AFGHANISTAN SECURITY

Long-standing Challenges 

May Affect Progress and 

Sustainment of Afghan 

National Security Forces

Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Sharon L. Pickup 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, Armed Services 

Committee, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

GAO-12-951T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-951T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, Armed Services Committee, 

House of Representatives

July 24, 2012

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY

Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and 

Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces

Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2002, the United States and 

other nations have worked to develop 

ANSF. In 2010, the United States, 

NATO, and other coalition partners

agreed to transition responsibility for 

the security of Afghanistan from the 

international community to the Afghan 

government by the end of 2014. 

According to NATO, a successful 

security transition requires ANSF 

capable of addressing security 

challenges in Afghanistan. To support 

its development, the United States has 

allocated $43 billion to train, equip, and 

sustain ANSF from fiscal years 2002 to 

2011, appropriated $11.2 billion in 

fiscal year 2012, and requested about 

$5.8 billion for fiscal year 2013. 

To assist Congress in its oversight, 

GAO has issued over 20 reports and 

testimonies on ANSF since 2005. This 

testimony discusses findings from 

GAO reports and ongoing work that 

cover (1) progress reported and tools 

used to assess ANSF capability, (2) 

challenges affecting the development 

of capable ANSF, and (3) use of U.S. 

Security Force Assistance Advisory 

Teams to advise and assist ANSF. To 

perform this work, GAO reviewed DOD 

and NATO documents, and met with 

officials in Washington, D.C.; Tampa, 

FL; Brussels, Belgium; and Kabul, 

Afghanistan.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making new 

recommendations but has made 

numerous recommendations in prior 

reports aimed at improving efforts to 

develop ANSF capabilities. DOD has 

generally concurred with most of these 

recommendations and has taken or 

has planned steps to address them.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) report progress developing capable Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF), but tools used to assess the performance of ANSF units have changed 

several times. In April 2012, DOD reported progress increasing the number and 

capability of ANSF, with 7 percent of army units and 9 percent of police units 

rated at the highest level of capability. GAO has previously found the tools used 

by DOD and NATO to assess ANSF reliable enough to support broad statements

regarding capability. However, issues related to these tools exist. When GAO

reported on ANA capability in January 2011, the highest capability rating level 

was “independent”—meaning that a unit was capable of executing the full 

spectrum of its missions without assistance from coalition forces. As of August 

2011, the highest level had changed to “independent with advisors”—meaning 

that a unit was capable of executing its mission and can call for coalition forces 

when necessary. DOD reports, these changes, as well as the elimination of 

certain requirements for validating units, were partly responsible for the increase

in ANSF units rated at the highest level.

Several long-standing challenges may affect the sustainment of capable ANSF, 

including cost, key skill gaps in Afghan forces, and limited ministerial capacity.

First, while the Afghan government and coalition partners agreed in May 2012 to 

a sustainment model for ANSF, with an annual budget of $4.1 billion, GAO has

previously reported the Afghan government has limited ability to financially 

support its security forces and is dependent on donor contributions. Second, 

shortfalls in leadership and logistics capabilities in ANSF persist. Addressing 

such gaps is necessary to reduce ANSF reliance on coalition support. Finally, the 

Ministries of Defense and Interior—which oversee the Afghan army and police—

continue to require coalition support to accomplish their missions. DOD has also 

reported these ministries face challenges, such as lack of expertise in human 

capital and problems with corruption. GAO has made recommendations to 

address these challenges, including addressing shortages of trainers. Since GAO 

made its recommendations, additional trainers have deployed to Afghanistan.

As part of the overall transition of lead security responsibility to ANSF, starting in 

early 2012, the Army and Marine Corps began training and deploying small 

teams of advisors with specialized capabilities, referred to as Security Force 

Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs). These teams will be located throughout 

Afghanistan and will work with ANSF personnel from the headquarters to the 

battalion level and advise and assist in areas such as command and control and

intelligence. GAO’s past work examining the use of training and advisor teams in 

Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted certain areas relevant to DOD’s plans to provide

SFAATs in support of the current mission in Afghanistan. For example, GAO 

found it is important that DOD assign officers and non-commissioned officers to 

advisor teams in a timely manner so they can train and exercise as a team prior 

to deployment. In addition, commanders need to set clear priorities between the 

advising mission and other operational requirements such as counterinsurgency 

operations. Given the key role of advising teams in supporting the transition 

process, these areas will be important considerations for DOD as it continues to 

refine its plans for forming, deploying, and using advisor personnel to mentor and 

develop the ANSF.

