FEMA

Risk Management Series

Risk Assessment

A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 

Against Buildings

FEMA 452 / January 2005

U.S. AIR FORCE

RISK MANAGEMENT SERIES

Risk Assessment

A How-To Guide to Mitigate

Potential Terrorist Attacks 

Against Buildings

PROVIDING PROTECTION TO PEOPLE AND BUILDINGS

FEMA 452 / January 2005

www.fema.gov
Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do 

not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. Additionally, neither FEMA or any of its employees 

makes any warrantee, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for 

the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, product, or process included in 

this publication. Users of information from this publication assume all liability arising from 

such use.
FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i

BACKGROUND

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed this Risk 

Assessment, A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, to provide a clear, flexible, and comprehensive methodology to prepare 

a risk assessment. The intended audience includes the building sciences community of architects and engineers working for private institutions, building 

owners/operators/managers, and State and local government officials 

working in the building sciences community. 

OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

The objective of this How-To Guide is to outline methods for identifying the 

critical assets and functions within buildings, determining the threats to those 

assets, and assessing the vulnerabilities associated with those threats. Based on 

those considerations, the methods presented in this How-To Guide provide a 

means to assess the risk to the assets and to make risk-based decisions on how 

to mitigate those risks. The scope of the methods includes reducing physical 

damage to structural and non-structural components of buildings and related 

infrastructure, and reducing resultant casualties during conventional bomb 

attacks, as well as chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) agents. This 

document is written as a How-To Guide. It presents five steps and multiple 

tasks within each step that will lead you through a process for conducting a 

risk assessment and selecting mitigation options. It discusses what information 

is required to conduct a risk assessment, how and where to obtain it, and how 

to use it to calculate a risk score against each selected threat. 

This is one of a series of publications that address security issues in high-population, private sector buildings. This document is a companion to the Reference 

Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (FEMA 426) and 

the Building Design for Homeland Security Training Course (FEMA E155). 

This document also leverages information contained within the Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks (FEMA 427). 

The primary use of this risk assessment methodology is for buildings, although it could be adapted for other types of critical infrastructure.

The foundation of the risk assessment methodology presented in this document is based on the approach that was developed for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs (VA) through the National Institute for Building Sciences 
ii FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

(NIBS). Over 150 buildings have been successfully assessed using this technique. The risk assessment methodology presented in this publication has 

been refined by FEMA for this audience. 

The purpose of this How-To Guide is to provide a methodology for risk assessment to the building sciences community working for private institutions. It 

is up to the decision-makers to decide which types of threats they wish to protect against and which mitigation options are feasible and cost-effective. 

This How-To Guide views as critical that a team created to assess a particular 

building will be composed of professionals capable of evaluating different 

parts of the building. They should be senior individuals who have a breadth 

and depth of experience in the areas of civil, electrical, and mechanical 

engineering; architecture; site planning and security engineering; and how 

security and antiterrorism considerations affect site and building design. 

The information contained in this document is:

❍ not mandatory

❍ not applicable to all buildings

❍ not applicable when it interferes with other hazards such as fire

ORGANIZATION AND CONTENT 

In order to create a safe environment, many factors must be considered. 

Figure 1 depicts the risk assessment process presented in this document to 

help identify the best and most cost-effective terrorism mitigation measures 

for a building’s own unique security needs. The first step is to conduct a 

threat assessment wherein the threat or hazard is identified, defined, and 

quantified (Step 1). For terrorism, the threat is the aggressors (people or 

groups) that are known to exist and that have the capability and a history of 

using hostile actions, or that have expressed intentions for using hostile actions against potential targets as well as on whom there is current credible 

information on targeting activity (surveillance of potential targets) or indications of preparation for terrorist acts. The capabilities and histories of the 

aggressors include the tactics they have used to achieve their ends. The next 

step of the assessment process is to identify the value of a building’s assets that 

need to be protected (Step 2). 

After conducting a asset value assessment, the next step is to conduct a vulnerability assessment (Step 3). A vulnerability assessment evaluates the potential 

vulnerability of the critical assets against a broad range of identified threats/

hazards. In and of itself, the vulnerability assessment provides a basis for 
FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii

determining mitigation measures for protection of the critical assets. The vulnerability assessment is the bridge in the methodology between threat/hazard, 

asset value, and the resultant level of risk.

The next step of the process is the risk assessment (Step 4). The risk assessment analyzes the threat, asset value, and vulnerability to ascertain the level 

of risk for each critical asset against each applicable threat. Inherent in this 

is the likelihood or probability of the threat occurring and the consequences 

of the occurrence. Thus, a very high likelihood of occurrence with very small 

consequences may require simple low cost mitigation measures, but a very low 

likelihood of occurrence with very grave consequences may require more costly 

and complex mitigation measures. The risk assessment should provide a relative 

risk profile. High-risk combinations of assets against associated threats, with the 

identified vulnerability, allow prioritization of resources to implement mitigation 

measures.

The final step (Step 5) is to consider mitigation options that are directly associated with, and responsive to, the major risks identified during Step 4. From 

Step 5, decisions can be made as to where to minimize the risks and how to 

accomplish that over time. This is commonly referred to as Risk Management. 

A number of worksheets are utilized in this How-To Guide. They can be used 

to apply key concepts described in this document and are presented at the 

end of each Step. 

A core element of this How-To Guide is the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist included in Appendix A. The Checklist can be used to collect 

Asset Value

Assessment

(Step 2)

Vulnerability

Assessment

(Step 3)

Consider

Mitigation Options

(Step 5)

Decision

(Risk Management) Risk Assessment

(Step 4)

Threat

Identification 

and Rating

(Step 1)

Figure 1 Risk assessment process model
iv FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

and report information related to the building infrastructure. It compiles 

many best practices based on technologies and scientific research to consider 

during the design of a new building or renovation of an existing building. It 

allows a consistent security evaluation of designs at various levels. 

A Risk Assessment Database accompanies this publication in the form of 

computer software. The purpose of this database is for a user to collect and 

organize risk scoring, building vulnerability data, and mitigation measures for 

multiple buildings. More information can be found on throughout this publication and in Appendix B.

The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist and the Risk Assessment 

Database were developed with assistance from the Department of Veterans Affairs and the National Institute for Building Sciences.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Principal Authors:

Milagros Kennett, FEMA, Project Officer, Risk Management Series 

Publications

Eric Letvin, URS, Consultant Project Manager

Michael Chipley, PBSJ

Terrance Ryan, UTD, Inc. 

Contributors:

Lloyd Siegel, Department of Veterans Affairs

Marcelle Habibion, Department of Veterans Affairs

Kurt Knight, Department of Veterans Affairs

Eve Hinman, Hinman Consulting Engineering

Sarah Steerman, UTD, Inc.

Deb Daly, Greenhorne & O’Mara, Inc.

Julie Liptak, Greenhorne & O’Mara, Inc.

Wanda Rizer, Consultant

Project Advisory Panel:

Elizabeth Miller, National Capital Planning Commission

Doug Hall, Smithsonian Institution

Wade Belcher, General Service Administration
FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v

Michael Gressel, CDC/NIOSH

Kenneth Mead, CDC/NIOSH

Robert Chapman, NIST

Lawrence Skelly, Department of Homeland Security

Curt Betts, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Earle Kennett, National Institute for Building Sciences

Frederick Krimgold, Virginia Tech

David Hattis, Building Technology, Inc.

