UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JOHN B. LOCKWOOD; THOMAS W.

ALLINGER; LUIS ARANDA; CURTIS G.

CONTEE; DALE EDNOCK; TYRONE

HENSON; MICHAEL J. LOJACONO;

GEORGE J. NUTTER,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

and

STEPHEN E. ALLEN, SR.; ANGELA M.

COLBERT-QUEEN; WILLIAM A. No. 99-2487

FOLGER, JR.; GEORGE M. GROOMS;

JAMES E. LAWS, III; NOLITA K.

PROCTOR; RUDOLPH THOMAS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY,

MARYLAND,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-98-1385-AW)

Argued: May 2, 2000

Decided: June 29, 2000

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS

and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: John Anthony Bielec, Deputy County Attorney, Upper

Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellant. Molly Ann Elkin, MULHOLLAND & HICKEY, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF:

Sean D. Wallace, County Attorney, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for

Appellant. Thomas A. Woodley, MULHOLLAND & HICKEY,

Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Prince George's County, Maryland (the County), appeals from the

district court's decision in Lockwood v. Prince George's County, 58

F. Supp.2d 651 (D. Md. 1999), in which the court granted a motion

for summary judgment in favor of John Lockwood and several other

former and current county fire investigators employed by the County's fire department (collectively, Appellees) who sued the County for

violations of the overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards

Act (FLSA). In granting summary judgment, the district court

rejected the County's legal argument that fire investigators are

exempt from the requirements of the FLSA under that statute's "fire

protection activities" exemption and held that the County owed

Appellees back pay in the form of overtime compensation. The district court also held that Appellees were entitled to liquidated damages under the statute, and it rejected the County's argument that the

FLSA could not constitutionally be applied to local governments.

Because we agree with the district court that, under the version of the

FLSA in effect during the period for which the district court awarded

 2
Appellees back pay,1 Appellees were not employees engaged in fire

protection activities and thus were subject to the FLSA's overtime

pay requirements, we affirm the district court's grant of summary

judgment on the issue of liability. We also hold that the district court

did not abuse its discretion when it awarded liquidated damages to

Appellees, and we thus affirm its grant of summary judgment on that

issue. Finally, we, like the district court, cannot accept the County's

invitation to overrule Supreme Court precedent that directly holds that

the FLSA constitutionally can be applied to local governments.2

_________________________________________________________________

1 Appellees were awarded back pay in the form of overtime compensation for the period from June 7, 1997, to July 31, 1999. During that time,

the FLSA provided no statutory definition of an"employee in fire protection activities"; there was only a regulatory definition of the term in 29

C.F.R. § 553.210(a). On December 9, 1999, Congress amended the

FLSA by inserting a definition for the term "employee in fire protection

activities." See 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(y) (West Supp. 2000). The new subsection reads as follows:

"Employee in fire protection activities" means an employee,

including a firefighter, paramedic, emergency medical technician, rescue worker, ambulance personnel, or hazardous material

worker, who --

(1) is trained in fire suppression, has the legal authority and

responsibility to engage in fire suppression, and is employed

by a fire department of a municipality, county, fire district,

or State; and

(2) is engaged in the prevention, control, and extinguishment of fires or response to emergency situations where life,

property, or the environment is at risk.

29 U.S.C.A. § 203(y). We do not apply the statutory definition here, as

the County cannot be charged with obeying a law not in effect at the time

of its actions. Still, we note that, in light of the definition of "employee

in fire protection activities" provided by 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(y), the fourpart regulatory definition provided by 29 C.F.R.§ 553.210(a) will need

to be revised. That definition, as we note later, speaks of an employee

engaged in fire protection activities as one who prevents, controls, or

extinguishes fires, while 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(y) speaks of an employee

engaged in fire protection activities as one who prevents, controls, and

extinguishes fires.

2 The district court also granted summary judgment to the County on

the issue of whether the FLSA's two-year or three-year statute of limita-

 3
I.

Appellees sued the County in the United States District Court for

the District of Maryland for violating the FLSA by failing to pay them

overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty hours per

week.3 Appellees worked the following shift schedule: two ten-hour

shifts, followed by two fourteen-hour shifts, followed by four days

off-duty. As the duties of Appellees are relevant to the first two legal

issues in this case, we shall briefly discuss the undisputed nature of

those duties.

