UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4053

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

DARRYL JAROD MAGWOOD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:12-cr-00361-LMB-2)

Submitted: May 28, 2013 Decided: June 13, 2013

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Timothy V. Anderson, ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, Virginia Beach, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Mary Katherine Barr Daly, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Darryl Jarod Magwood was convicted at a bench trial of 

conspiracy to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine 

base, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006), and possession of a 

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c) (2006). He was sentenced to 150 months in prison. 

Magwood now appeals. His attorney has filed a brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

raising three issues but stating that there are no meritorious 

issues for appeal. Magwood has filed a pro se supplemental 

brief raising additional issues. We affirm. 

I

Magwood first challenges the district court’s 

credibility determinations, especially the finding that 

Detective Flick, a key Government witness, “was an extremely 

credible witness.” Credibility determinations are within the 

province of the trier of fact and are not reviewable on appeal. 

See United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995); 

United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989). 

Accordingly, this claim is without merit.

II

Magwood contends that because he was not given Miranda

warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), prior to 

a post-arrest interrogation, testimony about that interview was 
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erroneously admitted at trial. In contravention of Magwood’s 

claim, Detective Christopher testified that Magwood was 

administered the appropriate warnings. The district court found 

Christopher’s testimony to be credible and Magwood’s testimony 

incredible. As this credibility determination is not subject to 

review, we conclude that Magwood received Miranda warnings and 

that testimony about his post-arrest interview was properly 

admitted. 

III

Magwood claims that there was insufficient evidence to 

convict him of the firearm offense. We will “sustain a guilty 

verdict that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, is supported by substantial evidence.” 

United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 385 (4th Cir 2008) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the 

government must prove that the defendant (1) used, carried or 

possessed a firearm (2) in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime or a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); 

United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 565 (4th Cir. 2009). 

Possession may be actual or constructive. United States v. 

Booker, 436 F.3d 238, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2006). “Furtherance” under 

§ 924(c) means “furthering, advancing, or helping forward.” 
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United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

We hold that there was sufficient evidence to convict 

Magwood of the firearm offense. First, the evidence establishes 

that Magwood constructively possessed the firearm that was 

seized during a traffic stop: the gun was under the car’s 

passenger seat where Magwood was seated the entire evening; he 

was seen reaching under the seat when the traffic stop began; he 

was seen with the gun earlier that evening; and he had carried 

that firearm during previous drug transactions. Further, it is 

reasonable to infer that the gun was being used in furtherance 

of a drug offense: it was easily accessible; it was loaded; and 

it was in close proximity to both drugs and drug profits

discovered in the car and on Magwood’s person. 

IV

Magwood claims that trial counsel was ineffective 

because he did not move to suppress statements Magwood made 

during the post-arrest interview. Magwood also contends that 

counsel was ineffective because he “coerced” Magwood to sign a

statement of facts in connection with plea proceedings that were

aborted. Magwood makes several other conclusory allegations of 

ineffective assistance.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally 

are not cognizable on direct appeal unless the record 
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conclusively establishes counsel’s “objectively unreasonable 

performance” and resulting prejudice. United States v. Benton, 

523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir 2008). To allow for adequate 

development of the record, a defendant ordinarily should bring 

his ineffective assistance claim in a 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 

Supp. 2012) motion. United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 

216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). We discern no errors by counsel 

warranting reversal.

V

In the Anders brief, counsel contends that Magwood’s 

below-Guidelines sentence is unreasonable but offers no basis 

for this claim. Our review of relevant documents, including the

presentence report and sentencing transcript, convinces us that 

the sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable 

and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing sentence. See United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 

359, 365 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

VI

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm. This court requires that counsel inform 

Magwood, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court 

of the United States for further review. If Magwood requests 
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that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a 

petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court 

for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion 

must state that a copy thereof was served on Magwood.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED