In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-12472

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GRACE, INC., 

ENGAGE MIAMI, INC., 

SOUTH DADE BRANCH OF THE NAACP, 

MIAMI-DADE BRANCH OF THE NAACP, 

CLARICE COOPER, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

CITY OF MIAMI, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-24066-KMM

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Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

A little more than three months before City of Miami voters 

go to the polls to elect commissioners, the district court adopted 

the plaintiffs’ remedial plan to redraw the borders for the City’s five 

single-member districts and ordered the City to implement the remedial plan in lieu of the City’s redistricting legislation. Yet the 

Supreme Court “has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal 

courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of 

an election.” Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 

S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020); see also League of Women Voters of Fla., Inc. 

v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 32 F.4th 1363, 1371 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[F]ederal 

district courts ordinarily should not enjoin state election laws in the 

period close to an election.” (quotation omitted)); New Ga. Project 

v. Raffensperger, 976 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2020) (“The Supreme 

Court has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should 

ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” 

(quotation omitted)). This is “called the Purcell principle,” League 

of Women Voters, 32 F.4th at 1370, which comes from the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006).1 

1 In Purcell, the Supreme Court considered “an application to enjoin operation 

of voter identification procedures just weeks before an election” in Arizona 

and held that the court of appeals “was required to weigh, in addition to the 

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“That important principle of judicial restraint not only prevents voter confusion but also prevents election administrator confusion—and thereby protects the [local] interest in running an orderly, efficient election and in giving citizens (including the losing 

candidates and their supporters) confidence in the fairness of the 

election.” Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 

28, 31 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). “Court orders affecting 

elections . . . can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” Purcell, 549 U.S.

at 4–5. “When an election is close at hand, the rules of the road 

should be clear and settled.” Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 

31 (Kavanugh, J., concurring). That’s because running an election 

“is a complicated endeavor.” Id. “Lawmakers initially must make 

a host of difficult decisions about how best to structure and conduct 

the election.” Id. “[V]olunteers must participate in a massive coordinated effort to implement the lawmakers’ policy choices on the 

ground before and during the election, and again in counting the 

votes afterwards.” Id. “And at every step, state and local officials 

must communicate to voters how, when, and where they may cast 

their ballots through in-person voting on election day, absentee 

voting, or early voting.” Id. 

“[E]ven seemingly innocuous late-in-the-day judicial alterations to [local] election laws can interfere with administration of an 

harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases and its own institutional procedures.” 549 U.S. 

at 4.

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election and cause unanticipated consequences.” League of Women 

Voters, 32 F.4th at 1371 (quotation omitted). “If a court alters election laws near an election, election administrators must first understand the court’s injunction, then devise plans to implement that 

late-breaking injunction, and then determine as necessary how best 

to inform voters, as well as state and local election officials and volunteers, about those last-minute changes.” Democratic Nat’l Comm., 

141 S. Ct. at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). “Late judicial tinkering

with election laws can lead to disruption and to unanticipated and 

unfair consequences for candidates, political parties, and voters, 

among others.” Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 881 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). The Purcell “principle also discourages 

last-minute litigation and instead encourages litigants to bring any 

substantial challenges to election rules ahead of time, in the ordinary litigation process.” Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 31 

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 

For these reasons, and others, “when a lower court intervenes and alters the election rules so close to the election date, our 

precedents indicate that this [c]ourt, as appropriate, should correct 

that error.” Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207; see also

League of Women Voters, 32 F.4th at 1371 (“[I]f a district court violates that principle, the appellate court should stay the injunction, 

often (as it could not do under the traditional test) while expressing 

no opinion on the merits.” (cleaned up)). “[I]t would be preferable 

if federal district courts did not contravene the Purcell principle by 

rewriting [local] election laws close to an election. But when they 

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do, appellate courts must step in.” Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. 

Ct. at 32 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). So we do. 