Ettore Contestabile, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory

This How-To Guide was prepared under contract to FEMA. It will be revised 

periodically, and comments and feedback to improve future editions are 

welcome. Please send comments and feedback by e-mail to riskmanagements

eriespubs@dhs.gov

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS vii

Foreword and Acknowledgments .....................................................................i

Step 1: Threat Identification and Rating .................................................... 1-1

Task 1.1 Identifying the Threats ...................................... 1-1

Task 1.2 Collecting Information .................................... 1-16

Task 1.3 Determining the Design Basis Threat ............. 1-18

Task 1.4 Determining the Threat Rating ...................... 1-24

 Step 2: Asset Value Assessment .............................................................. 2-1

Task 2.1 Identifying the Layers of Defense ..................... 2-2

Task 2.2 Identifying the Critical Assets ............................ 2-6

Task 2.3 Identifying the Building Core Functions and 

Infrastructure ................................................................... 2-11

Task 2.4 Determining the Asset Value Rating ............... 2-22

Step 3: Vulnerability Assessment ................................................................ 3-1

Task 3.1 Organizing Resources to Prepare the 

Assessment .......................................................................... 3-2

Task 3.2 Evaluating the Site and Building ....................... 3-6

Task 3.3 Preparing a Vulnerability Portfolio ................. 3-11

Task 3.4 Determining the Vulnerability Rating ............ 3-13 

Step 4: Risk Assessment ............................................................................ 4-1

Task 4.1 Preparing the Risk Assessment Matrices ........... 4-2

Task 4.2 Determining the Risk Ratings ........................... 4-7

Task 4.3 Prioritizing Observations in the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist ........................................... 4-10
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Step 5: Consider Mitigation Options ............................................................ 5-1

Task 5.1 Identifying Preliminary Mitigation Options ..... 5-2

Task 5.2 Reviewing Mitigation Options ........................... 5-6

Task 5.3 Estimating Cost ................................................... 5-9

Task 5.4 Mitigation, Cost, and the Layers of Defense .. 5-13

Appendix A Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist

Appendix B1 Risk Management Database: Assessor's User Guide

Appendix B2 Risk Management Database: Database Administrator's User 

Guide

Appendix B3 Risk Management Database: Manager's User Guide

Appendix C Acronyms and Abbreviations

Figures

Foreword and Acknowledgments

Figure 1 Risk assessment process model ........................... iii

Chapter 1

Figure 1-1 Steps and tasks ................................................. 1-1

Figure 1-2 Total international attacks by region, 1998-

2003 ..................................................................................... 1-3

Figure 1-3 Explosive environments - blast range to 

effect ................................................................................... 1-4

Figure 1-4 Explosive evacuation distance ........................ 1-5

Figure 1-5 Incident overpressure as a function of stand-off 

distance ............................................................................... 1-6

Figure 1-6 Total facilities affected by international terrorism and weapons of choice, 1998-2003 ..................... 1-16
TABLE OF CONTENTS ix

Chapter 2

Figure 2-1 Steps and tasks ................................................. 2-1

Figure 2-2 Layers of defense ............................................. 2-3

Figure 2-3 Layers of defense in urban setting ................. 2-5

Figure 2-4 Layers of defense when a particular building is 

considered a critical asset .................................................. 2-5

Figure 2-5 Potential blast effects – 200-lb car bomb ....... 2-7

Figure 2-6 Potential blast effects – 11,000-lb truck 

bomb ................................................................................... 2-7

Figure 2-7 Using HAZUS-MH to identify the criticality of 

assets ................................................................................... 2-8

Chapter 3

Figure 3-1 Steps and tasks ................................................. 3-1

Figure 3-2 Common system vulnerabilities ................... 3-14

Chapter 4

Figure 4-1 Steps and tasks ................................................. 4-1

Chapter 5

Figure 5-1 Steps and tasks ................................................. 5-2

Figure 5-2 Cost considerations ....................................... 5-10

Figure 5-3 Mitigation options for the second layer of defense .................................................................................. 5-14

Figure 5-4 Mitigation options for the third layer of defense .................................................................................. 5-15

Tables

Chapter 1

Table 1-1 Critical Biological Agent Categories ............. 1-11

Table 1-2 Event Profiles .................................................. 1-13
x TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table 1-3 Criteria to Select Primary Threats ................. 1-21

Table 1-4 Nominal Example to Select Primary Threats for 

a Specific Urban Multi-story Building ............................ 1-22

Table 1-5 Threat Rating .................................................. 1-25

Table 1-6A Nominal Example of Threat Rating for an 

Urban Multi-story Building (Building Function) .......... 1-26

Table 1-6B Nominal Example of Threat Rating for an 

Urban Multi-story Building (Building Infrastructure) . 1-26

Chapter 2

Table 2-1 Correlation of the Layers of Defense Against 

Threats .............................................................................. 2-12

Table 2-2 Building Core Functions ................................ 2-18

Table 2-3 Building Core Infrastructure ......................... 2-19

Table 2-4 Levels of Protection and Recommended Security Measures .................................................................... 2-21

Table 2-5 Asset Value Scale ............................................. 2-23

Table 2-6A Nominal Example of Asset Value Rating for an 

Urban Multi-story Building (Building Function) .......... 2-23

Table 2-6B Nominal Example of Asset Value Rating for an 

Urban Multi-story Building (Building Infrastructure) . 2-24

Chapter 3

Table 3-1 Screening Phase ................................................ 3-4

Table 3-2 Full On-site Evaluation ..................................... 3-5

Table 3-3 Detailed Evaluation .......................................... 3-5

Table 3-4 Vulnerability Rating ........................................ 3-15

Table 3-5A Nominal Example of Vulnerability Rating for a 

Specific Multi-story Building (Building Function) ........ 3-16

Table 3-5B Nominal Example of Vulnerability Rating for a 

Specific Multi-story Building (Building Infrastructure) 3-16
TABLE OF CONTENTS xi

Chapter 4

Table 4-1 Critical Functions Asset Value ......................... 4-4

Table 4-2 Critical Infrastructure Asset Value ................... 4-4

Table 4-3 Critical Functions Threat Rating ..................... 4-5

Table 4-4 Critical Infrastructure Threat Rating .............. 4-5

Table 4-5 Critical Functions Vulnerability Rating ........... 4-6

Table 4-6 Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Rating .... 4-7

Table 4-7 Total Risk Scale Color Code ............................ 4-8

Table 4-8 Site Functional Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix ..................................................................................... 4-8

Table 4-9 Site Infrastructure Pre-Assessment Screening 

Matrix ................................................................................. 4-9

Table 4-10 Nominal Example of Observations in the 

Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist ................. 4-10

STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-1

STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 

OVERVIEW

The first step in the assessment process is to help you to identify threats that 

are a priority concern in your area and that may pose a risk to your assets 

(see Figure 1-1). The threat identification and rating process involves the following tasks: 

❍ Identifying the threats 

❍ Collecting information 

❍ Determining the design basis threat

❍ Determining the threat rating

TASKS:

1.1 Identifying the threats 

1.2 Collecting information

1.3 Determining the design basis 

 threat

1.4 Determining the threat rating

Step 1: Threat Identification and Rating

Step 4: Risk Assessment

Step 2: Asset Value Assessment

Step 3: Vulnerability Assessment

Figure 1-1 Steps and tasks

Identifying the Threats (Task 1.1)

For this document, threat is defined as any indication, circumstance, or event 

with the potential to cause loss of, or damage to an asset. Within the military 

services, the intelligence community, and law enforcement, the term “threat” 

is typically used to describe the design criteria for terrorism or manmade disasters. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other civil 

Step 5: Consider Mitigation Options
1-2 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

agencies use the term “hazard” in several different contexts. “Natural hazard” 

typically refers to a natural event such as a flood, wind, or seismic disaster. 

“Human-caused (or manmade) hazards” are “technological hazards” and “terrorism” and are distinct from natural hazards primarily in that they originate 

from human activity. “Technological hazards” (i.e., a HazMat leak from a 

railcar) are generally assumed to be accidental and that their consequences 

are unintended. (Note that protection against technological hazards can also 

serve for the protection against terrorist attacks.) “Terrorism” is considered 

an unlawful act of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, 

in furtherance of political or social objectives.

In this guide, only manmade terrorist threats will be used in the critical functions and infrastructure matrices. The importance of technological hazards is 

that they can become a threat if they are targets of malicious attacks. 

Identifying the threats can be a difficult task. Because manmade hazards are 

different from other hazards such as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes, 

they are difficult to predict. Many years of historical and quantitative data, 

and probabilities associated with the cycle, duration, and magnitude of 

natural hazards exist. The fact that data for manmade hazards are scarce and 

that the magnitude and recurrence of terrorist attacks are almost unpredictable makes the determination of a particular threat for any particular site or 

building difficult and largely subjective. 

