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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

112TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

S. PRT. 

2012

112–39 

SYRIA: HUMANITARIAN AID 

MAY NO LONGER BE ENOUGH 

A MINORITY STAFF REPORT 

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

WILLIAM C. DANVERS, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

Summary .................................................................................................................. 1 

Background .............................................................................................................. 2 

Financial Situation .................................................................................................. 3 

Lebanon .................................................................................................................... 3 

Jordan ....................................................................................................................... 4

Turkey ...................................................................................................................... 6 

Syria .......................................................................................................................... 7 

Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 10 

Map—‘‘Syria: Numbers and Locations of People Fleeing Internal Violence’’ ..... 12 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, September 19, 2012. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: The transitions in the Middle East as part of 

the ‘‘Arab Spring’’ have been relatively peaceful—except in Syria, 

where more than 20,000 have been killed in fighting between forces 

loyal to Bashar al-Assad and those rising up against him. Not only 

have thousands been killed, hundreds of thousands of refugees 

have fled across Syria’s borders and more than one million Internally Displaced Persons seek shelter with family and friends inside 

Syria either as they flee the fighting or because their homes and 

livelihoods have been destroyed. 

Syria’s neighbors are greatly impacted as refugees stream across 

borders looking for food and shelter. The situation is even more 

complicated as some nations allow opposition forces to recuperate 

inside their borders before returning to Syria to re-engage in the 

fighting. Allegations of arms shipments and possible training of 

anti-Assad forces muddy the waters further. 

Policy makers must recognize that Assad continues in power primarily because he has the full military and financial backing of 

Iran and the diplomatic support of Russia and China which have 

successfully blocked any major action against Syria in the United 

Nations Security Council. With Iraq (which is roughly two-thirds 

Shiite Muslim) leaning more and more to Tehran as a natural coreligionist ally, Iran’s influence under the current circumstances 

could create a crescent of power running from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Tehran. 

Syria is a majority Sunni state, yet is ruled by Assad who is a 

Shia-affiliated Alawi. Alawis comprise only 10 percent of Syria’s 

population. Sensing his weakness, and wanting to aid their fellow 

Sunnis, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have begun to send arms to 

Assad’s opponents. Turkey has demonstrated its willingness to 

allow the use of its territory as a base for the Syrian opposition, 

or to at least turn a blind eye. Syria has thus become a proxy war 

against Iran. 

In the midst of this, more than 250,000 refugees have fled Syria 

to neighboring countries, each of which offers a varying mixture of 

tolerance, indifference and active assistance either through their 

own governments or the international community. Providing them 

food, shelter and security is beginning to strain both the international community and the host countries which have their own 

economic and domestic political pressures. 

(V) 

vi 

Almost all parties agree that bringing the crisis in Syria to a 

rapid conclusion by removing Assad from power is in everyone’s 

best interest as it will allow refugees to return and hopefully diminish the role of armed groups in forming a new government. 

Original hopes that he would go quietly into exile have been shattered as the brutality of his forces makes military defeat the only 

real alternative. One of the biggest unknowns is whether Syrians 

will refrain from mass retribution against the entire Alawi community for ‘‘guilt by association’’ with Assad and his cronies. Paradoxically, such possible wide-scale violence not only threatens to turn 

Syria into another faction-riven state such as today’s Lebanon, but 

the fear of massacres is one of the tools Assad is using to convince 

his fellow Alawis to fight with him to the end. 

In order to understand the situation on the ground more fully 

and to assess the possible options for U.S. policy, I asked Paul 

Foldi of my Foreign Relations Committee staff to visit the region. 

