10 August 2009

Amphibious Operations

Joint Publication 3-02
PREFACE 

1. Scope 

 This publication provides joint doctrine for the conduct of amphibious operations. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and 

training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their 

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC 

from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most 

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational 

doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not 

ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational 

command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, 

regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

 B.E. Grooms 

 Rear Admiral, USN 

 Vice Director, Joint Staff 

i 
Preface 

ii JP 3-02 

Intentionally Blank 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

JOINT PUBLICATION 3-02 

DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 2001 

 Updates and harmonizes discussion of amphibious operations with the 

constructs and context of the keystone and capstone joint publications. 

 Simplifies and reorganizes organization of text to facilitate comprehension 

and remove redundancy. 

 Reclassifies the five types of amphibious operations by replacing “other 

amphibious operations” with “amphibious support to other operations.” 

The five types of amphibious operations are: amphibious assault, amphibious 

raid, amphibious demonstration, amphibious withdrawal, and amphibious 

support to other operations 

 Updates discussion of the landing force to address the Marine Special 

Operations Company. 

 Realigns Chapter III, Conduct of Amphibious Operations, by removing 

dated constructs, organizations, capabilities, and terminology and improving 

the flow of the material presented.

 Updates Chapter V to more accurately reflect extant capabilities, 

procedures, and processes. 

 Adds an appendix on Landing Force Logistics Planning. 

 Glossary has been significantly revised by deleting outdated terms, 

modifying and adding a number of definitions, and properly sourcing all 

terms. 

 Modifies the definitions of the terms “action phase,” “advance force,” “afloat 

pre-positioning force”, “amphibious assault ship (multipurpose)”, 

“amphibious construction battalion”, “ amphibious objective area”, 

“approach schedule”, “assault phase”, “assault schedule”, “attack group”, 

“beach party”, “boat lane”, “carrier strike group”, “causeway launching 

area”, “command element”, “commander, amphibious task force”, 

“commander. landing force”, “composite warfare commander”, “covering 

fire”, “dock landing ship”, “follow-up shipping”, “hydrographic 

reconnaissance”, “landing area”, “landing area diagram”, “line of 

departure”, “naval beach group”, “planning directive”, “planning phase”, 

“preassault operations”, “regimental landing team”, “seabasing”, “ship-toshore movement”, “target information center”, “times”, “transport group”, 

and “wave”. 

iii 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-02 

 Removes the terms “amphibious assault area,” “amphibious assault 

landing,” “amphibious chart”, “amphibious command ship”, “amphibious 

control group”, “amphibious group”, “amphibious objective study”, 

“amphibious reconnaissance”, “amphibious reconnaissance unit”, 

“amphibious striking forces”, “assault area”, “assault area diagram”, “beach 

minefield”, “beach organization”, “beach reserves”, “boat diagram”, 

“consecutive voyage charter”, “deployment diagram”, “distant support 

area”, “floating reserve”, “horizon”, “initial reserves”, “joint amphibious 

operation”, “joint amphibious task force,” “landing attack”, “landing force 

supplies”, “landing schedule”, “marker ship”, “military sealift Commandcontrolled ships”, “naval support area”, “other landing ship areas”, 

“prelanding operations”, “salvage group”, “screening group”, “supporting 

aircraft”, “survey, liaison, and reconnaissance party”, “tactical air 

commander (ashore)”, “tactical air groups (shore-based)” “tactical air 

operation”, “tactical deception group”, “target classification”, and “vertical 

takeoff and landing aircraft transport area” from Joint Publication 1-02, 

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

 Adds a definition for the terms “air support coordination section”, “air 

traffic control section”, “amphibious breaching”, “amphibious defense 

zone”, “assault breaching”, “establishing directive”, “helicopter coordination 

section”, and “tactical air direction center.” 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

v 

 PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... xi 

CHAPTER I 

 OVERVIEW 

• General ............................................................................................................................. I-1 

• Applications ..................................................................................................................... I-1 

• Types of Amphibious Operations ................................................................................... I-2 

• Characteristics .................................................................................................................. I-3 

• Capabilities ...................................................................................................................... I-4 

• Initiating an Amphibious Operation ............................................................................... I-5 

• Phases of an Amphibious Operation ............................................................................... I-5 

• Terminating an Amphibious Operation .......................................................................... I-7 

CHAPTER II 

 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

• General ........................................................................................................................... II-1 

SECTION A. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES ................. II-2 

• Overview ........................................................................................................................ II-2 

• Amphibious Force Task Organization .......................................................................... II-6 

• Operational Areas .......................................................................................................... II-9 

SECTION B. AMPHIBIOUS AIR OPERATIONS ......................................................... II-10 

• Joint Air Operations .................................................................................................... II-10 

• Defensive Counterair ................................................................................................... II-11 

• Airspace Control in Amphibious Operations ............................................................. II-12 

• Navy Tactical Air Control Center ............................................................................... II-13 

• Marine Corps Tactical Air Command Center ............................................................ II-15 

• Direct Air Support Center ........................................................................................... II-16 

• Tactical Air Operations Center ................................................................................... II-16 

• Air Command and Control Procedures and Coordination ......................................... II-16 

• Transition from Tactical Air Control Center to Tactical Air Command Center ....... II-17 

CHAPTER III 

 CONDUCT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 

• Overview ....................................................................................................................... III-1 
Table of Contents 

SECTION A. PLANNING ................................................................................................. III-2 

• General .......................................................................................................................... III-2 

• Tenets of Amphibious Planning ................................................................................... III-2 

• Planning Directive ........................................................................................................ III-3 

• Planning Methods ......................................................................................................... III-3 

• Primary Decisions ........................................................................................................ III-5 

• Assessment ................................................................................................................. III-10 

• Movement Planning Responsibilities ........................................................................ III-11 

• Sea Routes ................................................................................................................... III-12 

• Staging Areas .............................................................................................................. III-13 

• Sea Areas .................................................................................................................... III-13 

• Geographic Reference Points ..................................................................................... III-15 

• Intelligence En Route ................................................................................................. III-15

• Coordination During Passage .................................................................................... III-16 

• Approach to the Operational Area ............................................................................. III-16 

• Ship-to-Shore Movement Considerations ................................................................. III-17 

• Relationship to Other Planning .................................................................................. III-20 

• Responsibilities ........................................................................................................... III-20 

• Landing Plan ............................................................................................................... III-22 

• Considerations ............................................................................................................ III-33 

• Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Operations ............................................................... III-34 

• Other Planning Considerations .................................................................................. III-37 

SECTION B. EMBARKATION ...................................................................................... III-37 

• Overview ..................................................................................................................... III-37 

SECTION C. REHEARSALS .......................................................................................... III-39 

• General ........................................................................................................................ III-39 

• Requirements .............................................................................................................. III-39 

• Rehearsal Plans ........................................................................................................... III-39 

SECTION D. MOVEMENT ............................................................................................ III-41 

• General ........................................................................................................................ III-41 

• Echelons of the Landing Force .................................................................................. III-42 

• Organization for Movement ....................................................................................... III-42 

SECTION E. ACTION ..................................................................................................... III-45

• General ........................................................................................................................ III-45 

• Organization and Command Relationships ............................................................... III-45 

• Control ........................................................................................................................ III-48 

• Supporting, Advance Force, and Preassault Operations ........................................... III-51 

• Final Preparations for the Ship-to-Shore Movement ................................................ III-56 

• Subsidiary Landings ................................................................................................... III-57

• Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore .................................................................................. III-58 

vi JP 3-02 
Table of Contents 

SECTION F. SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS BY TYPE 

 OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION .......................................................................... III-59 

• Assault ......................................................................................................................... III-59 

• Raids ............................................................................................................................ III-64 

• Demonstrations ........................................................................................................... III-66 

• Withdrawals ................................................................................................................ III-70 

• Amphibious Support to Other Operations ................................................................. III-71 

CHAPTER IV 

 AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST COASTAL DEFENSES 

• General .......................................................................................................................... IV-1 

• Antilanding Doctrine .................................................................................................... IV-1

• Amphibious Breach of Coastal Defenses .................................................................... IV-2 

• Integrated Mine Countermeasures and Amphibious Breaching Operations .............. IV-4 

• Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments ........ IV-5 

CHAPTER V 

 SUPPORT TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 

• General ............................................................................................................................ V-1 

SECTION A. INTELLIGENCE ......................................................................................... V-1 

• Introduction...................................................................................................................... V-1 

SECTION B. FIRE SUPPORT ........................................................................................... V-7 

• General ........................................................................................................................... V-7 

• Responsibilities .............................................................................................................. V-7 

• Systems .......................................................................................................................... V-8 

• Planning and Coordination .......................................................................................... V-10 

• Naval Surface Fire Support ......................................................................................... V-14 

SECTION C. COMMUNICATIONS ............................................................................... V-19 

• Overview/Considerations ............................................................................................ V-19 

• Identifying Requirements ............................................................................................ V-19 

• Responsibilities ............................................................................................................ V-21 

• Landing Force Communications Plan ........................................................................ V-23 

• Landing Force Communications System .................................................................... V-24 

• Landing Force Communications System Support by Phase ...................................... V-24 

SECTION D. LOGISTICS ................................................................................................ V-27 

• General .......................................................................................................................... V-28 

• Responsibilities ............................................................................................................ V-28 

• Considerations and Factors ......................................................................................... V-29 

• Combat Service Support Plans .................................................................................... V-31 

• Key Constructs ............................................................................................................ V-34 

vii 
Table of Contents 

• Health Service Support Plan ....................................................................................... V-36 

• Landing Force Support Party Plan .............................................................................. V-42 

• Pontoon Causeway and Lighterage Plans ................................................................... V-46 

• Engineer Plan ............................................................................................................... V-46 

SECTION E. PROTECTION ............................................................................................ V-48 

• General ......................................................................................................................... V-48 

• Rehearsal and Movement Security ............................................................................. V-48 

• Communications Security ........................................................................................... V-49 

• Deception ..................................................................................................................... V-49 

• Protective Measures .................................................................................................... V-49 

• Defensive Counterair Operations ................................................................................ V-50 

• Mine Countermeasures and Mine Warfare ................................................................ V-50 

SECTION F. SEABASING ............................................................................................... V-51 

• General ......................................................................................................................... V-51 

• Components ................................................................................................................. V-51 

• Planning Considerations .............................................................................................. V-51 

APPENDIX 

 A Landing Force Logistics Planning ........................................................................ A-1 

 B References ............................................................................................................. B-1

 C Administrative Instructions ................................................................................... C-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................... GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions .................................................................................. GL-6 

FIGURE 

 I-1 Phases of an Amphibious Operation ................................................................... I-6 

 II-1 Examples of Shifts in the Support Relationship ............................................... II-5 

 II-2 Coordination Responsibilities ......................................................................... II-14 

 III-1 Steps in the Amphibious Planning Process ...................................................... III-4 

 III-2 Primary Decisions Responsibilities Matrix ..................................................... III-6 

 III-3 Landing Area Selection .................................................................................... III-7 

 III-4 Sea Areas ......................................................................................................... III-14 

 III-5 Landing Plan Documents ................................................................................ III-23 

 III-6 Planning for Ship-to-Shore Movement .......................................................... III-33 

 III-7 Over-the-Horizon Operations ......................................................................... III-35 

 III-8 Assault Sequence ............................................................................................ III-60 

 IV-1 Principles of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

 and Nuclear Defense ....................................................................................... IV-7 

 V-1 Communications Support Requirements ........................................................ V-20 

viii JP 3-02 
Table of Contents 

 V-2 Communications System Support Plan ........................................................... V-22 

 V-3 Logistic and Combat Service Support Plans ................................................... V-32 

 V-4 Contents of the Health Service Support Plan .................................................. V-37 

 V-5 Health Service Support Planning Considerations ........................................... V-39 

 V-6 Landing Force Support Party Planning Considerations ................................. V-44 

ix 
Table of Contents 

x JP 3-02 

Intentionally Blank 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

 Provide an Overview of Amphibious Operations 

 Discuss Command and Control of Amphibious Operations 

 Discuss the Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

 Discuss Amphibious Operations Against Coastal Defenses 

 Discuss Support to Amphibious Operations 

 Provide Reference for Landing Force Logistics Planning 

Overview 

The primary purpose of an 

amphibious operation is 

introducing a landing force 

(LF) ashore. 

Amphibious operations 

seek to exploit the element 

of surprise and capitalize 

on enemy weakness by 

projecting and applying 

combat power precisely at 

the most advantageous 

location and time. 

This publication provides fundamental principles and 

guidance to assist joint force commanders (JFCs), their 

staffs, and supporting and subordinate commanders in 

the planning, execution, and assessment of amphibious 

operations. An amphibious operation is a military 

operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force 

(AF), embarked in ships or craft with the primary 

purpose of introducing a landing force (LF) ashore to 

accomplish the assigned mission. An AF is an 

amphibious task force (ATF) and an LF together with 

other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for 

amphibious operations. 

Amphibious operations apply maneuver principles to 

maritime power projection in joint and multinational 

operations. 

Amphibious operations can be designed to achieve 

operation or campaign objectives in one swift stroke; 

comprise the initial phase of a campaign or major 

operation to establish a military lodgment; serve as a 

supporting operation to deny the use of an area or 

facilities; to fix enemy forces and attention; to outflank 

an enemy; or to support military engagement, security 

cooperation, deterrence, humanitarian assistance, and 

civic assistance. 

xi 
Executive Summary 

AFs provide the JFC with a tailored, mobile force that is 

flexible enough to facilitate the entry of follow-on 

forces, be the main or supporting effort, or accomplish a 

coup-de-main. 

Amphibious operations take place across the range of 

military operations and are categorized into five types: 

assaults, raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, and 

amphibious support to other operations. 

An amphibious assault involves the establishment of an 

LF on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. 

An amphibious raid is a type of amphibious operation 

involving swift incursion into or temporary occupation 

of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. 

An amphibious demonstration is a show of force 

conducted to deceive with the expectation of deluding 

the enemy into a course of action (COA) unfavorable to 

it. 

An amphibious withdrawal is the extraction of forces by 

sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile 

shore. 

Amphibious support is a type of amphibious operation 

which contributes to conflict prevention or crisis 

mitigation. 

Amphibious operations may be used to support a wide 

variety of objectives, including: 

 Attacking enemy critical vulnerabilities or 

decisive points 

 Seizing a lodgment, to include ports and airfields 

 Seizing areas for the development of advanced 

bases 

 Destroying, neutralizing, or seizing enemy 

advanced bases and support facilities 

 Seizing or conducting a preemptive occupation 

of areas 

 Providing an afloat-strategic, operational, or 

tactical reserve 

 Providing strategic, operational, or tactical 

xii JP 3-02 
Executive Summary 

Amphibious forces (AFs) 

are task-organized based 

on the mission. 

 Evacuating US citizens, selected host nation 

citizens, or third country 

 Providing a secure environment until follow-on 

forces arrive 

An amphibious operation is ordinarily joint in nature 

and may require extensive air, land, maritime, space, 

and special operations forces participation. The key 

characteristic of an amphibious operation are close 

coordination and cooperation. 

To achieve success, an AF should be assured of local 

maritime and air superiority and a substantial superiority 

over enemy forces ashore. 

 

Amphibious operations and can be tailored and scaled to 

support a specific mission or situation. 

Amphibious operations commence with the initiating 

directive to the AF commanders to conduct military 

operations issued by the unified commander, subunified 

commander, Service component commander, or JFC 

delegated overall responsibility for the operation. 

Amphibious operations generally follow distinct phases; 

planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and action. 

Command and Control of Amphibious Operations 

Following the principles 

for joint operations 

provides for unity of effort 

through unity of 

command; centralized 

planning and direction; 

and decentralized 

execution. 

Amphibious operations follow the principles for joint 

operations. A JFC has the authority to organize forces 

to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the 

concept of operations (CONOPS). Sound organization 

provides for unity of effort through unity of command; 

centralized planning and direction; and decentralized 

execution. 

The JFC has full authority to assign missions, redirect 

efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate 

commanders. The JFC should allow Service tactical and 

operational assets and groupings to function generally as 

they were designed. 

xiii 
Executive Summary 

Joint force commanders 

(JFCs) may establish 

functional component 

commands or subordinate 

joint task forces. 

The JFC achieves unity of 

effort in pursuit of 

amphibious objectives by 

establishing unity of 

command over AFs. 

The supporting 

commander determines the 

forces, tactics, methods, 

procedures, and 

communications to be 

employed in providing this 

support. 

There is no standard 

organization applicable to 

all situations encountered 

in amphibious operations. 

JFCs may decide to establish a functional component 

command. A JFC may also establish a subordinate joint 

task force (JTF) on a geographical area or functional 

basis. A JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it 

was created has been achieved or when it is no longer 

required. 

Commander, amphibious task force (CATF) is the Navy 

officer designated in the initiating directive as the 

commander of the ATF. Commander, landing force 

(CLF) is the officer designated in the initiating directive 

as the commander of the LF for an amphibious 

operation. 

The JFC will organize the AF in such a way as to best 

accomplish the mission based on the CONOPS. In 

amphibious operations, Service component commanders 

normally retain operational control of their respective 

forces. 

Planning decisions must be reached on a basis of 

common understanding of the mission; objectives; 

tactics, techniques, and procedures; and on a free 

exchange of information. An establishing directive is 

normally issued to specify the purpose of support 

relationships, the effects desired, and the scope of the 

action to be taken. 

Support is a command authority. Unless limited by the 

establishing directive or the initiating directive, the 

supported commander has the authority to exercise 

general direction of the supporting effort. 

Except in emergencies, no significant decision 

contemplated by a commander in the chain of command 

that affects the plans, disposition, or intentions of a 

corresponding commander in another chain of command 

will be made without consultation with the commander 

concerned. 

No standard organization is applicable to all situations 

that may be encountered in an amphibious operation. 

Each task group may be organized separately, or several 

may be combined based upon operational requirements. 

Flexibility is essential. 

xiv JP 3-02 
Executive Summary 

JFCs may use boundaries 

to define areas of 

operations for land and 

maritime forces. 

Amphibious operations normally require a threedimensional geographic area, within which is located the 

AF’s objective(s). The operational area must be of 

sufficient size to conduct sea, land, and air operations to 

execute the mission of the AF. In addition, JFCs 

employ various maneuver and movement control and 

fire support coordination measures. 

The amphibious operation requires that the LF be 

organized at various times in one of three functional 

forms: the organization for embarkation, a temporary 

administrative task organization of forces established to 

simplify planning and facilitate execution of 

embarkation at all levels of command; the organization 

for landing, a specific tactical grouping of forces that 

facilitates landing and actions to accomplish the 

assigned mission; and the organization of LF units for 

accomplishment of missions ashore, employed as soon 

as possible following the landing of various assault 

elements of the LF. 

Joint air operations in support of the AF, are performed 

with air capabilities and forces made available by 

components in support of the JFC’s or AF’s objectives. 

The JFC normally designates a joint force air component 

commander, area air defense commander (AADC), and 

airspace control authority for the joint operations area 

(JOA). 

The AADC bears overall responsibility for air defense 

activities of the joint force. A coherent air defense plan 

requires the designated commander to conduct 

coordinated planning with all supporting and adjacent 

commanders and the JFC to establish a robust command 

and control (C2) arrangement. 

Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

Amphibious operations 

apply maneuver and rapid, 

focused operations at a 

tempo greater than the 

enemy can withstand. 

An amphibious operation applies maneuver principles to 

expeditionary power projection by establishing a LF 

ashore. The AF executes rapid, focused operations to 

accomplish the JFC’s objectives. All actions focus on 

achieving the commander’s objectives. Operations 

should create freedom of action for the AF, while 

creating a tempo greater than the enemy can withstand. 

xv 
Executive Summary 

The key to successful LF 

operations is the rapid 

build up of combat power 

ashore. 

Successful amphibious 

planning requires 

commanders’ involvement 

and guidance, unity of 

effort, and an integrated 

planning effort. 

The preferred tactic for AFs operating against coastal 

defenses is to avoid or bypass the strong points if unable 

to exploit gaps in these defenses. The AF realizes 

maximum effectiveness by using all available 

capabilities. 

The phases of an amphibious operation are: planning, 

embarkation, rehearsals, movement, and action. The 

action phase has been further divided into the four types 

of amphibious operations: assaults, raids, 

demonstrations, and withdrawals. 

Planning for an amphibious operation is continuous, 

from the receipt of the initiating directive through the 

termination of the operation. The tenets of successful 

amphibious planning are commanders’ involvement and 

guidance, unity of effort, and an integrated planning 

effort. 

The cornerstone of amphibious operations execution is 

the six-step planning process: mission analysis; COA 

development; COA wargame; COA comparison and 

decision; orders development; and transition. 

AF commanders make certain primary decisions during 

the planning process before further planning for an 

amphibious operation can proceed. 

Assessment is a process that measures progress of the 

AF toward mission accomplishment and occurs at all 

levels. Assessment actions and measures help 

commanders adjust operations and resources as required, 

determine when to execute branches and sequels, and 

make other critical decisions. 

The CATF is responsible for preparing a movement 

plan. Subordinate force and group commanders will 

prepare their own detailed movement plans. 

Postponement may be necessary because of weather 

conditions, unexpected movement of major enemy 

forces, or failure to meet go/no-go criteria after the AF 

has started its movement from final staging areas toward 

the operational area. The postponement plan will be 

prepared by the CATF and is usually promulgated as 

part of the OPLAN. 

xvi JP 3-02 
Executive Summary 

A complete system of 

geographic reference 

should be formulated to 

minimize the possibility of 

interference between 

various elements of the AF 

and other supporting 

forces. 

Proper coordination and 

timing is of utmost 

importance in the final 

stages of the approach. 

Movement plans must be flexible enough for execution 

of alternate plans at any point between the final staging 

area and the operational area. 

Sea routes and route points to the operational area and in 

the operational area will normally be planned by the 

CATF. Sea routes in the operational area should be 

selected that: ensure a minimum of interference among 

ships and formations; are clear of mines and 

navigational hazards; provide sufficient dispersion to 

prevent concentrations that would make the AF a 

desirable target for attack; and provide for economy of 

screening forces. 

Plans will be made by the CATF, in consultation with 

the CLF, to use staging areas while en route to the 

operational area. 

To minimize the possibility of interference between 

various elements of the AF and other supporting forces, 

sea areas in the vicinity of the landing area will be 

selected, designated, and divided into operating areas. 

The AF’s intelligence center is responsible for timely 

dissemination of pertinent intelligence information to 

the CATF and CLF. ATF ships receiving such 

information are responsible for passing it to the 

embarked landing forces. 

Forces not a part of the AF that are supporting the AF 

must coordinate their movement within the amphibious 

objective area with the ATF. Individual commanders 

must remain aware of the need for maintaining the 

schedule and proceeding along prescribed routes. 

Approach to the operational area includes the arrival of 

various task groups in the vicinity of the operational 

area. 

The plan for ship-to-shore movement is developed by 

the CATF and CLF to ensure that troops, equipment, 

and supplies are landed at the prescribed times, places, 

and in the formation required to support the LF scheme 

of maneuver. 

xvii 
Executive Summary 

Over-the-horizon 

operations hide intentions 

and capabilities, exploit the 

element of tactical surprise 

and expand the shoreline 

the enemy must defend. 

Rehearsal tests adequacy 

of plans, timing of detailed 

operations, 

communications 

information systems, 

combat readiness, and 

ensures all echelons are 

familiar with the plan. 

Detailed planning for the ship-to-shore movement can 

begin only after the LF scheme of maneuver ashore is 

determined. The landing and fire support plans must be 

carefully integrated. 

The CATF, in close coordination with the CLF, is 

responsible for the preparation of the overall ship-toshore movement and landing plan. Commanders of 

other forces assigned to the AF are responsible for 

determining and presenting their requirements to the 

CATF. Ship-to-shore movement planning for the LF is 

given final form and expression in the landing plan. All 

landing plan documents are the responsibility of either 

the CATF or CLF. CATF develops the naval landing 

plan documents required to conduct ship-to shore 

movement. 

An over-the-horizon (OTH) amphibious operation is an 

amphibious operation initiated from beyond visual and 

radar range of the enemy shore. An OTH operation is a 

tactical option to hide intentions and capabilities and to 

exploit the element of tactical surprise. It provides 

greater protection to the AF from near-shore threats, and 

provides escort ships a greater opportunity to detect, 

classify, track, and engage incoming hostile aircraft and 

coastal defense missiles while expanding the shoreline 

the enemy must be prepared to defend. 

The second phase, embarkation, is the period during 

which the forces, with their equipment and supplies, are 

embarked in assigned shipping. The primary goal is the 

orderly assembly of personnel and materiel and their 

embarkation in assigned shipping in a sequence 

designed to meet the requirements of the LF CONOPS 

ashore. Critical to embarkation planning is an 

understanding of the required amphibious lift. 

Rehearsal is the period during which the prospective 

operation is practiced to test adequacy of plans, timing 

of detailed operations, and combat readiness of 

participating forces; ensure that all echelons are familiar 

with the plan; and test communications-information 

systems. During this period the AF, or elements of, 

conduct one or more rehearsal exercise(s), ideally under 

conditions approximating those encountered in the 

littorals and expected landing area. The objective during 

xviii JP 3-02 
Executive Summary 

The action phase is the 

period of time between the 

arrival of the LF of the AF 

in the operational area and 

the accomplishment of 

their mission. 

 AF commanders may seek 

to shape their operational 

environment through three 

complementary operations: 

supporting operations, 

advance force operations, 

and pre-assault operations. 

this phase will be to exercise as much of the force and 

the OPLAN as the situation permits, with operational 

security and time being limiting factors. 

The movement phase commences upon departure of 

ships from loading points in the embarkation areas, and 

concludes when ships arrive at assigned stations in the 

operational area. During this phase, the AF is organized 

into movement groups, which execute movement in 

accordance with the movement plan on prescribed 

routes. Based on the landing plan, AF assets are 

organized for embarkation and deployment to support 

the amphibious operation. 

In an amphibious operation, the action phase is the 

period of time between the arrival of the LF of the AF in 

the operational area and the accomplishment of their 

mission. The LF is organized to execute the landing and 

to conduct initial operations ashore in accordance with 

the commander’s CONOPS. The action phase is 

characterized by decentralized execution of the plan by 

subordinate commanders. 

The CATF is responsible for overall control of both 

surface and air ship-to shore movement. Control and 

coordination measures necessary for employment of 

airborne elements of the LF will be established by the 

CATF in conjunction with the CLF and other concerned 

commanders specified in the initiating directive or 

establishing directive, if appropriate. Prior to the 

execution of the decisive action phase of an amphibious 

operation, the AF commanders may seek to shape their 

operational environment through three complementary 

operations: supporting operations, advance force 

operations, and pre-assault operations. 

The mission developed by the commander, and as 

amplified by the CONOPS ashore, is the principal 

means by which the commander ensures that his intent 

is understood and accomplished in detailed planning and 

execution of the operation. 

An amphibious assault begins on order, after sufficient 

elements of the main body of the AF arrive in the 

operational area. In the amphibious assault, combat 

power is progressively phased ashore. 

xix 
Executive Summary 

An amphibious raid is a 

swift incursion or 

occupation followed by a 

planned withdrawal. 

The amphibious 

demonstration is intended 

to confuse the enemy as to 

time, place, or strength of 

the main operation. 

In the concept for phasing ashore, the LF combat power 

should plan for the reestablishment of centralized 

control of the LF. 

An amphibious raid is an operation involving a swift 

incursion into or the temporary occupation of an 

objective to accomplish an assigned mission followed 

by a planned withdrawal. Surprise is an essential 

ingredient in the success of an amphibious raid. 

Withdrawal must be planned in detail, including 

provisions as to time and place for re-embarkation. 

The amphibious demonstration is intended to confuse 

the enemy as to time, place, or strength of the main 

operation. Effectiveness increases in direct proportion 

to the degree of realism involved in execution. The 

timing must be coordinated to achieve the maximum 

desired level of reaction from the enemy force. The 

demonstration must occur over a long enough period to 

allow the enemy to react. 

Amphibious withdrawals are operations conducted to 

extract forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or 

potentially hostile shore. Withdrawal begins with 

establishment of defensive measures in the embarkation 

area and ends when all elements of the force have been 

extracted and embarked on designated shipping. 

AFs must be prepared for involvement in a wide range 

of operations. In general, these additional operations 

focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting 

peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to 

domestic crises. 

 

Amphibious Operations Against Coastal Defenses

The preferred tactic 

against coastal defenses is 

to avoid, bypass, or exploit 

gaps whenever possible. 

The preferred tactic for AFs operating against countries 

or organizations employing coastal defenses is to avoid, 

bypass, or exploit gaps in these defenses whenever 

possible. Operational limitations may preclude this 

tactic and a breach of these defenses may be required. 

Coastal defenses depend on the hydrography, terrain, 

resources, development time available, and ingenuity of 

the antagonists. Antilanding doctrine usually focuses on 

xx JP 3-02 
Executive Summary 

If rules of engagement 

permit, minecountermeasures are best 

accomplished by 

destruction of mines prior 

to their deployment. 

The principles of chemical, 

biological, radiological, 

and nuclear defense are: 

avoidance, protection, and 

decontamination. 

the development of four layered barriers within the 

littorals. The four barriers from the littorals to land are 

perimeter, main, engineer, and beach. 

AFs should request national and theater collection assets 

to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the 

defended coastal area to determine the best landing area 

to conduct the breach. Water depth and beach 

characteristics are key factors. 

Two primary mine-countermeasures (MCM) techniques 

are mine hunting and minesweeping. Local air and 

maritime superiority in the operational area is required 

in order for MCM forces to commence operations. 

Suppression, obscuration, security, reduction, and 

deception are fundamentals that must be applied to 

amphibious breaching operations to ensure success. 

Commanders must maintain a clear understanding of 

potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

(CBRN) threats, and planning must include measures to 

minimize associated AF vulnerabilities. 

The principles of CBRN defense are: avoidance of 

CBRN and toxic industrial materials (TIM) hazards, 

particularly contamination; protection of individuals and 

units from unavoidable CBRN and TIM hazards; and 

required decontamination in order to restore operational 

capability.

Support to Amphibious Operations 

Support for amphibious 

operations can be broken 

down into intelligence, fire 

support, communications, 

logistics, protection, and 

seabasing. 

Supporting operations may set the conditions for the 

advance force to move into the operational area and are 

enablers that support the execution of the amphibious 

operation. These operations are conducted by forces 

other than the AF and need to be thoroughly 

coordinated. 

Amphibious operations involve extensive planning in all 

functional areas to ensure that ships, aircraft, landing 

craft, and supporting fires are synchronized to arrive at 

specific points at specific times to take advantage of 

enemy critical vulnerabilities and expedite combat 

power build-up and sustainment ashore. This requires 

xxi 
Executive Summary 

Fire support plans optimize 

the employment of fire 

support to achieve the 

designated commander’s 

intent. 

Command and control 

systems must be robust, 

flexible, sustainable, 

survivable, and as 

expeditionary as the AF. 

comprehensive joint intelligence preparation of the 

operational environment, including harmonization of 

intelligence and operational planners to ensure that 

COAs are feasible and that enemy capabilities, 

vulnerabilities, and centers of gravity are identified and 

taken into consideration. 

Properly planned and executed supporting fires are 

critical to the success of an amphibious operation. Fires 

in support of amphibious operations are the synergistic 

product of three subsystems: target acquisition (TA), 

C2, and attack resources. TA systems and equipment 

perform the key tasks of target detection, location, 

tracking, identification, and classification in sufficient 

detail to permit the effective attack of the target. C2 

systems bring all information together for collation and 

decision making. Attack systems include fires delivered 

from air, surface, land, and subsurface attack systems. 

Fire support planning is the continuous and concurrent 

process of analyzing, allocating, and scheduling of fire 

support to integrate it with the forces to maximize 

combat power. The purpose is to optimize the 

employment of fire support to achieve the designated 

commander’s intent by shaping the operational area and 

providing support to maneuver forces. 

The CATF is responsible for preparation of the overall 

naval surface fire support (NSFS) plan, based on the 

CLF and Navy requirements. The plan includes 

allocation of gunfire support ships and facilities. The 

CATF is also responsible for the general policy on 

targeting priorities. 

The CLF is responsible for determination of LF 

requirements for NSFS, including selection of targets to 

be attacked in preassault operations, those to be fired on 

in support of the LF assault, and the timing of these fires 

in relation to the LF scheme of maneuver. 

Amphibious operations require a flexible C2 system 

capable of supporting rapid decision making and 

execution to maintain a high tempo of operations. These 

systems must be robust, flexible, sustainable, survivable, 

and as expeditionary as the AF. CATF and CLF are 

responsible for communications system support 

xxii JP 3-02 
Executive Summary 

Seabasing provides options 

for closing, assembling, 

employing, sustaining, and 

reconstituting forces for 

amphibious operations. 

planning, with the designated commander consolidating 

the requirements. 

The CATF is normally responsible for determining 

overall logistic requirements for the AF. Like all 

logistic systems, the AF logistic systems must be 

responsive, simple, flexible, economical, attainable, 

sustainable, and survivable. 

Protection of the AF is essential for all operations, but 

especially during ship-to-shore movement. Maritime 

superiority permits the conduct of amphibious 

operations without prohibitive interference by the 

opposing force. 

In formulating plans for movement to the operational 

area, sea routes and rendezvous points must be carefully 

selected. Sea routes through mineable waters, or close 

to enemy shore installations from which the enemy can 

carry out air, surface, or subsurface attacks, are to be 

avoided if possible. To minimize probability of 

detection, routes will be planned to avoid known or 

probable areas of enemy surveillance. Communications 

security is essential and must be maintained throughout 

planning. 

Seabasing is the deployment, assembly, command, 

projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint 

combat power from the sea without reliance on land 

bases within the JOA. Employing the seabasing 

construct provides a JFC with options for closing, 

assembling, employing, sustaining, and reconstituting 

forces for amphibious operations. Seabasing provides 

operational maneuver for ship-to-shore movement and 

assured access to the joint force during the action phase 

of amphibious operations while significantly reducing 

the footprint ashore, and minimizing the permissions 

required to operate from host nations. Seabasing also 

increases the maneuver options for LF ashore by 

reducing the need to protect elements such as C2 and 

logistic supplies. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication establishes joint doctrine for 

amphibious operations. 

xxiii 
Executive Summary 

xxiv JP 3-02 

Intentionally blank 
CHAPTER I 

OVERVIEW 

I-1 

“A landing on a foreign coast in the face of hostile troops has always been one of 

the most difficult operations of war.” 

Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970) 

1. General 

a. This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to assist joint force 

commanders (JFCs), their staffs, and supporting and subordinate commanders in the 

planning, execution, and assessment of amphibious operations. An amphibious operation is 

a military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force (AF), embarked in ships 

or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the 

assigned mission. 

b. This publication specifically addresses the five types of amphibious operations, 

command relationships, particular planning responsibilities and processes, command and 

control (C2) during execution, and various support considerations. An understanding of the 

information provided herein provides a basis for mission analysis, course of action (COA) 

development, and development of a commander’s intent with associated planning guidance 

and assessment criteria considerations. 

2. Applications 

a. Amphibious operations apply maneuver principles to maritime power projection in 

joint and multinational operations. Maneuver, in conjunction with fires, is used to achieve a 

position of advantage in order to destroy or seriously disrupt the enemy’s cohesion through 

a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly 

deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. Amphibious operations seek to 

exploit the element of surprise and capitalize on enemy weakness by projecting and 

applying combat power precisely at the most advantageous location and time. Conducted 

alone, or in conjunction with other military operations, they can be designed to: 

(1) Achieve operation or campaign objectives in one swift stroke by capitalizing 

on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to strike directly at enemy 

critical vulnerabilities and decisive points in order to defeat strategic or operational centers 

of gravity (COGs). 

(2) Comprise the initial phase of a campaign or major operation where the 

objective is to establish a military lodgment to support subsequent phases. 

(3) Serve as a supporting operation in a campaign in order to deny the use of an 

area or facilities to the enemy, or to fix enemy forces and attention in support of other 

combat operations. 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-02 

(4) Outflank an enemy. 

(5) Support military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and 

humanitarian and civic assistance. 

b. An AF is an amphibious task force (ATF) and a landing force (LF) together with 

other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. An ATF 

is defined as a Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. An LF is 

defined as a Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious 

operations. AFs provide the JFC with a tailored, mobile force that is flexible enough to 

facilitate the entry of follow-on forces, be the main or supporting effort, or accomplish a 

coup-de-main. The ability to conduct and sustain scalable operations from over the horizon 

(OTH), without the requirement for diplomatic clearance or host-nation support, provides 

the JFC with additional options for the use of the military instrument of national power in 

supporting US security objectives. 

3. Types of Amphibious Operations 

a. Amphibious operations take place across the range of military operations and are 

categorized into five types: assaults, raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, and amphibious 

support to other operations. 

(1) Amphibious Assault. An amphibious assault involves the establishment of 

an LF on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. The organic capabilities of AFs, including 

air and fire support, logistics, and mobility, allow them to gain access to an area by forcible 

entry. The salient requirement of an amphibious assault is the necessity for swift buildup of 

sufficient combat power ashore, from an initial zero capability to full coordinated striking 

power, as the attack progresses toward AF objectives. Other types of forcible entry 

operations are addressed in Joint Publication (JP) 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 

(2) Amphibious Raid. An amphibious raid is a type of amphibious operation 

involving swift incursion into or temporary occupation of an objective followed by a 

planned withdrawal. 

(3) Amphibious Demonstration. An amphibious demonstration is a show of 

force conducted to deceive with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a COA 

unfavorable to it. 

(4) Amphibious Withdrawal. An amphibious withdrawal is the extraction of 

forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore. 

(5) Amphibious Support to Other Operations. A type of amphibious operation 

which contributes to conflict prevention or crisis mitigation. AFs routinely conduct 

amphibious support to other operations such as: security cooperation, foreign humanitarian 
Overview 

I-3 

assistance (FHA), civil support, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), peace 

operations, recovery operations, or disaster relief, etc.

b. Amphibious operations may be used to support a wide variety of objectives, 

including: 

(1) Attack enemy critical vulnerabilities or decisive points that lead to the defeat 

of strategic or operational COGs. 

(2) Seize a lodgment, to include ports and airfields, for the introduction of followon forces. 

(3) Seize areas for the development of advanced bases. 

(4) Destroy, neutralize, or seize enemy advanced bases and support facilities. 

(5) Seize or conduct a preemptive occupation of areas that either enable friendly 

freedom of movement or deny freedom of movement by adversaries. 

(6) Provide an afloat strategic, operational, or tactical reserve to exploit 

opportunities and counter threats. 

(7) Provide strategic, operational, or tactical deception to force the enemy to 

defend along littoral areas. 

(8) When directed, evacuate US citizens, selected citizens from the host nation, or 

third country nationals whose lives are in danger. 

(9) Provide a secure environment until follow-on forces arrive on-scene to allow 

humanitarian relief efforts to progress and facilitate the movement of food and medical care 

to relieve suffering and prevent the loss of life. 

4. Characteristics 

a. Integration of Navy and Landing Forces. The key characteristic of an 

amphibious operation is close coordination and cooperation between the ATF, LF, and 

other designated forces. An amphibious operation is ordinarily joint in nature and may 

require extensive air, land, maritime, space, and special operations forces participation. It is 

typified by close integration of forces trained, organized, and equipped for different combat 

functions. 

b. Rapid Buildup of Combat Power from the Sea to Shore. The salient 

requirement of an amphibious assault is the necessity for swift, uninterrupted buildup of 

sufficient combat power ashore, from an initial zero capability to full coordinated striking 

power, as the attack progresses toward AF objectives. To achieve success, an AF should 

be assured of local maritime and air superiority and a substantial superiority over 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-02 

enemy forces ashore. In the face of compelling necessity, commanders may undertake an 

amphibious operation on the basis of a reasonable superiority of the entire force. For 

example, maritime and air superiority may justify a landing even though the LF does not 

possess the desired numerical superiority in ground forces, if friendly surface and air units 

can be used effectively to negate the enemy’s advantage. In addition to reasonable 

superiority within the landing area, an AF should have the ability to provide continuous 

support for forces ashore. 

c. Task-organized forces are capable of multiple missions across the full range of 

military operations to enable joint and multinational operations. AFs are task-organized 

based on the mission. While forward-deployed AFs routinely deploy with a similar task 

organization, they can be quickly reinforced or augmented with other assets in theater, from 

adjacent theaters, from the continental United States, or with multinational forces. The C2 

capabilities of the ATF and LF facilitate the accomplishment of multiple and diverse 

missions and the integration of joint and multinational forces. 

d. Unity of Effort. Amphibious operations require an exceptional degree of unity of 

effort. The inherent complexity of amphibious operations normally requires the JFC’s 

personal attention and timely decisions for numerous planning, integration, and 

support activities. 

5. Capabilities 

a. Amphibious operations can be tailored and scaled to support a specific mission or 

situation, allowing the commander to increase or decrease the level of intensity to reflect a 

changing situation. The adaptability and versatility of AFs provide unique capabilities to 

the JFC. 

b. The conduct of an amphibious operation is possible under a wide variety of weather 

conditions and various types of emission control (EMCON). 

c. AFs have the capability to conduct amphibious operations from OTH, beyond visual 

and radar range of the shoreline. Diplomatic concerns may require keeping ATF ships out 

of view of a foreign shore, while retaining the capability to insert an LF ashore via air and 

landing craft assets. 

d. Routinely forward-deployed AFs, comprised of an ATF and an LF, provide the JFC 

with a force proficient in time-sensitive planning and capable of rapid response in crisis 

situations. These AFs operate without the requirement for bases, ports, and airfields, and 

often experience fewer overflight restrictions. They can perform a wide range of missionessential tasks to facilitate the accomplishment of the joint force mission. 

e. When any special operations forces (SOF) element is part of the AF, the AF 

becomes special operations capable.
Overview 

I-5 

6. Initiating an Amphibious Operation 

 Amphibious operations commence with the initiating directive, issued by the 

commander with establishing authority, to the AF commanders. The initiating directive is 

an order to subordinate commanders to conduct military operations. It is issued by the 

unified commander, subunified commander, Service component commander, or JFC 

delegated overall responsibility for the operation. The initiating directive may come in 

the form of a warning order, an alert order, a planning order, or an operation order 

(OPORD). The complete information required to conduct an amphibious operation may 

come from a combination of these orders (e.g., a warning order followed by an alert order 

or OPORD). The initiating directive normally provides the following information: 

a. The establishing authority’s mission, intent, and concept of operations (CONOPS). 

b. Designation of required commanders, establishment of their command relationships, 

and provision of special instructions (SPINS) as required to support the AF organization 

and mission. SPINS may include an establishing directive when a support relationship is 

established among designated commanders of the AF. The establishing directive is 

discussed in detail in Chapter II, “Command and Control.” 

c. Designation of the AF’s assigned, attached, and supporting forces. 

d. Assignment of an operational area as appropriate. 

e. Assignment of tasks. 

f. Assignment of responsibility and provision of necessary coordinating instructions 

for the conduct of supporting operations. 

g. Target dates for execution of the operation. 

h. Additional coordinating instructions, as required. 

7. Phases of an Amphibious Operation 

 Amphibious operations generally follow distinct phases, though the sequence may 

vary. The phases are planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and action (see Figure 

I-1). 

a. While planning occurs throughout the entire operation, it is normally dominant prior 

to embarkation. Successive phases bear the title of the dominant activity taking place 

within the phase. 

b. When AFs are forward deployed, or when subsequent tasks are assigned, the 

sequence of phases may differ. Generally, forward-deployed AFs use the sequence 

“embarkation,” “planning,” “rehearsal” (to include potential reconfiguration of 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-02 

embarked forces), “movement to the operational area,” and “action.” However, 

significant planning is conducted prior to embarkation to anticipate the most likely missions 

and to load assigned shipping accordingly. 

PHASES OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

The planning phase normally denotes the period extending from the issuance of

an initiating directive that triggers planning for a specific operation and ends with

the embarkation of landing forces. However, planning is continuous throughout

the operation. Although planning never ends, it is useful to distinguish between

the planning phase and subsequent phases because of the change that may

occur in the relationship between amphibious force commanders at the time the

planning phase terminates and the next phase begins.

PLANNING

The movement phase is the period during which various elements of the

amphibious force move from points of embarkation or from a forward-deployed

position to the operational area. This move may be via rehearsal, staging, or

rendezvous areas. The movement phase is completed when the various elements

of the amphibious force arrive at their assigned positions in the operational area.

MOVEMENT

The action phase is the period from the arrival of the amphibious force in the

operational area, through the accomplishment of the mission and the termination

of the amphibious operation.

ACTION

The rehearsal phase is the period during which the prospective operation is

rehearsed for the purpose of:

Testing the adequacy of plans, timing of detailed operations, and combat

readiness of participating forces

Ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans

Testing communications and information systems

Rehearsal may consist of an actual landing or may be conducted as a command

post exercise.

REHEARSAL

The embarkation phase is the period during which the landing force with its

equipment and supplies, embark in assigned shipping. The landing plan and the

scheme of maneuver ashore will influence which staffs and units are embarked

on which ships, the number and type of landing craft that will be embarked, and

how the units will be phased ashore. The organization for embarkation needs to

provide for flexibility to support changes to the original plan. The extent to

which changes in the landing plan can be accomplished may depend on the

ability to reconfigure embarked forces.

EMBARKATION

Figure I-1. Phases of an Amphibious Operation 
Overview 

I-7 

Note: The reader should not confuse the phasing model for amphibious operations with that 

addressed in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. An 

amphibious operation could be planned or executed within any of the six phases of that 

major operation/campaign phasing model. 

8. Terminating an Amphibious Operation 

 The ability to know how and when to terminate amphibious operations is part of 

operational design. The termination of the amphibious operation is predicated on the 

accomplishment of the amphibious mission per the specific conditions contained in the 

initiating directive. Upon completion of the amphibious operation, the establishing 

authority will provide direction as required for command arrangements and 

assignment of AFs. Some type of military operation may be required and will normally 

continue after the conclusion of the amphibious operation. Commanders and their staffs 

should continually assess the ongoing operation in light of assigned objectives and in 

consideration of the transition to other operations, anticipated or not. 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-02 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER II 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

II-1 

“Amphibious warfare requires the closest practicable cooperation by all the 

combatant services, both in planning and execution, and a command organization 

which definitely assigns responsibility for major decisions throughout all stages of 

the operation, embarkation, overseas movement, beach assault, and subsequent 

support of forces ashore.” 

Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, US Navy (1887-1972) 

1. General 

a. Amphibious operations follow the principles for joint operations as delineated in JP 

1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

b. Command relationships during multinational operations are based on international 

standardization agreements or on bilateral agreements between nations. The command 

relationships for these operations will be defined in the initiating directive. 

Refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and Allied Tactical Publication-8(B), Doctrine 

for Amphibious Operations, for more information. 

c. “JFC” is a general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, 

or joint task force (JTF) commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command 

authority) or operational control (OPCON) over a joint force. A JFC has the authority to 

organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the CONOPS. The 

organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated 

operation and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. The JFC will 

establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate 

command relationships, and establish coordinating instructions as required. Sound 

organization provides for unity of effort through unity of command, centralized 

planning and direction, and decentralized execution. 

Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more details on joint 

force organization. 

d. All joint forces include Service component commands that provide administrative 

and logistic support. The JFC may conduct operations through the Service component 

commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. This relationship is 

appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of 

operations dictate organizational integrity of Service forces for conducting operations. The 

JFC has full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among 

subordinate commanders. The JFC should allow Service tactical and operational assets and 

groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the 

requirements of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the 

Service organizations. 
Chapter II 

e. JFCs may decide to establish a functional component command to integrate 

planning; reduce their span of control; and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, 

information flow, unity of effort, weapon systems management, component interaction, or 

control over the scheme of maneuver. 

f. A JFC may also establish a subordinate JTF on a geographical area or functional 

basis when the mission has a specific, limited objective and does not require centralized 

control of logistics. The mission assigned to a JTF should require execution of 

responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, 

or should require coordination within a subordinate area. A JTF is dissolved by the JFC 

when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer 

required. 

g. The terms “commander, amphibious task force” (CATF) and “commander, landing 

force” (CLF) are used throughout this publication solely to clarify the doctrinal duties and 

responsibilities of these commanders. CATF is the Navy officer designated in the initiating 

directive as the commander of the ATF. CLF is the officer designated in the initiating 

directive as the commander of the LF for an amphibious operation. During operations, 

amphibious commanders may be referred to by either their operational command titles (e.g., 

amphibious squadron and Marine expeditionary unit [MEU] commanders) or assigned task 

force designators (e.g., Combined or Commander Task Force 62.1). 

SECTION A. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES 

“Command and control is just one element in the complex tapestry of warfare. A 

poor system well executed can beat a good system when that system’s execution 

breaks down . . . any command and control system must be complemented by 

sound tactical doctrine, realistic training, and superbly motivated troops.” 

Extract from Army Command and General Staff College FC 101-34 

2. Overview 

 The JFC achieves unity of effort in pursuit of amphibious objectives by 

establishing unity of command over AFs. The JFC may establish unity of command over 

AFs by retaining OPCON over the Service or functional component commands executing 

the amphibious operation, or by delegating OPCON or tactical control (TACON) of the AF. 

The JFC may remain the common superior to the CATF and CLF or delegate to a 

subordinate commander which may accelerate decision cycles. Forces, not command 

relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the 

command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will 

relinquish) over those forces must be specified. 

a. The JFC will organize the AF in such a way as to best accomplish the mission based 

on the CONOPS. 

II-2 JP 3-02 
Command and Control 

b. The command relationships established among the CATF, CLF, and other 

designated commanders of the AF are important decisions. The type of relationship chosen 

by the common superior commander, or establishing authority, should be based on mission, 

nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, C2 capabilities, operational 

environment, and recommendations from subordinate commanders. While the full range of 

command relationship options as outlined in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States, are available, in amphibious operations, Service component commanders 

normally retain OPCON of their respective forces. If the JFC organizes along functional 

lines, functional component commanders will normally exercise OPCON over their parent 

Services’ forces and TACON over other Services’ forces attached or made available for 

tasking. 

(1) Typically a support relationship is established between the commanders 

and is based on the complementary rather than similar nature and capabilities of the 

ATF and LF. However, it is not the intent to limit the common superior’s authority to 

establish either an OPCON or TACON command relationship as appropriate.

(2) Regardless of the command relationships, when the initiating directive is 

received, unique relationships are observed during the planning phase. The AF 

commanders, designated in the initiating directive, are coequal in planning matters. 

Planning decisions must be reached on a basis of common understanding of the mission, 

objectives, and tactics, techniques, and procedures and on a free exchange of information. 

Any differences between commanders that cannot be resolved are referred to the 

establishing authority. If a change in the mission occurs after commencement of operations 

or if an amphibious operation is initiated from an afloat posture, coequal planning 

relationships (either as described above or as specified in the initiating directive) will apply 

to any subsequent planning. However, as the operational situation dictates, the commander 

delegated OPCON of the AF may specify planning relationships to coordinate planning 

efforts, especially during crisis action planning (CAP), under the provisions of the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, Joint Operation 

Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).

(3) An establishing directive is essential whenever the support command 

relationship will be used to ensure unity of effort within the AF. Normally, the 

commanders within the AF will develop a draft establishing directive during the planning 

phase to provide the specifics of the support relationship. The commanders within the AF 

submit the draft establishing directive to the establishing authority for approval. The 

establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, 

the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It may also include, but is not 

necessarily limited to, the following: 

(a) Forces and other resources allocated to the supporting effort. 

(b) Time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort. 

(c) Relative priority of the supporting effort. 

II-3 
Chapter II 

(d) Authority, if any, of the supporting commander(s) to modify the 

supporting effort in the event of an exceptional opportunity or an emergency. 

(e) Degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the 

supporting effort. 

(f) Force protection responsibilities afloat and ashore. 

(4) Unless otherwise stated in the initiating or establishing directive, the CATF 

and CLF will identify the events and conditions for any shifts of the support relationship 

throughout the operation, ideally during the planning phase, and forward them to the 

establishing authority for approval. 

(5) The establishing authority will resolve any differences among the 

commanders. 

(6) Support is a command authority. This relationship is appropriate when one 

organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. The designation of 

the supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to the commanders and 

staffs who are planning or executing the operation. The support relationship is, by design, a 

somewhat vague and therefore very flexible arrangement. 

(7) A supported commander may be designated for the entire operation, a 

particular phase or stage of the operation, a particular function, or a combination of phases, 

stages, events, and functions. Unless limited by the establishing directive or the initiating 

directive, the supported commander has the authority to exercise general direction of 

the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of 

targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions 

necessary for coordination and efficiency. The establishing authority is responsible for 

ensuring that the supported and supporting commanders understand the degree of authority 

that the supported commander is granted. 

(a) If not specified in the initiating directive, the CATF and CLF will 

determine who has primary responsibility for the essential tasks during the mission analysis 

in the planning process. 

See Chapter III, “Conduct of Amphibious Operations,” for mission analysis and the 

planning process. 

(b) In an operation of relatively short duration, the establishing 

authority will normally choose one commander as supported for the entire operation. 

When there is no littoral threat to the AF the establishing authority may designate the CLF 

as the supported commander for the entire operation. During the movement or transit 

phase, the CATF may be designated the supported commander based on having 

responsibility for the major action or activity during that phase. The CATF may be 

II-4 JP 3-02 
Command and Control 

designated the supported commander based on capabilities for airspace control and air 

defense for the entire operation if, for example, the LF does not intend to establish a tactical 

air command center ashore (see Figure II-1). 

EXAMPLES OF SHIFTS IN THE

SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP*

Assault

Raid with coastal threat

Inland Raid with no coastal threat

Demonstration

Withdrawal

Humanitarian Assistance

CATF

CLF

Commander, Amphibious Task Force

Commander, Landing Force

MISSION SUPPORTED COMMANDER

CATF, then CLF

CATF, then CLF, then CATF

CLF

CATF

CLF, then CATF

CATF or CLF

*Actual supported-supporting commanders will be designated by the

establishing authority based on the specific mission requirements.

Figure II-1. Examples of Shifts in the Support Relationship 

(c) Considerations for shifts in the support relationship include but are not 

limited to the following: 

1. Responsibility for the preponderance of the mission. 

2. Force capabilities. 

3. Level of threat. 

4. Type, phase, and duration of operation. 

5. C2 capabilities. 

6. Operational environment assigned. 

7. Recommendations from subordinate commanders. 

II-5 
Chapter II 

(d) The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, 

procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting 

commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters 

concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in 

planning for the integration of such support into the supported commander’s effort as a 

whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated throughout 

the supporting commander’s organization. The supporting commander has the 

responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take full action to fulfill 

them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other 

assigned tasks. When the supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported 

commander, the establishing authority will be notified by either the supported or supporting 

commander. The establishing authority is responsible for resolving these issues. 

(e) Elements of the AF (ATF, LF, and other forces) may be embarked for 

what could be extended periods of time on the same platforms, but responsible to different 

or parallel chains of command. Such parallel chains of command create special 

requirements for coordination. Except in emergencies, no significant decision 

contemplated by a commander in the chain of command that affects the plans, 

disposition, or intentions of a corresponding commander in another chain of 

command will be made without consultation with the commander concerned. In 

emergency situations, the commander making an emergency decision will notify 

corresponding commanders of his or her action at the earliest practicable time. 

(f) Command relationships should be based on the nature of the mission and 

the objectives to be accomplished. Command relationships, including supported and 

supporting commander(s) relationships should be delineated clearly and succinctly. The 

specific command relationships will vary based on the mission assigned, environment 

within which operations must be conducted, and the makeup of existing and potential 

adversaries and the time available to achieve the end state. 

3. Amphibious Force Task Organization 

a. Task Organization. AFs are task-organized based on the mission. No standard 

organization is applicable to all situations that may be encountered in an amphibious 

operation. Each task group may be organized separately, or several may be combined 

based upon operational requirements. Flexibility is essential. The relationship of the 

commanders will be determined by the JFC based upon mission requirements and 

promulgated in appropriate orders (e.g., initiating directive, establishing directive, operation 

plan [OPLAN]). 

b. Task Designators. Task designators are utilized by US and North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization naval forces that assign forces in a task force, task group, task unit, and task 

element hierarchical structure. 

II-6 JP 3-02 
Command and Control 

c. Navy Forces. At the CATF’s discretion and as promulgated in the initiating 

directive and establishing directive, two or more of these groups may be combined and 

others added or deleted as dictated by operational requirements. For example, control 

groups may not be required when conducting OTH operations. The Navy forces of the AF, 

which may consist of US and multinational forces, is task-organized according to the 

separate tasks required to meet the operational requirements. CATF uses the Navy’s 

composite warfare commander (CWC) construct to defend the ATF at sea. The CWC 

conducts operations to counter threats to the force and to maintain tactical sea control with 

assets assigned. 

For further details on C2 of Navy forces, see JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint 

Maritime Operations. 

d. Landing Forces. The LF consists of ground combat units and any of its combat 

support and combat service support units. The LF may be composed of Marine Corps 

and/or Army forces, other US forces, and multinational forces. If LF capabilities are 

required by the CATF, the CLF will make decisions as to the appropriate LF capabilities to 

be made available TACON to the CATF. If US Army forces comprise part of the LF, the 

Army maneuver battalion, brigade, division, or corps will also be task-organized with 

appropriate combat and combat service support (CSS) capabilities. When Marine Corps 

forces are employed as the LF, they will be task organized into a Marine air-ground task 

force (MAGTF), the Marine Corps’ principal organization for missions across the range of 

military operations. The MAGTF is functionally grouped into four core elements: a 

command element (CE), a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element 

(ACE), and a logistics combat element (LCE). The basic structure of the MAGTF never 

varies, but the number, size, and type of Marine Corps units comprising each of the four 

elements are always mission dependent. Notional task organizations include the Marine 

expeditionary force (MEF), Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), MEU, and in some 

cases, a special purpose Marine air-ground task force (SPMAGTF). 

(1) Marine Expeditionary Force. A MEF is the largest MAGTF and is the 

Marine Corps’ principal warfighting organization, and is normally commanded by a 

lieutenant general. The size and composition of a deployed MEF can vary greatly 

depending on the requirements of the mission. A MEF is normally built around a division, 

a Marine aircraft wing, and a Marine logistics group; the largest respective Marine Corps 

ground, air, or logistic units. A MEF is capable of missions across the full range of 

military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in 

any environment. It can operate from a sea base, land base, or both, and typically deploys 

with more than 45,000 personnel with up to 60 days of sustainment. It is normally built 

around a GCE of an infantry division. The ACE consists of a Marine aircraft wing with 

fixed- and rotary-wing groups. The LCE is a combat logistics force that is organized to 

provide the full range of combat service support to the MEF. The MEF headquarters can 

serve as a JTF headquarters. When operating as part of a JTF, the MEF commander can 

operate as a functional component commander. MEFs are capable of self-sustained forcible 

entry to overcome challenges to access. It can seize and hold beachheads, airfields, and 

II-7 
Chapter II 

ports to enable the introduction of follow-on forces. The MEF can then remain in theater to 

conduct the full range of military operations in support of the joint campaign. 

(2) Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The MEB is a mid-sized MAGTF that is 

usually commanded by a brigadier or major general, and is comprised of 8,000 to 18,000 

Marines. The MEB varies in size and composition and is task-organized to meet the 

requirements of a specific situation. It is normally built around a GCE of a reinforced 

infantry regiment. The ACE consists of a Marine aircraft group with fixed- and rotary-wing 

squadrons. The LCE is a combat logistics regiment that is organized to provide the full 

range of CSS to the MEB. A MEB is capable of rapid deployment and employment via 

amphibious shipping and intratheater airlift and sealift. It can operate by itself with a selfsustainment capability of 30 days. The MEB can conduct forcible entry operations. The 

MEB is designed to aggregate with other MEBs, MEUs, and other pre-positioning force 

assets to fight as the MEF. 

(3) Marine Expeditionary Unit. A MEU is organized as a MAGTF with 

approximately 2,200 Marines and Sailors. It is normally commanded by a Marine colonel, 

and consists of a CE, a reinforced infantry battalion, a reinforced composite aviation 

squadron, and a task-organized LCE. The forward-deployed MEU is uniquely organized, 

trained, and equipped to provide the JFC with an expeditionary force. It fulfills the Marine 

Corps’ forward, sea-based deployment requirements and deploys with up to 15 days of 

supplies. Two to three MEUs are normally deployed forward supporting geographic 

combatant commander requirements, prepared to deploy in response to crisis situations as 

required. They can rapidly deploy and employ via amphibious shipping, by airlift, through 

marshalling with maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) assets, or any combination thereof. 

In terms of employment, a MEU does not regularly conduct opposed amphibious 

operations and can only conduct amphibious operations of limited duration and scope. 

Its expeditionary warfare capabilities make it extremely useful for crisis response, 

immediate reaction operations such as NEO, humanitarian and civic assistance, limited 

objective attacks, raids, and for acting as an advance force for a larger follow-on MAGTF. 

The special operations capable designation of a MEU (special operations capable) indicates 

the presence of a Marine special operations company (MSOC). This MSOC is typically 

chartered to perform three core missions: direct action, special reconnaissance, and foreign 

internal defense. The MSOC is OPCON to the geographic combatant commander, 

normally executed through the theater special operations command commander. 

(4) Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force. The SPMAGTF is 

organized, trained, and equipped with narrowly focused capabilities. It is designed to 

accomplish a wide variety of expeditionary operations, but its missions are usually limited 

in scope and duration. It is configured to accomplish specific mission(s) for which a 

MEF/MEB/MEU would be inappropriate or too large. A SPMAGTF may be any size, but 

is usually a small force, MEU-sized, or smaller. 

(5) Landing Force Organizational Shifts. The amphibious operation requires 

that the LF be organized at various times in one of three functional forms.

II-8 JP 3-02 
Command and Control 

(a) Organization for Embarkation. The organization for embarkation is a 

temporary administrative task organization of forces established to simplify planning and 

facilitate execution of embarkation at all levels of command. This organization is used by 

the LF during the movement phase of the amphibious operation. 

For more information see Chapter III, “Conduct of Amphibious Operations,” Section B 

“Embarkation,” and JP 3-02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation. 

(b) Organization for Landing. The organization for landing represents a 

specific tactical grouping of forces that facilitates landing and actions to accomplish the 

assigned mission. 

For more information see Chapter III, “Conduct of Amphibious Operations,” Section E 

“Action.”

(c) Organization for Combat. The task organization of LF units for 

accomplishment of missions ashore is employed as soon as possible following the landing 

of various assault elements of the LF. It involves the combination of combat, combat 

support, CSS, and other units that the CLF determines will best accomplish the assigned 

mission. 

1. External fire support means made available to the LF may be 

organized to support the specified task groups formed. Such forces normally include 

artillery units (not organic to the division), naval surface fire support (NSFS), and joint 

aviation. 

2. CSS installations and units are organized and located to support 

the LF and combat support forces. Centralized control of CSS is efficient, but it is often 

necessary to decentralize control to those elements that support the tactical elements, 

particularly when these task organizations have been assigned independent missions. 

4. Operational Areas 

a. General. Amphibious operations normally require a three-dimensional 

geographic area, within which is located the AF’s objective(s). The operational area 

must be of sufficient size to conduct sea, land, and air operations to execute the mission of 

the AF. In addition, JFCs employ various maneuver and movement control and fire support 

coordination measures (FSCMs) to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures 

include boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air 

operations, air defense areas, amphibious objective areas (AOAs), submarine operating 

patrol areas and minefields. JFCs may use boundaries to define areas of operations (AOs) 

for land and maritime forces. Within the designated operational area, the designated 

commander will synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. The operational areas that 

may be assigned to an AF in an initiating directive are an AOA or an AO normally in 

conjunction with a high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ). 

II-9 
Chapter II 

(1) An AOA is a geographical area (delineated for C2 purposes in the initiating 

directive) within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the AF. This area must 

be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the AF’s mission and must provide 

sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations in direct support of the 

amphibious operation. 

(2) An AO is an operational area defined by the JFC for land and maritime forces 

and should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and 

protect their forces. 

For additional guidance on boundaries and synchronization of joint efforts within land and 

naval AOs, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

b. Assigned Area. The commander designated in the initiating directive is responsible 

for airspace control, defense of friendly forces, and direction and deconfliction of 

supporting arms. The initiating directive will also specify the degree of authority that the 

designated commander has over supporting forces entering the assigned geographic area. 

The designated commander will request the airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) 

required for inclusion in the establishing directive (for a support relationship) or in the 

CONOPS to further ensure success of the mission. 

c. Disestablishment of Assigned Area. Once the type of operational area (AOA or 

AO) is defined, it is not necessarily dissolved upon termination of the amphibious 

operation. The operational area may be required for the coordination of follow-on logistic 

support of the operation or other missions as assigned. As with its establishment, 

disestablishing the area is the decision of the establishing authority (with CATF or CLF 

recommendations) and should be delineated in the initiating directive or in follow-on 

orders. 

SECTION B. AMPHIBIOUS AIR OPERATIONS 

“The doctrine and performance of Marines and airmen matured in Pacific 

campaigns as the hesitancy and missteps of Guadalcanal, New Guinea, and 

Tarawa were heeded. Coordinated amphibious assault and air warfare became 

irrepressible.” 

“Struggle for the Marianas,” Captain Bernard D. Cole, US Navy 

Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 95 

5. Joint Air Operations 

 Joint air operations in support of the AF, are performed with air capabilities and forces 

made available by components in support of the JFC’s or AF’s objectives. To create 

synergy and avoid duplication of effort, the JFC synchronizes and integrates the 

actions of assigned, attached, and supporting capabilities and forces in time, space, 

and purpose. The JFC normally accomplishes this through designation of a joint force air 

component commander (JFACC), area air defense commander (AADC), and airspace 

II-10 JP 3-02 
Command and Control 

control authority (ACA) for the joint operations area (JOA). The JFACC uses joint air to 

support amphibious operations within the AOA. It is within this context that joint air 

tasking, air defense activities, and airspace control are conducted during amphibious 

operations. 

For more information, see JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

6. Defensive Counterair 

a. The AADC bears overall responsibility for air defense activities of the joint 

force. The AADC may, however, designate subordinate regional air defense commanders 

(RADCs) for specific geographic regions to accomplish the joint force mission. 

Additionally, sector air defense commanders (SADCs) may be designated within and 

subordinate to RADCs. The RADC is normally established within the ATF 

organization and is responsible for the airspace allocated for amphibious operations, 

including but not limited to the AOA (if established). The CATF will coordinate joint 

air requirements in support of active defense plans and procedures with the AADC and 

attack operations with the JFACC. The CATF usually assigns an air defense commander 

(ADC), normally located on the most capable air defense platform, to actually carry out air 

defense operations. The ADC coordinates with the Navy tactical air control center (Navy 

TACC) to maintain a current air picture. 

b. When an AOA is established, the airspace assigned to the AF usually includes a 

margin of airspace surrounding the AOA called the amphibious defense zone (ADZ). 

An ADZ is the area encompassing the AOA and the adjoining airspace required by 

accompanying naval forces for the purpose of air defense. The actual size and shape of an 

ADZ is dependent upon the capabilities of air defense platforms assigned to the CATF; the 

size of the AOA; and agreement between the AF’s RADC, the AADC, and adjacent ADCs. 

Within the ADZ, the AF air defense agency maintains positive identification of all aircraft 

and conducts air defense with the authority to engage in accordance with established rules 

of engagement (ROE) and AADC established procedures. 

c. Planning Considerations

(1) A coherent air defense plan requires the designated commander to conduct 

coordinated planning with all supporting and adjacent commanders and the JFC to establish 

a robust C2 arrangement. Effective air defense operations require a control system that 

functions despite a high volume of all types of friendly aircraft operations within the 

operational area and the difficult overland target detection environment present in 

amphibious operations. 

(2) The area air defense plan must be written with detailed engagement 

procedures that are consistent with the airspace control plan (ACP) and operations in the 

combat zone. The geographic arrangement of weapons and the location of specific types of 

air defense operations, as well as specific procedures for identification of aircraft, are 

important factors to include in planning. 

II-11 
Chapter II 

Refer to JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, and JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, for 

additional information. 

Other key factors to consider are described in JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control. 

7. Airspace Control in Amphibious Operations 

a. Assignment of airspace allows the JFC to exercise C2 of forces, deconflict high 

volumes of different types of aircraft and missiles, and defense forces. During amphibious 

operations, the ACA will normally further delegate the control authority for a specific 

airspace control area to the CATF. The further delegation of roles typically includes 

regional air defense responsibilities. The complexity and size of an amphibious operation 

directly affects the amount of airspace allocated. 

See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, for further information on control 

authority designation. 

b. A HIDACZ is airspace in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous 

and varied weapons, such as artillery, missiles, and NSFS, and airspace users. A HIDACZ 

has defined dimensions that usually coincide with specific geographical features or 

navigational aids. Access to a HIDACZ is normally controlled by the Navy TACC. 

c. The level of air control allocated to the AF depends on the degree of air control 

measures. The ACA approves these measures on behalf of the JFC. A HIDACZ is an 

effective means of airspace control that is typically initiated by the primary user (CATF). 

Considerations for establishing a HIDACZ include: 

(1) Airspace control capabilities of the AF. 

(2) Minimum risk routes into and out of the HIDACZ and to the target area. 

(3) Air traffic advisory as required. Procedures and systems must also be 

considered for air traffic control service during instrument meteorological conditions. 

(4) Procedures for expeditious movement of aircraft into and out of the HIDACZ. 

(5) Coordination of fire support, as well as air defense weapons control orders or 

status within and in the vicinity of the HIDACZ. 

(6) Range and type of NSFS available. 

(7) Location of enemy forces inside and in close proximity to the HIDACZ. 

(8) The HIDACZ should cover the ATF’s sea echelon areas and extend inland to 

the LF’s fire support coordination line (FSCL). Optimally, it should extend beyond the 

II-12 JP 3-02 
Command and Control 

FSCL so that the CLF can fight the deep battle. Additionally, the HIDACZ should be large 

enough to accommodate the flow of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, to include unmanned 

aircraft systems (UASs), into and out of the amphibious airspace. 

d. Under the ATF, the Navy TACC typically onboard the amphibious flagship, 

will normally be established as the agency responsible for controlling all air operations 

within the allocated airspace regardless of mission or origin, to include supporting arms and 

assault breaching. An aircraft or surface combatant with the requisite air C2 capabilities 

may also serve this function. Regardless of where actual airspace control is exercised, close 

and continuous coordination between airspace control and air defense agencies is essential. 

Emphasis will be placed on simple, flexible air traffic control plans and a combination of 

positive and procedural airspace control. There are three levels of control: procedural, 

positive, and a combination of the two. AFs operating in a non-radar environment will rely 

exclusively on procedural control. Amphibious air control plans employ a combination 

of positive and procedural control methods. 

(1) Positive Airspace Control. Positive airspace control uses radar; electronic 

warfare support; identification, friend or foe/selective identification feature; visual means; 

digital data links; and elements of the air defense network communications system to 

positively identify, track, and direct air assets. 

(2) Procedural Airspace Control. Procedural control methods supplement those 

methods utilized in positive airspace control. Procedural control will be used when 

electronic or visual identification, tracking, or communication means are unavailable or 

inadequate to provide positive airspace control. These methods are often used when 

adequate coverage does exist to complement positive control methods. Procedural airspace 

control relies on a combination of previously agreed upon and promulgated orders and 

procedures. 

See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, for more details. 

e. To ensure unity of effort and minimal interference along adjacent boundaries, the 

AF air control agency coordinates the items listed in Figure II-2 with the ACA. Navy 

TACC prepares and submits ACMs for the AF to the ACA for inclusion in the JFC’s 

ACP. The ACP provides the basic information needed to operate within the amphibious 

airspace. Changes to established procedures will be coordinated with all airspace users. 

The airspace control order (ACO) and SPINS to the air tasking order (ATO) may contain 

changes to airspace control procedures and must be reviewed daily by all users of 

amphibious airspace. 

8. Navy Tactical Air Control Center 

 The senior Navy amphibious air control agency is the Navy TACC. The functions of 

the Navy TACC may be spread across several ships. The Navy TACC possesses the 

functionality of future plans and current operations. During amphibious operations, the 

Navy TACC coordinates the types of ACMs and controls all air operations within the 

II-13 
Chapter II 

operational area until a land-based air control agency is established ashore. Once a 

land-based air control agency receives control of all LF air operations, the Navy TACC may 

become a tactical air direction center (TADC) supporting the land-based air control agency. 

The supporting arms coordination center (SACC) is a single location on board an 

amphibious assault ship (general purpose) (LHA) or amphibious assault ship (multipurpose) 

(LHD) in which all communication facilities incident to the coordination of fire support 

from artillery, air, and NSFS are centralized. This is the naval counterpart to the fire 

support coordination center (FSCC) and direct air support center (DASC) used by the LF. 

The Navy TACC has five sections, four of which control and integrate aircraft. 

a. Air Traffic Control Section (ATCS). The ATCS is located in the Navy TACC 

and provides initial safe passage, radar control, and surveillance for close air support (CAS) 

aircraft in the operational area. The ATCS also controls and routes rotary-wing CAS 

aircraft and assault support aircraft and coordinates with individual shipboard helicopter 

direction centers (HDCs) and the amphibious air traffic control center (AATCC) onboard 

the large deck amphibious ship(s) during amphibious operations. In amphibious operations, 

the HDC is the primary direct control agency for the helicopter group/unit commander 

operating under the overall control of the Navy TACC. 

b. Helicopter Coordination Section (HCS). The HCS coordinates rotary-wing air 

operations with all HDCs and AATCC(s) in the amphibious task force. HCS tasks are to: 

(1) Ensure all assault support requests are coordinated. 

(2) Coordinate ship-to-shore movements. 

(3) Resolve conflicts in rotary-wing tasking. 

Procedures for coordination of flight information

Clearance of aircraft to enter and depart the airspace

sector

Procedures for assisting and coordinating with airspace

control elements that respond to adjacent or supporting

component commanders

Procedures for deconfliction of operations during

transitional operations and during operations in

overlapping airspace areas

COORDINATION RESPONSIBILITIES

Figure II-2. Coordination Responsibilities 

II-14 JP 3-02 
Command and Control 

c. Air Support Coordination Section (ASCS). The ASCS is located in the SACC 

and is the section of the Navy TACC designated to coordinate, control, and integrate all 

direct support aircraft (i.e., CAS) and assault support operations. 

d. Air Defense Section (ADS). The ADS, located in the Navy TACC, provides 

liaison with air defense commanders and provides early detection, identification, and 

warning of enemy aircraft. 

e. Plans, Execution, and Support Section. The plans cell participates in the targeting 

effort as air operations subject matter experts through the targeting board. The section’s 

planning will coincide with the ATO process. The section forwards excess air sorties and 

air support requests to the establishing authority for tasking and allocation. The input from 

the targeting board is processed by the ATO planning, production, and execution cell. This 

cell normally produces the following amphibious products: the ACO, the ATO, SPINS, and 

additional fire support asset requests. If the Navy TACC is acting as the joint air operations 

center for an enabling JFACC, the plans cell section may be required to produce the air 

apportionment recommendation for the JFC. 

9. Marine Corps Tactical Air Command Center 

 The Marine Corps tactical air command center (Marine TACC), when established 

ashore, provides the facilities for the ACE commander and staff to conduct air 

operations. Other Services’ comparable agencies include the US Air Force air and space 

operations center and the Navy TACC. If the ACE is afloat, the Marine TACC may be 

incrementally phased ashore. Initially, a Marine TADC is established ashore subordinate to 

The air traffic control section provides initial safe passage, radar control, 

and surveillance for close air support aircraft in the operational area. 

II-15 
Chapter II 

the Navy TACC and is responsible for air operations in the landward sector of the 

operational area. Upon completion of its build-up and when airspace management 

functions are passed from afloat to ashore, the Marine TADC assumes the title and 

responsibilities of the Marine TACC. The Navy TACC then may become a TADC, in 

support of the Marine TACC. 

10. Direct Air Support Center 

 The DASC is an organization within the Marine air command and control system 

(MACCS) that serves as the central coordination point for all direct support air requests. 

Based upon the tactical situation, the DASC is normally located with either the senior GCE, 

FSCC, or the MAGTF force fires coordination center (FFCC). The DASC assigns direct air 

support aircraft to terminal control agencies, provides aircraft ingress and egress route 

instructions, and disseminates advisory information. When control is afloat, the Navy 

TACC supervises the DASC’s operations. When control is ashore, the Marine TADC or 

Marine TACC supervises the DASC’s operations. The DASC is normally the first major 

LF air control agency to come ashore, typically landing in the same wave as the FSCC. 

11. Tactical Air Operations Center 

 The tactical air operations center (TAOC) provides safe passage, radar control, and 

surveillance for CAS aircraft en route to and from target areas. Until the Marine TADC or 

Marine TACC is established ashore, the TAOC normally reports to the Navy TACC. The 

TAOC, or elements thereof typically deploy with the land elements of a MEB or a MEF. 

The TAOC’s capabilities incrementally increase as the size of the land force component 

increases (i.e., MEB or MEF size land force). 

12. Air Command and Control Procedures and Coordination 

 The air C2 procedures described below are frequently associated with an established 

AOA; however, the underlying principles apply for most amphibious operations, whether 

an AOA is established or other airspace allocation methods are used. 

a. Pre-D-day Operations. Prior to the commencement of amphibious operations, 

airspace control and air defense operations throughout the operational area will be 

the direct responsibility of the ACA and AADC, respectively, as designated by the 

JFC. Control is exercised through the designated air control agency which, as described 

earlier, could be an aircraft, surface ship, or Navy TACC. Subordinate TADCs, as 

designated, monitor air control circuits in readiness to assume all or part of the duties of the 

air control agency, if necessary. 

b. Advance Forces. An advance force is a temporary organization within the AF 

which precedes the main body to the objective area. Its function is to participate in 

preparing the objective for the main assault by conducting such operations as 

reconnaissance, seizure of supporting positions, mine countermeasures (MCM), preliminary 

bombardment, underwater demolitions, and air support. If advance force operations are 

II-16 JP 3-02 
Command and Control 

conducted in the operational area, the designated commander normally exercises air 

C2 through an advance force commander. The advance force commander controls 

operations in the designated area through an air control agency tailored and trained for the 

mission. CATF typically assumes responsibility for local airspace control and air defense 

operations upon arrival of the main body of the AF in the operational area. 

c. Control by Attack Groups. When subordinate attack groups are formed for 

operations in widely separated landing areas, the designated commander normally 

delegates to each attack group commander authority for control of airspace and air 

operations in the immediate area surrounding the respective landing areas. An attack 

group is a subordinate task organization of the Navy forces of an ATF. It is composed of 

assault shipping and supporting naval units designated to transport, protect, land, and 

initially support a landing group. In amphibious operations, a landing group is a 

subordinate task organization of the LF capable of conducting landing operations, under a 

single tactical command, against an objective or group of objectives. The attack group 

commander exercises control through a local air control and defense agency consisting of 

airborne elements, an escorting surface combatant, or a TADC on the appropriate attack 

group ship. Overall direction of air operations as they apply to the amphibious mission is 

normally retained by the CATF and exercised through the designated air control agency. 

d. Air Tasking. The commander designated in the initiating directive is 

responsible for coordinating the air support requirements for the AF. The commander 

coordinates the submission of air support requests through preparation of an air allocation 

request (ALLOREQ). An ALLOREQ message provides, among other things, the vehicle 

for requesting additional air support beyond the capability of the AF and its direct support 

components. 

For more information see, JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, and 

Chapter V, Section B, “Fire Support,” for more discussion of the joint air tasking cycle, and 

Chapter IV, “Amphibious Operations Against Coastal Defenses,” for amplification on 

assault breaching. 

e. Air Defense Transition Ashore. As sufficient air defense assets are established 

ashore, the CLF will coordinate with the CATF to assume SADC responsibility in the 

landward sector of the operational area, the dimensions of which will have been 

predetermined during the planning phase of the operation. 

f. Termination of the Amphibious Operation. Upon termination of the amphibious 

operation, the AF will be dissolved, and air control and defense responsibilities in the area 

passed to the appropriate commander in accordance with the establishing authority’s 

guidance. 

13. Transition from Tactical Air Control Center to Tactical Air Command Center 

 Both the Navy and the Marine Corps air control systems are capable of independent 

operations; however, in the conduct of an amphibious operation, elements of both systems 

II-17 
Chapter II 

II-18 JP 3-02 

are used to different degrees from the beginning of the operation until the control is phased 

ashore. Under the ATF commander, the TACC, typically on board the LHA or LHD, will 

normally be established as the agency responsible for controlling all air operations within 

the allocated airspace regardless of mission or origin, to include supporting arms. As the 

operation progresses, the LF commander, having the capability to control air operations, 

may establish C2 systems ashore and incrementally accept responsibility for various C2 

functions from the ATF commander. When full capability is achieved, the CLF may 

assume full air control responsibility from the ATF commander (i.e., Navy TACC). In 

some cases it might be neither necessary nor desirable to transfer authority ashore. As the 

amphibious operation proceeds, C2 of aviation operations is transitioned ashore as MACCS 

agencies are established on the ground. Air C2 functions are traditionally sequenced ashore 

in five phases. 

a. Phase one is characterized by the arrival of various “supporting arms controllers” 

ashore; namely the tactical air control party (TACP), forward observers, air support liaison 

teams, and NSFS spot teams. 

b. In phase two, the DASC is normally the first principal air control agency established 

ashore. When control is afloat, the Navy TACC supervises the DASC’s operations. 

c. The movement of the TAOC ashore, although not directly related to CAS, is the 

principal event in phase three. 

d. In phase four, the senior organization of the Marine air control group is established 

ashore and functions as the Marine TADC under control of the Navy TACC. 

e. Phase five is characterized by the passage of command responsibility ashore. The 

Marine Corps TADC assumes the role of the Marine TACC. Once the Marine TACC 

receives control of all LF air operations, the Navy TACC may become the TADC (afloat) 

supporting the land-based air control agency. The CATF will normally be assigned RADC 

or SADC responsibility for the seaward sector of the operational area. 

See Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-02.1.3, Amphibious/Expeditionary 

Operations Air Control, for more details. 
CHAPTER III 

CONDUCT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 

III-1 

“Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea-based power 

possesses.” 

B.H. Liddell Hart, Deterrence or Defense, 1960 

1. Overview 

 An amphibious operation applies maneuver principles to expeditionary power 

projection by establishing a LF ashore. The AF executes rapid, focused operations to 

accomplish the JFC’s objectives. Regardless of the type of amphibious operation, the CLF 

and CATF plan and execute operations based on maneuver warfare philosophy and the 

following general concepts. 

a. All actions focus on achieving the commander’s objectives. The CONOPS 

guides the decisive actions to exploit enemy vulnerabilities and attack enemy COGs and 

selected decisive points. 

b. The use of the sea offers maneuver space. Operations should create freedom of 

action for the AF, while creating a tempo greater than the enemy can withstand. The 

AF commander should exploit evolutionary advances in electronic warfare (EW), precision 

targeting systems, waterborne/airborne transportation craft, and anything else that allows 

for the introduction of the AF at the time and place of his choosing. Maneuver can begin 

long before closing the shoreline as the sea offers many avenues of approach. 

c. The key to successful LF operations is the rapid build up of combat power ashore. 

Therefore, it is imperative that commanders seek to pit friendly strength against enemy 

weakness. 

d. The preferred tactic for AFs operating against coastal defenses is to avoid or bypass 

the strong points if unable to exploit gaps in these defenses. Operations that emphasize 

intelligence, deception, and flexibility will help identify and create gaps while also 

enhancing the force protection of the entire joint force. If unable to bypass the strong 

points, the AF will be required to neutralize an adversary’s anti-access systems. 

e. The complexity of amphibious operations and the vulnerability of the AF as it builds 

combat power ashore require the full integration of organic assets as well as those of 

other joint and multinational forces. The AF realizes maximum effectiveness by using 

all available capabilities. 

f. This chapter has been structured to follow the phases of an amphibious operation as 

discussed in Chapter I, “Overview.” The phases are: planning, embarkation, rehearsals, 

movement, and action (also known as PERMA). The action phase has been further divided 

into the five types of amphibious operations. 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-02 

SECTION A. PLANNING 

2. General 

 The planning process described herein is designed for use by any size AF while 

conducting any operation. This tool assists commanders, who make the decisions (see 

paragraph 6, “Primary Decisions”), required in most amphibious operations. The focus of 

the planning process is the development of a plan that accomplishes the mission. It 

links the employment of the AF to the attainment of operational and strategic objectives 

through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of the amphibious operation 

within the JFC’s overall operation or campaign. The nature of amphibious warfare gives 

rise to planning procedures that are both intricate and unique. Planning intricacy stems 

from the complex detail required to fully coordinate the assault landing of troops, 

equipment, and supplies; maximize maneuver, speed, and available fire support; and 

minimize the vulnerability of the assault forces and naval shipping. The uniqueness of 

amphibious planning stems from the interrelationships between the components of the AF; 

between the AF and the joint force; and between the AF and supporting organizations and 

agencies. 

3. Tenets of Amphibious Planning 

 Planning for an amphibious operation is continuous, from the receipt of the initiating 

directive through the termination of the operation. Amphibious planning requires 

concurrent, parallel, and detailed planning by all participating forces. The planning pattern 

is cyclical in nature, composed of a series of analyses and judgments of operational 

situations, each stemming from those that have preceded. The tenets of successful 

amphibious planning are commanders’ involvement and guidance, unity of effort, and an 

integrated planning effort. 

a. Commanders’ Involvement and Guidance. The complexity of amphibious 

operations requires AF commanders to drive the planning process. Their guidance and 

intent are central to planning and must be translated into a design for action by 

subordinates. Their decisions (e.g., AF area of operations, AF objectives, AF CONOPS, 

landing beaches, commanders’ critical information requirements, and promulgated essential 

elements of friendly information) are required before additional steps in the process can 

proceed. 

b. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort allows the AF commanders to effectively focus 

their forces on mission accomplishment. They must view their operational environment

as an indivisible entity, for operations or events in one area may have profound and often 

unintended effects on other areas and events. 

c. Integrated Planning. Integrated planning in amphibious operations has two parts. 

The first part is the assembly of the AF commanders and their staffs in the same 

locality. When such arrangements are not practicable, the exchange of liaison officers 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-3 

qualified to perform planning functions and the use of advanced technology, collaborative 

planning aids, and video teleconferencing are necessary. During planning, and particularly 

in CAP, AF commanders ensure that their planning efforts are parallel and concurrent with 

each other and those of their higher headquarters. The same degree of integration by AF 

commanders and their staffs must also be achieved with subordinate units to ensure a 

coordinated and thorough plan. The second part of integrated planning occurs across 

functional areas. An integrated operational planning team, consisting of cross functional 

representatives, is necessary. The use of functional areas, C2, intelligence, fires, movement 

and maneuver, protection and sustainment, enable commanders to integrate the planning 

effort and supervise the plan. The use of functional areas facilitates the consideration of all 

relevant factors and minimizes omissions. The key to this part of integrated planning is the 

assignment of appropriate personnel to represent each functional area. Integrated planning 

is facilitated by the use of operational planning teams which are dynamic, ad hoc 

organizations formed around planners from functional areas, appropriate staff 

representatives, subordinate and supporting command liaison officers, and other subject 

matter experts. 

See JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

4. Planning Directive 

 Following receipt of the initiating directive, the AF commanders issue a coordinated 

planning directive to harmonize staff actions, and complete required planning in the time 

allowed. The planning directive specifies the plan of action and milestones to complete 

each major step in the planning process, and the timeline for the development of 

OPLANs, OPORDs, operational general matters (OPGENs), operation tasks (OPTASKs) 

and other products. 

5. Planning Methods 

 Amphibious planning is conducted as part of the Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System (JOPES) planning activities that occur either as contingency planning or 

CAP. 

a. Contingency Planning. Contingency planning occurs in response to a hypothetical 

situation and is based on requirements identified in the Guidance for Employment of the 

Force, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, or other planning directives. It is performed well 

in advance of expected execution, often during peacetime or before initiating an operation. 

b. Crisis Action Planning. CAP is the JOPES process involving the time-sensitive 

development of joint OPLANs and OPORDs for the deployment, employment, and 

sustainment of assigned and allocated forces in response to an imminent situation. CAP is 

based on up-to-date actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. 

For more detailed information on contingency planning and CAP refer to CJCSM 3122.01 

Series Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-02 

c. Amphibious Planning Process. The cornerstone of amphibious operations 

execution is the six-step planning process. It is modeled upon the joint operation planning 

process found in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. The six steps of the process are mission 

analysis, COA development, COA wargame, COA comparison and decision, orders 

development, and transition (see Figure III-1). This planning process provides logical 

procedures to follow from receipt of the initiating directive through the development of 

OPLANs, OPORDs, OPTASKs, and other products. The process also provides the AF 

commanders and their staffs with a means to organize planning activities, transmit plans to 

subordinate commands, and share a common understanding of the mission and the 

commanders’ intents. Staff interactions, processes, and compatible system interfaces, and 

STEPS IN THE AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING PROCESS

1

2

3

4

5

6

MISSION ANALYSIS

Higher commanders’

warning order, OPLAN,

or OPORD

AF commanders’ planning

products or OPORD

COURSE OF ACTION

DEVELOPMENT

COURSE OF ACTION

WAR GAME

ORDERS AND OPGEN

DEVELOPMENT

COURSE OF

ACTION

COMPARISON AND

DECISION

TRANSITION

AF

OPGEN

Amphibious Force

Operation General Matter

OPLAN

OPORD

Operation Plan

Operation Order

Figure III-1. Steps in the Amphibious Planning Process 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-5 

the overlap between various planning steps allow a concurrent, coordinated effort that 

maintains flexibility, makes efficient use of available time, and facilitates continuous 

information sharing. It enhances the commanders’ ability to make timely decisions. 

6. Primary Decisions 

 AF commanders make certain primary decisions during the planning process before 

further planning for an amphibious operation can proceed. In some cases, these decisions 

may have been made by the establishing authority and promulgated in the initiating 

directive. The decisions and who makes them are described below. In the case of mutual 

decisions, both commanders must concur or the decision is referred to the establishing 

authority for resolution (see Figure III-2). 

a. During “mission analysis,” the following decisions are made: 

(1) Determine AF Mission(s). AF commanders may decide on a coordinated 

mission statement or develop separate but supporting mission statements. The 

determination of a coordinated AF mission statement is a mutual decision. If separate but 

supporting mission statements are chosen, then each commander must develop his or her 

respective mission statement. 

(2) Select AF Objective(s). AF objectives are physical in nature such as: 

terrain, infrastructure (e.g., ports or airfields), or forces that must be seized, secured, 

or destroyed in order to accomplish the mission. AF objectives are designated in 

alphabetic order (e.g., AF Objective A and AF Objective B). The selection of AF 

objectives is a mutual decision. 

b. During “COA Development,” AF staffs further develop COAs based on the 

guidance from the AF commanders. Normally, the LF planners will provide an LF COA 

for the ATF planners to build a supporting COA. At a minimum, COAs include the general 

area for a landing (which may already be specified by higher headquarters), designation of 

the main effort, the scheme of maneuver, and the task organization. The selected COAs 

will be wargamed and compared based on criteria established by the commanders. The 

selection of AF COAs is a mutual decision. 

c. COA analysis and wargaming follows JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

d. No later than during “COA comparison and decision” the following decisions 

must be made: 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-02 

 (1) Select Course of Action. At this point a COA is selected and the CONOPS 

(including fire support planning guidance) is prepared. The CONOPS is usually a written 

and graphic representation, in broad outline, of the intent of both of the commanders with 

respect to their portion of the operation. It gives an overall picture of the operation, 

including the transit, formation for landing, and the scheme of maneuver for accomplishing 

the AF objectives. Both commanders prepare mutually supporting CONOPS. 

(2) Select Landing Areas. The landing area includes the beach, the approaches 

to the beach, the transport areas, the fire support areas, the airspace above it, and the land 

included in the advance inland to accomplish the initial objectives. The selection of the 

landing area is a mutual decision (see Figure III-3). The beach is the area extending from 

PRIMARY DECISIONS RESPONSIBILITIES MATRIX

PRIMARY DECISION

May be contained

in the initiating

directive

Decision Decision

made not

later than

step

1. Determine Amphibious

Force Mission(s)

X MUTUAL 1

1

2

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

MUTUAL

MUTUAL

MUTUAL

MUTUAL

MUTUAL

CATF

CATF Commander, Amphibious Task Force

CLF

CLF Commander, Landing Force

CLF

MUTUAL

X

X

X

2. Select Amphibious

Force Objective(s)

4. Select Course of Action

6. Select Landing Beaches

8. Select Landing Force

Objectives

10. Select Date and Hour

Of Landing

3. Determine Courses of

Action for Development

5. Select Landing Areas

7. Determine Sea Areas

9. Select Landing Zones

and Drops Zones

Figure III-2. Primary Decisions Responsibilities Matrix 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-7 

the shoreline inland to a marked change in physiographic form or material, or to the line of 

permanent vegetation (coastline). 

(3) Select Landing Beaches. A landing beach is usually the portion of a 

shoreline required for the landing of a battalion landing team (BLT). In an amphibious 

operation, a BLT is an infantry battalion normally reinforced by necessary combat and 

combat support elements; the basic unit for planning an assault landing. Landing beaches 

are selected from within the selected landing areas. Landing beaches are named by color 

and are typically 1000 meters wide. Principal factors in the selection of landing beaches (in 

addition to those previously described for selection of landing areas) include: 

LANDING AREA SELECTION

NAVAL CONSIDERATIONS LANDING FORCE

CONSIDERATIONS

AIR CONSIDERATIONS

Suitability of landing area

Hostile capabilities

Coastline configuration

Inland terrain

Combat service support requirements

Possibility of early seizure and

rehabilitation of air and port facilities

Beach ingress/egress trafficability

Ability to achieve and maintain

local air superiority and perform

Interdiction and close air support

Available air capabilities

Command and control capabilities

to include deconfliction ability

Ability to support the landing

and subsequent operations

Hostile counterair capabilities

and disposition

Possibility of early seizure

and rehabilitation of facilities

Ability to support the landing

and subsequent operations

Degree of shelter from sea and

weather

Hydrography of beach

approaches, offshore, and near

shore areas

Extent of mineable waters

Hostile ability to defeat mine

countermeasures

Practicality of improving

unloading facilities

Hostile capabilities and

disposition

Possibility of early seizure and

rehabilitation of port facilities

Figure III-3. Landing Area Selection 
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-02 

(a) Suitability for landing craft (e.g., landing crafts, air cushion [LCACs]) 

and amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs). A landing craft is a craft employed in 

amphibious operations, specifically designed for carrying troops and their equipment and 

for beaching, unloading, and retracting. It is also used for resupply operations. The AAV is 

a fully tracked, amphibious vehicle tasked to land the surface assault elements of the LF and 

their equipment in a single lift from assault shipping during amphibious operations to inland 

objectives. AAVs are also used to conduct mechanized operations and related combat 

support in subsequent operations ashore. The three types of AAVs are command, 

personnel, and recovery. 

