Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

CBP's Ability to Detect Biological and Chemical 


Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 


(Redacted)
 

OIG-10-01 October 2009 
 

 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 

 October 7, 2009 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports 

prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and 

effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s capability to target and detect biological and chemical threats in maritime 

cargo containers. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant 

agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We 

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We 

express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 


Inspector General 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 


Executive Summary............................................................................................................ 1 


Background......................................................................................................................... 2 


Results of Audit .................................................................................................................. 3 


Development of Detection Devices ................................................................................ 3 


Risk Assessment of Pathways......................................................................................... 4 


Recommendation ............................................................................................................ 5 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................... 5 


Cargo Examination Policies and Procedures.................................................................. 6 


Recommendation ............................................................................................................ 7 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................... 7 


Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology........................................................... 9 


Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ......................................... 10 


Appendix C: Major Contributors to this Report .......................................................... 14 


Appendix D: Report Distribution ................................................................................ 15 


Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
OIG
 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

Section 809(g) of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 

Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-293) requires the Office of Inspector 

General to submit an annual report on its evaluation of the current 

cargo inspection targeting system for international intermodal 

cargo containers. Customs and Border Protection is responsible 

for operation of the targeting system and conducting cargo 

container examinations. This review addresses the tools, 

information, and guidance that the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection officers use to examine high-risk containers that 

potentially contain biological and chemical weapons. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection has taken steps to mitigate the 

threat of nuclear and radiological weapons in maritime cargo 

containers, but could do more to mitigate the threats posed by 

biological and chemical weapons. Customs and Border Protection 

officials said that new devices are currently being developed and 

tested that could help officers rapidly detect and identify biological 

and chemical threats during cargo inspections. However, Customs 

and Border Protection has not conducted a formal risk assessment 

to determine which pathways, including maritime cargo, pose the 

highest risk of biological and chemical weapons entering the 

Nation. Conducting a formal risk assessment of the various 

pathways would help ensure that Customs and Border Protection 

allocates its detection technology development resources to threat 

pathways that pose the highest risk to national security. 

In addition, Customs and Border Protection needs updated policies 

and procedures on how inspections for such threats are to be 

conducted. Currently,

 Operating procedures 

do not require that nor 

do they describe conduct the inspections. 

Without updated policies to focus cargo inspections, biological and 

chemical threats may go undetected. 

Customs and Border Protection concurred with our 

recommendations to complete a risk assessment and update its 

policies and procedures for inspecting cargo containers for 

biological and chemical threats. 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 


Page 1 

Background 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) mission includes 

protecting the American public against terrorists and the 

instruments of terror. One widely recognized vulnerability for 

entry of weapons of mass destruction is through the nation’s 

seaports. In 2008, approximately 11 million oceangoing cargo 

containers arrived at the nation’s seaports. To manage this large 

volume of maritime cargo, CBP employs a layered approach that is 

centered on advanced intelligence, effective inspections, a secure 

port environment, and successful implementation of examination 

policies and procedures. 

An effective inspection process includes the screening of shipping 

information, nonintrusive inspections, and physical examinations. 

The Automated Targeting System, which uses a complex model of 

weighted rules, assists CBP officers in screening shipping 

information and selecting shipments for inspection. Additionally, 

CBP officers at ports of entry use their local knowledge and 

judgment to select unusual or irregular shipments for inspection. 

A shipment selected by either the Automated Targeting System or 

local officers is held for a nonintrusive inspection. One type of 

nonintrusive inspection device takes x-ray images of the container, 

which CBP officers use to identify anomalies such as areas that 

appear unusual or inconsistent with the container contents listed on 

the shipping documents. Officers may refer a shipment with 

unresolved anomalies for physical examination, which may consist 

of a visual inspection of the container’s interior, limited inspection 

of selected contents, or complete unloading of cargo. Officers also 

use physical examinations to determine whether a shipment 

contains undeclared or inadmissible cargo. 