He traveled to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey August 29–September 

8. As detailed more fully in the following report, Mr. Foldi found 

there are three possible courses for future U.S. action, each with 

risks and benefits. • Continue supplying humanitarian aid only.—This would keep 

the U.S. out of the conflict. But some argue that, as happened 

in Bosnia, our decision not to take sides in spite of a clear preponderance of aggression on the part of one side prolongs the 

suffering and allows the malefactors to commit even greater 

human rights violations. In this case, Assad long ago threw 

away any bid for international support with indiscriminant 

shelling, bombing and killing of civilians. • Impose a no fly zone.—Supporters say it will provide both a humanitarian safe haven for refugees and neutralize the value of 

Assad’s superior fighter planes, bombers and helicopters. Critics point out that Assad’s highly capable air defenses would 

make enforcement costly and potentially lethal and that similar zones in Iraq did nothing to assist Saddam’s opponents. 

• Train and arm the opposition.—Saudi Arabia and Qatar are already providing light arms, but in order to allow anti-Assad 

forces to succeed, they will need to be able to neutralize his air 

power with anti-aircraft weapons. The U.S. has provided such 

equipment to other insurgents in the past with mixed results. 

In this case, Turkey would be especially leery that such arms 

might fall into the hands of guerilla groups it is already fighting. 

I hope you will find this report useful as we attempt to address 

this crisis. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

Ranking Member. 

(1) 

SYRIA: HUMANITARIAN AID MAY 

NO LONGER BE ENOUGH 

SUMMARY

More than an estimated 250,000 Syrian refugees are now testing 

the stability of its neighbors Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. While 

each country has its own strains, Jordan is the nearest to an actual 

breaking point both financially and on the humanitarian front. 

Turkey has valiantly tried to handle the issue on its own but it 

must now ask for more and more international assistance. Somewhat surprisingly, Lebanon, with its already chaotic sectarian 

issues, seems the least impacted by the refugees for now. Nonetheless, if allowed to continue, governments in Jordan certainly, and 

Turkey possibly, could fall if refugee waves continue. 

Foreign Relations Committee staff traveled to each of these countries to meet with local political leaders, international aid workers 

and NGOs, and American State Department officials to assess the 

crisis. Visits and meetings were held in Beirut, Lebanon; Amman, 

Jordan, Za’atri and Cyber City Refugee Camps in Jordan; Istanbul, 

Turkey, Turkish Refugee Camps in Hatay Province next to the Syrian border, and Ankara, Turkey, from August 29 to September 8, 

2012. 

With Saudi Arabia and Qatar supplying arms for Assad’s looseknit opponents known as the Free Syria Army and Iran fully supporting Assad with weapons and funds, this civil war has, de facto, 

become a proxy war against Iran. U.S. policy makers must now decide if the potential for regional destabilization as a result of 

unabated refugee flows will be less costly in long run than greater 

U.S. military involvement in the short run—either through a 

NATO No-Fly-Zone (originally requested by Turkey) or more significant arms and training to the FSA than they currently receive. 

Risks are inherent either way. A prolonged war, in addition to the 

mounting humanitarian costs, will also permit the increased entrenched factionalization of both the military and political opposition. NATO involvement will be costly in terms of armaments expended and possible causalities or prisoners. U.S.-provided weapons and training may drag other nations into the conflict and could 

result in arms falling into the wrong hands. 

2 

2See the State Department’s Humanitarian Information Unit’s map from September 12, 2012 

at the end of this report for more information. Updated maps and information can be found at 

https://hiu.state.gov/pages/home.aspx 

BACKGROUND

(in millions) 

Total 

Population 

New Syrian 

Refugees/IDPs 

Existing 

Iraqi Refugees Palestinians 

Syria1 21 1.2 1.0 0.5 

Lebanon 4.3 0.070 0.1 0.450 

Jordan 6.2 0.087 0.4 2.0 

Turkey 0.75 0.080 nominal N/A 

1 Figures come from USAID Syria Fact Sheet # 3; September 5, 2012: http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/syria/template/ 

fs_sr/fy2012/syria_ce_fs03_09-05-2012.pdf 

August saw the highest monthly outflow of refugees from Syria— 

over 100,000. The actual number for each country fluctuates wildly 

(‘‘official‘‘ numbers come from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) list of registered refugees, but because there are 

