JUNE 8, 2011

AUDIT REPORT

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 (ASSIGNMENT NO. A-10-007-00)

OFFICE OF AUDITS

NASA’S MANAGEMENT OF THE MARS SCIENCE 

LABORATORY PROJECT

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration

 
REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

Final report released by:

Paul K. Martin

Inspector General

Acronyms 

ATLO Assembly, Test, and Launch Operations 

FY Fiscal Year

IPAO Independent Program Assessment Office 

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

MMRTG Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 

MSL Mars Science Laboratory

NPR NASA Procedural Requirements

P/FR Problem/Failure Report

SAM Sample Analysis at Mars

SA/SPaH Sample Acquisition/Sample Processing and Handling 
JUNE 8, 2011

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

OVERVIEW

NASA’S MANAGEMENT OF THE

MARS SCIENCE LABORATORY PROJECT

The Issue

The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL), part of the Science Mission Directorate’s Mars 

Exploration Program (Mars Program), is the most technologically challenging 

interplanetary rover ever designed. This NASA flagship mission, whose life-cycle costs 

are currently estimated at approximately $2.5 billion, will employ an array of new 

technologies to adjust its flight while descending through the Martian atmosphere, 

including a sky crane touchdown system that will lower the rover on a tether to the 

Martian surface.1

Source: 

 Contributing to the complexity of the mission are the Project’s 

innovative entry, descent, and landing system; the size and mass of the rover (four times 

as heavy as the previous Martian rovers Spirit and Opportunity); the number and 

interdependence of its 10 science instruments; and a new type of power generating 

system. 

Figure 1. Artist’s Concept of the Mars Science Laboratory Rover on the Surface of Mars

http://marsprogram.jpl.nasa.gov/msl/images/PIA09201-br2.jpg (accessed May 4, 2011). 

 

1 Flagship missions are missions with costs exceeding $1 billion.
OVERVIEW

ii REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

The primary objective of the Mars Program is to determine whether Mars has, or ever 

had, an environment capable of supporting life. In pursuit of this objective, the MSL

rover – known as Curiosity – will assess the biological potential for life at the landing 

site, characterize the geology of the landing region, investigate planetary processes that 

influence habitability, and analyze surface radiation. NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

(JPL) is responsible for development and management of the MSL Project. 

Due to planetary alignment, the optimal launch window for a mission to Mars occurs 

every 26 months. MSL was scheduled to launch in a window between September and 

October 2009. However, in February 2009, because of the late delivery of several critical 

components and instruments, NASA delayed the launch to a date between October and 

December 2011. 

This delay and the additional resources required to resolve the underlying technical issues 

increased the Project’s development costs by 86 percent, from $969 million to the current 

$1.8 billion, and its life-cycle costs by 56 percent, from $1.6 billion to the current 

$2.5 billion. If the Project is delayed to a late 2013 launch window, NASA’s costs would 

further increase, at least by the $570 million that would be required to redesign the 

mission to account for differences in planetary alignment and the Martian dust storm 

season. 

The following timelines show the Project’s phases, major milestones (Figure 2), and lifecycle cost estimates (Figure 3).

Figure 2. MSL Project Timeline Overview

September 2003 December 2014

September 2003 - September 2006

Formulation and Design

10/28/2003

Mission Concept Review

6/20/2006

Preliminary Design Review

September 2006 - December 2011

Development (Final Design, Fabrication, Integration and Testing)

11/25/2011

Launch

4/27/2011

Pre-Ship Review

8/1/2012

Land on Mars

December 2011 - December 2014

Operations

6/1/2007

Critical Design Review

2/23/2009

New Cost and Schedule Baseline (Rebaseline)

6/18/2009

Rebaseline Approval
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 iii

Figure 3. MSL Project Life-Cycle Cost Timeline

September 2003 December 2014

September 2003 - September 2006

Formulation and Design

September 2006 - December 2011

Development (Final Design, Fabrication, Integration and Testing)

December 2011 - December 2014

Operations

8/2006

initial life-cycle cost estimate of $1.6 billion

6/2009

$2.3 billion life-cycle cost estimate

1/2010

$2.4 billion life-cycle cost estimate

11/2010

Additional $71 million requested (to $2.5 billion)

In light of the importance of the MSL Project to NASA’s Mars Program, the Office of 

Inspector General conducted an audit to examine whether the Agency has effectively 

managed the Project to accomplish mission objectives while meeting revised cost and 

schedule projections. See Appendix A for details of the audit’s scope and methodology. 

Results 

We found that the MSL Project has overcome the key technical issues that were the 

primary causes of the 2-year launch delay. Additionally, as of March 2011 all critical 

components and instruments have been installed on the rover. Project managers expected 

to complete integration of equipment by May 2011 and ship MSL to Kennedy for flight 

preparation by June 2011. 

However, of the ten issues Project managers identified as contributing to the launch 

delay, as of March 2011 three remained unresolved: contamination of rock and soil 

samples collected by the Sample Acquisition/Sample Processing and Handling 

(SA/SPaH) subsystem and development of flight software and the fault protection

systems.

2

In addition, approximately 1,200 reports of problems and failures observed by Project 

personnel remained open as of February 2011. If these reports are not resolved prior to 

launch, there is a possibility that an unknown risk could materialize and negatively affect 

mission success. 

 The resolution of these and other issues that may arise during final integration 

is likely to strain the already limited margin managers built into the Project’s schedule to 

allow for unanticipated delays. Moreover, since November 2009 this schedule margin 

has been decreasing at a rate greater than planned. 

Finally, since the 2009 decision to delay launch, the Project has received three budget 

increases, most recently an infusion of $71 million in December 2010. However, in our 

judgment because Project managers did not adequately consider historical cost trends 

 

2 Fault protection enables an instrument or system that does not operate as expected to operate at a reduced 

level rather than fail completely. 
OVERVIEW

iv REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

when estimating the amount required to complete development, we believe the Project 

may require additional funds to meet the 2011 scheduled launch date. 

Remaining Unresolved Technical Issues. Although Project managers have overcome 

the majority of technical issues that led to the launch delay, as of March 2011 three 

significant technical issues remain unresolved. In addition, management is evaluating the 

mission impact of unexpected degradation of the MSL’s power source, the Multi-Mission 

Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG).3

One major issue contributing to the 2-year delay was the late delivery of the rover’s

SA/SPaH subsystem, which will acquire soil and rock samples from the Martian surface

and deliver them to other instruments on the rover for analysis. During testing of the 

SA/SPaH, managers discovered particulate contamination of samples. Program managers 

told us that this issue would not present a mission-level risk because any contaminants 

could be filtered through data processing. As of March 2011, Project managers said they 

have identified and validated a method to minimize contamination of samples and have 

nearly completed implementing the solution. However, we remain concerned because 

remaining work on the SA/SPaH is not due to be complete until June 2011, when the 

rover is due for delivery to Kennedy Space Center for final integration and assembly. 

 

The two other major unresolved issues are the development of flight software and fault 

protection systems. The onboard computer will use the flight software to direct MSL’s 

flight. The fault protection system is an engineering design that will enable MSL’s 

instruments and equipment that do not perform as expected to continue operating at a 

reduced level rather than fail completely. 

As early as May 2009, MSL’s Standing Review Board expressed concern about delays in 

development of flight software and fault protection systems and we are concerned that 

their development remains incomplete.

4

Because of technical issues related to these three and other items, Project managers must 

complete nearly three times the number of critical tasks than originally planned in the few 

months remaining until launch. As shown in Table 1, Project managers had planned to 

have all critical tasks (except for Kennedy Space Center operations) completed by April 

 As of March 2011, the majority of the software 

needed for launch, cruise, entry, descent, and landing was developed. However, the 

software was not expected to be delivered until May 2011 and Project managers stated 

that work on software required to operate the rover on Mars would be completed after 

launch. In addition, as of March 2011, 13 of the 16 necessary fault protection related 

tasks had been completed and the remaining 3 were in progress. 

 

3 The MMRTG provides power by the natural degradation of the radioactive material, plutonium-238 

dioxide. The material has naturally decayed during the 2-year launch delay. In addition, environmental 

testing has shown some power degradation anomalies that are yet to be resolved.

4 The Standing Review Board is an outside group of experts convened by NASA to monitor the status of a 

program or project. The Board periodically conducts independent reviews of performance related to cost, 

schedule, technical, and other risks. 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 v 

2011. However, when they revised the schedule in November 2010, that date slipped by 

3 months to July 2011. Furthermore, the February 2011 revision shows that seven critical 

tasks have been further delayed. Coupled with the decreasing schedule margin described 

below, we are concerned that management may be pressured to reduce mission 

capabilities in order to avoid another 2-year delay and the at least $570 million in 

associated costs. 

Accelerated Schedule Margin Decrease. To allow for unanticipated delays, NASA 

routinely builds a margin of extra time into project development schedules. We found 

that for MSL this schedule margin has eroded at a rate slightly greater than planned and 

that as of February 2011 only 60 margin days remained (see Figure 4). 