With any terrorist threats, it is important to understand who the people are 

with the intent to cause harm. The aggressors seek publicity for their cause, 

monetary gain (in some instances), or political gain through their actions. 

These actions include injuring or killing people; destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources; or stealing equipment, material, 

or information. In some cases, the threat may originate from more than one 

group, with differing methods and motives.

Aggressor tactics run the gamut: moving vehicle bombs; stationary vehicle 

bombs; bombs delivered by persons (suicide bombers); exterior attacks 

(thrown objects like rocks, Molotov cocktails, hand grenades, or hand-placed 

bombs); attack weapons (rocket propelled grenades, light antitank weapons, 

etc.); ballistic attacks (small arms handled by one individual); covert entries 

(gaining entry by false credentials or circumventing security with or without 

weapons); mail bombs (delivered to individuals); supply bombs (larger 

bombs processed through shipping departments); airborne contamination 

(chemical, biological, or radiological [CBR] agents used to contaminate the 
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-3

air supply of a building); and waterborne contamination (CBR agents injected into the water supply). 

Domestic terrorism refers to activities that involve acts dangerous to human 

life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any 

state; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 

to influence the policy of a government by mass destruction, assassination, 

or kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the 

United States. 

International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life 

that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or 

that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the 

United States or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate 

or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of a government by 

intimidation or coercion; affect the conduct of a government by mass 

destruction, assassination or kidnapping; and occur primarily outside the 

territorial jurisdiction of the United States or transcend national boundaries 

in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they 

appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their 

perpetrators operate or seek asylum. Totals for international terrorism in 

1998-2003 are shown by regions in Figure 1-2.

Figure 1-2 Total international attacks by 

region, 1998-2003

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Business Diplomat Government Military Other

383 804

9281

41

51

53

95

221 39

71

7

0

1

1

31

31

72

31

4

4

1

2

71

411

76

38

48

69

101

282

Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, U.S. Department of State

872

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Business Diplomat Government Military Other

383 804

9281

41

51

53

95

221 39

71

7

0

1

1

31

31

72

31

4

4

1

2

71

411

76

38

48

69

101

282

Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, U.S. Department of State

872
1-4 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

Explosive Blast Weapons

Two parameters are used to define the explosive blast design threat: the 

weapon size, measured in equivalent pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT), and 

the stand-off. The stand-off is the distance measured from the center of 

gravity of the charge to the component of interest.

Figures 1-3 through 1-5 illustrate these principles. Figure 1-3 shows an example of a blast range-to-effect chart that indicates the distance or stand-off 

to which a given size bomb will produce a given effect. Figure 1-4 is a quick 

reference chart that provides recommended evacuation distances for a given 

explosive weight. Figure 1-5 provides a quick method for predicting the 

expected overpressure (expressed in pounds per square inch or psi) on a 

building for a specific explosive weight and stand-off distance. For additional 

information on overpressure and blast effects, see FEMA 426 and 427.

Figure 1-3 Explosive environments - blast range to effect
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-5

High Explosives (TNT Equivalent)

Threat Description Explosive Mass1 

(TNT Equivalent)

Building Evacuation 

Distance2

Outdoor Evacuation 

Distance3

Pipe Bomb 5 lbs

 2.3 kg

 70 ft

 21 m

 850 ft

 259 m

Suicide Belt 10 lbs

 4.5 kg

 90 ft

 27 m

1,080 ft

 330 m

Suicide Vest 20 lbs

 9 kg

 110 ft

 34 m

1,360 ft

 415 m

Briefcase/Suitcase Bomb 50 lbs

 23 kg

 150 ft

 46 m

1,850 ft

 564 m

Compact Sedan 500 lbs

 227 kg

 320 ft

 98 m

1,500 ft

 457 m

Sedan 1,000 lbs

 454 kg

 400 ft

 122 m

1,750 ft

 534 m

Passenger/Cargo Van 4,000 lbs

1,814 kg

 640 ft

 195 m

2,750 ft

 838 m

Small Moving Van/Delivery 

Truck

10,000 lbs

 4,536 kg

 860 ft

 263 m

3,750 ft

1,143 m

Moving Van/Water Truck 30,000 lbs

13,608 kg

1,240 ft

 375 m

6,500 ft

1,982 m

Semitrailer 60,000 lbs

27,216 kg

1,570 ft

 475 m

7,000 ft

2,134 m

Figure 1-4 Explosive evacuation distance

1Based on the maximum amount of material that could reasonably fit into a container or vehicle. Variations are possible.

2Governed by the ability of an unreinforced building to withstand severe damage or collapse.

3Governed by the greater of fragment throw distance or glass breakage/falling glass hazard distance. These distances 

can be reduced for personnel wearing ballistic protection. Note that the pipe bomb, suicide belt/vest, and briefcase/

suitcase bomb are assumed to have a fragmentation characteristic that requires greater stand-off distances than an equal 

amount of explosives in a vehicle.
1-6 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

Figure 1-5 Incident overpressure as a function of stand-off distance

To put the weapon size into perspective, it should be noted that thousands of 

deliberate explosions occur every year within the United States, but the vast 

majority of them have weapon yields of less than 5 pounds. The number of 

large-scale vehicle weapon attacks that have used hundreds of pounds of TNT 

during the past 20 years is, by comparison, very small. In general, the largest 

credible explosive size is a function of the security measures in place. Each 

line of security may be thought of as a sieve, reducing the size of the weapon 

that may gain access. Therefore, the largest weapons are considered in totally 

unsecured public spaces (e.g., in a vehicle on the nearest public street), and 

the smallest weapons are considered in the most secured areas of the building 

(e.g., in a briefcase smuggled past the screening station). It should also be 

noted that the likely target is often not the building under consideration by 

the risk assessment, but a high-risk building that is nearby. Historically, more 

building damage has been due to collateral effects than direct attack. Based 

upon access to the agent, the degree of difficulty, and past experience, it can 

be stated that the chance of a large-scale explosive attack occurring is extremely low and that a smaller explosive attack is far more likely. 

From the standpoint of structural design, the vehicle bomb is the most important consideration and has been a favorite tactic of terrorists. Ingredients for 

homemade bombs are easily obtained on the open market, as are the techniques for making bombs. 
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-7

Vehicle bombs are able to deliver a sufficiently large quantity of explosives 

to cause potentially devastating structural damage. Security design intended 

to limit or mitigate damage from a vehicle bomb assumes that the bomb is 

detonated at a so-called critical location. The critical location is a function 

of the site, the building layout, the security measures in place, and the position of the weapon. For a vehicle bomb, the critical location is taken to be at 

the closest point that a vehicle can approach, assuming that all security measures are in place. This may be a parking area directly beneath the occupied 

building, the loading dock, the curb directly outside the facility, or at a vehicle-access control gate where inspection takes place, depending on the level 

of protection incorporated into the design. 

Another explosive attack threat is the small bomb that is hand delivered. 

Small weapons can cause large damage when they are brought into vulnerable and unsecured areas of the building. Greater damage may be caused 

when the weapon is brought into the interior, such as the building lobby, mail 

room, and retail spaces. Recent events around the world make it clear that 

there is an increased likelihood that bombs will be delivered by persons (suicide bombers or hand carried bombs) who are willing to sacrifice their own 

lives. Hand-carried explosives are typically on the order of 5 to 10 pounds 

of TNT equivalent. However, larger charge weights, in the 50- to 100-pound 

TNT equivalent range, can be readily carried in rolling cases. Mail bombs are 

typically less than 10 pounds of TNT equivalent. 

Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Weapons

Three parameters are used to define the CBR design basis threat: the exposure, the duration, and the concentration. Each of the CBR agents has 

different human effects and methods of attack.