no visa requirements for Syrians to enter these three countries, 

these numbers are undoubtedly low; some say as many as 140,000 

are currently in Jordan). Many refugees arrive wounded, either because they were fired upon by Syrian security forces as they attempted to escape or because they are wounded combatants. Border 

crossings open and close with great irregularity, forcing many refugees to use as active or abandoned smuggling routes, gaps in fences 

where fences exist, or just crossing miles of trackless desert. There 

are even reports of refugees wounded in minefields along parts of 

the border.2

Depending on the security situation, many Syrian refugees return home temporarily to check on family (or fight) and depart 

again when the situation deteriorates. This transient aspect of the 

refugees can result in double or even triple counting. In addition 

to this recent influx, Lebanon and Jordan are host to large number 

of Iraqis displaced in the last decade and Palestinians who arrived 

decades ago and who have remained for the multiple generations 

that have been born since. 

Most Syrian refugees in Lebanon are not in camps but live with 

family members, friends, or rent housing. In Turkey, refugees are 

mainly in well laid out camps (some tents, many in converted/subdivided warehouses) with older camps near the border, newer ones 

farther away. Jordan has a mix, though almost all new arrivals are 

going into camps (the largest of 25,000+ is a dusty, desolate U.N. 

camp called Za’atri that staff visited). Roaming Syrian populations 

inside their own country (Internally Displaced Persons ‘‘IDPs’’) 

cluster near the Turkish border awaiting entry or seeking protection or shelter with relations in other parts of Syria. 

As with all refugee situations, children are the most vulnerable 

and stressed, both in terms of missing parents and inadequate eduVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:56 Oct 05, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\TOPIC REPORTS\MINORITY\SYRIA, PAUL F
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3http://jordan.usembassy.gov/pr_100_million_asst_072212.html 4 ‘‘Jordan, U.N. Appeal for $700 Million To Help Deal With Refugees’’ Washington Post; September 1, 2012: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle—east/jordan-un-appeal-for-700- 

million-to-help-deal-with-influx-of-syrian-refugees/2012/09/01/d544891c-f431-11e1-b74c84ed55e0300b_story.html 5 ‘‘Aid Agencies Scrambling to Relocate Refugees from Schools’’ Voice of America: August 31, 

2012: http://www.voanews.com/content/aid-agencies-scramblint-to-relocate-refugees-from-syrianschools/1499528.html 

cational/recreational opportunities. Bored children, especially adolescents, trapped inside walled or fenced facilities are particularly 

prone to venting their frustration through violence when cajoled or 

provoked by a few malcontents. Soccer balls and school books are 

just as necessary as food and shelter. 

FINANCIAL SITUATION

To date the U.S. has offered $103 million in regional assistance, 

primarily to the World Food Program (WFP) and to the U.N. High 

Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The U.S. also just finalized 

$100 million in Direct Budget Support to Jordan.3 Jordan, always 

cash-strapped, has still not received the $1 billion in direct support 

it gets every year from Saudi Arabia, and the government, in conjunction with the U.N., issued an international appeal at the beginning of September for $700 million to help with the crisis.4 Turkey 

has spent more than $300 million of its own resources on the refugees. It is unclear when Assad will run out of money. Estimates 

fluctuate wildly, and some speculate he will be broke by the end 

of the year due to a burn rate of up to $1billion/month, but these 

figures are pure guesswork at this point. Others contend he has 

money squirreled away or that Iran might be willing to fund him. 