Table 1. Critical Tasks for Completion Prior to Launch 

Task

Planned Completion Date

Feb. 2009 Plan Nov. 2010 Plan Feb. 2011 Plan 

Mechanical June 2010 January 2011 March 2011 

Payload May 2009 January 2011 May 2011 

SA/SPaH February 2010 May 2011 June 2011 

Avionics June 2010 March 2011 May 2011 

Launch Vehicle April 2011 April 2011 April 2011 

Flight Software June 2010 May 2011 May 2011 

Assembly, Test, and 

Launch Operations January 2011 May 2011 June 2011 

Testbeds April 2010 June 2011 July 2011 

Guidance, Navigation, 

and Control December 2010 July 2011 July 2011 

Kennedy Operations September 2011 November 2011 November 2011 

MMRTG April 2011 April 2011 June 2011 
OVERVIEW

vi REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

When the launch was rescheduled in 2009, Project managers programmed 185 margin 

days into the development schedule. However, since November 2009 the Project has 

been consuming margin days more quickly than managers expected as a result of the 

number and complexity of technical issues needing to be resolved. Although managers

expressed confidence that the remaining schedule margin would be adequate to address 

the risks having potential schedule impact that they have indentified, the rate of schedule 

margin decrease concerns us because the inherent complexity of the MSL Project

increases the likelihood that additional issues will arise in final testing and integration. 

Project Management Did Not Effectively Assess or Prioritize the Risks Identified by 

the P/FR Process. Problem/Failure Reports (P/FRs) are generated when individuals 

working on a project observe a departure from design, performance, testing, or other 

requirements that affects equipment function or could compromise mission objectives. 

P/FRs may range from minor issues with negligible effects to potential “red flag” issues 

with significant or major effects, up to and including a loss of mission. 

We found that MSL Project managers did not consistently identify and assess the risks 

associated with P/FRs. For example, during our audit fieldwork in June 2010, the 

Project’s P/FR database contained 983 open P/FRs. We found that the Project had not 

conducted a preliminary risk assessment or assessed potential cost and schedule impacts 

for 71 of these open P/FRs. 

We also found that the number of open P/FRs increased between February 2010 and 

February 2011. For example, when we conducted a detailed analysis of the database in 

June 2010, 983 P/FRs were in open status. By February 2011, that number had increased 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Figure 4. Comparison of Planned Schedule Margin to Actual

Planned Schedule Margin Actual Schedule Margin

Projected Schedule Margin
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 vii

to 1,213. Moreover, during this period the average time a P/FR remained open was 

1.2 years, and P/FRs with higher degrees of risk – including significant and potential red 

flag reports – remained open on average approximately 1.6 years. 

Project managers expressed confidence that they will close those P/FRs that require 

resolution before the launch date, noting that P/FRs involving flight software can be 

resolved after launch. However, as discussed above, because Project managers have not 

assessed the risk associated with all open P/FRs, we remain concerned that they do not 

have sufficient information to assess whether these P/FRs could negatively impact safety, 

cost, or mission success and may not have allocated sufficient resources to address them. 

Our concern is heightened by the increasing number of open P/FRs, the fast approaching 

launch date, and the amount of time that it has taken Project managers to close P/FRs in 

the past. 

Project Funding May Be Inadequate. The Project achieved several important 

technological successes over the past 2 years, including delivery and acceptance of the 

actuators (motors that allow the rover and instruments to move), avionics, radar system, 

and most of the rover’s instruments. However, Project managers did not accurately 

assess the risks associated with developing and integrating the MSL instruments and did 

not accurately estimate the resources required to address these risks. Consequently, the 

cost of completing development and the Project’s life-cycle costs have increased. 

In August 2006, NASA estimated the life-cycle cost for MSL as $1.6 billion. After 

launch was rescheduled for 2011, Project managers developed a new schedule and cost 

baseline for the Project, adding $400 million to complete development. Estimated lifecycle costs for the Project increased to $2.3 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2010 and to 

$2.4 billion in FY 2011. In November 2010, the Project requested an additional 

$71 million, which brought the total life-cycle cost estimate to the current estimate of 

approximately $2.5 billion. The extra money was obtained by reprogramming funds in 

the FY 2010 Mars Program budget, identifying additional funds from the Planetary 

Science Division in FY 2011, and addressing the balance in the FY 2012 budget request. 

The primary causes for the most recent cost escalations were:

• increases in the validation and verification and testing programs; 

• problem resolution; 

• funding of the assembly, test, and launch operations (ATLO) team for a postshipment delay period; 

• impact on Kennedy Space Center operations due to delaying the launch to 

November 2011; and

• P/FR and other paperwork closure. 
OVERVIEW

viii REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

In our judgment, even Project management’s most recent estimate may be insufficient to 

ensure timely completion of the Project in light of the historical pattern of cost increases

and the amount of work that remains to be completed before launch. For example, when 

NASA rescheduled the launch to 2011, Project managers estimated the cost to complete 

development at $400 million and maintained $95 million of unallocated reserve at the 

Program level. However, this level of reserve turned out to be insufficient and the 

estimated cost to complete development was increased by $137 million, from 

$400 million to $537 million, in December 2010. 

Our analysis of the Project’s current estimate to complete development indicates that 

even the $537 million figure may be too low. Our analysis is based on the earned value 

management system budget data and estimates of the additional work that will be needed

to address unknowns. We estimate that $581 million may be required – $44 million more 

than management’s latest estimate. Based on our calculations, unless managers request 

additional money the Project may have insufficient funds to complete all currently 

identified tasks prior to launch and may therefore be forced to reduce capabilities, delay 

the launch for 2 years, or cancel the mission.

5

Conclusion. Historically, NASA has found the probability that schedule-impacting 

problems will arise is commensurate with the complexity of the project. MSL is one of 

NASA’s most technologically complex projects to date. Accordingly, we are concerned 

that unanticipated problems arising during final integration and testing of MSL, as well as 

technical complications resulting from outstanding P/FRs, could cause cost and schedule 

impacts that will consume the current funding and threaten efforts to complete 

development and launch on the current schedule. Similarly, we are concerned that the 

limited remaining schedule margin may increase pressure on NASA to accept reduced 

capabilities in order to meet the approaching launch window and avoid another 2-year

delay that would require significant redesign at a cost of at least $570 million or cancel 

the mission. 

 

Management Action

To minimize the risk of missing the upcoming launch window and incurring the resultant 

costs, NASA’s Associate Administrator for the Science Mission Directorate should 

reassess the sufficiency of the Project’s funding based on our calculations. In addition, 

the MSL Project Manager should allocate additional resources to expeditiously close all 

outstanding P/FRs that could impact mission success. 

 

5

 Our $581 million calculation is an overall estimate based on the average efficiency of Project 

management’s work performed since February 2009 and includes items that did not increase in cost and 

items that may have substantially increased in cost above the average. We considered the Project’s cost in 

aggregate and did not attempt to segregate the impact of individual items on work performance efficiency 

and cost to complete project development (see Appendix D).
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 ix

In response to a draft of this report, the Associate Administrator for the Science Mission 

Directorate concurred with our recommendations and stated the Directorate had been 

conducting weekly monitoring and ongoing assessments of the Project’s funding status, 

expenditures, and remaining work (see Appendix E for the Agency’s response). 

According to these assessments, the Project’s budget, coupled with $22 million in 

Directorate-held reserves, will be sufficient for MSL to achieve a timely and safe launch. 

In addition, the Associate Administrator stated that MSL Project management has 

developed a plan to address all open P/FRs and expected to close all relevant P/FRs by 

the time of the MSL launch. 

We consider the Associate Administrator’s comments and proposed actions to be 

responsive to our recommendations. The recommendations are resolved and will be 

closed upon completion and verification of the proposed corrective actions. 

Other Matters of Interest

On May 20, 2011, subsequent to the issuance of a draft of this report, an incident 

occurred during flight system assembly that had the potential of causing damage to MSL 

system components. Due to a crane operator’s error, the spacecraft’s backshell (the part 

of the spacecraft structure designed to decelerate the spacecraft and protect its contents 

from overheating during entry into the Martian atmosphere) and the support cart the 

backshell was attached to were pulled off the ground for a few seconds. At the time, 

on-site personnel reported that they did not hear any noises (pops or creaks) from the 

backshell. 

MSL Project managers stated that the incident did not appear to have placed excessive 

loads on the backshell, and subsequent visual inspections and “tap testing” of the 

backshell did not reveal any damage. In addition, the contractor compared the loads from 

the incident with the expected flight loads and concluded that the backshell had not been 

damaged. As of June 2, 2011, it was unclear whether the incident will have any impact 

on the Project’s cost and schedule. 

JUNE 8, 2011

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Background _________________________________________ 1 

Objectives __________________________________________ 4 

RESULTS

Unresolved Technical Issues Continue to Strain Launch

Schedule Margin ___________________________________ 5

Additional Risk Associated with Closing 

Problem/Failure Reports ____________________________ 11

Project Management Consistently Underestimated

Cost to Complete MSL______________________________ 14

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology_______________________________ 21

Review of Internal Controls ____________________________ 22

Prior Coverage ______________________________________ 22

APPENDIX B 

Payload Descriptions _________________________________ 23

APPENDIX C 

Task Descriptions____________________________________ 27

APPENDIX D 

Cost Projection Approaches ____________________________ 31

APPENDIX E 

Management Comments ______________________________ 34

APPENDIX F 

Report Distribution___________________________________ 36

JUNE 8, 2011

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 1 

INTRODUCTION

Background

The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL), part of the Mars Exploration Program (Mars 

Program), is one of NASA’s flagship missions with life-cycle costs currently estimated at 

$2.5 billion.6

The Mars Program seeks to understand if Mars has, or ever had, an environment capable 

of supporting life. To answer this question, NASA plans to place a rover – known as 

Curiosity – on the surface of Mars to assess the biological potential at the landing site, 

characterize the geology of the landing region, investigate planetary processes that 

influence habitability, and analyze surface radiation. This roving science laboratory 

includes 10 advanced research instruments (described in Appendix B) that will collect 

Martian soil and rock samples and make detailed measurements of element composition, 

elemental isotopes and abundance, mineralogy, and organic compounds. 