View GAO-12-951T. For more information, 

contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 

512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov, or Sharon 

L. Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or 

pickups@gao.gov. 
Page 1 GAO-12-951T 

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Cooper, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here to discuss U.S. and international efforts to 

develop capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Since 2002, 

the United States and other nations have worked to develop the 

capabilities of ANSF. In 2010, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO), the Afghan government, and members of the 

international community agreed to transition responsibility for the security 

of Afghanistan from the international community to the Afghan 

government by the end of 2014. In the past few months, NATO has 

begun to shift the focus of its mission from combat to a support role more 

focused on advising and assisting ANSF. According to NATO, a 

successful transition requires that ANSF be fully capable of addressing 

security challenges in Afghanistan on a sustainable basis. To support this 

effort, the United States allocated $43 billion to build, train, equip, and 

sustain ANSF from fiscal year 2002 to 2011, with an additional $11.2 

billion appropriated in fiscal year 2012 and approximately $5.8 billion 

requested by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for fiscal year 2013.

To assist Congress in its oversight, since 2005 we have issued over 20 

reports and testimonies focusing on ANSF. Our remarks are based on our 

prior and ongoing work on this issue.1

 

1

For example, GAO, Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan 

Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps, 

Specifically, we address (1) 

progress reported and tools used to assess ANSF capability, (2) 

challenges affecting the development of capable ANSF, and (3) use of 

U.S. Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams to advise and assist 

ANSF. Detailed information on the scope and methodology for our prior 

work can be found in the reports we have cited throughout this statement. 

For the purposes of this testimony, we updated data on ANSF size and 

capability using DOD and NATO progress reports. We obtained the views 

of DOD on this information and incorporated the Department’s comments 

where appropriate. We conducted the underlying performance audits in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

GAO-12-293R

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2012); and Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but 

Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined, GAO-11-66 (Washington, 

D.C.: Jan. 27, 2011).
Page 2 GAO-12-951T 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

DOD and NATO report progress in developing capable ANSF.2 In April 

2012, DOD reported that the number of ANSF grew steadily and 

exceeded growth targets. Similarly, as of May 2012, NATO reported that 

the Afghan National Army (ANA) reached its October 2012 recruitment 

growth goal of 195,000, while the Afghan National Police (ANP) reached 

149,208 of its October 2012 goal of 157,000. We previously reported that 

DOD reported similar progress in 2010, achieving its interim growth goals 

for the ANA several months ahead of schedule. Further, DOD noted that 

increased numbers of ANSF were accompanied by increased capability 

of these forces, reporting that 7 percent (15 out of 219) of ANA and 9

percent (39 out of 435) of ANP units rated as operating independently 

with the assistance of advisors.3 Table 1 provides additional information 

on DOD assessments of the ANA and ANP. 

 

2

DOD reported this assessment in its April 2012 Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, which covers progress in Afghanistan from October 1, 2011 to 

March 31, 2012.

3

Assessments classify ANSF units into one of six levels of performance: independent with 

advisors, effective with advisors, effective with partners, developing with partners, 

established, and not assessed.

DOD and NATO 

Report Progress 

Developing Capable 

ANSF, but Assessment 

Tool Has Changed 

Over Time
Page 3 GAO-12-951T 

Table 1: DOD Assessments of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National 

Police (ANP) Operational Effectiveness reported in April 2012

Rating Definition 

Level

ANA Units and 

Headquarters

Percent 

of Units

ANP 

Units

Percent 

of Units

Independent with 

Advisors 

15 7% 39 9% 

Effective with 

Advisors

101 46 180 41 

Effective with 

Partners

80 37 102 23

Developing with 

Partners

18 8 36 8 

Established 3 1 16 4 

Not Assessed 2 1 62 14

Totals 219 100% 435 100%

Source: DOD. 