Chemical, biological, and radiological attacks are an emerging threat and of 

great concern because of the large geographic area contaminated, numbers 

of people affected, and the high economic cost of response and recovery. The 

use of CBR weapons and the stated intent of terrorist groups to acquire and 

For design purposes, large-scale truck bombs typically contain 10,000 pounds or more of TNT 

equivalent, depending on the size and capacity of the vehicle used to deliver the weapon. Vehicle 

bombs that utilize vans down to small sedans typically contain 5,000 to 100 pounds of TNT 

equivalent, respectively. A briefcase bomb is approximately 50 pounds, and a pipe bomb is 

generally in the range of 5 pounds of TNT equivalent. Suicide bombers can deliver belts ranging 

from 10 pounds (teenagers), 15-20 pounds (women), and 30-40 pounds (men).
1-8 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

use the weapons increases the target set, and the weapons can affect a single 

building, an entire city, multiple counties, or even states. 

Like explosive threats, CBR threats may be delivered externally or internally 

to the building. External ground-based threats may be released at a stand-off 

distance from the building or may be delivered directly through an air intake 

or other opening. Interior threats may be delivered to accessible areas such as 

the lobby, mailroom, loading dock, or egress route. Because there may not be 

an official or obvious warning prior to a CBR event, the best defense is to be 

alert to signs of a release occurring.

Chemical. Chemical agents are compounds with unique chemical properties 

that can produce lethal or damaging effects in humans, animals, and plants. 

Chemical agents can exist as solids, liquids, or gases, depending on temperature and pressure. Most chemical agents are liquid and can be introduced 

into an unprotected population relatively easily using aerosol generators, explosive devices, breaking containers, or other forms of covert dissemination. 

Dispersed as an aerosol or vapor, chemical agents have their greatest potential 

for inflicting mass casualties. There are two categories of chemicals: lethal 

and incapacitating. The lethal chemicals are subdivided into industrial and 

warfare.

Industrial chemicals are used extensively throughout the nation on a daily 

basis. Lethal industrial chemicals are listed as Toxic Industrial Compounds 

(TICs). Of concern is the use of TICs as a weapon (e.g., derailment of a chlorine tanker car), especially in the urban environment.

Chemical agents can have an immediate effect (a few seconds to a few minutes) or a delayed effect (several hours to several days). Although potentially 

lethal, chemical agents are difficult to deliver in lethal concentrations. Outdoors, the agents often dissipate rapidly. Chemical agents are also difficult to 

produce. There are six types of agents:

❍ Choking/lung-damaging (pulmonary) agents such as chlorine and 

phosgene

❍ Blood agents such as cyanide

❍ Vesicants or blister agents such as mustard
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-9

❍ Nerve agents such as GA (tabun), GB (sarin), GD (soman), GF 

(cyclohexyl sarin), and VX (phosphonothioic acid)

❍ Incapacitating agents such as BZ (3-quinulidinyle benzilate)

❍ Riot-control agents similar to Mace

Biological. Biological agents pose a serious threat because of their accessible 

nature and the rapid manner in which they spread. These agents are disseminated by the use of aerosols, contaminated food or water supplies, direct 

skin contact, or injection. Several biological agents can be adapted for use 

as weapons by terrorists. These agents include anthrax (sometimes found in 

sheep and cattle), tularemia (rabbit fever), cholera, the plague (sometimes 

found in prairie dog colonies), and botulism (found in improperly canned 

food). A biological incident will most likely be first recognized in the hospital 

emergency room, medical examiner’s office, or within the public health community long after the terrorist attack. The consequences of such an attack may 

present communities with an unprecedented requirement to provide mass 

protective treatment to exposed populations, mass patient care, mass fatality 

management, and environmental health cleanup procedures and plans.

Biological agents are organisms or toxins that can kill or incapacitate people, 

livestock, and crops. The three basic groups of biological agents that would 

likely be used as weapons are bacteria, viruses, and toxins. 

1. Bacteria are small free-living organisms that reproduce by simple 

division and are easy to grow. The diseases they produce often respond 

to treatment with antibiotics.

2. Viruses are organisms that require living cells in which to reproduce 

and are intimately dependent upon the body they infect. Viruses 

produce diseases that generally do not respond to antibiotics; however, 

antiviral drugs are sometimes effective. 

3. Toxins are poisonous substances found in, and extracted from, living 

plants, animals, or microorganisms; some toxins can be produced or 

altered by chemical means. Some toxins can be treated with specific 

antitoxins and selected drugs.

Most biological agents are difficult to grow and maintain. Many break down 

quickly when exposed to sunlight and other environmental factors, while 
1-10 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

others such as anthrax spores are very long lived. They can be dispersed by 

spraying them in the air, or by infecting animals or humans, as well through 

food and water contamination.

❍ Aerosols — Biological agents are dispersed into the air as an aerosol that 

may drift for miles. Inhaling the agent may cause disease in people or 

animals. 

❍ Animals — Some diseases are spread by insects and animals, such as fleas, 

mice, flies, and mosquitoes. Deliberately spreading diseases through 

livestock is also referred to as agro-terrorism.

❍ Food and water contamination — Some pathogenic organisms and toxins 

may persist in food and water supplies. Most microbes can be killed, and 

toxins deactivated, by cooking food and boiling water.

Person-to-person spread of a few infectious agents is also possible. Humans 

have been the source of infection for smallpox, plague, and the Lassa viruses. 

In a 2002 report, Public Health Assessment of Biological Terrorism Agents, 

the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has classified biological agents as one 

of three priority categories for initial public health preparedness efforts: A, B, 

or C (see Table 1-1). The CDC maintains a comprehensive list of agents, diseases, and other threats at www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/index.asp 

Agents in Category A have the greatest potential for adverse public health 

impact with mass casualties, and most require broad-based public health preparedness efforts (e.g., improved surveillance and laboratory diagnosis and 

stockpiling of specific medications). Category A agents also have a moderate 

to high potential for large-scale dissemination or a heightened general public 

awareness that could cause mass public fear and civil disruption.

Most Category B agents also have some potential for large-scale dissemination with resultant illness, but generally cause less illness and death, and, 

therefore, would be expected to have lower medical and public health impacts. These agents also have lower general public awareness than Category A 

agents and require fewer special public health preparedness efforts. Agents in 

this category require some improvement in public health and medical awareness, surveillance, or laboratory diagnostic capabilities, but present limited 

additional requirements for stockpiled therapeutics beyond those identified 

for Category A agents. Biological agents that have undergone some development for widespread dissemination but do not otherwise meet the criteria for 
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-11

Category A, as well as several biological agents of concern for food and water safety, are included 

in this category.

Biological agents that are currently not believed to present a high bioterrorism risk to public 

health, but that could emerge as future threats (as scientific understanding of these agents improves) were placed in Category C. 

Table 1-1: Critical Biological Agent Categories

Biological Agent(s) Disease

Category A

Variola major Smallpox

Bacillus anthracis Anthrax

Yersinia pestis Plague

Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxins) Botulism

Francisella tulaensis Tularemia

Filoviruses and Arenaviruses (e.g., Ebola virus, Lassa virus) Viral hemorrhagic fevers

Category B

Coxiella burnetii Q fever

Brucella spp. Brucellosis

Burkholderia mallei Glanders

Burkholderia pseudomallei Meliodosis

Alphaviruses Encephalitis

Rickettsia prowazekii Typhus fever

Toxins (e.g., Ricin) Toxic syndromes

Chlamydia psittaci Psittacosis

Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella spp.)

Water safety threats (e.g., Vibrio cholerae)

Category C

Emerging threat agents (e.g., Nipah virus, hantavirus)

SOURCE: PUBLIC HEALTH ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM AGENTS (CDC, 2002)

Nuclear and Radiological. Nuclear threat is the use, threatened use, or threatened detonation of 

a nuclear bomb or device. At present, there is no known instance in which any non-governmental 

entity has been able to obtain or produce a nuclear weapon. The most likely scenario is the detonation of a large conventional explosive that incorporates nuclear material or detonation of an 

explosive proximate to nuclear materials in use, storage, or transit. Of concern is the increasing 

frequency of shipments of radiological materials throughout the world.