LEBANON

Lebanon’s capital Beirut remains relatively calm due in part to 

the government’s official policy of ‘‘disassociation’’ with the Syrian 

crisis—a policy brought about because Iran’s client Hezbollah forms 

part of the Lebanese government. This policy has not prevented 

sectarian fighting from spilling over into Tripoli in the north as rivals mirror the fighting just across the border. Occasionally, crossborder firing and even shelling has taken place, so far with no 

major consequences. Lebanon’s politics are so chaotic that the Syrian refugees are actually a boon to business. An earlier spate of 

kidnappings of Lebanese inside Syria resulted in tit-for-tat 

kidnappings inside Lebanon. This led most Gulf countries to urge 

their citizens to flee or to avoid tourism-dependent Lebanon. Welloff Syrian refugees have filled much of that void, renting vacant 

apartments with year-long leases, to the point that rents are escalating. For those without such funds, Lebanon was able to convert 

many empty schools into temporary shelters, yet school is about to 

start and it is not clear where those families will move to once displaced.5

Lebanon’s multi-racial/multi-ethnic nature resulting from intermarriages between tribes and sects has created safe-havens for 

those Syrians who are able to stay with family. Depending on the 

level of Syrian military/police checkpoints—some of which require 

a bribe to pass and some which do not—as well as Hezbollah checkVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:56 Oct 05, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\TOPIC REPORTS\MINORITY\SYRIA, PAUL F
4 

6 Reconstruction of the Nahrel-Bared Camp & UNRWA Compound: http://www.unrwa.org/ 

userfiles/2011042974549.pdf 

points in Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley, Damascus to Beirut is 

but a short, 50 mile car ride. This proximity has allowed many Syrians to return temporarily to their capital or nearby towns. 

Palestinian issues continue to plague Lebanon. Funds are still 

lacking for the final rebuilding phase of a large section of an 

UNRWA ‘‘camp’’ (no tents, but an entire urban neighborhood) that 

was destroyed by the Lebanese army in 2007 in a firefight which 

displaced 30,000.6 Palestinians had limited property and work 

rights in Syria; they have far fewer in Lebanon. Housing options 

for them are limited absent the rebuilding of the destroyed neighborhood and as Palestinians, according to treaty, can only receive 

assistance from UNRWA, not UNHCR. 

JORDAN

U.S. Embassy officials praised the Jordanian Armed Forces 

(JAF) for doing all it can to assist Syrian refugees. The JAF welcomes them at the border, and in the beginning, men and officers 

fed refugees out of their own rations. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is now providing JAF with additional humanitarian 

equipment to assist with refugee management. Wide-scale allegations of Jordanian authorities seizing refugee travel docs are denied by the government. Such allegations are no surprise and indeed may have occurred early in the crisis as overwhelmed border 

officials quite conceivably tossed passports/ID cards into boxes with 

the hopes of sorting them out later. However, the matter now 

needs to be redressed quickly—both to return rightful property but, 

more importantly, to allow Syrians needed documents to return 

home. 

Jordan’s scarce water resources are strained under any conditions and many have long blamed Syria for stealing more than its 

share from the Yarmouk tributary of the Jordan River that forms 

the north-west most portion of the Jordan’s border with Syria. 

Hosting 100,000+ Syrians will only compound this, especially as 

many Syrians appear not always sympathetic to the demands of 

water conservation required in Jordan’s more arid environment. 

Additionally, Jordan’s sluggish economy and allegations of highlevel economic corruption are straining domestic forces. This could 

easily lead to either 1) the refugees rioting themselves over mistreatment or 2) inflame popular protests against a king and government that is perceived as aiding refugees while ignoring the 

plight of its own citizens. While the King seems to understand the 

message behind the Arab Spring, he has not been able to make sufficient reforms to quell growing unrest. To compensate, or, as his 

domestic critics would charge, curry favor in order to prop up his 

rule, King Abdullah has been extremely accommodating to U.S. requests during this crisis. 