The Prince George's County Fire Department is organized into the

Office of the Fire Chief and three major commands: the Management

Services Command, the Special Operations Command, and the Emergency Operations Command. The Office of Fire Investigations, in

which the fire investigators operate, is part of the Special Operations

Command. County firefighters are within the Emergency Operations

Command. According to the "General Order" governing the organization of the fire department and its duties, the Office of Fire Investiga-

_________________________________________________________________

tions applies to this case, holding that the two-year statute of limitations

applies because the County's violation of the FLSA was not willful.

Under 29 U.S.C.A. § 255(a) (West 1998), a two-year statute of limitations applies unless the employer's violation of the FLSA has been willful, in which case a three-year statute of limitations applies. Appellees

do not challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment on this

issue.

3 Appellees, along with the County, stipulated to the district court that,

until June 7, 1997, they were not due overtime compensation for hours

worked in excess of forty hours per week because they were covered by

the FLSA's exemption for employees engaged in law enforcement activities. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(k) (West 1998). The parties do not dispute

that on June 7, 1997, the County took away the arrest powers of all but

one of Appellees, Tyrone Henson, leaving the remaining Appellees outside the exemption for law enforcement activities. We note that, while

employees operating under the law enforcement exemption are entitled

to overtime compensation at a rate of time-and-a-half after working over

171 hours in a 28-day span, employees operating under the fire protection activities exemption are not entitled to overtime compensation until

they have worked more than 212 hours in a 28-day span. See 29 C.F.R.

§ 553.201 (1999).

 4
tions is charged with the following responsibilities: (a) enforcing the

fire and explosives laws of Maryland and the County; (b) reducing

arson, bombings, and other related crimes; (c) determining the cause

and origin of all fires and explosions in the County; and (d)

"[b]ringing to justice" all violators of fire and explosives laws. (J.A.

at 337.)

While it is undisputed that the main task of fire investigators is to

investigate the origin of fires rather than to extinguish fires, the

County emphasizes that fire investigators are within the chain of command of the fire department and that there is a significant overlap in

the training of firefighters and fire investigators; each fire investigator

candidate must have a minimum of three years of experience as a firefighter before he may apply for a transfer to the Office of Fire Investigations. The County notes that, while a fire investigator, unlike a

firefighter, is assigned to an office building rather than a fire station,

he is subject to being transferred to a fire station to work as a firefighter at any time.

Appellees do not dispute the County's assertion that as fire investigators, they can be pressed into firefighting service while they are on

the job as fire investigators. While there has always been some dispute as to whether the gear fire investigators carry in their squad cars

can be characterized as firefighting equipment or simply protective

equipment4 and as to how quickly fire investigators must arrive on the

scene of a fire, the County does not dispute the fact that it can provide

no example of an instance in which fire investigators have actually

been pressed into service at the scene of a fire to perform firefighting

tasks such as working a hose or entering a burning building.

II.

We review de novo the district court's decision to grant Appellees

summary judgment. See Altizer v. Deeds, 191 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir.

1999). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

_________________________________________________________________

4 The squad cars provided by the County for Appellees' use during

working hours are equipped with sirens and protective gear such as bunker pants, gloves, and helmets.

 5
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry

of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

As we review the district court's decision that Appellees are not

covered by the "fire protection activities" exemption of § 7(k) of the

FLSA and its award of liquidated damages, we must first keep in

mind that the County has the burden of showing that it is entitled to

the § 7(k) exemption. See Roy v. County of Lexington, 141 F.3d 533,

540 (4th Cir. 1998). In the event that Appellees are not covered by

the exemption, the County also has the burden of showing that liquidated damages are not appropriate. See Mayhew v. Wells, 125 F.3d

216, 220 (4th Cir. 1997). Most important, we must keep in mind that,

as a matter of law, "exemptions from or exceptions to the Act's

requirements, including the § 7(k) exemption, are to be narrowly construed against the employer asserting them." Roy, 141 F.3d at 540

(internal quotation marks omitted). Once a district court determines

that an employer violated the FLSA by wrongly claiming the benefit

of the exemption, we review its decision to award liquidated damages

for abuse of discretion. See id. at 548.