Nuclear explosions can cause deadly effects: blinding light, intense heat (thermal radiation), initial 

nuclear radiation, blast, fires started by the heat pulse, and secondary fires caused by the destruc-
1-12 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

tion. They also produce radioactive particles called fallout that can be carried 

by wind for hundreds of miles.

Terrorist use of a radiological dispersion device (RDD) – often called ”dirty 

nuke” or “dirty bomb” – is considered far more likely than the use of a nuclear device. These radiological weapons are a combination of conventional 

explosives and radioactive material designed to scatter dangerous and sublethal amounts of radioactive material over a general area. Such radiological 

weapons appeal to terrorists because they require very little technical knowledge to build and deploy compared to that of a nuclear device. Also, these 

radioactive materials, used widely in medicine, agriculture, industry, and 

research, are much more readily available and easy to obtain compared to 

weapons grade uranium or plutonium.

Terrorist use of a nuclear device would probably be limited to a single smaller 

“suitcase” weapon. The strength of such a nuclear weapon would be in the 

range of the bombs used during World War II. The nature of the effects 

would be the same as a weapon delivered by an inter-continental missile, but 

the area and severity of the effects would be significantly more limited.

There is no way of knowing how much warning time there would be before 

an attack by a terrorist using a nuclear or radiological weapon. A surprise attack remains a possibility. The danger of a massive strategic nuclear attack 

on the United States involving many weapons receded with the end of the 

Cold War; however, some terrorists have been supported by nations that have 

nuclear weapons programs. 

Other Threats. Other threats discussed in this manual include armed attacks, 

cyber attacks, high-altitude electromagnetic pulse, and high power microwave. These are discussed briefly in Table 1-2. 

Table 1-2 provides selected threats that you may consider when preparing 

your risk assessment, some of which has not been discussed previously in this 

How-To Guide. 

Table 1-2: Event Profiles 
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-13

Threat Application Mode Duration Extent of Effects; 

Static/Dynamic

Mitigating and Exacerbating 

Conditions

Improvised Explosive 

Device (Bomb)

- Stationary Vehicle

- Moving Vehicle

- Mail

- Supply

- Thrown

- Placed

- Suicide Bomber

Detonation of 

explosive device on 

or near target; via 

person, vehicle, or 

projectile. 

Instantaneous; 

additional 

secondary devices 

may be used, 

lengthening the 

duration of the 

threat until the 

attack site is 

determined to be 

clear. 

Extent of damage 

is determined by 

type and quantity 

of explosive. Effects 

generally static 

other than cascading 

consequences, 

incremental 

structural failure, 

etc. 

Blast energy at a given stand-off 

is inversely proportional to the 

cube of the distance from the 

device; thus, each additional 

increment of stand-off provides 

progressively more protection. 

Exacerbating conditions include 

ease of access to target; lack 

of barriers/shielding; poor 

construction; and ease of 

concealment of device.

Armed Attack

- Ballistics (small 

arms)

- Stand-off Weapons 

(rocket propelled 

grenades, mortars) 

Tactical assault or 

sniper attacks from 

a remote location.

Generally minutes 

to days.

Varies, based upon 

the perpetrator’s 

intent and 

capabilities.

Inadequate security can allow 

easy access to target, easy 

concealment of weapons, and 

undetected initiation of an attack.

Chemical Agent

- Blister

- Blood

- Choking/Lung/

Pulmonary

- Incapacitating

- Nerve

- Riot Control/Tear 

Gas

- Vomiting

Liquid/aerosol 

contaminants can 

be dispersed using 

sprayers or other 

aerosol generators; 

liquids vaporizing 

from puddles/

containers; or 

munitions.

Chemical agents 

may pose viable 

threats for hours to 

weeks, depending 

on the agent and 

the conditions in 

which it exists. 

Contamination can 

be carried out of 

the initial target 

area by persons, 

vehicles, water, and 

wind. Chemicals 

may be corrosive or 

otherwise damaging 

over time if not 

remediated. 

Air temperature can affect 

evaporation of aerosols. Ground 

temperature affects evaporation 

in pools of liquids. Humidity can 

enlarge aerosol particles, reducing 

the inhalation hazard. Precipitation 

can dilute and disperse agents, but 

can spread contamination. Wind 

can disperse vapors, but also cause 

target area to be dynamic. The 

micro-meteorological effects of 

buildings and terrain can alter travel 

and duration of agents. Shielding in 

the form of sheltering in place may 

protect people and property from 

harmful effects for a limited time.
1-14 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

Threat Application Mode Duration Extent of Effects; 

Static/Dynamic

Mitigating and Exacerbating 

Conditions

Biological Agent

- Anthrax

- Botulism

- Brucellosis

- Plague

- Smallpox

- Tularemia

- Viral Hemorrhagic 

Fevers

- Toxins (Botulinum,

Ricin, Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B, 

T-2 Mycotoxins)

Liquid or solid 

contaminants can 

be dispersed using 

sprayers/aerosol 

generators or by 

point or line sources 

such as munitions, 

covert deposits, and 

moving sprayers. 

May be directed 

at food or water 

supplies.

Biological agents 

may pose viable 

threats for hours to 

years, depending 

on the agent and 

the conditions in 

which it exists.

Depending on the 

agent used and the 

effectiveness with 

which it is deployed, 

contamination can be 

spread via wind and 

water. Infection can 

be spread via human 

or animal vectors. 

Altitude of release above 

ground can affect dispersion; 

sunlight is destructive to many 

bacteria and viruses; light to 

moderate winds will disperse 

agents, but higher winds can 

break up aerosol clouds; and 

the micro-meteorological effects 

of buildings and terrain can 

influence aerosolization and 

travel of agents. 

Radiological Agent

- Alpha

- Beta

- Gamma

Radioactive 

contaminants can 

be dispersed using 

sprayers/aerosol 

generators, or by 

point or line sources 

such as munitions, 

covert deposits, and 

moving sprayers. 

Contaminants may 

remain hazardous 

for seconds to 

years, depending on 

material used. 

Initial effects will be 

localized to site of 

attack; depending 

on meteorological 

conditions, 

subsequent behavior 

of radioactive 

contaminants may be 

dynamic. 

Duration of exposure, distance 

from source of radiation, and 

the amount of shielding between 

source and target determine 

exposure to radiation. 

Cyber Attacks Electronic attack using 

one computer system 

against another.

Minutes to days. Generally no direct 

effects on built 

environment. 

Inadequate security can facilitate 

access to critical computer 

systems, allowing them to be used 

to conduct attacks.

High-Altitude 

Electromagnetic Pulse 

(HEMP)

An electromagnetic 

energy field produced 

in the atmosphere 

by the power and 

radiation of a nuclear 

explosion. It can 

overload computer 

circuitry with effects 

similar to, but causing 

damage much 

more swiftly than a 

lightning strike.

It can be induced 

hundreds to a few 

thousand kilometers 

from the detonation. 

Affects electronic 

systems. There is 

no effect on people. 

It diminishes with 

distance, and 

electronic equipment 

that is turned off 

is less likely to be 

damaged. 

To produce maximum effect, 

a nuclear device must explode 

very high in the atmosphere. 

Electronic equipment may be 

hardened by surrounding it with 

protective metallic shielding that 

routes damaging electromagnetic 

fields away from highly sensitive 

electrical components.

Table 1-2: Event Profiles (continued) 
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-15

Threat Application Mode Duration Extent of Effects; 

Static/Dynamic

Mitigating and Exacerbating 

Conditions

High Power Microwave 

(HPM) EMP

It is a non-nuclear 

radio frequency 

energy field. Radio 

frequency weapons 

can be hidden in 

an attaché case, 

suitcase, van, or 

aircraft. Energy can 

be focused using an 

antenna, or emitter, 

to produce effects 

similar to HEMP, but 

only within a very 

limited range.

An HPM weapon has 

a shorter possible 

range than HEMP, but 

it can induce currents 

large enough to melt 

circuitry, or it can 

cause equipment to 

fail minutes, days, 

or even weeks 

later. HPM weapons 

are smaller-scale, 

are delivered at a 

closer range to the 

intended target, and 

can sometimes be 

emitted for a longer 

duration.