Even Jordan, with its long history of tolerating large foreign-born 

populations, has its limits. Thus some six weeks ago it began planning a massive camp to house the latest influx of refugees. Called 

Za’atri, and located near Jordan’s north-west border with Syria, the 

5 

camp has ballooned to well over 25,000 refugees with upwards of 

1,000 arriving daily. Administered by UNHCR with help from 

UNICEF, the World Food Program (WFP), Save the Children and 

a host of other donors, the tented camp quickly got out of hand. 

Conditions in the older half of the camp are particularly dire as 

well-meaning engineers graded the ground to allow for flat surfaces, but this only displaced the thin layer of topsoil and created 

a desolate and dusty environment instead. The U.S., particularly 

DoD, was able to apply some rapid funding to procure truckloads 

of gravel which are now being used in the newer portions of the 

camp (called Za’atri 2, 3, etc.) and keep the dust down quite well. 

Many of the refugees are from Syria’s upper and middle class. Staff 

spoke with lawyers and doctors who fled with nothing but who are 

beginning to chafe at their conditions. 

At Za’atri, the food and water demands of the camp are insatiable and are straining relations with nearby towns and villages 

which fear that scarce resources will soon disappear. Communal 

kitchens are being constructed in Za’atri to alleviate the current dietary monotony, but establishing a food voucher system to allow 

camp residents to purchase what they want to cook will take time. 

Refugees are provided with a solar powered lamp, mattresses, blankets and a few other household items. Latrines and showers use 

gravity tanks and are surprisingly hygienic given the environment 

and constant usage. Security is an issue as an earlier riot injured 

several police officers (who, with great discipline, refused to attack 

the mob), but the police now refuse to patrol the camp. 

A lucky few families have small 9x18 single room trailers instead 

of tents. While these provide better living than tents, it is a matter 

of scale. The trailers are more permanent, and could be transported 

back to Syria if needed; however, for the price of one trailer, 

UNHCR can provide 4–5 tents. The approach of winter—bitterly 

cold in the desert—also means additional resources will have to be 

spent for heaters and extra tarps to winterize tents. 

Dust covered UNCHR tents in the original Za’atri camp 

6 

(left) Container housing in Za’atri (right) Za’atri 2 Camp with U.S.-provided gravel 

keeps the dust down 

TURKEY

Turkey’s huge population means the actual number of refugees 

(or ‘‘guests’’ as they are officially called; ‘‘refugees’’ is a loaded word 

for the Turks and verboten) is statistically insignificant. Turkey 

has spent $300 million thus far supporting these guests (MFA officials quoted $10 million to build a camp to house 10,000 and $3 

million/month to operate it). Meanwhile the opposition party goads 

the government daily either for not doing enough to help the refugees or for questioning the abrupt about face on the country’s formally cozy ties with the Assad regime. (Some observers believe 

Turkey’s current stance against Syria is personal and comes from 

the rebuff Assad gave to Turkish PM Erdogan’s suggestions to 

Assad for democratic reforms following the Arab Spring.) 

Turkey originally created a Cadillac of a camp when the refugee 

waves first hit. This is understandable for several reasons. Turkey’s economy is booming, and the country wanted to show off its 

wealth and prestige accordingly. 

As the refuges continued to pour in, the Turks scaled back subsequent efforts, but compared to Za’atri, the camps in Turkey are 

still upscale. Staff visited an abandoned two-story warehouse that 

had been subdivided using sheetrock/drywall into multiple units, 

each with a door and window facing a common hall, with a stove 

and water jug, as well as an operating electric fan. While not paradise by any means, it is miles above Za’atri. Refugees are allowed 

to leave camp from 8am-8pm and local press reports said they were 

a boon to the Turkish agricultural industry. Those with money they 

brought or from friends were able to outfit their rooms as needed 

and one had even purchased an air conditioner. 

Turkey’s initial go-it-alone attitude has begun to waver, and the 

government let it be known that 100,000 refugees was a red-line 

for the government. Turkey recently asked UNHCR to become 

more involved in planning future sites, which UNHCR contends 

must be farther from the border—at least one day’s walk—as this 

deters those inside from using a camp as a base of operations. 