A.

The first issue pressed by the County on appeal is its contention

that the district court erred when it held, as a matter of law, that

Appellees were not employees engaged in "fire protection activities"

under § 7(k) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(k) (West 1998). Before

addressing the merits of this argument, we first provide an overview

of the relevant statutory and regulatory framework, starting with

§ 7(a) of the FLSA. That section requires employers to pay employees

at least time-and-a-half wages for hours worked in excess of forty

hours per week. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a) (West 1998). Section 7(k),

along with its accompanying regulations, provides a"fire protection

activities" exemption to this general rule, stating that an employer

need not provide overtime compensation to employees engaged in

"fire protection activities" until its employees work over 212 hours

 6
during a twenty-eight day period. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(k); 29

C.F.R. §§ 553.201 and 553.230 (1999). Both parties agree that Appellees' weekly shift schedules caused them to work more than forty

hours per week. They also agree that, if Appellees can be classified

as employees engaged in fire protection activities for purposes of 29

U.S.C.A. § 207(k), then they would not be entitled to back pay in the

form of overtime compensation because their shift schedules did not

cause them to work over 212 hours in a twenty-eight day span.

The FLSA's governing regulations provide a four-part regulatory

definition of "employee in fire protection activities." See 29 C.F.R.

§ 553.210(a) (1999). The County does not challenge the propriety of

the district court's use of this regulatory definition, arguing instead

that the district court incorrectly applied it to the facts of this case.

The regulation provides in relevant part that

the term "any employee . . . in fire protection activities"

refers to any employee (1) who is employed by an organized

fire department or fire protection district; (2) who has been

trained to the extent required by State statute or local ordinance; (3) who has the legal authority and responsibility to

engage in the prevention, control or extinguishment of a fire

of any type; and (4) who performs activities which are

required for, and directly concerned with, the prevention,

control or extinguishment of fires, including such incidental

non-firefighting functions as housekeeping, equipment

maintenance, lecturing, attending community fire drills and

inspecting homes and schools for fire hazards.

29 C.F.R. § 553.210(a) (1999).5 The parties agree that the job of fire

investigator satisfies parts (1) and (2) of the regulatory definition;

they disagree as to whether the job satisfies parts (3) and (4). The

County contends that the fire investigators have the responsibility to

prevent, control, or extinguish fires, and that the investigators perform

activities that are directly concerned with preventing, controlling, or

extinguishing fires.

_________________________________________________________________

5 Both 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.210 and 553.215 (1999) also provide alternate

definitions that are not relevant here because they apply only to ambulance and rescue service employees.

 7
In its first line of argument, the County offers a broad definition of

the word "prevention," which appears in parts (3) and (4) of the regulatory definition. Acknowledging that the main responsibility of fire

investigators is to investigate the origins of fires and to determine

their causes, the County maintains that the activity of investigating is

itself a fundamental part of fire prevention. The County notes that a

properly conducted investigation can help catch arsonists who might

strike again and perhaps spot trends responsible for the starting of

accidental fires. If the activity of investigating the origin of fires,

along with catching arsonists, is viewed as fire prevention, then, the

County argues, its fire investigators should be covered by the fire protection activities exemption of § 7(k).

The County's argument, however, stretches the term"prevention"

too far. In Carlson v. City of Minneapolis, 925 F.2d 264 (8th Cir.

1991) (per curiam), the Eighth Circuit confronted the same question:

Do fire investigators, in light of the regulatory definition provided by

29 C.F.R. § 553.210(a), prevent fires? The Eighth Circuit, after

observing that it had to construe § 7(k) narrowly against the city,

offered the following answer:

[W]e find unconvincing the city's argument that the investigators prevent fires by "remov[ing] arsonists from society

and deter[ring] others from intentionally setting fires." The

investigators do not anticipate, counter, or stop fires from

happening; rather, their work begins after fires occur when

they search for incendiary origins and, if required, identify

perpetrators for prosecution. Thus, we do not believe the

investigators engage in fire protection activities.