 MSL is currently scheduled to launch in a window between November 25, 

2011, and December 18, 2011; land on Mars in August 2012; and operate on the surface 

of the planet for a minimum of 1 Martian year (approximately 2 Earth years). 

The MSL rover is engineered to drive longer distances over rougher terrain than NASA’s 

previous Martian rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, and unlike those rovers which relied on 

solar power, will use a radioisotope power system to generate the electricity needed to 

operate. MSL’s key performance parameters are: (1) land within a 10-kilometer (6-mile) 

radius from a designated point on the surface of Mars; (2) acquire scientific data for 

1 Martian year; (3) have a total traverse path of 20 kilometers (12 miles); and (4) select, 

acquire, process, distribute, and analyze 74 soil and rock samples.

The primary components of MSL are the launch vehicle (an Atlas V rocket), flight 

system, and the terrestrial ground-data system processing stations. The flight system 

consists of an Earth-Mars cruise stage, an entry-descent-landing system, and a mobile 

science rover with its science instrument payload. 

MSL is the most technologically challenging interplanetary rover ever designed. It will 

use new technologies to adjust its flight while descending through the Martian 

atmosphere and set the rover on the surface by lowering it on a tether from a hovering 

descent stage (see Figure 5). 

 

6 Flagship missions are missions with costs exceeding $1 billion.
INTRODUCTION

2 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

Figure 5. MSL Mission Overview

Source: NASA/Jack Pfaller (KSC-2009-3750)

LAUNCH

− Nov.–Dec. 2011 Launch

− Atlas V launch vehicle

SURFACE MISSION

− August 2012

− 1 Mars year prime mission

− 900 kilogram (kg) rover

− mobility capability of 20

kilometers 

− Approx. 100 kg payload of 

instruments and support tools

− Radioisotope Power Source

ENTRY, DESCENT, AND LANDING

− 15 minutes

− Direct Entry 

− Communication provided by 

ultra-high frequency link to different 

relay orbiters, based on latitude

 

CRUISE/APPROACH

− Approximately 9 months

in route

− Approach starts 5 days 

before entry
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 3 

The NASA Associate Administrator for the Science Mission Directorate is the 

programmatic authority for the MSL Project. NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is 

responsible for performing overall system design and integration. In addition, five other 

NASA Centers support MSL: 

• Ames Research Center – provides the Chemistry and Mineralogy (ChemMin) 

instrument and elements of the Ground Data System and supports entry descent 

and landing systems engineering and verification; 

• Goddard Space Flight Center – provides the Sample Analysis at Mars (SAM) 

instrument;

• Johnson Space Center – supports entry descent and landing systems engineering 

and delivers guidance, navigation, and control algorithms; 

• Kennedy Space Center – supports final integration, assembly, and launch; and 

• Langley Research Center – supports entry descent and landing systems 

engineering and delivers guidance, navigation, and control algorithms. 

Three foreign government space agencies – the Russian Federal Space Agency, the 

Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, and the Canadian Space Agency – the 

Department of Energy, and a number of subcontractors also contribute to the MSL 

Project. 

Cost and Schedule History. Due to planetary alignment, the optimal launch window for 

a mission to Mars occurs every 26 months. Originally, MSL was to launch between 

September 2009 and October 2009. In February 2009, NASA delayed the launch 2 years 

to a window between October and December 2011. The delay resulted from unresolved

technical issues that caused several critical components and instruments to miss their 

delivery dates. For example, actuators (motors that allow the rover and instruments to 

move) and avionics missed scheduled delivery dates by 11 and 4 months, respectively. 

The 2-year delay and the additional resources required to resolve the underlying technical 

issues increased the Project’s development costs from $969 million to $1.8 billion or 

86 percent, and its life-cycle costs from $1.6 billion to $2.5 billion or 56 percent.

7

 

7 As required by the NASA Appropriation Act of 2005, NASA notified Congress in December 2008 that 

MSL had exceeded its schedule baseline by more than 6 months and its cost baseline by more than 

15 percent.

 

Table 2 shows the Project’s cost increases since 2006. 
INTRODUCTION

4 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

Table 2. MSL Project Cost Summary (millions)

Phase

Initial Cost 

Estimate per 

2006 Project 

Plan 

Proposed 

FY 2012 

Budget 

Funds 

Expended as of 

December 2010 

Formulation 

(Phases A and B) $ 515.1 $ 515.5 $ 515.5

Development 

(Phases C and D) 968.6 1,802.0 1,609.9

Operation

(Phase E) 158.5 158.8 

Life-Cycle Cost $1,642.2 $2,476.3 $2,125.4

Objectives

The overall objective of this audit was to examine whether NASA has effectively 

managed the MSL Project to accomplish its mission objectives while meeting revised 

schedule and cost milestones. We also reviewed management’s cost estimate and its 

process for identifying, reporting, and mitigating risks. See Appendix A for details of the 

audit’s scope and methodology, our review of internal controls, and a list of prior 

coverage.

 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 5 

UNRESOLVED TECHNICAL ISSUES CONTINUE TO 

STRAIN LAUNCH SCHEDULE MARGIN 

As of February 2011, MSL’s remaining schedule margin was 60 days and more tasks 

remained to be completed prior to launch than managers had planned. Specifically, 

the Project had 11 outstanding tasks to be completed in 2011 as opposed to the 4 

tasks managers had planned as of February 2009. This increase occurred because of 

continuing technical challenges that are still being resolved. Although NASA

expects that the remaining schedule margin will be sufficient to complete the 

remaining tasks, in our judgment, the margin may not be sufficient to provide 

management with the flexibility to resolve unanticipated issues that typically arise in 

the integration and testing of complex projects like MSL. Consequently, to meet the 

launch schedule and avoid the more than $570 million in additional costs a delay 

would engender, Project managers may have to accept greater risks than anticipated 

related to safety, cost, and the completion of mission objectives.

Schedule Margin and Remaining Technical Issues 

Project managers include a schedule margin to allow for resolution of unanticipated 

issues that arise during project development. The size of the schedule margin varies 

depending on a project’s potential for unforeseen issues such as failures during testing, 

procurement-related delays, resource availability problems, and new technology 

challenges. When NASA rescheduled the MSL launch in 2009, the Project’s schedule 

margin was 185 days. As of February 2011, managers planned to have 110 days of 

remaining schedule margin, but only 60 days of margin remained. 

Remaining Unresolved Technical Issues. Project management has overcome most of 

the technical issues that were the primary causes of the 2009 launch delay. For example, 

the actuators have been redesigned, manufactured, and delivered, and the technical issues 

related to developing a subsystem for gas removal for the Sample Analysis at Mars 

(SAM) instrument were resolved and the SAM installed on the rover in January 2011.8

 

8 SAM is designed to identify materials that contain the element carbon, including methane, that are 

associated with life and explore ways in which the compounds are generated and destroyed on Mars.

 

However, of the ten issues identified as contributing to the decision to delay the launch, 

three remained unresolved as of March 2011: contamination of rock and soil samples 

collected by the Sample Acquisition/Sample Processing and Handling (SA/SPaH) 

subsystem and development of flight software and fault protection systems. 
RESULTS

6 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

Project managers acknowledged that the SA/SPaH will be resolved prior to launch. 

However, they stated that issues involving fault protection development and flight 

software not related to launch can be resolved after MSL has been launched. 

The immature technology and late delivery of the rover’s SA/SPaH subsystem was one of 

the major issues that caused the 2-year schedule delay.9

The other two remaining issues are development of flight software and development of 

fault protection systems. Flight software will be used in conjunction with the spacecraft’s 

onboard computer for command and control of all spacecraft activities (see Appendix C, 

Task 9, for a detailed description). Fault protection is an engineering fail-safe design 

required of all NASA flight projects that enables a system to continue operating at a 

reduced level rather than failing completely. During previous reviews in May 2009 and 

June 2010, MSL’s Standing Review Board expressed concern about the late development 

of the resource load plan for fault protection and redundancy management.

 During testing, Project managers 

found that hydrocarbons from oil used during the manufacturing of the drill bits were 

being released and causing contamination of samples. As of March 2011, Project 

managers said they have identified and validated a solution to minimize contamination of 

samples and the revised drill bit fabrication was already near completion. However, we 

remain concerned because work on this mission-critical subsystem is still incomplete and 

not due for delivery until June 2011, when the rover is due for delivery to Kennedy Space 

Center for final integration and assembly. 

10

More Recent Concerns. Project managers stated that the expected performance of the 

rover’s power generation system, the Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric 

Generator (MMRTG), has been reduced. Thermoelectric modules inside the MMRTG, 

which was developed and provided to NASA by the Department of Energy, convert heat 

(thermal energy) from the decay of a radioisotope (plutonium-238 dioxide) into 

electricity. Project managers attribute some of the MMRTG’s performance degradation 

to the natural radioactive decay that occurred during the 2-year launch delay. However, 

unexpected temporary reductions in the system’s power output were also noted during 

testing that simulated the vibration and shock that MSL will experience during its entry, 

descent, and landing on Mars. 