(b) Offshore approaches and tidal conditions. 

(c) Number, location, and suitability of beach support areas, beach exits, and 

nearby infrastructure. In amphibious operations, the beach support area is to the rear of a 

LF or elements thereof, established and operated by shore party units, which contains the 

facilities for the unloading of troops and materiel and the support of the forces ashore; it 

includes facilities for the evacuation of wounded, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), and 

captured materiel. Landing beaches are designated by color, and subdivisions are further 

designated with the addition of a number (Green Beach, Red Beach 1, and Red Beach 2). 

The selection of landing beaches is a mutual decision. 

(d) Determine requirement and feasibility of OTH operations. Consider 

threat, environmental conditions, likelihood of achieving surprise, and friendly force 

The commander, landing force selects landing and drop zones. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-9 

capabilities (e.g., power projection and sustainment). See paragraph 21, “Over-the-Horizon 

Amphibious Operations.” 

(4) Determine Sea Areas and the Sea Echelon Plan. A sea echelon is a portion 

of the amphibious shipping that withdraws from, or remains out of, the transport area during 

a landing or an operation. It operates in designated areas to seaward in an on-call or 

unscheduled status. The sea echelon plan provides for the dispersion of amphibious 

shipping to minimize losses due to enemy attacks and to reduce the area that must be 

cleared for mines. Amphibious shipping consists of organic navy ships specifically 

designed to transport, land, and support landing forces in amphibious assault operations and 

capable of being loaded or unloaded by naval personnel without external assistance in the 

AOA. In amphibious operations, the transport area is an area assigned to a transport 

organization for the purpose of debarking troops and equipment. The CATF determines the 

sea echelon plan. The design of the amphibious airspace must take into account, as a 

general rule, the lateral limits of the amphibious area above the sea echelon areas. 

(5) Select LF Objectives. LF objectives facilitate the attainment of AF 

objectives and/or uninterrupted landing of forces and materiel. LF objectives are 

normally designated by LF and a number (e.g., LF Objective 1). LF objectives are selected 

by the CLF. 

(6) Select Landing Zones (LZs) and Drop Zones (DZs). An LZ is a specified 

zone used for the landing of aircraft. An LZ may contain one or more landing sites. A DZ 

is a specific area upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies are air dropped. LZs 

and DZs are designated when airborne or air-transported forces are employed. The CLF 

selects LZs and DZs. 

(7) Select Date and Hour of Landing. The date and hour of the landing are 

selected unless they are specified in the initiating directive. H-hour, in amphibious 

operations, is the time the first assault elements are scheduled to touchdown on the beach or 

an LZ. L-hour is defined in amphibious operations as the time at which the first helicopter 

of the helicopterborne assault wave touches down in the LZ. H- and L-hour are confirmed 

prior to commencement of the landing based on the weather, enemy situation, and other 

pertinent factors. If not specified in the initiating directive, this is a mutual decision. 

Landing considerations include: 

(a) Is it preferable to land at high tide or low tide? 

(b) Is it preferable to land during the day or night, and if at night, which 

nights or when during the night based on luminescence? 

(c) Is it preferable to land on a certain day due to religious and cultural 

events? 

(d) Is it preferable to land in a certain month due to better weather? 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-02 

(e) Is it preferable to land immediately after certain countermine operations, 

which are more effective at low tide, have been conducted or is it better to wait for high 

tide? 

(f) Is it preferable to have the helicopters land at the same time as the surface 

assault? 

e. Orders and OPGEN Development. OPGENs and OPTASKs are messages, 

used by commanders of Navy forces to transmit orders, fragmentary orders, and 

tactical and operational tasks to elements of the ATF. Orders and 

OPGENs/OPTASKs serve as the principal means by which the commanders express 

their decisions, intents, and guidance. 

(1) Order and OPGEN/OPTASK Crosstalk. After the primary decisions have 

been made and step four of the planning process is completed, the AF commanders develop 

their OPLANs, OPORDs, OPGENs, or OPTASKs. The staffs must maintain constant 

communication to ensure continued harmonization of their concurrent planning efforts. 

Depending upon time available, once final drafts of the OPORD and 

OPGEN/OPTASK have been completed a crosstalk and confirmation brief should be 

conducted between the commanders and staffs. The purpose of the crosstalk is to 

compare these documents with higher and adjacent orders to ensure unity of effort and to 

identify any discrepancies or gaps. Following the staff’s correction of any discrepancies 

identified during the crosstalk, the OPORD and OPGEN will be submitted for approval, and 

a confirmation brief is scheduled. 

(2) Confirmation Brief. A confirmation brief is given by a subordinate 

commander and his staff once planning is complete. The participants brief their scheme of 

maneuver and fire support plan and the relationship between their unit’s mission and the 

other units in the operation. The confirmation brief allows the higher commander to 

identify discrepancies between his order and the subordinates’ plan(s) and allows for 

corrective actions, if required, prior to execution. 

f. Transition. Transition is an orderly handover of an OPLAN, OPORD, OPGEN, or 

OPTASK as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides those 

who will execute the plan or order with the situational awareness and rationale for key 

decisions necessary to ensure that there is a coherent shift from planning to execution. 

7. Assessment 

 Assessment is a process that measures progress of the AF toward mission 

accomplishment and occurs at all levels. The assessment process begins during mission 

analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to 

determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an 

objective. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and 

resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other 

critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-11 

and end state. As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is 

directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed. Assessment at the 

operational level typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and 

uses measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that support operational mission accomplishment. 

Commanders use MOEs to determine progress toward success in those operations for which 

tactical-level combat assessment ways, means, and measures do not apply. Tactical-level 

assessment typically uses measures of performance to evaluate task accomplishment. The 

results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on 

specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include assessing progress 

by phase lines; neutralization of enemy forces; control of key terrain or resources; and 

security, relief, or reconstruction tasks. Assessment of results at the tactical level helps 

commanders determine operational and strategic progress, so JFCs must have a 

comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at 

all levels. 

For more information refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

8. Movement Planning Responsibilities 

a. Movement Plan. The CATF is responsible for preparing a movement plan. In 

operations involving several attack groups, the CATF usually prepares a general movement 

plan in which coordination measures are included as necessary. Subordinate force and 

group commanders will prepare their own detailed movement plans. Because details of 

USS San Antonio (LPD-17) transits the Suez Canal en route to the operational area. 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-02 

the movement depend on overall requirements of the operation, the movement plans 

are generally among the last to be completed. Each movement plan is normally included 

as an annex to the appropriate OPLAN or OPORD. 

b. Coordination with Other Forces. Coordination measures between forces 

supporting the amphibious operation and the AF will normally be provided in planning 

guidance issued by the JFC or designated commander. 

c. Postponement Plan. Postponement may be necessary because of weather 

conditions, unexpected movement of major enemy forces, or failure to meet go/no-go 

criteria after the AF has started its movement from final staging areas toward the 

operational area. This contingency is provided for in the postponement plan. Usually, 

postponement is on a 24-hour basis, which involves backtracking or diversion of ships 

into a designated sea area. A longer postponement may involve redeployment of the force 

to a staging area. The postponement plan will be prepared by the CATF and is usually 

promulgated as part of the OPLAN. Execution of the postponement plan will normally be 

controlled by the JFC or designated commander, based on the recommendations of the 

CATF and CLF. 

d. Alternate Plans. The alternate plan for an amphibious operation may differ from 

the preferred plan and necessitate separate movement or approach plans. It is seldom 

possible to determine far in advance the time at which an alternate plan will be placed in 

effect. Movement plans must therefore be flexible enough for execution of alternate plans 

at any point between the final staging area and the operational area. 

9. Sea Routes 

a. En route to the Operational Area. Sea routes and route points to the 

operational area will normally be planned by the CATF. Routes selected should lead 

from all possible ports of departure to the operational area. Alternate routes should also be 

provided to avoid interference between forces and to permit diversion should the threat of 

enemy attack or weather prevent use of primary routes. Routes and route points should be 

named to facilitate reference. Small-scale charts, which show sea routes and route points, 

are prepared and included in the operation plans and orders of appropriate ATF echelons. 

All sea routes should be wide enough for a movement group commander to maneuver his 

group without interfering with the movement of other groups. 

b. Within the Operational Area. CATF determines sea routes in the operational 

area. During planning, sea route selection must take into consideration the missions of 

various task forces, groups, units, and elements in the AF, so they may proceed 

expeditiously to their assigned stations without interference. Sea routes to the operational 

area will connect with sea routes within the operational area at designated points just 

outside the area screen to minimize interference during the deployment and movement of 

forces from their cruising or approach formations to assigned stations or areas. Sea routes 

in the operational area should be selected that: 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-13 

(1) Ensure a minimum of interference among ships and formations. 

(2) Are clear of mines and navigational hazards to the maximum extent possible. 

(3) Provide sufficient dispersion to prevent concentrations that would make the 

AF a desirable target for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attack. 

(4) Provide for economy of screening forces. 

10. Staging Areas 

 Plans will be made by the CATF, in consultation with the CLF, to use staging areas 

while en route to the operational area. The AF may stage at one or more intervening ports 

for logistic support, emergency repairs, or final rehearsals. The CATF will select the 

staging area required and will ensure that: 

a. Necessary service craft are available. 

b. A general logistics schedule is promulgated. 

c. Anchorages are assigned based on consideration for expediting logistics while 

facilitating entry and sortie of movement groups staging through the area and avoiding 

vulnerable concentrations. 

d. Provision is made for replacement or repair of critical supplies or equipment 

expended or damaged during rehearsal. 

11. Sea Areas 

a. To minimize the possibility of interference between various elements of the AF and 

other supporting forces, sea areas in the vicinity of the landing area will be selected by the 

CATF and designated by the higher commander. The sea areas will be divided into a 

number of operating areas as depicted in Figure III-4 and described below. 

b. Ocean Operating Areas. Two kinds of ocean operating areas may be selected. 

(1) Close support area. Defines the portion(s) of the ocean operating area 

nearest to, but not necessarily in, the objective area. They are assigned to carrier strike 

groups, surface action groups, surface action units, and certain logistic CSS elements. 

(2) Distant retirement area. Located to seaward of the landing area and divided 

into a number of operating areas in which assault ships may retire and operate in the event 

of heavy weather or to prevent concentration of ships in the landing area. 
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 3-02 

c. Sea Areas Within the Landing Area. Areas in the landing area extending outward 

to the inner limits of the close support areas. 

 (1) Sea Echelon Area. An area to seaward of a transport area from which assault 

ships are phased into the transport area and to which assault ships withdraw from the 

transport area. The use of a sea echelon area allows for dispersion as a defense against 

attack. 

(2) Transport Area. In amphibious operations, an area assigned to a transport 

organization for the purpose of debarking troops and equipment. It consists of mine cleared 

lanes, areas, and channels leading from a sea echelon area to the beaches. The maximum 

number of ships in the transport area is determined by dispersion requirements, availability 

SEA AREAS

INNER

TRANSPORT

AREA

OCEAN

OPERATING

AREAS

LANDING

AREA OUTER TRANSPORT

AREA TRANSPORT

AREA

SEA ECHELON AREA

CLOSE SUPPORT AREA

DISTANT RETIREMENT AREA

AAV

CLA

amphibious a ehicle VLZ

landing craft air cushion launch area

ssault v vertical landing zone

CUSHION

LANDING

ZONE

CUSHION

LANDING VLZ ZONE

AAV

Launching

Area

CLA BOAT LANES

FIRE

SUPPORT

AREA

CLA

Causeway Operating

Area

Figure III-4. Sea Areas 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-15 

of forces for MCM operations, and local hydrography and topography. Transport landing 

areas include: 

(a) Outer Transport Area. An area inside the antisubmarine screen to 

which assault transports proceed initially after arrival in the objective area. 

(b) Inner Transport Area. Area located close to the landing beach which 

transports may utilize to expedite unloading. Considerations are: depth of water, 

navigational hazards, boat traffic, and enemy action. 

(3) Landing Craft Air Cushion Launch Area (CLA). CLAs are located in the 

transport area and sea echelon area. The CLA (the sea component) and landing craft air 

cushion landing zone (CLZ) (the beach component) are connected by transit lanes. 

(4) AAV Launch Area. Areas located near and to seaward of the line of 

departure (LOD) to which landing ships proceed to launch AAVs. 

(5) Causeway Operation Area. The causeway launching area is an area located 

near the LOD but clear of the approach lanes to an area located in the inner transport area. 

(6) A boat lane is a lane for amphibious assault landing craft, which goes from the 

LOD at sea to the landing beaches. The width of the boat lane is determined by the number 

of craft that need to safely transit the boat lane. The beach can be wider than the boat lane 

and several boat lanes can serve one beach. 

(7) Fire Support Areas (FSAs)/Fire Support Station. A maneuver area or 

exact location assigned to fire support ships from which surface fire support is delivered. 

12. Geographic Reference Points 

 A complete system of geographic reference points for the operational area and 

surrounding ocean area should be formulated during planning. The points may be used to 

indicate routes (particularly where the direction of the routes changes), to depict the shape 

and location of the areas discussed above, and for certain locations not related to areas or 

routes. Reference points will be encoded and defined by exact latitude and longitude. 

13. Intelligence En Route 

a. The AF, or elements thereof, may receive significant intelligence information while 

en route to the operational area. This is particularly true in situations where advance forces 

or forces external to the AF, conduct pre-D-day operations in the operational area or where 

remote sensor data is provided. 

b. The AF’s intelligence center is responsible for timely dissemination of pertinent 

intelligence information to the CATF and CLF. ATF ships receiving such information are 

responsible for passing it to the embarked landing forces. 
Chapter III 

III-16 JP 3-02 

14. Coordination During Passage 

a. Forces not a part of the AF that are supporting the AF must coordinate their 

movement within the AOA with the ATF. This coordination must be delineated in the 

plans of the JFC or designated commander. 

b. Individual commanders must remain aware of the need for maintaining the schedule 

and proceeding along prescribed routes. If deviation is required, the commander of the 

group will determine whether to break EMCON to advise other commands of the situation. 

In certain situations, there may be serious consequences if friendly land or carrier-based 

search aircraft observe a force in a position not indicated in the aircrew briefing. All 

commanders must be fully cognizant of the general scheme and operational areas of other 

forces. 

15. Approach to the Operational Area 

a. Approach to the operational area includes the arrival of various task groups in the 

vicinity of the operational area and deployment of task groups from cruising formations, 

aggregating as necessary according to assigned tasks and proceeding to designated positions 

in the operational area. During this critical period, additional protective measures may be 

necessary. These provisions should encompass: 

(1) Counterair measures, including timely air strikes against enemy airfields 

within range of the landing area. 

(2) Location and neutralization of enemy submarines, surface craft, minefields, 

and shore batteries that can interfere with the approach. 

(3) Selection of approach routes that avoid lengthy exposure to fire from enemy 

shore batteries. 

b. Approach of the main body is usually more complicated than the advance force 

because it involves a greater number of ships and because the arrival of the main body must 

be carefully timed relative to H-hour. However, if an advance force has been employed, 

protective measures for the main body during the approach may be easier because the 

advance force may have been in the area for some time and implemented many of the 

necessary protective measures. In particular, minesweep assets of the advance force will 

normally have swept enough of the landing area to permit the main body to approach with 

less risk. The same considerations apply to the approach of the demonstration force as to 

the approach of the main body. 

c. Proper coordination and timing is of utmost importance in the final stages of the 

approach of all elements of each movement group to prevent interference between elements 

and permit each to arrive at its assigned position at the proper time to commence its task. 

Careful, precise, and accurate navigation is essential. The presence of advanced force 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-17 

elements already in the landing area may increase the complexity of the amphibious 

landing. The advance force commander is responsible to ensure that elements of the 

advance force do not interfere with the approach of the main body. When the AF is 

composed of two or more task groups, the CATF normally coordinates the approach of the 

various task groups, but the task group commander is responsible for the movements of 

each individual task group. 

16. Ship-to-Shore Movement Considerations 

a. The plan for ship-to-shore movement is developed by the CATF and CLF to ensure 

that troops, equipment, and supplies are landed at the prescribed times, places, and in the 

formation required to support the LF scheme of maneuver. Ship-to-shore movement is that 

portion of the assault which includes the deployment of the LF from the assault shipping to 

designated landing areas. The element of a force comprised of tailored units and craft 

assigned to conduct the initial assault on the operational area is known as the assault 

echelon (AE). Assault troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies that are not 

needed to initiate the assault, but are required to support and sustain the assault are known 

as the assault follow-on echelon (AFOE). The AFOE will, therefore, usually come in 

after the AE has conducted the initial assault. Ship-to-shore movement is perhaps the 

most critical part of the action phase of amphibious operations. During this period, the 

LF and assault shipping are most concentrated. Landing craft, AAVs, and helicopters are 

vulnerable to adversary fire, not to mention the natural hazards of weather, sea state, and 

surf conditions. Movement control requirements are complex and must be coordinated 

precisely with supporting arms. 

“It was to be a brutal day. At first light on 15 June 1944, the Navy fire support 

ships of the task force lying off Saipan Island increased their previous days’ 

preparatory fires involving all caliber of weapons. At 0542, Vice Admiral 

Richmond K. Turner ordered, “Land the landing force.” Around 0700, the landing 

ships, tank (LSTs) moved to within approximately 1,250 yards behind the line of 

departure. Troops in the LSTs began debarking from them in landing vehicles, 

tracked (LVTs). Control vessels containing Navy and Marine personnel with their 

radio gear took their positions displaying flags indicating which beach approaches 

they controlled.” 

John C. Chapin: 

Breaching the Marianas: The Battle for Saipan

b. Organizations and agencies may be established to support the ship-to-shore 

movement plan. These organizations and agencies (i.e., terminal service battalion, 

amphibious construction battalion, or cargo handling and port group units) may be required 

to support the offload of merchant ships. An amphibious construction battalion is a 

permanently commissioned naval unit, subordinate to the commander, naval beach group, 

designed to provide an administrative unit from which personnel and equipment are formed 

in tactical elements and made available to appropriate commanders to operate pontoon 

causeways, transfer barges, warping tugs, and assault bulk fuel systems, and to meet salvage 

requirements of the naval beach party. The beach party is the Navy component of the 

landing force support party (LFSP) under the tactical control of the LFSP commander. As 
Chapter III 

III-18 JP 3-02 

developed seaports and airports become available, they are used to supplement traditional 

beach operations. Unloading operations are divided into two periods. 

(1) The initial landing and unloading period is a tactical evolution and must 

provide rapid build-up of combat forces ashore and quick response to LF requirements. 

(2) The selective and general unloading period. Selective unloading is 

tactical in nature and used to satisfy immediate support requirements when a full 

general unloading period is unnecessary or not feasible. General unloading is primarily 

logistic-oriented and emphasizes speed, volume, and rapid completion of the unloading of 

required personnel and materiel. It encompasses the unloading of units and cargo from the 

ships as rapidly as cargo handling facilities on the beach or ashore permit. It proceeds 

without regard to class, type, or priority of cargo. 

c. Conduct of Ship-to-Shore Movement. All ship-to-shore movement is controlled 

by CATF. For large operations, there will be a central control officer (CCO) who will 

control all ship-to-shore movement by surface. The primary control officer (PCO) will 

control all ship-to-shore movement to a colored beach and works for the CCO. If the 

operation does not require a CCO, then the PCO will work directly for CATF. A parallel 

organization exists with air with all air ship-to-shore movement controlled by the tactical air 

officer (TAO) and the HCS will control all flights into a helicopter landing zone (HLZ). If 

the operation does not require a TAO, then the HCS will work directly for CATF. The 

commencement of landing craft and aircraft loading operations and the timing of other shipto-shore movement preparations are dependent on the designated H-hour and L-hour. All 

elements must be prepared to modify plans on short notice to conform to changes in Hhour. Prior to H- or L-hour, surface movement control group personnel are cross-decked, 

as required, to ships of the control group. Helicopter movement control groups take 

assigned stations and initiate actions as required to meet the time schedule for initial 

landings. The loading of personnel, equipment, and supplies of the scheduled waves is 

tedious work and time consuming. Whether using landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or 

helicopters, the LF must develop and adhere to a strict time schedule based on the 

established H-hour. Preparations are made for debarkation of on-call and nonscheduled 

units and for dispatching these units when required. 

(1) Scheduled Waves (Waterborne). Once H/L-hour are confirmed by CATF 

and CLF, scheduled waves are landed according to plan. When practicable, the first 

scheduled wave is dispatched by the CCO with other waves being regulated by the various 

PCOs. 

(2) On-call Waves (Waterborne). The landing of on-call waves and prepositioned emergency supplies is initiated when called by the LF and continues until these 

categories are ashore. When the commander ashore desires the landing of an on-call unit, 

he notifies his tactical-logistical (TACLOG) group of the desired place and time (if 

appropriate) of landing. The Navy control officer then directs the landing of the unit. Prepositioned emergency supplies are located in proximity to the appropriate control officer 

who directs their landing as requested by the troop commander concerned. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-19 

(3) Nonscheduled units and remaining LF supplies. Nonscheduled units and 

remaining LF supplies are landed in accordance with the requirements of the LF. On rare 

occasions, these categories may be landed before completion of on-call waves and prepositioned emergency supplies. Nonscheduled units and previously designated supplies are 

normally requested by serial until the commencement of general unloading. The 

responsibility for their landing is assigned by the CATF to the commanders of the cognizant 

control organizations. In the landing of nonscheduled units, the maximum coordination 

between LF and ATF control organizations is essential to ensure responsiveness and 

efficient use of landing ships and craft. The control officers concerned regulate the 

movement of the ships and craft in accordance with instructions from appropriate 

commanders and requests from the TACLOG group. Any changes in the landing sequence, 

no matter how slight they may seem, will invariably disrupt the flow of the offload and may 

result in unintended delays. The CLF requests the landing of the nonscheduled units and 

notifies the CATF of any requested modifications to the landing sequence as soon as 

possible. The CLF continually reviews the progress of the landing and submits periodic 

and timely requests to the CATF for landing needed units and items of supply. 

(4) Scheduled waves (helicopterborne). Helicopterborne ship-to-shore 

movement is normally completed during the initial unloading period. In fact, helicopters 

usually must make several trips to land and supply the LF units going ashore. Scheduled 

waves are launched on a prescribed time schedule to ensure the timely arrival in the LZs in 

accordance with the LF OPLAN. The prescribed launch times will be based on many 

factors such as distance to the LZ, speed of the aircraft, prevailing weather (wind) 

conditions, etc. 

(5) On-call waves (helicopterborne). Because of the urgency that may be 

attendant to landing on-call waves, elements or items in other landing categories may be 

preempted to permit their landing. The number of on-call units or items must be kept to a 

minimum if their high-priority status is to be preserved. 

(6) Nonscheduled waves (helicopterborne). The landing of nonscheduled, 

helicopterborne waves commences upon completion of scheduled landings into the LZs. 

Once started, this process may be interrupted to permit the landing of on-call or other 

selected units or supplies based on the request of the appropriate LF commander. 

Furthermore, unforeseen circumstances such as the requirement for LF helicopters to 

support other tactical missions, may also interrupt the landing of nonscheduled waves. 

Once the helicopterborne ship-to-shore movement is completed, transport helicopters are 

employed to meet tactical and logistical requirements of LF operations ashore as directed 

by the CLF. Helicopter movement in these operations will be controlled by appropriate 

tactical air control agencies. 

d. Amphibious operations involve complex interrelationships between the LFs, ATF, 

and other assigned and supporting forces, especially during the action phase. Planning is a 

synergistic effort which must ensure that ATF’s, LF’s, and other forces’ considerations are 

adequately addressed. The CATF is responsible for preparation and coordination of 
Chapter III 

III-20 JP 3-02 

the ship-to-shore movement plan. The CATF is responsible for the ship-to-shore 

movement, but will coordinate with the CLF for changing situations that affect the 

amphibious operation as revealed by intelligence sources or landing forces ashore. 

17. Relationship to Other Planning 

 Detailed planning for the ship-to-shore movement can begin only after the LF scheme 

of maneuver ashore is determined. The landing and fire support plans must be carefully 

integrated. The landing plan should provide for requisite logistic support of all forces. 

Maximum attention will be given to preserving operations security (OPSEC) during 

planning. 

18. Responsibilities 

a. The CATF, in close coordination with the CLF, is responsible for the preparation of 

the overall ship-to-shore movement and landing plan. Included in the planning is the 

selection of necessary approach and retirement lanes, check points, rendezvous areas, and 

aids to navigation to facilitate movement of airland troops. In an amphibious operation, a 

rendezvous area is the area in which the landing craft and amphibious vehicles rendezvous 

to form waves after being loaded, and prior to movement to the LOD. Where appropriate, 

other force commanders participate in this process. The CATF is responsible for 

debarkation until termination of the amphibious operation, at which time the 

responsibilities for offload of follow-up ships and logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) 

operations may be passed to another organization designated by higher authority. In the 

case of an amphibious assault, the operation will normally be terminated only after the 

entire AFOE is ashore. The CLF is responsible for determining LF requirements for 

the ship-to-shore movement and presenting them to the CATF. The CLF provides 

information on the availability of organic assets (helicopters and amphibious vehicles) to 

the CATF and prepares the documents contained in the LF landing plan. 

b. Commanders of other forces assigned to the AF (including those assigned for 

movement to the operational area for tasks not part of the amphibious operation) are 

responsible for determining and presenting their requirements to the CATF. 

c. Hydrographic conditions. The Navy’s fleet survey team conducts quick response 

hydrographic surveys and produces charting products in the field for maritime 

requirements. It provides high resolution hydrographic surveys for use in nautical or 

tactical charting and support amphibious landings, mine warfare, or naval special warfare 

with bathymetry and other collected hydrographic information. C-130 deployable 

detachments from this team can conduct navigation quality surveys or clearance surveys to 

provide access to ports and waterways in support of amphibious operations. 

For more information, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-21 

THE INVASION OF NORMANDY 

The invasion of Normandy was without question the most important 

battle fought in western Europe in the Second World War. The Allies’ 

success in landing their troops and securing a beachhead on June 6, 

1944, doomed Hitler. The landings at Anzio only a few months earlier 

had shown that success was by no means certain. Amphibious 

landings were inevitably extremely risky operations. Years of careful 

planning — and a certain amount of luck at the last moment — led to 

the Allied victory in Normandy. 

Allied strategists meeting in Washington in May 1943 set the date for 

the cross channel invasion of France as May 1, 1944. Due to a 

shortage of landing craft, however, the invasion date would be 

postponed from May to June 1944. Planning for the invasion had been 

going on since 1942. The raid at Dieppe had provided an early and 

disastrous dress rehearsal. The fighting in North Africa, Sicily, and 

Italy had taught the Allies valuable lessons. If there was one lesson 

above all that the Allies had been forced to learn, it was not to 

underestimate the abilities of their enemy. 

The Allies had decided in July 1943 that the Cotentin peninsula of 

Normandy offered the best location for the invasion. The Germans, 

who had 3000 miles of coastline to defend, did not know where the 

invasion would come. They put up their heaviest defenses in the 

Calais region of the French coast. Nazi leaders disagreed on the most 

likely site for the invasion and on the strategy for employment of their 

forces. This lack of unity in the German command would prove a 

great weakness to them. 

In England the troops who would land on D-day went through endless 

rehearsals for the invasion. For veterans of combat in North Africa, 

Sicily, and Italy, the training seemed like a waste of time. Those who 

had never seen combat tried to imagine what the real thing would be 

like. In late May 1944, the rehearsals came to an end. Soldiers were 

confined to their quarters, then shipped to “concentration areas” near 

ports and airfields from which they would depart. For security 

reasons they were not told their ultimate destination. When they were 

safely at sea they would finally be told they were headed to Normandy. 

By the end of the day of June 5, 1944, over 2500 ships carrying the 

Allied invasion force were heading toward the Normandy coast. More 

than 1000 planes and gliders were being readied to carry the airborne 

troops into battle. Every man who boarded a ship or plane for Europe 

was given a letter from Eisenhower with his order of the day. 

“You are about to embark on a great crusade, toward which we have 

striven these many months. . . . The tide has turned. The free men of 

the 

world are marching together to victory. . . .” 

SOURCE: World War II — America at War, Maurice Isserman, 1991 
Chapter III 

III-22 JP 3-02 

19. Landing Plan 

a. Ship-to-shore movement planning for the LF is given final form and expression 

in the landing plan. The landing plan is designed to support the LF’s CONOPS, keeping 

in mind the inherent capabilities and operational characteristics of available amphibious 

ships and landing craft. It is prepared after the final allocation of means has been made. It 

represents the integrated sum of detailed plans for waterborne and airborne ship-to-shore 

movement prepared by corresponding ATF and LF commands at all levels. This plan 

should maximize range and speed capabilities of surface assault craft and aircraft (rotary, 

tilt-rotor, and vertical takeoff and landing [VTOL]) that allow a coordinated assault over a 

wide range. A flexible landing plan enables the AF to gain and retain tactical initiative, 

enhances operational flexibility, takes advantage of enemy force dispositions and 

weaknesses, and employs the element of surprise to the maximum extent. The landing plan 

is composed of certain specific documents that present, in detail, the numbers of land craft, 

helicopters, and surface craft available for use and the exact personnel and equipment that 

will be loaded on each, along with embarkation and landing times. These documents 

should be incorporated in annexes to operation and administrative plans and orders (Figure 

III-5). The body of the landing plan is usually short, with only information of interest 

to all subordinate units. The bulk of the plan is a compilation of documents included as 

tabs and enclosures that contain the facts and figures essential for the orderly and timely 

execution of the landing. 

b. The landing plan is concerned primarily with establishing relative landing priorities 

among the various elements of the LF and with overall coordination of ship-to-shore 

movement planning. Specifically, it provides: 

US Soldiers of the 8th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, move out 

over the seawall on “Utah” Beach. (June 6, 1944). 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-23 

(1) Priority for landing of elements of the LF. 

COMMANDER, AMPHIBIOUS

TASK FORCE

RESPONSIBILITY

Naval Landing Plan

Landing Craft Availability Table

Landing Craft Employment

Plan

Debarkation Schedule

Ship’s Diagram

Pontoon Causeway Plan

Unloading Plan

Approach Schedule

Assault Wave Diagram

Landing Area Diagram

Transport Area Diagram

Beach Approach Diagram

Sea Echelon Area

Landing Control Plan

Medical Regulating Plan

Amphibious Bulk Liquid

Transfer System and Offshore

Petroleum Discharge System

Plan

LANDING PLAN DOCUMENTS

COMMANDER, LANDING

FORCE RESPONSIBILITY

Landing Force Landing Plan

Amphibious Vehicle Availability

Table

Landing Craft and Amphibious

Vehicle Assignment Table

Landing Diagram

Landing Force Serial

Assignment Table

Landing Priority Table

Landing Force Sequence Table

Assault Schedule

Amphibious Vehicle

Employment Plan

Helicopter Availability Table

Heliteam Wave and Serial

Assignment Table

Helicopter Enplaning Schedule

Helicopter Landing Diagram

Helicopter Employment and

Assault Landing Table

Ground Combat Element

Landing Plan

Consolidated Landing and

Approach Plan

Aviation Combat Element and

Landing Force Aviation Landing

Plan

Figure III-5. Landing Plan Documents 
Chapter III 

III-24 JP 3-02 

(2) Allocation of resources. 

(3) Allocation of serial numbers. 

(4) Correlation of the sequence for landing of all units not being landed with 

assault elements, but landing before general unloading. 

(5) Coordination of the landing plans of separate landing groups, if required. 

c. Landing plan documentation is a responsibility of both CATF and CLF. 

Although some documents require joint preparation by ships’ commanding officers (COs) 

and COs of troops (e.g., debarkation schedule and helicopter enplaning schedule), all 

landing plan documents are the responsibility of either the CATF or CLF. 

d. After the available means for ship-to-shore movement have been assigned, LF plans 

are prepared in the following sequence: 

(1) CLF allocates or specifies landing assets to subordinate elements on the basis 

of availability and in accordance with the CONOPS and scheme of maneuver ashore. 

(2) CLF allocates blocks of serial numbers to elements of the force. 

(3) CLF determines the relative landing priorities for the various elements of the 

force. 

(4) Subordinate LF elements prepare a plan for landing based on assigned tasks 

and priorities. Landing plans for other forces not landing with ground combat forces are 

submitted to the LF commander. 

(5) CLF correlates these recommendations and publishes them in the LF landing 

plan. 

(6) Subordinate commands make pertinent extracts from the LF landing plan, as 

necessary, for control and coordination. 

(7) Planning for the movement of supplies ashore, for the composition of floating 

dumps, and for the levels of supply ashore is conducted concurrently with other ship-toshore movement planning. 

e. CATF develops the naval landing plan documents required to conduct ship-toshore movement. The information contained in several of these documents is vital to the 

CLF in the development of his own landing plan. 

(1) The landing craft availability table lists the type and number of landing craft 

that will be available from each ship of the transport group, specifies the total required for 

Navy use, and indicates those available for troop use. The table is the basis for assignment 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-25 

of landing craft for the ship-to-shore movement. It is prepared by the transport group 

commander, or in his absence, by the CATF. 

(2) The landing craft employment plan provides for the assigned movement of 

landing craft from the various ships to satisfy Navy and LF requirements. It indicates the 

number of landing craft, their types, their parent ships, the ships to which they will report, 

the time at which they will report, and the period during which they will be attached. The 

plan is prepared by the transport group CO, or in his absence, by the CATF. 

(3) The debarkation schedule is a plan that provides for the orderly debarkation 

of troops and equipment, and emergency supplies for the waterborne ship-to-shore 

movement. Prepared jointly by the CO of each ship and the CO of troops embarked, it is 

usually prepared after the troops are aboard and is distributed to all personnel responsible 

for control of debarkation. Debarkation schedules are not normally prepared for units 

landing in amphibious vehicles or aircraft (rotary, tilt-rotor, and VTOL). The debarkation 

schedule contains the following information: 

(a) The sequence in which landing craft, by type, come alongside the 

debarkation stations, or depart the well deck. 

(b) The individual boats and boat teams or supply loads that load from each 

troop debarkation station and the boats into which they are loaded. 

(4) The ship’s diagram supplements the debarkation schedule and graphically 

shows the location where each boat team will load. 

(5) The approach schedule indicates the following for each scheduled wave: 

time of departure from the rendezvous area, LOD, and other control points; and time of 

arrival at the beach. 

(6) The assault wave diagram displays the assault waves as they will appear at a 

specified time prior to H-hour. The diagram is consolidated jointly at the ATF/LF level and 

given wide distribution. 

(7) The landing area diagram is prepared by the transport group commander or 

CATF as an overlay for an appropriately scaled chart. It shows graphically the most 

important details of the landing area: beach designations, boat lanes, LODs, landing ship 

areas, transport areas, and FSAs in the immediate vicinity of the boat lanes. The diagram 

contains extracts from other documents and may have numerous enclosures containing 

specific information required for orderly ship-to-shore movement. 

(8) The transport area diagram is prepared as an overlay for a chart of the 

objective area. It shows the area extending from at least 1,000 yards off the beach to 

seaward and at least 1,000 yards to seaward beyond the outermost berth in the designated 

transport area. If both an outer and inner transport area are to be used, two diagrams will be 

required. Overlays will include the following information as appropriate: 
Chapter III 

III-26 JP 3-02 

(a) Transport area(s) and assignment of all deep-draft ships to berths. 

(b) Landing ship areas and assignment of all landing ships to berths. 

(c) Inner transport area. 

(d) Boat and approach lanes. 

(e) LODs. 

(f) AAV launching area. 

(g) Causeway launching area. 

(h) Beaches. 

(i) Distances from the beach to the center of transport area, from the beach to 

the LOD, from the approach lane to the LOD, and the lengths of beaches. 

(j) LCAC routes and areas such as LCAC collection area, LCAC departure 

point, LCAC control point, LCAC penetration point, and LCAC landing zone. 

The general landing plan for Operation OVERLORD assigns beaches to US and Allied forces.
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-27 

(9) A beach approach diagram is prepared by the transport group commander or 

CATF as an overlay for a large-scale chart of the landing beaches. The overlay depicts an 

area extending from each beach seaward to 300 to 500 yards beyond the LOD, showing the 

following: 

(a) Designation and dimensions of landing beaches. 

(b) LOD. 

(c) Distance from beach to LOD. 

(d) Position of control and medical ships and boats. 

(e) Cargo transfer line information, if one is established. 

(f) Return boat lanes. 

 

(10) If a sea echelon is used, specific information relating to the sea echelon area

is prepared as a diagram by the CATF in agreement with the CLF. The diagram contains 

the locations and limits of the sea echelon, swept transport lanes, LOD, primary control 

ships, and beaches. 

(11) The CLF is responsible for the LF landing plan. It is the compilation of 

detailed plans prepared by the LF. The following documents designate the forces going 

ashore, and promulgate the means, organization, sequence, and landing priorities: 

(a) The amphibious vehicle availability table is a list of the type and 

number of vehicles available for assault landings and for support of other elements of the 

operation. It also indicates the ships in which the AAVs are carried to the objective area. 

(b) The landing craft and amphibious vehicle assignment table indicates 

the organization of LF units into boat teams and the assignment of boat teams to scheduled 

waves, on-call waves, or nonscheduled units. It may also include instructions for assigning 

floating dump supplies to landing craft or amphibious vehicles AAVs. The table, together 

with the debarkation schedule, furnishes the ship’s CO with information for debarking 

troops and floating dump supplies. The landing craft and amphibious vehicle AAV 

assignment table is prepared and promulgated at the same time as the landing diagram. 

Both tables are prepared by the CLF. Following are some key considerations for the 

assignment of units and personnel to landing craft and amphibious vehicles: 

1. A deck space or deck loading is the space and weight factor used to 

determine the capacity of boats, landing craft, and amphibious vehicles, based on the 

requirements of one person with individual equipment. 

2. Allowance of deck spaces must be made for troop equipment, such as 

mortars, machine guns, vehicles, and heavy equipment. A smaller number of personnel 
Chapter III 

III-28 JP 3-02 

embark in craft carrying such equipment. The number of deck spaces the equipment 

occupies is included in a separate column of the table. 

3. Tactical integrity required by the tactical plan must be maintained. 

Units must land in proper tactical formations. 

4. The assignment of command elements and any attached or supporting 

troops (such as forward observers, naval gunfire spotters, or communications personnel) is 

made to the craft carrying the infantry units to which they are attached or directly support. 

If such units are assigned to separate craft, the craft are given positions in the waves that 

will facilitate small unit employment on beaching. A separate wave may be organized for 

command elements, supporting arms, and/or antitank units. 

5. Distributing elements of command and liaison personnel among two 

or more landing craft reduces the risk of heavy losses in command elements. Personnel and 

equipment from key elements such as communications units are similarly distributed. 

6. The priority of craft assignment is in the following order: assault 

units, supporting units, and reserve units. 

(c) The landing diagram provides information on the tactical deployment of 

units for the landing. Based on the recommendations of subordinate commanders, the 

landing diagram is prepared and promulgated at the same time as the landing craft and 

amphibious vehicle assignment table. It is distributed to all personnel responsible for 

controlling the formation of the boat group and its waves during ship-to-shore movement, 

and the information it contains is used in the preparation of assault schedules. 

(d) The LF serial assignment table reflects the organization of the LF for 

ship-to-shore movement. 

1. A serial is a group of LF units and their equipment that originate from 

the same ship and that, for tactical or logistic reasons, will land on a specified beach or a 

specified HLZ at the same time. A serial number is assigned to each serial (group). 

2. Serial numbers are administratively assigned numbers and do not in 

themselves prescribe a priority in landing. They are assigned only for reference purposes 

and the assignment in no way precludes the use of code names, designations, or unit titles 

when expedient. 

3. Early in the planning stage the CLF allocates a block of consecutive 

serial numbers on the basis of administrative organization to each LF unit and Navy 

element to be landed; regardless of their location in the AE or AFOE. Allocation begins at 

the highest echelon as each unit allocates a consecutive portion of its block to subordinate 

units. Allocation continues until each element within the LF has a block of consecutive 

numbers for assignment to its subordinate and attached elements. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-29 

4. After the landing and embarkation plans have been determined, each 

planning echelon assigns serial numbers from its allocated block to its units, parts of units, 

or groupings. It is important to note that, while allocation of blocks of serial numbers to 

units is based on the administrative organization, the actual assignment of individual serial 

numbers is based on the organization for landing. The method of assignment does not 

depend either on the priority or on the estimated sequence of landing of nonscheduled units. 

5. The LF serial assignment table indicates the tactical units, equipment, 

and supplies that are to be loaded into each landing craft, amphibious vehicle, or aircraft, 

and may be further broken down into a serial assignment table (Surface) and a heliteam 

wave and serial assignment table. 

(e) The landing priority table is a worksheet used at the LF level to 

prescribe the planned buildup of the LF ashore. It is based on the commander’s tactical 

plan and provides a foundation for the orderly deployment of the LF in support of the plan. 

The table lists all major units to be landed, the order or priority, the planned time of landing, 

and the designated beaches and/or LZs. It is used principally when the LF is complex or 

when a phasing of LF units is required. 

(f) The LF sequence table is a complete list of the estimated landing 

sequence of the nonscheduled units of the LF. It is the principal document for executing 

and controlling the ship-to-shore movement of these units and is the basis for their 

embarkation and loading plans. Unless specific requests for changes are made during the 

execution of ship-to-shore movement, the landing proceeds in accordance with the 

estimated sequence shown in the LF sequence table. The table provides the following: 

1. A guide to the embarkation officer in preparing loading plans. 

2. The commander’s priorities in offloading nonscheduled serials. 

3. The order vehicles and equipment of nonscheduled units should be 

loaded so as to be available when requested. 

4. The preferred sequence for landing nonscheduled serials. 

(g) The assault schedule prescribes the formation, composition, and timing 

of waves landing over each beach. The CLF prepares the assault schedule based on the 

recommendations of subordinate unit commanders. 

(h) The amphibious vehicle employment plan shows the origin, number 

and type, wave, destination, and contents of amphibious vehicles in initial movement and 

subsequent trips from ship to the beach. 

(i) The helicopter availability table shows the number and models of 

helicopters available for a proposed helicopterborne landing. Prepared by the helicopter 
Chapter III 

III-30 JP 3-02 

unit commander, it lists the helicopter units, the number of helicopters available for first and 

subsequent lifts, their tentative load capacity, and the ships on which they are transported. 

(j) The heliteam wave and serial assignment table is prepared by the 

helicopterborne unit commander in coordination with the ship’s CO. It indicates the tactical 

units, equipment, and supplies that are to be loaded into each heliteam by its assigned serial 

number and the serial number of the flight and wave. It lists the weight of personnel and 

equipment and includes all landing categories — scheduled, on-call, and nonscheduled 

waves. 

(k) The helicopter enplaning schedule plans for the orderly enplaning of 

troops, supplies, and equipment for the helicopterborne ship-to-shore movement. It shows 

the following: 

1. The enplaning stations on the flight deck of the ship. 

2. The sequence in which helicopters are spotted at the enplaning 

stations. 

3. The serialized heliteam with equipment and supplies assigned to each 

helicopter in each designated flight. 

(l) The helicopter landing diagram illustrates the routes to and from LZs. It 

includes the helicopter transport area, rendezvous points, approach and retirement routes, 

departure and initial points, other control points, LZs and sites, and other details as are 

necessary for clarity. The diagrams are prepared by the senior helicopter unit commander 

in coordination with the cognizant helicopter transport unit commanders, and are submitted 

via the chain of command to the CATF for approval and coordination. 

(m) The helicopter employment and assault landing table is a detailed 

plan for the movement of helicopterborne troops, equipment, and supplies. It provides the 

landing timetable for the helicopter movement and indicates the assignment of specific 

troop units to specific numbered flights. Analogous to the assault schedule and landing 

sequence table prepared by surface-landed units, it is the basis for the helicopter unit’s flight 

schedules and the control of helicopter movement by the appropriate air control agency. 

The helicopter employment and assault landing table is prepared in close coordination 

between the commanders of the helicopterborne and helicopter units. 

(n) The ground combat element landing plan is developed by the senior 

GCE representative, who does the major portion of the detailed planning and immediate 

supervision of the waterborne and helicopterborne ship-to-shore movement on the part of 

the LF. It is developed in coordination with the related Navy organization and based on 

information provided by both CLF and CATF concerning forces to be landed and landing 

assets available. Subordinate units down to the battalion level prepare their own landing 

plans, including all relevant documents. These plans may be incorporated into the landing 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-31 

plan of the next higher unit as an appendix, or the information contained in the documents 

incorporated in the documents of the GCE landing plan. 

(o) The aviation combat element and LF aviation landing plan does not 

provide information concerning aviation support to ship-to-shore movement, but rather 

outlines the commander’s plans for establishing aviation units ashore in the landing area by 

both air and surface means. It provides detailed plans for the landing of aviation elements 

that are embarked in assault shipping and landed with assault units or as nonscheduled 

units. 

1. The aviation landing plan contains the following: 

a. Plans for the echelonment and landing sequence of all aviation 

units to be established ashore within the landing area. 

b. Detailed landing documents for aviation elements that move 

ashore before general unloading. 

c. Applicable ship-to-shore control provisions. 

d. Information on pontoon causeways, fuel handling systems, and 

the landing of engineering elements and equipment necessary for aviation support ashore. 

2. Composition of Echelons. Elements of air control squadrons and 

helicopter groups comprising the first echelon are landed by helicopter to initiate operations 

ashore. The second echelon of these units is landed over the beaches with the heavy 

equipment and personnel required for sustained operations. 

a. Fixed-wing fighter and attack groups land in an initial echelon 

composed of personnel and heavy equipment for base operations and maintenance. This 

echelon is surface-lifted into the landing area and landed over the beaches. A second 

echelon composed of pilots, aircraft, and crew is flown into the area from land bases. 

b. The LF aviation organization for landing will differ greatly from 

the task organization because of the division of air groups and squadrons into elements for 

landing and wide variation in the time and method of landing these elements. The landing 

plan must provide for a grouping of the aviation elements into a series of echelons based on 

time and method of landing. These echelons, and the time and manner of their movement 

to the landing area, are shown in the general paragraph in the body of the aviation landing 

plan. Detailed composition of echelons is in a separate appendix. 

3. Scheduled On-Call, and Nonscheduled Elements. Air control 

units, elements of the LF aviation headquarters squadrons, aviation groups, headquarters 

support squadrons, air base, and aviation logistics squadrons may be landed before 

commencement of general unloading to initiate establishment of air facilities ashore. These 
Chapter III 

III-32 JP 3-02 

units are either embarked with and landed as part of the assault division(s) or are landed as 

nonscheduled units. 

a. Detachments of the aviation units and the CSS elements that form 

part of the helicopter support teams (HSTs) are often landed in scheduled waves. Air 

support radar teams usually will be landed in on-call waves. Such elements are shown in 

the assault schedules (or helicopter employment and assault landing table, and helicopter 

wave and serial assignment table) of the division(s). Other aviation elements that are 

landed early in the ship-to-shore movement are serialized and shown in the division or LF 

landing sequence table. 

b. The LF aviation landing plan lists separately those aviation 

elements that are landed in scheduled, on-call, or nonscheduled units. The landing plan also 

contains additional landing documents, as extracted from division and force landing plans, 

necessary to describe the method and sequence for landing these elements. This 

information is shown in the following enclosures: 

(1) Extracts from appropriate assault schedules. 

(2) Extracts from helicopter employment and assault landing 

tables. 