Id. at 265 (second and third alteration in original).6 We find the reasoning of the Carlson decision persuasive and apply it here. The job

of the Prince George's County fire investigators involves only the

aftermath of a fire. Once the fire is extinguished, they determine the

origin of the fire and, in cases of arson, help track down the arsonist.

Like the investigators in Carlson, they do not "anticipate, counter, or

_________________________________________________________________

6 The Carlson court also noted that the fire investigators, as part of their

job, "neither extinguish nor control fires." Carlson v. City of Minneapolis, 925 F.2d 264, 265 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).

 8
stop fires from happening." Id. The County's contention that its fire

investigators "prevent" fires relies upon an indirect connection

between post-fire investigations and future fires. The existence of this

indirect connection is no doubt plausible. In other circumstances, it

might give us greater pause. Because we must construe § 7(k) narrowly against the County, however, we agree with the district court

that reliance upon this indirect connection is simply not enough for

the County to meet its substantial burden of showing that the § 7(k)

"fire protection activities" exemption applies to Appellees.

The County's second line of argument focuses upon the fact that

fire investigators can, if needed, be pressed into service to fight fires,

i.e., that fire investigators may actually be involved in controlling and

extinguishing fires under parts (3) and (4) of the regulatory definition.

As noted by the district court, the first, and most obvious, problem

with this argument is that the County cannot provide one example of

when any Appellee actually suited up and fought a fire. This fact, in

light of 29 C.F.R. § 553.212(a) (1999), presents an insurmountable

obstacle for this argument. That regulation provides:

Employees engaged in fire protection . . . activities . . . may

also engage in some nonexempt work which is not performed as an incident to or in conjunction with their fire

protection . . . activities. For example, firefighters who work

for forest conservation agencies may, during slack times,

plant trees and perform other conservation activities unrelated to their firefighting duties. The performance of such

nonexempt work will not defeat the section . . . 7(k) exception[ ] unless it exceeds 20 percent of the total hours worked

by that employee during the workweek or applicable work

period. A person who spends more than 20 percent of

his/her working time in non-exempt activities is not considered to be an employee engaged in fire protection . . . activities for purposes of this part.

29 C.F.R. § 553.212(a). Because it is undisputed that fire investigators spend the vast majority of their time investigating fires, a role

that we have declined to term "prevention," logic compels the conclusion that this regulation forbids the County from applying the § 7(k)

"fire protection activities" exemption to Appellees because they

 9
"may," but never have been, called upon to control or extinguish fires.7

Because the County can point to no instance where Appellees have

actually been required to fight fires, it follows that more than twenty

percent of Appellees' time is spent on nonexempt activities, i.e.,

investigating the origins of fires and aiding in the finding of arsonists.8

_________________________________________________________________

7 The County argues that the fact that its fire investigators may be called upon to extinguish fires distinguishes the case from West v. Anne

Arundel County, 137 F.3d 752 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1048

(1998). In West, we found that the Emergency Medical Technicians

(EMTs) employed by Anne Arundel County's fire department were not

covered by the § 7(k) exemption. See id. at 761. The County notes that

part of our determination that the EMTs spent more than 20 percent of

their time engaged in nonexempt activities was based upon the fact that

EMTs were forbidden, by standard operating procedure, to engage in fire

suppression activities. See id. Thus, EMTs necessarily spent zero percent

of their time performing the exempt activity of fighting fires. Although

the County stresses that, unlike the EMTs in West, Appellees were not

barred from fighting fires, this is a distinction without a difference. Like

the paramedics in West, Appellees have spent zero percent of their time

fighting fires.

8 In support of its argument, the County relies primarily on two cases:

Lang v. City of Omaha, 186 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 1999), and Bond v. City

of Jackson, 939 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1991). In Lang, the Eighth Circuit

held that paramedics who were cross-trained as firefighters and available

to serve as back-up firefighters were covered by§ 7(k) of the FLSA. See

id. at 1038-39. The Lang court noted that, in serving a medical support

function on the scene of fires, paramedics -- serving only in their role

as paramedics -- are directly concerned with the effort to fight, i.e.

extinguish, fires. See id. at 1038. To the extent that the County wishes

to apply this logic to Appellees and suggest that Lang somehow overrules the Eighth Circuit's previous decision in Carlson v. City of Minneapolis, 925 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1991), we make two necessary

observations: First, fire investigators, serving only in their role as fire

investigators, do not, unlike paramedics, provide support services to firefighters that are directly concerned with fighting fires. Second, nothing

in Lang purports to overrule Carlson, a case that specifically dealt with

the normal duties of fire investigators and concluded that fire investigators are not covered by § 7(k) because they do not control, prevent, or

extinguish fires. See id. at 265. Of course, while the Carlson court gave

no indication as to whether the fire investigators in that case could be

called upon to fight fires in an emergency, the paramedics in Lang, like

 10
We, therefore, affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment

to Appellees on this issue.