 MSL 

managers completed the fault protection design and initiated testing in November 2010. 

As of March 2011, MSL managers had completed development and initiated testing of 

most of the flight software; however, development of software to control the spacecraft 

and rover remained in progress. 

 

9 SA/SPaH has two primary functions, sample acquisition and sample processing and handling. Sample 

acquisition is accomplished by an arm that supports a percussive powdering drill, abrader, scoop, and 

contact instruments; the sample processing and handling performs sample transfer using door mechanisms 

for delivering samples to the rover’s analytical instruments. 

10 The Standing Review Board is an outside group of experts convened by NASA to monitor the status of a 

program or project. The Board periodically conducts independent reviews of performance related to 

cost, schedule, technical, and other risks. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 7 

Department of Energy officials stated that the power degradation issue is unlikely to 

cause a catastrophic failure. However, as a cautionary measure, MSL Project managers 

have reduced the mission’s performance capabilities to processing 28 rather than 74 soil 

and rock samples and to traversing 4.5 kilometers rather than 20 kilometers. 

Schedule Margin Erosion and Remaining Tasks 

We found that the MSL’s schedule margin has eroded at a greater rate than Project 

managers anticipated. As of February 2011, 60 days of margin remained compared to the 

110 days that had been planned (see Figure 6). In November 2009, the Project 

experienced a steep decline, from 185 to 120 margin days. In comparison, Project 

managers expected to maintain 185 margin days until March 2010. Furthermore, the gap 

between planned and actual margin has remained constant. To management’s credit, in 

addition to the original margin of 105 days to allow for unforeseen issues, the Project 

manager held 55 days in his own reserve. In addition, the decision to schedule the launch 

for the latter part of the launch window provided another 25 days of margin. Without 

these two actions, the Project would have exhausted its schedule margin. 

As shown in Figure 6, the schedule margin had the most significant decrease (60 days) 

starting in March 2010. This coincided with delays in delivering the Project’s major 

components, including actuators, SAM, and SA/SPaH (see Table 3.) 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Figure 6. Plan versus Actual Schedule Margin

Planned Schedule Margin Actual Schedule Margin

Projected Schedule Margin
RESULTS

8 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

Table 3. MSL Major Components Delivery Schedule

Component

Estimated Delivery Dates

Actual 

Delivery Date 

to Assembly 

and Testing

Delay 

Since 

Initial 

Status 

(in 

months)

Per 3/09 

Status 

Review

Per 6/09 

Status 

Review

Per 11/09 

Status 

Review

Actuators 7/22/2009 10/16/2009 1/27/2010 7/8/2010 11

Avionics 

power assembly 10/19/2009 1/15/2010 1/7/2010 1/13/2010 2 

motor control 1/29/2010 1/29/2010 3/2/2010 6/3/2010 4

compute element 3/3/2010 3/3/2010 5/10/2010 5/12/2010 2

analog module 6/3/2010 6/3/2010 6/8/2010 10/25/2010 4

SA/SPaH 5/28/2010 6/8/2010 8/20/2010 8/12/2010 2

Radar 5/20/2009 11/9/2009 12/11/2009 3/4/2010 9

Project managers expressed confidence that the current schedule margin would be 

adequate to address all risks to schedule identified to date. However, we are concerned 

that the complexity of the Project, the outstanding technical issues that remain to be 

resolved, and the problem/failure reports that still need to be closed (see discussion 

below) will increase the likelihood that unanticipated issues will arise during final testing 

and integration, which the current schedule margin will be inadequate to accommodate. 

Delays in development and delivery of critical project components and subsystems have 

contributed to erosion of the schedule margin. As seen in Figure 7 these delays pushed 

the completion of critical tasks into 2011 and therefore closer to the launch date. When 

the original launch delay was approved in February 2009, the project budgeted 185 

margin days (top blue line in Figure 6) and the corresponding launch-related tasks were 

scheduled for completion as shown in white in Figure 7. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 9 

Figure 7. Comparison of Critical Tasks Timeline 

(see Appendix C for task descriptions)

2009 2010 2011

 

FebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDecJanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDecJanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec

Mechanical

Payload

SA/SPaH

Avionics

Launch Vehicle

Flight Software

Assembly, Test,

and Launch 

Operations

Testbeds

Guidance, 

Navigation, and 

Control 

 

 

 

 

Kennedy 

Operations

Multi-Mission 

Radioisotope 

Thermoelectric 

Generator 

(MMRTG)

 

Legend

- Per Feb 2009 Plan - Per Feb 2011 Plan
RESULTS

10 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

As shown in Figure 7, in February 2009 managers planned to complete 4 tasks in the final 

11 months prior to launch. However, by February 2011 this list had grown to 11 tasks. 

As discussed previously, delays in development and delivery of critical components and 

subsystems postponed these tasks closer to the launch date. When these deliveries were 

delayed, the completion dates for the tasks were extended into 2011 causing the Project to 

lose margin days (red line in Figure 6). These extended tasks are adding to those that 

Project managers previously planned for 2011 including: 

• Mechanical assembly and electrical integrations; 

• Rover rework, including major instrument and component installation; 

• Software updates; 

• Drill rework (part of SA/SPaH), requiring complete turret deintegration and 

reintegration; 

• Environmental testing; 

• System and functional testing; 

• Rover descent stage fit check; 

• Mass Property Measurements; 

• MMRTG installation (mechanical and electrical); 

• Pack and ship to Kennedy Space Center; and

• Final processing at Kennedy and integration on the launch vehicle. 

With only 60 margin days remaining for calendar year 2011, Project managers have 

limited flexibility to address any significant new problems that may arise as the Project is 

integrated and prepared for launch. Unforeseen incidents – such as the one that occurred 

on May 20, 2011, when a crane operator’s error resulted in unplanned inspections and 

assessments of MSL’s backshell to determine whether it was damaged – have the 

potential to erode schedule margin and affect the schedule.11

 

11 The spacecraft backshell is designed to decelerate the spacecraft and protect its contents from 

aerothermal heating during entry into the Martian atmosphere. The crane operator lifted the backshell 

and the support cart it was attached to for a few seconds. Subsequent visual inspections and “tap testing” 

of the backshell did not reveal any damage. 

 Missing the current launch 

window would result in another 2-year delay at a cost of at least an additional 

$570 million or mission cancellation. Moreover, we are concerned that as the schedule 

margin tightens NASA will face increased pressure to reduce capabilities relative to the

mission objectives. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 11

ADDITIONAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH CLOSING 

PROBLEM/FAILURE REPORTS 

Project managers did not consistently identify and assess cost and schedule risks 

associated with problem/failure reports (P/FRs). Consequently, cost reserve and 

schedule margins may not be adequate to accommodate the potential impacts of these 

risks. A large number of P/FRs remain open and resolving them may result in 

increased costs and delays due to unanticipated problems. 

Problem/Failure Report Associated Risks and Closures 

JPL requires a formal problem/failure reporting and analysis program to support flight 

project hardware and software developments. The program requires the cognizant 

engineer to review P/FRs and assign a preliminary risk rating within 10 days of 

occurrence of the incident for early identification of potentially significant issues.

12

MSL Project Management Did Not Effectively Assess or Prioritize the Risks 

Identified by the P/FR Process. During fieldwork, in June 2010, there were 2,085 

P/FRs on record for the MSL Project, with 1,102 closed and 983 open. We found that 

71 of the open P/FRs had not received the required preliminary risk assessment. In the 

absence of these assessments, Project managers may not have allocated sufficient 

resources to address these P/FRs. 

 MSL 

Project managers developed a problem/failure reporting process to address problems and 

concerns attributed to technical uncertainties identified during development of the MSL. 

These reports range from minor issues with negligible effects to “red flag” issues with 

significant or major effects up to and including a loss of mission. An example of a minor 

P/FR is the correction of language in a test procedure. An example of a red flag issue is 

the unexpected powering down of MSL’s main onboard computer during a critical phase 

of the mission. In such a situation, the computer may lose memory of the last action 

performed, which could lead to unintended actions resulting in hardware or software 

failure and the inability to achieve mission objectives.

Problem/Failure Reports Were Not Closed in a Timely Manner. We analyzed P/FR 

database trends from June 2010 to February 2011 and found that although the number of 

open P/FRs as a percentage of the whole was decreasing, the absolute number of open 

P/FRs increased. Specifically, as of February 24, 2011, the number of P/FRs had 

increased to 2,865, of which 1,652 were closed and 1,213 open. Figure 8 shows a trend 

of steady increase in P/FRs while Table 4 shows that more than 42 percent of the 

Project’s P/FRs remained open as of February 2011. 

