comprehensive force management process. The 

committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, to provide a report to the congressional defense committees by December 1, 2010, 

describing: (1) the regional missile defense architectures, including the force structure and inventory requirements derived from the architectures, and (2) the comprehensive force management process, and the capability, deployment, and resource outcomes that have been determined 

by this process. 

(House Report 111–491—NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 2011) 

have been given a goal to minimize any impacts to the Aegis system (including the 

VLS system). 

Mr. TURNER. What is the current planning for other than Europe PAAs? What 

will costs and architectures look like? Force requirements? Burden sharing? 

a. Why hasn’t the following report required pursuant to directed report language 

in the FY10 House-passed NDAA been provided? * 

General O’REILLY. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Department of 

Defense, is responsible for developing policy for the planning of PAAs beyond Europe. 

The Defense Department provided an input for the reporting requirement of the 

FY11 NDAA in its August 18, 2011 correspondence to Senators Levin and Inouye 

and Representatives Rogers and McKeon which included the results of the Joint Capability Mix (JCM) III Study. Copies of this correspondence, which includes the 

JCM III briefing, are attached. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Will the U.S. seek to deploy an additional TPY–2 in Japan? Couldn’t 

such a deployment be used to provided additional sensor coverage useful for the defense of the United States? 

General O’REILLY. MDA does not determine where BMDS assets are deployed. 

The Warfighter, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

advise the Secretary of Defense on international deployments. 

From a technical perspective, an additional AN/TPY–2 radar in Japan, with an 

appropriate boresight, can provide sensor viewing of intercontinental ballistic missile trajectories from North Korea to the United States to add another layer of support to the Ballistic Missile Defense System sensor architecture. 

Mr. TURNER. Who will make the decision to revise the current GMD shot doctrine? 

a. If DPRK deploys 5 road mobile ICBMs, does the U.S. have enough GBIs under 

current assumptions of shot doctrine? What if it deploys 10? Or 20? 

b. Does the DPRK presently have nuclear warheads capable of being mounted on 

its ballistic missiles? 

General O’REILLY. (a) The Commander of United States Northern Command 

(CDRUSNORTHCOM) has the authority and responsibility for defense of the United 

States. Questions in this subject area should be directed toward 

CDRUSNORTHCOM. 

(b) Questions in this subject area should be directed to the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence and the broader Intelligence Community. The Missile Defense Agency does not maintain the intelligence resources to assess foreign nuclear 

capability. 

Mr. TURNER. What is the plan to retain Cobra Dane capability? Which agencies 

will pick up the costs? If this has not been decided yet, who are the POCs involved 

in making the decision? 

General O’REILLY. MDA plans to fund our share of the operation and support 

costs for the sustainment of Cobra Dane with all other users for as long as it is 

operational. 
137 

Mr. TURNER. If the DPRK deploys 20 ICBMs by 2020, and the IIB is delivered 

and deployed on time, please explain where they will be deployed to protect CONUS 

from a North Korean ballistic missile? a. Does this mean they will need to be seabased at initial deployment? b. If they can’t fit in the existing 8-pack VLS configuration space, how many ships will have to be outfitted with how many interceptors 

to deal with the threat? 

General O’REILLY. The SM–3 Block IIB is in the concept definition phase and the 

exact configuration, number of missiles, and location (land-based and/or sea-based) 

to defend CONUS from a North Korean ICBM attack yet to be determined. The industry concept development teams have been given a goal to provide sea-based flexibility. MDA has commenced discussions with Navy regarding potential operations 

to examine trade space for shipboard deployment which will determine the total 

number of missiles deployable per sea-based asset. 

Mr. TURNER. Has the Administration seen evidence/intelligence of foreign support—including materiel—for the North Korean, road mobile ICBM? a. Please detail 

what the Administration is doing to cut that off? 

General O’REILLY. Questions in this subject area should be directed toward the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the broader Intelligence Community. The Missile Defense Agency does not maintain intelligence resources to assess 

North Korean and Iranian ICBM development. 

(a) Questions regarding the Administration’s actions in response to intelligence reports should be directed to the National Security Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, specifically the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

Mr. TURNER. Why would an East Coast site have to use GBIs? What analysis has 

been done of the potential of employing either IIA or IIB missiles? Please provide 

that analysis or indicate if it has not been done. 

General O’REILLY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. How is morale in MDA today? 

General O’REILLY. The results of the 2011 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey 

(EV survey), sponsored by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), reflect our 

improvement in 41 of 84 areas, as compared to 2010 responses, which indicated 

overall job satisfaction in MDA. In key areas (e.g., overall satisfaction, training, salary, ethical conduct, diversity and equal employment opportunity etc.), MDA was 7– 

14 percentage points above the government wide average. Finally, among the most 

improved agencies in the EV survey, MDA was 32 of 154 government-wide. Slides 

more fully summarizing our results are attached. This improvement in morale was 

achieved despite the involuntary realignment of approximately over 75% of the 

MDA NCR workforce during BRAC implementation. 

[The slides referred to can be found in the Appendix on pages 118–124.] 

Mr. TURNER. Will both existing sensors and interceptors be evaluated as part of 

your Hedge report? 

a. Will your plan assume use of existing discriminating radar for defense of the 

west and east coast CONUS regions? 

b. Will your plan provide an investment strategy which will optimize sensor and 

interceptor performance to accommodate early deployment options as well as the 

longer term such as phase 4 of PAA? 

c. What about the implementation of air launched weapons as part of the boost 

phase solution? 

General O’REILLY. While the Missile Defense Agency has provided analysis supporting Hedge options, this effort is under the purview of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy (USDP), and I would defer to USDP on these questions. 

Mr. TURNER. Will the IIB be deployed in land- and sea-based modes in 2020? In 

what quantities? Based on past experience with the GMD and SM–3 IA, and the 

recent test failure of the IB, what is the projected shot doctrine for the IIB likely 

to be? 

General O’REILLY. The SM–3 Block IIB will be designed by the Missile Defense 

Agency in cooperation with the U.S. Navy to have both land-based and sea-based 

capability. Initial fielding will occur at land-based Aegis Ashore sites in Europe in 

the 2021 timeframe. The industry concept development teams have been given a 

goal and incentive to propose ship compatible SM–3 IIB concepts. The Navy and 

MDA will determine the opportunity and resultant timeline to deploy the SM–3 

Block IIB on Aegis BMD ships. 

Additional information is provided in the classified response. 

Mr. TURNER. What requirements changed to support reducing THAAD battery 

purchases by 3 and THAAD interceptor purchases by 66? 

General O’REILLY. There was no change in requirements. However, to meet budget constraints driven by debt ceiling considerations, the Department followed stand-
138 

ard procedures for budget decisions. Specifically, the Missile Defense Executive 

Board provided guidance and considered many options before recommending the reduction of THAAD and AN/TPY–2 purchases to the Defense Management Action 

Group (DMAG). The DMAG concurred that these reductions posed the least impact 

on overall missile defense capability and approved the recommendation to reduce 

the number of THAAD and AN/TPY–2 radars for inclusion in the President’s Budget 

for FY 2013. 

Mr. TURNER. Why is MDA procuring 6 fewer TPY–2 radars under the FY13 budget and FYDP? What assumptions changed since last year? 

General O’REILLY. To meet budget constraints driven by debt ceiling considerations, the Department followed standard procedures for budget decisions. Specifically, the Missile Defense Executive Board provided guidance and considered many 

options before recommending the reduction of THAAD and AN/TPY–2 reductions to 

the Defense Management Action Group (DMAG). The DMAG concurred that these 

reductions posed the least impact on overall missile defense capability and approved 

the recommendation to reduce the number of THAAD and AN/TPY–2 radars for inclusion in the President’s Budget for FY 2013. 

Mr. TURNER. How much would an EIS on an East Coast missile defense site cost? 

Would it make sense to do an EIS on more than one location, e.g., Ft. Drum and 

Loring AFB? 

General O’REILLY. MDA’s estimate for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is $3 million. The actual cost will depend on the final number of candidate site(s) 

and the location(s) within the site(s) analyzed to meet National Environmental Policy Act requirements. Environmental conditions that also impact costs include endangered and threatened species habitats, cultural resources, natural resources, and 

proximity to developed areas. 

Yes, it makes sense to do an EIS on more than one location based on siting study 

input of viable alternatives. Any location suitable for a missile field would have to 

account for a 50 km radius for a first stage booster drop zone and a 600 km radius 

for a second stage booster drop zone. 

Mr. TURNER. Did IDA and NAS in their recently completed studies on missile defense conclude that an East Coast site would be beneficial for the defense of the 

United States? Didn’t Northcom do the same in 2007–2008 before the President 

issued the BMDR and changed the policy? 

General O’REILLY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Please explain what ‘‘cuing’’ PTSS will need? Which specific systems 

will provide the cue to PTSS? 

General O’REILLY. PTSS is the persistent component of an overall BMDS sensor 

architecture that consists of multiple, mutually reinforcing sensor systems that 

cover the missile defense battle-space from ignition to reentry. PTSS looks above the 

horizon—away from the structured clutter of the hard earth and atmospheric limb— 

in the late boost, post boost and midcourse phases of threat flight, delivering precision 3D tracks to the BMDS fire control network. By design, PTSS does not perform 

the below-the-horizon boost phase acquisition and track functions. PTSS will leverage the integration of all-source Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) data feeds 

(Air Force’s Space Based Infrared System and several Intelligence Community sensors) into the BMDS and the distribution of OPIR data for missile defense processing on compressed engagement timelines. PTSS is a cued precision tracking capability that will receive tasking from C2BMC based on an OPIR handover or cue. 

OPIR state vectors will be used by PTSS to initialize the tracking sensor scheduling 

process and to refresh the target list as new launches are detected and processed. 

Mr. TURNER. How many PTSS satellites will be procured in the initial constellation (6, 9, or 12)? When will this decision be made? What will factor in to the size 

of the constellation? 

a. When will the first replacement satellites need to be procured? Launched? 

b. How far in advance of such procurement and launch will that decision be 

made? 

General O’REILLY. Nine (9) PTSS satellites will be procured in the initial constellation. 

Two factors determine the size of the operational constellation: 1) raid handling 

capacity and 2) evolution of the threat. Six (6) satellites in the on-orbit constellation 

provide the minimum connectivity necessary for around-the-globe communications, 

nine (9) satellites provide stereo coverage of ballistic missile threats and twelve (12) 

satellites provide operational redundancy and resiliency. 

a. Given a 9-satellite constellation, satellite #10 would be the first replenishment 

satellite to be used as the first vehicles near their predicated end of life. Launching 

PTSS satellites is more cost effective today if two satellites are launched together 
139 

on one Atlas or Delta launch vehicle, PTSS satellite #10 would accompany satellite 

#9 on the same launch vehicle. That tandem launch is expected to occur in FY24, 

with advanced procurement beginning six years prior to that (FY18). 

Note: in this timeframe, the commercial marketplace may include a new launch 

provider that may be able to offer cost effective options for single-satellite launches, 

presenting the opportunity to decouple the launch of satellite #10 from satellite #9. 

MDA will monitor that as activities progress. 

b. The advanced procurement decision for satellite #10 would be made in FY18. 

The production decision for satellite #10 would be made one year later (FY19). 

Mr. TURNER. Please detail what opportunities the USAF will have to provide 

input on PTSS design requirements to optimize its SSA capabilities. When will this 

occur? Who will be the direct responsible POCs for USAF and MDA decisions on 

PTSS requirements in support of SSA? 

General O’REILLY. The USAF and MDA have been working together since 2010 

on PTSS support to Space Situational Awareness (SSA). 

In the summer 2010, MDA and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) conducted a 

joint study to assess the PTSS design to understand how PTSS could contribute to 

the SSA mission. This study provided a high level snapshot of how PTSS could contribute to the SSA mission as identified in USSTRATCOM’s SSA Initial Capabilities 

Document. 

In March 2012, a second joint study between MDA and AFSPC was kicked off to 

explore in further detail PTSS’s inherent SSA capabilities, implementation options, 

required interfaces and cost estimates. This study is set to conclude in June 2012 

and the results will be briefed to the July 2012 PTSS Systems Requirements Review 

(SRR). 

AFSPC will update its long term SSA architecture with the inherent SSA capability delivered by PTSS as documented in the March 2012 joint study. 

AFSPC and MDA will jointly review the study requirements. We expect that some 

will require changes to ground data processing and dissemination. These changes 

could be handled as new inputs from AFSPC and MDA to the DOD Joint Overhead 

Persistent Infrared (OPIR) Ground system architecture. 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide an annualized and detailed cost breakdown on operating SBX since the capability came online. a. Please provide breakdown of how 

PBR13 will be spent. 