UNHCR told staff that one current camp in Turkey was even found 

to have a tunnel under the border into Syria, it was so close. 

7 

7 ‘‘Turkey Shifts Syrian Refugees From Borders’’ Voice of America, September 13, 2012: http:// 

www.voanews.com/content/turkey_shifts_syrian_refugees_from_broders/1507286.html 8 ‘‘Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Commander Says Its Troops In Syria′′ Reuters, September 16, 

2012: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/16/us-iran-syria-presence-idUSBRE88F04C2 

0120916 

A Turkish warehouse converted to house Syrian ‘‘guests’’ 

Keeping camps for refugees and not as an R-and-R spot for opposition fighters will not only allow better internal controls, but ensure the safety of non-combatants in the camp, according to 

UNHCR. Turkey’s most recent efforts to move those refugees living 

in rented homes near the Syrian border into camps reflects Ankara’s desire to know exactly who is inside their borders.7 However, 

any Turkish attempts to restrict young males from popping in and 

out of Syria—whether to fight or to check on family—will no doubt 

increase tensions inside the camps. 

In hopes of limiting the number of Syrian ‘‘guests,’’ Turkey has 

begun a novel approach known as ‘‘Zero Point Distribution.’’ Food 

and basic hygiene necessities are left right at the Syrian border 

(i.e.—the Zero Point) with the hope that Syrians will be able to 

subsist off this assistance yet remain in Syria. Staff visited a Zero 

Point distribution center located only a mile from the border and 

run by the Turkish Red Crescent which stockpiled bottled water, 

prepackaged boxes of food, even bags of American rice purchased 

on the local market. The aid is dropped off along the border, but 

not near official crossings where it might fall into Syrian government hands. 

SYRIA

The U.S. must decide the extent to which it wants to participate 

in the on-going proxy war against Iran, which is what Syria has 

become thanks to assistance from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to the 

Free Syria Army (FSA) versus Iranian8 (some add Chinese, possibly Russian) assistance to Syria. Defeating Assad is beating 

Tehran. With Iraq leaning ever more towards its Shiite neighbor 

to the East, it is in no one’s interest to allow Tehran to have a geopolitical and actual terrorist crescent running from Tehran to 

Hezbollah/Hamas. 

8 

9 ‘‘CIA Said To Be Steering Arms To Syrian Opposition’’ New York Times; June 21, 2012: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/middleeast/cia-said-to-aid-in-steering-arms-to-syrianrebels.html?pagewanted=all 

The U.S. so far has engaged officially only in humanitarian assistance (though some press reporting suggests otherwise.) 9 However much the current levels of humanitarian and financial assistance are appreciated by senior politicians in the region, the populace little knows of U.S. efforts because it comes either as direct bilateral budgetary support or is diluted with other funds through 

U.N. agencies. Even though they have delivered only a few, the 

Saudi’s promise of thousands of temporary trailers to shelter refugees has earned them wide praise in the Jordanian street. 

Some argue that more overt U.S. assistance for the FSA will 

counter the perception that we did nothing to help oust Mubarak; 

these observers also contend U.S. military help would keep the 

FSA from being too beholden to Saudi and Qatari Wahhabists. Others say that, as recent tragic events suggest, our efforts in Libya 

have borne little pro-U.S. fruit and that we could expect the same 

in Syria. 

There is no question the FSA is a loose coalition of forces whose 

only unifying factor is a desire to oust Assad via military means 

now that it is clear he will not go quietly. The FSA runs the gamut 

of idealistic students who took up arms after their peaceful demonstrations were fired upon to foreign Al Qaeda fighters looking for 

action to help their Sunni brethren. In between are Syrian army 

defectors, shop keepers and every other stratum of Syrian society. 