(3) Extracts from helicopter wave and serial assignment tables. 

(4) Serial assignment table. 

(5) Landing sequence table. 

(p) Serial numbers for nonscheduled aviation elements are allocated by the 

LF. The assigned serials and an itemized list of personnel and equipment of aviation 

elements that are to land in scheduled or on-call waves are submitted to the CLF for 

coordination and approval. The division is then furnished the necessary information to 

provide for landing non-scheduled aviation elements. These elements are incorporated into 

the force landing sequence tables. 

(12) Ship-to-Shore Control. To monitor the landing of aviation elements early 

in the ship-to-shore movement, the LF aviation commander provides representatives to the 

senior TACLOG group. As changes or delays in the landing of aviation elements occur, the 

commander may then be apprised of the situation. Schedules and tables required by 

aviation representatives in the HDC and the Navy TACC, in addition to those in the LF 

aviation landing plan, may be in the air annex to the OPLAN or OPORD. 

(13) Airfields, Pontoon Causeways, Fuel Handling Systems, and Engineering 

Operations. The availability of operational facilities required to establish aviation ashore 

determines the time of landing aviation elements. Information on the projected dates when 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-33 

these facilities will be complete, or engineering work will begin, is provided in the landing 

plan when available. This information includes estimated dates for: 

(a) Airfields achieving operational status. 

(b) Installation of pontoon causeways for landing heavy aviation assets. 

(c) Completion of fuel handling systems from the beach to the airfields or 

helicopter operating sites. 

(d) Landing of engineers and commencement of work on airfields. 

20. Considerations 

 Planning for the ship-to-shore movement follows a general sequence of development 

(see Figure III-6). Detailed planning for the ship-to-shore movement cannot begin until the 

LF CONOPS ashore is approved. Likewise, the completed landing plan will drive 

embarkation planning. Principal factors that influence ship-to-shore movement planning 

include the following: 

a. Tactical integrity of the LF allows for unity of command and execution of proven 

tactics, techniques, and procedures during assaults on initial objectives. The organization 

PLANNING FOR SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT

PLANNING FOR

SHIP-TO-SHORE

MOVEMENT

AAV

CATF

CLF

LCAC

LCM

LCU

LF

amphibious a ehicle

commander, amphibious task force

commander, landing force

landing craft, air cushion

landing craft, mechanized

landing craft, utility

landing force

ssault v LF scheme of maneuver ashore

CLF identifies requirements

and LF assets (e.g., AAV, helos)

CATF identifies Navy assets

(e.g., LCAC, LCM, LCU)

CATF determines if more assets are

required and requests them from

the establishing commander

Plans adjusted to match

assets available

Final allocation of means

Detailed landing plan developed

Figure III-6. Planning for Ship-to-Shore Movement 
Chapter III 

III-34 JP 3-02 

for landing must closely mirror the tactical formations of the LF and ensure adequate C2 for 

the respective commanders. As much as feasible, the LF should embark on assigned 

shipping, landing craft, AAVs, and helicopters along normal organizational lines. 

b. Required degree of dispersion of assault shipping, to include contemplated 

employment of a sea echelon plan. Assault shipping is shipping assigned to the ATF and 

utilized for transporting assault troops, vehicles, equipment, and supplies to the objective 

area. 

c. Available assault shipping and ship-to-shore movement assets. The type and 

quantity of assault shipping and ship-to-shore movement craft will influence every aspect of 

the planning and execution of the operation. The inherent capabilities and characteristics of 

available ATF assets play a key role in the development of the LF CONOPS. 

d. Protection of the AF. This is a matter of mutual concern to the CATF and CLF. At 

times, commanders and their staffs must consider the use of LF assets (such as aircraft, 

antiair missiles, crew-served weapons, etc.) in the defense of the ATF. Protection 

comprising both active and passive measures must be provided during all phases of the 

amphibious operation, but particularly during the vulnerable period of ship-to-shore 

movement. Active protection includes defense counterair operations, antisubmarine and 

anti-small-boat screens, covering forces, electronic countermeasures, smoke, and NSFS. 

Passive protection places major emphasis on dispersion and mobility. 

See Chapter V, “Support to Amphibious Operations,” Section E “Protection.”

e. Flexibility. The ship-to-shore movement plan must have sufficient flexibility to 

exploit adversary critical vulnerabilities that may become apparent only after the 

commencement of the landing. 

f. Availability and planned utilization of supporting arms. 

g. Need for speed and positive centralized control. 

h. MCM and obstacle reduction requirements. 

i. Assault breaching operations in the surf zone (SZ) and on the beach. 

j. Go/no-go criteria. 

k. Hydrographic conditions. 

21. Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Operations 

a. General. An OTH amphibious operation is an amphibious operation initiated from 

beyond visual and radar range of the enemy shore. The goal of OTH operations is to 

achieve operational surprise through creation of multiple threats, and ultimately to shatter 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-35 

an enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions that create a 

turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which an adversary cannot cope. The 

decision to conduct OTH operations may also principally be a force protection decision to 

mitigate threats such as antiship missiles. See Figure III-7 for advantages and 

disadvantages inherent to an OTH operation. 

b. Scope. An OTH operation is a tactical option to hide intentions and capabilities and 

to exploit the element of tactical surprise to achieve AF objectives. It provides greater 

protection to the AF from near-shore threats, and provides escort ships a greater opportunity 

to detect, classify, track, and engage incoming hostile aircraft and coastal defense missiles 

while expanding the shoreline the enemy must be prepared to defend. Conversely, the 

expanded OTH operational environment increases ship-to-shore transit distance and time, 

complicates C2, and may strain logistic sustainment of the LF. Conceptually, the 

operation will still be viewed as a single integrated evolution rather than as two or 

three parallel operations (e.g., airborne assault, conventional surface assault, LCAC 

assault). As the situation ashore develops, the CATF and CLF adjust the ship-to-shore 

OVER THE HORIZON OPERATIONS

ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

Reduced risk to amphibious

task force ships

Simplified air defense

Reduced mine threat to

amphibious task force ships

Enhanced operational or

tactical surprise

Increased flexibility

Extended vulnerability of

landing craft

Expanded operational

environment requiring more

self-defense assets

Increased cycle time for

landing craft and aircraft

(reduced throughput)

Lost or reduced availability of

naval surface fire support

Inability of amphibious assault

vehicles to swim ashore

Decreased communications

system connectivity

Greater susceptibility to sea

state

Figure III-7. Over-the-Horizon Operations 
Chapter III 

III-36 JP 3-02 

maneuver to reinforce successes, and may 

change penetration points, vertical landing 

zones (VLZs), and CLZs to keep enemy 

forces off balance. To increase combat 

power, ease the logistic strain for forces 

ashore, and support follow-on forces, the 

designated commander may shift all or 

part of the AF to near-shore operations. 

This decision is based on the threat to 

forces afloat, CLF requirements, and the 

situation ashore. 

c. Planning Considerations. While 

OTH techniques are applicable to any type 

of amphibious operation, special 

considerations are required. C2 

interrelationships are even more critical in 

OTH amphibious operations. An OTH 

operation requires that the landing plan 

be fluid, containing alternate landing 

sites that may even be selected while 

landing craft are in transit. Operational 

requirements for planning an OTH 

amphibious operation include the 

following: 

(1) Developing and 

maintaining an accurate and timely 

tactical picture of the operational area. The need for timely intelligence data is increased 

for OTH operations because the number of possible landing sites is increased. The seaward 

tactical picture, as it pertains to the presence or absence of enemy naval forces between the 

ATF and shore, plays a significant role in the selection of possible landing sites and 

therefore affects the scheme of maneuver. Using OTH tactics requires consolidation of the 

tactical picture of land and water to provide the CATF and CLF with a consolidated base 

from which to plan and make tactical decisions. Interoperable C2 systems for maintaining 

situational awareness and a common tactical picture for the CATF and CLF are absolutely 

essential in OTH operations. 

(2) Surveillance and reconnaissance of the operational area with emphasis on 

possible landing sites. Positioning the AF OTH allows the landing site location to remain 

flexible. Landing sites may be chosen just before launching the first wave, which requires 

timely intelligence, surveillance and hydrographic reconnaissance of potential beach 

landing sites and HLZs. 

(3) Reliable communications and accurate navigation. OTH operations 

planning is more complex than traditional amphibious planning because of the increased 

Landing craft, air cushion vehicles provide the 

over-the-horizon heavy lift capability for the 

landing force. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-37 

distances between launch platforms, landing beaches, supporting fires, and control 

platforms. This in turn requires greater coordination and communications capability. 

Flexibility must be maintained throughout the operation since VLZs and CLZs may be 

widely separated. The vertical assault may land forces inland where they will be able to 

threaten key enemy positions, facilities, and lines of communications (LOCs). The surface 

assault points of entry are sites along the coastline where the hydrography, terrain, and 

enemy situation allow the LF to rapidly move ashore and thrust inland. 

(4) Naval surface fire support may be a requirement for successful 

prosecution of an amphibious assault. However, since one underlying reason for an OTH 

assault is the strength of coastal defenses, the primary mission of NSFS may shift from 

destroying enemy forces at a defended landing beach to isolating the landing area(s). 

Preassault fire support in the vicinity of landing sites may also be restricted, especially prior 

to D-day and H-hour, to preserve tactical surprise. D-day is the unnamed day on which a 

particular operation commences or is to commence. NSFS ships may initially be OTH with 

the ATF, closing the beach along with the initial waves of landing craft. Although ships 

can use land attack missiles for OTH fire support, their quantities are limited. With no 

current capability to conduct OTH surface gun fire support, missions normally conducted 

by NSFS will initially rest with aviation assets. 

22. Other Planning Considerations 

 Planning for supporting functions (e.g., fires, communications, logistics, health service 

support [HSS]) is discussed in Chapter V, “Support to Amphibious Operations.” 

SECTION B. EMBARKATION 

23. Overview 

a. General. The embarkation phase is the period during which the forces, with 

their equipment and supplies, are embarked in assigned shipping. The primary goal of 

this phase is the orderly assembly of personnel and materiel and their embarkation in 

assigned shipping in a sequence designed to meet the requirements of the LF CONOPS 

ashore. Detailed considerations and guidance on the organization for embarkation, 

planning, and execution of this phase of the operation can be found in JP 3-02.1, 

Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation. Military Sealift Command (MSC) support to 

amphibious operations and associated special considerations, is provided in Navy Warfare 

Publication (NWP) 3-02.21, MSC Support of Amphibious Operations. 

 

b. Considerations. Plans for assembly of assault shipping and movement of troops to 

embarkation points are prepared by the CATF and CLF, respectively, as separate 

documents in the form of movement orders and embarkation and loading plans. These 

plans must be coordinated and distributed as soon as possible to permit initiation of 

preliminary movements and preparations to ensure that the embarkation is begun without 

delay. Critical to embarkation planning is an understanding of the required amphibious lift, 

which is the total capacity of assault shipping utilized in an amphibious operation, 
Chapter III 

III-38 JP 3-02 

expressed in terms of personnel, vehicles, and measurement or weight tons of supplies. The 

organization for embarkation is a temporary task organization within each element of the 

AF. The organization for embarkation conforms to the circumstances of the deployment 

and the requirements of the expected tactical situation. Upon completion of the 

embarkation phase, these task organizations dissolve. Assault shipping assigned to 

transport the LF to the AOA is formed into tactical groupings by the CATF. The number 

and types of ships assigned to each of these groupings is determined by the size and 

composition of the LF organization for embarkation. The LF organization for 

embarkation consists of embarkation groups, units, elements, and teams. 

Corresponding embarkation echelons are formed within the ATF. 

c. Responsibilities. ATF and LF commanders’ planning responsibilities are as 

follows: 

(1) The CATF is responsible for: 

(a) Allocating assault shipping and sealift. 

(b) Providing ship’s loading characteristics pamphlets to the CLF. 

(c) Organizing Navy forces for embarkation. 

(d) Preparing movement orders for ships. 

(e) Approving LF embarkation and loading plans. Ships’ commanding 

officers have the final determination of what and how the ship is loaded. They are 

personally responsible for the safety of their ships and must approve the load plan. 

(f) Planning for external support. 

(g) Advising CLF on US Navy support forces’ embarkation requirements, for 

example explosive ordinance disposal teams, sea air-land team, assault craft unit, and 

beachmaster unit requirements. 

(2) The CLF is responsible for: 

(a) Determining LF requirements for assault shipping. 

(b) Developing LF organization for embarkation. 

(c) Determining embarkation support requirements. 

(d) Preparing detailed embarkation and loading plans. 

(3) Other commanders must: 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-39 

(a) Provide their lift requirements. 

(b) Organize their units for embarkation. 

(c) Participate in embarkation planning meetings. 

See JP 3-02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation, for embarkation and loading 

plan considerations. 

SECTION C. REHEARSALS 

24. General 

 Rehearsal is the period during which the prospective operation is practiced for the 

following reasons: 

a. Test adequacy of plans, timing of detailed operations, and combat readiness of 

participating forces. 

b. Ensure that all echelons are familiar with the plan. 

c. Test communications-information systems. 

“The projection of the 10th Mountain Division (Light) from the aircraft carrier USS 

America into Haiti in 1994 showed what can result when we break down 

traditional service walls in search of a new synergy. An Army official aboard the 

carrier during the operation affirmed the need for practice: “The key to this 

operation is combat rehearsals. You have to make it work before you show up in 

theater and are trying it for the first time.” 

Source: Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1998-99 

(Quote from interview with Rick Cantwell, December 31, 1996) 

25. Requirements 

 The rehearsal phase may be conducted concurrently with other phases of the 

amphibious operation but most often is associated with the movement to the 

operational area phase. During this period the AF, or elements of, conduct one or more 

rehearsal exercise(s), ideally under conditions approximating those encountered in the 

littorals and expected landing area. The objective during this phase will be to exercise as 

much of the force and the OPLAN as the situation permits, with OPSEC and time being 

limiting factors. 

26. Rehearsal Plans 

 Responsibility for preparation of rehearsal plans is the same as for preparation of 

the OPLAN. Rehearsal plans will be issued separately from actual plans and require 

execution of the various tasks and functions paralleling those required during the operation. 
Chapter III 

III-40 JP 3-02 

a. The number, nature, and scope of rehearsals will be influenced by the following 

considerations: 

(1) The complexity of the tasks. 

(2) Time available for rehearsals. 

(3) State of training. 

(4) Suitability of available areas. 

(5) Special or unusual problems to be faced in the actual operation. 

(6) Intelligence. 

(7) Adequacy of communications system. 

(8) Logistic and CSS availability to replenish, replace, or repair assets used. 

(9) OPSEC to prevent disclosure of timing, location, or intent to conduct an 

amphibious operation. 

(10) Organic modeling and simulation ability. 

b. Factors influencing the dates on which rehearsals are conducted and the time 

allocated for them include the following: 

(1) Complete and careful execution of the entire rehearsal. 

(2) Re-embarkation of all troops, equipment, and supplies. 

(3) Replenishment, repair, or replacement of equipment and supplies used during 

rehearsals including landing craft, ships, or aircraft. 

(4) Critiques at all levels of command for evaluation and correction of problems. 

(5) Time to revise areas of the plan in which the rehearsal identified problems. 

c. Selection of the rehearsal area is influenced by the following: 

(1) Suitability. 

(2) Similarity of the rehearsal area to the actual landing area. 

(3) Feasibility of employing live ammunition. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-41 

(4) OPSEC. 

(5) Susceptibility to enemy interference. 

(6) Location of the rehearsal area in relation to the operational area and to points 

of embarkation. 

(7) Health conditions at the rehearsal area. 

(8) Activity of civilian personnel, vehicles, shipping, and small craft that may 

interfere with the rehearsal. 

(9) Environmental and management restrictions. 

d. Testing the effectiveness of communications-information systems plans will be 

influenced by the following: 

(1) Level of training of communications-information systems personnel and 

training time available. 

(2) Level of training of intelligence, maneuver, fires, logistics, and other 

functional area personnel regarding their use of communications-information systems 

resources. 

(3) Status of communications-information systems equipment. 

(4) OPSEC and information security (INFOSEC) restrictions. 

SECTION D. MOVEMENT 

27. General 

 The movement phase commences upon departure of ships from loading points in the 

embarkation areas, and concludes when ships arrive at assigned stations in the operational 

area. During this phase, the AF is organized into movement groups, which execute 

movement in accordance with the movement plan on prescribed routes (with alternate 

routes designated for emergency use). In amphibious operations, the movement plan is 

the naval plan providing for the movement of the ATF to the objective area. It includes 

information and instructions concerning departure of ships from embarkation points, the 

passage at sea, and the approach to and arrival in assigned positions in the objective area. 

Movement of the force to the operational area may be interrupted by rehearsals, stops at 

staging areas for logistic reasons, or pauses at rendezvous points. Execution of a 

postponement plan due to adverse weather or other unfavorable situations may necessitate a 

revised movement plan. 
Chapter III 

III-42 JP 3-02 

28. Echelons of the Landing Force 

 The echelons of the LF will include the AE, the MPF ships, afloat pre-positioning force 

(APF), AFOE, and follow-up transport ships and aircraft as described below. The Marine 

Corp’s APF ships are identified first as they are the first assets from the APF to be called 

up. 

a. AE. The AE is that element of a force that comprises tailored units and aircraft 

assigned to conduct the initial assault on the operational area. The AE is normally 

embarked in amphibious ships, which include the following naval ship classes: the 

LHA, LHD, amphibious transport dock (LPD), and dock landing ship (LSD). These 

ships, each with its internal dock, are designed to embark, deploy, and land elements of a 

LF in an assault by helicopters, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and by combinations of 

these methods. The LHDs and LHAs are the Navy’s largest amphibious ships. Their 

mission is to embark, deploy, and land elements of the landing force in an amphibious 

assault by helicopters, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or by combinations of these 

methods. The LPD is designed to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by 

means of embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters. The LSD is 

designed to transport and launch loaded amphibious craft and/or amphibian vehicles with 

their crews, embarked personnel, and equipment. It also has the ability to render limited 

docking and repair services to small ships and craft. The AE ships are combat loaded with 

troops, equipment, and supplies that typically provide at least 15 days of sustainment. 

Other elements included in the AE are LF elements of the advance force that deploy with 

sufficient supplies to accomplish their mission and sustain themselves until subsequent 

forces arrive. 

b. MPF and APF. MPF and APF operations that augment and reinforce the LF 

will normally occur before the arrival of the AFOE. The pre-positioned force can 

provide equipment and supplies to a MEB or US Army maneuver unit at a permissive 

location in the operational area. These additional troops, supplies, and equipment can then 

be transported by ATF assets or other means to reinforce or augment the landing and 

support forces ashore. 

c. AFOE. Information concerning AFOE is contained in Section E, “Action.” 

d. Follow-up Ships and Aircraft. In amphibious operations, follow-up is the landing 

of reinforcements and stores after the AEs and AFOEs have landed. Follow-up is carried 

by transport ships and aircraft not originally part of the AF. 

29. Organization for Movement 

 Based on the landing plan, AF assets are organized for embarkation and deployment to 

support the amphibious operation. This organization is based on the time-phased force 

requirements of the AF in the operational area. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-43 

a. Transport Groups. Those elements that directly deploy and support the landing of 

the LF are functionally designated as transport groups in the ATF organization. 

(1) Amphibious transport groups provide for embarkation, movement to the 

landing area, landing, and logistic support of the LF. An amphibious transport group is a 

subdivision of an amphibious task force composed primarily of transport ships. The size of 

the transport group will depend upon the scope of the operation. A transport unit will 

usually be formed to embark troops and equipment to be landed over a designated beach or 

to embark all helicopterborne troops and equipment. They are comprised of all the assets in 

which the LF is embarked, including lighterage and cargo offloading and discharge systems 

to be employed in ship-to-shore movement. The amphibious transport group can include 

ships from commercial and other sources that include the following: 

(a) At present MSC has approximately 30 pre-positioned force vessels 

including 6 in reduced operating status laden with military equipment, supplies, and fuel. 

This force has three separate elements: maritime pre-positioned ships, afloat prepositioning ships, and a collection of vessels that support the Navy, Air Force, and Defense 

Logistics Agency. The MPF(enhanced) represents an increased capability with an 

augmented ship for each squadron that carries an expeditionary medical facility and 

expeditionary airfield engineering equipment. 

(b) MSC’s surge sealift fleet consisting of large, medium speed roll-on/rolloff (RO/RO) ships capable of moving large amounts of heavy unit equipment such as tanks, 

large wheeled vehicles, and helicopters. 

(c) Other MSC-provided ships, consisting of commercial ships (both US and 

foreign flag) acquired for specific lift requirements. 

(d) Two MSC operated hospital ships. 

(e) The Ready Reserve Force consisting of commercial or former military 

vessels of high military utility including commercial RO/RO and fast sealift ships, barge, 

container, tanker, crane, and breakbulk ships. Some of these vessels have had their military 

capabilities enhanced with the addition of systems such as the modular cargo delivery 

system and the offshore petroleum discharge system (OPDS). Some have been altered for 

specific missions such as aviation logistic support ships and auxiliary crane ships. The 

Maritime Administration maintains these vessels in a 4- or 5-day readiness status. When 

activated, these ships are under the operational control of MSC. 

(f) Ships provided by allied and friendly governments. 

(g) Additional detachments can add capabilities provided by the joint high 

speed vessel or Army watercraft such as the logistic support vessel or landing craft utility. 

These detachments may augment amphibious transport group task organizations when 

conditions permit Army land component command seaborne and beach landing capability 

integration. 
Chapter III 

III-44 JP 3-02 

(2) Airlift is used for amphibious operations involving the fly-in echelon to link 

up with equipment delivered by the MSC. Aircraft assigned can be organic military or 

commercial, to include: 

(a) Aircraft activated/volunteered under Civil Reserve Air Fleet. 

(b) Aircraft requisitioned by the US Government. 

(c) Aircraft provided by allied and friendly governments. 

b. Multiple Transport Groups. If more than one landing area is established in the 

operational area, additional transport groups (one for each landing area) are formed. 

Transport groups are combat loaded to support the landing plan of the assigned landing 

area. Each amphibious transport group is assigned assault ships and lighterage required by 

the LF in its assigned landing area. 

c. Movement Group(s). The ATF may be task-organized into movement groups 

based on ports of embarkation (POEs), and individual ship speed, mission, and required 

arrival time in the operational area. Using the above criteria, all Navy forces, selfdeploying LF aircraft, and self-deploying Air Force units should be task-organized into 

separate movement groups. A movement group will include all required screen and logistic 

support. 

d. Pre-D-day Groups. The advance force, when used, usually proceeds to the landing 

Essex Amphibious Ready Group steams in formation, in the Andaman Sea. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-45 

area as a single movement group. However, if there is a wide disparity of speed between 

various ships, or if part of the LF is required to capture nearby islands or other key terrain 

before the arrival of the main body of the AF, it may be necessary to organize the 

advance force into two or more movement groups, each with a screen. 

(1) The main body of the AF should consist of the following groups: one or more 

transport groups, one or more combat logistic groups, and one or more support battle 

groups. 

(2) Under certain conditions, it may be desirable to attach all or part of the combat 

logistic groups or support battle groups to the transport groups, in order to provide support 

and protection from attack while en route. Protection from attack while en route may also 

be provided by nonorganic forces. 

(3) Elements of the AF may be phased into the operational area by echelons, 

instead of being brought in simultaneously. 

e. Post-D-day Groups. Movement groups of the AF scheduled to arrive in the 

operational area after D-day will usually be assigned a screen for force protection. 

f. Follow-up. The first follow-up elements may arrive in the operational area before 

unloading of the AE or AFOE ships is complete. In such cases, OPCON or TACON of 

these elements will normally be passed to the CATF at a designated point before their 

arrival in the operational area. The CATF retains OPCON or TACON of these elements 

until such time as the amphibious operation is terminated, the elements are detached from 

the AF, or another offload authority has been designated. 

See JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS), and JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal 

Operations, for further information. 

SECTION E. ACTION 

30. General 

 In an amphibious operation, the action phase is the period of time between the arrival 

of the LF of the AF in the operational area and the accomplishment of their mission. 

31. Organization and Command Relationships 

 Organization of forces, responsibilities for accomplishment of tasks, and command 

relationships during the action phase of all types of amphibious operations are essentially 

the same. Variations in responsibility and authority as required by the individual situation 

will be specified in the initiating directive. 

a. Organization for the action phase of an amphibious operation is based on the 

parallel organization of the ATF, LF, and other designated forces. LF organization for 
Chapter III 

III-46 JP 3-02 

landing is the specific tactical grouping of forces for accomplishment of the assigned 

mission. Tactical integrity of landing elements is maintained insofar as practicable during 

ship-to-shore movement. The ATF and LF organizations should parallel one another to 

facilitate execution of the landing plan and the LF scheme of maneuver ashore. 

b. The organization of ATF forces for the action phase is as follows: 

(1) ATF forces afloat provide the transport groups for the vertical and surface 

ship-to-shore movement and also provide the necessary landing craft, and AAV control 

organization. 

(2) For the surface movement, the LF may be landed from ships by landing craft; 

AAVs, or small boats (e.g., combat rubber raiding craft). 

(3) The amphibious shipping, landing craft, AAVs, and organic aviation are 

organized to correspond to the tactical organization of troops to ensure control and 

maneuverability. This organization includes boat waves, boat groups, and boat flotillas. 

(4) A boat wave consists of the landing craft or AAVs within a boat group that 

carries the troops, equipment, or cargo requiring simultaneous landing. 

(5) The boat group is the basic organization of landing craft. One boat group is 

organized for each surface landing force element within scheduled waves at a designated 

beach. 

(6) The boat flotilla is an organization of two or more boat groups. 

(7) Although LCACs are landing craft, their employment differs slightly from 

displacement landing craft. Operations conducted from 25 nautical miles (nms) offshore or 

more are usually considered OTH. Limited operations using one or more LCAC groups 

may be conducted from as far as 100 nms offshore. However, this distance approaches the 

maximum capability of the craft and requires careful planning. 

c. The organization of the LF for the action phase will be different with each 

operation, but the general task organization remains the same. The LF is organized to 

execute the landing and to conduct initial operations ashore in accordance with the 

commander’s CONOPS. The major subordinate elements of the LF should be capable 

of independent operations during the initial stages of the landing and operations 

ashore. For example, a regimental commander will need time to establish C2 over the 

separate battalions, which may have landed across different beaches and/or LZs. The 

organization for landing should also provide for: 

(1) Maximum combat power at the point of landing. 

(2) Depth to the assault to ensure flexibility and a sustained buildup of combat 

power. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-47 

(3) Dispersion of the force as consistent with other requirements. 

(4) Sufficient flexibility to exploit weaknesses found in the adversary defenses. 

(5) Timely establishment/employment of tactical and administrative support 

systems ashore. 

(6) Closest possible resemblance to the organization for combat. 

d. As discussed earlier, the Marine Corps will organize as a MAGTF to conduct LF 

operations, but will further organize into “landing teams” to facilitate the ship-to-shore 

movement and initial operations ashore. When Army forces are employed as the LF, they 

will generally consist of a ground combat division, brigade, or battalion that is taskorganized with other combat, combat support, and CSS units. As with the MAGTF, the 

Army LF will also organize into “landing teams” that are based around ground maneuver 

units within the LF. The organization for the LF will be as follows: 

(1) Divisions. Although smaller organizations may be employed in appropriate 

cases, the reinforced infantry division is the basic self-contained tactical organization for the 

conduct of amphibious assault operations. Landing support and aviation units are included 

in the LF organization for landing. Those specifically designated CSS and aviation units 

scheduled to land during the initial assault, and over the same beaches as the assault 

divisions, are included in the landing plans of the assault divisions. 

(2) Regiments or Brigades. The regimental landing team or brigade landing team 

is a task-organized assault element consisting of an infantry regiment or brigade reinforced 

by those support elements required. This reinforcement usually includes subordinate BLTs, 

aviation, and CSS elements. 

(3) Battalions. The BLT is the basic organization of the LF for ship-to-shore 

movement planning. The BLT consists of an infantry battalion or similar unit reinforced by 

such supporting and service units as may be attached for the movement. Because the BLT 

is a specific tactical organization for landing, it should be differentiated from the infantry 

battalion or similar organization. For ship-to-shore movement, the BLT is further organized 

for waterborne and/or helicopterborne movement. 

(a) For movement by landing craft and amphibious vehicles, the BLTs are 

formed into boat flotillas, boat groups, boat waves, and boat teams. Insofar as practicable, 

the tactical integrity of troop units should be maintained within boat waves and boat teams. 

The ATF landing craft are also organized by boat flotillas, groups, and waves. A boat team 

consists of the LF personnel assigned to an individual landing craft. 

(b) For movement by helicopter, the BLTs are formed into helicopter flights, 

waves, and teams. 
Chapter III 

III-48 JP 3-02 

(4) Task grouping of tanks, artillery, antitank, engineer, and other supporting arms 

or service units may be formed to support initial operations ashore, but not integrated into a 

BLT. 

(5) Reserve forces are organized in a manner similar to their assault counterparts. 

Although not tailored for a specific beach or LZ, reserve forces are normally prepared to 

conduct an assault landing by either landing craft or helicopter movement. 

e. Organization of Sea Areas. Sea areas in the vicinity of the objective area are 

selected and designated by the CATF or higher authority in order to minimize the 

possibility of interference between components of the AF and other supporting forces, and 

to maximize force defense and speed of the offensive. Those portions of the sea areas in the 

landing area in which the ship-to-shore movement is conducted are of particular concern to 

the LF. CATF, in coordination with the CLF, plans the necessary approach and retirement 

lanes, checkpoints, rendezvous points and aids to navigation to facilitate the control and 

coordination of ship-to-shore movement. 

32. Control 

a. The CATF is responsible for overall control of both surface and air ship-toshore movement. Initially, ship-to-shore movement, both on the surface and through the 

air, is centrally controlled to permit coordination of support for LF elements. Later, as 

circumstances permit, control of surface movement is decentralized for efficient and rapid 

execution. However, VTOL aircraft movement remains under centralized control. 

b. Control and coordination measures necessary for employment of airborne elements 

of the LF will be established by the CATF in conjunction with the CLF and other concerned 

commanders specified in the initiating directive or establishing directive, if appropriate. 

c. Control Organizations 

(1) Movement control of landing ships, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, 

and helicopters from the transport and landing ship sea echelons areas to landing 

beaches and HLZs is exercised through a Navy control group. A control group consists 

of personnel, ships, and craft designated to control the waterborne ship-to-shore movement. 

Organization of the control group is based on the arrangement and number of beaches on 

which the LF is to land. CATF, in collaboration with the CLF, will develop the OPTASK 

Amphib message. This overarching OPTASK specifies the ATF commander’s intent, 

duties and responsibilities, all geographic areas (surface: inner transport areas, outer 

transport areas, beaches, CLZs, boatlanes, etc., air: ingress, egress routes, HLZs, etc; fires: 

fire support areas/stations, no fire areas, targets, etc;), the operational area (e.g. AOA or 

AO/HIDACZ), timelines for the assault, medical regulating instructions, force protection 

instructions, etc. The initial OPTASK Amphib message should be promulgated no later 

than 72 hours prior to the assault to allow sufficient time for the subordinate units to plan. 

Updates can then be promulgated as more information becomes available. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-49 

(2) The Navy control group keeps the CATF, CLF, and other designated 

commanders informed of the progress of the movement from ship-to-shore, including the 

actual landing of the waves and the visible progress of operations ashore. The CATF and 

transport group commanders designate control ships and control officers, as appropriate. 

The organization of the Navy control group is based on the arrangement and number of 

landing beaches used by the AF and is specifically designed to support the LF’s 

organization for landing. The Navy control group uses control measures such as approach 

lanes, boat lanes, and transfer lines, to facilitate control of movement. The primary 

agencies of the Navy control group include the following: 

(a) Central Control Officer. This Navy officer is normally located aboard 

the CATF’s flagship to coordinate the overall ship-to-shore movement of surface assault 

units, including LCAC operations. The CCO is responsible for: 

1. Planning and supervising the surface-borne ship-to-shore movement. 

2. Organizing the Navy control group to best support the landing plan. 

3. Maintaining liaison with the tactical action officer. 

4. Maintaining liaison with the TACLOG group. 

(b) Primary Control Officer. The PCO is embarked in a primary control 

ship assigned to control the movement of the landing craft and amphibious vehicles. A 

PCO is assigned for each landing beach and is responsible for the following: 

1. Promulgate the primary control ship intentions message no later than 

48 hours prior to the assault to allow sufficient time for the subordinate units to plan. 

Updates can then be promulgated as more information becomes available. 

2. Maintaining the current location and status of ships, landing craft, and 

boats assigned to conduct a landing on a specific beach. 

3. Monitoring surf and weather conditions, and recommending the 

termination of boat operations should conditions warrant. 

4. Maintaining the status of debarkation or embarkation. 

5. Landing scheduled waves at the correct beach at the specified time. 

6. Arranging for fueling boats, and providing rest and food for boat 

crews. 

7. Providing liaison to the surfaceborne TACLOG group detachment. 

8. Conducting landing craft or amphibious vehicle salvage operations. 
Chapter III 

III-50 JP 3-02 

9. Coordinating landing craft operations within a designated area 

following the initial action. 

(c) LCAC Control Officer (LCO). The LCO works for the PCO and is in 

charge of all ship-to-shore movement using LCACs. He is aboard the LCAC control ship 

(LCS) and is responsible for promulgating the LCS intentions message. 

(d) Secondary Control Officer (SCO). When designated, the SCO embarks 

in the secondary control ship and is the principal assistant to the PCO. The SCO 

responsible for: 

1. Maintaining duplicate control records and plots required of the PCO. 

2. Monitoring PCO radio circuits. 

3. Controlling surfaceborne ship-to-shore movement over a landing 

beach when two or more landing beaches are designated. 

4. Assuming PCO duties in an emergency. 

Detailed description and use of these control measures can be found in NTTP 

3-02.1M/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-31.5, Ship-to-Shore 

Movement. 

(3) LFSP is a temporary, special category task organization of the AF that 

contains a shore party support element, a helicopter assault support element, and a Navy 

beach group element. The primary mission of the LFSP is to facilitate the landing and 

movement of troops, equipment, and supplies across beaches and into LZs, ports, and 

airfields. 

See NTTP 3-02.1M/MCWP 3-31.5, Ship-to-Shore Movement, for detailed discussion of the 

organization and functions of the Navy control group. 

(4) VTOL aircraft units employed in the ship-to-shore movement are subordinate 

elements of the LF. These units execute the ship-to-shore movement in accordance with the 

landing plan. Plans include provisions for shifting control of VTOL aircraft operations to 

the CLF when the situation ashore permits. During the ship-to-shore movement, the 

CATF coordinates and controls air operations through the Navy TACC. Within the 

Navy TACC, coordination of VTOL aircraft operations is accomplished by the 

helicopter/VTOL aircraft coordination section. Control of VTOL aircraft ship-to-shore 

movement is further delegated to the HDC, which is the primary direct control agency for 

the helicopter/VTOL aircraft transport unit. Once established ashore, the CLF coordinates 

and controls air operations through the Marine TACC. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-51 

See NTTP 3-02.1M/MCWP 3-31.5, Ship-to-Shore Movement, for further detailed 

discussion of the organization and control of the VTOL assault. 

(5) Tactical-Logistical Group. The TACLOG group is a temporary agency, 

composed of landing force personnel, that advises the Navy control organization of LF 

requirements during ship-to-shore movement. TACLOG groups assist the Navy control 

organization in expediting the landing of personnel, equipment, and supplies in accordance 

with the LF landing plan. TACLOG groups also serve as the primary source of information 

to the CLF regarding the status of LF units during ship-to-shore movement. The TACLOG 

group provides the link between the LFSP and advises the LF operations center and the 

Navy control organizations on the status of the offload. 

33. Supporting, Advance Force, and Preassault Operations 

a. General. Prior to the execution of the decisive action phase of an amphibious 

operation, the AF commanders may seek to shape their operational environment through 

three complementary operations. Although these operations are usually referred to in the 

context of an amphibious assault or raid, they may be used to shape the operational 

environment for a NEO or humanitarian operation. The exact manner in which these 

operations are conducted will depend on the type of amphibious operation. The force and 

the time period in which these operations are conducted typically define the operation. 

These shaping operations usually occur sequentially, but may in some instances occur 

simultaneously. These operations are, in order of occurrence, supporting, advance force, 

and preassault operations. 

(1) Supporting operations are conducted by forces other than the AF in support 

of the amphibious operation; are ordered by a higher authority, normally based on a request 

from the AF commanders; and may set the conditions for the advance force to move into 

the operational area. 

(2) Advance force operations are conducted in the operational area by a taskorganized element of the AF, prior to the arrival of the AF in the operational area. 

(3) Preassault operations are conducted by the AF upon its arrival in the 

operational area and prior to the time of the assault or decisive action, normally delineated 

by H- and L-hour. 

b. Supporting Operations. Supporting operations conducted by forces other than 

the AF may establish the prerequisites for an amphibious operation (e.g., 

establishment of air and maritime superiority). Supporting operations are ordered by 

the JFC or a designated commander and are to a large degree based on requests for certain 

actions from the amphibious commanders. These operations are normally conducted by 

naval, air, and SOF prior to the arrival of the advance force; however, they may occur at 

any time before or after H-hour. 
Chapter III 

III-52 JP 3-02 

(1) Supporting maritime operations may include establishing maritime 

superiority, the initiation of MCM operations, deception, and hydrographic survey of 

potential landing beaches. Meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) data, including 

tailored imagery, may be obtained directly from the Naval Oceanographic Office or via a 

joint or Service METOC forecast activity in support of naval forces. 

(2) Sea- and land-based supporting air operations may include establishing air 

superiority, reconnaissance, and the attack of land targets that may impact the amphibious 

operation. Assault breaching efforts may also include aerial delivered weapons intended to 

destroy obstacles within the surf zone, such as mines and barriers. 

(3) Supporting SOF operations may include but are not limited to: psychological 

operations, civil affairs, special reconnaissance, and direct action. 

See JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, for more information. 

c. Advance Force Operations

(1) The advance force conducts 

operations within the AF operational area 

established by the initiating directive. 

However, based on the limited capabilities 

of the advance force, this operational area 

may not be activated until the arrival of the 

AF. Advanced force operations range 

from clandestine reconnaissance to 

bombardment of the landing area by air, 

naval surface fires, and even artillery if 

firing positions are available. Overt 

actions are usually meant to either shape 

the operational area or to deceive the 

enemy as to the real objectives. The 

advance force may be assigned a smaller 

operational area (AOA or AO) if it has 

sufficient assets to control it or an 

operational area may not be established. 

Advance forces are task-organized to 

perform tasks that may include, but are not 

limited to: 

(a) MCM operations with 

emphasis on the clearance of mines in the 

transport areas, FSAs, and sea approaches 

to the landing beaches. 

Navy Seals perform beach reconnaissance. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-53 

(b) Hydrographic reconnaissance of the landing beaches and seaward 

approaches. 

(c) Reconnaissance and surveillance of AF objectives, LF objectives, landing 

beaches, LZs, DZs, and high speed avenues of approach into the landing area. 

(d) Neutralization or destruction of adversary high-value assets. 

(2) Decision to Employ an Advance Force. The JFC or other higher authority 

may restrict or preclude the use of an advance force based on the diplomatic or military 

situation. If advance force operations are authorized, the decision to employ an 

advance force is made after weighing the advantages of operational and tactical 

surprise and the requirements for preparation of the landing area. Knowledge of the 

operational area, the indigenous population, extent of adversary fixed defenses, air defenses, 

mines and obstacles, must be evaluated. 

(a) Surprise. Complete surprise is difficult to attain against an alert 

adversary and the prospects of achieving it will decrease with efforts to isolate the 

AOA/AO. In any event, advance force operations should always cover areas that are not 

within the selected LZs. OPSEC is an important consideration to the success of any 

amphibious operation. Every effort must be made to conceal the landing areas and AF 

objectives from the enemy until the commencement of the ship-to-shore movement. When 

surprise is a principal consideration for success, but is not attained, the risk to the AF is 

increased. 

(b) Preparation of the Landing Area. When the landing area is extensively 

organized for defense or the offshore areas are heavily mined, the AF commanders may 

elect to conduct advance force operations. In this case, the destruction or neutralization of 

the fixed defenses far outweighs the disadvantage of disclosing the selected landing area. 

Conversely, advance force operations may not be prudent when the landing area selected is 

lightly defended and the main defending force is held in reserve — waiting to employ 

against the AF’s main effort. 

(3) Planning Advance Force Operations. Planning the advance force 

operation is an integral part of planning the overall amphibious operation. The 

command relationships between commanders within the advance force must be specified in 

the initiating directive. The LF CONOPS should never be based on the assumption that 

these forces will always be available for tasking by the CLF upon the arrival of the AF 

into the operational area. The CATF designates the amphibious task group (ATG) 

commander for the advance force, provides forces, and ensures that the requisite command 

and information systems are available to conduct the operation. CLF will evaluate the 

missions assigned to the advance force and assume the following additional planning 

responsibilities:
Chapter III 

III-54 JP 3-02 

(a) Form a landing group or subordinate task organization, designating the 

advance force landing and/or reconnaissance group commander and providing the requisite 

staff and forces to accomplish assigned LF tasks. 

1. A landing group commander will be used when offensive landings or 

strikes are conducted by LF units of the advance force. In amphibious operations, a landing 

group commander is the officer designated by the CLF as the single tactical commander of 

a subordinate task organization capable of conducting landing operations against a position 

or group of positions. 

2. A reconnaissance group commander is used when LF units conduct 

only reconnaissance and surveillance missions. 

(b) Determine LF requirements for NSFS, priority intelligence requirements 

(PIRs), air support, space support, reconnaissance, etc. and submit to the CATF. 

(c) Determine communications system requirements for the LF personnel 

who will accompany the advance force. 

(d) Determine SOF support requirements and coordinate command 

relationships with the advance force commander. 

(e) Designate FSCC and/or fires cell (FC) personnel to augment the advance 

force SACC. 

(f) Modify embarkation and landing plans (cross deck equipment and 

personnel as required) to support the advance force operations. 

(4) The decision on establishment of an advance force operational area must be 

made after considering the advance force’s mission, forces, ability to control an assigned 

area, and the level of threat. 

(5) Appropriate coordination measures are established to facilitate coordination 

and unity of effort. These measures are influenced by, among other things, the scope of the 

supporting operations taking place in the vicinity of the operational area, and the command 

relationships established between the advance force and other forces in the area. 

(6) SOF employed during advance force operations will usually remain under the 

OPCON of the theater special operations command commander (acting as the commander, 

joint force special operations component command [JFSOCC]) and be assigned in support 

of the CATF and/or CLF depending on the location and nature of the mission. SOF may 

also be operating in or near the AOA on distinctly separate low-visibility or clandestine 

missions in support of the combatant commander. Coordination must occur between AF 

planners and the JFSOCC/joint special operations task force to maximize effectiveness. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-55 

(7) Upon arrival of the AF in the operational area, the advance force is usually 

disestablished and forces revert to control of CATF and CLF or other designated 

commanders. Certain tasks may dictate that the OPCON or TACON of SOF or 

reconnaissance teams remains with the advance force to minimize disruptions prior to the 

decisive action. It is important to maintain the SOF chain of command in order to preserve 

the C2 relationship(s) of SOF forces for the gaining commander. 

d. Preassault Operations. Final preparations of the landing area are usually under the 

control of the CATF and CLF. These preparations are usually of a more overt nature. 

Assets used to conduct these operations may reduce the resources available for tasking at Hand L-hour. The CLF must ensure that inherent risks associated with preassault operations 

do not critically impair the CONOPS ashore. Some of the planning considerations may 

include the following: 

(1) Demolition of visible obstacles, clearance of required mines, breaching of any 

remaining seaward minefields and barriers to and on the beach, overt marking of usable 

channels, direct action missions, target acquisition (TA) and spotting for NSFS, and initial 

terminal guidance for designated assault landings. 

(2) Air operations in accordance with air support plans, including EW, and 

preplanned air strikes against adversary installations en route to and in the vicinity of 

beaches, DZs, LZs, targets of opportunity, and mines and obstacles in the SZ and on the 

beach. 

(3) NSFS in accordance with the NSFS plan, including destruction or 

neutralization of adversary installations that might interfere with the approach and final 

deployment of the AF or otherwise interfere with the operation. 

(4) Artillery support on landing areas in accordance with artillery fire support 

plans if artillery has been put in place during preassault operations. 

(5) Ammunition (naval, aviation ordnance, artillery, etc.) expenditure and fuel 

consumption prior to the landing. 

(6) Loss of equipment prior to D-day to include high demand, low density item 

losses due to maintenance and repair. 

(7) Loss of personnel due to casualties, injuries, sickness, or required “down 

time” (such as recovery periods for long range reconnaissance teams, aircrews, etc.). 

(8) Resupply and rearming schedule for the AF, or lack thereof. 

(9) LF requirement to support other forces prior to and after D-day. 

e. With the completion of preassault operations, the AF will conduct surface and/or 

vertical assaults into the landing area to accomplish the decisive action. 
Chapter III 

III-56 JP 3-02 

34. Final Preparations for the Ship-to-Shore Movement 

 In some cases units may need to be cross-decked prior to the assault. This should be 

kept to the minimum as there may be insufficient berthing for the troops that are crossdecked. Also, this means that the air or landing craft crews will be transferring personnel 

instead of making last minute preparations for the operation. Upon completion of any preexecution operations the ATF starts the final approach to assigned positions for the 

landings. Ships prepare for the debarkation of the embarked troops, equipment, and 

supplies in accordance with previously prepared plans. The commencement of debarkation 

and the timing of the ship-to-shore movement depend on the designated H-hour. All 

elements must be prepared to modify plans on short notice to conform to changes in Hhour. 

a. Landing Force Operations. LF operations ashore begin with the landing of the 

first scheduled wave, by surface means, vertical insertion, or airborne landing. Elements of 

the LF quickly transition from an organization for landing to an organization for combat in 

order to accomplish the LF missions ashore. Once fully established ashore, the LF conducts 

tactical operations similar to normal land operations but remains dependent on at-sea forces 

for support. As the operation progresses and support is established ashore, the degree of 

dependence is reduced. 

b. The CLF is responsible for the overall planning and execution of LF operations 

ashore. To guide LF operations ashore during the action phase, the CLF and his staff 

develop the LF plan for operations. During the initial preparation of the plan, the LF staff 

will need to develop the essential items necessary to frame the overall OPLAN. The LF 

CONOPS ashore, the plan for fire support, and the concept for CSS are produced based on 

the CLF’s guidance and intent. 

(1) CONOPS Ashore. The development of the concept of LF operations ashore 

is an evolutionary process. The concept developed during detailed planning is a refinement 

of the initial concept developed during preliminary amphibious planning. Ultimately, the 

detailed concept is included in the OPLAN. The operational and logistic requirements of 

subordinate elements and changes in the adversary situation may necessitate modifications 

to this concept, but it must always provide additional clarity to the LF commander’s intent. 

The detailed CONOPS ashore amplifies CLF’s decisions and indicates how he 

visualizes the operation. Included in the CONOPS, the scheme of maneuver is a plan for 

the execution of a tactical COA. It includes objectives, types of offensive maneuver to be 

employed, distribution of forces, and necessary control measures. In formulating the 

scheme of maneuver for an amphibious operation, the principles of ground combat remain 

valid. However, variations of application may be necessary because of the character of the 

operation. 