 

12 JPL Rule 73472, Section 5.10.15, “Preliminary Risk Rating.” 
RESULTS

12 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

Source: MSL Project Quarterly Status Report February 2011

Table 4. MSL P/FR Progress Snapshot

As of Date Total

Increase 

from

previous 

month

No. of 

Closed 

P/FRs

Increase

of 

P/FRs 

Closed

No. of 

Open 

P/FRs

Net Incr 

(Decr) of 

Open 

P/FRs

Open 

P/FRs to 

Total 

P/FRs

6/21/10 2,085 1,102 983 47 percent

7/19/10 2,184 99 1,132 30 1,052 69 48 percent

8/20/10 2,248 64 1,185 53 1,063 11 47 percent

9/17/10 2,320 72 1,250 65 1,070 7 46 percent

10/18/10 2,413 93 1,360 110 1,053 (17) 44 percent

11/15/10 2,485 72 1,421 61 1,064 11 43 percent

12/20/10 2,563 78 1,493 72 1,070 6 42 percent

1/27/11 2,720 165 1,595 117 1,125 48 41 percent

2/24/11 2,865 145 1,652 57 1,213 88 42 percent

Total 

Increase 780 550 230

The trend also shows that the number of P/FRs has increased by about 1,000 over the 

12-month period between February 23, 2010, and February 24, 2011. Both the trend line 

and the 8-month snapshot show that while an increasing number of P/FRs were closed 

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

2/23/2010

3/9/2010

3/23/2010

4/6/2010

4/20/2010

5/4/2010

5/18/2010

6/1/2010

6/15/20106/29/20107/13/20107/27/20108/10/20108/24/2010

9/7/2010

9/21/201010/5/2010

10/19/2010

11/2/2010

11/16/201011/30/201012/14/201012/28/2010

1/11/20111/25/2011

2/8/2011

2/22/2011

Number of P\FRs

Date

Total 

P/FRs

Closed 

P/FRs

Open 

P/FRs

Figure 8. MSL Problem/Failure Report Trend
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 13

over this period, the total number of P/FRs grew at a faster rate. Our review of the June 

2010 P/FR database also found that, on average, P/FRs remained open for 1.2 years and 

that those concerning potentially red flag issues remained open on average for 1.6 years. 

The unresolved P/FRs we reviewed were in various stages of the reporting process. 

About one-third of the open P/FRs were in the final (signature) phase, which Project 

managers said they expected to close with minimal effort. In addition, Project managers 

said they felt confident that they could close all of the P/FRs that must be closed to 

proceed to launch before the scheduled launch date, noting that those involving flight 

software can be closed after launch. However, we are concerned that 20 of 30 significant 

or potential red flag P/FRs that were open as of April 2011 involve flight hardware that 

could present significant challenges to mission success. Furthermore, as previously 

stated, at least 71 P/FRs were not properly assessed, leaving open the possibility of 

unknown risks that could impact mission success or result in unanticipated cost growth. 

Recommendations, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of 

Management’s Response

Recommendation 1. The MSL Project Manager should ensure that the required preliminary 

risk assessments are completed on all P/FRs and identify required resources to resolve the 

identified problems. 

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator for the Science Mission 

Directorate concurred, stating that the MSL Project Manager has engaged senior JPL

management to use lab resources to assess and ensure rapid disposition of all open P/FRs. 

In addition, senior P/FR team leads have been identified for all critical areas, with daily 

tracking and weekly reporting on the resolution progress. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s proposed actions are 

responsive; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and will be closed upon 

completion and verification of the proposed corrective actions. 

Recommendation 2. The MSL Project Manager should develop a plan to address all open 

P/FRs. The plan should prioritize P/FRs commensurate with their severity, provide a schedule 

for completion, and establish realistic resource requirements to ensure a timely and safe launch. 

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator concurred, stating that Project 

management had developed such a plan in March 2011. Based on improved P/FR closure 

progress to date, Project management expected the plan would lead to closure of all 

relevant P/FRs by the time of the MSL launch. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s proposed actions are

responsive; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and will be closed upon 

completion and verification of the proposed corrective actions. 
RESULTS

14 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

PROJECT MANAGEMENT CONSISTENTLY 

UNDERESTIMATED THE COST TO 

COMPLETE MSL

Project managers have increased cost estimates for MSL multiple times since 

inception of the Project. Since February 2009, the Project has received three budget 

increases totaling $137 million, including a $71 million increase in December 2010. 

Even with these increases, we are concerned that based on historical cost trends and 

the remaining work to be completed, funding for MSL may still be insufficient to 

meet the 2011 launch schedule. In our judgment, in order to meet the scheduled 

launch date without reducing scope, the Project may require additional funding. 

Project Management Consistently Underestimated Costs

MSL’s 2-year launch delay and the additional resources required to resolve the underlying 

technical issues increased the Project’s development costs from $969 million to 

$1.8 billion (86 percent) and the corresponding life-cycle cost estimate from $1.6 billion

(per the May 2006 project plan) to $2.5 billion. Moreover, the current development and 

life-cycle cost estimates reflect three separate increases over the past 2 years. Since the 

launch was delayed in February 2009, the estimated cost to complete development has 

increased by $137 million, including an additional $71 million – consisting of 

$36 million in identified work and a $35 million reserve – in December 2010. In 

addition, Mars Program management set aside $22 million as Program Office reserve 

that has not been specifically allocated to the MSL Project. 

Growing Cost Estimates. Following the decision to delay MSL’s launch, Project 

managers established a new schedule and cost baseline taking into consideration the work 

required to meet the 2011 launch date. This February 2009 rebaseline included a 

$400 million estimate to complete the remaining work through launch (the development 

phase). In May 2009, NASA’s Independent Program Assessment Office (IPAO) 

projected that development costs would likely exceed the Project’s revised estimate by

$65–$95 million and could exceed the estimate by up to $107 million.

13

 

13 The IPAO provides independent life-cycle reviews and assessments of the technical, schedule, cost, and 

risk posture of proposed and ongoing projects to provide objective advice to the Agency Program 

Management Council.

 At that time, the 

Mars Program Office set aside a $95 million Program Office reserve. However, 1 year 

later the IPAO and JPL’s independent cost assessment both showed a risk that the 

$495 million cost estimate would be insufficient. See Table 5 for their estimates.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 15

Table 5. Independent Cost Estimates

Low Mostly Likely High

IPAO Assessment as of June 2010 $484 million $495 million $520 million 

JPL Independent Assessment as of 

 May 2010 $498 million $511 million 

Although the IPAO’s most likely estimate remained at $495 million, its “high” estimate

increased to $520 million. JPL did not offer a “most likely” estimate, but its independent 

assessments at the low end exceeded the $495 million estimate by $3 million and its 

“high” figure exceeded the estimate by $16 million. 

See Table 6 for details of the Project’s history of cost increases through December 2010. 
RESULTS

16 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

Table 6. MSL Cost Estimates Since 2009 Launch Delay

(Estimated Cost to Complete Project Development)

Date of Cost 

Estimate 

Estimated Cost to 

Complete

(in millions)

Main Factors Driving Cost Growth 

February 2009 $ 400 

• SAM development activity

• flight systems development activity: 

actuators; avionics; SA/SPaH subsystem; 

and radar 

• late subsystem deliveries

• launch vehicle

June 2009 + 32

 432 

• This increase resulted from a review by the 

Standing Review Board and NASA 

management of the Project reserve level and 

risks. The major technical drivers remained 

the same as above.

November 2009 + 34

 466 

• SAM development activity

• flight system development activity: 

actuators, avionics, SA/SPaH subsystem, 

and radar 

• late subsystem deliveries 

December 2010 + 71

 $ 537* 

• increases in the validation and verification

program and test program 

• funding of the ATLO team for a postshipment delay period. 

• increase in Kennedy operations cost 

estimate for the change in the launch date to 

November 2011 

• P/FR resolution and other paperwork 

closure 

* In December 2010, management for the Mars Program set aside an additional $22 million as unallocated 

reserve. This amount is a Program Office reserve that was not allocated to MSL and is not included in the 

figures above.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 17

Budget May Be Inadequate. In November 2010, managers requested an additional 

$71 million, which brought the development cost estimate to $537 million and the total 

life-cycle cost estimate to $2.5 billion. The Agency Program Management Council 

approved the request in December 2010.14

The November 2010 request consisted of $36 million to complete the then current scope 

of work plus $35 million in reserve. Managers developed the $36 million estimate by 

conducting a bottom-up review of the remaining work and the $35 million figure by 

calculating 20 percent reserve levels based on the total estimated cost ($175 million) as of 

September 2010 to complete the Project’s development phase.

 

15

However, in our judgment, in light of the Project’s historical pattern of cost increases and 

our analysis of the Project managers’ cost estimates, current funding may be insufficient 

to ensure the Project meets the 2011 launch date. In June 2009, the Mars Program Office 

set aside a $95 million reserve; however, this reserve has proved insufficient to cover the 

current $137 million cost increase needed to complete the development phase. 

 In addition, Project 

managers said they validated the reserve requirement by using various cost projection 

approaches.

Our analysis indicated that the Project’s $537 million estimate to complete development 

may still be insufficient to fund the Project through launch. We recomputed a cost to 

complete estimate by factoring in cost increases associated with the additional work 

requirements added since February 2009 to address technical issues identified during 

development and determined that $581 million was required – $44 million more than the 

current estimate.

16

Although Project managers have received three funding increases since February 2009, 

Figure 9 illustrates that the schedule margin gap between planned and actual number of 

days available has not decreased. Accordingly, it appears that Project management has

consistently underestimated the amount of resources necessary to complete tasks in 

accordance with the schedule. In addition, because we are concerned that the probability 

of unforeseen problems will increase commensurate with the complexity of the project 

and that issues discovered during integration and testing or as a result of closing the 

 (See Appendix D for details of our computation.) 

 

14 The Agency Program Management Council is NASA’s senior management group, chaired by the NASA 

Associate Administrator or his designee, responsible for reviewing formulation performance, 

recommending approval, and overseeing implementation of programs and projects according to Agency 

commitments, priorities, and policies.