Politically, the opposition is just as splintered. The most prominent is the Syrian National Conference (SNC); however, the SNC 

is viewed inside Syria as a bunch of ex-pats who jet around the 

world decrying the situation but who are unable to provide the FSA 

with either weapons or funds from the Syrian diaspora or donor 

communities, and at the same time refuse to die in the rubble with 

the FSA. Given this military and political Tower of Babel, the real 

danger exists that an Assad-free Syria—far from controlling Lebanon as it used to—will become another Lebanon as those with the 

guns will make the rules. 

A gym near the Turkish/Syria border converted to a warehouse to store items for 

Turkish Red Crescent’s ‘‘Zero Point Distribution’’ 

9 

10 Antennas provided are the size of dinner plates and therefore easily hidden on rooftops or 

balconies. 

While staff heard from younger FSA members and some in the 

SNC that Assad’s exit will bring an abrupt peace, most Syria 

watchers believe that the fighting is now tribal and sectarian. One 

interlocutor told staff of a comment from a foreign contact of 

Assad’s. ‘‘Before Ramadan in 2011, I was speaking to the leader of 

Syria; after Ramadan, I was speaking to the leaders of the 

Alawites.’’ While they comprise barely 10% of Syria’s population, 

virtually all military and political power concentrated in Alawite 

hands. As such, most observers believe they will now fight to the 

death to maintain power, and that their brutality to date means— 

regardless of their role—almost all will be rounded up and killed 

when Assad is defeated. Such a scenario is also used by Assad to 

sustain the Alawites in their fight against the opposition as he 

warns fellow clansmen they are in a literal matter of life and 

death. 

To combat the current political fragmentation, the U.S. State Department, through its Istanbul-based OSOS (Office of Syrian Opposition Support—a creation of State’s bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)) is training Syrian activists in the use 

of secure communications and providing them with Arabic-language laptops and mobile satellite up-links.10 This training is 

based upon the Obama administration’s policy of ‘‘non-lethal aid for 

non-lethal actors.’’ The training—thus far in groups of a dozen— 

must be held in Istanbul, a city of 10 plus million, in order to provide both the trainers and the trainees greater anonymity. While 

it is certainly more expensive to run the training from Istanbul 

rather than closer to the border, this blending-in allows OSOS to 

keep a low profile and maintain better security. Trainers switch to 

another of the city’s countless hotels every few sessions; such anonymity would be impossible in the tiny, tightly-knit villages near 

the border. 

Younger trainees (all of whom must be smuggled from Syria to 

Istanbul), however, want more than the limited data package offered with the computer/antenna. The YouTube generation believes 

it can win greater international support (and possibly intervention) 

by continual uploading of graphic videos showing Syrian atrocities. 

U.S. sponsored trainers stress there are already enough videos out 

there. They argue, rather, the need is to create nascent political 

networks using the equipment to link up with fellow activists in 

neighboring towns (instead of transmitting the large, and costly, 

video files which the OSOS package will not support). Trainers 

dangle rewards of increased data packages (which can be paid for 

in Istanbul) for activists who contact OSOS upon their return to 

Syria and report on their location, conditions, etc. OSOS will expand training to larger classes and more direct democratic transition activities in the coming weeks. 

As the friction with OSOS’s support demonstrates, Assad opponents want more than just tents for refugees and laptops, they 

want the means to remove him militarily. While it is clear that 

Saudi Arabia and Qatar are providing arms to their Sunni co-religionists (primarily via Turkey, where U.S. press reports suggest 

10 

11 ‘‘Syrian Rebels Get Influx Of Arms With Gulf Neighbors’’ money, U.S. coordination′′ Washington Post; May 15, 2012: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrian-rebelsget-influx-of-arms-with-gulf-neighbors-money-us-coordination/2012/05/15/ 

gIQAds2TSU_story.html; ′′Turkey Calls For No Fly Zone′′ CBSNews.com; August 31, 2012: 