General O’REILLY. The annualized cost breakdown for the Sea Based X-Band 

Radar (SBX) is contained in the attached table. 

[The table can be found in the Appendix on page 125.] 

In FY13, the SBX will be in a Limited Test Support Status. In this status, the 

Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar will retain its unique capabilities. Its technical performance capability will continue, including connectivity to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Fire Control System. SBX will maintain its American Bureau of 

Shipping (ABS) and Coast Guard certifications, and will be staffed to maintain the 

vessel, X-band radar (XBR) and other critical systems for support to both testing 

and contingency activation. 

It will continue to participate in Ballistic Missile Defense System ground and 

flight testing, while being available to support contingency operations as directed by 

OSD and the Joint Staff. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is working with Joint 

Staff and the U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for 

Integrated Missile Defense to determine the appropriate response time for contingencies. 

The Navy and MDA joint cost estimate for Limited Test Support Status is still 

being developed and is expected to be complete in May 2012. 

Mr. TURNER. What will be the discrimination capability of the PTSS constellation 

at IOC originating from the satellites themselves? 

General O’REILLY. Discrimination of warheads, decoys, lifting bodies, debris, etc. 

is an activity with C2BMC and BMDS terrestrial and space-borne sensors each contributing a necessary part. PTSS has a three color infrared sensor. The three colors 

are Visible-Near Infrared (VNIR), Mid Wave Infrared (MWIR), and Mid Long Infrared (MLIR). Collecting observations in these three bands simultaneously aids PTSS 

in a process called bulk filtering (frame-to-frame comparisons based on radiometric 

features of an object like object temperature and emissivity area) to eliminate hot 

fuel debris associated with threat missile thrust termination and unsteady motor 

operation. This raw data is sent to the C2BMC for further discrimination and determination, such as combining PTSS with radar data to fully exploit the multiple sensor types. PTSS also has the ability to track ballistic missiles in a ‘‘birth-to-death’’ 

fashion and observe reentry vehicle deployments. PTSS will also be connected to 

other sensors by C2BMC to observe behaviors and features of closely spaced objects 

over extended time periods and during unexpected movements. 
140 

Mr. TURNER. Will PTSS transmit its data direct to interceptors, or will it have 

to be routed through land-based systems or other satellites? Please respond in detail. 

General O’REILLY. PTSS does not communicate directly to interceptors or interceptor weapon systems; it is a node on the networked Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and therefore PTSS data is communicated to weapon systems through 

the BMDS Command and Control Battle Management Communications (C2BMC) 

element. 

The PTSS architecture includes multiple communication paths to transmit tracking data to the C2BMC for networked dissemination to various weapon fire control 

systems. PTSS communication paths include: 

• A satellite communications crosslink that allows any PTSS satellite to pass its 

tracking data to its neighboring satellite in the constellation 

• Existing space entry point links 

• MDA ground entry point links 

• Emergency ground link to the Air Force Satellite Communication Network. 

These links are available on all space vehicles in the PTSS constellation and thus 

provide connectivity to the PTSS operations center. The PTSS operations center provides connectivity to the C2BMC as well as other critical nodes, including the Joint 

Space Operations Center and the Joint Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) 

Ground. 

Mr. TURNER. What are your views on the Iron Dome system? What parts of the 

system (i.e., technologies) could be of value to the U.S.? 

General O’REILLY. Iron Dome has been used in combat for Rocket, Artillery and 

Mortar Defense (RAM–D) and is currently in production with four batteries delivered and deployed in Israel. Iron Dome has demonstrated capability in defending 

populated areas against Rocket Artillery and Mortar (RAM) attacks with fly-out 

ranges of four to seventy kilometers. 

The Missile Defense Agency is not the lead for ongoing studies within the Department for the Iron Dome System, but it is being considered in three U.S. suitability 

assessments: Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment II Analysis of Alternatives (AoA); Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) study directed 

by the Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Center for Army Analysis Integrated Air 

and Missile Defense (CAA IAMD) future investment strategy for Assistant Chief of 

Staff, G–8. These studies are not yet completed, and questions regarding them 

should be directed to the appropriate lead within the Department. 

Mr. TURNER. How would STSS be used to respond to an attack on CONUS today? 

General O’REILLY. STSS is not an operational element within the BMDS and 

would not be used for the homeland defense mission. 

STSS consists of only two satellites in lower earth orbit and as such has very limited coverage. It is a research and development system used to demonstrate on-orbit 

space-based technologies to track ballistic missiles in mid-course phase and provide 

a networked remote sensor capability to deliver fire control quality data to BMDS 

weapons systems such as Aegis. STSS is providing valuable insights and risk reduction for the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) and BMDS space integration 

across expected range of performance, CONOPS, Tactics, Techniques, Procedures, 

and BMDS architectures, and for potential contribution to other mission areas such 

as Space Situational Awareness. 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide a detailed description of the costs to conduct an 

ICBM test in late FY13. 

General O’REILLY. There are no ICBM tests planned in FY13. An ICBM test 

(FTG–11) is scheduled for late FY15, and another ICBM test (FTG–13) is planned 

for late FY16. Programmed funds associated with those tests are detailed below by 

fiscal year. 
141 

Mr. TURNER. What is the minimum VBO required for the SM–3 IIB missile? 

a. An SM–3 IIA missile? 

b. An SM–3 IB missile? 

General O’REILLY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Do you have sufficient missile inventory to meet PAA phase 1 and 

2 deployment objectives? 

General O’REILLY. In executing the attached proposed Standard Missile-3 Buy-Delivery Plan (assumes approval of MDA’s Above Threshold Reprogramming request 

(Ser. # FY12–10PA)), missile inventory will be sufficient to meet the present PAA 

phases 1 and 2 deployment objectives at the end of FY 2015. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 126.] 

Mr. TURNER. Please describe how many spares MDA will have for testing if MDA 

procures 57 GBIs? How many years of reliability tests will that support? 

General O’REILLY. (a): Procuring 57 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) will provide for 30 operational interceptors, 16 for planned Integrated Master Test Plan 

(IMTP) testing and 11 additional for Stockpile Reliability Program (SRP) testing 

and spares 

(b): The 57 GBIs support IMTP testing and reliability testing through 2032. 

Mr. TURNER. Regarding the SM–3 IB, what components is MDA accepting/not accepting from the vendor prior to a successful intercept test later this year? 

General O’REILLY. MDA is currently only accepting missile components necessary 

for the RDT&E Flight Test Rounds. Further procurement of components for production missiles are pending Long Lead Kinetic Warhead Materiel Procurement Authorization currently scheduled for 1QFY13 and subsequent production decisions. 

Mr. TURNER. Is it a requirements driver to have PTSS able to track a raid size 

of many (i.e., at least a dozen) SRBMs and/or MRBMs? How would the raid size 

requirements change if the constellation was oriented around purely homeland defense? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, it is a requirement to have PTSS able to track a raid size 

of many dozens of MRBMs and IRBMs. PTSS also has the ability to track SRBMs 

if they reach a sufficient altitude and/or range. The raid size capacity requirement 

would not be impacted if the constellation was oriented around purely homeland defense. The current approach for PTSS supports Homeland Defense against areas 

where we are the most concerned, as well as from unexpected launch locations. The 

architecture is flexible and adaptable to evolving threats, such as if improved defense against emerging threats. 
142 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide an excursion showing sensor coverage of threats 

against the United States launched from North Korea using current radars, including SBX, and a TPY–2 deployed in Japan (facing the appropriate direction). 

a. Provide the same with PTSS deployed. 

General O’REILLY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide an excursion showing sensor coverage of threats 

against the United States launched from Iran using current radars, including Cape 

Cod UEWR, and a TPY–2 deployed in the South Caucasus. 

a. Provide the same with PTSS deployed. 

General O’REILLY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide a detailed description of the costs to conduct an 

ICBM test in late FY13. 

General O’REILLY. There are no ICBM tests planned in FY13. An ICBM test 

(FTG–11) is scheduled for late FY15, and another ICBM test (FTG–13) is planned 

for late FY16. Programmed funds associated with those tests are detailed below by 

fiscal year. 

Mr. TURNER. If there was I&W of a threat to CONUS, how long and how much 

would it cost to fully load all 39 GBI silos with current GBI inventory? Please provide a detailed breakdown. 

a. Will there ever be a year through 2025 when MDA would not have the GBI 

inventory to fully load out all 39 GBI silos? 

General O’REILLY. (a) The Department continues to refine Hedge strategy options, 

and emplacing 38 operational GBIs is one of the considered courses of action. If approved by the Department, with Missile Field 2, there are 38 available silos for 

operational use (assuming Missile Field 1 is empty). The 39th silo referred to the 

question is a test silo and is required for the Integrated Master Test Plan test program. The Agency would have the GBI inventory to load 38 silos by 4QFY2014. This 

assumes: 

• Successful execution of Return-to-Intercept Program (CTV–01 and FTG–06b) 

• All spare GBIs are loaded into the eight operational Missile Field 2 silos 

The cost to emplace the eight additional GBIs to reach a total of 38 operational 

is $16.0M. 

Once the inventory of 38 GBIs is reached by 4QFY2014, the program could maintain that inventory level through 2025. Additional GBIs are included under the Development and Sustainment Contract and scheduled for delivery in FY2016 through 

FY2018 to support spares and flight tests. 
143 

Mr. TURNER. The NDAA states that the FY 12 funds are to be the ‘‘final obligation’’ of funds. Can you assure me that DOD understands this new law, and that 

DOD will work to find a resolution that avoids the U.S. continuing to have to spend 

hundreds of millions of dollars on a program that will never be procured? 

Mr. AHERN. Section 235 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the Department to submit a plan to use FY 2012 funding 

for MEADS as final obligations for either implementing a restructured program of 

reduced scope or funding termination liability costs. DOD fully understands this 

law, noting also that it is within the President’s sole authority to determine the content of his proposed annual budget in future years. Thus, submitting a President’s 

Budget request for FY 2013 that included a request for funds for the MEADS was 

not in violation of the law. In accordance with the FY 2012 NDAA, the Department 

has repeatedly consulted and attempted to negotiate with our international partners, the German and Italian Ministries of Defense (MODs), regarding development 

of a plan to further restructure the program in the event that Congress does not 

authorize or appropriate FY 2013 funding to complete our MEADS Design and Development Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) obligations. We have advised the 

German and Italian MODs at the highest levels that there is significant risk that 

FY 2013 funding may not be made available by the Congress. In response, our partners have made clear to the Department, and the German Minister of Defense has 

advised Senator Levin directly, that they remain fully committed to their MOU obligations and expect that all partner nations will provide their 2013 funding to complete the Proof of Concept effort. They have also made clear that we are too late 

in the development effort to change course again and that we jeopardize our ability 

to realize the benefits of the program if we renege on our nine-year agreement near 

the end of the eighth year. The fact remains that, while we have aggressively engaged with our partners to complete MEADS MOU efforts using only FY 2012 funding, we cannot force them to agree to this course of action. 

As with other cooperative MOUs, the Department considers the MEADS D&D 

MOU to be legally binding on the nations, recognizing that our financial responsibilities under such MOUs are subject to the availability of funds appropriated for such 

purposes. The Administration has requested funding in the FY 2013 budget to fulfill 

our MOU responsibilities vis-a`-vis our international partners, the German and 

Italian MODs, consistent with the three MOU participants’ direction to restructure 

the MEADS prime contract in April 2011. 

More broadly, while the Department understands the need to make difficult 

choices in the current fiscal environment concerning funding for all of our activities, 

we also note that failure to meet our MEADS MOU funding obligations for FY 2013 

could negatively affect our allies’ implementation of current transatlantic projects 

and multinational cooperation—as well as their willingness to join future cooperative endeavors with the United States—that are strongly supported by the Administration and Congress. In fact, the ramifications of failing to provide funds for this 

program, which is so near completion, could impact our relationship with our allies 

on a much broader basis than just future cooperative projects. 

Mr. TURNER. Can you tell me the exact amount of termination costs if the U.S. 

were to unilaterally terminate the MOU today? 

Mr. AHERN. The MEADS Design and Development (D&D) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is a cooperative MOU entered into by the U.S. Department of Defense and German and Italian Ministries of Defense (MODs). U.S. DOD can withdraw from, but cannot unilaterally terminate the MEADS D&D MOU. Consistent 

with other cooperative MOUs, the Department considers the MEADS D&D MOU to 

be legally binding on the nations, recognizing that our financial responsibilities 

under such MOUs are subject to the availability of funds appropriated for such purposes. 