B.

The County argues that, even if the district court was correct to

grant summary judgment to Appellees on the first issue, it erred when

_________________________________________________________________

the fire investigators in this case, were available to be pressed into firefighting service. See Lang, 186 F.3d at 1038-39. In reaching its holding,

the Lang court stated that the paramedics' role as backup firefighters did

place them "in a status that concerns itself with the extinguishment of

fires." Id. at 1039. We note that, in all probability, the role of backup

firefighter did not consume more than eighty percent of the paramedics'

time. The Lang court, however, never applied 29 C.F.R. § 553.212(a)

(1999) to the paramedics' time spent as backup firefighters, presumably

because of its observation that the paramedics' normal role of providing

medical support at the scene directly concerns the fighting of fires.

Because the logic of Carlson, as well as our discussion of the issue

above, indicates that the normal role of the fire investigator does not

involve the control, prevention, or extinguishment of fires, an application

of 29 C.F.R. § 553.212(a) to Appellees' role as emergency firefighters --

a role that no evidence indicates they have ever had to fill -- necessarily

indicates that they spend most of their time doing the nonexempt work

of conducting investigations into the cause and origins of fires.

The County next turns to Bond, a case in which the Fifth Circuit held

that emergency medical technicians (EMTs) employed by the city of

Jackson, Mississippi, were employees engaged in"fire protection activities" under § 7(k) of the FLSA. The Bond court's holding was based, in

large part, upon the fact that the EMTs were regularly dispatched to fires

and were trained to rescue people from fires. See Bond, 939 F.2d at 287-

88. The County contends that, if the EMTs in Bond, who were crosstrained as firefighters, were engaged in fire protection activities, there is

no reason that the same cannot be said for Appellees. What the County

overlooks is that the Bond court, in making its holding, relied upon the

separate regulatory definitions of "employees in fire protection activities," found in both 29 C.F.R. § 553.210 (1999) and 29 C.F.R. § 553.215

(1999), that apply only to ambulance and rescue service employees. See

id. Because these definitions do not use the terms "control," "extinguishment," and "prevention" in relation to fires, the Bond decision is inapposite to this case.

 11
it granted summary judgment to Appellees on the issue of liquidated

damages. Awarding Appellees liquidated damages was in error, it

says, because it had a good faith belief, based upon reasonable

grounds, that Appellees were covered by § 7(k) of the FLSA.

According to 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 1998),"[a]ny employer

who violates the provisions of . . . section 207 of this title shall be

liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their

unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as

the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages." (emphasis added). We have stated that the"FLSA plainly envisions that liquidated damages in an amount equal to the unpaid

overtime compensation are the norm for violations of § 7 of the Act."

Mayhew, 125 F.3d at 220 (emphasis added). Still, a district court can

refuse to make an award of limited damages under the following circumstances:

In any action commenced prior to or on or after May 14,

1947 to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime

compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C.A.§ 201 et

seq.], if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court

that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in

good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing

that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its

sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any

amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title.

29 U.S.C.A. § 260 (West 1998) (emphasis added); see also Roy, 141

F.3d at 548. Section 260 places "a plain and substantial burden upon

the employer to persuade the court that the failure to obey the statute

was both in good faith and predicated upon such reasonable grounds

that it would be unfair to impose upon him more than a compensatory

verdict." Mayhew, 125 F.3d at 220 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in awarding liquidated damages. We have previously held that an

employer may not take an "ostrichlike" approach to the FLSA by

 12
"`simply remain[ing] blissfully ignorant of FLSA requirements.'"