15 Managers applied the 20 percent based on guidance in JPL’s Flight Project Practices, a set of project 

management best practices. 

16 Our $581 million calculation is an overall estimate based on the average efficiency of Project 

management’s work performed since February 2009 and includes items that did not increase in cost and 

items that may have substantially increased in cost above the average. We considered the Project’s cost 

in aggregate and did not attempt to segregate the impact of individual items on work performance 

efficiency and cost to complete project development. 
RESULTS

18 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

outstanding P/FR issues will consume all of the current funding and reserve, thereby 

potentially jeopardizing the scheduled launch. 

Figure 9. Comparison of Schedule Margin Reduction to

Estimated Total Cost to Complete 

Funding limitations may also increase pressure on Project managers to reduce science 

capabilities or accept a higher level of risk in order to avoid further delay. Rescheduling 

launch from 2009 to 2011 added approximately $900 million to the Project’s life-cycle 

cost estimate, and any further delay to 2013 or 2014 would only add to that figure. 

According to Program managers, in addition to added administrative and maintenance 

costs, such a delay would require the spacecraft’s cruise and descent stages be redesigned

to accommodate differences in planetary alignment and the Martian dust storm season. 

This redesign alone would cost approximately $570 million. 

400

432

466

537

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

0

50

100

150

200

250

C

o

s

t

M

a

r

g

i

n

D

a

y

s

Estimated Total Cost to Complete

Planned Schedule Margin

Actual Schedule Margin

Projected Schedule Margin
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 19

Recommendation, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of 

Management’s Response

Recommendation 3. The Associate Administrator for the Science Mission Directorate 

should reevaluate the Project’s history of cost estimation, reassess the sufficiency of 

available reserves, and adjust funding accordingly. 

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator for the Science Mission 

Directorate concurred and stated that the Directorate’s ongoing assessments indicated that 

the Project’s budget coupled with $22 million in Directorate-held reserves would be 

sufficient for MSL to achieve a timely and safe launch. In addition, the Associate 

Administrator said the Directorate was conducting weekly monitoring of the Project’s 

funding status and expenditures. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s proposed actions are 

responsive. Although the recommendation is resolved, it will remain open pending our 

review and analysis of management’s assessments of the sufficiency of its reserve 

funding. 

APPENDIXES

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 21

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology

We performed this audit from May 2010 through April 2011 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. 

We performed work at JPL and at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. We obtained, 

reviewed, and analyzed Federal, NASA, and JPL policies and procedures relating to space

flight program and project management, including the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 

(Public Law 109-155), NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5D, NPR 8000.4A, 

Science Mission Directorate Management Handbook, and JPL Rules and Internal 

Standard Operating Procedures. We also reviewed NASA contract NAS7-03001 to 

determine contractual requirements for JPL operations. We interviewed management 

officials from the Science Mission Directorate’s Independent Program Assessment 

Office, and JPL MSL Project management. We discussed areas related to MSL’s 

rebaseline process, management oversight tools and processes, current project status, and 

issues that impact delivery delays and potential launch delays. 

Project Technical Risk. We reviewed JPL Rules 35506 “Anomaly Resolution” and 

73472 “JPL Problem/Failure Reports, Preparation and Review Guidelines” to understand 

the standards for effective anomaly reporting and resolution for JPL flight projects and 

the preliminary rate rating process. We interviewed JPL MSL Mission Assurance 

personnel to understand P/FR processing. To determine whether MSL Project 

management had effectively identified and assessed technical risk, we reviewed the status 

of P/FRs as of August 2010. We analyzed the P/FR database and historical trend for the 

8-month period of June 2010–February 2011. We also selected 20 P/FRs based on the 

significance of the areas affected by the problem or failure and evaluated the P/FR

reporting, analyzing, testing, and closing process. 

Project Schedule Estimating. We reviewed planning documents for the February 2009 

rebaseline, Project status reports since the rebaseline, and Headquarters Project reviews 

since the rebaseline. We obtained an understanding of major issues that caused the 2-year

delay. To determine the adequacy and effectiveness of the Project’s schedule control 

procedures, we reviewed instrument delivery schedules and critical path timelines and 

compared them with the rebaseline planning documents. We also analyzed schedule 
APPENDIX A 

22 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

margin trend since rebaseline and compared the actual schedule margin with the planned 

schedule margin. 

Project Cost Estimating. To determine the adequacy and effectiveness of the Project’s 

cost control procedures, we analyzed the cost growth trend since rebaseline and main 

factors driving cost growth. We reviewed JPL’s current cost estimate method and 

recomputed a cost to complete estimate by factoring in cost increases associated with the 

additional work requirements (due to scope adjustments). 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We used computer-processed data to perform this 

audit. JPL reportable incidents involving design, development, and testing of flightconfigured hardware and software were reported to the problem/failure reporting and 

analysis program. Although we did not test the general or application controls of this 

program we did compare the information in the key data fields with our sample of P/FRs 

and supporting documents for the data and determined that the data was valid and reliable 

to support our objectives and conclusions. 

Review of Internal Controls 

We reviewed the internal controls associated with MSL Project management’s 

assessment of cost and technical risk that could impact the near-term launch schedule. 

We noted concerns as discussed in the report. Our recommendations, if implemented, 

should address the concerns. 

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued three

reports of particular relevance to the subject of this report. Unrestricted GAO reports can 

be accessed over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov. 

“NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects” (GAO-10-227SP, February 

2010) 

“Information Technology: Agencies Need to Improve the Implementation and Use of 

Earned Value Techniques to Help Manage Major System Acquisitions” (GAO-10-2, 

October 2009) 

“NASA: Projects Need More Disciplined Oversight and Management to Address Key 

Challenges” (GAO-09-436T, March 2009) 
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 23

PAYLOAD DESCRIPTIONS

Figure 10. Rover Payloads 

 Source: Status Report from Program Executive

To accomplish the science goals of the MSL mission, the rover carries a science payload 

with instruments sponsored by NASA and others contributed by international partners. 

These instruments are roughly divided into 4 categories. Table 7 identifies the 

instruments and their categories. 
APPENDIX B 

24 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

Table 7. Instrument Descriptions . 

Category/ 

Instrument Functional Description

Supporting 

Organization

Remote Sensing/

Mast Camera 

(MastCam)

MastCam will take color images and color video footage of the Martian 

terrain. Like the cameras on the rovers that landed on Mars in 2004, 

the MastCam design consists of two camera systems mounted on a mast

extending upward from the MSL rover deck (body). The MastCam 

will be used to study the Martian landscape, rocks, and soils; to view 

frost and weather phenomena; and to support the driving and sampling 

operations of the rover.

Malin Space Science 

Systems 

(Subcontractor)

Remote Sensing/ 

Chemistry and

Camera 

(ChemCam)

Looking at rocks and soils from a distance, ChemCam will fire a laser 

and analyze the elemental composition of vaporized materials from 

areas smaller than 1 millimeter on the surface of Martian rocks and 

soils. An onboard spectrograph will provide detail about minerals and 

microstructures in rocks by measuring the composition of the resulting 

plasma – an extremely hot gas made of free-floating ions and electrons. 

ChemCam will also use the laser to clear away dust from Martian rocks 

and a remote camera to acquire detailed images. The camera can 

resolve features 5 to 10 times smaller than those visible with cameras 

on NASA’s two Mars Exploration rovers that began exploring Mars in 

January 2004. In the event the MSL rover cannot reach a rock or 

outcrop of interest, ChemCam will have the capability to analyze it 

from a distance.

Los Alamos National 

Laboratory 

(Subcontractor)

In-Situ/ 

Mars Hand Lens 

Imager (MAHLI)

MSL will carry its own equivalent of the geologist’s hand lens, 

MAHLI. MAHLI will provide earthbound scientists with close-up 

views of the minerals, textures, and structures in Martian rocks and the 

surface layer of rocky debris and dust. The self-focusing camera, 

roughly 4 centimeters wide (1.5 inches), will take color images of 

features as small as 12.5 micrometers, smaller than the diameter of a 

human hair. MAHLI will carry both white light sources, similar to the 

light from a flashlight, and ultraviolet light sources, similar to the light 

from a tanning lamp, making the imager functional both day and night. 

The ultraviolet light will be used to induce fluorescence to help detect 

carbonate and evaporite minerals (minerals that form by coming out of 

solution when water evaporates), both of which indicate that water 

helped shape the landscape on Mars.

MAHLI’s main objective will be to help the MSL science team 

understand the geologic history of the landing site on Mars. MAHLI 

will also help researchers select samples for further investigation.

Malin Space Science 

Systems 

(Subcontractor)

In-Situ/ 

Alpha-Particle 

X-ray 

Spectrometer 

(APXS)

APXS will measure the abundance of chemical elements in rocks and 

soils. APXS will be placed in contact with rock and soil samples on 

Mars and will expose the material to alpha particles and X-rays emitted 

during the radioactive decay of the element curium. 

Canadian Space 

Agency (CSA)
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 25

Category/ 

Instrument Functional Description

Supporting 

Organization

Analytical/

Chemistry and 

Mineralogy 

Instrument

(CheMin)

CheMin will identify and measure the abundances of various minerals 

on Mars. Examples of minerals found on Mars so far are olivine, 

pyroxenes, hematite, goethite, and magnetite. 