Germany and Italy have made clear they do not wish to terminate the program 

in the final year of development. The DOD has expressed its support for the 

MEADS Proof of Concept as agreed to with Italy and Germany and urges the Congress to provide the necessary funds which have been requested in the President’s 

FY 2013 budget request. The United States’ national maximum commitment for the 

MEADS Program per the MOU is approximately $2.3 billion (in base year 2004 dollars). In current year dollars, the MOU ceiling amount is approximately $2.7 billion, 

of which at the end of FY 12, approximately $2.35 billion will have been obligated 

for the MEADS Program. The maximum remaining potential liability for the United 

States under the MEADS MOU is $348 million. This amount represents the difference between what the U.S. committed to provide under the MOU and what the 

U.S. has provided to date. 
144 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Gilmore, do you believe one GBI test per year is statistically sufficient to ensure high confidence in GBI reliability into the middle of the next decade? 

Mr. GILMORE. Due to urgent need, the Bush Administration decided to field the 

Ground-Based Missile Defense (GMD) system absent a successful flight test of the 

ground-based interceptor (GBI) and kill vehicle composing the deployed system, as 

well as absent a comprehensive program of ground-based component-level testing 

for reliability and performance of those interceptors and kill vehicles. Thus, the 

original decision to field GMD was made without data permitting statistical assessment at any meaningful level of confidence of the GBI’s reliability or performance. 

The resulting concurrent fielding of the GMD system while it remains under development has complicated the challenge of testing the GMD system’s reliability and 

overall operational effectiveness. 

For other missile systems such as Minuteman III and Trident II, stockpile reliability testing has historically been conducted using three to four flight tests per 

year per missile type after initial development and testing. The booster stacks for 

these offensive missiles and the booster stack for GBIs are similar; however, the 

similarity ends there. Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) have relatively 

large fielded inventories; the GBI fielded inventory is small. Also, unlike an ICBM, 

fully testing GMD mission reliability and effectiveness currently requires the GBI 

to complete an intercept in order to assess kill vehicle reliability and effectiveness. 

This means that every comprehensive GBI flight test (which tests both reliability 

and overall performance) must presently have a target to shoot at, making these 

tests much more complex, expensive, and difficult to plan, conduct, and assess relative to the flight test of a Minuteman III or Trident II. In particular, analyzing 

and understanding fully the implications of the large amount of data generated during GMD flight tests is time-consuming and difficult. Testing at a pace that exceeds 

the ability to understand and act on the data collected would not result in increased 

reliability or performance of the GMD system. 

A key element of overall ICBM reliability is the reliability of the associated nuclear warhead, which is not assessed completely during ICBM flight testing. Component-level ground testing, modeling, simulation, and analysis play a substantial role 

in evaluating the reliability of ICBM warheads. Similarly, it has been the Department’s plan for some time to use modeling, simulation, and analysis to asses GBI 

reliability, as well as to evaluate GMD operational effectiveness overall. The Missile 

Defense Agency (MDA) is also now initiating a comprehensive ground-based component-level reliability assessment and testing program for the GBIs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you agree with Chairman Turner’s assertion that the Obama 

Administration is spending four or five times more on regional defense than on the 

protection of the homeland? And how much are we investing (percentage-wise) in 

homeland missile defense and in regional missile defense in FY13? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The United States is not spending four times more on regional BMD 

than it is on the protection of the homeland. The Missile Defense Agency spends 

roughly a third of its missile defense budget on homeland defense, a third on regional defense, and a third on elements that contribute to both regional and homeland defense. 

The United States has already made and continues to make substantial investments in homeland BMD, totaling billions of dollars over the past decade. This has 

put us in an advantageous position given the fact that neither North Korea nor Iran 

has successfully tested an ICBM or demonstrated an ICBM-class warhead. Meanwhile, deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partners are threatened today by hundreds 

of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you still agree with Secretary Gates’ decision to limit the number of deployed GBIs at 30? Does the rationale for that decision still exist? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The rationale for then-Secretary Gates’ decision remains valid. Secretary Gates directed the Department to pause at 30 deployed GBIs for the protection of the homeland based on three factors. 

First, the ICBM deployments from Iran and North Korea did not occur, and Intelligence Community assessments determined that neither country was close to developing and deploying ICBMs successfully. 

Second, a technical assessment indicated that high concurrency in the development and deployment of GBIs had resulted in technical challenges that required 

resolution. 
145 

Third, development and deployment of an advanced Standard Missile-3, the SM– 

3 IIB, would provide a valuable early intercept opportunity at a lower cost than procuring additional GBIs. 

Secretary Gates also decided to finish construction of the remaining silos at Fort 

Greely, Alaska for deployment of up to 38 GBIs as a hedge against the possibility 

that long-range threats may emerge in numbers that could overwhelm the current 

inventory of 30 GBIs before the SM–3 IIB becomes available. As soon as current 

GBI technical issues are resolved and confirmed through flight testing, GBI production will resume. 

The Department will continue to develop hedge options and improve the Ballistic 

Missile Defense System to provide the appropriate capability to counter the projected ICBM threat from Iran or North Korea. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. As follow-up in more detail on a previous question about the adequacy of the current missile defense plan. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated that ‘‘U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change.’’ 

Given the updated intelligence community’s assessment of the threat from Iran and 

North Korea, is the proposed PAA plan, starting with PAA in Europe, and the current proposed hedging policy still adequate to respond to the threat? Why? Why not? 

What steps are being taken to ensure that the plan is still responsive to the threat 

as it evolves? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Administration remains committed to the protection of the 

homeland, and our deployed forces, allies and partners. The FY13 budget request 

reflects these priorities. 

The need to strengthen our regional missile defense protection is clear: deployed 

U.S. forces, allies, and partners are threatened today by hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. After a decade of significant progress in developing 

and fielding capabilities for protection against short-, medium-, and intermediaterange ballistic missiles, the United States is now capable of strengthening protection of its forces abroad and assisting its allies and partners in providing for their 

own defense. 

The homeland is currently protected against potential limited intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM) attacks from states like North Korea and Iran. Maintaining 

this position is essential and will require the continued improvement to the Groundbased Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, including enhanced performance by the 

Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) and the deployment of new sensors. This necessitates the development and deployment of the Precision Tracking Space System 

(PTSS) to handle larger raid sizes and the Standard Missile 3 (SM–3) Block IIB as 

the ICBM threat from states such as Iran and North Korea matures. 

It is prudent for the United States to have a hedge strategy to address possible 

delays in the development of our missile defense or new threats that may emerge. 

Key elements of the hedge strategy were set out in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review two years ago, including completion of a second field of 14 GBI silos at Fort 

Greely, Alaska. This increases the availability of silos in the event that additional 

GBI deployments become necessary. We also continue to develop the two-stage GBI 

and pursue additional programs to hedge against future uncertainties. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. According to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, ‘‘some 

Iranian officials—probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—have changed 

their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States 

in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime’’ and that ‘‘We 

are also concerned about Iranian plotting against U.S. or allied interests overseas.’’ 

In this context, how prepared are we to defend against attacks from short- or medium-range missiles off U.S. coasts? 

Dr. ROBERTS. We continue to be concerned about this scenario. However, we do 

not believe that there is a credible threat at this time. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are the milestones for increasing reliability and discrimination? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The GMD milestones for increasing reliability include successful 

GBI flight testing, GBI component reliability growth testing, upgrade of current 

GBIs, and delivery of new GBIs. 

Controlled Test Vehicle One (CTV 01) and Flight Test Ground Based Interceptor 

(FTG)–06b flight tests will be in FY13, FTG–08 in FY14, and FTG–11a&b (salvo 

mission) in FY15. Although component reliability testing will be conducted over the 

life of the program, additional GBI component testing specifically focusing on reliability growth by FY15 is being planned for FY13–FY15. Capability Enhancement 

(CE)–I interceptors will continue to be upgraded through FY17; and CE–II interceptors will be reworked from 4Qtr FY13 through 4Qtr FY15 to integrate the FTG– 

06a fix. Manufacturing of CE–II interceptors will restart in 2Qtr FY13 following 
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successful flight testing of CTV–01 and FTG–06b; deliveries of new CE–II Block I 

interceptors will begin in 1Qtr FY16. 

The milestones for increasing discrimination capabilities include completion of the 

Ground Test 06 (GT–06) campaign by 1Qtr FY16 to test and validate the capability 

to process near-term discrimination data from BMDS sensors. The subsequent flight 

test date and fielding date have not been sent. Candidate options to improve Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) on-board discrimination capabilities are under 

study. Selected discrimination improvements developed from this effort will be incorporated into the next EKV software upgrades planned for Functional Qualification Testing in 2Qtr FY14 and 4Qtr FY14. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Will we be able to deploy SM3–IIBs on ships? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The SM–3 Block II B will be designed and developed to be 

deployable in Aegis BMD assets at sea and ashore. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Why do we need regional missile defense and whom do these systems protect? And how does the EPAA contribute to homeland defense? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The threat from short-range, medium-range, and intermediaterange ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs) in regions where the United 

States deploys forces and maintains security relationships exists today and continues to grow, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 

To address the rapid growth in regional ballistic missile threats, the United 

States has begun deploying phased adaptive approaches in regions where deployed 

U.S. forces, allies, and partners are threatened. The first application of this phased 

approach was in Europe, but the United States also maintains a missile defense 

presence in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific that will be tailored to the threats 

and circumstances unique to those regions. 

Phase Four of the EPAA will directly contribute to homeland defense through the 

deployment of the SM–3 IIB. When deployed in Europe, the SM–3 IIB serves as the 

first tier of a layered defense of the U.S. homeland from potential ICBM threats 

from the Middle East. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Can you tell us what savings were reaped from the new GMD contract competition? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The independent government estimate was approximately $4.492B 

at the time of the Request for Proposal (RFP). The competitively awarded Development and Sustainment (DSC) contract is valued at $3.48B if all options are exercised. 

The competition of the GMD Development and Sustainment contract netted a 20 percent reduction or approximately $1B less than the Government’s independent estimate. Those savings provided the opportunity to procure five additional GBIs, fund 

the Return to Intercept (RTI) activities associated with the GMD Flight Test–06a 

failure, support the two additional flight tests associated with the RTI (Control Test 

Vehicle–01, and FTG–06b), and repair the fielded CE–II GBIs impacted by the flight 

test failure redesign. All of these efforts were presented to and endorsed by the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB). 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Have previous administrations shared any sensitive information 

about U.S. missile defense systems with the Russian Federation? For what purpose? 

How does the Administration protect classified information? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Russia accepted an invitation to observe a Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) intercept flight test, FTG–03a, in September 2007. Because Russian observers saw classified test display data, the event required a vetted and approved 

exception to national disclosure policy. Presumably, the purpose for inviting Russia 

to observe the test was to increase transparency and to help lay the groundwork 

for missile defense cooperation. 

Access to classified information is strictly governed by U.S. National Disclosure 

Policy and other applicable laws and policies. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. On March 31, 2008, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England 

stated that ‘‘we have offered Russia a wide-ranging proposal to cooperate on missile 

defense—everything from modeling and simulation, to data sharing, to joint development of a regional missile defense architecture—all designed to defend the United 

States, Europe, and Russia from the growing threat of Iranian ballistic missiles. An 

extraordinary series of transparency measures have also been offered to reassure 

Russia. Despite some Russian reluctance to sign up to these cooperative missile defense activities, we continue to work toward this goal.’’ Can you expand why it 

makes national security sense for the current administration to continue the efforts 

by the previous Administration regarding the pursuit of missile defense cooperation 

with Russia? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Cooperation with Russia on missile defense has long been a priority 

of successive Presidential Administrations. Sharing of early warning data could contribute by increasing reaction times and situational awareness. Cooperation with 
147 

the Russian Federation in missile defense, particularly sharing of early warning and 

sensor data, could enhance the effectiveness of both European regional and U.S. 

homeland defense. For example, the NATO Alliance could benefit from the data 

from Russia’s Armavir radar for defense against projected Middle Eastern ballistic 

missile attack. The United States could also benefit from radars deployed in Russia’s interior. These radars are optimally located for viewing North Korean 

launches, and would enhance U.S. homeland defense. 

U.S.-Russia missile defense cooperation would also send a strong message of deterrence to Iran and North Korea and devalue their development of missiles and 

pursuit of nuclear capability. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Could you provide examples of cost-sharing with our allies on missile defense? What further improvements can be made on this front? 

Dr. ROBERTS. As stated in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the United States 

is well-positioned to defend against regional ballistic missile threats to U.S. forces. 

In order to protect allies and partners most effectively and enable them to defend 

themselves from the growing ballistic missile threat, the United States is actively 

leading international efforts to expand regional ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities. 

A prime example of a cost-sharing partnership is our ongoing collaboration with Japan on the SM–3 Block IIA interceptor. Japan has committed more than $1 billion to the development and testing of the upgraded version of the SM–3 interceptor. 

Japan has also invested in Aegis BMD capability for Japanese ships and acquired 

SM–3 Block IA interceptors through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. In addition, Japan hosts an AN/TPY–2 radar in support of the BMD mission. 

Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region, the Republic of Korea and Australia are actively engaged with the United States in joint modeling and simulation activities. 

NATO Allies are providing financial support for the implementation of European 

missile defense. For example, NATO has agreed to pay for the expansion of Active 

Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) with NATO common funding, 

which is approximately $1 billion in committed funds. Some Allies are already committed to fielding additional capabilities of their own. For example, the Netherlands 

has approved plans and funding to upgrade the SMART–L radar on four air defense 

frigates, giving the ships a BMD Long-Range Search & Track (LRS&T) capability. 

Germany is testing and intends to operationalize an Airborne Infrared System 

(ABIR) system, which could support NATO BMD. In addition, France has proposed 

a concept for a single geosynchronous infrared shared-early warning satellite, and 

is developing a transportable, midcourse radar for BMD and early warning. Germany and the Netherlands have also proposed an interceptor pooling concept where 

several Allies would purchase SM–3 interceptors that could then be used in support 

of NATO missile defense. 

Also in support of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, 

Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to host U.S. assets. These host 

governments will bear the costs of providing perimeter defense and security for the 

U.S. assets and infrastructure. 

The United Kingdom and Denmark are currently providing critical contributions 

to the Ballistic Missile Defense System and U.S. homeland defense by hosting upgraded early warning radars at Fylingdales and Thule, respectively. 

In the Middle East, there is growing interest in missile defense capabilities, especially with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. In December 2011, the 

United Arab Emirates signed an FMS case for the sale of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. Other GCC countries have expressed interest 

in acquiring regional missile defense capabilities. 

The United States also has a long-standing relationship with Israel on the joint 

development of Israeli ballistic missile defense capabilities that are interoperable 

with U.S. capabilities forward-deployed in the region. This enduring partnership has 

resulted in the development and fielding of missile and long-range rocket defense 

for our close partner. Israel also hosts an AN/TPY–2 radar supporting enhanced regional BMD. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Russia is concerned about configurations of the European Phased 

Adaptive Approach (EPAA) that they believe would have capability against Russian 

ICBMs. For example, Phases 3 and 4 of the EPAA are of special concern to Russia, 

due in part to the large numbers of interceptors that MDA plans to buy. To gain 

Russia’s cooperation would MDA consider missile defense architectures that would 

be effective against Iran but not against Russia? What is the minimum number of 

interceptors that are needed against Iran? Against North Korea? (please respond in 

classified form [if] necessary). 

Dr. ROBERTS. The European Phased Adaptive Approach is designed and configured to counter ballistic missiles from the Middle East. The SM–3 interceptors we 
148 

will deploy as part of the EPAA are too slow and not in a position to intercept Russian ICBMs. Russia has many ICBM launch points from within its territory, as well 

as a capable sea-launched ballistic missile force and air-launched cruise missile 

force that will not pass within range of the EPAA deployment locations. 

Because the ballistic missile threat from states like Iran and North Korea continues to grow, the United States cannot accept limits on the capability of missile 

defenses designed to meet the threat. The United States will continue to field new 

capabilities in order to defend ourselves and our allies and partners. Iran and North 

Korea already possesses hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, so 

there is no minimum number of interceptors that are needed to defend against the 

regional threat. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you agree with Chairman Turner’s assertion that the Obama 

Administration is spending four or five times more on regional defense than on the 

protection of the homeland? And how much are we investing (percentage-wise) in 

homeland missile defense and in regional missile defense in FY13? 

General O’REILLY. No, MDA’s FY13 President’s Budget request includes 14 percent directly supporting Homeland defense and 19 percent to Homeland and Regional defense, for a total of 33 percent. There is 26 percent which contributes directly to Regional defense. The remaining 41 percent is for targets, test, engineering, agency operations, and future capabilities development. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you need more funding for GMD in FY13? Why/why not? 

General O’REILLY. FY13 President’s budget request is sufficient to address program requirements in FY13. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has executed a detailed plan to determine the root cause of its recent Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) flight test failures. Based on those findings, MDA is implementing design fixes and will vigorously test these improvements through ground and flight 

testing prior to restarting production. The FY13 President’s Budget fully supports 

this engineering development and testing work, and all the operations and 

sustainment requirements for the fielded GMD system and missiles. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. As follow-up in more detail on a previous question about the adequacy of the current missile defense plan. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated that ‘‘U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change.’’ 

Given the updated intelligence community’s assessment of the threat from Iran and 

North Korea, is the proposed PAA plan, starting with PAA in Europe, and the current proposed hedging policy still adequate to respond to the threat? Why? Why not? 

What steps are being taken to ensure that the plan is still responsive to the threat 

as it evolves? 

General O’REILLY. The Missile Defense Agency does not maintain intelligence resources necessary to assess North Korean and Iranian ballistic missile development, 

and relies on Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) and the broader 

Intelligence Community for this data. With regards to threat assessments, questions 

should be directed to USD(I) and the broader Intelligence Community. 

While the Missile Defense Agency has provided analysis supporting Hedge and 

Phased Adaptive Approach options, these efforts are under the purview of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP), and I would defer to USDP on these questions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In response to questions for the record pursuant to our hearing on 

the missile defense budget last year, you stated: ‘‘No GMD tests against a true 

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) have yet been conducted.’’ When can we expect MDA to conduct such a test? 

General O’REILLY. There are no ICBM tests planned in FY13. An ICBM test 

(FTG–11) is scheduled for late FY15, and another ICBM test (FTG–13) is planned 

for late FY16. Programmed funds associated with those tests are detailed below by 

fiscal year. 
149 

Ms. SANCHEZ. For GMD testing, is a hit considered a kill? Does this introduce any 

risk in reliability assumptions for GBIs? 

General O’REILLY. During Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) testing, a hit 

is not necessarily counted as a kill. Analysis of the telemetry collected during the 

flight test identifies where the actual impact took place. This analysis determines 

if the impact is within the acceptable tolerance to be counted as a kill. This does 

not introduce any risk in reliability assumptions for Ground Based Interceptors 

(GBIs). If the GBI performs its mission and hits the target, the reliability assumptions are not considered a risk item. If the determination is made that the impact 

did not constitute a kill, then a review board would need to assess the collected data 

to determine if the problem is with kinematics, system design, or some other unknown issue. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. According to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, ‘‘some 

Iranian officials—probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—have changed 

their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States 

in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime’’ and that ‘‘We 

are also concerned about Iranian plotting against U.S. or allied interests overseas.’’ 

In this context, how prepared are we to defend against attacks from short- or medium-range missiles off U.S. coasts? 

General O’REILLY. The Commander of United States Northern Command 

(CDRUSNORTHCOM) has the authority and responsibility for defense of the United 

States. Questions in this subject area should be directed toward 

CDRUSNORTHCOM. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are the milestones for increasing reliability and discrimination? 

General O’REILLY. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) milestones for 

increasing reliability include successful Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) flight testing, GBI component reliability growth testing, upgrade of current GBIs, and delivery of new GBIs. Controlled Test Vehicle-One (CTV–01) and Flight Test Ground 

Based Interceptor (FTG)–06b flight tests will be in FY13, FTG–08 in FY14, and 

FTG–11a&b (salvo mission) in FY15. While component reliability testing will be 

conducted over the life of the program, additional GBI component testing specifically 

focusing on reliability growth by FY15 is being planned for FY13–FY15. Capability 

Enhancement (CE)–I interceptors will continue to be upgraded through FY17; and 

CE–II interceptors will be reworked from 4Qtr FY13 through 4Qtr FY15 to integrate 

the FTG–06a fix. Manufacturing of CE–II interceptors will restart in 2Qtr FY13 following successful flight testing of CTV–01 and FTG–06b; and deliveries of new CE– 

II Block I interceptors will begin in 1Qtr FY16. 
150 

The milestones for increasing discrimination include completion of the GT–06 

ground test campaign by 1Qtr FY16 to provide the capability to process near-term 

discrimination data from BMDS sensors. Options to improve EKV on-board discrimination capabilities are under study and will be incorporated in the next Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) software upgrades, 23.0 and 10.0. Functional Qualification 

Testing (FQT) of software upgrades 23.0 and 10.0 are planned in 2Qtr FY14 and 

4Qtr FY14, respectively, to provide improved discrimination capabilities. The FQT 

versions of 23.0 and 10.0 will be tested in ground and flight tests; the date for fielding has not been set. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are MDA plans to increase reliability of the Ground-Based 

Interceptors? 

General O’REILLY. The Missile Defense Agency plan for increasing the reliability 

of the Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) consists of a Fleet Upgrade Program, a 

Flight Test Rotation Plan, a Reliability Growth Testing Program, and a Stockpile 

Reliability Program. These programs are to be guided by a detailed GBI reliability 

assessment that is ongoing as part of the recently awarded Development and 

Sustainment Contract. This assessment will be completed in late Fiscal Year (FY) 

2012 and evaluates all GBI components against maximum expected life-cycle and 

operational environments. The results of this assessment will identify components 

for additional reliability growth. These components would require development, procurement, and testing. 

GBI Fleet Upgrade Program consists of removing interceptors from silos, performing upgrades to remove known risks, replacing limited life items (replaced 

items are used in the Stockpile Reliability Program), and returning the newly upgrade interceptors to the operational fleet. All currently fielded interceptors will undergo an upgrade process by the end of FY 2017. 

Flight Test Rotation Plan removes older interceptors from silos, performs a limited upgrade to support the flight test configuration requirements, replaces limited 

life items (replaced items are used in the Stockpile Reliability Program) and then 

delivers the test interceptor for the flight test program. 

GBI Reliability Growth Testing Program ensures ‘‘fixes’’ to known risks are both 

effective and eliminate the risks. In the near term, Control Test Vehicle–One (CTV– 

01) and Flight Test Ground Based Interceptor (FTG)–06b flight tests are the final 

verification test milestones to demonstrate the design fixes effectively eliminate the 

FTG–06a issues. 

Stockpile Reliability Program is a comprehensive effort that includes testing, 

trending analysis, and identification of reliability improvements for the GBI hardware. Aging and surveillance testing and analyses are also being performed. Service 

Life Extension testing will continue for one-shot devices. All one-shot devices removed from fielded vehicles during Upgrade and Flight Test Rotation activities will 

be fired to obtain performance data. The program also includes the dedication of 

older interceptors to Stockpile Reliability Program activities. Over the course of 

seven years, four interceptors are planned to be removed from service and will undergo stockpile reliability testing. Reliability and performance upgrades to the GBI 

booster and Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle are in development. Four of the new build 

interceptors are currently planned to be placed into service in FY 2016 through FY 

2017. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How long will the GBI production line remain warm? 

General O’REILLY. Presidential Budget 2013 sustains a warm Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) production line for first tier subcontractors through Fiscal Year (FY) 

2018 by funding the manufacturing completion of a total of 57 GBIs. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Will we wait to procure new GBIs until after a successful flight 

test? Why? 

General O’REILLY. One of the key policy initiatives proposed by the 2010 Ballistic 

Missile Defense Review and approved by the Secretary of Defense was that we will 

‘‘fly before we buy’’ (or flight test missiles and their components prior to mass production and fielding of these systems). Therefore, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 

will wait until a successful flight test to procure new Ground Based Interceptors 

(GBIs). The MDA initiated procurement of five Capability Enhancement II Block I 

GBIs under the Development and Sustainment Contract (DSC) awarded 30 December 2011, and plans to exercise an option to procure an additional five. The design 

of these DSC GBIs will include the fixes to address the recent flight test failures. 

Flight Test GBI–06b will validate these fixes and has a scheduled launch in 

FY2013. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is being done to correct the SM3–IA anomaly and the SM3– 

IB test failure? Have these problems been fixed? What does this mean for keeping 

the SM3 production line warm and procurement of additional missiles? 
151 

General O’REILLY. A Failure Investigation Team (FIT) was established, in April 

2011, shortly after the SM–3 Block IA anomalous behavior was observed during 

FTM–15. The FIT identified the intermittent failure of the Cold Gas Regulator 

(CGR) in the Third Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM) as the leading theory for root cause 

of the anomalous behavior. The FIT also identified indicators to serve as predictors 

of anomalous performance. Fleet assets were screened for these indicators. Affected 

rounds were identified by serial number and location. These rounds remain serviceable but will be returned at the earliest opportunity to replace the CGR. A CGR 

re-design effort was also started to address FIT’s findings on CGR failure modes. 