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202—162-57504064/turkey-calls-for-syria-safe-zones-u.n-securitycouncil-remains-unmoved/ 12 ‘‘Ankara Vows To Take ‘Necessary Action’ After Syria Shoots Down Turkish Jet’’ The 

Guardian (UK); June 23, 2012: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/23/syria-shootingdown-turkish-jet 13 ‘‘Exploration Vessel Nautilus Locates Downed Turkish Jet’’ Ocean Exploration Trust; July 

11, 2012: http://oceanexplorationtrust.com/press/20120711_Turkey.htm 

the CIA is also involved in vetting and training), these light arms 

cannot counter Assad’s superiority in artillery and fixed and rotarywing air power. FSA and other forces want either a no-fly zone or 

the firepower to create their own.11

Some interlocutors staff spoke with contested the current DCthink which holds that a no-fly zone (NFZ) inside Syria is militarily 

impossible because Assad’s air defenses are too tough. Supporters 

of a NFZ point out that most Syrian anti-aircraft assets are concentrated near Damascus and while certainly not insignificant, are 

of an older Soviet quality. Thus, they say, an NFZ in the northwest 

of the country, including Aleppo, is not impossible. Opponents of a 

NFZ point to our experience in Iraq where decade-long northern 

and southern NFZs did little to allow Saddam’s opponents to overthrow him. They contend that a NFZ will do little to create a tipping point in favor of the FSA. 

The Turks do not want to impose a NFZ on their own for the 

same geo-political reason they do not wish to intercede alone on the 

ground to create a humanitarian Safe Zone: fear of allowing Assad 

to shift the fighting from Syrian-on-Syrian to Arab versus the 

dreaded Turk/Ottoman Empire of long ago. However, Turkey seems 

perfectly willing to play a greater role, as long as it has the political cover to do so. With continued Russian and Chinese obstruction in the U.N. Security Council, the only option would therefore 

be NATO. The June loss of a Turkish reconnaissance fighter over 

the Mediterranean had the potential to become a Gulf of Tonkin 

moment as Turkey quickly accepted Syrian claims to have shot it 

down, but NATO declined to get more involved.12 The sunken jet 

was recently discovered by the U.S. deep-sea robot company used 

to find the Titanic.13 Mechanical failure is also a possible cause of 

the crash, according to American interlocutors familiar with the incident who cautioned about a rush to judgment. 

It is unclear if Ankara will continue to look for, or foment, an incident that would draw in NATO, but Turkey clearly has the military power to defeat Assad on its own. However, the military and 

current government are at odds with one another as hundreds of 

generals are on trial for an alleged 2003 coup attempt. Given this, 

Turkish PM Erdogan is more likely to rely on his Turkish National 

Intelligence Organization (TNIO) instead to be the main contact 

with Syrian fighters inside Turkey and to work with the Saudis 

and Qataris to receive the arms shipments mentioned above and to 

turn them over to the Free Syria Army. 

CONCLUSION

With more than 20,000 dead so far in Syria, Assad must go sooner rather than later. In addition to the humanitarian catastrophe 

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he has created, Syria’s role as Iran’s client has endangered our allies in the area and led to its support of groups actively seeking 

to kill Americans. America’s current policy of only providing humanitarian assistance addresses real needs and is appreciated by 

our allies in the region. It does not address the issue of shortening 

the conflict. A NATO-imposed no fly zone might tilt the military 

advantage in favor of the insurgents, but it may be deemed too 

costly or risky. Another option is to provide the FSA with arms capable of shooting down Syrian fixed and rotary wing aircraft. However, our own experience in providing MANPADs to various groups 

over the years has yielded mixed results. In this situation, Turkey 

could balk for fear that these weapons would fall into the hands 

of its Kurdish separatist insurgency—the PKK. Our own fears of 

Al-Qaeda affiliates achieving the same are not unwarranted. Supplying such weapons after careful vetting of the recipients might 

level the field enough to allow the uprising to succeed. 

12 

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