IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D22-21

LT Case No. 2021-CT-000417-E

EDUARDO ARTURO TORRES,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed November 4, 2022

Appeal from the County Court 

for Orange County,

Andrew L. Cameron, Judge.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Richard Alexander 

Pallas, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General, Daytona Beach, for 

Appellant.

Stuart I. Hyman, of Stuart I. Hyman, 

P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

ON THE APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING1

1 The appellee’s motion for rehearing en banc that was embedded in 

his motion for rehearing will be addressed in a separate order. 
2

LAMBERT, C.J.

We deny the appellee’s motion for rehearing. However, to correct a 

ministerial error in the court’s prior opinion in this case, we withdraw that 

opinion and issue the following opinion in its place. 

The State of Florida appeals an order entered by the trial court after an 

evidentiary hearing granting Eduardo Arturo Torres’s (“the defendant”) 

motion to suppress the results of a breath test because the municipal law 

enforcement officer was outside of his geographic jurisdiction when he 

requested that the defendant submit to this testing. As the relevant facts in 

the case, described below, are not in dispute, our review is de novo. See 

State v. Furr, 723 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“This court conducts 

de novo review of a trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts in 

a motion to suppress.” (citing Butler v. State, 706 So. 2d 100, 101 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 1998))). For the following reasons, we reverse the order.

FACTS—

In the early morning of April 19, 2021, Officer Craig Campbell of the 

Winter Park Police Department was on duty in his patrol vehicle when he 

conducted a traffic stop of the defendant based upon the defendant’s 

hazardous driving pattern. During this stop, Campbell observed that the 
3

defendant smelled of alcohol, his eyes had “a glassy haze,” and he swayed

while exiting his car. 

The defendant admitted to Campbell that he had consumed alcoholic 

beverages and thereafter agreed to submit to field sobriety exercises.

Following these exercises, Officer Campbell arrested the defendant for the 

offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to the 

extent that his normal faculties were impaired (“DUI”). All of the foregoing 

events occurred in Winter Park.

Campbell then transported the defendant from Winter Park to the 

Orange County Breath Test Center in Orlando.

2 There, pursuant to Florida’s 

implied consent law,

3 Campbell asked the defendant to submit to a breath 

2 Winter Park and Orlando are both located in Orange County. 

3 The implied consent law is codified at section 316.1932(1)(a)1.a., 

Florida Statutes (2021), and provides, in pertinent part, 

A person who accepts the privilege extended by the 

laws of this state of operating a motor vehicle within 

this state is, by operating such vehicle, deemed to 

have given his or her consent to submit to an 

approved chemical test or physical test including, but 

not limited to, an infrared light test of his or her breath 

for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content 

of his or her blood or breath if the person is lawfully 

arrested for any offense allegedly committed while 

the person was driving or was in actual physical 

control of a motor vehicle while under the influence 

of alcoholic beverages. The chemical or physical 

breath test must be incidental to a lawful arrest and 
4

test, to which the defendant agreed. The test was administered by a civilian

employee with the Orange County Sheriff’s Department,

4 and the results 

showed that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was at more than twice the 

legal limit in the State of Florida. The State later filed an information formally 

charging the defendant with DUI.

Following discovery, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the 

breath test results. He asserted that, under section 316.1932(1)(a)1., only a 

law enforcement officer could request the administration of a breath test and

because Officer Campbell was outside the city limits of Winter Park when he 

requested the defendant submit to the breath test, at that point, Campbell

was “nothing more than a private citizen.” The defendant argued that, as a 

“private citizen,” Campbell was not permitted under the implied consent 

statute to obtain or gather breath test evidence but that he improperly did so 

under the “color of [his] office”; thus, the results from the test should be 

suppressed. See Knight v. State, 154 So. 3d 1157, 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)

(“When an officer unlawfully asserts official authority, either expressly or 

administered at the request of a law enforcement 

officer who has reasonable cause to believe such 

person was driving or was in actual physical control 

of the motor vehicle within this state while under the 

influence of alcoholic beverages. 

4 The qualifications of this employee to administer the breath test are

not an issue in this appeal.
5

implicitly, to gain access to evidence, that evidence must be suppressed.”).

Following a hearing held on the defendant’s motion to suppress at 

which Campbell was the only witness, the trial court announced that, based

on Phoenix v. State, 455 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1984), Mattos v. State, 199 So. 

3d 416 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), and State v. Sills, 852 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2003), it was granting the motion.