The re-designed CGR is currently scheduled to be qualified by July 2012. 

A Failure Review Board (FRB) was established immediately after observing the 

SM–3 Block IB TSRM energetic event during FTM–16 Event 2. The FRB has identified several leading theories for root cause of this failure mode through data collected from additional ground testing since the flight test and through supporting 

modeling and simulation efforts. In response to the FRB findings, missile fly-out parameters in the Aegis Weapon System are being adjusted to mitigate the failure 

seen in FTM–16 Event 2. Certification testing and subsequent Aegis BMD 4.0.1/ 

SM–3 Block IB flight tests will verify the mitigation. 

Through an above threshold reprogramming, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 

has requested funding for critical supplier sustainment and a limited quantity of 

missile procurement. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Will we be able to deploy SM3–IIBs on ships? 

General O’REILLY. The industry concept development teams have been given a 

goal and incentive to propose ship compatible SM–3 IIB concepts. All Teams are 

pursuing viable concepts to meet all goals. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Why do we need regional missile defense and whom do these systems protect? And how does the EPAA contribute to homeland defense? 

General O’REILLY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

subcommittee files.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Can you tell us what savings were reaped from the new GMD contract competition? 

General O’REILLY. The independent government estimate was approximately $4.492B at the time of the Request for Proposal (RFP). The competitively awarded 

Development and Sustainment (DSC) contract is valued at $3.48B if all options are 

exercised. 

The competition of the GMD Development and Sustainment contract netted a 20% reduction or approximately $1B less than the Government’s independent estimate. 

Those savings provided the opportunity to procure five additional GBIs, fund the 

Return to Intercept (RTI) activities associated with the GMD Flight Test–06a failure, support the two additional flight tests associated with the RTI (Control Test 

Vehicle–01, and FTG–06b), and to repair the fielded CE–II GBIs impacted by the 

flight test failure redesign. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Russia is concerned about configurations of the European Phased 

Adaptive Approach (EPAA) that they believe would have capability against Russian 

ICBMs. For example, Phases 3 and 4 of the EPAA are of special concern to Russia, 

due in part to the large numbers of interceptors that MDA plans to buy. To gain 

Russia’s cooperation would MDA consider missile defense architectures that would 

be effective against Iran but not against Russia? What is the minimum number of 

interceptors that are needed against Iran? Against North Korea? (please respond in 

classified form is necessary). 

General O’REILLY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

subcommittee files.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the Administration doing to reduce the cost of the MEADS 

program, and to close out the program with FY12 funding? Given the direction to 

either re-scope or terminate, why does your FY13 budget request an additional $400 

million? When were Secretary of Defense Panetta and Secretary of State Clinton 

brought into discussions with Germany and Italy, at a broader level than just missile defense discussions? 

Mr. AHERN. The Administration has requested funding in the Fiscal Year (FY) 

2013 budget to complete our international obligations as agreed under the MEADS 

Design and Development Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with our international partners, Germany and Italy, and consistent with the three Nations’ direction to restructure the contract in April 2011. The NATO MEADS Management 

Agency issued contract Amendment 26 to MEADS, International on October 31, 

2011 to implement that direction for restructuring the MEADS Design and Development to a significantly reduced scope MEADS Proof of Concept (PoC) effort. The reduced-scope restructure was pursued to avoid an additional $1 billion in U.S. investment during fiscal years 2012 to 2017, which according to the DOD Cost Analysis 
152 

and Program Evaluation cost estimate, would have been required to fully complete 

the D&D phase as originally planned. This mutually agreed PoC effort, which will 

complete development and testing of MEADS elements and would provide the Participants with a useful data package for the future missile defense activities of each 

of the nations, requires 2012 and 2013 funding from the U.S. and partner nations, 

recognizing that actual funds availability from each nation is subject to appropriation by the Participants’ respective legislative bodies in accordance with MOU paragraph 19.1. 

In accordance with the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the 

Department has repeatedly consulted and attempted to negotiate with our international partners, Germany and Italy, regarding development of a plan to further 

restructure the program in the event that Congress does not authorize or appropriate FY 2013 funding to complete our MOU obligations. Secretary Panetta met 

with the German Minister of Defense (MoD) in February where the German MoD 

reiterated his unequivocal support for completing the MEADS PoC. We do not know 

of any discussions between the Secretary of State and her German counterpart. 

During our discussions, we have advised Germany and Italy that there is significant risk that FY 2013 funding may not be made available by the Congress. In response, our partners have made clear to the Department, and Germany has advised 

Senator Levin directly, that they remain fully committed to their MOU obligations 

and expect that all partner nations will provide their 2013 funding to complete the 

PoC effort. They have also made clear that we are too late in the development effort 

to change course again and that we jeopardize our ability to realize the benefits of 

the program if we renege on our nine-year agreement near the end of the eighth 

year. The fact remains that, while we have aggressively engaged with our partners 

to complete MEADS MOU efforts using only FY 2012 funding, we cannot force them 

to agree to this course of action. 

As with other cooperative MOUs, the Department considers the MEAD as D&D 

MOU to be legally binding on the nations, albeit subject to the availability of funds. 

While the Department understands the need to make difficult choices in the current 

fiscal environment concerning funding for all of our activities, we note that failure 

to meet our MEADS MOU funding obligations for FY 2013 could negatively affect 

our allies’ implementation of current transatlantic projects and multinational cooperation—as well as their willingness to join future cooperative endeavors with the 

United States—that are strongly supported by the Administration and Congress. In 

fact, the ramifications of failing to provide funds for this program which is so near 

completion could impact our relationship with our allies on a much broader basis 

than just future cooperative projects. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In response to questions for the record pursuant to our hearing on 

the missile defense budget last year, you stated: ‘‘No GMD tests against a true 

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) have yet been conducted.’’ When can we expect MDA to conduct such a test? 

Dr. GILMORE. The Missile Defense Agency plans to conduct the first Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense flight test that will use an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

(ICBM)-class target during the 4th quarter of Fiscal Year 2015. In the just signed 

Integrated Master Test Plan, Version 12.1, this test is designated as FTG–11. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. For GMD testing, is a hit considered a kill? Does this introduce any 

risk in reliability assumptions for GBIs? 

Dr. GILMORE. A hit on the threat re-entry vehicle (RV) by the exo-atmospheric kill 

vehicle (EKV) is not automatically considered a kill. Ground testing (using rocketpropelled sleds), as well as modeling and simulation demonstrate the EKV can 

strike the RV in a location that does not result in a kill. This was the case in Flight 

Test Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI)–02 (FTG–02). Although the flight test objectives excluded actually killing the incoming RV, the EKV achieved a ‘‘glancing blow’’ 

on the RV. Subsequent analysis indicated the ‘‘glancing blow’’ would not have resulted in a kill. I score the FTG–02 flight test as a hit, but not a kill. 

In principle, an intercept hit that does not result in a kill could have a number 

of causes, some of which could be related to reliability. The result of FTG–02, in 

which an RV kill was not planned (and was not achieved), is not a reliability issue. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are MDA plans to increase reliability of the Ground-Based 

Interceptors? 

Dr. GILMORE. In the immediate future, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will implement and flight test changes to the Capability Enhancement–II Exo-atmospheric 

Kill Vehicle used on a subset of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) fleet. If successful, this test will be an important step in increasing the mission reliability of 

the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs). Following this, the MDA will execute the 

subsequent Ground-based Midcourse Defense test events contained in the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), which are designed to demonstrate additional ca-
153 

pabilities of Ground-Based Missile Defense over more of the system’s battlespace. 

Executing the IMTP will, as it has already done, identify unexpected or otherwise 

unknown failure mechanisms, thereby enabling them to be fixed. This identification 

and correction of failure mechanisms accomplished through a rigorous program of 

flight testing increases the reliability of the GBIs. The MDA is also now implementing a rigorous program of component-level analysis and ground-testing of the 

GBIs that will provide additional data on failure mechanisms needing correction, resulting in improved reliability of the interceptors and kill vehicles. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Will we wait to procure new GBIs until after a successful flight 

test? Why? 

Dr. GILMORE. The decision to produce more Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) 

rests with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The Agency has stopped production 

of the Capability Enhancement–II Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle until it has determined through flight test that it has found and corrected the problems associated 

with the most recent failure of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. In my 

view, this is a prudent decision. Building additional GBIs means building more kill 

vehicles. The components in the kill vehicle that caused the FTG–06a failure are 

some of the first to be assembled. Thus, building more kill vehicles now, which 

would have to be done using extant plans and designs, would require those kill vehicles to be nearly completely disassembled later—and then re-assembled—to implement needed corrections. Such an approach would entail substantial additional expense relative to assembling kill vehicles with corrections fully implemented. It 

would also increase the chance of inadvertent introduction of a fault during disassembly and re-assembly. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is being done to correct the SM3–IA anomaly and the SM3– 

IB test failure? Have these problems been fixed? What does this mean for keeping 

the SM3 production line warm and procurement of additional missiles? 

Dr. GILMORE. Both the SM–3 IA anomaly (Flight Test Standard Missile (FTM)– 

15) and SM–3 IB test failure (FTM–16) are under investigation by Failure Review 

Boards (FRBs) convened by the Missile Defense Agency. The boards are seeking to 

identify the root causes of the performance issues observed during the recent testing. Although the FRBs have not completed their work, it appears that both issues 

are associated with the Third Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM), a common component 

to both the IA and IB missiles. 

The FTM–15 anomaly investigation remains focused on the TSRM Attitude Control System Cold Gas Regulator (CGR); it is expected to complete in June. The FRB 

has identified performance characteristics of the current regulators that are measured when they are manufactured. Those characteristics, which are documented for 

each regulator, indicate whether it will perform anomalously. Until re-designed regulators are retrofit to the fleet, these characteristics will be used to screen the existing fleet of SM3 1As to assure their reliable performance. A redesigned regulator 

has completed initial testing and is entering the qualification cycle. This redesigned 

regulator will be used on all future production missiles. 

The leading theory to explain the FTM–16 failure is a case burn-through caused 

by a short-duration Inter-Pulse Delay (IPD) occurring between the first and second 

pulses of the TSRM burn. Ground testing has confirmed higher than expected damage to missile case insulation and nozzle components when the delay between the 

first and second pulses is short. A change is being implemented in Aegis BMD 3.6.2 

and Aegis BMD 4.0.2 software early this fall to preclude causing the missile to execute damaging IPDs. An initial firing with the longer IPDs to be implemented in 

this software change shows no damage to the TSRM, and a full qualification of the 

TSRM will be conducted using this revised IPD. Operational performance of the 

missile is not expected to be affected significantly by the revised IPDs, and the performance of the revised IPD will be observed in subsequent flight testing. 

The Missile Defense Agency can best address the question of the status of the 

Standard Missile production line. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. The FYDP cuts missile defense funding by approximately $3.6 billion 

over the next four years based on the FY12 FYDP, yet the Administration still insists the EPAA is on budget and on schedule. Can you explain how the EPAA is 

unaffected despite such budget cuts? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Missile defense is emphasized in the new strategic guidance, and 

the Department used a clear set of priorities to guide spending decisions in this mission area. By balancing budget realities against threat projections, we have had an 

opportunity to develop a budget that met our priorities. We will continue to expand 
154 

our regional missile defense capabilities, but at a somewhat slower rate than envisioned in last year’s budget request. 

We have protected spending for our top missile defense priorities: defending the 

homeland, implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and pursuing phased adaptive approaches with allies and partners in the Middle East and 

Asia-Pacific. 

Mr. FRANKS. EPAA is the U.S. contribution to NATO’s newly adopted territorial 

missile defense mission. What can you tell us about the specific missile defense contributions our allies will be providing to the territorial missile defense mission, specifically: what is being done to ensure the United States isn’t bearing the total burden of the EPAA program, and can we do this before knowing ourselves what these 

costs are? 

Dr. ROBERTS. NATO Allies have already begun to act to provide financial support 

for the implementation of European missile defense. For example, NATO has agreed 

to pay for the expansion of Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 

(ALTBMD) with NATO common funding. 

Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have all agreed to host U.S. assets in support of NATO missile defense. These host governments will bear the costs of providing perimeter defense and security for U.S. assets and infrastructure. Access to 

the hosted facilities contributes directly to core U.S. security goals. 