Still, the plaintiffs may “overcome” the Purcell principle, 

“even with respect to an injunction issued close to an election,” if 

they “establish[] at least the following: (i) the underlying merits are 

entirely clearcut in favor of the plaintiff[s]; (ii) the plaintiff[s] would 

suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction; (iii) the plaintiff[s] 

have not unduly delayed bringing the complaint to court; and (iv) 

the changes in question are at least feasible before the election 

without significant cost, confusion, or hardship.” Merrill, 142 S. Ct. 

at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); accord League of Women Voters, 

32 F.4th at 1372–73 (applying Justice Kavanaugh’s framework from 

Merrill). Here, the plaintiffs have not made that showing.

First, it is not clearcut that the remedial plan the district 

court adopted remediates the alleged racial sorting in the City’s redistricting legislation. Comparing the maps, the district court’s remedial plan looks a lot like the City’s March 2022 redistricting plan

the district court enjoined. And, comparing the population data, 

the racial makeup of the district court’s remedial plan is close to the 

racial makeup of the City’s June 2023 redistricting plan.

Second, as to undue delay, the City adopted its redistricting 

legislation in March 2022. The plaintiffs waited nine months—December 2022—to file their lawsuit. And then they waited two more 

months—February 2023—to move for a preliminary injunction. In 

their response to the stay motion, the plaintiffs do not explain the 

eleven month delay.

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Finally, the plaintiffs argue that, under Purcell, the City did 

not submit any evidence to show the cost, confusion, or hardship 

of the district court’s remedial plan. But the plaintiffs are confused 

about their burden under Purcell. Under the Purcell principle, 

“lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules 

on the eve of an election.” New Ga. Project, 976 F.3d at 1284 (quotation omitted). But Purcell is not “absolute.” League of Women Voters, 32 F.4th at 1372. Instead, it “simply heightens the showing necessary for [the] plaintiff[s] to overcome the [s]tate’s extraordinarily 

strong interest in avoiding late, judicially imposed changes to its 

election laws and procedures.” Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); accord League of Women Voters, 32 F.4th at 

1372 (“[W]e agree with Justice Kavanaugh that Purcell only (but significantly) heightens the standard that a plaintiff must meet to obtain injunctive relief that will upset a state’s interest in running its 

elections without judicial interference.” (footnote and quotation 

omitted)). 

To “overcome” the Purcell principle “with respect to an injunction issued close to an election,” the “plaintiff[s] [must] establish[] . . . the changes in question are at least feasible before the 

election without significant cost, confusion, or hardship.” Merrill, 

142 S. Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Because of the City’s 

“extraordinarily strong interest in avoiding late, judicially imposed 

changes to its election laws,” the plaintiffs must make the showing 

that the remedial plan is feasible without significant costs, confusion, or hardship.

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They have not made that showing. At best, the plaintiffs argue that there will be no chaos in election administration because 

the elections’ supervisor said she could implement the new map by 

August 1, 2023. But the absence of chaos is hardly acceptable under 

Purcell. This says nothing about the significant costs, confusion, 

and hardships on candidates, voters, and the public. Even if the 

elections’ supervisor can pull off the election (although the plaintiffs never mention the significant cost of pulling it off), the district 

court’s remedial plan still imposes significant costs on candidates, 

voters, and the public. The district court’s remedial plan, for example, splits some existing precincts between districts that are up 

for election (not all the districts are up for election in November) 

and between one district that is up for election and one that is not. 

The result, therefore, of implementing the district court’s remedial 

plan could very likely be voter confusion: voters who were under 

the impression that they would be casting their ballots in November for seats in their district will no longer be doing so, and vice 

versa. Because “the plaintiffs have not established that the changes 

are feasible without significant cost, confusion, or hardship,” they 

“cannot overcome even a more relaxed version of the Purcell principle.” Id. at 881–82.