5 It then contemporaneously signed a

written order suppressing the breath test results.6

ANALYSIS—

As a general rule, “municipal law enforcement officers can exercise 

their law enforcement powers only within the territorial limits of the 

municipality.” Knight, 154 So. 3d at 1159 (citing Nunn v. State, 121 So. 3d 

566, 567 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); State v. Griffis, 502 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 

5th DCA 1987)). The narrow issue before us is whether, under the facts of 

the case, Officer Campbell nevertheless retained the power or authority to

request that the defendant submit to a breath test as part of an ongoing DUI 

5 The trial court did not discuss the facts or holdings from these cases

when explaining or announcing its ruling. 

6 The order signed appears to have been prepared in open court by a

deputy clerk. Although the document is titled “Order,” its format is similar to 

a Court Minutes document as it contains other information unrelated to the 

suppression hearing. Pertinent to the matter before us, the order simply 

states that the “intoxilyzer results” were suppressed for being “outside of 

jurisdiction.”
6

investigation when Campbell was outside the territorial limits of his

municipality. Although not fully explained in the written order, the reference 

to Officer Campbell being “outside of [his] jurisdiction” essentially determined 

that, as argued by the defendant, Campbell was a “private citizen” and thus,

under Florida’s implied consent law, no longer had the authority to make this 

request.

To provide context to the trial court’s ruling, at common law, a private 

citizen could arrest an individual who committed a felony or a breach of the 

peace7 in his or her presence. Furr, 723 So. 2d at 844–45; State v. Phoenix, 

428 So. 2d 262, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), approved, 455 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 

1984). A law enforcement officer acting outside of the geographic limits of 

their municipality has these same arrest powers. Cf. Phoenix, 455 So. 2d at 

1025 (observing that “[c]ommon sense dictates that law enforcement 

officials, when they are outside their jurisdictions, should not be any less 

capable, by virtue of their position, of making a felony arrest than a private 

citizen”). 

To be clear, the dispute here is not about Officer Campbell’s DUI arrest 

of the defendant in Winter Park. The question is whether the breath test 

evidence was properly suppressed because Campbell, post-arrest, while

7 A DUI is considered a crime involving a breach of the peace. See 

Edwards v. State, 462 So. 2d 581, 582–83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). 
7

outside of his territorial jurisdiction, used the color of his office to obtain this 

evidence that a private citizen, under the implied consent statute, could not 

have obtained. The color of office doctrine precludes a law enforcement

officer who is outside of their territorial jurisdiction from using the power or 

color of the office to observe unlawful activity or to gain access to evidence 

that would not be available to a similarly-situated private citizen. See 

Phoenix, 455 So. 2d at 1025. 

This doctrine, however, is not without its exceptions. One exception, 

as argued by the State, allows a municipal officer to continue to act or 

investigate outside of his or her geographic jurisdiction if the subject matter 

of the officer’s investigation originates inside their city limits. Knight, 154 So. 

3d at 1159; Nunn, 121 So. 3d at 568.

8 The State contends that this exception 

applies and the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress because 

the subject matter of Officer Campbell’s DUI investigation originated within 

his jurisdiction of Winter Park. Thus, the State argues that Campbell was 

lawfully permitted to continue his investigation at the Breath Test Center in 

8 Another exception is that an officer may exercise their authority 

outside of the territorial jurisdiction if in “fresh pursuit.” See Moncrieffe v. 

State, 55 So. 3d 736, 740 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (recognizing that a municipal 

law enforcement officer may arrest an offender outside the boundaries of the 

municipality when acting in fresh pursuit). The parties agree that the fresh 

pursuit exception does not apply here. 
8

Orlando and request that the defendant submit to a breath test.

The abbreviated reference in the written order to being “outside [of his]

jurisdiction” and the trial court’s reliance on Phoenix, Mattos, and Sills in its

oral pronouncement granting the defendant’s motion to suppress indicate

that the court necessarily determined that the above exception to the color 

of office doctrine did not apply. As we explain below, we conclude that it 

does.

We begin our analysis with an examination of the three cases relied on 

by the trial court, which we find to be distinguishable from the facts in our 

case. First, the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Phoenix was that the 

color of office doctrine did not bar law enforcement officers from making a 

citizen’s arrest outside of their jurisdiction, even after they had identified 

themselves as police officers, because the officers had not yet asserted their 

official positions for any other purpose. 455 So. 2d at 1024–25. Phoenix is 

inapposite here because Officer Campbell did not make a citizen’s arrest.

Next, in Mattos, the defendant was arrested for committing a felony 

DUI. 199 So. 3d at 418. The offense both originated and was observed by 

the arresting municipal law enforcement officer outside of the officer’s

geographic jurisdiction. Id. Following the trial court’s denial of the 

defendant’s motion to suppress “all written and oral statements made [by 

him] to the police or other state agents,” the defendant tendered a no contest 
9

plea to the charge but with a reservation of rights regarding the denial of his 

suppression motion. Id.