In addition, some Allies are already committed to fielding additional capabilities 

of their own. For example, the Netherlands has approved plans and funding to upgrade the SMART–L radar on four air defense frigates, giving the ships a track and 

cue capability. The Dutch plan to field one ship per year from 2017–2020 at cost 

of Ö26M per ship. Germany is testing and intends to operationalize an Airborne Infrared System (ABIR) system which could support NATO BMD. In addition, France 

has proposed a concept for a single geosynchronous infrared shared-early warning 

satellite, and is developing a transportable, midcourse radar for BMD and early 

warning. 

Mr. FRANKS. The Administration’s decision in 2009 to adopt a Phased Adaptive 

Approach (PAA) for missile defense in Europe was based, in part, on a revised assessment that Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles were developing 

more rapidly than previously projected, while the longer-range missile threat had 

been slower to develop than previously estimated. What trends in Iranian ballistic 

missile developments have you seen over the last three years that might change this 

assessment, and have you seen any changes in threat development since 2009? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Intelligence Community assesses that Iran has an active program to develop long-range ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles, but Iran has 

not successfully tested an ICBM or demonstrated an ICBM-class warhead. At the 

same time, Iran currently possesses hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic 

missiles, is developing and testing intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and continues to expand its ballistic missile arsenal both quantitatively and qualitatively. 

Mr. FRANKS. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense program has seen sizeable 

budget cuts in the past three years. In FY10, it was reduced by $525 million. The 

FY11 request was a nearly $300 million increase over FY10, but the FY12 budget 

request further reduces the GMD program by $185 million and the FY13 request 

reduces the program by another $260 million. How are these reductions impacting 

GMD operations, sustainment, and any modernization activities, and does the FY13 

budget request still reflect your funding requirements for GMD? 

General O’REILLY. The FY13 President’s budget is sufficient to accomplish the 

program content for FY13. Program progress has been paced by technical accomplishments—not funding limitations. The December 2011 competitive award of the 

Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) contract reduced costs by over $1 billion. 

These savings allow the Missile Defense Agency to correct problems discovered during recent flight test failures and demonstrate those corrections in flight tests, and 

to continue all plans to support, field, and enhance our Homeland missile defense 

capability. The savings also support the procurement of five additional ground-based 

interceptors within the contract period. 

The FY09 GMD appropriation was $1.472B, a reduction of just over $600M from 

the budget request. The reductions included a transfer of $390M for the European 

Capability into a new program element (PE) and a transfer of $104M for Targets 

into a Test PE. Further, there was a reduction of $115M in General Congressional 

Reductions and Congressional Undistributed Adjustments. During FY09, GMD continued manufacturing 3-Stage Capability Enhancement–Two (CE–II) Ground Based 

Interceptors (GBI) and delivered 4 GBIs, upgraded 2 CE–II GBIs, fielded an upgrade to ground systems (GS) software update version 6B and command launch 

equipment (CLE) software build 4.1, fielded a second Relocatable In-Flight Inter-
155 

ceptor Communication System data terminal (RIDT) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, 

and conducted flight test GMD–05 (FTG–05). The FY10 GMD appropriation was $1.22B which included a $50M Congressional 

add for GBI vendor base sustainment. GMD incorporated several program changes 

in response to a DOD decision to reduce the requirement from 44 to 30 fielded GBIs 

to include holding the GBIs 38–44 delivery at the major sub-assembly level, halt 

construction of Missile Field 2, and stopping GS software development and its associated models and simulations (M&S) development. During FY10, GMD continued 

manufacturing of 3-Stage CE–II interceptors delivering 5 GBIs, upgraded 2 GBIs, 

fielded Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) software update version 9.2, executed the 

first 2-Stage GBI test in Booster Verification Test–One (BVT–01), and conducted 

FTG–06 which resulted in a failed intercept. The FY11 GMD appropriation was $1.245B, a reduction of $100M from the budget request. The reductions in FY11 included a $35M Congressional Reduction for excess award fee paid for test and integration failures, as well as an $8.9M Congressional Reduction and a $23.5M Congressional Rescission. The budget enabled GMD 

to resume activities stopped in FY10, including the delivery of fully integrated GBIs 

38–44, a 14-silo Missile Field 2, and GS software development with associated M 

& S. During FY11, GMD continued manufacturing of 3-Stage CE–II interceptors, 

upgraded 3 GBIs, fielded GS upgraded software version 6B1.5, completed the Fort 

Greely Alaska (FGA) power plant construction, and conducted FTG–06a, a failed 

intercept test. The failure of FTG–06a initiated a GMD Return to Intercept (RTI) 

initiative. GBI manufacturing activities were adjusted to suspend the build-up of 

the EKV until the root cause was determined and design mitigations could be incorporated. The FY12 GMD appropriation was $1.159B, which included a General Congres- sional Reduction of $1.5M. During FY12, GMD plans to repurpose two (2) operational GBIs to support the RTI flight tests including control test vehicle–One 

(CTV–01) and FTG–06b, complete development of the FGA power plant, complete 

Missile Field 2, deliver a second fire direction center node at FGA, conduct the 

CTV–01 mission (non-intercept flight test) and FTG–06b (intercept flight test), and 

initiate manufacturing for GBIs 48–52 in the first quarter of FY12. GMD awarded 

the development and sustainment contract to Boeing, which provided the program 

with savings across the FYDP. The FY13 budget requested for GMD is $903.2M. The reductions in FY13 include the transfer of $5.8M for Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) for the Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications Program and a transfer of $20.7M for facilities support to the Program Wide Support account. During 

FY13, GMD will complete the RTI testing, correct deficiencies in existing CE–II 

interceptors, and restart interceptor manufacturing implementing the design solutions into the GBIs yet to be delivered. GMD will continue the manufacturing of 

GBIs 48–52 and initiate manufacturing for GBIs 53–57. GMD will commence construction of the IDT at Fort Drum, initiate planning for FTG–08 including the buildup of the second 2-Stage interceptor, planning for FTG–11, and continuing software 

development for both the interceptor and GS products. 

[See table in the Appendix on page 127.] 

Mr. FRANKS. The FYDP cuts missile defense funding by approximately $3.6 billion 

over the next four years based on the FY12 FYDP, yet the Administration still insists the EPAA is on budget and on schedule. Can you explain how the EPAA is 

unaffected despite such budget cuts? 

General O’REILLY. For the EPAA, THAAD is a potential surge asset on an as 

needed basis determined by request from the COCOM and adjudicated in the Global 

Force Management Process (GFMP) by OSD and the Joint Staff. The $3.6 billion 

in FY12 FYDP budget cuts were taken in THAAD and AN/TPY2 procurement accounts do not impact the EPAA schedule. 

Mr. FRANKS. EPAA is the U.S. contribution to NATO’s newly adopted territorial 

missile defense mission. What can you tell us about the specific missile defense contributions our allies will be providing to the territorial missile defense mission, specifically: what is being done to ensure the United States isn’t bearing the total burden of the EPAA program, and can we do this before knowing ourselves what these 

costs are? 

General O’REILLY. Our international allies are making significant contributions to 

the NATO territorial missile defense mission by hosting key EPAA assets within 

their respective countries. Turkey is hosting an AN/TPY–2 under Phase I of EPAA, 

Romania and Poland will host Aegis Ashore Sites beginning in Phase II and III respectively, and beginning in 2014, four multi-mission Arleigh Burke-class guidedmissile destroyers with BMD capability will be forward deployed to Rota, Spain in 

support of EPAA. 
156 

As a result of a decision taken by NATO nations at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the 

Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program is being expanded to include the territorial missile defense mission. The ALTBMD Program is 

a NATO common funded command and control system that will enable real-time information exchanges between NATO and national missile defense systems. NATO 

will issue force goals for territorial missile defense in 2013 and invite nations to 

pledge missile defense assets for territorial missile defense. To date, the Netherlands, France and Germany, have all made political commitments to provide missile 

defense systems for territorial missile defense of Europe. The Netherlands, has offered to provide up to four frigates with upgraded SMART–L radars, beginning in 

2017 for the NATO territorial missile defense mission. France has offered to provide 

satellite capabilities for early detection and warning as well as a long-range early 

warning radar for territorial missile defense. Germany has also committed to provide PATRIOT batteries for the same. Many other NATO nations are discussing upgrading shipboard sensors to enable BMD detection, tracking and cueing functions. 

We fully expect as NATO establishes force planning goals for territorial missile defense, that other NATO nations will offer their national missile defense systems, 

both land and sea-based for territorial missile defense of NATO Europe. 

Finally, it is important to note that the United Kingdom and Denmark already 

provided additional critical contributions to the BMDS and U.S. Homeland Defense 

by hosting upgraded early warning radars at Fylingdales and Thule respectively. 

Mr. FRANKS. Iran has been undertaking a series of space launches for at least the 

past three years. Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hoss 

Cartwright stated that space launches can translate into improvements to an ICBM 

program. In your opinion, what does Iran learn from these space launches that can 

inform its ICBM program? 

General O’REILLY. In general, space launch events can reveal progress to successfully achieving technical capabilities directly applicable to the development of 

ICBMs such as staging, guidance, and propulsion. Space launch events do not however, demonstrate the survivability of a re-entry vehicle. The analysis required to 

assess what Iran may learn from these space launches is a core competency of the 

Intelligence Community, specifically in this area the National Air and Space Intelligence Center. That organization is best suited for questions pertaining to foreign 

ICBM development. 

Mr. FRANKS. The SM–3 Block IIB interceptor is planned for deployment by 2020 

to improve protection of the U.S. homeland against potential ICBM attack as part 

of Phase 4 of the EPAA. The FY13 budget request provides an additional $1.9 billion to the SM–3 Block IIB development program across the Future Years Defense 

Program (FYDP). How much more funding will be necessary to develop and deploy 

this system beyond what’s in the FYDP, how did last year’s funding cut to this system change the schedule for fielding this system, and will the SM–3 Block IIB design be optimized for ICBM intercept capabilities? 

General O’REILLY. MDA’s cost estimate is that $1.1 B is needed beyond the FYDP 

to complete the development and initial fielding of the system. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) is conducting an independent estimate to be completed in June. 

The FY12 funding reduction delayed the overall program schedule by approximately 4 months, though the SM–3 Block IIB is still planned for initial deployment 

in the 2020 timeframe. 

The SM–3 Block IIB design is being optimized for its primary mission to counter 

first generation ICBMs targeted at the U.S. homeland as a first and independent 

interceptor layer. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What is the value of the EPAA? What other regional PAA architectures are being considered? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The missile defenses that are deployed as part of the European 

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) protect U.S. deployed forces, allies, and partners 

in Europe. In addition, the EPAA will contribute directly to the ballistic missile defense of the U.S. homeland with the deployment of the SM–3 Block IIB interceptor 

and a forward-based AN/TPY–2 radar. 

The EPAA is a strong symbol of the continued U.S. commitment to NATO, an alliance that has served our interests for more than six decades. By deploying the 

EPAA in a NATO context, we have increased the potential for additional Allied contributions because all contributions will be under the framework of a NATO effort 

in support of collective security. For example, NATO has agreed to pay for the ex-
157 

pansion of Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) with NATO 

common funding. 

Efforts to improve missile defenses in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific are ongoing. The approaches in these regions are being tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to those regions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What did we accomplish in phase 1 of the EPAA? Are we on track 

to meet the ambitious goals of phase 2, 3 and 4? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The elements of the first phase of EPAA are now in place. Phase 

1 began with the upgrade to the command and control system in Ramstein, Germany, followed by the deployment of a BMD-capable ship for the defense of NATO 

mission in March 2011. We have continued to maintain a ship with missile defense 

capability in the region since that time. In December 2011, the United States deployed a forward-based radar to Turkey, and that radar is fully operational. Associated command and control capabilities, integrating the C2BMC at Ramstein Air 

Base in Germany and NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 

(ALTBMD) Interim Capability, are now operational. 

For EPAA Phases 2 and 3, the basing agreements required to deploy Aegis Ashore 

sites in Romania and Poland have been signed and have entered into force for the 

sites to become operational in the 2015 timeframe and 2018 timeframe, respectively. 

The SM–3 Block IB is on track to be deployed to Aegis BMD-configured ships and 

the Romanian Aegis Ashore site. This interceptor recently conducted a successful 

flight-test mission in May 2012. Two additional flight tests using more complex scenarios and targets are scheduled later this year. In addition, the more capable SM– 

3 Block IIA (intended to address longer range threats) is on track to be deployed 

on Aegis BMD-configured ships and at the Aegis Ashore sites in 2018. Flight testing 

is planned and scheduled to occur well in advance of this deployment. 