Minerals are indicative of environmental conditions that existed when 

they formed. For example, olivine and pyroxene, two primary minerals 

in basalt, form when lava solidifies. Jarosite, found in sedimentary 

rocks by NASA’s rover Opportunity on Mars, precipitates out of water. 

Using CheMin, scientists will be able to study further the role that 

water played in forming minerals on Mars. Different minerals are 

linked to certain kinds of environments. Scientists will use CheMin to 

search for mineral clues indicative of a past Martian environment that 

might have supported life. 

NASA Ames Research 

Center

Analytical/ 

Sample Analysis 

at Mars (SAM) 

The SAM instrument suite will take up more than half the science 

payload on board the MSL rover and feature chemical equipment found 

in many scientific laboratories on Earth. SAM will search for 

compounds of the element carbon, including methane, that are

associated with life and explore ways in which they are generated and 

destroyed in the Martian ecosphere. 

A suite of three instruments, including a mass spectrometer, gas 

chromatograph, and tunable laser spectrometer, SAM will also look 

for and measure the abundances of other light elements, such as 

hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, associated with life. The mass 

spectrometer will separate elements and compounds by mass for 

identification and measurement. The gas chromatograph will heat soil 

and rock samples until they vaporize, and will then separate the 

resulting gases into various components for analysis. The laser 

spectrometer will measure the abundance of various isotopes of carbon, 

hydrogen, and oxygen in atmospheric gases such as methane, water 

vapor, and carbon dioxide. These measurements will be accurate to 

within 10 parts per thousand. 

NASA Goddard Space 

Flight Center

Environmental/ 

Radiation 

Assessment 

Detector (RAD)

RAD will be one of the first instruments sent to Mars specifically to 

prepare for future human exploration. RAD will measure and identify 

all high-energy radiation on the Martian surface, such as protons, 

energetic ions of various elements, neutrons, and gamma rays. That 

includes not only direct radiation from space, but also secondary 

radiation produced by the interaction of space radiation with the 

Martian atmosphere and surface rocks and soils. 

RAD will also assess the hazard presented by radiation to potential 

microbial life, past and present, both on and beneath the Martian 

surface. In addition, RAD will investigate how radiation has affected 

the chemical and isotopic composition of Martian rocks and soils. 

Southwest Research 

Institute 

(Subcontractor)
APPENDIX B 

26 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

Category/ 

Instrument Functional Description

Supporting 

Organization

Environmental/ 

Mars Descent 

Imager (MARDI)

Knowing the location of loose debris, boulders, cliffs, and other 

features of the terrain will be vital for planning the path of exploration 

after the MSL rover arrives on Mars. MARDI will take color video 

during the rover's descent toward the surface, providing an "astronaut's 

view" of the local environment. 

As soon as the rover jettisons its heatshield several kilometers above 

the surface, MARDI will begin producing a five-frames-per-second 

video stream of high-resolution, overhead views of the landing site. It 

will continue acquiring images until the rover lands, storing the video 

data in digital memory. After landing safely on Mars, the rover will 

transfer the data to Earth. 

In addition to helping Earthbound planners select an optimum path of 

exploration, MARDI will provide information about the larger geologic 

context surrounding the landing site. It will also enable mappers to 

determine the spacecraft’s precise location after landing. 

Malin Space Science 

Systems 

(Subcontractor)

Environmental/ 

Dynamic Albedo 

of Neutrons 

(DAN)

One way to look for water on Mars is to look for neutrons escaping 

from the planet’s surface. Cosmic rays from space constantly bombard 

the surface of Mars, knocking neutrons in soils and rocks out of their 

atomic orbits. If liquid or frozen water happens to be present, 

hydrogen atoms slow the neutrons down. In this way, some of the 

neutrons escaping into space have less energy and move more slowly. 

These slower particles can be measured with a neutron detector. 

The MSL rover will carry a pulsing neutron generator called DAN that 

will be sensitive enough to detect water content as low as one-tenth of 

1 percent and resolve layers of water and ice beneath the surface. 

Albedo is a scientific word for the reflection or scattering of light. 

Russian Space Agency

Environmental/ 

Rover 

Environmental 

Monitoring 

Station (REMS)

REMS will measure and provide daily and seasonal reports on 

atmospheric pressure, humidity, ultraviolet radiation at the Martian 

surface, wind speed and direction, air temperature, and ground 

temperature around the rover. 

Two small booms on the rover mast will record the horizontal and 

vertical components of wind speed to characterize air flow near the 

Martian surface from breezes, dust devils, and dust storms. A sensor 

inside the rover’s electronic box will be exposed to the atmosphere 

through a small opening and will measure changes in pressure caused 

by different meteorological events such as dust devils, atmospheric 

tides, and cold and warm fronts. A small filter will shield the sensor 

against dust contamination. 

A suite of infrared sensors on one of the booms will measure the 

intensity of infrared radiation emitted by the ground, which will 

provide an estimate of ground temperature. These data will provide the 

basis for computing ground temperature. A sensor on the other boom 

will track atmospheric humidity. Both booms will carry sensors for 

measuring air temperature. 

Spanish Space Agency 

(INTA)

Source: http://mars.jpl.nasa.gov/msl/mission/instruments/ 
APPENDIX C 

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 27

TASK DESCRIPTIONS

Table 8. MSL Project Task Descriptions

Task Task Description

1 Propulsion The MSL propulsion subsystem comprises two independently operated 

subsystems: cruise stage (CS) propulsion and the descent stage (DS). 

The CS propulsion subsystem is used to perform attitude control and 

delta-V functions during the cruise to Mars, while DS propulsion is 

used to carry out a soft landing of the rover on the surface of Mars.

2 Thermal The flight system thermal control subsystem provides in-flight active 

and passive thermal control hardware that maintains flight hardware 

within allowable temperature limits during prelaunch, launch, cruise, 

and landed operations. 

3 Telecom All MSL communications are handled through the telecommunications 

subsystem. This subsystem receives and demodulates uplink 

commands, transmits science and engineering data, and provides 

coherent two-way tracking and ranging. The telecommunications 

subsystem is composed of a complete ultra-high frequency (UHF) 

subsystem to handle proximity link communications with NASA assets 

in orbit around Mars (Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, Odyssey) and also 

a complete X-Band subsystem that handles communications directly 

with Earth. 

The UHF subsystem spans the rover, DS, and the Backshell/Parachute 

Cone Stage of MSL and is used during Entry, Descent, and Landing 

(EDL) and rover surface operations. 

The X-Band subsystem spans the rover, DS, Backshell/Parachute Cone 

Stage, and CS of MSL and is used during CS, EDL, and rover surface 

operations. 

4 Mechanical There are three work breakdown structure elements in this category: 

aeroshell, parachute, and motor actuators/gearboxes. The aeroshell is a 

scaled Viking heritage heatshield and thermal protection system (TPS), 

4.75 meters in diameter. The descent phase of MSL begins after 

guided atmospheric entry, with the aeroshell having passed through 

peak heating and peak deceleration. 

Stowed at the top of the backshell is a Viking heritage parachute scaled 

up to 22.5 meters in diameter, to accommodate the significantly heavier 

mass of MSL. The supersonic parachute is deployed via the mortar in 

the backshell. 
APPENDIX C 

28 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

Task Task Description

(Mechanical,

continued) 

The rover mechanical subsystem provides the basis for integrating all 

of the other rover subsystems and payload elements. In addition to the 

internal and external accommodation of instruments, the mechanical 

subsystem is responsible for the large number of deployments that 

bring the rover to its full functionality.

5 Payload See Appendix B. 

6 SA/SPaH The Sample Acquisition/Sample Processing and Handling (SA/SPaH) 

subsystem is fully responsible for the acquisition of rock and regolith 

samples from the Martian surface and the processing of these samples 

into fine particles that are then distributed to the analytical science 

instruments, SAM and CheMin. The SA/SPaH subsystem is also 

responsible for the placement of the two contact instruments, APXS 

and MAHLI, on rock and soil targets. 

7 Avionics All onboard command and data handling is hosted by the avionics 

subsystem. Avionics also contains solar power generation and all 

onboard primary power bus regulation, motor control, pyrotechnic 

device control, and primary power distribution functions. Its 

performance is critical to collection, storage, processing, and 

distribution of engineering and science data, commanding for all 

subsystems, and attitude control during cruise, EDL, and rover surface 

operations. It is also critical for supplying power to the entire flight 

system.

8 Launch Vehicle The launch vehicle for the MSL mission will be an Atlas V (541), 

which consists of a Common Core Booster (CCB), four solid rocket 

boosters (SRB), and one Centaur III with a 5.4-m diameter payload 

fairing. The Atlas V launch vehicle system is based on the 3.8-meter

(12.5-foot) diameter CCB powered by a single RD-180 engine. The 

Atlas 541 is provided to NASA by United Launch Alliance. Launch of 

the MSL spacecraft will be from Launch Complex-41 at the Cape 

Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The launch services contract 

for MSL is managed by NASA’s Launch Services Program Office at 

Kennedy Space Center. 

9 Flight Software The flight system software is composed of seven functional domains: 

avionics interface, infrastructure interface, flight and ground interface, 

guidance/navigation and control, mobility, payloads and articulation, 

and high-level system behaviors.

MSL flight software (FSW) is defined as all software that executes in 

the Rover Compute Element (RCE) flight computer. Specifically 

excluded from this definition is device-resident firmware, software that 

executes in the resident central processing units of the science 

instruments, test software, simulation software, ground operations 

software, and mission support software. 
APPENDIX C 

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 29

Task Task Description

(Flight Software,

continued) 

The RCE is the key element of the MSL avionics subsystem, which 

entirely controls the MSL spacecraft. 