(2) Plan of Supporting Fires. Fire support has a major effect on the 

development of the LF plan for operations. Until the LF’s organic artillery is ashore, NSFS 

and aviation assets (fixed- and rotary-wing) are normally the only means of fire support for 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-57 

the LF. A portion of these assets may also be tasked to defend the AF as a whole, limiting 

their availability to the LF. 

For additional information on supporting arms, see Chapter V, “Support to Amphibious 

Operations,” Section B, “Fire Support.”

(3) Plan for the Employment of LF Aviation. The plan for the employment of 

LF aviation to support operations ashore is integrated with the overall air plans of the CATF 

and AF commanders. Air operations performed by ATF and LF aviation elements, and 

other supporting air forces, complement one another and constitute a collective capability 

for support of the amphibious operation. When the LF is a MAGTF, the MAGTF 

commander retains OPCON of the organic aviation assets for use in support of the LF 

CONOPS and his overall mission. During the course of the operation, excess MAGTF 

sorties can be allocated by the JFC to other component commanders as appropriate. The 

MAGTF commander provides excess sorties and sorties for air defense, long-range 

interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance to the JFC in accordance with JP 1, Doctrine 

for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

(4) Plan for the Employment of the LF CSS. The plan for the employment of 

the LF CSS is expressed in the concept for CSS. This document establishes the logistic 

support plan for the LF from the embarkation phase through the termination of LF 

operations ashore.

c. Reserves. The CLF will usually plan to withhold a portion of the force during the 

initial stages of the action phase. The LF reserve must be capable of landing when and 

where required in order to best influence the tactical situation as it develops ashore. 

(1) Subordinate units of the LF will normally not have their own reserve due to 

the limited ship-to-shore movement assets and the need to commit all landing groups to 

maximize the combat power ashore. On-call waves are the normal means with which the 

ground commander can influence the action ashore. While afloat, certain units may be 

treated as a reserve for commitment as required by the situation. 

(2) When keeping the reserve afloat is no longer any advantage, it is landed and 

positioned ashore to facilitate future employment. This action should not be undertaken 

until sufficient area has been seized ashore to permit adequate maneuver space. 

35. Subsidiary Landings 

 In an amphibious operation, a subsidiary landing is a landing, normally conducted 

by elements of the AF, usually made outside the designated landing area to support 

the main landing. An amphibious operation may require one or more subsidiary landings 

conducted before, during, or after the main landing. If made before, the effect on the main 

landing must be considered in terms of possible loss of surprise. Subsidiary landings must 

be planned and executed by commanders with the same precision as the main landing. 

Division of forces to conduct subsidiary landings is justified only when such employment 
Chapter III 

III-58 JP 3-02 

will be of greater value than commitment to the main landing. Forces employed in 

subsidiary landings that precede the main landing may be re-embarked and employed as a 

tactical reserve supporting the main landing. Subsidiary landings may be executed to 

accomplish one or more of the following specific purposes: 

a. Seize specific areas to be used in support of the main landing; i.e., seizing islands or 

mainland areas adjacent to the main landing area for use as: 

(1) Artillery, missile, and rocket firing positions. 

(2) Airfields or vertical and short takeoff and landing aircraft-capable locations. 

(3) Protected anchorage, temporary advanced naval bases, or logistics and CSS 

sites from which the main landing can be supported. 

(4) Air warning and control system sites. 

b. Seize an area to deny its use to the enemy in opposing the main landing. 

c. Divert enemy attention and forces from the main landing or fix enemy defensive 

forces in place as part of a deception operation. 

36. Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore 

 Joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) are operations in which Navy and Army LOTS 

forces conduct LOTS operations together under a JFC. Traditionally, Navy LOTS includes 

the use of United States Marine Corps forces. Generally, LOTS operations are joint in 

all but a few exceptions. The scope of JLOTS operations extends from acceptance of ships 

for off-load through the arrival of equipment and cargo at inland staging and marshalling 

areas. The JLOTS forces are normally organized along Service lines, but can also 

follow functional lines, with Service elements integrated under the TACON of the JLOTS 

commander. Geographic combatant commanders have overall responsibility for JLOTS 

operations in their areas of responsibility. United States Transportation Command 

(USTRANSCOM) forces, when attached to the supported geographic combatant 

commander, will normally also be under TACON of the JLOTS commander. The 

geographic combatant commander may delegate authority to subordinate JFCs in the 

conduct of their assigned missions. Each Service component has personnel and equipment 

necessary for the conduct of LOTS operations. During the planning for and execution of 

JLOTS operations, each Service component will furnish such equipment and perform those 

tasks required by the OPLAN and OPORD or as directed by the JFC during OPORD 

execution. The JLOTS commander will accomplish detailed planning and execution of 

JLOTS operations through a central planning team composed of representatives from 

participating Service and USTRANSCOM components. Principal responsibilities of the 

JLOTS commander include the following: 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-59 

a. Publishing an OPORD or directive that states responsibilities and describes 

procedures for the conduct of the JLOTS operation. 

b. Handling JLOTS execution, beginning with acceptance of ships for off-load, 

through the arrival of equipment and cargo at inland staging and marshalling areas. 

c. Coordinating over-the-shore liquid cargo operations. For the OPDS, 

responsibility includes acceptance of OPDS vessels and the installation and operation of 

OPDS to its termination point on the beach, where it interfaces with the inland petroleum 

distribution systems and the amphibious assault fuel system.

For additional information see JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS). 

SECTION F. SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS BY TYPE 

OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION 

37. Assault 

a. Action. The assault begins on order, after sufficient elements of the main body of 

the AF that are capable of beginning the ship-to-shore movement arrive in the operational 

area. For an assault, the action phase ends when conditions specified in the initiating 

directive are met, as recommended by the CATF and CLF and approved by the JFC or 

designated commander. 

b. Sequence. The assault is the most difficult type of amphibious operation and one of 

the most difficult of all military operations. Many of the principles and procedures of the 

assault apply to other types of amphibious operations. The normal sequence during the 

action phase of the operation is depicted in Figure III-8. 

c. Planning Considerations for Assault

(1) The LF mission is developed early in the planning process after careful 

analysis of the AF mission and only after all specified and implied tasks are identified 

and understood. The mission is translated into specific LF objectives by the CLF, 

objectives that serve as the primary basis for determining the LF scheme of maneuver, fire 

support, organization for combat, formation for landing, landing plan, and logistic support 

requirements. The mission developed by the commander, and as amplified by the 

CONOPS ashore, is the principal means by which the commander ensures that his intent is 

understood and accomplished in detailed planning and execution of the operation. 

(2) Projection of Combat Power Ashore. In the amphibious assault, combat 

power is progressively phased ashore. Initially, the LF is able to employ only a small 

fraction of its total potential power. Tactical operations are initiated by small units that 

are normally only supported by NSFS and attack aircraft. Before long, the preponderance 

of the LF is ashore and functioning as a cohesive organization exerting its maximum 
Chapter III 

III-60 JP 3-02 

combat power. The echelonment reflected in the organization for landing provides for the 

orderly progression and development of combat power. 

For more information on LF echelons see Section D, “Movement.” 

(3) The time required to phase the LF’s combat power ashore depends on many 

factors and the CATF and CLF must develop the OPORD based on best estimates. Some 

of those factors affecting the build up of combat power ashore include the following: 

(a) Degree of adversary interference with the landing. 

(b) Availability, by type and number, of ship-to-shore movement assets. 

(c) Availability by type and number of amphibious ships. 

(d) The location of the transport areas with respect to the beach. 

(e) Capacity (including throughput considerations) of landing beaches and 

LZs. 

(f) Extent of fire support available to the LF prior to establishing organic 

assets ashore. 

(g) Terrain, weather, and sea conditions in the landing area. 

ASSAULT SEQUENCE

ASSAULT

SEQUENCE

Preparation of the landing area by supporting arms

Force Arrives in Operational Area

Mission Accomplishment

Ship-to-shore movement of the landing force

Air and surface assault landings

Link up operations between surface and air landed forces

Provision of supporting arms and logistics and/or combat

service support

Landing of remaining landing force elements

Figure III-8. Assault Sequence 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-61 

(h) Available maneuver space, and trafficability considerations, in the 

landing area. 

(4) Phasing Ashore. The LF will seldom be able to secure control of the 

landward section of the landing area in a single landing. Therefore, the CLF will have to 

phase his units and capabilities ashore during the execution of the OPORD. Intermediate 

objectives and phase lines may be used to coordinate and track the phases of LF operations 

ashore. Phasing can revolve around many mediums: time, (in relation to H-hour, L-hour, or 

D-day), distance (intermediate objectives or phase lines), terrain (crossing of obstacles), or 

event-driven (linkup with helicopterborne forces or seizure of an off shore fire support 

position). Regardless of the method used, the CLF must ensure that the plan is based on 

sound decisions and the capabilities of the LF as a whole. Especially during the landing 

of scheduled waves, the action phase is characterized by decentralized execution of the 

plan by subordinate commanders. The concept for phasing ashore the LF’s combat 

power should plan for the reestablishment of centralized control of the LF. This 

reestablishment of centralized control normally progresses from lower to higher 

echelons successively. 

(a) Support Capabilities of Other Elements of the ATF. In developing 

plans, the CLF must consider all elements of the AF, as well as other forces that will be able 

to support his CONOPS. 

(b) Other Plan Requirements. This publication does not discuss, in detail, 

all the functional planning responsibilities normally associated with an OPLAN. Planning 

factors that do not differ significantly from land combat such as public affairs, civil-military 

operations, information operations, and offensive/defensive operations in general, remain 

valid and they will not be addressed in this chapter. 

d. Landing Force Scheme of Maneuver. The formulation of the scheme of 

maneuver for an amphibious assault is based on the same fundamentals of warfare normally 

associated with all military operations. However, there are a few conditions and 

considerations that may require particular attention. 

(1) The fundamental goal is to introduce the LF ashore to accomplish the 

assigned mission. Normally starting from a zero combat capability ashore, the LF seeks 

the early seizure of key objectives through aggressive offensive action to disrupt adversary 

defenses, permit the rapid landing of supporting units, and contribute to the rapid 

development of full combat power ashore. 

(2) The scheme of maneuver may support the rapid build up of combat 

power ashore vice the immediate seizure of AF objectives. The scheme of maneuver 

may allow the engagement of the adversary on ground chosen by the CLF and at a time that 

gives the LF a marked advantage. 

(3) The landing of the force at separate locations can create problems in 

achievement of mass, with attendant difficulties in C2, fire support, and other functional 
Chapter III 

III-62 JP 3-02 

areas. The CLF can overcome this obstacle by ensuring that the major elements of the LF 

fully understand the mission, commander’s intent, and are task-organized to act 

independently during the early stages of the operation. 

(4) The types of combat units in the LF task organization and their strength 

influence the scheme of maneuver. 

(a) LFs that have organic or attached combat support and CSS capabilities 

are usually better suited for amphibious operations than LFs comprised of infantry units 

alone. 

(b) Armored elements provide substantial combat power and mobility for the 

LF if landed early in the operation. 

(c) Artillery in the AE may be either self-propelled or towed. All Marine 

Corps artillery is towed. The LF may contain Army self-propelled artillery, which is well 

suited for certain conditions and is landed in the same manner as armor. Towed artillery is 

best transported by helicopter until landing craft become available. 

(d) Combat engineer units will normally be attached to infantry and 

mechanized units to provide immediate, responsive, and decentralized support. Later, 

engineer forces may be reorganized to provide direct or general support. 

(e) Air defense units organic to the LF are established ashore early to provide 

for the landward extension of an air defense system. They will be part of the CATF’s 

integrated air defense system until control is phased ashore. 

(5) The LF scheme of maneuver should meet certain key requirements: 

(a) Its primary purpose, should be the seizure of objectives requisite to the 

buildup and establishment of the LF ashore. 

(b) Utilize all avenues of approach proximate to the selected beaches and 

LZs. 

(c) Supportable by NSFS, missiles, and tactical air, especially prior to the 

landing of artillery. 

(d) LF echelons should be capable of initial success without dependence on 

other assault units. 

(e) Provide for the development of mutual support between units as the attack 

progresses. 

(f) Provide for early establishment of combat service support areas (CSSAs) 

as required. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-63 

e. Reserves

(1) Commitment of the reserve in an amphibious assault may be more complex 

than in normal land operations. 

(2) When afloat, the reserve may be delayed pending availability of landing craft, 

amphibious vehicles, or helicopters, plus the time required for debarkation and movement 

ashore. 

(3) Employment of the reserves may delay the movement of other assault 

formations because all elements of the LF must share the same ship-to-shore movement 

assets. 

(4) Landing of the reserve by surface means depends on the availability of landing 

craft as well as a suitable landing beach near the area of intended employment. 

f. Assault Follow-on Echelon Operations. The AFOE is that echelon of the assault 

troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies which, although not needed to initiate the 

assault, are required to support and sustain the assault. The AFOE is normally required 

in the operational area no later than 5 days after commencement of the assault 

landing. 

(1) The AFOE is divided into airlifted and sealifted forces and supplies. Required 

arrival time in theater, suitability of material for air and sea lift, and lift availability, in that 

order, will determine transportation mode. 

(2) The AFOE is organized for landing and embarkation, respectively, based on 

anticipated requirements of operations ashore. Units, personnel, and material configured in 

shipload and planeload lots as dictated by landing and embarkation plans are then organized 

into movement groups. Embarkation plans are prepared by the LF and appropriate 

subordinate commanders containing instructions and information concerning the 

organization for embarkation, assignment to shipping, supplies and equipment to be 

embarked, location and assignment of embarkation areas, control and communication 

arrangements, movement schedules and embarkation sequence, and additional pertinent 

instructions relating to the embarkation of the LF. 

(3) Units and their equipment are marshalled at their home stations and staged at 

POEs in accordance with their time-phased deployment schedules. Materiel arriving from 

logistic sources is assembled at POEs under LF supervision. 

(4) The requirement to containerize AFOE material cannot be 

overemphasized. 

(5) Although the CATF and CLF are responsible for planning and executing 

embarkation, civilian stevedores, contracted by the Military Surface Deployment and 
Chapter III 

III-64 JP 3-02 

Distribution Command at commercial ports and by the Navy and naval installations, are 

used to load common-user shipping provided by the Commander, USTRANSCOM. 

Because of the large number of foreign nationals employed by foreign flag shippers and 

port facilities, it may be necessary for commanders of amphibious transport groups to 

augment port and/or embarked security forces to protect against sabotage of equipment, 

either in port or while embarked. 

(6) Ship unloading is directed by the normal ATF-LF ship-to-shore control and 

support activities (PCO, HDC, TACLOG group, LFSP, etc.). The size and organization of 

these agencies will change as the operation matures. Additional cargo handling battalion 

and amphibious construction battalion forces are required to support the offload of 

merchant ships. As they become accessible, developed seaports and aerial ports are used to 

supplement traditional beach operations, expanding the ship-to-shore organization 

accordingly. The CATF and CLF are responsible for debarkation and offload until 

termination of the amphibious operation. In the case of an amphibious assault, the 

amphibious operation would not normally be terminated until the entire AFOE is ashore. 

At that time, the responsibilities for offload of follow-up material may be passed to another 

offload organization designated by higher authority. 

g. Follow-Up Transport Ships and Aircraft. Follow-up ships and aircraft carry 

reinforcements and stores for use after landing of the AE and AFOE. The CATF will 

assume control of follow-up ships and aircraft upon arrival in the operational area. 

38. Raids 

a. Scope. An amphibious raid is an operation involving a swift incursion into or 

the temporary occupation of an objective to accomplish an assigned mission followed 

by a planned withdrawal. Amphibious raids are conducted as independent operations or 

in support of other operations. Depending on the purpose of the raid, it may be conducted 

using covert insertion means, relying on stealth to approach the objective, or overtly with 

full fire support in a manner that may resemble the early stages of an amphibious assault. 

Generally, amphibious raids are conducted to: 

(1) Destroy certain targets, particularly those that do not lend themselves to 

destruction by other means. 

(2) Harass the enemy by attacks on isolated posts, patrols, or headquarters. 

(3) Capture or kill key personnel. 

(4) Support forces engaged with the enemy by attacking the enemy rear or flank 

positions on a seacoast. 

(5) Obtain information on hydrography, terrain, enemy dispositions, strength, 

movements, and weapons. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-65 

(6) Create a diversion in connection with strategic deception operations. 

(7) Evacuate individuals or materiel. 

(8) Establish, support, or coordinate unconventional warfare activities. 

b. General. Thorough, integrated rehearsals are essential to precision and speed in 

executing a raid. All participating forces must be drilled in every detail of debarkation, 

movement ashore, operations ashore, withdrawal, and reembarkation. An amphibious raid 

is planned and executed in the same general manner as an amphibious assault, except that a 

raid always includes a provision for withdrawal of the raiding force. The following factors 

must be considered when planning an amphibious raid: 

(1) The size of the raid force is normally limited to the essential number of 

personnel required to accomplish the mission. This increases the chance of maintaining 

security, achieving surprise at the objective, and facilitates rapid withdrawal upon 

completion of the mission. 

(2) It may be unnecessary for selected beaches or LZs to meet all the 

requirements of an amphibious assault. Beaches or LZs may be chosen to ensure tactical 

surprise or facilitate withdrawal. 

(3) A raid will be of limited duration. 

(4) The objective, and nature and duration of the operation may simplify logistic 

requirements. 

c. Planning Considerations. The following must be considered when planning a 

raid: 

(1) Surprise is an essential ingredient in the success of an amphibious raid and 

offsets the lack of logistic and fire support normally associated with amphibious operations. 

(2) Security during the planning and execution of a raid must receive particular 

attention, to include full exploitation of deceptive measures. Such deceptive measures may 

take the form of elaborate cover plans or may be confined to simple ruses. 

(3) The following factors will influence the choice of landing areas for the raid 

force. 

(a) Enemy disposition. 

(b) Sea approaches. 

(c) Hydrographic and beach characteristics. 
Chapter III 

III-66 JP 3-02 

(d) Availability of LZs. 

(e) Avenues of approach to the objective and beach exits. 

(4) The estimated time that the raiding force will have to be ashore may influence 

the choice of H-hour and, consequently, the conditions of visibility under which the raiding 

force may be landed and withdrawn. It will likewise affect the scope of logistic 

arrangements. 

(5) Purpose of the raid, including its relation to other concurrent or imminent 

operations that it may support, will influence the selection of D-day for the raid. In addition, 

these same factors may affect the availability of shipping, aircraft, and logistic and fire 

support means for the raid. 

(6) Planning for the embarkation of forces assigned to participate in an 

amphibious raid is similar to preparation for the amphibious assault, including consideration 

of OPSEC measures. 

(7) Fire support planning is similar to that for an amphibious assault, except that, 

where surprise is a major factor, supporting fires usually are withheld and EMCON is 

maintained until surprise is lost. 

(8) Planning for ship-to-shore movement is generally similar to that for an 

amphibious assault except movement may be made entirely by rotary-wing or tilt-rotor 

aircraft, raiding craft, or LCACs. 

(9) Withdrawal must be planned in detail, including provisions as to time and 

place for re-embarkation. If the landing point and withdrawal point are not the same, 

positive means of location and identification of the latter must be established. Special 

situations may permit planning for withdrawal of the raiding force directly into friendly 

territory without re-embarkation. Withdrawal by air may be possible when the area of the 

raid includes a usable airfield or terrain suitable for landing VTOL aircraft. Detailed 

planning must include provisions for an alternate extraction method in the event of 

inclement weather. One consideration may be to have the raid force remain ashore in a 

hiding position until extraction can be executed. 

39. Demonstrations 

a. Scope. The amphibious demonstration is intended to confuse the enemy as to 

time, place, or strength of the main operation. Amphibious demonstrations may be 

conducted in conjunction with other deception operations in order to delude or confuse the 

enemy. In the operational area, an amphibious demonstration may be conducted in or near 

the landing area in conjunction with an amphibious assault. In still other cases, a 

demonstration may be conducted outside the operational area by forces not attached to the 

main amphibious effort to divert or immobilize enemy strategic reserve forces that could 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-67 

threaten the amphibious assault. Likewise, the demonstration could be used to divert 

enemy attention from other operations. 

b. General. Effectiveness of a demonstration increases in direct proportion to the 

degree of realism involved in its execution. The enemy must be convinced that a LF is 

preparing for an amphibious landing. All visible, audible, and electronic aspects of the 

demonstration must appear to be authentic. A demonstration normally includes the 

approach of forces to the demonstration area, at least a part of the ship-to-shore movement, 

and employment of supporting fires. A brief but intense preliminary bombardment will 

usually be more effective than deliberate harassing fire over longer periods of time. A 

communications deception plan will be used. SOF and tactical deception units may be 

employed. 

c. Demonstrations Within the Operational Area. An amphibious demonstration 

may be conducted by a portion of the force within the operational area when it is intended 

to influence enemy action within that area. The intended purpose may be to cause the 

enemy to employ its reserves improperly, to disclose weapon positions by inducing 

premature firing, to distract attention, to place an early burden on communications system, 

to precipitate a general air or naval engagement, or to harass. The decision to conduct such 

a demonstration is made during the planning phase, in consultation with supporting 

commanders as appropriate. 

d. Demonstrations Outside the Operational Area. An amphibious demonstration 

may be conducted outside the operational area to divert or immobilize enemy strategic 

reserves or other forces capable of affecting the amphibious operation, to distract hostile 

attention from such an operation, or to precipitate a general air or naval engagement. Such 

a demonstration may be executed as a supporting operation by a separate AF. The time and 

place of the demonstration is decided by the JFC or higher authority based on the 

recommendations by the CATF and CLF. 

e. Demonstrations in Support of Other Operations. An amphibious demonstration 

may be conducted with the intent of supporting other operations in the theater or designated 

operational area. A demonstration conducted before, during, or after commencement of 

another operation may distract the attention of enemy commanders and induce the enemy to 

divert major resources. 

f. Planning Considerations. In planning amphibious demonstrations, consideration 

must be given to the following: 

(1) Location. The demonstration area must be near enough to the main effort to 

permit subsequent employment of the demonstration force if that force is required for 

subsequent operations. On the other hand, it will be sufficiently separated from the main 

effort to avoid interference and to ensure that the enemy will be materially delayed in 

repositioning forces. The demonstration area must be suitable for an actual landing, for 

only in such an area can the threat of landing be plausible. The demonstration area should 

appear to be a viable threat to the enemy; otherwise the enemy may not react. An alternate 
Chapter III 

III-68 JP 3-02 

landing area will often prove suitable for demonstration purposes. If the purpose of the 

demonstration is to cause the enemy to prematurely disclose its positions or for harassment, 

it may be conducted prior to execution. 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS DURING THE GULF WAR 

During the Gulf War, an additional dimension of deception activity, 

besides masking the stealthy relocation of the coalition line, was the 

demonstration of amphibious assault capabilities. As part of this 

ruse, an impressive amphibious assault task force was stationed 

conspicuously off the coast of Kuwait. This fleet was comprised of 

forty amphibious landing craft, the largest such force to be assembled 

since Inchon. The force contained the most up-to-date, equipmentladen amphibious ships, as well as aircraft, and helicopter airlift. 

Battleships provided offshore artillery support. For movement to the 

beach, these forces were equipped with new LVTP-7s (landing, 

vehicle, track, personnel), LCAC (landing craft, air cushion) hovercraft, 

and CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters. In short, this was a powerful 

and credible force stationed threateningly close to the Iraqi defenses 

along the coast. 

To solidify what must have been the Iraqi military’s predicted axis of 

attack, USCENTCOM [US Central Command] regularly made 

references to the press concerning the training capabilities and 

presence of the amphibious force in the Persian Gulf and, later, off the 

coast of Kuwait. On 1 February, Newsweek magazine carried a beach 

assault in the news about a large-scale amphibious invasion. To keep 

the idea of a beach assault in the news, large-scale amphibious 

rehearsals were conducted, including, notable, the one held during the 

last 10 days of January in which 8,000 US Marines landed on the coast 

of Oman. Moreover, during this period, Navy SEALs (sea-air-land 

teams) carried out numerous missions along the Kuwaiti coast to 

gather information on the beach gradients and firmness of the sand, 

the nature and location of minefields, and the disposition of enemy 

forces. Carrier air and naval artillery missions were also executed 

throughout the period to support suspicions of a major coalition 

amphibious assault. 

So that Iraqi commanders would continue to anticipate an amphibious 

attack, US amphibious support vessels along the coast remained 

positioned as if threatening to attack, and the battleships Missouri and 

Wisconsin and carrier-based aircraft continued bombardments. The 

object was to fix the six Iraqi infantry divisions deployed along the 

shoreline, and this was achieved. Iraqi strategists made no early effort 

to withdraw their forces from the coastal defense works, with the 

consequence that those forces were rapidly pinned against the coast 

by the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, which had broken through the 

lines in the south. 

SOURCE: Deception: Deceiving the Enemy in 

Operation DESERT STORM, Thomas M. Huber, 1992 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-69 

(2) Timing. The timing of a demonstration conducted in support of another 

operation must be coordinated to achieve the maximum desired level of reaction from the 

enemy force. 

(a) Prior to Main Operation. A demonstration before the main operation is 

conducted to: 

1. Draw enemy forces to the demonstration area and away from the area 

of the main operation. 

2. Cause the enemy to disclose its positions. 

3. Provide protracted and systematic harassment. 

4. Divert the attention of the enemy from the main operation. 

5. Cause premature commitment of enemy forces. 

(b) Simultaneously with Main Operation. A demonstration may 

commence at the same time as the main operation if it is desired to prevent redeployment of 

enemy forces and delude the enemy as to the location of the main operation. 

(c) Subsequent to Main Operation. A demonstration may be conducted 

subsequent to the main operation to divert enemy forces or fire from the point of the main 

effort. Successive demonstrations may be executed at a number of points after the main 

operation commences. 

(3) Forces. The demonstration force must appear to be of such composition and 

size as to cause the desired reaction. When the demonstration force is constituted from 

within the AF, the LF reserve and the shipping in which it is embarked may be employed if 

the presence of the reserve is not required in the immediate area of the main landing. 

(4) Supporting Arms. The demonstration force will execute supporting fires of a 

nature and scope that ensures credibility. Factors that may serve to limit the amount of 

supporting fires are the availability of NSFS ships, aircraft, and ammunition supply. 

(5) Rehearsals. Sufficient rehearsals will be held to ensure that the 

demonstration will be realistic. 

g. Action. The demonstration must occur over a long enough period to allow the 

enemy to react. The movement of waves toward the beach or LZs must be conducted as a 

normal ship-to-shore movement, except that boat waves normally do not actually beach and 

VTOL aircraft waves do not land. Empty landing craft must maintain sufficient distance 

from the beach to preclude close enemy observation. At a prearranged time or distance 

from the beach or VLZ, or on signal, the boat waves and VTOL aircraft waves withdraw. 
Chapter III 

III-70 JP 3-02 

On completion of the demonstration, the demonstration force is dissolved and its elements 

are reassigned in accordance with the OPORD or OPLAN. 

40. Withdrawals 

a. Scope. Amphibious withdrawals are operations conducted to extract forces by 

sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore. They may be conducted 

under enemy pressure, under operational urgency to obtain forces needed elsewhere, or to 

remove forces whose mission is completed. Withdrawal begins with establishment of 

defensive measures in the embarkation area and ends when all elements of the force have 

been extracted and embarked on designated shipping. 

b. Characteristics. While sharing many traits of the amphibious assault, the 

amphibious withdrawal embraces the following distinguishing characteristics: 

(1) Except in the case of withdrawals associated with amphibious raids, planning 

processes will usually be abbreviated. 

(2) Time available to execute will be limited when enemy action against the LF 

being withdrawn is substantial or when the requirement for forces elsewhere is urgent. 

(3) Facilities and equipment for embarkation, available fire support means, and 

means for C2 of the withdrawal may be limited. 

(4) The operation may be conducted under adverse weather conditions or 

unfavorable terrain or hydrographic features. 

(5) The force to be withdrawn may not have been inserted by an amphibious 

operation and units may be unfamiliar with amphibious procedures, thus significantly 

complicating the operation. 

(6) Additionally, there may be the requirement to evacuate significant numbers of 

foreign nationals for diplomatic/humanitarian needs. 

c. Execution. The amphibious withdrawal is normally executed in the following 

general sequence of steps. 

(1) Establish defense of the embarkation area by air, naval, and ground covering 

forces while organizing and embarking LF personnel, supplies, and equipment not required 

for support of operations ashore. It is important to maintain local air and maritime 

superiority to ensure the success of the withdrawal. 

(2) Progressively reduce troop strength and quantity of materiel and equipment 

ashore under protection of air, naval, and ground covering forces. Depending on limitations 

in afloat cargo capacity and loading time, all usable military materiel is either evacuated or 

destroyed. During this phase, specific provisions are made for the evacuation of casualties. 
Conduct of Amphibious Operations 

III-71 

(3) Withdraw the ground covering force. Consideration must be given to the 

difficulty of embarking heavy elements such as artillery and armor. 

d. Supporting Arms. As in the amphibious assault, defense of an embarkation area 

on a hostile or potentially hostile shore requires closely coordinated employment of all 

available supporting arms. Procedures used in the coordination are essentially the same in 

both cases. The primary difference is that in the assault, supporting arms and control 

facilities are progressively built up ashore, whereas in a withdrawal, supporting arms and 

control facilities are progressively decreased ashore until all functions are performed afloat. 

e. Embarkation Procedures

(1) If embarkation is preparatory to immediate reemployment of the force, 

planning for embarkation of forces is conducted in accordance with normal planning 

procedures, as set forth in JP 3-02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation. Combat 

loading will be employed in preparation for a subsequent amphibious operation. Combat 

loading is the arrangement of personnel and the stowage of equipment and supplies in a 

manner designed to conform to the anticipated tactical operation of the organization 

embarked. Each individual item is stowed so that it can be unloaded at the required time. 

Embarkation for movement to base areas will normally employ administrative loading. 

(2) Initial size of the embarkation area depends on several factors, such as: 

(a) Terrain essential for defense in the event that the embarkation is 

conducted under enemy pressure. 

(b) Number of personnel (potentially including friendly indigenous 

population) and amount of equipment and supplies to be embarked. 

(c) Artillery, NSFS, and air support available for defense. 

(d) Nature and extent of usable beaches. 

(e) Time available for the embarkation. 

41. Amphibious Support to Other Operations 

 Amphibious forces routinely contribute to conflict prevention and crisis 

mitigation. Although beyond the scope of this publication, these may include operations 

such as security cooperation, FHA, civil support, NEOs, peace operations, recovery 

operations, or disaster relief. 

a. Amphibious forces are particularly well suited to conduct many types of these

operations. Their ability to operate either OTH or within sight of land provides an ability 

to demonstrate a varying degree of US force presence. Task-organized elements, precisely 
Chapter III 

III-72 JP 3-02 

tailored for specific missions, can be inserted, employed, and withdrawn to meet specific 

military or diplomatic objectives. The ability to operate from a sea base reduces the overall 

“footprint” ashore, thus reducing the potential diplomatic impact as well as reducing the 

potential threat to the force. The maneuverability of sea-based forces also allows them to 

conduct operations over a large area. Finally, the ship-to-shore movement capability and 

the ability to shelter, feed, and provide medical care provides maritime forces with a unique 

capability to conduct a NEO.

b. The Afloat Pre-positioning Force. Because of the large and varied quantity of 

supplies and equipment embarked, MSC’s APF is particularly well suited to support FHA 

operations. 

c. Characteristics. Amphibious forces must be prepared for involvement in a wide 

range of operations. In general, operations focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, 

promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. In 

addition, these forces may be only one of many participating US and foreign government or 

nongovernmental organizations. As a result, these operations normally have more 

restrictive ROE. The goal is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and 

conclude operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. 
CHAPTER IV 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST COASTAL DEFENSES 

IV-1 

“A comparison of the several landings leads to the inescapable conclusion that 

landings should not be attempted in the face of organized resistance if, by any 

combination of march or maneuver, it is possible to land unopposed within striking 

distance of the objective.” 

Major General A.A. Vandegrift, US Marine Corps 

Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, 1 July 1943 

1. General 

 Coastal defenses against amphibious operations have become a military necessity for a 

number of countries considered a threat to regional stability and national interests. 

Enemies often employ integrated antilanding capabilities that have evolved 

incorporating the use of land, sea, air, and, in some cases, space assets. These 

capabilities involve integration of reconnaissance, long-range interdiction by air and sea 

forces, and a combined arms ground force at the beach. Central to most antilanding 

defenses is the use of littoral mine warfare. In most cases adversaries will employ mines 

as an economy of force defensive measure. In addition, some countries may base their 

coastal defense on the threatened employment of CBRN weapons or may integrate CBRN 

weapons into their existing coastal defense. The preferred tactic for AFs operating 

against countries or organizations employing coastal defenses is to avoid, bypass, or 

exploit gaps in these defenses whenever possible. However, operational limitations may 

preclude this tactic and a breach of these defenses may be required. 

2. Antilanding Doctrine 

 Coastal defenses depend on the hydrography, terrain, resources, development time 

available, and ingenuity of the antagonists. Antilanding doctrine usually focuses on the 

development of four layered barriers within the littorals. These barriers are under 

observation and covered by shore-based fires. Because of the littoral nature of these 

barriers, they generally fall within the hydrographic description of shallow water (up to 200 

feet in depth). The four barriers from the littorals to land are perimeter, main, engineer, and 

beach. 

a. Perimeter Barrier. The first littoral barrier encountered is the perimeter minefield. 

This minefield, located at the maximum range of ground-based covering fires, is 

intended to delay and break up the ATF. Covering fire is used to protect defensive 

barriers from assault forces attempts to breach those barriers. Delay at the perimeter 

minefield could allow coastal defenses time for final preparation and movement of reserves 

to potential landing beaches. Antiship cruise missiles and coastal artillery may provide 

covering fires. Electric and diesel submarines and aircraft may attempt to attack the AF. 

b. Main Barrier. The main barrier holds the primary minefield. The minefield 

may be approximately two (2) to three (3) nms off the coast and is intended to deny the 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-02 

maneuver of ATF ships and landing craft during ship-to-shore movement. Land-based 

artillery, air-defense systems, and possibly small boats and aircraft cover the main barrier. 

c. Engineer Barrier. The engineer barrier is located at or near the shoreline and 

contains both minefields and obstacles. The engineer barrier is often laid in very shallow 

water (VSW) from 40 to 10 feet of water and the SZ from 10 feet of water to the high water 

mark. Installed by ground force engineers, the barrier targets landing craft and amphibious 

vehicles and attempts to deny access to the beach. Land-based artillery, air defense 

systems, and crew-served weapons cover the engineer barrier. 

d. Beach Barrier. The beach barrier canalizes the LF for counterattacks by 

tactical reserve forces. Minefields and obstacles are placed along avenues of egress off the 

beach and in front of defended positions. Land-based artillery, air defense systems, and 

crew-served weapons all provide support to a counterattack by the reserve. 

3. Amphibious Breach of Coastal Defenses 

a. AFs should request national and theater collection assets to conduct reconnaissance 

and surveillance of the defended coastal area to determine the best landing area to conduct 

the breach. The collection request should focus on location of mines, obstacles, and enemy 

locations in the area, to include air, naval, and ground forces. Also key is the compatibility 

of the beach and the suitability of the area for available landing craft and vehicles, including 

maneuver area, tidal levels, and incline. 

Minefields and obstacles are placed along avenues of egress off the beach 

and in front of defended positions.
Amphibious Operations Against Coastal Defenses 

IV-3 

b. Mine Threat. Because adversaries proliferate the use of mines into which they 

have incorporated new technology, current information on a potential adversary’s mine 

resources is crucial to planning. The types, characteristics, numbers, and storage locations 

of mines as well as the transportation assets and at-sea delivery capability are vital 

information. 

c. Operational Area Characteristics. Efforts required to clear, remove, or sweep a 

minefield depend significantly on the mined area’s physical environment. Water depth 

and beach characteristics are key factors. Significant ocean currents increase the difficulty 

of sweeping moored mines. Tidal ranges expose mines in VSW, making them easy to 

detect but placing a burden on clearing teams to finish their task within a prescribed time 

limit. Knowing their precise locations aid assault breaching efforts. Natural and man-made 

obstacles also hinder breaching operations. High densities of mine-like objects on the 

bottom complicate operations. Once the landing area is chosen, the coastal defenses in the 

vicinity are degraded to the desired level through supporting, advance force, and preassault 

operations conducted by AF and other forces, to include the full spectrum of MCM forces 

(if not part of advance forces) and the advance force. 

Refer to Chapter V, “Support to Amphibious Operations,” for information on supporting 

and advance force operations. 

d. Local air and maritime superiority in the operational area is required in order for the 

MCM forces to commence operations. Supporting operations may also be conducted for 

proactive MCM and to wear down land forces. 

e. Proactive MCM. If ROE permit, MCM is best accomplished by destruction of 

mines prior to their deployment. Proactive MCM includes lethal and nonlethal attacks 

on production and storage facilities, transportation assets, and forces used to plant 

mines. A key consideration in any potential littoral conflict is the establishment of ROE 

that allow for early, aggressive, and proactive MCM operations. 

f. MCM Forces. The time required for MCM operations will usually require MCM 

forces to commence operations prior to the arrival of the AF and, potentially, the advance 

force. MCM forces are extremely vulnerable and will require constant protection 

from hostile forces. Due to the limited assets available for an MCM operation, the CATF 

will need to prioritize the MCM effort in the operational area. There should also be an 

awareness that MCM operations have the potential to compromise the OPSEC of the 

impending amphibious operation. Appropriate consideration or measures should be 

implemented to minimize the operational impact. Two primary MCM techniques are mine 

hunting and minesweeping. 

(1) Mine Hunting. During mine hunting, the MCM platform uses its available 

assets to detect, classify, identify, and neutralize all mine-like contacts found. In favorable 

hydrographic conditions, mine hunting is the preferred method for conducting enabling 

MCM. Mine hunting does not require specific knowledge of the mine threat and provides a 

means to estimate the remaining risk to transiting vessels. 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-02 

(2) Minesweeping. Minesweeping is the technique of clearing mines using either 

mechanical, explosive, or influence sweep equipment. Mechanical sweeping removes, 

disturbs, or otherwise neutralizes the mine; explosive sweeping causes sympathetic 

detonations in, damages, or displaces the mine; and influence sweeping produces either the 

acoustic and/or magnetic influence required to detonate the mine. It is performed at slightly 

faster speeds than hunting, but its success is largely a factor of environmental conditions 

and the intelligence data available. Minesweeping does not allow the MCM commander 

(MCMC) to accurately estimate the remaining risk. 

See JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 

4. Integrated Mine Countermeasures and Amphibious Breaching Operations 

a. Responsibility. The MCMC, who is usually subordinate to the CATF upon the 

arrival of the AF in the operational area, is responsible for planning all MCM and breaching 

operations and conducting MCM operations including breaching outer mine barriers from 

deep water, 200 feet and deeper, to the beginning of the SZ, the 10-foot contour depth. The 

CATF is responsible for conducting assault breaching operations from the SZ to the beach 

exit. The assault breaching mission is conducted and coordinated with the LF CONOPS 

through the SACC. Airspace synchronization and control procedures are provided by the 

Navy TACC. The CLF is responsible for conducting mine and obstacle breaching and 

clearing operations from the beach exit inland and follow-on clearance operations on the 

beach. MCM and amphibious breaching operations must be synchronized. Lane 

requirements of the landing force and mine or obstacle construction will dictate size and 

composition of the amphibious breach force. During assault breaching efforts involving 

munitions, large lane widths exponentially increase the number of weapons required to 

neutralize beach obstacles and mines. The CLF must carefully consider the SZ lane widths, 

the requirement for surprise, and the tactical needs of the landing force when relying upon 

delivered munitions. 

b. Fundamentals. Suppression, obscuration, security, reduction, and deception are 

fundamentals that must be applied to amphibious breaching operations to ensure success. 

(1) Suppression. Effective suppression is the mission-critical task during any 

breaching operation. Suppression protects forces reducing and maneuvering through the 

obstacle and fixes the enemy in position. Suppressive fires include the full range of lethal 

and nonlethal fires from NSFS and CAS to electronic attack (EA). 

(2) Obscuration. Obscuration hampers enemy observation and TA, and conceals 

friendly activities and movement. EA prevents the enemy use of radar and radio signals to 

observe and report the operation. 

(3) Security. Support forces prevent the enemy from interfering with obstacle 

reduction and the passage of the assault waves through the breach lanes. Security must be 

effective against coastal defenses and counterattack forces. Vertical assault forces may 
Amphibious Operations Against Coastal Defenses 

IV-5 

seize and deny routes of ingress into the landing area to prevent the counterattack of the 

landing beaches. 

(4) Reduction. Reduction forces, normally composed of ATF and LF elements, 

and supported by tactical aviation dropping precision guided assault breaching munitions, 

create lanes through the mines and obstacles, allowing the assault waves to pass. The 

location of lanes depends largely on identified weaknesses in the mine and obstacle belt. If 

the AF cannot find gaps or weak coverage in the obstacles, they will apply concentrated 

force at a designated point to rupture the defense and create a gap. Units reducing the 

obstacle mark the lane and report the obstacle type, location, and lane locations to higher 

headquarters. Lanes are handed over to follow-on forces who further reduce or clear the 

obstacles, if required. 

(5) Deception. Deception operations are a necessity during assault breaching 

efforts. Large lane sizes demand large numbers of weapons and multiple aircraft passes to 

clear the SZ prior to the assault. This may draw immediate attention to the LF unless 

alternate lanes are brought under fire as well. 

5. Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments 

 The employment or threat of use of CBRN weapons or the intentional release of toxic 

industrial materials (TIMs), pose unique challenges for AFs when planning and conducting 

amphibious operations. The CBRN threat occurs across the full range of military 

operations. Recent improvements in missile technology that have increased the range and 

precision of weapons capable of carrying bulk CBRN materials, together with the use of 

mines and barriers to canalize or impede the AFs, has amplified our potential vulnerability 

to a CBRN attack. These trends are requiring AF commanders to always consider the 

potential impact of enemy CBRN weapon employment when planning and conducting 

amphibious operations. Commanders must maintain a clear understanding of potential 

CBRN threats, and planning must include measures to minimize associated AF 

vulnerabilities. 

Refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments. 

a. Responsibilities. The AF must be capable of efficiently and effectively 

continuing its operations in a CBRN threat environment. Within the AF, the CATF is 

responsible for CBRN defense of the forces afloat, including the LF while embarked. The 

CLF is responsible for CBRN defense of the landing force once ashore. 

b. Planning Considerations. AF commanders address potential CBRN threats during 

the planning phase. 

 

(1) Advanced CBRN Defense Planning. CBRN defense plans include 

provisions for the following: 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-02 

(a) Requesting supporting operations to eliminate or reduce an adversary’s 

CBRN capabilities within the operational area prior to the arrival of the AF. 

(b) Planning advance force operations to further degrade an adversary’s 

CBRN capabilities and to detect contaminated areas that may interfere with the CONOPS. 

(c) Planning offensive and defensive actions taken by the AF to minimize the 

vulnerability to and mitigate the effects of CBRN attacks, to include the development of 

branches and sequels. 

(2) The AF’s joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

(JIPOE) process must address the capabilities and limitations of an adversary’s CBRN 

weapons and delivery systems; their C2 and release procedures; and indicators of intent to 

employ CBRN weapons. The AF commanders should provide target planning and 

execution guidance using the full extent of actions allowed by the ROE based on the desired 

effects needed against the adversary’s CBRN weapons, delivery means, and C2 capabilities 

to support achievement of the objectives. 

(3) The principles of CBRN defense must be factored into planning and 

specifically address the hazards created by CBRN weapons: avoidance of CBRN and TIM 

hazards, particularly contamination, protection of individuals and units from unavoidable 

CBRN and TIM hazards, and required decontamination in order to restore operational 

capability. Application of these principles (see Figure IV-1), helps to minimize 

vulnerabilities, protect the AF, and maintain the operational tempo in order to achieve the 

AF objectives. 

(4) CBRN Contamination Avoidance. CBRN contamination avoidance 

prevents the disruption of the amphibious operation by eliminating unnecessary time in 

elevated protective postures (see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments) and minimizing decontamination 

requirements. Avoiding contamination requires the ability to recognize the presence or 

absence of CBRN and TIM hazards in the air, on water, land, personnel, equipment, and 

facilities, at both long and short range. Supporting and advance force operations should 

provide for long-range surveillance and detection capabilities focusing on such areas as the 

landing beaches, HLZs, LF objectives, and the AF objectives. Pre-assault operations and 

actions taken throughout the remainder of the amphibious operation should provide for 

short-range surveillance and detection capabilities in support of the LF units operating 

ashore and ATF ships within the sea echelon area. 

(5) CBRN Protection. Specific actions required of the ATF and LF before, 

during, and after CBRN attacks should be clearly communicated and rehearsed. CBRN 

protection conserves the force by providing individual and collective protection capabilities 

essential to mitigating the effects of CBRN hazards. Protecting the force from CBRN 

hazards may include preventing or reducing individual and collective exposures, and 

applying medical prophylaxes. Individual protection also includes measures to protect 

equipment, vehicles and supplies. 
Amphibious Operations Against Coastal Defenses 

IV-7 

(a) Individual Protection. Commanders must adopt a mission-oriented 

protective posture (MOPP) to establish flexible force readiness levels for individual CBRN 

protection, ensure the force has received pre-treatments and immunizations as required, and 

has available antidotes and other medical treatments to survive the effects of the CBRN 

threats. MOPP analysis (the process of determining a recommended MOPP) integrates 

CBRN protection requirements — derived from CBRN threat assessments — with mission 

requirements in light of the performance degradation caused by wearing protective 

equipment. The LF and ATF personnel manning flight decks, well decks, and landing craft, 

as well as operating ashore (such as beachmaster units), require individual protective 

equipment and must be capable of operating in MOPP-levels commensurate with the threat. 

Likewise, individual equipment, vehicles and supplies gain considerable protection from 

covers. These covers may be as simple as thick plastic sheathing, which should provide 

immediate protection against large-scale use of liquid chemical agents. 

PRINCIPLES OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE

AVOIDANCE

Anticipate; use intelligence preparation of the operational

environment, sensors; avoid hazards BEFORE

contamination affects operations

PROTECTION

Apply individual and collective protection, as

appropriate, to conserve combat power

DECONTAMINATION

Decontaminate (immediate, operational, or

thorough) when needed to restore combat power

Figure IV-1. Principles of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-02 

For additional information on individual protection see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments, and Field Manual (FM) 

3-11.21/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-37.2C, Multi-Service Tactics 

Techniques and Procedures for CBRN Consequence Management Operations. 

(b) Collective Protection. Sustaining operations in CBRN environments 

may require collective protection equipment, which provides a toxic-free area for 

conducting operations and performing life support functions such as rest, relief, and medical 

treatment. When collective protection is not available ashore, plans must be developed, 

exercised, and evaluated to move personnel to alternative toxic-free areas afloat that are 

well away from contaminated areas ashore. 

(6) Decontamination. When contamination avoidance is not possible, 

decontamination supports the post-attack restoration of the AF and the resumption of 

operations to a near-normal capability. Decontamination is intended to minimize the time 

required to return personnel and mission-essential equipment to a mission-capable state. 

Because decontamination may be labor and logistic intensive and assets are limited, the AF 

commanders must prioritize requirements and decontaminate only what is necessary. 

Commanders may choose to defer decontamination of some items and, depending on agent 

type and weather conditions, opt to either defer use of equipment or allow natural 

weathering effects (temperature, wind, salt water, and sunlight) to reduce hazards. 