With respect to EPAA Phase 4, the Department has awarded contracts to three 

prime contractors for concept development of a more advanced version of the SM– 

3 interceptor, the Block IIB. Due to funding cuts in Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, the deployment of this program has been delayed one year to 2021. 

We have also taken steps to support the requirement for sea-based BMD capabilities in all phases of the EPAA. Spain has agreed to host four U.S. Aegis destroyers 

at the existing naval facility at Rota. These multi-mission ships will support the 

EPAA, as well as other U.S. European Command and NATO maritime missions. 

The first two ships are scheduled to arrive in 2014, and two more ships will arrive 

in 2015. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How does the FY13 budget request preserve some of the important 

investments made on the directed energy program? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The FY13 budget request preserves directed-energy program investment efforts and builds on knowledge gained in developing and testing the airborne 

laser test bed (ALTB) lasers and beam control system. The ALTB’s complexity drove 

the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to pursue compact, efficient electric lasers for operation at high altitude, where the need for atmospheric compensation is minimized 

and laser beam jitter is greatly reduced. 

In operating the ALTB, MDA gathered terabytes of acquisition and tracking algorithms and missile vulnerability test data to anchor directed-energy models and 

simulations. The budget request aims to preserve this knowledge base. Further, it 

expands the base’s usefulness by re-hosting the data and providing a user-friendly 

interface to help design the next-generation airborne laser system. MDA’s budget 

request also maintains key intellectual capital, and invests $15.2M in FY13 for laser 

development at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and MIT Lincoln Laboratory Both laboratories are able to maintain core expertise at this funding level. 

The budget further provides $7.4M in FY2013 for high-altitude environment testing. MDA plans to use a surrogate platform, such as the Phantom Eye, to collect 

and quantify the benefits of high-altitude low-mach flight for laser operation. Data 

previously collected by the ALTB and other DOD programs is being used as a baseline to quantify the benefits of high-altitude, low-mach flight. 

There is $2.6M in the FY13 budget request to begin definition and component development for a next-generation airborne laser for missile defense. This will give industry an avenue to invest in efficient lasers, lightweight beam control components, 

modeling and simulation, and target lethality for missile defense missions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Why do we need regional missile defense and whom do these systems protect? And how does the EPAA contribute to homeland defense? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The threat from short-range, medium-range, and intermediaterange ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs) in regions where the United 

States deploys forces and maintains security relationships exists today and continues to grow, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
158 

To address the rapid growth in regional ballistic missile threats, the United 

States has begun deploying phased adaptive approaches in regions where U.S. deployed forces, allies, and partners are threatened. The first application of this 

phased approach was in Europe, but the United States also maintains a missile defense presence in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific that will be tailored to the 

threats and circumstances unique to those regions. 

Phase Four of the EPAA will directly contribute to homeland defense through the 

deployment of the SM–3 IIB. When deployed in Europe, the SM–3 IIB serves as the 

first tier of a layered defense of the U.S. homeland from potential ICBM threats 

from the Middle East. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What is the value of Precision Tracking Space System and has it 

been tested? Is it duplicative of existing or future capabilities? 

General O’REILLY. The Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) provides benefits 

in two areas, one, resulting from its persistent global space based coverage and the 

other from its infrared sensor. 

Space based sensors are valuable to national security because they are persistent, 

provide access to denied regions and have low operations and sustainment costs. 

• Persistence. By operating from space, PTSS provides persistent tracking access 

to 70% of the Earth’s surface for homeland and regional defense by covering the 

gaps in our existing sensor coverage, and specifically for coverage regional 

threat areas. PTSS can cover territory that is outside the field of view of airborne, sea, and land-based sensors, for example, territory hidden by the curvature of the Earth or out of range. 

• Guaranteed access. PTSS has unfettered access in a way that land and air 

based sensors do not. With PTSS, host nation agreements are not necessary, 

nor are basing or over-flight rights, which are required for other land and airborne sensors. 

• Low operations and sustainment costs. PTSS will perform its mission at operations and sustainment rates significantly lower than those traditionally associated with terrestrial radars like the AN/TPY–2 radar. The O&S cost of the entire PTSS system is less than the annual O&S of two TPY–2’s. 

The infrared payload on PTSS satellites provides unique technical capabilities for 

missile defense. 

• When combined with radar data, PTSS infrared data provides the BMDS data 

to better discriminate among threat objects. 

• PTSS will, for the first time, operationally track missile objects in the same infrared phenomenology as the kill vehicle, making threat target hand-off more 

effective. 

PTSS Testing. PTSS is in the early steps of development and full system testing 

will begin immediately after first launch (4QFY17). As a precursor, the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) demonstration satellites currently on orbit are 

providing technical information and proving the value and concepts associated with 

PTSS. STSS has participated in a number of recent BMD flight tests. In 3QFY11, 

during Flight Test Mission-15, the U.S. Navy Aegis BMD weapon system simulator 

in San Diego conducted a simulated intercept using STSS tracking data and projected PTSS concept of operations received from the BMDS. Moreover, the PTSS satellite design is based on mature, high technical readiness level, qualified space components. 

PTSS is not duplicative of other space capabilities. Unlike the Earth-pointing infrared sensors of the early warning satellites, PTSS features a side-pointing, infrared sensor that can track threat missiles through flight. This side-pointing capability is not available from any other operational or planned sensors today. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How does the new missile defense test plan increase reliability of 

our missile defense systems? 

General O’REILLY. The Agency’s test plan itself does not increase reliability. Reliability improvements are confirmed or verified through component-level and systemlevel testing on the ground at maximum predicted environments. Components are 

then assembled into complete interceptors for confirmation in system-level flight 

tests. When ground or flight testing identifies shortcomings, MDA addresses them 

through design improvements. The recently awarded GMD Development and 

Sustainment Contract (DSC) aggressively address reliability improvement. First, 

the DSC requires the contractor to address known shortcomings with design improvements in both new and upgraded interceptors. Second, the contract requires 

additional extensive ground testing of interceptor components to validate current reliability predictions, or identify additional areas for improvement through redesign 

and replacement. Finally, the DSC dramatically enhances Stockpile Reliability Program activity to test and track aging effects on the fielded systems. 
159 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What is the value of the EPAA? What other regional PAA architectures are being considered? 

General O’REILLY. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) capability 

which is adaptable to the predicted threat and flexible for protection of NATO allies, 

U.S. deployed forces, and infrastructure against increasingly capable ballistic missiles. In its later stages, the EPAA will enhance and augment the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense system in protection of the U.S. homeland against future limited 

intercontinental ballistic missile threats from projected regional threats. 

Questions related to other regional PAAs should be addressed tothe Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Department of Defense lead on this issue. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What did we accomplish in phase 1 of the EPAA? Are we on track 

to meet the ambitious goals of phase 2, 3 and 4? 

General O’REILLY. Last year MDA supported certification and deployment of 

Phase 1 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) consisting of command 

and control in Germany, a forward-based radar in Turkey, and an Aegis Ballistic 

Missile Defense (BMD) ship in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Critical BMDS regional capabilities were demonstrated in April 2011, conducting an Aegis BMD 

flight test (FTM–15) using the SM–3 Block IA interceptor launched using track data 

from the AN/TPY–2 radar passed through the C2BMC system to intercept an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) target. This mission also was the first 

Launch-on-Remote Aegis engagement and intercept of an IRBM with the SM–3 

Block IA. 

MDA remains on track to meet Phase 2 development and deployment. MDA supported successful negotiations for host nation agreements to deploy Aegis Ashore 

batteries to Romania (Phase 2) and Poland (Phase 3); installation of the Aegis BMD 

3.6.1 weapon system on three Aegis ships; upgrade of one Aegis BMD ship to Aegis 

BMD 4.0.1 (increasing the Aegis BMD fleet to 22 operationally configured BMD 

ships); and delivery of 19 SM–3 Block IA interceptors and the first SM–3 Block IB 

interceptor. 

For EPAA Phases 3 and 4, the SM–3 Block IIA interceptor, being co-developed 

with the Japanese government, remains on schedule for deployment at an Aegis 

Ashore site in Poland and at sea in 2018. This year the SM–3 Block IIA preliminary 

and component design reviews will finish and development of Aegis BMD 5.1 fire 

control system with expected certification in 2018. Last year risk reduction contracts 

were awarded for the Block IIB missile sub-system components, including advanced 

propulsion, seeker, and lightweight material technologies and we awarded concept 

design contracts for the SM–3 Block IIB interceptor to three aerospace industry 

teams. The Request For Proposal and source selection for the SM–3 Block IIB Product Development Phase is on track to begin in early 2014. The Precision Tracking 

Satellite System (PTSS) development is on schedule as are the plans for a launch 

of the first two units by fiscal year 2017. 

Finally, I would like to note that MDA took steps in the planning of EPAA to minimize the risk of accomplishing the goals. For example, the early phases of the approach consist of application of mature programs to the European theater. Some examples are the use of certified software programs (Aegis 4.01) and early flight testing of the SM–3 IB interceptor well in advance of its expected IOC (4 years). The 

design, build and deployment for the Aegis Ashore test site at PMRF serves as a 

risk reduction effort for the Phase 2 and Phase 3 Aegis Ashore fielding plan. The 

development plan for the Block IIA was extended by 2 years to allow for sufficient 

development and test to occur prior to the commit date. Finally, the Phase 4 approach includes program development timelines that are consistent with historical 

acquisition timelines for similar products. Specifically, over 6 years for the SM–3 

Block IIB product development to production decision (5–6 years for other MDA missile programs) and 5 years for the PTSS, in-line with historical acquisition timelines 

for satellites of this mass (1600 kg in less than 6 years). These items, along with 

our historical success with fielding systems on time give me the confidence that we 

will continue to meet the attainable goals of EPAA. We do not assess the goals of 

EPAA phases 2, 3, and 4 as ambitious. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How does the FY13 budget request preserve some of the important 

investments made on the directed energy program? 

General O’REILLY. The FY13 budget request builds on Airborne Laser Test Bed 

(ALTB) knowledge gained in developing and testing ALTB’s multiple lasers and 

beam control system. ALTB’s complexity drove the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) 

pursuit of compact, efficient electric lasers for operation at high altitude where the 

need for atmospheric compensation is minimized and laser beam jitter is greatly reduced. 

MDA’s budget request maintains key intellectual capital. The budget invests 

$12.4M in FY13 for laser development at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
160 

(LLNL) and MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL). Both laboratories are maintaining 

core expertise. The budget also funds $8.2M in FY13 for high environment altitude test. The 

Agency plans to use a surrogate platform, such as the Phantom Eye, to collect and 

quantify the benefits of high altitude low mach flight for laser operation. Data previously collected by the ALTB and other DOD programs will be used as a baseline 

to quantify the benefits of high-altitude low-mach flight. In addition, the budget provides $3M in FY13 to begin component development 

for and concept definition of a next-generation airborne laser for missile defense. 

This provides industry an avenue to apply investments in efficient lasers, lightweight beam control components, modeling and simulation and target lethality to 

MDA missions. 

MDA captured terabytes of acquisition and tracking algorithms and missile vulnerability test data to anchor directed energy models and simulations by operating 

the ALTB. The budget preserves this knowledge base and expands its utility by rehosting the data and providing a user friendly interface to aid in the design of the 

next-generation airborne laser system. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What is our current hedging capability for homeland defense? 

General O’REILLY. While the Missile Defense Agency has provided analysis supporting Hedge options, this effort is under the purview of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy (USDP), and I would defer to USDP on this question. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Why do we need regional missile defense and whom do these systems protect? And how does the EPAA contribute to homeland defense? 

General O’REILLY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

subcommittee files.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Why is the Administration requesting $400 million in FY13 for 

MEADS? And how is the Administration implementing FY12 NDAA legislation to 

seek to reduce costs and close out the program with FY12 funds? Is the Secretary 

of State engaged, in addition to the Secretary of Defense? 

Mr. AHERN. As with other cooperative Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), the 

Department considers the MEADS Design and Development (D&D) MOU to be legally binding on the nations, albeit subject to the availability of funds. The Administration has requested funding in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 budget to complete our 

international obligations as agreed under the MEADS D&D MOU with the other 

program participants—the German Federal Ministry of Defense and the Italian 

Ministry of Defense—and consistent with the three participants’ direction to restructure the contract in April 2011. The NATO MEADS Management Agency issued 

contract Amendment 26 to MEADS, International on October 31, 2011 to implement 

the participants’ direction for restructuring the MEADS D&D program to a significantly reduced scope MEADS Proof of Concept (PoC) effort. This mutually agreed 

PoC effort, which will complete development and testing of MEADS elements and 

provide the participants with a useful data package for the future missile defense 

activities of each of the nations, requires 2012 and 2013 funding from the U.S. and 

partner nations, recognizing that, in accordance with MOU paragraph 19.1, actual 

funds availability from each nation is subject to appropriation by the participants’ 

respective legislative bodies. 