Vulnerable 

systems include 

electronic ignition 

systems, radars, 

communications, 

data processing, 

navigation, electronic 

triggers of explosive 

devices. HPM 

capabilities can cause 

a painful burning 

sensation or other 

injury to a person 

directly in the path 

of the focused power 

beam, or can be fatal 

if a person is too close 

to the microwave 

emitter.

Very damaging to electronics 

within a small geographic area. 

A shockwave could disrupt many 

computers within a 1-mile range. 

Radio frequency weapons have 

ranges from tens of meters 

to tens of kilometers. Unlike 

HEMP, however, HPM radiation is 

composed of shorter wave forms 

at higher-frequencies, which 

make it highly effective against 

electronic equipment and more 

difficult to harden against.

Note: Cyber attack focuses on denial of service, worms, and viruses designed to attack or destroy critical infrastructure 

related systems such as energy management, supervisory control and data acquisition systems, security, control valves, 

and voice over internet protocol telephones, which are critical systems that support multiple functions and are becoming 

increasingly connected to the internet.

It is important to indicate that commercial buildings have been the preferred target of recent 

terrorist attacks. Figure 1-6 illustrates such actions. Between 1998 and 2003, 1,566 commercial facilities were struck by terrorists while only 97 government, 170 diplomat facilities, and 41 military 

facilities were affected during the same period.

Table 1-2: Event Profiles (continued)
1-16 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

Figure 1-6 Total facilities affected by international terrorism and weapons of 

choice, 1998-2003

Collecting Information (Task 1.2)

When collecting information for your threat assessment, you may ask the following questions: What groups or organizations exist/are known? Do they 

have capability among themselves or is that capability readily obtainable locally? Do they have a history of terrorist acts and what are their tactics? What 

are the intentions of the aggressors against the government, commercial 

enterprises, industrial sectors, or individuals? Has it been determined that 

targeting (planning a tactic or seeking vulnerabilities) is actually occurring or 

being discussed?

Western EuropeNorth

America

Middle

East

Latin AmericaAfrica Asia Eurasia

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

12 35

33 55

86

07

94 27 89

101

3

2 8

4

5

41 53

13

102

111

13 62 02 92

92 73

2

0

0

0

0

4

03

84

71 9 42

58

291 221

35 64

Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, U.S. Department of State

Western

Europe North

America Middle East

Latin

America Africa Asia Eurasia

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

12 35

33 55

86

07

94 27 89

101

3

2 8

4

5

41 53

13

102

111

13 62 02 92

92 73

2

0

0

0

0

4

03

84

71 9 42

58

291 221

35 64

Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, U.S. Department of State
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-17

For technological hazards, these same questions take a different perspective. Does anything that can be a hazard (or be attacked, causing collateral 

damage) exist within a given distance of the building in question? What is the 

capability of that incident to cause harm? Is there a history of this type of accident occurring? 

Many security and intelligence organizations are a good source of information and data for threat assessments. These organizations include the police 

department (whose jurisdiction includes the building or site), the local State 

police office, and the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI.) In many areas of the country, there are threat coordinating committees, including FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, that facilitate the sharing 

of information. In addition, the CDC, the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), and the Homeland Security Offices (HSOs) at the State 

level are good sources of information. For technological hazards, it is important to gather information from the local fire department and hazardous 

materials (HazMat) unit, Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), 

and State Emergency Response Commission (SERC). LEPC and SERC are 

local and State organizations established under a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) program. They identify critical facilities in vulnerable 

zones and generate emergency management plans. Additionally, most fire 

departments understand which industries in the local area handle the most 

combustible materials and the HazMat unit understands who handles materials that could have a negative impact upon people and the environment. In 

many jurisdictions, the HazMat unit is part of the fire department.

Other good sources of information include the Department of Homeland 

Security Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IA/IP) Directorate and, under the Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). The IA/IP Directorate and the 

TTIC enhance intelligence fusion to bring together all terrorist information 

in one place, enabling America’s best intelligence analysts and investigators 

from multiple departments to work as a team to put together the pieces of the 

puzzle. 

Threat information is communicated through The Homeland Security Information Network. This communications system delivers real-time interactive 

connectivity among State and local partners and with the DHS Homeland 

Security Operations Center (HSOC) through the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES). Other DHS agencies participate through 

seats at the HSOC and their own operations centers, and the system will be 

further expanded within DHS operations. Each State and major urban area’s 
1-18 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

Homeland Security Advisor and other points of contact will receive software 

licenses, technology, and training to participate in the information sharing 

and situational awareness that JRIES already brings to State and local homeland security personnel across the United States. Examples of other points 

of participation include State National Guard offices, Emergency Operations 

Centers (EOCs), and first responder and Public Safety departments.

The network significantly strengthens the flow of real-time threat information 

to State, local, and private sector partners at the Sensitive-but-Unclassified 

level (SBU), and provides a platform for communications through the classified SECRET level to State offices. The program is built upon the JRIES 

platform, a secure network and a suite of applications currently operating 

at the SBU level. Participants currently include approximately 100 organizations, including Federal agencies, States, municipalities, and other local 

government entities, with a significant law enforcement user base. All participating entities have a certified counterterrorism mission. Approximately 

1,000 users currently have access to the system. 

Determining the Design Basis Threat (Task 1.3)

Stopping a terrorist or physical attack on a building is very difficult; any 

building or site can be breached or destroyed. Weapons, tools, and tactics 

can change faster than a building can be modified against a particular threat. 

However, the more secure the building or site and the better the building is 

designed to withstand an attack, the better the odds the building will not be 

attacked or, if attacked, it will suffer less damage. Terrorists generally select 

targets that have some value as a target, such as an iconic commercial property, symbolic government building, or structure likely to inflict significant 

emotional or economic damage such as a shopping mall or major seaport. 

The type and size of the weapons to be considered in the threat assessment 

are usually selected by the building stakeholders in collaboration with the 

Assessment Team (i.e., engineers who specialize in the design of structures 

to mitigate the effects of explosions - see Step 3 of this How-To Guide). The 

threat assessment and analysis for any building can range from a general 

threat scenario to a very detailed examination of specific groups, individuals, 

and tactics that the building may need to be designed to repel or defend 

against. For this How-To Guide, a simplified method has been selected to 

help the Assessment Team and building stakeholders to identify the primary 

threats to their buildings (see Selecting Primary Threats below and Table 1-

3). 
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-19

It is important to indicate that there are other sophisticated methods and 

criteria that can be used for more detailed threat analysis, including the 

TM5-853 Army-Air Force Security Engineering Manual, the State of Florida HLSCAM vulnerability and criticality matrix, the Department of Defense (DoD) 

CARVER process, and the FEMA 386-7 Site/Building Inherent Vulnerability 

Assessment Matrix. The determination of which method to be used should be 

left to the Assessment Team and building owners.

The methodology presented in this How-To Guide is based upon several 

methodologies, including some of the ones listed above. It provides a simple 

and straightforward approach to focus on the primary threats using selected criteria. These primary threats will help the Assessment Team and 

stakeholders complete the risk assessment and focus on proper mitigation 

measures. 

Selecting Primary Threats

Unlike natural disasters, terrorists continually evaluate, plan, and seek to exploit the weakest building protective design features. Therefore, it becomes 

impossible both from a technical and benefit/cost point to try to protect everything from every type of attack. The building stakeholders have to make a 

determination as to what the design basis threat is for their building and what 

level of protection they can afford. As the terrorist threat changes over time, 

the building stakeholders may wish to revisit this part of the risk assessment 

process.

To select your primary threats, the criteria described below have been provided. The selected criteria are part of Table 1-3, which is designed to help 

you to determine your potential threat. Scores from 1 to 10 (10 being the 

greater threat) are described. 

❍ Access to Agent. The ease by which the source material can be acquired to 

carry out the attack. Consideration includes the local materials of HazMat 

inventory, farm and mining supplies, major chemical or manufacturing 

plants, university and commercial laboratories, and transportation 

centers.