Rover flight software is the software in the main computer of the rover

that monitors the status of the flight system during all phases, checks 

for the presence of commands to execute, maintains a buffer of 

telemetry for transmission, performs communication functions, and 

checks the overall health of the spacecraft. 

Central control of the entire flight system is under control of the flight 

software running in the RCE, the same architecture as was used for the 

Mars Exploration Rover (MER) mission. Additionally, the internal 

architecture of the flight software is also inherited from that mission. 

10 Assembly, Test, 

and Launch 

Operations 

(ATLO) 

This task involves flight system verification, integration, and testing. 

Specifically, ATLO accomplishes flight system integration, assembly, 

and launch execution, as well as the planning and test procedures 

associated with those activities.

11 Testbeds The MSL Project will have access to three system testbeds for the 

conduct of the mission. Developed and certified prior to launch, after 

launch, these facilities are available for the verification of uplink 

products and procedures (often for first-time events, as well as for 

others when time permits) as well as for troubleshooting and anomaly 

resolution during flight operations. 

Two of these testbeds are stationary (non-mobile) but support limited 

surface phase testing via simulated mobility and terrain interactions 

and instrument simulations. The higher fidelity system is named the 

Mission System Testbed (MSTB), which has the most complete 

complement of hardware models available. 

An additional stationary testbed, the Flight Software Testbed 

(FSWTB), is also available, but with some hardware components only 

represented as software simulations. 

The majority of launch, cruise, and EDL testing will take place on 

these platforms. Additionally, a mobile testbed, the Vehicle System 

Testbed (VSTB) is available for surface phase testing, including 

mobility, of the SA/SPaH hardware and engineering models of the 

payload instruments. The VSTB does not support launch, cruise, or 

EDL testing.

12 Guidance, 

Navigation and 

Control (GN&C)

The flight system GN&C supports the Cruise Phase and uses the Mars 

Pathfinder/MER heritage star scanner and the Adcole sun sensor 

package. Cruise navigation comprises orbit determination and 

propulsive maneuver design. Orbit determination responsibilities 

include determining the trajectory of the spacecraft and predicting 

atmospheric entry condition and delivery accuracy. Propulsive 

maneuver design responsibilities include designing trajectory 
APPENDIX C 

30 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

Task Task Description

(GN&C, 

continued) 

correction maneuvers to achieve the desired atmospheric entry 

conditions and calculating mission statistical change in velocity (speed) 

and propellant requirements. 

During approach and entry phases, GN&C will de-spin the entry body 

and turn the capsule to the entry attitude. After successfully slowing 

the EDL system down, the parachute is deployed, and the front 

aeroshell is separated, the rover radar begins radar acquisition of the 

surface and computation of relative velocity

GN&C for a rover may be equated to the “eyes” of the rover. The 

rover attitude control subsystem consists of two major elements:

• The engineering camera subsystem, which is responsible for 

providing the surface system with images and from which 3D terrain 

information can be derived. 

• The rover’s Inertial Measurement Unit, which is used to support 

rover navigation of traverses and to estimate tilt on the Martian 

surface.

13 Kennedy 

Operations 

The MSL Flight System will arrive at Kennedy’s Payload Hazardous 

Servicing Facility in a somewhat preassembled state. The flight system 

and mechanical and electrical ground support equipment will be 

configured for a post-shipment system test. Following completion of 

the system test, all flight segments will start the closeout process in 

preparation for final flight assembly. 

Upon completion of the rover and descent stage (DS) closeout 

activities, the DS propellant tanks will be loaded and then the rover and 

DS will be mated to form the powered descent vehicle (PDV). The 

PDV is installed inside the backshell and then the heatshield is mated 

to the backshell to form the entry vehicle (EV). 

Once completed, the EV is mated to the CS and then the CS propellant 

tanks are loaded. Following the execution of launch configuration 

mass property measurements and a final limited electrical functional 

test of the flight vehicle, the MSL spacecraft enters the Atlas launch 

vehicle flow. 

14 Multi-Mission 

Radioisotope 

Thermoelectric 

Generator 

(MMRTG)

This is a U.S. Department of Energy radioisotope power supply that 

will generate electricity from the heat of plutonium’s radioactive decay. 

This type of power supply could give the mission an operating lifespan 

on Mars’ surface of a full Martian year (687 Earth days) or more. 
APPENDIX D 

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 31

COST PROJECTION 

APPROACHES

Approach 1 

Cost projection reflects historical increases to the scope of work, inefficiencies, and a 

performance trend factor. Our calculations are based on the cost estimates from the 

February 2009 rebaseline when the estimated cost to complete development was 

projected to be $400 million. We assumed that any changes from that estimate forward 

would be attributed to unexpected work (due to technical problems) and efficiencies in 

performance of the work. Note that the mission deliverables were not changed. 

1. Amount of work: The amount of work required to meet the established 

deliverables for work performed by JPL increased by $75 million, from 

$325 million in February 2009 to $400 million in September 2010 – a 

23.1 percent increase. We applied the same percentage increase to the initial 

budget of $400 million and concluded that the cost estimate should have been 

$492 million. [$400 million X 1.231 = $492 million]

2. Efficiency factor: Project management’s performance measurement process 

calculated an 11 percent inefficiency rate for the Project through September 2010. 

We applied the same inefficiency factor to our adjusted cost from step 1 above. 

[$492 X 1.11 = $546 million] 

3. Performance trend factor: Project management determined that performance is 

degrading at a rate of 6.4 percent since February 2009 (date of rebaseline). We 

applied this performance trend factor to our adjusted cost from step 2 above. 

[$546 million X 1.064 = $581 million] 

Our estimate represents a rough order of magnitude considering Project management’s

history of underestimating the work requirement. Instead of estimating work requirement 

and reserve separately, we made a projection based on total work history. Our estimate is 

not based on a scientific assessment of the work. 
APPENDIX D 

32 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

Approach 2

(

February 2009 BAC

($325 million) X ( September 2010 BCWP

($262 million) ) ) September 2010 BAC

($401 million)

September 2010 ACWP

($291 million)

• BAC (budgeted at completion) 2009 – the estimated cost to complete 

development at the start of the 2-year delay in February 2009. 

• BAC 2010 – the adjusted estimated cost to complete development on September 

2010, which included adjustments to the scope of work required to meet the 

established deliverables.

• BCWP (budgeted cost of work performed) 2010 – the expected cost, based on the 

February 2009 cost estimate, of the work actually performed through September 

2010. 

• ACWP (actual cost of work performed) 2010 – the actual cost of the work 

performed through September 2010. 

The objective of the computation was to determine how much it will cost to complete the 

remaining work that was initially budgeted at $400 million. Our assumption was that the 

amount of work performed included part of the initially budgeted work, unanticipated 

additional work, and cost increase. Further, on the average, the rate of cost incurred was 

even for all three parts. 

1. Determine the rate at which work is being completed. Calculated by using 

September 2010 (BCWP ÷ BAC) = .654. 

2. Determine how much of the initially budgeted work was completed, assuming 

work was performed proportionally with the total work done. Calculated by 

multiplying rate of work completed (.654) by initial budget of $326 million = 

$213 million (meaning $213 million of the initial $326 million of budgeted work 

was completed). 

3. Determine the actual cost efficiency of the work. Calculated by dividing the 

budgeted cost of the work completed by the actual cost of the work completed 

($213 million ÷ $291 million) = .732 (meaning that for every dollar the Project 

has spent, 73.2 cents was spent on completing the planned work originally 

budgeted; the remaining 26.8 cents was attributed to price increases and to 

unanticipated work required to get the original work completed). 
APPENDIX D 

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 33

4. Determine the estimated cost to complete Project development by applying the 

actual efficiency: 

73.2 = $400 million

100 Projected cost to complete

Or divide the initial cost to complete of $400 million by actual efficiency (.732) = 

$546 million. 

 

5. Apply anticipated additional price increase of 6.4 percent: 

$546 million X 1.064 = $581 million. 
APPENDIX E 

34 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS
APPENDIX E 

REPORT NO. IG-11-019 35

Enclosures

omitted.
APPENDIX F 

36 REPORT NO. IG-11-019 

REPORT DISTRIBUTION

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Administrator

Deputy Administrator

Chief of Staff

NASA Advisory Council’s Audit, Finance, and Analysis Committee 

Associate Administrator, Science Mission Directorate

Director, Goddard Space Flight Center

Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

Program Manager, Mars Exploration Program 

Project Manager, Mars Science Laboratory

Non-NASA Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch

Government Accountability Office 

Director, NASA Financial Management, Office of Financial Management and 

Assurance

Director, NASA Issues, Office of Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Subcommittee on Science and Space

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Organization, Efficiency, and Financial Management

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 
REPORT NO. IG-11-019 37

Major Contributors to the Report: 

Raymond Tolomeo, Director, Science and Aeronautics Research Directorate

Stephen Siu, Project Manager

Gerardo Saucedo, Team Leader

Jiang Yun Lu, Auditor 

Tiffany Xu, Auditor 

Cindy Stein, Technical Support 

Ron Yarbrough, Technical Support 
JUNE 8, 2011

REPORT No. IG-11-019 

OFFICE OF AUDITS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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