The plaintiffs push back that Purcell is inapplicable for two 

reasons. First, they contend that the City cannot rely on the Purcell

principle “in light of [its] previous representations to the district 

court that the schedule on which the district court proceeded was 

sufficient to enable effectual relief.” See Rose v. Raffensperger, 143 

S. Ct. 58, 59 (2022). But the City never made that representation 

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to the district court. Here are the two parts of the record that the 

plaintiffs cite in support. In its response to the plaintiffs’ motion for 

a preliminary injunction, the City wrote:

Plaintiffs’ Motion seeking an injunction is either a

year too late or 25 years too late. The redistricting 

occurred in March of 2022. This case was filed nine 

months later, in December. Plaintiffs then waited two 

more months before filing the Motion. A special election has already occurred last month, and another 

election is coming in November. Plaintiff[s] admit 

that the new districts would have to be set by August 

1. Even if there is a ruling on the Motion, new districts would have to be drawn, face inevitable challenges by Plaintiffs, and be ruled on by this Court, and 

this does not even factor in any appellate remedies. 

Plaintiffs make no excuse and give no explanation for 

their delay.

(citations omitted). This is not a representation that the district 

court’s schedule was sufficient to enable effectual relief. On the 

contrary, the City argued that, because of the plaintiffs’ delay in 

bringing their complaint to court, there was not enough time to 

get full review of any remedial plan.

The other part of the record is more of the same. At the 

hearing on the preliminary injunction motion, the City told the 

magistrate judge:

But the question then becomes, without any alternative math, and given that we are down to the wire, 

and that by August 1st, according to the Division of 

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Elections, according to the e-mail they put in, there 

needs to be a final, non-appealable map that’s gonna 

happen by November, and we would be in a situation—and they did wait; they waited nearly a year for 

the preliminary injunction to bring it. You would be 

in a situation where we would essentially be drawing 

the same maps and they would be rejecting them conceivably and then coming back here to have rulings 

upon them.

The City was clear that the August 1, 2023 deadline worked only if 

the district court’s remedial plan was “a final, non-appealable map.” 

But the district court didn’t adopt a “final, non-appealable map.” It 

adopted a temporary remedial plan while it considered the merits 

of the plaintiffs’ claim that the City’s redistricting legislation violated the Fourteenth Amendment. And, now, the temporary remedial plan is on appeal. Again, the City did not represent that the 

district court’s schedule was sufficient to enable effectual review in 

time for the November election.

Even the district court acknowledged that the City raised the 

Purcell problem throughout the litigation. As the district court explained in its order denying the City’s stay motion:

In the Motion, Defendant again raises the argument 

that Purcell applies to the instant Action. In fact, Defendant copies its argument regarding how Purcell 

should alter the standard by which the Court considers the instant Motion verbatim from its prior motion 

to stay. The Court has already addressed whether Purcell applies, not just once, but twice. It will not 

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evaluate the argument a third time. Therefore, finding Purcell inapplicable to the instant Action, the 

Court reviews the Motion under the traditional 

framework.

(footnotes and citations omitted). The district court understood 

that the City did not waive its Purcell argument.

Second, the plaintiffs contend that the Purcell principle 

doesn’t apply because the district court’s order adopting the remedial plan is the status quo and granting a stay (as the City asks us to 

do) would be tinkering with the election laws in violation of Purcell. 

But “[c]orrecting an erroneous lower court injunction of a [local]

election law does not itself constitute a Purcell problem. Otherwise, 

appellate courts could never correct late-breaking lower court injunctions of a [local] election law. That would be absurd and is not 

the law.” Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 882 n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); 

see also Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 31–32 (Kavanaugh, J., 

concurring) (“Applicants retort that the Purcell principle precludes 

an appellate court . . . from overturning a district court’s injunction 

of a state election rule in the period close to an election. That argument defies common sense and would turn Purcell on its head. 

Correcting an erroneous lower court injunction of a state election 

rule cannot itself constitute a Purcell problem. Otherwise, appellate 

courts could never correct a late-breaking lower court injunction 

of a state election rule. That obviously is not the law.”).