❍ Knowledge/Expertise. The general level of skill and training that 

combines the ability to create the weapon (or arm an agent) and the 

technical knowledge of the systems to be attacked (heating, ventilation, 

and air conditioning (HVAC), nuclear, etc.). Knowledge and expertise 

can be gained by surveillance, open source research, specialized training, 

or years of practice in industry. 
1-20 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

❍ History of Threats (Building Functions/Tenants). What has the potential 

threat element done in the past, how many times, and was the threat 

local, regional, national, or international in nature? When was the most 

recent incident and where, and against what target? Are the building 

functions and tenants attractive targets for the terrorist?

❍ Asset Visibility/Symbolic. The economic, cultural, and symbolic 

importance of the building to society that may be exploited by the 

terrorist seeking monetary or political gain through their actions.

❍ Asset Accessibility. The ability of the terrorist to become well-positioned 

to carry out an attack at the critical location against the intended target. 

The critical location is a function of the site, the building layout, and the 

security measures in place. 

❍ Site Population/Capacity. The population demographics of the building 

and surrounding area.

❍ Collateral Damage/Distance to the Building. The potential of the threat 

to cause collateral damage or disruption to the building of interest. The 

building of interest is not considered the primary target.

Table 1-3 is used in conjunction with Table 1-2 to create a general Threat Scenario for the site or building. Table 1-4 illustrates the use of the threat scoring 

matrix for a typical multi-story commercial office building in an urban area 

with underground parking, internet enabled environmental energy management system, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telecommunications system, 

Internal Protocol/Transmission Control Protocol (IP/TCP) enabled security 

system using local area network (LAN) and wireless connectivity for closedcircuit televisions (CCTVs) and entry access control, and standard hard wire 

connectivity for the fire alarm system. Your potential threats will be selected 

from those reaching the highest scores.
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-21

Table 1-3: Criteria to Select Primary Threats

Criteria

Scenario Access to 

Agent

Knowledge/

Expertise

History of Threats 

(Building Functions/

Tenants)

Asset 

Visibility/

Symbolic

Asset 

Accessibility

Site 

Population/

Capacity

Collateral 

Damage/

Distance 

to Building 

9-10 Readily 

available

Basic 

knowledge/open 

source

Local incident, occurred 

recently, caused great 

damage; building functions 

and tenants were primary 

targets

Existence 

widely 

known/iconic

Open access, 

unrestricted 

parking

> 5,000 Within 

1,000-foot 

radius

6-8 Easy to 

produce

Bachelor’s 

degree or 

technical school/

open scientific 

or technical 

literature

Regional/State incident, 

occurred a few years ago, 

caused substantial damage; 

building functions and 

tenants were one of the 

primary targets

Existence 

locally 

known/

landmark

Open access, 

restricted 

parking

1,001-5,000 Within 1-

mile radius

3-5 Difficult to 

produce or 

acquire

Advanced 

training/rare 

scientific or 

declassified 

literature

National incident, occurred 

some time in the past, 

caused important damage; 

building functions and 

tenants were one of the 

primary targets

Existence 

publish/wellknown

Controlled 

access, 

protected 

entry

251-1,000 Within 2-

mile radius

1-2 Very 

difficult to 

produce or 

acquire

Advanced degree 

or training/

classified 

information

International incident, 

occurred many years ago, 

caused localized damage; 

building functions and 

tenants were not the 

primary targets

Existence not 

well-known/

no symbolic 

importance

Remote 

location, 

secure 

perimeter, 

armed 

guards, 

tightly 

controlled 

access

1-250 Within 10-

mile radius
1-22 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

Table 1-4: Nominal Example to Select Primary Threats for a Specific Urban Multi-story Building

Criteria Score

Scenario Access 

to 

Agent

Knowledge/

Expertise

History of 

Threats 

(Building 

Functions/

Tenants)

Asset 

Visibility/

Symbolic

Asset 

Accessibility

Site 

Population/

Capacity

Collateral 

Damage/

Distance 

to 

Building

Improvised Explosive Device (Bomb)

1-lb. Mail Bomb 9 9 3 8 3 10 1 43

5-lb. Pipe Bomb 9 9 3 8 3 10 2 44

50-lb. Satchel Bomb/Suicide 

Bomber

8 8 6 8 3 10 3 46

500-lb. Car Bomb 6 8 7 8 3 10 3 45

5,000-lb. Truck Bomb 4 8 5 8 3 10 3 41

20,000-lb. Truck Bomb 2 6 1 8 3 10 3 33

Natural Gas 2 8 1 8 3 10 5 37

Bomb/Aircraft/Ship

Small Aircraft 9 6 3 8 3 10 3 42

Medium Aircraft 5 4 7 8 3 10 3 40

Large Aircraft 2 3 7 8 3 10 3 36

Ship 0 0 0 8 3 10 3 24

Chemical Agent Choking

Chlorine 5 7 2 8 3 10 2 37

Phosgene 3 10 2 8 3 10 1 37

Blood

Hydrogen Cyanide 3 8 2 8 3 10 1 35

Blister

Lewisite 3 6 2 8 3 10 1 33

Nerve

Sarin 3 4 6 8 3 10 4 38
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-23

Biological Agent Bacteria

Anthrax 4 5 9 8 3 10 2 41

Plague 4 5 3 8 3 10 2 35

Tularemia 4 5 2 8 3 10 2 34

Viruses

Hemorrehagic 

Fevers

4 5 2 8 3 10 2 34

Smallpox 2 5 2 8 3 10 2 32

Toxins

Botulinum 5 5 5 8 3 10 2 38

Ricin 8 8 9 8 3 10 2 48

Radiological Agent

“Dirty Bomb” 5 7 1 8 3 10 5 39

Spent Fuel Storage 2 6 1 8 3 10 1 31

Nuclear Plant 1 6 1 8 3 10 1 30

Armed Attack

RPG/LAW/Mortar 4 5 2 8 3 10 2 34

Ballistic 10 10 5 8 3 10 2 48

Cyber Attack

Worm 9 10 5 8 3 10 1 46

Virus 9 10 5 8 3 10 1 46

Denial of Service 9 7 5 8 3 10 1 43

Note that the values for “Asset Visibility/Symbolic,” “Asset Accessibility,” and “Site Population/

Capacity” are constants because a single building is being analyzed. 

For the nominal example, the five primary threats that will be examined in 

more detail and the assumptions are:

❍ Suicide Bomber. 50-lb. satchel or vest detonating in interior space or near 

primary structural member

Table 1-4: Nominal Example to Select Primary Threats for a Specific Urban Multi-story Building (continued)

Scenario Access 

to 

Agent

Knowledge/

Expertise

History of 

Threats 

(Building 

Functions/

Tenants)

Asset 

Visibility/

Symbolic

Asset 

Accessibility

Site 

Population/

Capacity

Collateral 

Damage/

Distance 

to 

Building

Criteria Score
1-24 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

❍ Vehicle Bomb. 500-lb. car bomb detonating within 15 feet of building exterior

❍ Chemical Agent. Sarin gas most toxic of the listed agents; assumed worst case

❍ Biological Agent. Recent mail attacks with Ricin; no antidote, high economic productivity loss

❍ Cyber Attack. Impact on Emergency Management Systems (EMS), VoIP telecommunications, 

security systems

The “dirty bomb” and armed assault are other potential threats that could be considered, but are 

left out of this analysis for simplicity.

These examples reveal subjective estimates and summed scores and provide a first level analysis of 

the primary threats that may affect your site or building. To complete this portion of your risk assessment, you should use Worksheet 1-1. 

Determining the Threat Rating (Task 1.4)

Having selected the primary threats for your site or building, the next step is to determine how 

the threat will affect the functions and critical infrastructure. The threat rating is an integral part 

of the risk assessment and is used to determine, characterize, and quantify a loss caused by an aggressor using a weapon or agent and tactic against the target (asset). The threat rating deals with 

the likelihood or probability of the threat occurring and the consequences of its occurrence. 