Both biological and chemical threats are classified as weapons of 

mass destruction. Biological threats, such as weaponized anthrax, 

smallpox, and foot-and-mouth disease, are disease-causing viruses 

or bacteria that can kill or cause harm to individuals or agricultural 

resources. Chemical threats, such as sarin and mustard gas, harm 

individuals or groups of people through exposure to toxic chemical 

substances. 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 


Page 2 

Results of Audit 


CBP has taken steps to mitigate the threat of nuclear and 

radiological weapons of mass destruction in maritime cargo 

containers, but could do more to mitigate threats posed by 

biological and chemical weapons. CBP officials said that new 

devices are currently being developed and tested that could better 

enable officers to rapidly detect and identify biological and 

chemical threats during cargo inspections. However, CBP has not 

conducted a formal risk assessment to determine which pathways, 

including maritime cargo, pose the highest risk of biological and 

chemical weapons entering the nation. Conducting a formal risk 

assessment of the various pathways would help ensure that CBP 

allocates its detection technology development resources to threat 

pathways that pose the highest risk. 

In addition, CBP needs updated policies and procedures on how to 

conduct inspections for such threats. Currently,

 Operating 

procedures do not require that 

nor do they describe conduct the 

inspections. Without updated policies to focus cargo inspections, 

biological and chemical threats may go undetected and officers 

may be exposed to health and safety risks. 

Development of Detection Devices 

CBP officers use nonintrusive inspection devices to scan cargo 

containers for anomalies and nuclear and radiological emissions. 

CBP officials said that new devices are currently being developed 

and tested that could better enable officers to detect and identify 

biological and chemical threats during a physical examination. 

These devices can potentially reduce the time and expertise needed 

to confirm the presence of a threat once a suspicious container is 

identified through targeting and x-ray imaging. 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 

Page 3 
Risk Assessment of Pathways 

As devices and additional resources for detecting biological and 

chemical threats become available, CBP must determine whether 

deploying those resources in the maritime cargo environment will 

provide the most benefit. CBP officials identified a number of 

pathways within CBP’s jurisdiction through which biological or 

chemical threats might enter the country

 CBP officials must prioritize which pathways 

should receive the most attention and detection technology 

development resources to address biological and chemical threats. 

CBP has not conducted a formal risk assessment of the pathways 

by which biological and chemical threats may enter the country as 

a basis for making its resource priority decisions. In 2007, CBP 

identified the need for a biological pathway risk assessment of 

where and how biological threats might enter the nation, but it has 

not taken significant action to address this need. CBP uses risk 

assessments prepared by other government agencies to target 

specific countries, shippers, and shipments for potential biological 

and chemical agents, 

One of CBP’s biological/agricultural subject matter experts said 

that, in general, 

However, the opinions of 

CBP’s subject matter expert are not reflected in CBP policies or 

resource allocations for cargo examination personnel and 

equipment and are not a complete substitute for a formal 

evaluation or ranking of the relative risks of the various possible 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 

Page 4 
threat pathways. A formal assessment would help identify which 

pathways pose the highest risk of biological and chemical weapons 

entering the country. It would assist in the evaluation of detection 

technologies under development. By focusing on the various 

pathways of entry, CBP could also better target its resources and 

better justify its approach to biological and chemical threat 

detection in the maritime cargo environment. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection: 

Recommendation #1: Conduct or commission a formal risk 

assessment of potential pathways by which biological and 

chemical threats may enter the country, and ensure that detection 

technology resources are allocated to the pathways that pose the 

highest risk. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CBP Comments to Recommendation #1: 

CBP concurred in part with our recommendation to conduct or 

commission a formal risk assessment of potential pathways by 

which biological and chemical threats may enter the country. CBP 

is participating in an initiative with DHS 

A second 

initiative is the DHS 

Through participation in these initiatives, CBP believes it will be 

well positioned to identify pathways that pose the highest risk of 

biological and chemical weapons entering the country. CBP 

expects that these initiatives will be completed by August 31, 

2010. 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 

Page 5 
OIG Analysis 

We consider CBP’s proposed actions responsive to this 

recommendation. We encourage CBP to continue these efforts and 

to maintain focus on identification of pathways that pose the 

highest risk. We consider this recommendation resolved, but it 

will remain open until CBP finalizes and provides us with a formal 

risk assessment of potential pathways by which biological and 

chemical threats might enter the country. 