The dissenting opinion gives its own reasons for why the 

Purcell principle does not apply. First, it says, the City isn’t entitled 

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to a stay because it delayed seeking review of the district court’s 

preliminary injunction. But the dissenting opinion misunderstands 

what the City is appealing. The City isn’t seeking review of the 

preliminary injunction. The City is seeking review of the order, 

issued months later, adopting the plaintiffs’ remedial plan. The remedial plan didn’t exist before July 31, 2023. The district court 

adopted one that day. And, that same day, the City appealed and 

sought a stay pending appeal. There was no remedial plan for the 

City to appeal before July 31; the preliminary injunction didn’t impose one. The City was the opposite of dilatory. 

Second, the dissenting opinion contends that applying Purcell is perverse because it incentivizes the City to submit a constitutionally problematic map close to election time. But there’s nothing perverse about what the City did here. The City approved its 

redistricting legislation in March 2022. The plaintiffs waited eleven 

months to seek an injunction. We’re rubbing up against the election because of the plaintiffs’ delay. The City, in contrast, approved 

its redistricting twenty months before voters are set to go to the 

polls in November 2023.

Third, the dissenting opinion relies on an unpublished, nonprecedential order in Jacksonville Branch of NAACP v. City of Jacksonville, No. 22-14260, 2023 WL 119425 (11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2023). Of 

course, that order is not binding on anyone, including us. But, to 

the extent it was, the Jacksonville Branch order didn’t discuss or analyze the Purcell principle. Not one word about the application of 

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Purcell to these facts. It says nothing about the issues we address in 

this order.

* * * *

“[P]ractical considerations sometimes require courts to allow elections to proceed despite pending legal challenges.” Riley v. 

Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 426 (2008). As in Merrill, this is one of those 

times. While we “express[] no opinion on the merits” of the plaintiffs’ claims, League of Women Voters, 32 F.4th at 1371 (quotation 

omitted), the “Purcell principle requires that we stay” the district 

court’s order adopting the remedial plan and ordering the City to 

implement it. See Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 882 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). We therefore grant the City’s emergency motion to stay. 

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23-12472 WILSON, J., Dissenting 1 

WILSON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:

 Today, the majority allows the City of Miami’s November 2023 municipal elections to proceed under a map that the 

district court found “perpetuates the impact of the Enjoined Plan’s 

unconstitutional racial gerrymandering.” The majority faults the 

Plaintiffs for dilatory litigation and applies the Purcell principle1 to 

stay the implementation of the district court’s interim plan. Because any urgency in this appeal is attributable to the City’s delay, 

I would not reward them with a stay. Accordingly, I respectfully 

dissent. 

As the majority describes, in February of this year, the Plaintiffs sued the City of Miami to enjoin newly drawn district maps. 

In May, the district court preliminarily enjoined the City’s use of 

those maps (the Enjoined Plan) and, in consultation with the parties, set a schedule for the creation of remedial maps. The City’s 

officials stated that they needed new maps by no later than August 

1, 2023. The City appealed the preliminary injunction and sought 

a stay pending appeal from the district court, which was denied. 

The City could have then petitioned this court for a stay, but it did 

not. Ultimately, it voluntarily dismissed that appeal. 

Around the same time, the City adopted a new map (the Remedial Plan) and submitted it to the district court. Because of the 

preliminary injunction, the district court had to review the Remedial Plan before it could be used and had to ensure that it corrected 

1 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam). 

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the constitutional defects found in the Enjoined Plan. The district 

court compared the Enjoined Plan and the Remedial Plan, analyzing shifts in populations and geographic boundaries. Ultimately, as 

the factfinder, the district court concluded that there was both direct and circumstantial evidence that the Commissioners intended 

for the Remedial Plan to preserve the prior racial breakdown of the 

Enjoined Plan. Thus, the district court found that rather than remedying unconstitutional gerrymandering, the Remedial Plan perpetuated it. Because neither the Enjoined Plan nor the Remedial 

Plan passed constitutional muster, the district court ordered that 

an interim plan submitted by the Plaintiffs be used. The district 

court chose this plan because it respected the City’s legitimate, 

non-race-based policy goals; complied with traditional redistricting 

criteria; and adhered to state and federal law.

