United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 23-2274

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Leonard Haskins

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Northern

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Submitted: February 12, 2024

Filed: May 22, 2024

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Before LOKEN, COLLOTON,1 and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

On June 18, 2021, Jonesboro, Arkansas police officers smelled marijuana as

they approached a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation, removed the driver and a

passenger, Leonard Haskins, and searched the vehicle. The officers found a 9 mm

1

Judge Colloton became Chief Judge of the Circuit on March 11, 2024. See 28

U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
pistol in the glovebox in front of where Haskins had been sitting. In a backpack

behind the passenger seat, they found various drugs including methamphetamine and

ecstasy, digital scales, and a box of 9 mm ammunition. Haskins admitted the pistol

and backpack contents were his. Another bag of ecstasy pills was found in his pocket

during booking at the jail. Haskins was indicted for four drug and firearm violations,

including being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1), Count One, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug

trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), Count Four. He pleaded

guilty to Count One; the government dismissed the other counts.

The Presentence Investigative Report (PSR) calculated the advisory guidelines

range: felon-in-possession base offense level 20; four-level increase for possession

in connection with another felony offense (drug trafficking); two-level reduction for

acceptance of responsibility; Criminal History Category III; range 51 to 63 months

imprisonment; statutory maximum sentence 120 months. The PSR noted that, absent

the plea agreement, Haskins would have been subject to a mandatory minimum 60-

month sentence if convicted of Count Four, “consecutive to any other sentence.” 

At sentencing, the district court2 adopted the PSR without objection. The court

granted Haskins a three-level acceptance reduction, reducing the guidelines range to

46 to 57 months imprisonment. Neither party objected or requested a variance. The

court advised defense counsel, “an upward variance may be appropriate in this case”

because, “given what I’ve seen in the PSR,” the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing

factors “would suggest a significantly higher sentence than the guidelines.” After

extensive argument by counsel and allocution by Haskins, the district court sentenced

Haskins to the statutory maximum of 120 months, a 63-month upward variance from

2The Honorable Lee P. Rudofsky, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

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the top of the advisory guidelines sentencing range. Haskins appeals, arguing the

sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm. 

“We review a defendant’s challenge to substantive reasonableness under a

highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Jones, 71 F.4th

1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2023). A district court abuses its sentencing discretion when it

“(1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight;

(2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only

the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of

judgment.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)

(quotation omitted). “[A] major departure [from the advisory guidelines range]

should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.” Id.

(quotation omitted). But it is “the unusual case when we reverse a district court

sentence -- whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range -- as

substantively unreasonable.” Id. at 464.

In explaining the sentence, the district court first noted that the offense of

conviction was not “what I’ll call a random” felon-in-possession offense. “[N]umber

one, you had a gun in connection with another felony offense. There were illegal

drugs around. . . . Number two, this is not your first felon in possession conviction. 

That raises the level and nature of the offense.” The court then explained that other

considerations “push[ed] this above the guidelines, and in my view considerably

above the guidelines,” because of the court’s responsibility to protect the public and

promote respect for the rule of law:

[W]hen I look at your PSR, I see a terrible murder, a brutal murder that

you committed personally, premeditated [in 1993] when you were 16. 

You used a firearm to end somebody’s life intentionally . . . after you

had time to think about it. . . . [A]fter . . . and during your significantly

long sentence, you continued to violate rules and violate the law

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repeatedly [showing] that a significantly long sentence was not enough

to stop you from violating the law. . . .

After that, you had more convictions. . . . [T]he one in 2009 . . .

was for a dangerous misdemeanor where you harmed somebody else,

including punching them in the face and hitting them with a stick.

In 2009 there was the felon in possession conviction. And not

only there did you have ammunition in your possession . . . . But you

also fled on foot, showing, again, a disdain for the rule of law . . . and a

disdain for police officers.

* * * * *

. . . I understand [counsel’s] argument that the last of these

convictions was back in 2009 and you’ve been out in the free world

since 2013 and . . . you didn’t commit any crimes -- or at least . . . while

you were arrested for a bunch, you weren’t convicted of anything. . . .

[T]hat’s important to me.

But, again, we’re not in a situation where you just had a gun [in

this case]. You had guns and drugs. You were committing additional

crimes in 2021. . . . [I]f you did take a break, you decided to go back

into the world where you shouldn’t go even knowing the consequences.

. . . Those . . . factors plus . . . respect for law, which I don’t

believe you have at all . . . are the factors that in my view push this all

the way to the statutory maximum . . . . [N]othing below it will do.

On appeal, Haskins argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing

an excessive sentence significantly above the advisory guidelines range sentence. He

emphasizes that the 1993 premeditated murder was committed at a young age, his

only prior drug conviction was for misdemeanor possession of marijuana in 2009, and

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his “only other crime of violence”3

 was the 2009 conviction for misdemeanor

domestic assault. He argues his history “does not present a defendant with a recurrent

history of convictions of violence to the general public or involvement [in] drug

related offenses different from that of the majority of federal criminal defendants

contemplated by the federal sentencing guidelines.”

After careful review, we conclude the district court did not abuse its substantial

discretion in imposing the statutory maximum felon-in-possession sentence. The 

court gave the applicable guidelines careful consideration, noting that, “while . . . not

mandatory [they] do have a significant weight,” but concluded that the § 3553(a)

sentencing factors warranted a substantial upward variance. The court considered the

mitigating factors noted by defense counsel but found them outweighed by § 3553(a)

factors -- specific deterrence, promotion of respect for the law, and protection of the

public from further crimes. The district court has “wide latitude” to weigh the 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and to “assign some factors greater weight than

others.” United States v. Obi, 25 F.4th 574, 582 (8th Cir. 2022). Thus,

“disagreement with how the district court weighed the relevant sentencing factors

does not justify reversal.” Jones, 71 F.4th at 1087. Though Haskins’ more serious

prior convictions were accounted for by the guidelines, “a sentencing court may vary

upward based on criminal history already accounted for by the Guidelines.” United

States v. Manuel, 73 F.4th 989, 993 (8th Cir. 2023). 

Regarding the extent of the upward variance, we have upheld sentences with

greater upward variances in cases involving similar considerations. See, e.g., United

States v. Johnson, 916 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 2019) (affirming a 204-month sentence

when the advisory range was 57 to 71 months). Accordingly, the judgment of the

district court is affirmed. 

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3Paragraph 23 of the PSR reported that, while incarcerated for the murder

conviction, Haskins was disciplined 13 times for “Battery” and “Aggravated Battery.”

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