Decontamination is organized into four categories that reflect operational urgency: 

immediate, operational, thorough, and clearance. In order to maintain the operational 

tempo, the AF uses immediate and operational decontamination to the maximum extent 

possible until the AF objectives are secured. During an operational pause, thorough 

decontamination is conducted. Clearance decontamination is accomplished following the 

cessation of hostilities in preparation for force reconstitution and return to garrison. For 

more information refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. Service publications provide detailed tactics, techniques, 

and procedures for the technical aspects of decontamination. 
CHAPTER V 

SUPPORT TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 

V-1 

“For the whole reason-for-being of all military intelligence personnel is to facilitate 

accomplishment of the mission, and to save lives. When they fail, all the wrong 

people are hurt.” 

Stedman Chandler and Robert W. Robb 

Front-Line Intelligence 

1. General 

a. Supporting operations may set the conditions for the advance force to move into 

the operational area and are enablers that support the execution of the amphibious 

operation. These operations are conducted by forces other than the AF and need to be 

thoroughly coordinated. Examples of supporting operations are: 

(1) Military deception operations to influence the actions of adversary forces. 

(2) Interdiction operations to isolate the landing area. 

(3) Destruction of specific targets ashore. 

(4) Defensive counterair, undersea warfare, and surface warfare operations to gain 

local air and maritime superiority prior to combat operations in the operational area. 

(5) Psychological operations. 

(6) Mine hunting, minesweeping, or minelaying. 

(7) Information operations. 

(8) Irregular warfare. 

b. Support for amphibious operations can be broken down into intelligence, fire 

support, communications, logistics, protection, and seabasing. 

SECTION A. INTELLIGENCE 

2. Introduction 

a. Amphibious Operations Intelligence 

(1) Amphibious operations involve extensive planning in all functional areas to 

ensure that ships, aircraft, landing craft, and supporting fires are synchronized to arrive at 

specific points at specific times to take advantage of enemy critical vulnerabilities and 

expedite combat power build-up and sustainment ashore. This requires comprehensive 
Chapter V 

V-2 JP 3-02 

JIPOE, including harmonization of intelligence and operational planners to ensure that 

COAs are feasible and that enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and COGs are identified and 

taken into consideration. 

(2) Amphibious operations have been characterized as the most complex and 

difficult of military operations; however, the basic nature of intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance (ISR) does not change in amphibious operations. Depending on the 

size and duration of the operation, the AF commander may direct either a joint intelligence 

support element (JISE) or an operational level joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) be 

established to support the AF. The JISE or JIOC will be the central node in securing theater 

and/or national level intelligence support for the AF, and provide direct intelligence support 

to AF components. Amphibious operations differ from other military operations because of 

the significant challenges posed by relatively fewer AF ISR assets in the operational area 

during the planning phase, a heavy initial reliance on national and theater collection assets, 

the transition to shore, and the ability to provide predictive analysis to compensate for 

relatively longer periods of uncertainty. 

For more information, see JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military 

Operations. 

b. Required ISR Capabilities. The following intelligence capabilities are required to 

support amphibious operations: 

(1) Detailed terrain and hydrographic analysis to identify suitable zones of entry 

(e.g., beaches, HLZs, DZs). 

(2) Interoperable information systems that provide timely dissemination of 

information for amphibious planning and rehearsals. 

(3) Standoff collection assets capable of satisfying ATF and LF requirements 

from OTH. 

(4) Intelligence dissemination systems linking widely dispersed forces afloat and 

ashore. 

(5) Flexible intelligence assets capable of rapidly transitioning ashore with 

minimal degradation of support. 

c. Intelligence Process 

(1) Planning and Direction. There are a number of unique intelligence 

considerations for amphibious operations. During the embarked planning phase, the ATF 

and LF intelligence officers direct their personnel from the intelligence center established 

aboard amphibious shipping to support the intelligence needs of the entire AF. The 

intelligence center brings together all AF intelligence-related activities. While personnel 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-3 

and material remain organic to their respective commands, they may task-organize to 

perform intelligence work necessary for completion of the mission. 

(2) Collection. AF intelligence requirements are serviced by all available assets 

(national to organic). These assets collect information in denied and remote areas without 

compromising OPSEC and perform missions at significant distances from embarked forces. 

The small number of these systems and their inherent limitations often result in an 

incomplete intelligence picture. Advance force or pre-assault collection operations are 

often required to confirm and further develop the operational picture. An aggressive 

pre-assault intelligence effort will provide support for target selection however, the effort 

must ensure that collection operations do not expose the commander’s intent. 

(3) Processing and Exploitation. Individual intelligence sections will normally 

concentrate on their particular areas of expertise, satisfying their units’ requirements while 

contributing a broad-scope product to the general intelligence production effort. For 

example, LF intelligence could analyze the land operational environment, to include the 

enemy’s C2, ground forces, logistics, and reserves, while ATF intelligence could analyze 

enemy maritime forces and coastal defense threats. Air threats could be analyzed from a 

combined AF perspective. 

(4) Analysis and Production. During the analysis and production phase, all 

available processed information is integrated, analyzed, evaluated, and interpreted to create 

products that will satisfy the AF commanders’ requirements. Intelligence products are 

generally placed in one of eight categories: JIPOE; indications and warning; current 

intelligence; general military intelligence; target intelligence; scientific and technical 

intelligence; counterintelligence; and estimative intelligence. 

(5) Dissemination and Integration. Intelligence dissemination and integration 

during amphibious operations presents significant challenges. AF and supporting forces 

can be widely dispersed and may not assemble until late in the planning phase, if at all. 

Advances in technology have improved intelligence dissemination between afloat forces, 

but limitations still exist in the quantity and quality of intelligence exchanged. The 

immense volume of data required overtaxes communications and intelligence systems, to 

include critical graphic products that must be distributed during the planning phase. 

Intelligence officers at all levels, working in coordination with unit operations and 

communications-information systems officers, must develop plans that provide 

dissemination of actionable intelligence in a timely manner to all elements of the AF. Units 

located on ships not equipped with the latest C2, communications, or intelligence systems 

will be a high priority. Rather than an end of a process, the integration of intelligence is a 

continuous dialogue between the user and the producer. 

(6) Evaluation and Feedback. During the evaluation and feedback phase, 

intelligence personnel at all levels assess how each phase of the intelligence process is 

being performed. Commanders and staffs throughout the AF provide feedback if they are 

not receiving timely, accurate, usable, complete, and relevant information to support the 
Chapter V 

V-4 JP 3-02 

operation. Within the intelligence center, the AF intelligence officers are also evaluating 

the intelligence process to improve performance. 

d. Key Intelligence Activities 

(1) Mission Analysis

(a) The AF will develop preliminary intelligence studies and estimates 

upon receipt of the initiating directive or on being alerted for the potential operation. 

Preliminary planning may include an analysis of the operational area and the possible 

impact of terrain, hydrography, weather, traffic patterns of the local populations, and 

cultural features on the proposed operation. The most favorable areas for executing the 

landing are determined and additional intelligence requirements defined. Studies of 

beaches, ports, communications networks, existing air facilities, and terrain provide an 

initial basis for determining the number and types of LF elements that can be 

accommodated and supported within possible landing areas. These studies assist in the 

initial engineering and other service support requirements. 

(b) Many of the ten primary decisions made during the amphibious 

planning process are based on the initial intelligence estimate. The initial estimate 

serves to orient the AF commanders and their staffs to the operational environment 

including the nature of the threat; aids in the development of the commander’s intent by 

outlining what is operationally possible and most advantageous; and formulating the 

commander’s guidance to help shape intelligence operations. As a minimum, the initial 

estimate should provide the commander with information on the general weather conditions 

expected in the objective area; key terrain and man-made features and avenues of approach; 

the location, nature, and extent of available beaches including their respective operational 

constraints; and the general composition, strength, and disposition of adversary forces in the 

area, including all chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive 

capabilities. 

(2) COA Development. Intelligence operations support COA development in 

several ways. 

(a) Defining operational possibilities through the joint intelligence 

preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process. Certain products from the 

JIPOE process may be included as an annex or distributed as separate studies and reports, 

such as: 

1. Weather studies. 

2. Astronomical and tidal data. 

3. Beach, LZ, and DZ studies. 

4. Trafficability studies. 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-5 

5. Airfield and potential airfield studies. 

6. Special studies on adversary forces. 

7. Surveys of the civilian populace and cultural resources. 

8. Studies on the terrain impact on communications systems. 

(b) Continuously updating the view of the operational environment and 

estimates of adversary capabilities, intentions, and activities. 

(c) Providing focus on the adversary through identification of adversary 

COGs, critical vulnerabilities, and potential COAs, with emphasis on the most likely and 

most dangerous COAs. 

(d) Assisting in the prioritization of targets of interest. 

(3) COA Analysis. Intelligence operations assist COA analysis by: 

(a) Identifying and refining likely and dangerous adversary COAs and their 

potential impact on the LF and actions and/or reactions to friendly COAs under 

consideration. 

(b) Wargaming the adversary’s role. 

(c) Developing an independent evaluation of each friendly COA based upon 

an understanding of the operational situation and the potential adversary response as well as 

on the ability to provide intelligence support to that COA. 

(d) Helping to focus commanders and their staffs on the adversary and 

environment, with emphasis on the degree of uncertainty and resulting risk associated with 

each friendly COA. 

e. Plans and Orders Development. Once the AF COA has been mutually selected, 

intelligence operations are focused in order to collect against specific PIRs and update 

relevant intelligence. This detailed intelligence becomes the intelligence annex to the 

LF OPLAN/OPORD. It prescribes the conduct of intelligence operations and activities 

and is a medium through which information and intelligence may be disseminated, 

reconnaissance and surveillance missions assigned, and other intelligence tasks and 

procedures stated. Drafts of the intelligence annex should normally be distributed to other 

commanders in advance of the OPLAN/OPORD for use as planning studies. The volume 

and complexity of the material in the intelligence annex dictates the use of appendixes. 

f. Intelligence Support to Landing Force Operations Ashore 
Chapter V 

V-6 JP 3-02 

(1) Intelligence operations must ensure a continuous flow of timely, pertinent, and 

tailored intelligence throughout the LF to maintain a common operational picture of the 

operational environment while rapidly identifying new intelligence requirements (IRs) of 

commanders and the operating forces. Intelligence support operations involve the 

satisfaction of a much larger body of IRs, involving a significantly greater degree of 

detail. Additionally, time is a greater factor during the execution of operations than it was 

during planning. While days, weeks, and longer periods often are available during 

planning, intelligence support to current operations must be planned, executed, and 

the resulting intelligence products provided in hours, minutes, and even seconds. 

Finally, the uncertainty and disorder inherent in the initial stages of LF operations are 

significant, and the clash of opposing forces normally result in significant and fundamental 

changes in the situation that existed prior to landing. 

(2) Intelligence Focus During Execution. Intelligence support provided to the 

LF during operations ashore focuses on furnishing information that provides an exploitable 

advantage over the adversary. Accordingly, intelligence operations focus on providing 

information necessary to build situational awareness, identifying the latest adversary 

activities and friendly opportunities, aiding friendly maneuver and targeting, and supporting 

force protection — all while continuing to support future operations planning. Two key 

factors for ensuring effective intelligence support during these operations are: 

(a) As IRs usually exceed available intelligence resources, intelligence 

operations must be focused where they can have the greatest impact and value. A detailed, 

well thought out concept of intelligence support in accordance with the CLF’s intent 

and synchronized to LF CONOPS will lead to the best allocation of intelligence 

capabilities.

(b) Intelligence collection, production, and dissemination plans are developed 

to support the execution of LF tactical operations, the engagement of targets, the protection 

of the force, and the selection of branches and sequels. Close and continuous 

coordination between intelligence and LF operations personnel is essential to maintain 

common situational awareness of ongoing and planned future operations, monitor 

potential adversary reactions, identify new opportunities, and assess the impact of 

friendly actions on the adversary. 

(c) By satisfying the CLF’s critical information requirements and 

supporting the LF’s main effort, intelligence operations help generate operational tempo. 

They also facilitate tempo by supporting the decision making process through accurate 

situational awareness and by recognizing emerging patterns that enable the CLF and 

subordinate commanders to rapidly make decisions. 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-7 

SECTION B. FIRE SUPPORT 

3. General 

a. Properly planned and executed supporting fires are critical to the success of an 

amphibious operation. Since the availability and employment of one supporting weapon 

system influences the requirements for the others, the fire support requirements of all 

components of the AF must be considered together in planning the employment of fire 

support means. Fire support planning and coordination in amphibious operations are 

continuous processes seeking timely and appropriate application of force to achieve the 

objectives within the operational area. Maneuver and fires are complementary functions. 

Fire support planning integrates and synchronizes the AF organic fires with nonorganic 

supporting fires to achieve the commander’s intent. 

b. Both the ATF and the LF will require fire support during the amphibious assault. 

(1) AFs in the AOA/AO normally require fire support for operations such as 

beach reconnaissance, hydrographic survey, removal of beach and underwater obstacles, 

and MCM. In addition, aircraft and ships capable of providing fire support must be 

allocated to protect the force from air, surface, or subsurface attack. 

(2) The LF normally requires fire support against shore targets before, during, and 

after the initial landings. Once sufficient area is seized ashore, artillery can be landed to 

provide additional fire support. Until ground fire support means (e.g., mortars, rockets, and 

cannon artillery) of the LF are landed and ready to provide support, fire support is provided 

by CAS, NSFS, and in limited cases direct and indirect fires from adjacent friendly forces. 

4. Responsibilities 

 Commanders at each level of the LF have certain fire support responsibilities. 

a. Establishing a fire support coordination agency at each appropriate level of the 

LF for accomplishment of fire support coordination responsibilities during planning and 

execution of the operation. 

(1) Detailed integration of the fire support agencies of the ATF and LF. 

(2) Flexible, parallel C2 architecture that allows for decentralized fire support 

control, when applicable. 

b. Determining requirements for air, NSFS, and artillery fire support. 

c. Coordinating requests for fire support. 

d. Presenting the coordinated requests for NSFS and air support to the CATF. 
Chapter V 

V-8 JP 3-02 

e. Developing the LF concept of fires to support the scheme of maneuver. 

f. Conducting target analysis and selection. 

g. Establishing FSCMs, as required. 

5. Systems 

a. Overview of Systems. Fires in support of amphibious operations (amphibious 

fire support) is the synergistic product of three subsystems: TA, C2, and attack 

resources. TA systems and equipment perform the key tasks of target detection, location, 

tracking, identification, and classification in sufficient detail to permit the effective attack of 

the target. C2 systems bring all information together for collation and decision making. 

Vertical and horizontal coordination is essential, requiring a hierarchy of mutually 

supporting fire support coordinators and agencies. Attack systems include fires delivered 

from air, surface, land, and subsurface attack systems. Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Air 

Force aircraft may perform air-to-surface attack, including EW, within the operational area. 

Land-based attack systems typically include Marine Corps and Army artillery, mortars, 

rockets, missiles, and EW systems. Sea-based attack systems include Navy guns, missiles, 

and EW systems. 

b. Target Acquisition

(1) Organic. The typical AF has numerous organic TA assets, such as 

reconnaissance units, UAS shipboard and artillery counterfire radars, naval aviation, and 

ground sensors, as well as other observers, spotters, and controllers. 

(2) Nonorganic. The typical AF has the capability to exploit the information 

provided from non-organic ISR systems (manned and unmanned), subsurface, surface 

(ground and sea), military space systems, and national systems. Fire support information 

could be from SOF, interagency, multinational, and other nonorganic sources. 

(3) Intelligence Integration. The intelligence center established within the AF 

supports the TA system by coordinating the use of limited collection assets throughout the 

operational area. 

See Section A, “Intelligence,” for more information. 

c. Command and Control Agencies

(1) Overview. The initiating directive should identify responsibilities for fire 

support planning and coordination among the commanders of the AF. For the purposes of 

this chapter, the term “designated commander” will refer to the commander who has been 

delegated the command authority to plan and coordinate fires either for the entire 

amphibious operation or a particular phase of it. The effectiveness of fire support in 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-9 

amphibious operations is predicated on the designated commander providing clear and 

coordinated guidance to the forces involved, since unity of effort is essential. 

See Chapter II, “Command and Control,” for more information. 

(2) Supporting Arms Coordination Center. Upon initiation of planning, a 

SACC is established. The SACC plans, coordinates, and controls all organic and 

nonorganic fires within the operational area in support of the AF. It is located aboard 

an amphibious ship or appropriate ship configured with the requisite C2 facilities, enabling 

coordination of all forms of supporting fires (land, air, and sea based). The designated 

commander may choose either the ATF’s supporting arms coordinator (SAC), the LF’s 

force fires coordinator (FFC) (if US Marine Corps) or fire support coordinator (FSC) (if US 

Army) to supervise the SACC. Whether the SAC, FFC, or FSC supervises the SACC, fire 

support personnel from both the ATF and LF operate the SACC. The organization of 

the SACC is typically the same for any size amphibious operation; however, variations in 

operations may require specific needs. The organization described below is therefore to be 

used only as a guide. 

(a) Naval Surface Fire Support Section. The ATF staff mans the NSFS 

section. This section monitors the naval gunfire control net, support net, and other gunfire 

nets as appropriate. The LF staff provides liaison to the section. 

(b) Air Support Section. This section is manned by members of a Navy air 

control agency (e.g., tactical air control squadron or tactical air control group) and directed 

by the air support coordinator who reports to the tactical air officer. The tactical air officer 

is the equivalent of the CCO and is in charge of ship-to-shore movement by air. Until 

control is passed ashore, this officer exercises control over all operations of the Navy TACC 

and is charged with the following: a. control of all aircraft in the objective area assigned for 

tactical air operations, including offensive and defensive air; b. control of all other aircraft 

entering or passing through the objective area; and c. control of all air warning facilities in 

the objective area. This section supports the Navy TACC by controlling, supporting, or 

transferring control to subsidiary tactical air direction controllers afloat or ashore. The 

section is located in the SACC and coordinates with the Navy TACC to assist in the 

deconfliction of air missions, routes, and requests for fires. The LF staff provides liaison to 

the section. 

(c) Target Information Center (TIC). The TIC is the agency or activity 

responsible for collecting, displaying, evaluating, and disseminating information pertaining 

to potential targets. The TIC is responsible for targeting information and intelligence. It is 

manned by the ATF target intelligence officer, ATF air intelligence officer, LF target 

information officer, and other personnel, as required. TIC members will normally operate 

in the SACC. The ATF target intelligence officer supervises the TIC and maintains close 

liaison with ATF and LF intelligence and operations staff. The LF target information 

officer normally works in the intelligence center of the AF. 
Chapter V 

V-10 JP 3-02 

(3) Force Fires Coordination Center. When the responsibility for fire support 

planning and coordination is passed ashore, the FFCC is the Marine Corps’ senior fire 

support coordination agency and is responsible for the planning, execution, and 

coordination of all fires within the operational area. Prior to control being passed ashore, 

the FFCC incrementally assumes responsibility for fire support planning and coordination 

from the SACC. The FFCC is organized and supervised at the MAGTF-level by the FFC 

who is responsible to the LF operations officer for MAGTF fires. The organization 

operates at both the tactical and operational level addressing current and future fire support 

issues. 

For further information, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 

(4) Fire Support Coordination Center. The FSCC is the fire support 

coordination agency within the LF GCE. FSCCs are established at the battalion, regiment, 

and division level. The FSCC is responsible for the planning, execution, and coordination 

of all forms of fire support within the GCE’s area of operations. The FSCC is organized 

and supervised by the fire support coordinator who is responsible to the appropriate level 

GCE operations officer for GCE fires. FSCCs are initially subordinate to the SACC and, if 

the FFCC is established ashore, subordinate to that agency. 

d. Attack Resources

(1) Organic. The AF’s organic attack resources are capable of delivering lethal 

and nonlethal fires, and include naval aviation, NSFS, EW systems, artillery, rockets, and 

mortars. 

(2) Nonorganic. The SACC and the FFCC are able to coordinate and control 

nonorganic attack resources in support of the amphibious operation. Aircraft (manned and 

unmanned), ship-launched missiles, SOF, and nonlethal systems attacking targets within the 

operational area must be coordinated through the senior fire support coordination agency. 

6. Planning and Coordination 

a. Fire Support Planning. The purpose of fire support planning is to optimize the 

employment of fire support to achieve the designated commander’s intent by shaping 

the operational area and providing support to maneuver forces. Fire support planning 

is the continuous and concurrent process of analyzing, allocating, and scheduling of fire 

support to integrate it with the forces to maximize combat power. 

(1) Commander’s Guidance. Commanders determine how to shape the 

operational area with fires to assist both maritime and land maneuver forces and how to use 

maritime and land maneuver forces to exploit fires. When developing the fire support 

plan, the designated commander will formulate the “commander’s guidance for fires.” 

It is from this guidance that supporting and subordinate commanders and fire support 

personnel begin to frame the role of fire support in the plan. The commander’s guidance for 

fires should articulate the desired effects against the enemy’s capabilities and how these 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-11 

effects will contribute to the overall success of the operation. The designated commander 

identifies targets that are critical to the success of the operation (high-payoff targets), force 

protection issues, and any prohibitions or restrictions on fire support. A clear determination 

of the enemy’s COGs, decisive points, and critical vulnerabilities is central to fire support 

planning. 

(2) Apportionment and Allocation. In order to develop the fire support plan, 

attack resources may be considered for apportionment and allocation to the AF. In the 

general sense, apportionment is the distribution of resources among competing 

requirements. Specific apportionments are described as apportionment of air sorties and 

forces for planning. For example, air apportionment is a determination and assignment of 

the total expected air effort by percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the 

various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time. The AF could use 

this to influence and shape the conduct of the operation. Allocation, in a general sense, is 

the distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment. For 

example, air allocation is the translation of the air apportionment decision into total 

numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or task. The apportionment 

and allocation process requires input from the subordinate commands within the AF to 

ensure that their requirements are addressed. 

(a) Direct support air requirements and any excess sorties are identified to the 

establishing authority for further tasking. 

(b) Normally, the JFC will apportion assigned air assets (by priority or 

percentage) to support the AF. The JFC may also task supporting commands for air support 

as required. 

b. Targeting

Refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

(1) Targeting Board for the AF. The AF normally conducts an integrated 

targeting board to provide broad fire support and targeting oversight functions. 

Depending on the command relationships that the establishing authority promulgates in the 

initiating directive, the designated commander coordinates the targeting process for the AF 

through preparation and submission of target nominations and FSCMs. The designated 

commander during the period within which the targets are attacked has final approval 

authority over the fire support plan and target list. Those targets to be serviced by organic 

assets are passed to the appropriate agencies for servicing. Targets identified for servicing 

by nonorganic attack systems are forwarded to the next higher-level targeting board for 

consideration. The AF will provide, at a minimum, liaison officers to this targeting board 

(i.e., component-level) and may provide liaison officers to the senior joint targeting board 

(i.e., the JFC’s joint targeting coordination board), if established. AF targeting timelines are 

normally out to 72-96 hours in order to match the targeting timelines and planning cycle of 

the JFC. 
Chapter V 

V-12 JP 3-02 

(2) Submission of target nominations for supporting operations. The AF may 

seek to shape their designated (but not activated) operational area prior to the arrival of AFs 

through target nominations for attack by other components’ forces. Restrictions on the 

attack of certain targets may also be requested, if the designated AF commander desires to 

exploit them at a future time, such as certain enemy communications sites or bridges. 

c. Fire Support Coordination. From the beginning of the action phase until a short 

time after the first waves land, the LF is normally supported by scheduled fires. Once 

control agencies (e.g., forward observers and NSFS spotters) are ashore, the LF will 

normally begin calling for fires to support operations. Coordination is accomplished at the 

lowest echelon possible. This same principle applies in the planning of subsequent planned 

fires. Planning is accomplished as required at each level of the LF before daily fire support 

plans are transmitted to the next higher level for similar action. 

For more details, see JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 

d. Air Support Planning Responsibilities 

(1) CATF responsibilities include the determination of overall requirements of 

the AF, determination of air support capabilities, coordination of all air support requests, 

and preparation of an air plan. 

(2) CLF responsibilities include the determination of LF air support 

requirements, determination of LF air support capabilities, submission of plans for 

deployment of aviation elements ashore, and preparation of an air plan. 

(3) Air Force component commander responsibilities include providing for Air 

Force representation, determining Air Force air support capabilities, submission of 

deployment plans, and preparation of supporting air plans. 

See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information. 

(4) Air Support Planning Considerations

(a) Centralized Control System. All aircraft operating within the objective 

area must be under centralized control. A tactical air control system capable of providing 

the requisite centralized control is organized. A combination of positive and procedural 

control measures may be required. 

(b) Early Seizure of Airfields. Plans will usually provide for rapid seizure 

of existing airfields, airfield capable sites, and sites for early warning and air control. This 

enables the early deployment ashore of aviation elements and extends the radius of warning 

and control. 

(5) LF Air Support Planning. The LF plans for the employment of LF aviation 

to support the ship-to-shore movement and scheme of maneuver ashore. Basic planning 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-13 

also establishes requirements for air support from the other elements of the AF and joint 

force. Any adversary facilities to be captured intact must be specified and exempted from 

destruction. 

(a) Recommendations and requests from subordinate echelons of the LF are 

evaluated and consolidated with overall LF requirements into a comprehensive request for 

air support. When determining overall requirements, pre-D-day should be separated from 

D-day and post-D-day requirements. 

(b) LF requests for pre-D-day air operations concern primary intelligence 

needs and offensive air operations to reduce adversary forces and defensive installations in 

the landing area. The scope of pre-D-day operations may be limited by the need for 

surprise. The standard joint tactical air strike request is used for air support requests. 

 

(c) LF requests for air support of operations ashore commencing on Dday include identification of targets to be attacked, their priority, timing of attacks, and 

desired effects. The request may be in the form of an air schedule with amplifying 

instructions appended. During the ship-to-shore movement, preplanned air strikes assist in 

creating exploitable gaps within the landing area. During the critical period when landing 

craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters are making the final run to the beach or LZ, 

aircraft integrated with NSFS to support maneuver assist in neutralizing the beaches, LZs, 

approach routes, and adjacent key terrain features as the LF comes ashore. 

(d) Post-D-day air support can only be planned in general because 

requirements will depend on the tactical situation ashore and will not be fully known in 

advance. Applicable pre-D-day and D-day air operations are continued. 

(6) Air Support During the Assault

(a) Before Air Support Control Agencies are Established Ashore. Until 

the TACPs arriving with assault units are established ashore, CAS missions are executed 

under the direction of the tactical air coordinators (airborne) (TAC[A]s) and the terminal 

control of the forward air controllers (airborne). When the TACPs are established ashore, 

they request CAS from the Navy TACC. The Navy TACC assigns aircraft to missions as 

requests are received, and in accordance with the commander’s guidance for priority of 

fires. As the landing progresses, air control elements to be established ashore land and 

prepare to operate shore-based facilities for control of air operations. 

(b) Air Support Control Agencies Established Ashore. As air support 

control agencies are established ashore, they function initially under the Navy TACC. 

These agencies subsequently operate under the designated authority when control of CAS 

has been passed ashore by the CATF. In any case, requests are sent by the TACP directly 

to the air control agency, which assigns aircraft to CAS missions. TACP requests are 

monitored by the SACC and FSCC/FC. 
Chapter V 

V-14 JP 3-02 

(c) Terminal Phase. The terminal phase of a CAS strike is executed under 

the control of a joint terminal attack controller or forward air controller (ground and/or 

airborne). CAS missions are executed only on the approval authority granted by the 

commander of the supported LF. 

7. Naval Surface Fire Support 

a. The CATF is responsible for preparation of the overall NSFS plan, based on the 

CLF and Navy requirements. The plan includes allocation of gunfire support ships and 

facilities. The CATF is also responsible for the general policy on targeting priorities. The 

CLF is responsible for determination of LF requirements for NSFS, including selection of 

targets to be attacked in preassault operations, those to be fired on in support of the LF 

assault, and the timing of these fires in relation to the LF scheme of maneuver. When 

designated the supported commander, the CLF coordinates the timing, priorities, and 

desired effects of fires within the operational area. 

b. As a general rule there will be one NSFS ship in direct support for each battalion 

and one NSFS ship in general support for each regiment. 

c. Control of NSFS is exercised by, and passes to, different commands and agencies as 

the operation progresses. Arrangements must be made to provide appropriate commanders 

the proper facilities for control of NSFS. 

Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers are equipped with a 5-inch (127 mm) gun. 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-15 

(1) Advance Force Commander. The advance force commander has control of 

NSFS during advance force operations. Control is normally exercised through the advance 

force SACC. 

(2) CATF. Upon arrival in the objective area, the CATF exercises control of the 

NSFS through the SACC. 

(3) Subordinate ATGs. When subordinate ATGs are formed and separate 

landing areas are designated, the CATF may delegate to each attack group commander 

control of NSFS in the landing area. 

(4) CLF. Control may be passed to the CLF once he establishes the necessary 

control facilities ashore. He then has the authority to assign NSFS missions directly to the 

fire support ships. The CATF or his designated subordinate retains responsibility for 

allocation of available fire support ships. He also retains responsibility for logistic support 

and OPCON functions other than control of fires. 

d. NSFS Organization

(1) Naval Organization. Briefly, the naval echelons involved in surface fire 

support are as follows: 

(a) AF. The AF is the highest echelon directly concerned with the NSFS of 

the amphibious operation. 

(b) Fire Support Group. The fire support group is usually subdivided into 

fire support units and/or elements for efficient and effective delivery of gunfire support. 

(c) Fire Support Unit. When necessary for flexibility in organization, an 

echelon called the fire support unit may be interposed between the fire support group and 

fire support element. The fire support unit will function similarly to the fire support group. 

Fire support unit commanders normally do not deal directly with LF agencies. 

(d) Fire Support Element. Each fire support group (unit) is divided into 

smaller task elements of fire support ships, regardless of type operating in the same general 

locality. 

(e) Individual Fire Support Ship. The individual fire support ship is the 

basic echelon in NSFS. Its function is to deliver gunfire support under the control or 

direction of the agency to which assigned. The ship deals directly with the LF agencies. 

(2) LF Organization. The LF organization for control and employment of NSFS 

provides special staff or liaison representation at every level from and including the infantry 

battalion or comparable troop unit to the highest troop echelon present. 
Chapter V 

V-16 JP 3-02 

(a) LF NSFS Section. If established, the LF NSFS section provides NSFS 

communications and facilities for LF headquarters, performs NSFS special staff functions, 

and directs fires of assigned general support ships. 

(b) Division NSFS Section or Team. The division NSFS section or team 

provides NSFS communications and facilities for division headquarters, performs NSFS 

special staff functions, and directs employment of assigned support ships. 

(c) Regimental or Brigade NSFS Liaison Team. The regimental or 

brigade NSFS liaison team provides communications, liaison, and direction of NSFS in 

support of an infantry regiment or comparable unit. In addition, the team directs the fire of 

assigned general support ships. 

(d) Battalion Shore Fire Control Party (SFCP). The battalion SFCP 

includes a NSFS liaison team and a NSFS spotting team. The NSFS liaison team is 

specifically organized to handle NSFS liaison matters for the supported commander, while 

the spotting team is charged with requesting and adjusting fires of assigned direct support 

ships and general support ships. 

e. NSFS Plans

(1) Pre-D-Day NSFS Plans. The primary objective of pre-D-day NSFS is 

preparation of the landing area for the assault. The plan usually includes the following 

elements: 

(a) Assignment of ships to FSAs and zones of fire. 

(b) Announcement of ammunition allowances and plans for replenishment. 

(c) Communications instructions. 

(d) Designation of targets, provision for damage assessments, and acquisition 

of target intelligence. 

(e) Provision for availability of spotting aircraft (manned or unmanned) and 

reference to appropriate air support plans, to include potential CAS operations. 

(f) Provision for coordinating with MCM, underwater demolition, and air 

operations. 

(g) Provision for recording target information and reporting latest intelligence 

data to the CATF. 

(2) D-Day NSFS Plans. Essential elements of the plan for NSFS operations on 

D-day include: 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-17 

(a) Assignment of ships to FSAs, zones of fire, and in direct and general 

support of specific LF units. 

(b) Announcement of ammunition allowances and plans for replenishment. 

(c) Location when required, of landing craft approach and retirement lanes, 

aircraft ingress/egress routes and necessary coordinating instructions. These same 

instructions will be found in the appropriate portions of the related air support plan. 

(d) Communication instructions and procedures for transfer of control. 

(e) Designation of targets, target areas, deep support areas, and probable 

routes of approach of adversary reinforcements. 

(f) Provisions for spotting aircraft. 

(g) Instructions for massing fires of several ships. 

(h) Provisions for coordination with the ship-to-shore movement, MCM, 

underwater demolition, artillery, and air operations. 

(i) Closely timed neutralization of remaining adversary defenses to cover the 

waterborne and helicopterborne ship-to-shore movements, and support of the landing, 

deployment, and advance of troops. 

(j) Prompt and effective delivery in direct support of LF units. 

(k) Disruption of adversary systems of command, communication, and 

observation by destruction, neutralization, interdiction, and harassment. 

(l) Isolation of the landing area and defense against adversary 

counteroffensive action by massed fires on probable routes of approach with particular 

provisions for countermechanized programs. 

(3) Post D-Day. Post D-day NSFS plans provide for: 

(a) Fires on the flanks of the landing area and fires against targets of 

opportunity. 

(b) Defensive targets, night fires, illumination, countermechanized fires, and 

any special fires utilizing the inherent capability of gunfire ships and available munitions as 

required. 

f. NSFS Support During the Landing
Chapter V 

V-18 JP 3-02 

(1) Final Preparation of the Landing Area. This fire support is designed to 

destroy or neutralize adversary defense installations that might interfere with the approach 

and final deployment of the AF and to assist in isolation of the landing area. NSFS is used 

to support underwater demolition and MCM operations. Immediately before H-hour, major 

emphasis is placed on the destruction and neutralization of adversary defenses most 

dangerous to the successful landing of LF teams. 

(2) Fires in Close Support of the Initial Assault. NSFS is continued on those 

adversary installations that could prevent the landing until the safety of the leading waves 

requires these fires to be lifted. The final approach of the leading waves of assault craft, 

amphibious vehicles, or helicopters necessitates a shift of the scheduled fires inland from 

the landing beaches or outward from the LZs. The major portion of the fires delivered in 

close support of the landings consists of prearranged fires delivered on a closely fixed 

schedule in the assault landing team’s zone of action. Because the actual rate of advance 

and the estimated rate of advance may not coincide, the CATF, through the SACC, retards 

or accelerates the movement of scheduled fires as requested by the CLF. Close supporting 

fires continue until the SFCP with the assault landing teams are in a position to conduct the 

fires of the assigned direct support ships. At this time, the SFCPs begin adjusting fires. 

(3) Deep Support Fires. Deep support fires usually are delivered by ships 

assigned in general support. Each such ship is assigned a zone of responsibility that it 

covers by fire and observation. Within assigned zones of responsibility and on a 

prearranged schedule, ships neutralize known adversary targets, interdict adversary LOCs, 

attack targets of opportunity, execute counterbattery fire, reinforce fires of direct support 

ships as directed, and conduct missions assigned by the supported unit. 

For more details, see JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 

g. Other Planning and Coordination Considerations 

(1) Air Defense. The CATF usually assigns an ADC, normally on the most 

capable air defense platform, to carry out air defense operations. The ADC coordinates 

with the Navy TACC to maintain situational awareness. A coherent air defense plan also 

requires coordinated planning with the SACC to ensure the physical location of air defense 

weapons systems afloat, ashore, and aloft. The procedures for identifying aircraft and other 

relevant information are shared. 

(2) Advance Force SACC. Although normally only one SACC is active at any 

one time, advance force operations may require the establishment of a fire support agency 

to coordinate fires in support of the neutralization or destruction of enemy high value assets 

or the emergency extraction of SOF or reconnaissance units. The advance force SACC 

must maintain situational awareness on the insertions and extractions of teams, locations of 

teams ashore, and mine warfare operations within the area, to include sea and air assets. 

The AF SACC assumes responsibility as the primary fire support agency from the advance 

force SACC, upon its arrival in the operational area. 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-19 

(3) Assault Breaching Operations. Assault breaching, a part of amphibious 

breaching, is a preplanned fire support mission using precision guided munitions to 

neutralize mines and obstacles in the surf zone and on the beach (10 foot depth contour to 

high water mark [HWM] and HWM to beach exit, respectively). Assault breaching must be 

coordinated and synchronized with the maneuver of troops going ashore, other D-day fires, 

and ongoing MCM operations, in particular, underwater MCM operations being conducted 

in the very shallow water (10-40 foot depth contours) region. JDAM [Joint Direct Attack 

Munition] JABS [Assault Breaching System] is the only capability currently available for 

breaching mines and obstacles from the 10-foot depth contour to the beach exit. The 

MCMC, in coordination with the CATF and CLF, is responsible for planning the breach 

and determination of individual weapon aim points, fuze settings, and priority of effort for 

the CATF to forward an air support request (ASR) to the appropriate air component. As 

with all other ASRs within the operational area, Air Force and US Marine Corps tactical air 

support is planned and tasked in accordance with the established air tasking process. The 

breach is conducted by the CATF through the SACC and the Navy TACC. 

Additional information on assault breaching is provided in Chapter IV, “Amphibious 

Operations Against Coastal Defenses.” 

SECTION C. COMMUNICATIONS 

8. Overview/Considerations 

 Amphibious operations require a flexible C2 system capable of supporting rapid 

decision making and execution to maintain a high tempo of operations. These systems 

must be robust, flexible, sustainable, survivable, and as expeditionary as the AF. 

Communications system architecture must provide strategic and tactical connectivity to a 

variety of tailored AFs. The AF must have the ability to plan for, provide C2 for, and 

support all functional areas (fires, aviation, intelligence, and CSS, etc.) afloat and ashore. 

Communications support requirements in amphibious operations are summarized in Figure 

V-1.

Communications system support functions will be performed in accordance with JP 6-0, 

Joint Communications System, and CJCSM 6231 series, Manual for Employing Joint 

Tactical Communications System. 

9. Identifying Requirements 

a. An effective communications system support plan: 

(1) Provides an EMCON plan and INFOSEC posture that balances OPSEC versus 

operational requirements. 

(2) Provides transmission and cryptographic security. Avoid cryptographic code 

changes where possible during initial phases of amphibious assaults. 
Chapter V 

V-20 JP 3-02 

(3) Provides information assurance. 

(4) Avoids mutual interference throughout the electromagnetic spectrum. 

Communications system support plans of the AF must be integrated into the JFC’s joint 

communications-electronics operating instructions. 

(5) Deconflicts friendly EA with other friendly frequency use in accordance with 

the joint restricted frequency list. 

(6) Provides monitoring and defense of tactical and non-tactical computer 

networks. 

(7) Provides friendly forces’ position reporting to the Global Command and 

Control System-Maritime common operational picture. 

(8) Uses common agencies and alternate means of communications to assist in 

reducing mutual interference and decreasing frequency requirements. 

COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

A reliable, secure, rapid, flexible, and interoperable 

command and control, communications and information, 

system is required in both planning and execution

Support planning

Control ship-to-shore 

movement

Coordinate protection of the 

amphibious force

Control tactical air operations

Control assault vehicles and 

craft

Monitor command and control 

of advance force operations

Coordinate supporting arms 

Coordinate logistic support 

and combat service support

Coordinate support provided 

by other forces

Medical regulation 

Coordinate use of 

communications and 

electronic warfare 

Figure V-1. Communications Support Requirements 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-21 

(9) Provides access to meteorological and oceanographic forecasts and 

information impacting amphibious planning and execution. 

(10) Incorporates coalition or multinational forces into communications plans. 

b. Each major command of the force must have compatible and interoperable 

communications that will support the tactics and techniques employed by that force. 

Circuits provided must assure effective exercise of command and coordination of 

supporting fires. 

c. Subordinate commands of the AF may operate in widely separated areas during 

some phases of the amphibious operation. The communications plan must permit rapid 

integration of the force without undue interference between elements. 

d. Local frequencies and communications standards in use in the landing area must be 

considered to ensure compatibility and to prevent interference. 

e. Communications system connectivity must be established among all major 

participating commands at commencement of the planning phase. 

10. Responsibilities 

a. CATF and CLF are responsible for communications system support planning, with 

the designated commander consolidating the requirements. The communications system 

support plan must reflect the coordinated communications system requirements of the AF. 

The requirements may include radio and weapon guidance and control frequencies, call 

signs, compatible cryptographic and authentication systems, and special communications 

equipment, computer equipment and systems, or support. These responsibilities are very 

closely tied to both commanders and are best described as mutual as depicted in Figure V-2. 

(1) The communication systems support plan fulfills communication systems 

requirements of the AF in terms of circuits, channels and systems required, and policies and 

procedures governing the operation and coordination of the overall system. The plan 

includes the items listed in Figure V-2. 

(2) The plan is prepared in detail to facilitate use by commanders at all echelons. 

b. Specific CATF responsibilities normally include the following: 

(1) Preparation and promulgation of a coordinated plan for employment of AF 

communications during the operation. 

(2) Acquisition and assignment of necessary communications assets to 

subordinate elements of the force. 
Chapter V 

V-22 JP 3-02 

(3) Preparation of appropriate OPSEC and military deception guidance. 

(4) Preparation and promulgation of a coordinated EW plan for the force. 

(5) Providing necessary shipboard communications system and services in 

support of the embarked LF. 

(6) Development of a coordinated communications plan for the ATF for inclusion 

in the overall communications system support plan. 

(7) Development and promulgation of a plan for communications connectivity 

with other maritime forces. 

c. Specific communications system support planning responsibilities of CLF include 

the following: 

(1) Development of a coordinated communications plan for the LF component of 

the AF for inclusion in the overall force communications system support plan. 

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SUPPORT PLAN

General coverage of the communications situation, including

assumptions, guiding principles, and the concept of operational

communications employment

Announcement of the communications mission

Delegation of communications tasks and responsibilities to major

elements of the force

Detailed instructions for organization, installation, operation,

coordination, and maintenance of the communications system

Assignment and employment of call signs, frequencies,

cryptographic aids, and authentication systems

Instructions on countermeasures, operations security, military

deception, and communications security

Interoperability of computer systems, to include hardware and

software

Logistic support for communications and electronics

Figure V-2. Communications System Support Plan 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-23 

(2) Development and promulgation of a plan for communications connectivity 

with other ground forces ashore. 

(3) Establishment of computer and network requirements while embarked. 

(4) Identification of connectivity requirements prior to movement ashore for 

follow-on operations, if required. 

(5) Development of a LF EW plan based on the CATF’s appropriate OPSEC and 

military deception guidance and coordinated EW plan for the force. 

d. Due to the limited availability of AF communication assets, commanders of other 

embarked forces need to expeditiously determine and submit their communication 

requirements for inclusion into the communications system support plans. 

11. Landing Force Communications Plan 

 The LF communications plan is normally issued as an annex to the OPLAN or 

OPORD and must be compatible with the overall communications plan of the AF. The 

actual drafting of the communications plan is the staff responsibility of the LF assistant 

chief of staff for communications (G-6). Throughout the preparation of the plan, the G-6 

must coordinate with each staff section of the LF as well as his equivalent staff officers at 

parallel and subordinate commands. The G-6 counterpart on the ATF staff is the 

communications officer, or the Navy component communications staff officer (N-6). The 

G-6 and N-6 conduct concurrent and parallel planning addressing items such as: 

a. Allocation of shipboard radio equipment, spaces, and personnel to support LF 

operations. 

b. Assignment of call signs, coordinated with the CATF to facilitate handling of LF 

traffic over naval circuits during the movement phase. 

c. Identification of cryptographic and authentication systems that must be used by 

ATF and LF units. 

d. Development of communications security (COMSEC) procedures. 

e. Evaluation of assigned radio frequencies for optimal performance, to prevent mutual 

interference, and ensure adequacy of support for LF operations. 

f. Use of LF personnel to support the ships’ communications personnel during the 

movement to the objective and during the initial stages of the action phase. 

g. Development of computer networks that support the LF while embarked, including 

procedures for the receipt and distribution of message traffic. 
Chapter V 

V-24 JP 3-02 

12. Landing Force Communications System 

 The LF will embark in functionally operational spaces normally built on a Navy C2 

infrastructure. These spaces will be complete with permanent access to voice, data, and 

video systems necessary for the LF’s situational awareness. They will form the LF 

operational spaces, which are collectively known as the LF operations center. The 

infrastructure is based on joint standards and architectures and allows units, to draw upon a 

baseline of communications system capabilities, regardless of their Service. 

13. Landing Force Communications System Support by Phase 

a. Planning Phase. Communications system connectivity between the CLF, CATF, 

and AF commanders and staffs must be established immediately at commencement of the 

planning phase. Units of the LF must ensure preservation of COMSEC even though great 

distances may separate the various planning headquarters. The worldwide Defense 

Message System, supplemented by SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) 

electronic mail and secure telephone, provides the major communications means during this 

phase. 

b. Embarkation Phase. Before embarkation, commanders must provide for adequate 

communications system support between the AF and any external agencies involved in 

transportation. The CLF is normally responsible for planning and providing LF 

communications systems at the piers and/or beaches within the embarkation areas, to 

include coordinating the use of established facilities (military or civilian). A significant 

portion of the LF’s organic communications equipment will be packed and ready for 

embarkation so the CLF should make arrangements with the area’s local commander to 

provide communications support. Specifically, the plan should establish: 

(1) Ship-to-shore circuits for the control of loading (closely coordinated with the 

CATF). 

(2) Convoy control for serials moving from point of origin to seaport of 

embarkation. 

(3) Communications between the port of embarkation and the embarkation area, 

including the contracted use of commercial assets if feasible. 

(4) Communications between control points within the embarkation area. 

(5) Communications center and/or switching center operations within the 

embarkation area. 

c. Rehearsal Phase. The rehearsal phase of the amphibious operation gives the CLF 

the opportunity to test the LF communications plan. Under ideal conditions, the rehearsal 

will involve all elements of the force and attempt to fully test the communications systems 

involved without violating COMSEC procedures. By having a full-scale rehearsal, the CLF 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-25 

can further refine his communications requirements and identify critical vulnerabilities, thus 

allowing for appropriate adjustments to the OPLAN or OPORD before execution. Specific 

considerations during the rehearsal phase include: 

(1) Maximum use of secure voice equipment and use of minimum power on 

electronic emitters for COMSEC reasons. 

(2) Use of call signs and frequencies for rehearsal use only. 

(3) Plan to repair or replace communications equipment damaged during the 

rehearsal. 

(4) Plan for, allocate, and embark expendable items (such as wire and batteries) 

for use during the rehearsal. 

(5) Allocate enough time to conduct an objective critique of the communications 

plan after the rehearsal and to modify portions of the plan as necessary. 

d. Movement Phase. As discussed earlier, the CATF provides functionally 

operational spaces built on a Navy C2 infrastructure to the LF. During the movement 

phase, however, the CATF normally restricts the use of equipment, particularly transmitters 

and emitters, to prevent disclosure of locations, movements, and intentions of the force. 

The LF plan must address how the commander will communicate with LF units embarked 

on different ships, and possibly even separate movement groups, during these periods of 

radio silence. Some potential alternate means are helicopter messenger, visual signals, or 

line-of-sight radio if permitted by the emission control condition. Other LF 

communications considerations during movement include ensuring: 

(1) Embarkation information is accurate and reflects the communications guard 

situation for all elements of the LF. 

(2) Communications officers with the ATF have an accurate list of appropriate LF 

units (e.g., next senior and immediate subordinate) and their assigned shipping location. 

(3) ATF communications officers have an accurate listing of LF personnel who 

have message release authorities. 