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

ANSF ratings are based on the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool 

(CUAT), an assessment system used to evaluate the capability of ANSF. 

The assessment tool provides quantitative data for security force units, 

including the level of personnel, equipment, and training, and qualitative 

assessments for functions such as leadership and education. In addition, 

the assessment tool reports on the operational performance of the ANA 

and ANP units. DOD uses these assessments as part of its report of 

progress in the development of capable ANSF. We have previously found 

these assessment tools reliable enough to support broad statements 

regarding ANSF capability.4

However, issues related to these assessment tools exist. Specifically, key 

definitions used in ANSF assessments have changed several times and 

assessments did not fully measure ANP capability until recently.

• Changing definitions. Key definitions used in capability assessments 

of ANSF have changed several times. For instance, when we reported 

on ANA capability in January 2011, the highest capability rating level 

 

4

For the purpose of this statement, we determined that we did not need to independently 

validate these assessments, as we are presenting DOD and NATO data to describe and 

comment on their reports of progress.
Page 4 GAO-12-951T 

was “independent”—meaning that a unit was capable of planning, 

executing, and sustaining the full spectrum of its missions without 

assistance from coalition forces. As of August 2011, the highest level 

changed to “independent with advisors”—meaning that a unit was 

capable of planning, executing, and sustaining its mission, and can 

call for coalition forces when necessary.

5 The change to “independent 

with advisors” also lowered the standard for unit personnel and 

equipment levels from “not less than 85” to “not less than 75” percent 

of authorized levels. As DOD reports, these changes, as well as the 

elimination of certain requirements for validating units, were 

responsible, in part, for its reported increase in April 2012 of the 

number of ANSF units rated at the highest level. We have previously 

reported that clarity regarding the criteria by which security forces are 

assessed is critical to congressional oversight of efforts to develop 

foreign security forces.6

• Problems assessing ANP capability. DOD has reported problems 

using the CUAT to assess the capability of the ANP. Until recently, the 

same report template was used to assess the ANA and ANP, despite 

the differing missions of these institutions. While the assessment tool 

did rate the ability of ANA and ANP units to meet their 

counterinsurgency mission, according to DOD it did not address civil 

policing and other responsibilities of the ANP. 7

 

5

We first reported on changes to capability ratings for the ANA in 2008, noting that 

definitions for the highest level of ANA capability changed from “independent operating 

capability” to “full operational capability.” See GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further 

Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to 

Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, 

DOD reported that the 

February 2012 CUAT report began collecting data on community 

policing and rule of law capabilities of the ANP. According to DOD, 

prior to February 2012, the ANP were more focused on 

counterinsurgency than civil policing. However, the assessment tool 

cannot be used to report on the development of ANP capability to 

perform civil policing functions prior to February 2012.

GAO-08-661

(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008).

6

GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces’ Units as 

Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed, 

GAO-08-143R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2007).

7

GAO, Foreign Police Assistance: Defined Roles and Improved Information Sharing Could 

Enhance Interagency Collaboration, GAO-12-534 (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2012).
Page 5 GAO-12-951T 

The security transition in Afghanistan is contingent on ANSF capable of 

providing security throughout the country as coalition forces shift the 

focus of their mission to a support role. Several long-standing challenges, 

including cost, key skill gaps in Afghan forces, and limited capacity of 

ministries supporting the ANSF, may affect the capability of ANSF to 

sustain lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan.8

• Cost to sustain ANSF. We have previously reported that an analysis 

of the amount of future funding needed to support ANSF is critical for 

decision making and oversight. At the May 2012 NATO conference, 

the United States and other donor nations contributing to the NATOled ANSF training mission agreed to a preliminary model for the future 

sustainment of ANSF. This model envisions a post-2014 force size of 

228,500 with an estimated annual budget of $4.1 billion.9 We have 

previously reported that the Afghan government has limited ability to 

financially support its security forces and is dependent on donor 

contributions.10

• Key skill gaps in ANSF. In 2009 and 2011, we reported that key skill 

gaps exist within the ANA and ANP, including shortfalls in leadership 

and logistics capability.