In accordance with the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the 

Department has repeatedly consulted and attempted to negotiate with our international partners, the German Federal Ministry of Defense and the Italian Ministry 

of Defense, regarding development of a plan to further restructure the program in 

the event that Congress does not authorize or appropriate FY 2013 funding to complete our MOU obligations. We have directly informed the German and Italian participants that there is significant risk that FY 2013 funding may not be made available by the Congress. While DOD is the U.S. participant in the MOU, we have 

worked closely with officials in the Department of State (including the Ambassadors 

and country team members in the U.S. Embassies in Germany & Italy), who have 

provided DOD with useful advice and support. 

In response to our attempts to engage in discussions, our partners have made 

clear to the Department that they remain fully committed to their MOU obligations 

and expect that all participants will provide their 2013 funding to complete the PoC 

effort. They have also made clear that we are too late in the development effort to 

change course again and that we jeopardize our ability to realize the benefits of the 

program if we renege on our nine-year agreement near the end of the eighth year. 

The fact remains that, while we have aggressively engaged with our partners to 

complete MEADS MOU efforts using only FY 2012 funding, we cannot force them 

to agree to this course of action. 

More broadly, while the Department understands the need to make difficult 

choices in the current fiscal environment concerning funding for all of our activities, 
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we also note that failure to meet our MEADS MOU funding obligations for FY 2013 

could negatively affect our allies’ implementation of current transatlantic projects 

and multinational cooperation—as well as their willingness to join future cooperative endeavors with the United States—that are strongly supported by the Administration and Congress. In fact, the ramifications of failing to provide funds for this 

program which is so near completion could impact our relationship with our allies 

on a much broader basis than just future cooperative projects. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How does the new missile defense test plan increase reliability of 

our missile defense systems? 

Dr. GILMORE. Identification and correction of failure mechanisms accomplished 

through a rigorous program of flight and ground testing increases the reliability of 

the BMDS. The newest Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), Version 12.1, is designed to collect important performance data on each of the elements of the Ballistic 

Missile Defense System (BMDS). The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will use the 

data to verify and validate the models and simulations (M&S) that the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Operational Test Agency will accredit and use to assess element performance. In conjunction with modeling and simulation, executing 

the IMTP will enable quantitative statistical assessments of the reliability and performance of all the elements of the BMDS. These statistical assessments will identify the known failure mechanisms that most impact system reliability in the context of their expected operational uses, and thus the highest priorities for reliability 

improvements. Executing the IMTP will, as it has already done, identify unexpected 

or otherwise unknown failure mechanisms, thereby enabling those to be fixed. In 

this way, the rigorous program of flight and ground testing in the IMTP increases 

the reliability of the BMDS. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

Mr. HEINRICH. Given what we have learned from the Airborne Laser program, can 

you expand on any near- or medium-term applications for directed energy weapons 

in the ballistic missile defense architecture? 

General O’REILLY. The Airborne Laser program was able to collect data on tracking and atmospheric compensation, system jitter, boundary layer effects on propagation, and prove the lethality of a directed energy weapon for missile defense. Current funding supports an airborne demonstration of a newly developed laser with 

test beginning in 2020. During that test period, MDA will explore directed energy 

in the full spectrum of missile defense missions including tracking, discrimination 

and, eventually, lethal boost phase defense. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Is the $46 million for R&D requested in FY13 sufficient to maintain the brain trust that has enabled the recent advancements in directed energy? 

General O’REILLY. The Missile Defense Agency’s budget request is less than the 

FY12 Budget request but maintains much of the core expertise. The $46M R&D 

budget request includes: $20.6M for directed energy activities; $12.4M for laser development; and $8.2M for high altitude test and concept definition. 

Laser expertise at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories went from 39 personnel to 29 personnel; Program Office support contractors were maintained at 11 

at Kirtland Air Force Base; industry contractor expertise was decreased from 22 to 

9 contractors in support of high altitude environment testing and concept definition. 

Mr. HEINRICH. The Congress was clear in the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act that the $389 million appropriated in that year should be the final expenses 

for the program. Can you explain why the President’s budget request includes another $400 million for this program which the United States does not intend to procure? 

Mr. AHERN. Section 235 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 

Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 (P.L. 112–81) requires the Department to submit a plan to 

use FY 2012 funding for MEADS as final obligations for either implementing a restructured program of reduced scope or funding termination liability costs. In accordance with the FY 2012 NDAA, the Department has repeatedly consulted and 

attempted to negotiate with our international partners, the German and Italian 

Ministries of Defense, regarding development of a plan to further restructure the 

program in the event that Congress does not authorize or appropriate FY 2013 funding to complete our MEADS Design and Development Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) obligations. We have advised Germany and Italy at the highest levels that there is significant risk that FY 2013 funding may not be made available 

by the Congress. In response, our partners have made clear to the Department that 

they remain fully committed to their MOU obligations and expect that all program 

participants will provide their 2013 funding to complete the PoC effort. They have 
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also made clear that we are too late in the development effort to change course 

again and that we jeopardize our ability to realize the benefits of the program if 

we renege on our nine-year agreement near the end of the eighth year. Although 

we have aggressively engaged with the other MOU participants to seek to complete 

MEADS MOU efforts using only FY 2012 funding, we cannot force them to agree 

to this course of action. 

As with other cooperative MOUs, the Department considers the MEADS D&D 

MOU to be legally binding on the nations, recognizing that our financial responsibilities under such MOUs are subject to the availability of funds appropriated for such 

purposes. The Administration has requested funding in the FY 2013 budget to fulfill 

our MOU responsibilities vis-a`-vis our international partners, Germany and Italy, 

and consistent with the three Nations’ direction to restructure the contract in April 

2011. 

In furtherance of the MOU participants’ direction, the NATO MEADS Management Agency issued contract Amendment 26 to MEADS, International on October 

31, 2011 to implement the Nations’ direction to restructure the MEADS Design and 

Development as a significantly reduced scope Proof of Concept (PoC) effort. This mutually agreed PoC effort will complete development and testing of MEADS elements 

and provide the Participants with a useful data package for the future missile defense activities of each of the nations. The President’s Budget request for approximately $401M in FY 2013 funding was submitted in order to realize these objectives. 

More broadly, while the Department understands the need to make difficult 

choices in the current fiscal environment concerning funding for all of our activities, 

we also note that failure to meet our MEADS MOU funding obligations for FY 2013 

could negatively affect our allies’ implementation of current transatlantic projects 

and multinational cooperation—as well as their willingness to join future cooperative endeavors with the United States—that are strongly supported by the Administration and Congress. In fact, the ramifications of failing to provide funds for this 

program which is so near completion could impact our relationship with our allies 

on a much broader basis than just future cooperative projects. 

Mr. HEINRICH. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for Patriot in 

the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are required by the Army, and 

when, to operate and sustain the legacy Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of 

these funded in the FY12 request? 

Mr. AHERN. Patriot is deployed to protect U.S. forces and key assets from Tactical 

Ballistic Missile, Air and Cruise Missile threats. The Army’s Patriot modernization 

strategy is critical given U.S. plans not to procure the MEADS system. Modernization includes upgraded Patriot launchers and radars, the PAC–3 Missile Segment 

Enhancement (MSE) missile, net-centric communication and software upgrades. 

Modernization also hinges on integration with the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS). IBCS will connect Patriot with the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Network, enabling inter-service connectivity and visibility for multiple Air and 

Missile Defense platforms. IBCS will field to U.S. Patriot battalions beginning in 

Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. All Patriot battalions are now equipped with PAC–3 missile 

hit-to-kill capability. The MSE missile will provide a larger engagement envelope 

and increased probability of kill against Tactical Ballistic Missiles, Air Breathing 

Threats and Cruise Missiles. The Army has 15 Patriot PAC–3 battalions, currently 

50% deployed, forward stationed or on Prepare to Deploy Orders. This includes two 

battalions funded through the Grow the Army effort. The current program plan is 

to procure 84 PAC–3 missiles in FY 2013 and transition to MSE procurement beginning in FY 2014, with a first year procurement of 56 MSE missiles. The Army also 

plans to procure 38 Electronic Launcher Enhanced Systems (ELES) upgrades in FY 

2013, increasing the PAC–3 hit-to-kill capability within Patriot battalions. 

The Army has programmed significant modernization initiatives across FY 2013– 

2017, which are even more important in light of the plan to end U.S. participation 

in MEADS. The Preplanned Patriot Product Improvement Program provides for the 

upgrade of the Patriot System through individual materiel changes. It upgrades the 

Patriot system to address operational lessons learned, enhancements to joint force 

interoperability, and other system performance improvements to provide overmatch 

capability with the emerging threat. Efforts will be made to expedite Patriot materiel solutions (e.g. Radar Digital Processor, Communications Upgrades, Radars on 

the IBCS Net) to both enhance capability and facilitate integration into the IAMD 

architecture. Table 1 below provides the Project Justification for Preplanned Patriot 

Product Improvements and missile procurement from the Army’s 2013 budget. 
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The Post-Deployment Software Build (PDB) 7 (with Modernized Adjunct Processor) Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is planned for the first quarter of FY 2013. 

Radar Digital Processor (RDP) development will continue through FY 2014, with 

PDB 8 (with RDP) IOC in the first quarter of FY 2016. The Department will continue to refine the Patriot evolutionary development based on information gained 

from the MEADS Proof of Concept and results of ongoing Army, Joint Staff, and 

OSD reviews and studies of air and missile defense requirements. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade Patriot’s capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and production? 

Mr. AHERN. The Army has programmed significant modernization initiatives 

across Fiscal Years (FY) 2013–2017, which are even more important in light of the 

U.S. plan not to participate in MEADS production. The Preplanned Patriot Product 

Improvement Program provides for the upgrade of the Patriot System through individual materiel changes. It upgrades the Patriot system to address operational lessons learned, enhancements to joint force interoperability, and other system performance improvements to provide overmatch capability with the emerging threat. 

Efforts will be made to expedite Patriot materiel solutions (e.g. Radar Digital Processor, Communications Upgrades, Radars on the Integrated Battle Command System Net) to both enhance capability and facilitate integration into the Integrated 

Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture. Table 1 below provides the Project 

Justification for Preplanned Patriot Product Improvements and missile procurement 

from the Army’s 2013 budget. 

The Post-Deployment Software Build (PDB) 7 (with Modernized Adjunct Processor) Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is planned for the first quarter of FY 2013. 

Radar Digital Processor (RDP) development will continue through FY 2014, with 

PDB 8 (with RDP) IOC in the first quarter of FY 2016. The Department will continue to refine the Patriot evolutionary development based on information gained 

from the MEADS Proof of Concept and results of ongoing Army, Joint Staff, and 

OSD reviews and studies of air and missile defense requirements. 

The Department has requested $401 million in FY 2013 to complete the MEADS 

development effort and our international obligations under the MEADS Memorandum of Understanding. The DOD and the other MEADS Participants seek the 

results of the final two years of the Proof of Concept effort, the completed design 

and testing of the MEADS elements, the capability demonstrations, and the data 

archival and performance reporting in order to assess fully which elements or technologies would be available to transition to existing air and missile defense architectures. Until this critical design and performance data is available, no firm or final 

decisions can be made, but multiple MEADS technologies/capabilities/data might be 

harvested to benefit U.S. air and missile defense if the restructured MEADS D&D 

contract is completed. The MEADS Proof of Concept facilitates demonstration of the 
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advanced, rotating multi-function fire control radar and the lightweight/360-degree 

launcher; and the design and limited demonstration of an advanced surveillance 

radar, all of which would be considered in follow-on efforts to enhance air and missile defense once MEADS is completed. The system demonstrations in 2012 and 

2013 would prove the maturity of design and set the stage for potential European 

follow-on efforts and U.S. harvesting decisions. Given the decision to not procure 

MEADS systems, the DOD has not conducted a formal cost estimate for the production of MEADS, but as reported in the December 31, 2011 Select Acquisition Report 

on MEADS, the baseline Program Acquisition Unit Cost for a MEADS Fire Unit was 

estimated at $345 million (base year 2004 dollars) and the baseline program called 

for 48 fire units to be procured for a total cost of $16.5 billion. 

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