This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0556

Vernon E. Wallace,

Relator,

vs.

Metro Center for Independent Living, Inc.,

Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,

Respondent.

Filed January 19, 2016

Affirmed

Chutich, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development 

File No. 31888554-7

Vernon E. Wallace, Forest Lake, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Metro Center for Independent Living, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri (respondent)

Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, 

Minnesota (for respondent department) 

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and 

Chutich, Judge. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

CHUTICH, Judge

Relator Vernon Wallace, appealing on his own behalf, challenges a decision by an 

unemployment-law judge that he was discharged for employment misconduct and is 

therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits. Because we will not disturb the 

unemployment-law judge’s credibility determinations and because the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

FACTS

Vernon Wallace began employment with Metro Center for Independent Living in 

December 2012. In his role, Wallace regularly interacted with veteran mentors who 

volunteered in a mentoring program, veteran mentees who were also defendants in veterans 

court, veterans court staff including probation officers, and other center staff members. 

During eleven months of employment with the center, Wallace received several warnings 

and corrective actions related to inappropriate language and conduct and disregarding 

direction from his supervisors. Wallace was discharged from employment with the center

in November 2013. 

Wallace applied for unemployment benefits and was initially determined ineligible 

because he was discharged for employment misconduct. He filed an administrative appeal

to the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development. An initial

telephonic hearing was held before an unemployment-law judge. In January 2014, the 

unemployment-law judge issued a written decision of ineligibility determining that 
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Wallace had committed employment misconduct. Wallace filed a request for 

reconsideration, and the unemployment-law judge affirmed the initial determination. 

In April 2014, Wallace petitioned for certiorari review to this court for the first time. 

The department filed a letter conceding that the unemployment-law judge’s findings were 

unsupported by substantial evidence and that he abused his discretion in failing to order an 

additional hearing based on Wallace’s request for reconsideration. In October 2014, this 

court issued a special-term order reversing and remanding to the department. 

The department held a second telephonic hearing before a different unemploymentlaw judge in December 2014. At the outset of the second hearing, the unemployment-law 

judge stated that he would be considering new evidence in addition to the record from the 

first hearing. Over the course of the two hearings, testimony was taken from Wallace, his 

supervisor at the time of discharge, his first supervisor at the center, the center’s executive 

director at the time of discharge, a management-level employee of the center, two probation 

officers, and a veterans court employee. Wallace was not represented by a lawyer at either 

hearing; a hearing representative participated on behalf of the center at both.

Significant material discrepancies in testimony emerged at the second hearing. 

Ultimately, Wallace accused his supervisor and a probation officer of lying and 

collaborating to fabricate stories and evidence against him. When the unemployment-law 

judge pressed Wallace for some explanation as to why Wallace believed his supervisor

would go to such lengths to assemble an elaborate hoax against him, Wallace replied: “Oh 

boy, this is a sensitive thing....[The supervisor] is a self-professed lesbian....[which is] 

relevant because I think she hates men.” The unemployment-law judge asked whether 
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Wallace could “demonstrate. . .that [the supervisor] had a particular animus against men in 

general or that she had a particular animus against [Wallace] personally,” but admonished 

Wallace that if his only argument was that she is a lesbian, then “it’s utterly irrelevant and 

I couldn’t care less.” Wallace replied that he had no dispositive evidence, but that he felt

generally “uncomfortable” knowing that his supervisor was a lesbian and that he “didn’t 

want to be around her or the workplace because it felt like she was a bigger man than I was 

and she acted the part.” 

The second unemployment-law judge issued a written decision of ineligibility in 

January 2015. The decision included detailed findings and analysis to support the judge’s 

determination that Wallace committed employment misconduct. 

The unemployment-law judge found that Wallace had various inappropriate 

interactions at work, particularly with women colleagues. For example, he repeatedly 

called a center staff member “beautiful” and looked at her chest. Wallace frequently 

addressed a probation officer by unprofessional pet names and once referred to his 

supervisor as “the b-tch.” In addition, during a meeting about boundaries between 

professional roles, Wallace made an inappropriate sexual remark.

The unemployment-law judge further found that Wallace disregarded explicit 

instructions from his supervisor, including instructions to stop expanding the veterans

mentor program to additional counties, to stop promoting a “mentor-on-call” initiative, and 

to stop attending mentor-mentee meetings. When asked for an explanation about why he 

ignored these instructions, Wallace replied that his supervisor could not understand what 

his role needed because she was not a veteran.
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The unemployment-law judge also found that Wallace acted inappropriately in 

court-related contacts. He once advised a veteran-mentee not to tell his probation officer 

that he had consumed alcohol in violation of his probation terms, and Wallace inaccurately

informed a court employee that Wallace was no longer allowed to have any contact with 

veteran-defendants.

In the written decision finding employment misconduct, the unemployment-law 

judge acknowledged that key facts were “highly disputed” among Wallace and the various 

witnesses. Indeed, Wallace denied most of the above incidents in whole or in part. But 

the unemployment-law judge explicitly found that “[a]s a whole, the record shows that

Wallace’s testimony was not credible.”

Wallace filed a second request for reconsideration, after which a second order of 

affirmation issued. Wallace again petitioned for certiorari review to this court, resulting in 

this appeal.

D E C I S I O N

The purpose of the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Program is to provide 

“temporary partial wage replacement” to assist those who become unemployed through no 

fault of their own. Minn. Stat. § 268.03, subd. 1 (2014). This court may affirm the decision 

of an unemployment-law judge or remand the case for further proceedings; it may also 

reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the relator have been prejudiced 

because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision is affected by an error of law or 

unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the record as a whole. Minn. Stat. 

§ 268.105, subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2015).
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Chapter 268, which governs Minnesota unemployment insurance, “is remedial in 

nature and must be applied in favor of awarding unemployment benefits.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 268.031, subd. 2 (2014). An employee discharged for employment misconduct, 

however, is ineligible for unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) 

(2014). “Employment misconduct” is defined as “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent 

conduct . . . that displays clearly . . . a serious violation of the standards of behavior the 

employer has the right to reasonably expect of the employee.” Id., subd. 6(a)(1) (2014). 

“As a general rule, refusing to abide by an employer’s reasonable policies and requests 

amounts to disqualifying misconduct.” Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 

804 (Minn. 2002). 

Employment misconduct presents a mixed question of fact and law: whether an 

employee committed a particular act is a question of fact, and whether that act is 

employment misconduct is a question of law. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 

344 (Minn. App. 2006). An unemployment-law judge’s factual findings are viewed in a 

light most favorable to the decision, and they will not be disturbed if the evidence 

substantially sustains them. Id. Finally, and key to this appeal: credibility determinations 

are the exclusive province of the unemployment-law judge. Id. at 345.

The allegations against Wallace, if credited, amount to employment misconduct. 

Wallace’s appeal arises from his continuing theory that his supervisor choreographed an 

elaborate lie to satisfy a personal vendetta against him. Wallace acknowledges that the 

decision of the unemployment-law judge “came down to the credibility of the parties and 

who was telling the truth.” Here, the unemployment-law judge specifically found that 
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Wallace’s testimony “as a whole” was not credible. The judge’s decision analyzed the 

demeanor of various witnesses and the logical coherence of their testimony, and credited 

the testimony of the center employees over that of Wallace. We defer to this credibility 

finding. In addition, we conclude that the legal determination that Wallace committed 

employment misconduct is well supported by substantial evidence.

Affirmed.