Cargo Examination Policies and Procedures 

CBP has not provided updated guidance to support inspections of 

cargo containers for biological and chemical threats. The only 

document that details how cargo examinations should be 

performed is CBP’s 

which was last updated 

Despite 

the out-of-date guidance, CBP officers have broadened their 

examination techniques to search for weapons of mass destruction 

and they are trained to secure and isolate potentially hazardous 

containers. However, this guidance should be updated to address 

the current threats posed by biological and chemical weapons. 

CBP’s guidance also does not specify that officers conducting an 

examination 

 The Automated 

Targeting System or the local targeting team may identify a 

container as high risk and refer it for nonintrusive inspection and 

possibly physical examination. Once a container has been selected 

for examination, 

The guidance does not 

As a result, 

This could adversely 

affect the effectiveness of the officers’ inspections as well as their 

personal safety. 

A senior CBP official said that each inspecting officer should be 

knowledgeable of the likelihood of biological or chemical threats 

concealed within a shipment. However, we observed different 

operating procedures at several of the ports we visited. At one 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 

Page 6 
port, for example, supervisors emphasized that officers should 

always know what they are looking for during an examination. At 

this port, officers performing an examination were given a packet 

of information that listed shipping information and identified the 

reason a container was targeted. At another port, supervisors 

withheld the targeting information so that officers would not be 

predisposed to search for a specific threat. Updated policies that 

promote information sharing would provide the examining officers 

with consistent knowledge of the possibility of biological or 

chemical threats. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection: 

Recommendation #2: Develop and issue guidance to help ensure 

that Customs and Border Protection officers use consistent 

processes to examine cargo for all potential threats and are 

for 

examination. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CBP Comments to Recommendation #2: 

CBP concurred with our recommendation that it develop and issue 

guidance to help ensure that CBP officers use consistent processes 

to examine cargo. CBP stated that the Office of Field Operations 

has initiated efforts to update the Anti-Terrorism Contraband 

Enforcement Team National Directive. 

In addition, the Office of Field Operations has initiated efforts, in 

conjunction with CBP’s Office of Training and Development to 

explore the development of a training module for CBP officers that 

would include the different types of inspections/examinations. 

CBP expects that these initiatives will be completed by 

June 30, 2010. 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 

Page 7 
OIG Analysis 

We consider CBP’s proposed actions responsive to the 

recommendation. We encourage CBP to finalize and issue updated 

guidance as quickly as possible to ensure CBP officers have the 

most current guidance on cargo examination techniques. We also 

encourage CBP to pursue the development of a training module on 

the different types of inspections. We consider this 

recommendation resolved, but it will remain open until CBP issues 

and provides us with a copy of the updated guidance. 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 

Page 8 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The purpose of this audit was to determine whether U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) officers have the tools to identify and 

detect weapons of mass destruction, specifically biological and 

chemical agents, in maritime cargo containers. 

We interviewed government officials located at CBP headquarters 

in Washington, DC, and the Field Operations Academy in 

southeast Georgia. We judgmentally selected and reviewed CBP 

operations at the seaports of 

 We also reviewed training material and equipment 

used in the cargo security process. We developed an 

understanding of internal controls over the cargo security process 

by reviewing our prior audit work and CBP’s policies and 

procedures, interviewing knowledgeable CBP officials, and 

observing cargo inspections. The understanding we gained was 

used to plan the audit and determine the nature, timing, and extent 

of tests to be performed. 

We did not test the effectiveness of the nonintrusive inspection 

equipment and the physical examination process that CBP is 

currently using. 

We conducted this performance audit between November 2008 and 

March 2009 according to generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. 

We would like to thank CBP for its cooperation in the performance 

of this audit. 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 


Page 9 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 


Page 10 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 


Page 11 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 


Page 12 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 


Page 13 

Appendix C: Major Contributors to this Report 

 

Appendix C 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Brooke Bebow, Director 

Mark Ferguson, Audit Manager 

Jose Benitez-Rexach, Auditor 

Patricia Benson, Analyst 

Thomas Bobrowski, Analyst 

Elaine Ferguson, Analyst 

Tristan Weir, Analyst 

Andre Marseille, Independent Referencer 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 

Page 14 
Appendix D: Report Distribution 

Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff for Operations 

Chief of Staff for Policy 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Under Secretary for Management 

Chief Procurement Officer 

Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Executive Director, Cargo Security and Conveyance 

OIG Liaison, CBP 

DHS Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

CBP’s Ability To Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 

Page 15 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.