(4) ATF communications officers have an accurate listing of LF communications 

personnel embarked in their respective ships. The list should also contain clearance and 

access information of these LF personnel. 

(5) Establishment of LF communications centers, or equivalents, on all ships 

when major LF units are embarked. 

e. Action Phase. During the action phase, both the ATF and LF rely primarily on 

radio communications as the means for exercising C2. Accordingly, radio silence is usually 
Chapter V 

V-26 JP 3-02 

lifted by the CATF prior to H-hour in order to test all circuits before the ship-to-shore 

movement begins. During the initial portion of this phase, when the major LF headquarters 

are still afloat, LF circuits are provided by facilities specifically installed in amphibious 

shipping for use by LF personnel. LF communications must be complementary and 

generally parallel to those established by the ATF. These parallel systems usually terminate 

at each significant control center aboard the amphibious ships; (e.g., SACC, Navy TACC, 

HDC, and TACLOG group). The LF communications plan must address the many 

operational aspects of the action phase. 

(1) Waterborne Movement. Communications for control and coordination of 

landing ships, landing craft, and other waterborne vehicles moving from the transport area 

to landing areas are provided primarily by the CATF through a Navy control group. 

However, LF radio nets must be integrated into the group’s plan so that LF commanders 

can properly monitor and control the movements of the LF, especially important when the 

ship-to-shore movement includes LF organic AAVs. 

(2) Helicopterborne Movement. Communication nets for the control and 

coordination of the assault support helicopters are established and maintained by the CATF 

through his Navy TACC and HDC. LF personnel will augment the HDC and integrate LF 

communications into the overall aviation C2 systems. Helicopterborne movement normally 

generates additional, long-range communications requirements for the LF because of the 

inherent distances associated with helicopter operations. 

(3) Supporting Arms Coordination. Whether supervised by the ATF’s SAC or 

the LF’s FFC, the SACC coordinates and controls all organic and nonorganic fires in 

support of the AF until the LF establishes adequate control and communications facilities 

ashore. The LF communications must include nets that integrate all agencies that interface 

with the SACC. These include, but are not limited to, the NSFS, the air support section, the 

TIC, the FFCC/FSCC/FC of the LF, fire support observers, TACPs, forward air controller 

(airborne) and TAC(A), and artillery fire direction centers. 

Note: Consideration must be given to shipboard hazards of electromagnetic radiation to 

ordnance conditions/limitations that shut down or severely limit high frequency (HF) 

communication capabilities (e.g., loading of ordnance on aircraft requires securing HF 

communications on most naval vessels). 

For further information on shipboard hazards of electromagnetic radiation, see JP 3-04, 

Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations. 

(4) CSS. Selected units and agencies of the LF are required to assist the CATF in 

controlling and coordinating logistics during the action phase. LF communications must 

provide a means for the control of medical evacuation, EPW collection, foot and vehicular 

traffic ashore, as well as the means to control the movement of supplies and equipment. 

Landing support units are required to establish communications within the CSS area. This 

communications network must include the Navy beach parties, TACLOG group, supported 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-27 

LF units, HSTs and transport aircraft (if applicable), SACC, DASC (once established 

ashore), and other key agencies within the ATF and LF. 

f. Transition of Landing Force Command Posts Ashore 

(1) The command post (CP) movement from ship-to-shore must be accomplished 

in a manner that provides for communications continuity during the entire action phase. LF 

units are almost entirely dependent on netted radios during the early stages before they can 

gradually transition to wire, wire-multichannel radio, computer network systems 

(SIPRNET), messengers, or other means. The conduct of this transition governs the 

development of the LF communications system and is crucial to the seamless transition of 

effective C2 from the agencies afloat to those established ashore. 

(2) A CP movement from ship-to-shore is normally made in two or more 

echelons, depending on the type and size of the headquarters. In any case, each echelon 

requires a near equal communications capability which must be planned out in detail by the 

CLF and his staff. Furthermore, the commander, staff, and supporting personnel that make 

up a particular CP may be embarked on separate ships. In that case, radio communications 

must be established between the two or more groups of the CP as soon as practical. 

(3) When an advance party (or reconnaissance party) is sent ashore before the 

major echelons of a CP, direct radio communications are required between the advance 

party and the CP afloat. The type and quantity of communications equipment and 

personnel assigned to the advance party must be weighed against the need for those assets 

back at the CP during the action phase. 

(4) When in transit from ship-to-shore, the CLF and appropriate staff members 

will require communications with LF units already ashore (including the CP advance party 

if employed), LF units also in transit, LF units remaining on shipping, and appropriate ATF 

agencies afloat. The communications facilities normally available to the CLF (e.g., C2 

configured helicopter or AAV) will usually not be able to satisfy the total communications 

requirement. Therefore, the communications facilities should be allocated to only the most 

essential circuits. 

SECTION D. LOGISTICS 

“The logistical effort required to sustain the seizure of Iwo Jima was enormous, 

complex, largely improvised on lessons learned in earlier . . . operations in the 

Pacific. . . . Clearly, no other element of the emerging art of amphibious warfare 

had improved so greatly by the winter of 1945. Marines may have had the heart 

and firepower to tackle a fortress-like Iwo Jima earlier in the war, but they would 

have been crippled in the doing of it by limitations in amphibious logistical support 

capabilities. These concepts, procedures, organizations, and special materials 

took years to develop. . . .” 

From Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima, 

Joseph Alexander 
Chapter V 

V-28 JP 3-02 

14. General 

The CATF is normally responsible for determining overall logistic requirements 

for the AF. Those requirements that cannot be supported from resources available within 

the ATF are directed to the applicable Service component through the chain of command as 

established in the initiating directive. 

Additional guidance for joint logistic operations in support of amphibious operations is 

contained in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore 

(JLOTS). 

15. Responsibilities 

 AF commanders have specific and often complementary logistics planning 

responsibilities as listed below. 

a. CATF is responsible for the following: 

(1) Coordination of logistic requirements for all elements of the ATF. 

(2) Determination of requirements that can be met by internal resources. Those 

which cannot are directed to a higher authority or the appropriate Service through the chain 

of command. 

(3) Establishing priorities and allocating resources to meet the logistic 

requirements of the ATF. 

(4) Notification of appropriate responsible agencies early in the planning phase of 

any unusual requirements or special supplies or equipment required. 

(5) Providing the means required for the establishment and operation of a logistic 

system in the designated amphibious objective area. 

(6) Development of plans for handling EPWs and civilian evacuees and internees. 

(7) Development of the overall plan for HSS, including evacuation of casualties. 

(8) Preparation of the logistics annex to the OPLAN. 

b. For forces assigned, the CATF is responsible for the following: 

(1) Determination of the overall logistic requirements of the forces assigned. 

(2) Determination and allocation of the means to meet the logistic requirements of 

the forces assigned. 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-29 

(3) Ensuring the promulgation of the overall schedule to include plans for the 

assembly of shipping at points of embarkation. 

(4) Review and approval of embarkation and loading plans. 

(5) Ensuring the organization of assigned shipping into echelons as necessary for 

continued support of the LF OPLAN. 

c. The CLF is responsible for the following: 

(1) Determination of overall logistic requirements of the LF, including units, 

special equipment, and shipping. 

(2) Determination and allocation of the means to meet logistic requirements of the 

LF. 

(3) Determination of logistic requirements that cannot be met by the LF and 

submission of these requirements to the supported commander, CATF, or designated 

commander as appropriate. 

(4) Development of plans for the assembly of supplies and equipment to be 

embarked, including the supplies and equipment of other assigned forces for which the LF 

is responsible. 

(5) Preparation of the LF embarkation and ship loading plans and orders, in 

coordination with the CATF. 

(6) Planning for the coordination of logistics required by all elements of the LF. 

(7) Planning for the conveyance and distribution of logistics required by the LF. 

(8) Preparation of the logistics annex to the LF OPLAN. 

d. Other designated commanders of the AF are responsible for determining their 

logistic requirements and submitting to the CATF or appropriate commander those 

requirements that cannot be met internally. 

16. Considerations and Factors 

 The requirement for afloat forces to provide seamless support to the LF during the 

period in which its logistic system is primarily seabased has a significant influence on 

logistic planning for an amphibious operation. Like all logistic systems, the AF logistic 

systems must be responsive, simple, flexible, economical, attainable, sustainable, and 

survivable. Development of effective logistic systems must take into account the planning 

considerations and factors listed below. 
Chapter V 

V-30 JP 3-02 

a. Planning Considerations

(1) Orderly assembly and embarkation of personnel and materiel based on 

anticipated requirements of the LF scheme of maneuver ashore. 

(2) Establishment and maintenance of a logistic system in the operational area that 

will ensure adequate support to all elements of the AF, and subsequent support of base 

development and garrison forces as directed. 

(3) Impetus of logistic support from sea, or the rear, and directed forward to the 

point of application at the using unit. 

(4) Preservation of OPSEC during logistic planning. Nonsecure logistic planning 

can compromise tactical surprise and landing location. 

b. Planning Factors. Logistic planning factors are as follows: 

(1) Character, size, and duration of the operation. 

(2) Target date. 

(3) Objective area characteristics: 

(a) Terrain and hydrography. 

(b) Climate and weather. 

(c) Distance from support bases. 

(d) Indigenous support. 

(e) Facilities available. 

(f) Transportation systems. 

(g) Local resources. 

(h) Throughput capacity. 

(4) Enemy capabilities: 

(a) Freedom from interference. 

(b) Vulnerability to enemy. 

(5) Strength and composition of LF. 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-31 

(6) Distribution means. 

(7) LOCs and transportation networks. 

(8) Support base resupply. 

(9) Progressive increase in level and form of logistics. 

(10) Support required for EPWs. 

(11) Availability of logistic means. 

(12) Compatibility and capability of support systems. 

(13) Communications means. 

(14) Base defense and garrison plans. 

(15) Requirements for rehabilitation or construction of airfields. 

(16) Impact of CBRN effects (for more information about logistics planning 

factors in CBRN environments see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments). 

(17) Availability of AE and AFOE shipping. 

(18) Indigenous health risks and diseases prevalent. 

17. Combat Service Support Plans 

 See Figure V-3. 

a. The necessity to provide continuing and coordinated logistics to the LF when its 

logistic system is primarily sea-based requires coordination between the AF commanders to 

develop a control and delivery system that will ensure that the LF is provided the necessary 

support from embarkation through rehearsal, movement, execution, and continued 

operations ashore. Wherever possible, sustainment planning should encompass the 

concept of direct ship-to-user delivery. 

b. Logistic planning is accomplished under two major categories: initial supply and 

sustainment. 

(1) Initial Supply. Initial supply comprises the logistic levels carried as 

accompanying supplies in assault shipping, both AE and AFOE to provide required initial 
Chapter V 

V-32 JP 3-02 

support for the assault landing and initial operations ashore. Plans for initial supply include 

the following: 

(a) ATF provision for: 

1. Loading ships with supplies to prescribed levels as much as 

practicable considering the embarkation of troops. 

2. Rations for LF while embarked. 

3. Special facilities required for refueling and maintenance of aircraft, 

landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and other equipment as well as fuel for boat pools, 

beach groups, transportation pools, and other shore components. 

4. Water for the LF ashore until supply from sources ashore is available. 

(b) LF provision for: 

1. Assembly and loading of supplies to be landed with the LF in such a 

manner as to ensure availability for issue before and during debarkation. 

2. Establishment of pre-positioned emergency supplies (floating dumps) 

containing limited amounts of selected supplies for emergency issue. A floating dump 

consists of emergency supplies preloaded in landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or in 

landing ships. Floating dumps are located in the vicinity of the appropriate control officer, 

who directs their landing as requested by the troop commander concerned. 

LOGISTIC AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PLANS

Logistic Plans (supply and resupply)

Embarkation and Loading Plans

Health Service Support Plans

Landing Force Support Party Plans

Pontoon Causeway and Lighterage Plans

Engineering Plans

Advanced Base Development and Garrison Plans

Figure V-3. Logistic and Combat Service Support Plans 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-33 

3. Establishment of selected pre-staged supplies for ship-to-shore 

movement by VTOL aircraft (pre-staged VTOL-lifted supplies). 

4. Selective discharge of required supplies in accordance with the 

landing plan. 

5. Positive and efficient control of the movement of supplies from ship 

to desired locations ashore. 

6. Establishment of logistic heads ashore (if required) and the 

distribution of those supplies to forward units. 

(2) Sustainment. Sustainment comprises logistic support transported to the 

landing area in follow-up shipping and aircraft to support tactical operations ashore. 

(a) Sustainment is provided through either one or a combination of the 

following systems: 

1. Maintaining shipping and aircraft in an on-call status to be ordered 

into the landing area by the CATF, as requested by the CLF. 

2. Establishing fixed schedules for bringing shipping or aircraft into the 

landing area automatically as planned by the CLF. 

(b) Factors affecting decisions in this regard depend primarily on: 

1. Distance between the landing area and loading points. 

2. Availability of forward sheltered ports or anchorages for use as 

regulating stations. 

3. Requirement for convoy escort. 

4. Availability of aircraft dedicated for sustainment lift. 

5. Hostile activity on LOCs. 

6. Plans for general engineering support, including facilities required to 

accommodate supplies and the phase-in of LF units to handle supplies. 

7. Availability of manpower, materials handling equipment, and 

lighterage to off load shipping. 

8. Availability of LOTS resources. 
Chapter V 

V-34 JP 3-02 

c. Logistic plans are prepared by the CATF, CLF, and other designated commanders 

of the AF and include the following: 

(1) Primary source(s) of supply and responsibilities. 

(2) Levels of supply to be carried in AE, AFOE, and follow-up shipping. 

(3) Control and distribution of supplies. 

(4) Plan for landing supplies. 

(5) Resupply responsibilities, schedules, and sources. 

(6) Air delivery responsibility, procedures. 

(7) Captured material disposition instructions. 

(8) Salvage instructions. 

(9) Retrograde. 

(10) Casualties. 

18. Key Constructs 

a. Selective and General Unloading. From the CSS standpoint, the ship-to-shore 

movement is divided into two clearly distinguishable time periods: 

(1) Selective Unloading. The selective unloading period is primarily tactical in 

character and must be responsive to the requirements of LF units. During the early part of 

the ship-to-shore movement, CSS is provided on a selective basis from sources afloat. 

Movement of CSS elements to the landing beaches or LZs closely follows the combat 

elements. As the assault progresses, CSS units are established ashore, and support is 

provided both from within the beach support area (BSA) and from sources afloat. 

(2) General Unloading. Normally, general unloading is undertaken when 

sufficient troops and supplies have been landed to sustain the momentum of the attack and 

when areas are adequate to handle the incoming volume of supplies. When adequate 

assault supplies are ashore, and the BSA is organized and operating satisfactorily, the CLF 

recommends to the CATF that general unloading begin. 

b. BSA and CSSA. As the operation progresses and CSS units are phased ashore, the 

initial landing support organization is disestablished and its functions are assumed by the 

LFSP. BSAs, initially developed by the landing support elements, may be consolidated or 

expanded into CSSAs to provide continued support to the LF. The need for CSSAs and 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-35 

their number, size, and capabilities are situation dependent, but they are primarily 

influenced by the scope and duration of the operation. 

c. BSA/CSSA Defense. The CLF normally assigns the mission of defending the BSA 

or CSSA to the senior tactical commander ashore. To clarify responsibility, the LF 

OPORD will specify the security commander and the task organization designated to 

perform this mission. 

d. Critical Early Requirements. CSS in the initial stages of the amphibious 

operation is principally concerned with the provision of combat essential supplies such as 

rations, water, ammunition, and fuel. These critical items are normally drawn from LF 

stocks transported by AE and AFOE shipping. Other essential services, including medical 

support, are provided within the capabilities of the AF. Other CSS functions are of 

secondary importance during the early stages of the ship-to-shore movement and will 

normally not be involved in the scheduled waves. 

e. TACLOG Groups and the LFSP. The CLF places special emphasis on the 

importance of CSS coordination during the ship-to-shore movement by establishing 

TACLOG groups and the LFSP. 

f. Seabasing and the Sea Echelon Level

(1) Seabasing. In some cases, it may be undesirable or unnecessary to transfer 

substantial LF supplies and CSS organizations ashore. Seabasing allows for the majority of 

CSS assets to remain at sea and be sent ashore only when needed. In such cases, additional 

consideration must be devoted during the planning phase to ensure that CSS capabilities are 

balanced aboard those amphibious ships best suited to provide support. 

(2) Sea Echelon Level. The sea echelon level plan normally reduces the 

concentration of amphibious ships in areas near the beach. The majority of shipping will 

remain in distant sea operating areas until called forward in accordance with established 

priorities. In such cases, the out-of-sequence landing of supplies and equipment will 

cause delays in the established schedule. Specific provisions may be required to ensure 

rapid evacuation of casualties to more distant primary casualty receiving and treatment 

ships (CRTSs). 

g. Embarkation, Movement, and Rehearsal Support. Although the primary 

emphasis of CSS planning is to develop a CSS system to support the LF, the force must also 

be supported while en route. Support required in the embarkation areas may include the 

operation of camps and mess facilities in staging areas, road maintenance, and equipment 

maintenance. LF CSS requirements during the movement phase are primarily provided by 

the ATF but the LF must plan for administrative and maintenance requirements. CSS 

requirements during and after rehearsals may be extensive (especially if equipment repairs 

are necessary) and must be incorporated into the plan. 
Chapter V 

V-36 JP 3-02 

h. LF Aviation. During amphibious operations, fixed-wing aviation elements may be 

located outside the landing area, requiring a task-organized CSS detachment for support. 

When LF aviation is phased ashore into the AOA/AO, the CSS requirements (especially 

engineering and transportation) will be extensive. 

19. Health Service Support Plan 

a. The HSS plan is usually issued as annex Q (Medical Services) to the OPLAN and 

provides for HSS to all elements of the AF in accordance with the foregoing 

responsibilities. Likewise the LF HSS plan will be issued as annex Q (Medical Services) to 

the LF OPLAN. Both include the items listed in Figure V-4. The fleet surgical team, when 

assigned, should be included in operation planning to provide input into the medical logistic 

support plan. Additional HSS planning considerations are detailed in Figure V-5. 

b. Planning Responsibilities 

(1) The designated commander is responsible for overall preparation of plans, 

taking into account the following: 

(a) Coordinating, with the JFC or establishing authority, patient movement 

by sea or air from the operational area to HSS facilities outside the area. 

(b) Air transport of HSS supplies and equipment, which may involve 

intratheater airlift assets. 

(c) Coordination with supporting commanders for HSS assets requiring 

intratheater transportation. 

(d) Formulation, in conjunction with AF commanders, of a recommended 

patient movement policy for the operation. 

(e) Establishment of HSS requirements and standards for the civilian 

population in the operational area, when not prescribed by higher authority. 

(f) Development of procedures for regulating movement of casualties and 

patients within the landing area in conjunction with AF commanders. 

For more information, see JP 4-02, Health Service Support, and JP 3-11, Operations in 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. 

(2) The CATF is responsible for the following: 

(a) Provision for HSS for all embarked personnel between points of 

embarkation and the objective area. 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-37 

(b) Provision for HSS personnel, supplies, and equipment for all units based 

ashore and not attached to the LF. 

CONTENTS OF THE HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN

Statement of the health service support (HSS) situation

Statement of patient movement policy

Clear delineation of HSS responsibilities, organization, and

employment of the several elements, with particular

emphasis on shifts in responsibility during several phases

of the operation and measures necessary to ensure

coordinated HSS action by all elements of the amphibious

force

Provision for delivery and regulation of HSS in the objective

area

HSS medical logistics, including operation of HSS supply

stocks afloat and provision for pre-planned replenishment,

repair, and exchange of supplies and medical equipment

Procedures and responsibilities for keeping necessary

records and reports on the flow of casualties

Provision for HSS to patients while afloat

Provision for obtaining medical intelligence

Measures for preventive medicine, hygiene, and sanitation

Procedures for distribution of whole blood and colloids

Organization and operation of the patient movement system

Development of preventive and environmental health plans

and annex coordinated with the engineer environmental

management plans and annex

Figure V-4. Contents of the Health Service Support Plan 
Chapter V 

V-38 JP 3-02 

(c) In conjunction with the CLF, development of a procedure for movement 

of patients within the landing area. 

(d) Seaward evacuation from the beach, including communications to 

support movement of patients, receipt of patients, hospitalization afloat within the 

operational area, and initial casualty reporting for the ATF, LF, and other forces assigned. 

(e) Establishment of HSS requirements for the civilian population in the 

objective area, when not prescribed by higher authority. 

(f) Coordination of HSS for the civilian population with nongovernmental 

organizations and coalition forces. 

(g) Positioning and employment of hospital ships within the operational area. 

(3) The CLF identifies and coordinates LF HSS requirements with the CATF. 

Once command is passed ashore, close coordination with the CATF is still required. See 

Figure V-5 for LF HSS planning considerations. The CLF is responsible for preparation of 

plans, taking into account the following: 

(a) Providing HSS to LF personnel before embarkation. 

(b) Assistance to ship’s HSS department by providing HSS personnel to care 

for LF personnel while embarked. 

(c) Development, in conjunction with the CATF, of the evacuation policy for 

the operation. 

(d) Execution of the patient movement plan to the rear and from the 

operational area as directed. 

(e) Providing HSS to all personnel ashore in the operational area who are not 

otherwise provided for. 

(f) Determination of the HSS requirements of the LF that cannot be met by 

the LF capabilities. 

See JP 4-02, Health Service Support, for additional information regarding HSS. 

c. Patient Movement

(1) Patient Movement Policy. Patient movement policy is a command decision 

establishing the maximum number of days that patients may be held within the command 

for treatment. Patients who, in the opinion of responsible medical officers, cannot be 

returned to a duty status within the period prescribed are evacuated by the first available 

means, provided the travel involved will not aggravate their disabilities. The policy will be 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-39 

established for the theater by the combatant commander and is further defined by the CATF 

in conjunction with the CLF for the AOA. The use of any specific patient movement policy 

for the AOA serves only as a guide for medical planning, and must remain flexible to meet 

the changes in demand placed on the limited medical treatment capability initially available. 

(2) Patient Movement Plan. Plans for patient movement must be well defined 

and widely disseminated. These plans must include at a minimum: 

(a) Identification of CRTS or other medical treatment capabilities. 

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

GOAL

Providing for the health of the command and evacuation

and hospitalization of sick and wounded

Planning Must Consider:

Overall mission of the force

and the supporting medical

mission

Policies of higher

commanders

Landing area characteristics

Physical, biological, and

psychological threats to

personnel

Lines of communications and

evacuation

Evacuation policies and

procedures

Medical supplies required

Blood and colloid

requirements

Casualty estimates

Medical personnel available

and status of their training

Supporting medical facilities

and forces outside the

objective area

Medical needs for civilian

population and enemy

prisoners of war, if authorized

Need for service medical unit

augmentation

Requirements for casualty

receiving and treatment ships

Aircraft and landing craft to

provide ambulance facilities

Medical augmentation

requirements for commonuser shipping

Other medical facilities

available within the objective

area

Figure V-5. Health Service Support Planning Considerations 
Chapter V 

V-40 JP 3-02 

(b) Locations of medical treatment facilities ashore. 

(c) Communications procedures for patient movement coordination. 

(d) Provisions for mass patient movement. 

(3) As a matter of policy, the preferred mode of patient movement is via 

aircraft. The speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft serve to enhance the medical support 

capability of the LF. However, patient movement plans must not be aircraft-dependent and 

must include provisions for maximum use of ground and surface means. 

(4) Chain of Patient Movement. Patient movement experience during LF 

operations has demonstrated that there is no normal or typical chain of patient movement 

through which a casualty is moved from the place where wounded or injured to the medical 

treatment facility best suited to meet specific treatment needs. Past experience in no way 

eliminates the need for a functioning and coordinated patient movement using available 

transportation means to enhance the patient’s chances for survival and to effectively employ 

available transportation means. In planning patient movement, the guiding principles 

include: 

(a) Each successive echelon of HSS of care in the medical support system 

has greater treatment capability than the preceding echelon. 

(b) Each casualty should advance through the system only as far as needed to 

meet the specific treatment need. 

(c) Medical vehicles should be used for transportation at the earliest possible 

opportunity. 

(d) The arrangement of patient movement between medical treatment 

facilities is usually administrative in nature and can be preplanned. 

d. Medical Regulating. The actions and coordination necessary to arrange for the 

movement of patients through the levels of care. This process matches patients with a 

medical treatment facility that has the necessary HSS capabilities and available bed space 

(1) Medical Regulating Plan. This plan contains policies and procedures for 

evacuation and primary medical regulation of patients to designated CRTSs in the landing 

area, and provides for medical services. It also provides for secondary medical regulating 

evacuation of patients by air to medical treatment facilities outside the operational area or 

following medical or surgical treatment onboard the CRTSs. 

(2) Medical Regulating Agency. The functions of the medical regulating agency 

include: 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-41 

(a) Maintaining inventory of locations and availability of operating rooms, 

beds, and medical/surgical specialty teams on various treatment ships. 

(b) Maintaining inventory of locations and capabilities of treatment facilities 

established ashore. 

(c) Directing or recommending destinations for the patients. 

(d) Monitoring medical materiel, blood and blood products, and medical 

personnel replacement requirements. 

(e) Consolidating patient movement requests for patients requiring onward 

evacuation. 

e. Hospitalization

(1) Initial Hospital Support. Hospitalization support of LF operations is 

provided initially in CRTSs of the ATF and later by applicable appropriate medical units of 

the LF when they are established ashore. In most cases, however, the staff and equipment 

of LF medical units limit their capabilities to patient holding. Overloading is avoided to 

ensure that the capability to support current and future operations is not degraded. 

(2) Follow-on Hospital Support. Follow-on hospitalization and treatment 

Sailors of Fleet Surgical Team 2 simulate mass casualty procedures 

aboard the USS Nassau (LHA-4). 
Chapter V 

V-42 JP 3-02 

support of the LF may be provided by Navy, Army, or Air Force medical units, such as fleet 

hospitals and hospital ships, combat support hospitals, or expeditionary medical support 

units, respectively. These units may or may not be considered part of the AF. 

20. Landing Force Support Party Plan 

a. The LFSP is a temporary LF organization, composed of ATF and LF elements, 

that facilitates the ship-to-shore movement and provides initial combat support and 

CSS to the LF. The CLF is responsible for organizing a system to accomplish this mission 

and other specific support functions within the landing area. Other missions of the LFSP 

are as follows: 

(1) Facilitate the landing and movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment 

across the beach, into an LZ or through a port. 

(2) Evacuate casualties and EPWs from the beach. 

(3) Beach, retract, and salvage landing ships and craft. 

(4) Facilitate the establishment of the LCE, ACE, and naval beach group. A naval 

beach group is a permanently organized naval command within an AF composed of a 

commander and staff, a beachmaster unit, an amphibious construction battalion, and assault 

craft units, designed to provide ship-to-shore interface support to the CLF. Its specific 

organization depends on the number of beaches or zones through which the LF will land 

and the size of the units using the beaches or zones. For planning purposes, the basic LFSP 

structure consists of the LFSP commander, the shore party, the beach party, special 

attachments, and ships’ platoons. 

(a) LFSP Commander. The designated commander of the LFSP controls 

landing support operations within the landing area. The LFSP commander ensures effective 

landing support through close coordination with subordinate units, timely reinforcement, 

and consolidation of shore party and beach party elements. Initially, LFSP operations are 

decentralized to the shore party and beach party teams per established code (Green Beach, 

Red Beach 1, etc.). TACON for landing support operations on these beaches resides with 

the shore party team commander. When the shore party and beach party groups are 

established ashore, they assume TACON of their respective teams. TACON for landing 

support operations on each coded beach resides with the shore party group commander. 

When the shore party and beach party are established ashore and the shore party 

commander has consolidated command of the shore party groups, TACON of the shore 

party and beach party groups transitions to the shore party and beach party commanders 

respectively. Concurrent with this transition, the LFSP is established ashore and the LFSP 

commander assumes TACON of the shore party, beach party, special attachments, and all 

other LFSP units ashore. If the LFSP is not established ashore concurrently with the beach 

party and shore party, TACON for landing support operations resides with the shore party 

commander until the LFSP commander assumes TACON. The LFSP personnel and 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-43 

equipment landed are minimal as the shore party and beach party form the predominant part 

of the LFSP. 

(b) Shore Party. The shore party is the LF component of the LFSP. The 

nucleus for the shore party is the transportation support battalion, augmented with personnel 

and equipment from the GCE, ACE, and other LCE units. 

(c) Beach Party. The beach party is the Navy component of the LFSP and is 

under the TACON of the LFSP commander. Personnel and equipment for the beach party 

comes from the naval beach group and/or elements from a Navy cargo handling battalion, 

as required by the JFC/CATF. 

(d) Special Attachments. Special attachments are made to the LFSP for 

defense of the beach support area, to provide liaison personnel, and for specialized tasks. 

(e) Ships’ Platoons. A ship’s platoon consists of assigned LF personnel 

responsible for loading, stowing, and offloading LF equipment and supplies. When a ship 

carries equipment and supplies that belong only to LF units embarked on that ship, the 

ship’s platoon is sourced from the ship’s embarked troops at the direction of the 

commanding officer of troops. 

Detailed information about the LFSP is contained in NTTP 3-02.1M/MCWP 3-31.5, Shipto-Shore Movement, and NTTP 3-02.14, The Naval Beach Group. 

For further information, refer to JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS). 

b. LFSP Plan

(1) The CLF and appropriate subordinate commanders prepare LFSP plans 

containing instructions for the functioning of the LFSP, including the beach party and 

helicopter/VTOL aircraft support team, and air mobile support party requirements. 

(2) The LFSP plan includes the following: 

(a) Organization and mission of the LFSP. 

(b) Instructions to all subordinate elements. 

(c) LFSP communications instructions. 

(d) Beach, DZ, and LZ defense instructions. 

(e) Administrative instructions. 
Chapter V 

V-44 JP 3-02 

c. LFSP Planning Considerations. In developing the LFSP plans, consideration 

must be accorded the factors shown in Figure V-6 and the below: 

(1) Early detailed analysis of the landing area. 

(2) Detailed planning for organization of BSAs and LZ support areas. 

(3) Adequate communications between tactical units, control elements, and 

landing support elements. 

(4) Composition of the AE and AFOE. 

(5) Plans after seizure of the force beachhead line. 

LANDING FORCE SUPPORT PARTY

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Landing force scheme of maneuver and related landing plan

Enemy disposition in the landing area

Mine and obstacle clearance in the landing area

Landing area weather, terrain, and hydrographic conditions

Requirements for multiple, separate logistic installations to

provide for passive defense against weapons of mass

destruction

Requirement for beach development and clearance of landing

zones

Amounts and types of supplies and equipment to be landed

Types of ships (amphibious and commercial), landing craft

(displacement or air-cushion), and aircraft to be unloaded

Availability of personnel and equipment for landing force support

party operations

Policy concerning method of handling and disposition of enemy

prisoners of war

Casualty evacuation and health service support regulating

policies

Coordination required with other agencies

Provision for inter-Service support

Figure V-6. Landing Force Support Party Planning Considerations 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-45 

(6) Concept of CSS. 

(7) Environmental management requirements. 

d. LFSP Planning Responsibilities

(1) The CLF is responsible for the timely activation of the LFSP and the 

conduct of LFSP operations; however, AF elements participate in and contribute to the 

development of plans for its organization and employment. The CLF is responsible for the 

tactical employment and security ashore of all elements of the LFSP, and will integrate 

requirements into the fire support plan. The CLF determines and presents requirements 

for support of LFSP operations to the CATF. These requirements will be presented as 

early as possible in the planning phase. 

(2) The CATF is responsible for preparation of related plans that provide 

facilities and means to ensure effective support of LFSP operations. Examples of such 

plans are the pontoon causeway and lighterage plan, unloading plan, casualty evacuation 

plan, and EPW evacuation plan. Integrated training of shore party and beach party elements 

will be conducted before embarkation begins. 

e. Employment. The responsibility for embarking and landing the landing support 

units rests with the tactical unit supported. For this reason, the landing support units are 

attached to the tactical unit supported for embarkation and landing purposes only. The 

buildup of the LFSP ashore parallels the tactical buildup ashore. Landing support 

Build-up of beach support area at Inchon, Korea September 15, 1950. 
Chapter V 

V-46 JP 3-02 

operations begin with the landing of the advance parties and continue until the operation is 

completed or until the parties are relieved. Throughout the operation, the landing support 

task organization changes as required to meet the situation until the operation is terminated 

or the LFSP is relieved of its responsibilities. 

21. Pontoon Causeway and Lighterage Plans 

a. The CLF is responsible for presenting to the CATF requirements on which plans for 

pontoon causeways and lighterage support for the operation are based. The CATF prepares 

the pontoon causeway and lighterage plan in consultation with the CLF considering the 

following: 

(1) LF requirements. 

(2) Hydrographic conditions. 

(3) Availability of required types of sealift. 

b. The plan should include details on loading, transportation, launching, initial 

operational assignment, and provisions for maintenance and salvage of the causeway and 

lighterage equipment. It also contains specific instructions for transition of control. The 

plan will include provisions for retaining lighterage in the area after the assault shipping 

departs, for use in unloading follow-up shipping, and for other support of tactical 

operations. The plan is published as an annex to the CATF’s logistic plan. 

22. Engineer Plan 

 Engineer operations support the development of the operational environment for 

maneuver, enhance strategic and operational movement, and provide infrastructure for force 

protection. In addition to normal engineer operations (i.e., combat, general, and 

topographic), special considerations must be made for MCM and amphibious breaching, 

joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration, OPDSs, and amphibious bulk 

liquid transfer system connectivity. Involvement of the engineer staff is essential in the 

planning and execution of all phases of amphibious operations. 

a. Engineer Planning. The nature of engineer support for the LF in amphibious 

operations ranges from combat engineer support of a pioneer nature for the assault units to 

general engineer and CSS functions for the LF. The normal engineer tasks (mobility, 

countermobility, survivability, and general engineering) are applicable. 

(1) Combat Engineers. Combat engineer elements will normally be attached to 

the assault infantry units to perform a variety of tasks such as engineer reconnaissance, 

obstacle breaching and installation, development of BSAs, helicopter landing and VTOL 

site preparation, construction of beach exits, combat trails and pioneer roads, tactical 

bridging, integration of environmental planning issues, and water and bath services. 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-47 

(2) General Support Engineers. General support engineer elements will 

normally perform these tasks: deliberate clearing of obstacles, explosive ordnance disposal, 

vertical and horizontal construction, provision of utilities (including potable water and 

mobile electric power), installation and operation of bulk fuel systems ashore, maintenance 

and repair of routes of communication, topographic support, environmental management 

support, advanced airfield preparation, and bridge construction/maintenance. It is desirable 

for general support engineer elements to relieve combat engineer elements of 

responsibilities in rear areas as early as possible. 

b. Naval Construction Force (NCF). The NCF is the combined construction units of 

the Navy, including primarily the mobile construction battalions and the amphibious 

construction battalions. These units are part of the operating forces and represent the 

Navy’s capability for advanced base construction. 

(1) Naval Construction Regiment (NCR). When multiple naval mobile 

construction battalions (NMCBs) are deployed, an accompanying NCR will be deployed to 

serve as the C2 coordinator for the CATF/CLF and assigned naval construction support 

units. 

(2) NMCB. The NMCB provides construction support to Navy, Marine Corps, 

and other forces in military operations and conducts protection as required by the 

circumstances of the deployment situation. The NMCB provides a major deliberate 

construction capability and is employed to provide facilities that require extensive technical 

control and construction capability. The NMCB can be employed in expanding or 

constructing airfield complexes, constructing forward operating bases, repairing or 

developing ports, constructing major temporary or semi-permanent camps, extensively 

repairing or rebuilding principal bridges, and installing large-scale utilities systems (i.e., 

well drilling, water distribution systems). When NMCBs are assigned to the LF, these units 

will normally be attached to the CSS element. 

(3) Amphibious Construction Battalion (PHIBCB). The PHIBCB provides 

designated elements to CATF, supports the naval beach group during the initial assault and 

early phases of an amphibious operation, and assists the landing support element in 

operations that do not interfere with the PHIBCB’s primary mission. 

(4) NCF Planning Considerations. Engineer planning proceeds concurrently 

with tactical planning and other CSS planning. The organization for engineer support is 

based on the tasks to be accomplished and the priority established for principal tasks. The 

engineer appendix to the OPLAN or OPORD will include priorities for construction, road 

and bridge repairs, airfield development, concept of engineer operations, and control of 

Class IV engineer material. Planning considerations include the following: 

(a) Capabilities of assigned engineer units. 

(b) Requirements for new construction. 
Chapter V 

V-48 JP 3-02 

(c) Requirements for repair, maintenance, and improvement of facilities such 

as ports, roads, and airfields. 

(d) Transportation and support requirements of engineer support equipment 

and Class IV construction materials. 

(e) Limited beach trafficability of engineer support equipment. 

(f) Requirements for the repair, rehabilitation, and operation of existing 

utilities systems. 

(g) Announced priorities for semi-permanent construction. 

(h) Requirements for base development as established by higher authority. 

Further guidance can be found in JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

SECTION E. PROTECTION 

23. General 

 Protection of the AF is essential for all operations, but especially during ship-to-shore 

movement. Prior to commencing combat operations, Navy will normally conduct 

operations (e.g., air defense, undersea warfare, surface warfare, mine warfare) to gain local 

maritime and air superiority. Maritime superiority permits the conduct of amphibious 

operations without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. These operations are 

normally conducted by forces other than the AF, and may involve aircraft carriers, surface 

combatants, submarines, mine warfare ships, naval air forces, and other assets. These 

operations are conducted to counter and neutralize enemy aircraft, submarines, surface 

combatants, small boats, land-based anti-ship missiles, mines, and other potential threats to 

the AF. SOF and other naval and joint forces may also be used in the operations. During 

the planning phase of an amphibious operation, the protection of the ATF and LF is one of 

the most important considerations. 

24. Rehearsal and Movement Security 

 In formulating plans for movement to the operational area, sea routes and rendezvous 

points must be carefully selected. Sea routes through mineable waters, or close to enemy 

shore installations from which the enemy can carry out air, surface, or subsurface attacks, 

are to be avoided if possible. To minimize probability of detection, routes will be planned 

to avoid known or probable areas of enemy surveillance. Flexibility must be given in 

allocation of transit time to permit evasive courses to be steered by movement groups if it 

becomes necessary to avoid surface or subsurface threats. 

a. Because of similarity between the rehearsal and the actual operation, strict 

security measures must be enforced during rehearsals. The reconnaissance for, 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-49 

selection of, and arrangements for the use of the areas in which rehearsal(s) are to be held 

must be accomplished carefully. Deception measures may be necessary to ensure the 

security of the rehearsal. 

b. Unauthorized observation of the AF or unauthorized communications with external 

agencies must be prevented. The primary means of limiting unauthorized observation are 

restricting movements of personnel and ships, and establishing security perimeter patrols 

around the rehearsal area, both at sea and ashore. Special precautions must be taken to 

achieve communications security. 

c. The threat of reconnaissance satellites cannot be ignored. Execution of the 

rehearsal may have to be timed to coincide with those time periods when satellites cannot 

observe the rehearsal area, which may or may not coincide with planned execution times. 

Adjustment to the rehearsal (e.g., selection of misleading terrain, decentralized rehearsals, 

subordinate rehearsals separated by time and distance, and deliberately executed deception 

operations) may also be used to mask the purpose, location, and timing of the amphibious 

operation. 

d. In order to avoid detection of rehearsal activities, maximum use of wargaming and 

simulation will be considered. There are many events that take place in an amphibious 

operation that lend themselves to simulations. Denying observations of intentions is 

critical. 

25. Communications Security 

 COMSEC is essential and must be maintained throughout planning. 

See JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

26. Deception 

 The scope of employment of communications deception and countermeasures will 

normally be specified in the initiating directive. Additional AF requirements for 

employment of these techniques will be made known to and coordinated with higher 

authority during planning. 

See JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. 

27. Protective Measures 

 The LF must arrive in the landing area without critical reduction of its combat power. 

Measures necessary for protection of the LF elements in transit from the sea include all 

measures taken by any ATF organization operating at sea. 
Chapter V 

V-50 JP 3-02 

28. Defensive Counterair Operations 

Defensive counterair includes all measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and 

destroy or negate enemy air and missile forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly 

air environment. These operations employ both active and passive measures to protect US 

or multinational forces, assets, population centers, and interests. 

29. Mine Countermeasures and Mine Warfare 

a. General. Mining may interfere with the AF’s ability to maneuver within the AO, at 

sea, and on the beach. It may affect advance force operations and ship-to-shore operations 

through general unloading, and possibly hinder or preclude unloading of the AFOE. 

Planning for operational timelines, allocation of intelligence collection assets, AF task 

organization, the rate at which forces are established ashore, and deception operations can 

be affected by a mine threat. In a mined environment, available organic, national, and 

theater intelligence assets are obtained and used as soon as possible to gather information. 

Accomplishing this will enhance the ability of AF units to achieve surprise and rapidly 

project combat power or build up troops, equipment, and supplies ashore and into 

objectives located deeper inland. 

b. Considerations. The capability to counter mines and obstacles is essential to the 

conduct of amphibious operations, particularly ship-to-shore movement. The integration of 

MCM operations into the overall strategy of a landing plan is a responsibility shared by the 

ATF and LF commanders. In short, the ATF commander has primary responsibility for 

MCM operations in the water, and the LF commander is responsible for MCM operations 

An MH-53E Sea Dragon conducts mine countermeasure training using the MK-105 sled. 
Support to Amphibious Operations 

V-51 

ashore. To facilitate planning, participating commanders should provide detailed 

requirements for amphibious operations to the ATF commander, or MCMC, if assigned, as 

early as possible. Considerations should include location and size of the AO in comparison 

to available MCM assets, slow MCM transit times to the AO, rate of MCM operations to 

meet established deadlines, and requirements for protecting assets involved in the MCM 

effort. 

Refer to Chapter IV “Amphibious Operations Against Coastal Defenses,” for more 

information on MCM operations and mines. 

SECTION F. SEABASING 

30. General 

Seabasing is the deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint combat power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the 

JOA. Seabasing can increase the maneuver options for elements ashore by reducing the 

need to protect elements such as C2 and logistic supplies. The duration of seabasing 

depends on the tactical situation and the size and intensity of the operation. 

For more information on seabasing see NWP 3-62M/MCWP 3-31.7, Seabasing. 

31. Components 

 Depending on the assigned mission, a JFC can select and task-organize a wide range of 

naval, joint, or multinational forces. The elements comprising the sea base will be chosen 

based on the mission assigned to a JFC. Employing the seabasing construct provides a JFC 

with options for closing, assembling, employing, sustaining, and reconstituting forces for 

amphibious operations. Units that could constitute a sea base should possess a wide range 

of capabilities that complement each other. 

32. Planning Considerations 

a. Seabasing provides operational maneuver for ship-to-shore movement and assured 

access to the joint force during the action phase of amphibious operations while 

significantly reducing the footprint ashore, and minimizing the permissions required to 

operate from host nations. 

b. The situation on the ground may require the CATF and CLF to minimize the forces 

ashore. The seabasing construct allows certain LF and ATF support functions to remain 

aboard ship. 

c. With a sustainable logistics tail safely at sea, it leverages the ATF’s ability to 

operate from international waters, while providing support for the LF ashore. 
Chapter V 

V-52 JP 3-02 

d. Seabasing also increases the maneuver options for LF ashore by reducing the need 

to protect elements such as C2 and logistic supplies. 

e. Continuous sustainment of the sea base and supported forces ashore requires logistic 

operations and plans personnel to operate across the range of logistics. Limited logistic 

support will be available to support other forces ashore that arrived in the operational area 

via means other than the sea base. Planning considerations for sea base logistic support are 

as follows: 

(1) Infrastructure — the physical requirements and facilities needed to support 

and sustain force capability. 

(2) Capacity — the measure of how much force capability can be supported. 

(3) Rate — how fast things can be accomplished to support force capability over a 

given time under standard sets of conditions. 

(4) Interoperability — the degree to which seabasing can seamlessly integrate and 

support force capability. 

(5) Survivability — the ability to defend the sea base. 

(6) Accessibility — the flexibility to bypass or operate within the physical 

constraints presented by terrain, hydrography, weather, depth of operations, and level of 

threat. 
APPENDIX A 

LANDING FORCE LOGISTICS PLANNING 

A-1 

1. Landing Force Supply Planning 

 The types and quantities of supplies taken into the AOA/AO directly affect the 

requirement for air and surface transportation. For ease of control and planning for an 

amphibious operation, requirements for supply support are stated under two major 

categories — LF supplies and resupply. 

a. Determination of Requirements. Overall requirements for supply support of the 

LF indicate the total tonnage to be moved into the AOA/AO during a given period. Based 

on the statement of overall requirements for supply support, general requirements for the 

logistic support of the LF, including requirements for assault shipping and aerial resupply, 

are reported to higher authority. 

(1) Days of Supply (DOS). The first step in estimating overall requirements for 

supply support is to determine the DOS. The DOS is based on standard Service planning 

factors and logistics planning factors for the operation. In calculating the DOS, the 

requirements for each separate class of supply are considered. 

(2) Stockage Objective. The second step is to calculate the stockage objective 

for each class of supply. In operations of limited scope, limiting the stockage objective to 30 

DOS may be desirable. However, even the limited objective may not be reached until the 

latter stages of the assault. 

(3) Factors Influencing Stockage Objective. The amounts and types of supplies 

carried in the assault shipping must be compatible with the shipping space available and 

must meet the minimum requirements for support of the LF until termination of the 

amphibious operation. Before the stockage objective can be finally determined, the 

following factors must be carefully considered: 

(a) Adversary capabilities. 

(b) Availability of fixed-wing cargo aircraft. 

(c) Availability of shipping and distances involved. 

(d) Availability of ports and airfields. 

(4) Landing force operational reserve material (LFORM)/mission load 

allowance is a package of contingency supplies pre-positioned in amphibious ships to 

reduce loading time in contingencies. The LFORM package comprises Classes I (packaged 

operational rations), III(A) and III(W) (petroleum, oils, and lubricants), IV (field 

fortification material), and V(A) and V(W) (ammunition). However, other selected items 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-02 

can be included to support specific deployments and/or contingency operations at the 

discretion of the CLF. 

b. The Plan for Landing Supplies. In coordination with the CATF, the CLF 

develops plans for selective unloading of supplies in the objective area. The CATF 

allocates landing ships and craft required to carry supplies from ship to shore and to 

establish floating dumps. Together, in the plan for landing supplies, the CLF and CATF 

plan the ship-to-shore movement of supplies and equipment so that it is responsive to LF 

requirements. TACLOG groups are established to ensure that responsiveness is achieved. 

In developing the plan for landing supplies, the following factors are considered: 

(1) Types and amounts of supplies to be carried ashore by LF units as prescribed 

loads. 

(2) Types and amounts of supplies to be established in floating dumps and prestaged helicopter-lifted supplies. 

(3) Levels of supply to be established ashore. 

(4) Techniques that ensure the orderly, rapid buildup of supply levels ashore, such 

as: 

(a) Use of landing craft and vehicles carrying assault troops to ferry 

designated types and amounts of supplies ashore on each trip. 

US Marine MV-22 Osprey’s provide lift for resupply and replacements 

for the landing force ashore. 
Landing Force Logistics Planning 

A-3 

(b) Provision for the mobile loading of each vehicle of the LF not involved in 

the lift of the assault elements ashore. 