A January 2010 International Monetary Fund analysis 

projected that it will take at least until 2023 for the Afghan government 

to raise sufficient revenues to cover its operating expenses, including 

those related to the army and police. Ensuring continued donor 

contributions until that time may present challenges.

11

 

8

According to DOD, lead security responsibility means ANSF are planning and controlling 

operations with the advice and support of NATO. In May 2012, GAO issued a classified 

report on the security transition in Afghanistan.

We have previously recommended that 

DOD, in conjunction with international partners, take steps to 

eliminate the shortage of training personnel for the ANA needed to 

address these skill gaps. However, in April 2012, DOD reported that 

shortages in the number of non-commissioned officers needed to 

provide leadership to ANSF remained a challenge, noting that the 

ANA required an additional 10,600 non-commissioned officers and the 

9

In April 2012, GAO issued a restricted report on the cost to build and sustain ANSF.

10GAO, Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence, GAO-11-948R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 

2011).

11See GAO-11-66 and Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, 

GAO-09-473SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009).

Long-standing 

Challenges May Affect 

Progress and 

Sustainment of 

Capable ANSF
Page 6 GAO-12-951T 

ANP required approximately 8,300. DOD has previously noted that 

the development of leaders for ANSF is essential to improving its 

capability. Additionally, despite reported progress in providing ANSF 

with literacy training—a key prerequisite for learning specialized skills, 

such as logistics, needed to reduce reliance on coalition forces—DOD 

states that illiteracy remains a challenge. Further, despite the surge of 

U.S. troops to Afghanistan, the training mission continues to 

experience a shortfall in personnel needed to help address these key 

skill gaps. According to DOD, as of March 2012, about 16 percent of 

instructor positions to train ANSF were unfilled and NATO lacked 

pledges to fill them.

• Limited capacity of ministries supporting ANSF. We have previously 

reported that limited capacity in the Afghan Ministries of Defense 

(MOD) and Interior (MOI)—which oversee the ANA and ANP, 

respectively—present challenges to the development and sustainment 

of capable ANSF. For instance, MOI faced challenges, such as a lack 

of consolidated personnel databases and formal training in properly 

executing budget and salary functions. In April 2012, DOD reported 

that the MOD was assessed as requiring some coalition assistance to

accomplish its mission—an assessment unchanged since October 

2010, while the MOI was assessed as needing significant coalition 

assistance—an assessment unchanged since 2009.12 Additionally, 

DOD reported that the ministries face a variety of challenges, 

including, among others, MOD’s lack of human capital in areas 

requiring technical expertise and MOI’s continuing problems with 

corruption.

 

12GAO, Afghanistan Governance: Performance-Data Gaps Hinder Overall Assessment of 

U.S. Efforts to Build Financial Management Capacity, GAO-11-907 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 20, 2011).
Page 7 GAO-12-951T 

As part of the overall transition of lead security responsibility to the ANSF 

by 2014, NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is shifting from a combat role to 

more of an advising and assist mission. To that end, earlier this year, the 

United States and coalition nations have begun providing specialized 

teams, referred to as security force assistance advisory teams (SFAATs), 

to provide leadership and expertise to ANSF personnel and units. At the 

same time, overall U.S. troop levels are planned to draw down from about 

87,000 as of the end of March 2012, to approximately 68,000 by the end 

of September 2012.

Mentoring, advising, and partnering with ANSF units has been a key part 

of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. For the U.S. contribution, DOD has 

used a variety of approaches to provide U.S. forces to carry out the 

advise and assist mission, including forming individual training teams as 

well as augmenting existing brigade combat teams with additional 

personnel to serve as advisors. Starting in early 2012, the Army and 

Marine Corps began training and deploying small teams of advisors with 

specialized capabilities, or SFAATs. These teams will be located 

throughout Afghanistan and are comprised of officers and senior-grade 

non-commissioned officers. They will work with ANSF personnel from the 

headquarters to the battalion level and advise and assist in areas such as 

command and control, intelligence, and logistics. In addition, the SFAATs 

will work with the ground commander to arrange for these units to provide 

any necessary support to ANSF units such as fire support or medical 

assistance. To initially provide these teams, the Army and Marine Corps 

in some cases created these teams by drawing personnel from units that 

had already deployed to Afghanistan. In other cases, they created teams 

by drawing personnel from U.S. based units. As the Army and Marine 

Corps plan to provide additional teams of advisors for future deployments, 

they are exploring whether to use the same approaches or other options 

for organizing and deploying these personnel. In addition, coalition 

nations are expected to provide a number of similar advisor teams.