On appeal, the Fourth District Court reversed that part of the trial 

court’s order that failed to suppress the post-arrest statements made by the 

defendant after the officer attempted to have the defendant submit to a 

breathalyzer test. Id. at 421. The court concluded that the officer had made 

a citizen’s arrest and that once the officer began conducting a DUI

investigation following the arrest, he was acting under the color of law in that 

he was seeking evidence that could only have been available to him in his 

capacity of a law enforcement officer. Id. at 420–21.

The facts here differ significantly from Mattos. The DUI in Mattos

originated and was observed by the municipal officer outside of the city limits. 

As such, and as noted by our sister court, the officer effected a citizen’s 

arrest and could not thereafter, as part of a continuing DUI investigation, use 

the color of his office to request that the defendant submit to a breath test

under the implied consent law. In contrast, Officer Campbell did not make a 

citizen’s arrest as the defendant’s DUI originated in and was observed by 

Campbell within the city limits of Winter Park.

Lastly, in Sills, the defendant was arrested for committing a crime 

within the municipal law enforcement officer’s territorial jurisdiction. 852 So. 

2d at 391. The officer obtained additional evidence against the defendant
10

through a search of his residence that was located outside of the officer’s 

jurisdiction. Id. The defendant moved to suppress this evidence, which the 

State opposed, arguing the same exception to the color of law doctrine as 

raised by the defendant here. Id. The trial court granted the defendant’s 

motion, and the State appealed. Id. at 391–92. 

The Fourth District rejected the State’s argument and affirmed the trial 

court’s order. Id. at 394. The court explained that the evidence obtained by

the municipal officer at the defendant’s residence outside of his geographic

jurisdiction pertained to a separate crime that had not only originated outside 

of the officer’s jurisdiction, but was also wholly unrelated to the crime for 

which the defendant had been first arrested. Id. at 393. 

The facts in Sills materially differ from the present case. Simply stated, 

the breath test evidence obtained by Officer Campbell outside of his 

municipality was directly related to the arrest and ongoing investigation for 

the DUI committed by the defendant within Campbell’s jurisdiction. 

We hold that the ongoing investigation exception to the color of office 

doctrine applies here. Officer Campbell arrested the defendant because he 

had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime of DUI 

within Campbell’s municipality. We find that the color of office doctrine did 

not preclude him, as part of his ongoing investigation that originated inside 

the municipal city limits, from then taking the defendant to the Breath Test 
11

Center in Orlando and requesting that he submit to a breath test. 

Accordingly, we reverse the order suppressing the breath test evidence 

obtained in Orlando. In doing so, we note our agreement with the decision 

of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island where, in a case also involving a 

municipal law enforcement officer obtaining a breath test from a DUI suspect 

outside of the officer’s municipality, the court wrote:

In this case, [the defendant] had been lawfully 

arrested, based upon probable cause, and was in the 

legitimate custody of the [arresting police 

department]. It was only while acting in accordance 

with their duty to gather and preserve evidence for 

use at trial, that the officers drove [the defendant] to 

[a neighboring city] for a Breathalyzer test. We are 

thus satisfied that the [arresting police officer] acted 

appropriately and did not relinquish lawful custody of 

their prisoner at the town line. This conclusion rests 

upon the distinction between an arrest and seizure of 

a suspect outside a municipality’s borders—an 

authority that is limited in scope and recognized only 

in narrowly-defined circumstances—and the 

extraterritorial transport of a prisoner who is in lawful 

custody, for the performance of legitimate law 

enforcement duties, which we sanction today.

State ex rel. Town of Portsmouth v. Hagan, 819 A.2d 1256, 1261 (R.I. 

2003).9 

9 See also Pickering v. State, 412 S.W. 3d 143, 150 (Ark. 2012) (citing 

with approval the reasoning employed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court 

in Hagan and holding that the deputies’ actions in transporting the defendant 

to a neighboring county for the purpose of administering a breathalyzer test 

were both reasonable and lawful). 
12

Lastly, because we believe that the factual scenario that occurred here 

is a recurring one faced by municipal law enforcement officers during DUI 

investigations, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question 

of great public importance:

DOES A MUNICIPAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 

OFFICER WHO HAS LAWFULLY ARRESTED A 

SUSPECT FOR COMMITTING THE OFFENSE OF 

DUI WITHIN THE OFFICER’S TERRITORIAL

JURISDICTION HAVE THE CONTINUED 

AUTHORITY OF HIS OR HER OFFICE TO 

REQUEST THAT THE SUSPECT SUBMIT TO 

BREATH TESTING UNDER FLORIDA’S IMPLIED 

CONSENT LAW WHEN THE REQUEST AND THE 

TESTING TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE OF THE CITY 

LIMITS OF THE OFFICER’S MUNICIPALITY?

REVERSED; QUESTION CERTIFIED.

EDWARDS and HARRIS, JJ., concur.