In asking us to invoke Purcell to stay the district court’s interim plan, the City is in effect asking us to overturn not just the 

district court’s order denying approval of the Remedial Plan, but 

because the district court found the Remedial and Enjoined Plans 

to be substantially similar in constitutional inadequacies, the City 

essentially requests that we reverse the merits of the preliminary 

injunction entered in May of this year. Yet, the time for challenging 

that order has long since passed. The City was fully entitled to appeal that order—in fact, it did appeal initially, but then opted to 

voluntarily dismiss its case. 

Thus, the emergency, time-constrained position in which 

we find ourselves is not the result of the “undue delay,” Maj. Op. 

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23-12472 WILSON, J., Dissenting 3 

at 6, of the Plaintiffs in bringing this suit, but rather the City’s 

choice to not pursue a stay at the preliminary injunction stage. The 

City seeks the extraordinary equitable remedy of a stay pending appeal. But, “a party’s inequitable conduct can make equitable relief 

inappropriate.” Ramirez v. Collier, 142 S. Ct. 1264, 1282 (2022). 

Such is the case here. See Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 840 F.3d 

1244, 1248 (11th Cir. 2016) (“A delay in seeking a preliminary injunction of even only a few months . . . militates against a finding 

of irreparable harm.”); see also Texas v. Biden, 10 F.4th 538, 558 (5th 

Cir. 2021) (“The self-inflicted nature of the [movant’s] asserted 

harm “severely undermines” its claim for equitable relief.” (cleaned 

up)). Just as a stay applicant may not delay, and self-inflict the imminent harm it seeks relief from, in my view the City may not delay 

in seeking a stay to justify invocation of the Purcell principle. Because of the City’s dilatory actions in this litigation, I would not 

grant them a stay. 

Before I conclude, I would like to make two further points. 

First, the majority focuses on the fact that Purcell does not prevent 

this court from correcting the district court’s erroneous injunction. 

But again, if the City believed the preliminary injunction was erroneous, it abandoned that position by dismissing its prior appeal. 

What the City now asks this court to do is stop an interim and (what 

the district court concluded is a) constitutionally sound map from 

being used in favor of the Remedial Plan that was found to perpetuate the same racial gerrymandering that plagued the Enjoined 

Plan. Allowing the Purcell principle to be invoked in situations like 

this creates a perverse incentive. Loose application of the Purcell 

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principle incentives litigants like the City to submit constitutionally 

problematic maps to the district court close in time to the election, 

with the knowledge that, if the district court disapproves the map 

the City will receive a stay from this court. Respectfully, I would 

not incentive such behavior. 

Second, we have addressed a similar situation in a recent 

case from the City of Jacksonville. Branch of NACCP v. City of Jacksonville, No. 22-14260, 2023 WL 119425 (11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2023). 

There, the City of Jacksonville asked us to allow the City’s approved remedial plan to go into effect despite the district court finding that the remedial plan perpetuated the constitutional violations 

of the original enjoined plan. Id. at *2. We declined to do so because this request in effect required us to rule on the constitutionality of the remedial plan. Id. at *3. “[A]nd an order on a motion 

for stay pending appeal is not a resolution of the appeal itself.” Id. 

Here, the City is asking us to do the exact same thing. Staying the 

district court’s interim plan in effect casts our approval on the constitutionality of the Remedial Plan.

Finally, because I would find that the Purcell principle does 

not apply, I would consider the typical stay factors2 and find that 

the City has not met its burden. 

2 In determining whether to grant a stay, the court considers the following: 

“(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured 

absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other 

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23-12472 WILSON, J., Dissenting 5 

I respectfully dissent.

parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” 

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). 

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