Roy, 141 F.3d at 548 (quoting Burnley v. Short, 730 F.2d 136, 140

(4th Cir. 1984)). The Second Circuit has noted, along similar lines,

that, within the context of 29 U.S.C.A. § 260, good faith "requires

that an employer first take active steps to ascertain the dictates of the

FLSA and then move to comply with them." Reich v. Southern New

England Telecomm. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 71 (2d Cir. 1997).

In granting summary judgment to Appellees on the issue of liquidated damages, the district court noted that, in 1991, the Eighth Circuit issued its Carlson decision and, in 1993, the Department of Labor

circulated an opinion letter "which expressly held that arson investigators did not fall within the fire protection exemption." Lockwood v.

Prince George's County, 58 F. Supp.2d 651, 658 (D. Md. 1999). The

district court specifically noted that there was no evidence on the

record that the County had attempted to reconcile its policy with the

letter or Carlson or taken any steps to ascertain applicable law that

might impact their pay policy in regard to fire investigators. See id.

We are mindful that the issue of whether Appellees are engaged in

"fire protection activities" within the regulatory definition is one on

which reasonable people can disagree. As noted above, the County's

argument regarding the meaning of "prevention" is certainly not

implausible, and our rejection of it rests upon a narrow construction

of § 7(k) against the County that is compelled by our case law. While

we are loathe to punish any local government for its failure to answer

a close question correctly, the district court's review of the record correctly indicated that the County never attempted to answer the question at all; it simply assumed, without more, that fire investigators

were to be treated in the same fashion under the FLSA as firefighters.9

_________________________________________________________________

9 After the Supreme Court decided Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which held that the FLSA could constitutionally be applied to local governments, the County formed a temporary

committee to assess whether it was in compliance with the FLSA.

According to the County, the committee, which worked on FLSA issues

for a period of over one year, determined that all firefighters were covered by § 7(k); the situation of fire investigators was not addressed by the

committee or by subsequent policymakers, however, because "[n]o distinction" was ever raised between firefighters and fire investigators.

 13
Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion

when it awarded liquidated damages to Appellees.

C.

Finally, the County argues that, in light of cases from the Supreme

Court that have recognized the importance of federalism, such as

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the

federal government cannot conscript state officers to enforce federal

regulatory programs), and United States v. Lopez , 514 U.S. 549, 567-

68 (1995) (refusing to "convert congressional authority under the

Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by

the States" by striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of

1990), the holding of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469

U.S. 528 (1985) (subjecting local governments to the FLSA), has

been undermined and thus should be overruled. In rejecting this argument, the district court properly noted that, in West v. Anne Arundel

County, 137 F.3d 752 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1048 (1998),

this Court rejected the same argument, stating that no Supreme Court

case has specifically overruled Garcia and that "any decision to

revisit Garcia is not ours to make." Id. at 760. In West, we paid special heed to the Supreme Court's instruction to federal courts of

appeals that "`[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in

a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of

decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly

controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own

decisions.'" Id. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American

Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)). In light of West's clear and

_________________________________________________________________

(Appellant's Br. at 24.) As noted earlier, however, the parties stipulated

to the district court that, until June 1997, when the County took away

their powers of arrest, Appellees were covered by§ 7(k)'s exemption for

employees engaged in law enforcement activities. See Lockwood v.

Prince George's County, 58 F. Supp.2d 651, 653 (D. Md. 1999). Of

course, the district court's finding that the County made no attempt to

ascertain the applicability of § 7(k)'s "fire protection activities" exemption to Appellees applies to June 1997 and the months that followed.

 14
recent statement that it is not our prerogative to overrule Garcia, we

necessarily reject the County's invitation to do so here.10

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's decision to

grant summary judgment in favor of Appellees.

AFFIRMED

_________________________________________________________________

10 Citing Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999), for support, the

County also argues that under the Eleventh Amendment, counties cannot

be subject to suit for violations of the FLSA. That the County would cite

to Alden for this proposition is odd because, while the Supreme Court

held in that case that Congress cannot subject non-consenting states to

private suits brought in state courts, it specifically noted that an "important limit to the principle of sovereign immunity is that it bars suits

against States but not lesser entities." Id. at 2267; see also Hess v. Port

Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47 (1994) (stating that "cities

and counties do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity").

 15