(c) Means for facilitating the transfer of supplies from ship to shore, 

including the most efficient use of such items as pallets, containers, cargo nets, and slings. 

c. Supply Operations Ashore. During the early stages of the attack, the ATF ships 

are the primary supply source for the LF. Prior to the establishment of landing support 

ashore, critical supplies are furnished directly to the requesting unit by the CSS element, 

through the TACLOG group, from amphibious shipping. Subsequent to the establishment 

of landing support units ashore, combat elements are supplied through shore-based CSS 

facilities. As the operation progresses, several supply installations may be established 

within the beachhead by other CSS units of the LF. When adequate supply levels have 

been attained in installations ashore and transportation means are available, supply support 

of LF units will be provided from these areas. Supply sources may be augmented by the 

aerial delivery of supplies by fixed-wing aircraft operating from bases outside of landing 

area. The ships of the ATF continue as the primary source of immediate resupply for the 

LF. 

(1) Supply control and distribution are accomplished at both the LF level and at 

the lowest levels that have an organic supply capability; e.g., battalion. These levels are 

most important within the overall function of supply, especially during the critical transition 

from sea-based to shore-based supply support during an amphibious operation. Adherence 

to the following principles during the transitional and ashore stages of the operation will 

result in a control and distribution system that is reliable, flexible, and responsive. 

(a) Control. The flow of supply should be direct from source to consumer; 

supplies should be rehandled as infrequently as possible. 

(b) Distribution. The distribution system may provide either supply point 

distribution, wherein the unit draws supplies from a central location, or unit distribution, 

wherein the supplying agency delivers supplies to the unit. During the initial stages of the 

amphibious assault, unit distribution is normally required and is effected through the 

organization for landing support in conjunction with the TACLOG group and consists of 

delivery of pre-positioned emergency supplies. During later stages of the operation, as 

additional CSS units phase ashore and supplies are built up, supply point distribution may 

be employed. 

(2) Salvage is the term applied to materiel that has become unserviceable, lost, 

abandoned, or discarded, but which is recoverable. It includes captured adversary 

equipment. Unit commanders at all levels are responsible for salvage collection and 

evacuation within their respective unit areas. Designated salvage organizations receive and 

process salvage received from combat units. 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-02 

2. Landing Force Maintenance Planning 

 Maintenance operations support the administrative and functional needs of the LF units 

at the organizational (unit) and intermediate levels. LF commanders, the senior CSS unit 

commander, and the LF logistics staff officer and staff share responsibilities for 

maintenance planning. 

a. Planning Considerations. The LF maintenance plan should be based on an 

assumption that initial capabilities in the AOA/AO, especially once ashore, will be limited. 

The maintenance plan should provide for: 

(1) Clearly defined maintenance capabilities and responsibilities during each 

phase of the operation. 

(2) Early landing of maintenance personnel and critical repair parts. 

(3) Simple and responsive maintenance request procedures, including use of 

floating dumps if applicable. 

(4) Decentralized execution of maintenance action through contact teams and 

mobile repair facilities. 

(5) Executing repairs as rapidly and as close to the using unit as possible. 

(6) Coordinated employment of maintenance support with other CSS functions. 

(7) Provisions for battlefield salvage of large combat systems or vehicles via 

maintenance channels. 

b. Planning Requirements. All LF units must determine their maintenance 

requirements and compare them against their organic (unit level) capabilities. Shortfalls 

must be identified during the planning process and forwarded to higher and/or supporting 

unit commands. An estimate of maintenance requirements includes an in-depth 

examination of each of the following: 

(1) Available personnel; required skills and quantity. 

(2) Repair parts; consumables and secondary repairable items. 

(3) Tools and equipment; by type, quantity, and location. 

(4) Facilities support requirements during embarkation, movement, rehearsal, and 

action (including BSAs and CSSAs). 

(5) Requesting and reporting procedures, including data requirements, routing, 

distribution, and means of transmission. 
Landing Force Logistics Planning 

A-5 

(6) Transportation requirements for equipment recovery and salvage, contact 

teams, and distribution of repair parts and materials. 

(7) External maintenance units or agencies available for support. 

(8) Assistance/coordination with other subordinate CSS elements. 

3. Landing Force Transportation Planning 

 Transportation consists of movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment by water, 

air, or surface means. Transportation requirements are mainly based on two factors — the 

character of the operation and the types and quantities of supplies required in the 

objective area. Transportation tasks may include unloading and transfer of supplies 

ashore, forwarding of LF supplies and materials from the landing site(s), and operating the 

land transportation system (marking of routes, convoy control, etc.) within the AO. 

a. Transportation Requirements

(1) Requirements are normally stated in tons of supplies and equipment, gallons 

of fuel, or number of personnel to be moved during a particular period. The estimated 

distances of these movements will also play a key role in the planning estimate. 

(2) Detailed requirements state the specific numbers, types, and capacities of 

vehicles, bulk fuel facilities, and aircraft required at specific times and places. They also 

state the schedules of operation and routes to be traversed. 

(3) Plans for the employment of engineer, maintenance, service, and control 

personnel can be developed. Particular consideration must be given to the supply of 

aviation fuel. Although initiating air operations ashore through the use of packaged fuel is 

possible, continuing supply of aviation fuel requires the installation of bulk fuel systems and 

a high-capacity mobile liquid fuel transport capability ashore as soon as possible. 

(4) The demarkation line between ATF and LF responsibilities for bulk 

petroleum, oils, and lubricants supply is normally the high water mark. Delivering and 

transporting fuel to internal storage distribution areas is an LF responsibility. 

b. Planning Considerations. Transportation planning is influenced by: 

(1) The adequacy of the LOCs in the landing area (roads, rail, and waterway). 

(2) The extent of degradation of LOCs by weather, adversary action, and use. 

(3) The requirements for handling bulk fuel and water. 

(4) The availability of helicopters for transportation. 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-02 

c. Transportation in the AO

(1) The CLF, in coordination with the CATF, develops plans to sustain LF 

operations ashore. 

(2) The CLF establishes priorities for movement and ensures adequate movement 

and traffic control within the LF operational area, optimizing the use of assets and facilities. 

(3) The LF CSS plan makes provision for: 

(a) Transportation assets scheduled for landing during the initial landing and 

unloading period. 

(b) Combat loads prescribed for each vehicle prior to landing and once 

ashore. 

(c) Attachment of transportation units to combat, combat support, or CSS 

elements of the LF. 

(d) LF traffic control measures employed ashore. 
APPENDIX B 

REFERENCES 

B-1 

The development of JP 3-02 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

a. CJCSM 3500.04E, Universal Joint Task List. 

b. CJCSM 6231 Series, Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications 

System. 

2. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

b. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

c. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

d. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE). 

e. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

f. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

g. JP 3-04, Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations. 

h. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 

i. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 

j. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments.

k. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 

l. JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 

m. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

n. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. 

o. JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations. 

p. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-02 

q. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

r. JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

s. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

t. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

3. Service Publications 

a. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare.

b. FM 3-0, Operations.

c. FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations. 

d. FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization. 

e. FM 100-26, The Air/Ground Operations Systems. 

f. NTTP 3-02.1.3, Amphibious/Expeditionary Operations Air Control. 

g. NTTP 3-02.14, The Naval Beach Group. 

h. NWP 3-02.21, MSC Support of Amphibious Operations. 

i. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting. 

j. MCDP-6, Command and Control. 

k. MCWP 3-13, Employment of Amphibious Assault Vehicles. 

l. MCWP 3-25.10, Low Altitude Air Defense Handbook. 

m. MCWP 3-23, Offensive Air Support. 

4. Multi-Service Publications 

 a. MCWP 3-31.5/NTTP 3-02.1M, Ship to Shore Movement. 

 b. MCWP 3-31.6/NTTP 3-02.2, Supporting Arms Coordination in Amphibious 

Operations.
APPENDIX C 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

C-1 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint 

Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments 

should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and 

appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the US Navy. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for 

this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7). 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-02, 19 September 2001, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious 

Operations. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: CNO WASHINGTON DC//N511// 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10// 

 Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans 

and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that 

directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. 

The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when 

changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

____________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-02 

5. Distribution of Publications 

 Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be 

in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the 

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication 

to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy 

(Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 

Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 
GLOSSARY 

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

GL-1 

AADC area air defense commander 

AATCC amphibious air traffic control center 

AAV amphibious assault vehicle 

ACA airspace control authority 

ACE aviation combat element (MAGTF) 

ACM airspace coordinating measure 

ACO airspace control order 

ACP airspace control plan 

ADC air defense commander 

ADS air defense section 

ADZ amphibious defense zone 

AE assault echelon 

AF amphibious force 

AFOE assault follow-on echelon 

ALLOREQ air allocation request 

AO area of operations 

AOA amphibious objective area 

APF afloat pre-positioning force 

ASCS air support coordination section 

ASR air support request 

ATCS air traffic control section 

ATF amphibious task force 

ATG amphibious task group 

ATO air tasking order 

BLT battalion landing team 

BSA beach support area 

C2 command and control 

CAP crisis action planning 

CAS close air support 

CATF commander, amphibious task force 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCO central control officer 

CE command element (MAGTF) 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CLA landing craft air cushion launch area 

CLF commander, landing force 

CLZ landing craft air cushion landing zone 

CO commanding officer 

COA course of action 

COG center of gravity 

COMSEC communications security 
Glossary 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CP command post 

CRTS casualty receiving and treatment ship 

CSS combat service support 

CSSA combat service support area 

CWC composite warfare commander 

DASC direct air support center 

DOS days of supply 

DZ drop zone 

EA electronic attack 

EMCON emission control 

EPW enemy prisoner of war 

EW electronic warfare 

FC fires cell 

FFC force fires coordinator 

FFCC force fires coordination center 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FM field manual (Army) 

FSA fire support area 

FSC fire support coordinator 

FSCC fire support coordination center 

FSCL fire support coordination line 

FSCM fire support coordination measure 

G-6 assistant chief of staff for communications 

GCE ground combat element (MAGTF) 

HCS helicopter coordination section 

HDC helicopter direction center 

HF high frequency 

HIDACZ high-density airspace control zone 

HLZ helicopter landing zone 

HSS health service support 

HST helicopter support team 

HWM high water mark 

INFOSEC information security 

IR intelligence requirement 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFSOCC joint force special operations component command 

GL-2 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

JIOC joint intelligence operations center 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

JISE joint intelligence support element 

JLOTS joint logistics over-the-shore 

JOA joint operations area 

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

JP joint publication 

JTF joint task force 

LCAC landing craft, air cushion 

LCE logistics combat element (MAGTF) 

LCO landing craft air cushion control officer 

LCS landing craft air cushion control ship 

LF landing force 

LFORM landing force operational reserve material 

LFSP landing force support party 

LHA amphibious assault ship (general purpose) 

LHD amphibious assault ship (multipurpose) 

LOC line of communications 

LOD line of departure 

LOTS logistics over-the-shore 

LPD amphibious transport dock 

LSD dock landing ship 

LZ landing zone 

MACCS Marine air command and control system 

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force 

MCDP Marine Corps doctrine publication 

MCM mine countermeasures 

MCMC mine countermeasures commander 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication 

MEB Marine expeditionary brigade 

MEF Marine expeditionary force 

METOC meteorological and oceanographic 

MEU Marine expeditionary unit 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MOPP mission-oriented protective posture 

MPF maritime pre-positioning force 

MSC Military Sealift Command 

MSOC Marine special operations company 

N-6 Navy component communications staff officer 

NCF naval construction force 

NCR naval construction regiment 

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation 

GL-3 
Glossary 

nm nautical mile 

NMCB naval mobile construction battalion 

NSFS naval surface fire support 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NWP Navy warfare publication 

OPCON operational control 

OPDS offshore petroleum discharge system 

OPGEN operation general matter 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OPSEC operations security 

OPTASK operation task 

OTH over the horizon 

PCO primary control officer 

PHIBCB amphibious construction battalion 

PIR priority intelligence requirement 

POE port of embarkation 

RADC regional air defense commander 

ROE rules of engagement 

RO/RO roll-on/roll-off 

SAC supporting arms coordinator 

SACC supporting arms coordination center 

SADC sector air defense commander 

SCO secondary control officer 

SFCP shore fire control party 

SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 

SOF special operations forces 

SPINS special instructions 

SPMAGTF special purpose Marine air-ground task force 

SZ surf zone 

TA target acquisition 

TAC(A) tactical air coordinator (airborne) 

TACC tactical air command center (Marine Corps); tactical air 

 control center (Navy) 

TACLOG tactical-logistical 

TACON tactical control 

TACP tactical air control party 

TADC tactical air direction center 

TAO tactical air officer 

TAOC tactical air operations center (Marine Corps) 

TIC target information center 

GL-4 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

TIM toxic industrial material 

UAS unmanned aircraft system 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

VLZ vertical landing zone 

VSW very shallow water 

VTOL vertical takeoff and landing 

GL-5 
Glossary 

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for 

these terms and definitions. 

action phase. In amphibious operations, the period of time between the arrival of the 

landing forces of the amphibious force in the operational area and the accomplishment 

of their mission. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

advance force. A temporary organization within the amphibious task force, which 

precedes the main body to the objective area, for preparing the objective for the main 

assault by conducting such operations as reconnaissance, seizure of supporting 

positions, mine countermeasures, preliminary bombardment, underwater demolitions, 

and air support. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition 

and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

afloat pre-positioning force. Shipping maintained in full operational status to afloat preposition military equipment and supplies in support of combatant commanders’ 

operation plans. The afloat pre-positioning force consists of the three maritime prepositioning ships squadrons, the Army’s afloat pre-positioning stocks-3 ships, and the 

Navy, Defense Logistics Agency, and Air Force ships. Also called APF. (This term 

and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

airspace control area. Airspace that is laterally defined by the boundaries of the 

operational area, and may be subdivided into airspace control sectors. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall responsibility 

for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also 

called ACA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

air support coordination section. In amphibious operations, the section of the Navy 

tactical air control center designated to coordinate, control, and integrate all direct 

support aircraft (i.e., close air support) and assault support operations. Also called 

ASCS. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

air traffic control section. In amphibious operations, the section of the Navy tactical air 

control center designed to provide initial safe passage, radar control, and surveillance 

for close air support aircraft in the operational area. Also called ATCS. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

GL-6 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

air transport group. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

amphibious assault. The principal type of amphibious operation that involves establishing 

a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious assault area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

amphibious assault landing. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

amphibious assault ship (general purpose). A naval ship designed to embark, deploy, 

and land elements of a landing force in an assault by helicopters, landing craft, 

amphibious vehicles, and by combinations of these methods. Also called LHA. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-04) 

amphibious assault ship (multipurpose). A naval ship designed to embark, deploy, and 

land elements of a landing force in an assault by helicopters, landing craft, amphibious 

vehicles, and by combinations of these methods. Also called LHD. (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term “amphibious assault ship (dock)” and its definition 

and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

amphibious breaching. The conduct of a deliberate breaching operation specifically 

designed to overcome antilanding defenses in order to conduct an amphibious assault. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

amphibious chart. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

amphibious command ship. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

amphibious construction battalion. A permanently commissioned naval unit, subordinate 

to the commander, naval beach group, designed to provide an administrative unit from 

which personnel and equipment are formed in tactical elements and made available to 

appropriate commanders to operate pontoon causeways, transfer barges, warping tugs, 

and assault bulk fuel systems, and to meet salvage requirements of the naval beach 

party. Also called PHIBCB. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and 

its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

amphibious control group. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

amphibious defense zone. The area encompassing the amphibious objective area and the 

adjoining airspace required by accompanying naval forces for the purpose of air 

defense. Also called an ADZ. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

amphibious demonstration. A type of amphibious operation conducted for the purpose of 

deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy 

into a course of action unfavorable to him. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

GL-7 
Glossary 

amphibious force. An amphibious task force and a landing force together with other 

forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. Also called 

AF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious group. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

amphibious lift. The total capacity of assault shipping utilized in an amphibious operation, 

expressed in terms of personnel, vehicles, and measurement or weight tons of supplies. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious objective area. A geographical area (delineated for command and control 

purposes in the initiating directive) within which is located the objective(s) to be 

secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure 

accomplishment of the amphibious force’s mission and must provide sufficient area for 

conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. Also called AOA. (This term and 

its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion 

in JP 1-02.) 

amphibious objective study. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

amphibious operation. A military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious 

force, embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing 

force ashore to accomplish the assigned mission. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious planning. The process of planning for an amphibious operation, distinguished 

by the necessity for concurrent, parallel, and detailed planning by all participating 

forces. The planning pattern is cyclical in nature, composed of a series of analyses and 

judgments of operational situations, each stemming from those that have preceded. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious raid. A type of amphibious operation involving swift incursion into or 

temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious reconnaissance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

amphibious reconnaissance unit. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

amphibious shipping. Organic Navy ships specifically designed to transport, land, and 

support landing forces in amphibious assault operations and capable of being loaded or 

unloaded by naval personnel without external assistance in the amphibious objective 

area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

GL-8 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

amphibious squadron. A tactical and administrative organization composed of 

amphibious assault shipping to transport troops and their equipment for an amphibious 

assault operation. Also called PHIBRON. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious striking forces. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

amphibious task force. A Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious 

operations. The amphibious task force, together with the landing force and other 

forces, constitutes the amphibious force. Also called ATF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-02) 

amphibious transport dock. A ship designed to transport and land troops, equipment, 

and supplies by means of embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and 

helicopters. Designated as LPD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious transport group. A subdivision of an amphibious task force composed 

primarily of transport ships. The size of the transport group will depend upon the 

scope of the operation. Ships of the transport group will be combat-loaded to support 

the landing force scheme of maneuver ashore. A transport unit will usually be formed 

to embark troops and equipment to be landed over a designated beach or to embark all 

helicopter-borne troops and equipment. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious vehicle. A wheeled or tracked vehicle capable of operating on both land and 

water. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious vehicle availability table. A tabulation of the type and number of 

amphibious vehicles available primarily for assault landings and for support of other 

elements of the operation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious vehicle employment plan. A plan showing in tabular form the planned 

employment of amphibious vehicles in landing operations, including their employment 

after the initial movement to the beach. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious vehicle launching area. An area, in the vicinity of and to seaward of the line 

of departure, to which landing ships proceed and launch amphibious vehicles. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

amphibious withdrawal. A type of amphibious operation involving the extraction of 

forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

approach schedule. In amphibious operations, this schedule indicates, for each scheduled 

wave, the time of departure from the rendezvous area, from the line of departure, and 

from other control points and the time of arrival at the beach. (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

GL-9 
Glossary 

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, 

or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a 

single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the 

preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and 

communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. 

Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to 

the area air defense commander’s headquarters. Also called AADC. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and 

maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational 

area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component 

commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

assault. 1. The climax of an attack, closing with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. 2. In 

an amphibious operation, the period of time between the arrival of the major assault 

forces of the amphibious task force in the objective area and the accomplishment of the 

amphibious task force mission. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02). 3. To make a short, 

violent, but well-ordered attack against a local objective, such as a gun emplacement, a 

fort, or a machine gun nest. 4. A phase of an airborne operation beginning with 

delivery by air of the assault echelon of the force into the objective area and extending 

through attack of assault objectives and consolidation of the initial airhead. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-18) 

assault area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

assault area diagram. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

assault breaching. A part of amphibious breaching in support of an amphibious assault 

involving a fire support mission using precision guided munitions to neutralize mines 

and obstacles in the surf zone and on the beach. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

assault craft. A landing craft or amphibious vehicle primarily employed for landing troops 

and equipment in the assault waves of an amphibious operation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-02) 

assault craft unit. A permanently commissioned naval organization, subordinate to the 

commander, naval beach group, that contains landing craft and crews necessary to 

provide lighterage required in an amphibious operation. Also called ACU. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

assault echelon. In amphibious operations, the element of a force comprised of tailored 

units and aircraft assigned to conduct the initial assault on the operational area. Also 

called AE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

GL-10 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

assault follow-on echelon. In amphibious operations, that echelon of the assault troops, 

vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies that, though not needed to initiate the 

assault, is required to support and sustain the assault. In order to accomplish its 

purpose, it is normally required in the objective area no later than five days after 

commencement of the assault landing. Also called AFOE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-02) 

assault phase. In an airborne operation, a phase beginning with delivery by air of the 

assault echelon of the force into the objective area and extending through attack of 

assault objectives and consolidation of the initial airhead. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02 

and sourced to JP 3-18.) 

assault schedule. In amphibious operations, this schedule provides the formation, 

composition, and timing of waves landing over the beach. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

assault shipping. Shipping assigned to the amphibious task force and utilized for 

transporting assault troops, vehicles, equipment, and supplies to the objective area. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

attack group. A subordinate task organization of the Navy forces of an amphibious task 

force. It is composed of assault shipping and supporting naval units designated to 

transport, protect, land, and initially support a landing group. (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

battalion landing team. In an amphibious operation, an infantry battalion normally 

reinforced by necessary combat and service elements; the basic unit for planning an 

assault landing. Also called BLT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

beach. 1. The area extending from the shoreline inland to a marked change in 

physiographic form or material, or to the line of permanent vegetation (coastline). 2. In 

amphibious operations, that portion of the shoreline designated for landing of a tactical 

organization. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

beachhead. A designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore that, when seized 

and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and provides 

maneuver space requisite for subsequent projected operations ashore. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

beach minefield. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

beach organization. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

GL-11 
Glossary 

beach party. The Navy component of the landing force support party under the tactical 

control of the landing force support party commander. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

beach reserves. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

beach support area. In amphibious operations, the area to the rear of a landing force or 

elements thereof, established and operated by shore party units, which contains the 

facilities for the unloading of troops and materiel and the support of the forces ashore; 

it includes facilities for the evacuation of wounded, enemy prisoners of war, and 

captured materiel. Also called BSA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

boat diagram. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

boat group. The basic organization of landing craft. One boat group is organized for each 

battalion landing team (or equivalent) to be landed in the first trip of landing craft or 

amphibious vehicles. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

boat lane. A lane for amphibious assault landing craft, which extends from the line of 

departure to the beach. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

boat space. The space and weight factor used to determine the capacity of boats, landing 

craft, and amphibious vehicles. With respect to landing craft and amphibious vehicles, 

it is based on the requirements of one person with individual equipment. The person is 

assumed to weigh 224 pounds and to occupy 13.5 cubic feet of space. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

carrier strike group. A standing naval task group consisting of a carrier, embarked 

airwing, surface combatants, and submarines as assigned in direct support, operating in 

mutual support with the task of destroying hostile submarine, surface, and air forces 

within the group's assigned operational area and striking at targets along hostile shore 

lines or projecting power inland. Also called CSG. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term “carrier battle group” and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

casualty receiving and treatment ship. In amphibious operations, a ship designated to 

receive, provide treatment for, and transfer casualties. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

causeway launching area. An area located near the line of departure but clear of the 

approach lanes to an area located in the inner transport area. (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom 

of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

GL-12 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

central control officer. The officer designated by the amphibious task force commander 

for the overall coordination of the waterborne ship-to-shore movement. The central 

control officer is embarked in the central control ship. Also called CCO. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

close support area. Those parts of the ocean operating areas nearest to, but not necessarily 

in, the objective area. They are assigned to naval support carrier strike groups, surface 

action groups, surface action units, and certain logistic combat service support 

elements. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and 

are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

colored beach. That portion of usable coastline sufficient for the assault landing of a 

regimental landing team or similar sized unit. In the event that the landing force 

consists of a single battalion landing team, a colored beach will be used and no further 

subdivision of the beach is required. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

combat loading. The arrangement of personnel and the stowage of equipment and supplies 

in a manner designed to conform to the anticipated tactical operation of the 

organization embarked. Each individual item is stowed so that it can be unloaded at 

the required time. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

combat service support area. An area ashore that is organized to contain the necessary 

supplies, equipment, installations, and elements to provide the landing force with 

combat service support throughout the operation. Also called CSSA. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

command element. The core element of a Marine air-ground task force that is the 

headquarters. The command element is composed of the commander, general or 

executive and special staff sections, headquarters section, and requisite 

communications support, intelligence, and reconnaissance forces necessary to 

accomplish the mission. The command element provides command and control, 

intelligence, and other support essential for effective planning and execution of 

operations by the other elements of the Marine air-ground task force. The command 

element varies in size and composition. Also called CE. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

commander, amphibious task force. The Navy officer designated in the initiating 

directive as the commander of the amphibious task force. Also called CATF. (This 

term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

commander, landing force. The officer designated in the initiating directive as the 

commander of the landing force for an amphibious operation. Also called CLF. (This 

term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

GL-13 
Glossary 

commanding officer of troops. On a ship that has embarked units, a designated officer 

(usually the senior embarking unit commander) who is responsible for the 

administration, discipline, and training of all embarked units. Also called COT. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

composite warfare commander. An officer to whom the officer in tactical command of a 

naval task organization may delegate authority to conduct some or all of the offensive 

and defensive functions of the force. Also called CWC. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

consecutive voyage charter. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

control group. Personnel, ships, and craft designated to control the waterborne ship-toshore movement. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

covering fire. 1. Fire used to protect troops when they are within range of enemy small 

arms. 2. In amphibious usage, fire delivered prior to the landing to cover preparatory 

operations such as underwater demolition or mine countermeasures. (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

D-day. See times. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

departure point. 1. A navigational check point used by aircraft as a marker for setting 

course. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-17) 2. In amphibious operations, an air control 

point at the seaward end of the helicopter approach lane system from which helicopter 

waves are dispatched along the selected helicopter approach lane to the initial point. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

deployment diagram. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

distant retirement area. In amphibious operations, the sea area located to seaward of the 

landing area. This area is divided into a number of operating areas to which assault 

ships may retire and operate in the event of adverse weather or to prevent concentration 

of ships in the landing area. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and 

its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

distant support area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

dock landing ship. A ship designed to transport and launch loaded amphibious craft and/or 

amphibian vehicles with their crews and embarked personnel and/or equipment and to 

render limited docking and repair services to small ships and craft. Also called LSD. 

(This term and its definition modify the existing term “landing ship dock” and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

GL-14 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

embarkation phase. In amphibious operations, the phase that encompasses the orderly 

assembly of personnel and materiel and their subsequent loading aboard ships and/or 

aircraft in a sequence designed to meet the requirements of the landing force concept of 

operations ashore. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02.1) 

embarkation plans. The plans prepared by the landing force and appropriate subordinate 

commanders containing instructions and information concerning the organization for 

embarkation, assignment to shipping, supplies and equipment to be embarked, location 

and assignment of embarkation areas, control and communication arrangements, 

movement schedules and embarkation sequence, and additional pertinent instructions 

relating to the embarkation of the landing force. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

establishing directive. An order issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

evacuation control ship. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fire support area. An appropriate maneuver area assigned to fire support ships by the 

naval force commander from which they can deliver gunfire support to an amphibious 

operation. Also called FSA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

fire support station. An exact location at sea within a fire support area from which a fire 

support ship delivers fire. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

floating dump. Emergency supplies preloaded in landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or in 

landing ships. Floating dumps are located in the vicinity of the appropriate control 

officer, who directs their landing as requested by the troop commander concerned. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

floating reserve. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

follow-up. In amphibious operations, the reinforcements and stores carried on transport 

ships and aircraft (not originally part of the amphibious force) that are offloaded after 

the assault and assault follow-on echelons have been landed. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-02) 

follow-up shipping. Ships not originally a part of the amphibious task force but which 

deliver troops and supplies to the objective area after the action phase has begun. (This 

term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department 

of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical 

information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect 

against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

GL-15 
Glossary 

general unloading period. In amphibious operations, that part of the ship-to-shore 

movement in which unloading is primarily logistic in character, and emphasizes speed 

and volume of unloading operations. It encompasses the unloading of units and cargo 

from the ships as rapidly as facilities on the beach permit. It proceeds without regard to 

class, type, or priority of cargo, as permitted by cargo handling facilities ashore. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

go no-go. The condition or state of operability of a component or system: “go,” functioning 

properly; or “no-go,” not functioning properly. Alternatively, a critical point at which 

a decision to proceed or not must be made. (JP 1-02) 

helicopter coordination section. The section within the Navy tactical air control center 

that coordinates rotary-wing air operations with all helicopter direction centers and air 

traffic control center(s) in the amphibious force. Also called HCS. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

helicopter direction center. In amphibious operations, the primary direct control agency 

for the helicopter group/unit commander operating under the overall control of the 

tactical air control center. Also called HDC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

helicopter transport area. Areas to the seaward and on the flanks of the outer transport 

and landing ship areas, but preferably inside the area screen, used for launching and/or 

recovering helicopters. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

H-hour. See times. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

high-density airspace control zone. Airspace designated in an airspace control plan or 

airspace control order, in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and 

varied weapons and airspace users. A high-density airspace control zone has defined 

dimensions which usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids. 

Access to a high-density airspace control zone is normally controlled by the maneuver 

commander. The maneuver commander can also direct a more restrictive weapons 

status within the high-density airspace control zone. Also called HIDACZ. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

horizon. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

hydrographic reconnaissance. Reconnaissance of an area of water to determine depths, 

beach gradients, the nature of the bottom, and the location of coral reefs, rocks, shoals, 

and man-made obstacles. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

initial reserves. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

initial unloading period. In amphibious operations, that part of the ship-to-shore 

movement in which unloading is primarily tactical in character and must be instantly 

GL-16 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

responsive to landing force requirements. All elements intended to land during this 

period are serialized. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

initiating directive. An order to a subordinate commander to conduct military operations 

as directed. It is issued by the unified commander, subunified commander, Service 

component commander, or joint force commander delegated overall responsibility for 

the operation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-18) 

inner transport area. In amphibious operations, an area as close to the landing beach as 

depth of water, navigational hazards, boat traffic, and enemy action permit, to which 

transports may move to expedite unloading. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

integrated planning. In amphibious operations, the planning accomplished by 

commanders and staffs of corresponding echelons from parallel chains of command 

within the amphibious task force. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

joint amphibious operation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

joint amphibious task force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

joint logistics over-the-shore operations. Operations in which Navy and Army logistics 

over-the-shore forces conduct logistics over-the-shore operations together under a joint 

force commander. Also called JLOTS operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2) 

joint terminal attack controller. A qualified (certified) Service member who, from a 

forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and 

other offensive air operations. A qualified and current joint terminal attack controller 

will be recognized across the Department of Defense as capable and authorized to 

perform terminal attack control. Also called JTAC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09.3) 

landing area. 1. That part of the operational area within which are conducted the landing 

operations of an amphibious force. It includes the beach, the approaches to the beach, 

the transport areas, the fire support areas, the airspace above it, and the land included in 

the advance inland to the initial objective. 2. (Airborne) The general area used for 

landing troops and materiel either by airdrop or air landing. This area includes one or 

more drop zones or landing strips. 3. Any specially prepared or selected surface of 

land, water, or deck designated or used for takeoff and landing of aircraft. (This term 

and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

landing area diagram. A graphic means of showing, for amphibious operations, the 

beach designations, boat lanes, organization of the line of departure, scheduled waves, 

landing ship area, transport areas, and the fire support areas in the immediate vicinity 

of the boat lanes. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “assault area 

diagram” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

GL-17 
Glossary 

landing attack. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

landing beach. That portion of a shoreline usually required for the landing of a battalion 

landing team. However, it may also be that portion of a shoreline constituting a tactical 

locality (such as the shore of a bay) over which a force larger or smaller than a 

battalion landing team may be landed. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

landing craft. A craft employed in amphibious operations, specifically designed for 

carrying troops and their equipment and for beaching, unloading, and retracting. It is 

also used for resupply operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

landing craft and amphibious vehicle assignment table. A table showing the 

assignment of personnel and materiel to each landing craft and amphibious vehicle and 

the assignment of the landing craft and amphibious vehicles to waves for the ship-toshore movement. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

landing craft availability table. A tabulation of the type and number of landing craft that 

will be available from each ship of the transport group. The table is the basis for the 

assignment of landing craft to the boat groups for the ship-to-shore movement. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

landing diagram. A graphic means of illustrating the plan for the ship-to-shore 

movement. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

landing force. A Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious 

operations. The landing force, together with the amphibious task force and other 

forces, constitute the amphibious force. Also called LF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

landing force supplies. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

landing force support party. A temporary landing force organization composed of Navy 

and landing force elements, that facilitates the ship-to-shore movement and provides 

initial combat support and combat service support to the landing force. The landing 

force support party is brought into existence by a formal activation order issued by the 

commander, landing force. Also called LFSP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

landing group. In amphibious operations, a subordinate task organization of the landing 

force capable of conducting landing operations, under a single tactical command, 

against a position or group of positions. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

landing group commander. In amphibious operations, the officer designated by the 

commander, landing force as the single tactical commander of a subordinate task 

organization capable of conducting landing operations against a position or group of 

positions. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

GL-18 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

landing plan. In amphibious operations, a collective term referring to all individually 

prepared naval and landing force documents that, taken together, present in detail all 

instructions for execution of the ship-to-shore movement. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term and definition and are approved for inclusion in the next 

edition of JP 1-02 and sourced to JP 3-02.) 

landing schedule. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

landing sequence table. A document that incorporates the detailed plans for ship-to-shore 

movement of nonscheduled units. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

landing ship. An assault ship which is designed for long sea voyages and for rapid 

unloading over and on to a beach. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

landing site. 1. A site within a landing zone containing one or more landing points. 2. In 

amphibious operations, a continuous segment of coastline over which troops, 

equipment and supplies can be landed by surface means. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-02) 

L-hour. See times. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

lighterage. The process in which small craft are used to transport cargo or personnel from 

ship to shore. Lighterage may be performed using amphibians, landing craft, discharge 

lighters, causeways, and barges. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.6) 

line of departure. 1. In land warfare, a line designated to coordinate the departure of attack 

elements. Also called LD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-31) 2. In amphibious warfare, a 

suitably marked offshore coordinating line to assist assault craft to land on designated 

beaches at scheduled times the seaward end of a boat lane. Also called LOD. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and 

its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

logistics over-the-shore operations. The loading and unloading of ships without the 

benefit of deep draft-capable, fixed port facilities; or as a means of moving forces 

closer to tactical assembly areas dependent on threat force capabilities. Also called 

LOTS operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.6) 

maritime pre-positioning force operation. A rapid deployment and assembly of a Marine 

expeditionary force in a secure area using a combination of intertheater airlift and 

forward-deployed maritime pre-positioning ships. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.6) 

marker ship. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

massed fire. 1. The fire of the batteries of two or more ships directed against a single 

target. 2. Fire from a number of weapons directed at a single target point or small area. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

GL-19 
Glossary 

Military Sealift Command. A major command of the US Navy reporting to Commander 

Fleet Forces Command, and the US Transportation Command's component command 

responsible for designated common-user sealift transportation services to deploy, 

employ, sustain, and redeploy US forces on a global basis. Also called MSC. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2) 

Military Sealift Command-controlled ships. None. (Approved for removal from JP 

1-02.) 

movement group. Those ships and embarked units that load out and proceed to 

rendezvous in the objective area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

movement phase. In amphibious operations, the period during which various elements of 

the amphibious force move from points of embarkation to the operational area. This 

move may be via rehearsal, staging, or rendezvous areas. The movement phase is 

completed when the various elements of the amphibious force arrive at their assigned 

positions in the operational area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

movement plan. In amphibious operations, the naval plan providing for the movement of 

the amphibious task force to the objective area. It includes information and 

instructions concerning departure of ships from embarkation points, the passage at sea, 

and the approach to and arrival in assigned positions in the objective area. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

naval beach group. A permanently organized naval command within an amphibious force 

composed of a commander and staff, a beachmaster unit, an amphibious construction 

battalion, and assault craft units, designed to provide an administrative group from 

which required naval tactical components may be made available to the attack force 

commander and to the amphibious landing force commander. Also called NBG. (This 

term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

naval support area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

naval surface fire support. Fire provided by Navy surface gun and missile systems in 

support of a unit or units. Also called NSFS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09.3) 

nonscheduled units. Units of the landing force held in readiness for landing during the 

initial unloading period, but not included in either scheduled or on-call waves. This 

category usually includes certain of the combat support units and most of the combat 

service support units with higher echelon (division and above) reserve units of the 

landing force. Their landing is directed when the need ashore can be predicted with a 

reasonable degree of accuracy. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

GL-20 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

numbered beach. In amphibious operations, a subdivision of a colored beach, designated 

for the assault landing of a battalion landing team or similarly sized unit, when landed 

as part of a larger force. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any 

echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent 

in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the 

command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command 

over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, 

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to 

accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all 

aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions 

assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the 

commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised 

through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component 

commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize 

commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational 

control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of 

itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, 

discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 1) 

organization for combat. In amphibious operations, task organization of landing force 

units for combat, involving combinations of command, ground and aviation combat, 

combat support, and combat service support units for accomplishment of missions 

ashore. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

organization for embarkation. In amphibious operations, the organization for 

embarkation consisting of temporary landing force task organizations established by 

the commander, landing force and a temporary organization of Navy forces established 

by the commander, amphibious task force for the purpose of simplifying planning and 

facilitating the execution of embarkation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

organization for landing. In amphibious operations, the specific tactical grouping of the 

landing force for the assault. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

outer landing ship areas. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

outer transport area. In amphibious operations, an area inside the antisubmarine screen to 

which assault transports proceed initially after arrival in the objective area. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

over-the-horizon amphibious operations. An operational initiative launched from 

beyond visual and radar range of the shoreline. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

GL-21 
Glossary 

parallel chains of command. In amphibious operations, a parallel system of command, 

responding to the interrelationship of Navy, landing force, Air Force, and other major 

forces assigned, wherein corresponding commanders are established at each 

subordinate level of all components to facilitate coordinated planning for, and 

execution of, the amphibious operation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

plan for landing. In amphibious operations, a collective term referring to all individually 

prepared naval and landing force documents which, taken together, present in detail all 

instructions for execution of the ship-to-shore movement. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-02) 

planning directive. In amphibious operations, the plan issued by the designated 

commander, following receipt of the initiating directive, to ensure that the planning 

process and interdependent plans developed by the amphibious force will be 

coordinated, completed in the time allowed, and important aspects not overlooked. 

(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are 

approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

planning phase. In amphibious operations, the phase normally denoted by the period 

extending from the issuance of the initiating directive up to the embarkation phase. 

The planning phase may occur during movement or at any other time upon receipt of a 

new mission or change in the operational situation. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

preassault operations. Operations conducted by the amphibious force upon its arrival in 

the operational area and prior to H-hour and/or L-hour. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term “preassault operation” and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

prelanding operations. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

primary control officer. In amphibious operations, the officer embarked in a primary 

control ship assigned to control the movement of landing craft, amphibious vehicles, 

and landing ships to and from a colored beach. Also called PCO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-02) 

primary control ship. In amphibious operations, a ship of the task force designated to 

provide support for the primary control officer and a combat information center control 

team for a colored beach. Also called PCS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

regimental landing team. A task organization for landing composed of an infantry 

regiment reinforced by those elements that are required for initiation of its combat 

function ashore. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

GL-22 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

regulating point. An anchorage, port, or ocean area to which assault and assault follow-on 

echelons and follow-up shipping proceed on a schedule, and at which they are 

normally controlled by the commander, amphibious task force, until needed in the 

transport area for unloading. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

rehearsal phase. In amphibious operations, the period during which the prospective 

operation is practiced for the purpose of: (1) testing adequacy of plans, the timing of 

detailed operations, and the combat readiness of participating forces; (2) ensuring that 

all echelons are familiar with plans; and (3) testing communications-information 

systems. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

rendezvous area. In an amphibious operation, the area in which the landing craft and 

amphibious vehicles rendezvous to form waves after being loaded, and prior to 

movement to the line of departure. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

salvage group. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

screening group. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

sea areas. Areas in the amphibious objective area designated for the stationing of 

amphibious task force ships. Sea areas include inner transport area, sea echelon area, 

fire support area, etc. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

seabasing. The deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the 

operational area. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

sea echelon. A portion of the assault shipping which withdraws from or remains out of the 

transport area during an amphibious landing and operates in designated areas to 

seaward in an on-call or unscheduled status. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

sea echelon area. In amphibious operations, an area to seaward of a transport area from 

which assault shipping is phased into the transport area, and to which assault shipping 

withdraws from the transport area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

sea echelon plan. In amphibious operations, the distribution plan for amphibious shipping 

in the transport area to minimize losses due to enemy attack by weapons of mass 

destruction and to reduce the area to be swept of mines. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

selective unloading. In an amphibious operation, the controlled unloading from assault 

shipping, and movement ashore, of specific items of cargo at the request of the landing 

force commander. Normally, selective unloading parallels the landing of nonscheduled 

units during the initial unloading period of the ship-to-shore movement. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

GL-23 
Glossary 

serial. 1. An element or a group of elements within a series which is given a numerical or 

alphabetical designation for convenience in planning, scheduling, and control. 2. A 

serial can be a group of people, vehicles, equipment, or supplies and is used in 

airborne, air assault, amphibious operations, and convoys. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-02) 

serial assignment table. A table that is used in amphibious operations and shows the serial 

number, the title of the unit, the approximate number of personnel; the material, 

vehicles, or equipment in the serial; the number and type of landing craft and/or 

amphibious vehicles required to boat the serial; and the ship on which the serial is 

embarked. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

ship-to-shore movement. That portion of the action phase of an amphibious operation 

which includes the deployment of the landing force from the assault shipping to 

designated landing areas. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

 

shore party. A task organization of the landing force, formed for the purpose of facilitating 

the landing and movement off the beaches of troops, equipment, and supplies; for the 

evacuation from the beaches of casualties and enemy prisoners of war; and for 

facilitating the beaching, retraction, and salvaging of landing ships and craft. It 

comprises elements of both the naval and landing forces. Also called beach group. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

staging area. 1. Amphibious or airborne – A general locality between the mounting area 

and the objective of an amphibious or airborne expedition, through which the 

expedition or parts thereof pass after mounting, for refueling, regrouping of ships, 

and/or exercise, inspection, and redistribution of troops. 2. Other movements – A 

general locality established for the concentration of troop units and transient personnel 

between movements over the lines of communications. Also called SA. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-35) 

stowage. The method of placing cargo into a single hold or compartment of a ship to 

prevent damage, shifting, etc. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

subsidiary landing. In an amphibious operation, a landing usually made outside the 

designated landing area, the purpose of which is to support the main landing. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force 

in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit 

in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in 

combat. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects 

of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation 

GL-24 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the 

commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to 

requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support 

command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another 

commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the 

supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-0) 

supporting aircraft. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

supporting arms. Weapons and weapons systems of all types employed to support forces 

by indirect or direct fire. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

supporting arms coordination center. A single location on board an amphibious 

command ship in which all communication facilities incident to the coordination of fire 

support of the artillery, air, and naval gunfire are centralized. This is the naval 

counterpart to the fire support coordination center utilized by the landing force. Also 

called SACC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other 

support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. This includes 

the designated combatant commands and Department of Defense agencies as 

appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who 

aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is 

responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

supporting operations. In amphibious operations, those operations conducted by forces 

other than those conducted by the amphibious force. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

surface action group. A temporary or standing organization of combatant ships, other than 

carriers, tailored for a specific tactical mission. Also called SAG. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

survey, liaison, and reconnaissance party. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

tactical air commander (ashore). None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

tactical air control party. A subordinate operational component of a tactical air control 

system designed to provide air liaison to land forces and for the control of aircraft. 

Also called TACP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09.3) 

tactical air coordinator (airborne). An officer who coordinates, from an aircraft, the 

actions of other aircraft engaged in air support of ground or sea forces. Also called 

TAC(A). (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09.3) 

GL-25 
Glossary 

tactical air direction center. An air operations installation under the overall control of the 

Navy tactical air control center or the Marine Corps tactical air command center, from 

which aircraft and air warning service functions of tactical air operations in support of 

amphibious operations are directed. Also called TADC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-

09.3) 

tactical air groups (shore-based). None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

tactical air officer (afloat). The officer (aviator) under the amphibious task force 

commander who coordinates planning of all phases of air participation of the 

amphibious operation and air operations of supporting forces en route to and in the 

objective area. Until control is passed ashore, this officer exercises control over all 

operations of the tactical air control center (afloat) and is charged with the following: a. 

control of all aircraft in the objective area assigned for tactical air operations, including 

offensive and defensive air; b. control of all other aircraft entering or passing through 

the objective area; and c. control of all air warning facilities in the objective area. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

tactical air operation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or 

military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed 

direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary 

to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational 

control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below 

the level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for 

controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support 

assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 1) 

tactical deception group. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

tactical-logistical group. Representatives designated by troop commanders to assist Navy 

control officers aboard control ships in the ship-to-shore movement of troops, 

equipment, and supplies. Also called TACLOG group. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

target classification. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

target information center. The agency or activity responsible for collecting, displaying, 

evaluating, and disseminating information pertaining to potential targets. Also called 

TIC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are 

approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

task element. A component of a naval task unit organized by the commander of a task unit 

or higher authority. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

GL-26 JP 3-02 
Glossary 

task group. A component of naval task force organized by the commander of a task force 

or higher authority. Also called TG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

task unit. A component of a naval task group organized by the commander of a task group 

or higher authority. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

times. (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (Zulu time) and are assumed to 

be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally 

coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and 

specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be 

established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and 

surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-

hour day. a. C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences 

or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon 

systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The 

letter “C” will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or 

headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning 

of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly 

responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the 

planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or 

headquarters coordinating the planning. b. D-day. The unnamed day on which a 

particular operation commences or is to commence. (JP 3-02) c. F-hour. The 

effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military 

Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units. d. H-hour. The specific hour on 

D-day at which a particular operation commences. e. H-hour (amphibious 

operations). For amphibious operations, the time the first assault elements are 

scheduled to touch down on the beach, or a landing zone, and in some cases the 

commencement of countermine breaching operations. (JP 3-02) f. L-hour. The 

specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to 

commence. g. L-hour (amphibious operations). In amphibious operations, the time 

at which the first helicopter of the helicopter-borne assault wave touches down in the 

landing zone. (JP 3-02) h. M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on 

which full mobilization commences or is due to commence. i. N-day. The unnamed 

day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment. j. R-day. 

Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, 

and combat service support forces begins in an operation. k. S-day. The day the 

President authorizes Selective Reserve callup (not more than 200,000). l. T-day. The 

effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of national emergency and 

authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of 

the 200,000 callup). m. W-day. Declared by the President, W-day is associated with 

an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning). (This term 

and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

transport area. In amphibious operations, an area assigned to a transport organization for 

the purpose of debarking troops and equipment. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

GL-27 
Glossary 

transport group. An element that directly deploys and supports the landing of the landing 

force, and is functionally designated as a transport group in the amphibious task force 

organization. A transport group provides for the embarkation, movement to the 

objective, landing, and logistic support of the landing force. Transport groups 

comprise all sealift and airlift in which the landing force is embarked. They are 

categorized as follows: a. airlifted groups; b. Navy amphibious ship transport groups; 

and c. strategic sealift shipping groups. (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

vertical landing zone. A specified ground area for landing vertical takeoff and landing 

aircraft to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain one 

or more landing sites. Also called VLZ. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. Fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters capable of 

taking off or landing vertically. Also called VTOL aircraft. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-02) 

vertical takeoff and landing aircraft transport area. None. (Approved for removal from 

JP 1-02.) 

wave. A formation of forces, including ships, craft, amphibious vehicles or aircraft, 

required to beach or land about the same time. Waves can be classified by function: 

scheduled, on-call, or non-scheduled. Waves can also be classified by type of craft, 

e.g., assault, helicopter, or landing craft. (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

GL-28 JP 3-02 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATIONS

PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-02 Operations