Our past work examining the use of training teams and advisor teams in 

Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted certain areas that we believe are 

relevant to DOD’s plans to provide the SFAATs in support of the current 

mission in Afghanistan.13

 

13See Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, 

For example, our recent work focused on the 

GAO-11-760 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2011).

Factors to Consider in 

Deployment and Use 

of Security Force 

Assistance Advisory 

Teams to Develop the 

ANSF
Page 8 GAO-12-951T 

Army, which in 2009 shifted its approach and began replacing individual 

training teams with brigade combat teams augmented with advisor 

personnel. Specifically, we identified challenges related to the sourcing 

and training of personnel, balancing missions, defining command and 

control relationships, and providing support to advisor personnel once 

deployed.

• Sourcing and training of advisor personnel. Neither the training teams 

nor the augments provided to the Army’s brigade combat teams 

existed in any of the services’ doctrinal structures. Instead, they were 

typically sourced with personnel who were identified individually, and 

generally consisted of company and field-grade officers and senior 

non-commissioned officers who were taken from other units. We 

found that DOD faced some difficulty in providing the required field 

grade officers or specialized capabilities to these teams, because of 

widespread demand for these personnel, whose numbers were 

already in short supply. In addition, DOD faced challenges getting 

personnel assigned to advisor teams in a timely manner, limiting their 

ability to train and exercise as a team prior to deployment.

• Balancing advising activities with other missions. We found that units 

in Afghanistan faced some challenges because commanders did not 

always set clear priorities between the advising mission and other 

operational requirements, such as counterinsurgency operations or 

performing missions such as conducting checkpoints. As a result, in 

kinetic combat environments, commanders prioritized the combat 

mission and directed their resources accordingly.

• Defining command-and-control relationships. Theater commanders 

did not always provide clear guidance on command and control 

structures for the advisors. In some cases, the lack of clarity on 

command relationships between brigades and advisor teams led to 

the reassignment of advisors to the control of a division or a brigade 

that they had not trained and deployed with.

• Provision of support to advisor teams. We found that brigades in 

Afghanistan sometimes faced challenges providing the necessary 

support to advisor teams such as transportation assets, force 

protection resources, and equipment because support requirements 

had not always been clearly identified, these items and capabilities 

were in limited supply and were, at times, also needed to support 

combat operations.
Page 9 GAO-12-951T 

We made several recommendations to DOD to enhance the 

Department’s ability to support the advising mission, including clearly 

defining the requirements for the number, ranks, and capabilities of 

advisors, the relative priority of the advising mission, and the support that 

advisor teams require. DOD concurred with our recommendations and 

has taken some actions to implement them. Given the key role of advising 

teams in supporting the transition process, these areas will be important 

considerations for DOD as it continues to refine its plans for forming, 

deploying, and using advisor personnel to mentor and develop the ANSF.

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Cooper, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be 

happy to answer any questions you may have at this time.

For further information on this statement, please contact Charles Michael 

Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov, or Sharon L. 

Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. In addition, contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key 

contributions to this statement include Tetsuo Miyabara, Assistant 

Director; James A. Reynolds, Assistant Director; Ashley Alley; Teakoe 

Coleman; Tara Copp; Thomas Costa; Joyee Dasgupta; David Dayton; 

Martin deAlteriis; Hynek Kalkus; Farahnaaz Khakoo; Christopher Mulkins; 

Marcus Lloyd Oliver; Nina Pfeiffer; Lisa Reijula; Biza Repko; Luis 

Rodriguez; Pierre Toureille; and Sally Williamson.

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(320931)
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