For determining the threat rating, this How-To Guide provides a methodology based on consensus 

opinion of the building stakeholders, threat specialists, and engineers. (This group could be expanded as necessary to help refine the scoring process.) Table 1-5 provides a scale to help you 

with this process. The scale is a combination of a 7-level linguistic scale and a 10-point numerical 

scale (10 being the greater threat). The key elements of this scale are the likelihood/credibility of 

a threat, potential weapons to be used during a terrorist attack, and information available to decision-makers. The primary objective is to look at the threat, the geographic distribution of functions 

and critical infrastructure, redundancy, and response and recovery to evaluate the impact on the 

organization should a primary threat attack occur. Tables 1-6A and 1-6B display a nominal example 

of applying these ratings for an urban multi-story building.
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-25

Table 1-5: Threat Rating

Threat Rating

Very High 10

Very High – The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used against the site or 

building is imminent. Internal decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is credible.

High 8-9

High – The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used against the site or building is 

expected. Internal decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is credible.

Medium High 7

Medium High – The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used against the site or 

building is probable. Internal decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is credible.

Medium 5-6

Medium – The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used against the site or 

building is possible. Internal decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is known, but is not verified.

Medium Low 4

Medium Low – The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used in the region is probable. Internal decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies 

determine the threat is known, but is not likely.

Low 2-3

Low – The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used in the region is possible. Internal decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine 

the threat exists, but is not likely.

Very Low 1

Very Low – The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used in the region or against 

the site or building is very negligible. Internal decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is non-existent or extremely unlikely.

Worksheet 1-2 helps you organize and determine the threat rating in terms of building functions 

and infrastructure (see Task 2.3). The purpose is to produce a more informed opinion regarding 

the manmade hazards that affect your assets. 

As a starting point, use a value of 5 and assume a medium level of threat; then adjust the threat 

rating up or down based on consensus. Note that the threat rating is independent of the building 

function and infrastructure because it is assumed to be ubiquitous to the entire building and the 

same threat numeric value is used vertically for each function or infrastructure component (see 

Tables 1-6A and 1-6B). 
1-26 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

Table 1-6A: Nominal Example of Threat Rating for an Urban Multi-story Building (Building Function)

Function Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide 

Bomber

Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Administration 8 4 5 2 2

Engineering 8 4 5 2 2

Warehousing 8 4 5 2 2

Data Center 8 4 5 2 2

Food Service 8 4 5 2 2

Security 8 4 5 2 2

Housekeeping 8 4 5 2 2

Day Care 8 4 5 2 2

Table 1-6B: Nominal Example of Threat Rating for an Urban Multi-story Building (Building Infrastructure)

Infrastructure Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide 

Bomber

Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Site 8 4 5 2 2

Architectural 8 4 5 2 2

Structural Systems 8 4 5 2 2

Envelope Systems 8 4 5 2 2

Utility Systems 8 4 5 2 2

Mechanical Systems 8 4 5 2 2

Plumbing and Gas Systems 8 4 5 2 2

Electrical Systems 8 4 5 2 2

Fire Alarm Systems 8 4 5 2 2

IT/Communications Systems 8 4 5 2 2
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-27

WORKSHEET 1-1: SELECTION OF PRIMARY THREATS

Criteria Score

Scenario Access 

to 

Agent

Knowlege/

Expertise

History of 

Threats 

(Building 

Functions/

Tenants)

Asset 

Visibility/

Symbolic

Asset 

Accessibility

Site 

Population/

Capacity

Collateral 

Damage/

Distance 

to 

Building

Improvised Explosive Device (Bomb)

1-lb. Mail Bomb

5-lb. Pipe Bomb

50-lb. Satchel Bomb/

Suicide Bomber

500-lb. Car Bomb

5,000-lb. Truck Bomb

20,000-lb. Truck Bomb

Natural Gas

Worksheet 1-1 will help you to select your primary threats. Building stakeholders and the Assessment 

Team should review criteria provided in Task 1.3 of this How-To Guide to fill out this Worksheet. 

After ranking each threat against the provided criteria (Table 1-2), the threat scores should be 

summed. The top scoring threats (select three to ten of the threats based on score dispersion) become 

the major threats that you will use for the preparation of your risk assessment. 
1-28 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

Criteria Score

Scenario Access 

to 

Agent

Knowlege/

Expertise

History of 

Threats 

Against 

Buildings

Asset 

Visibility/

Symbolic

Asset 

Accessibility

Site 

Population/

Capacity

Collateral 

Damage/

Distance 

to Building

Bomb/Aircraft/Ship

Small Aircraft

Medium Aircraft

Large Aircraft

Ship 

Chemical Agent Choking

Chlorine

Phosgene

Blood

Hydrogen 

Cyanide

Blister

Lewisite

Nerve

Sarin

Biological Agent Bacteria

Anthrax

Plague

Tularemia

Viruses

Hemorrehagic 

Fevers

Smallpox

WORKSHEET 1-1: SELECTION OF PRIMARY THREATS (CONTINUED)
STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING 1-29 Toxins

Botulinum

Ricin

Radiological Agent

“Dirty Bomb”

Spent Fuel Storage

Nuclear Plant

Armed Attack

RPG/LAW/Mortar

Ballistic

Cyber Attack

Worm

Virus

Denial of Service

Criteria Score

Scenario Access 

to 

Agent

Knowlege/

Expertise

History 

of 

Threats 

Against 

Buildings

Asset 

Visibility/

Symbolic

Asset 

Accessibility

Site 

Population/

Capacity

Collateral 

Damage/

Distance 

to 

Building

WORKSHEET 1-1: SELECTION OF PRIMARY THREATS (CONTINUED)
1-30 STEP 1: THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND RATING

Worksheet 1-2 can be used to complete your risk assessment 

and will be used in conjunction with Worksheets 4-1 and 

4-2. It can be used to discuss priority threats with building 

stakeholders and among the members of the Assessment 

Team. To fill out this table, analyze the impact of a 

particular threat on the building core functions and building 

infrastructure components of your building. Use the results 

of Worksheet 1-1 to assist you in this process. Building core 

functions and building infrastructure components are defined 

in Section 2.3 of this How-To Guide.

Threat Rating

Very High 10

High 8-9

Medium High 7

Medium 5-6

Medium Low 4

Low 2-3

Very Low 1

Function Threat Rating (one column 

for each threat) Infrastructure Threat Rating (one column for each threat)

Administration Site

Engineering Architectural

Warehousing Structural Systems

Data Center Envelope Systems

Food Service Utility Systems

Security Mechanical Systems

Housekeeping Plumbing and Gas Systems

Day Care Electrical Systems

Other Fire Alarm Systems

Other IT/Communications Systems

WORKSHEET 1-2: THREAT RATING 
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-1

OVERVIEW

The second step in the assessment process is to identify the assets of your 

area, site, and building that may be affected by a threat (see Figure 2-1). Asset 

value can be defined as a degree of debilitating impact that would be caused 

by the incapacity or destruction of an asset. An asset refers to a resource 

of value requiring protection. It can be tangible (i.e., buildings, facilities, 

equipment activities, operations, and information) or intangible (i.e.,

processes or a company’s information and reputation). 

The asset value assessment process involves the following tasks: 

❍ Identifying the layers of defense

❍ Identifying the critical assets

❍ Identifying the building core functions and infrastructure

❍ Determining the asset value rating

In this How-To Guide, the identification of the assets is done within the 

concept of layers of defense. The objective of layers of defense is to create 

a succeeding number of security layers more difficult to penetrate, provide 

additional warning and response time, and allow building occupants to move 

into defensive positions or designated safe haven protection. This approach 

will be especially helpful for identifying your mitigation options after you 

conclude your risk assessment. 

TASKS:

2.1 Identifying the layers of defense

2.2 Identifying the critical assets

2.3 Identifying the building core functions and 

infrastructure

2.4 Determining the asset value rating

Step 4: Risk Assessment

Step 2: Asset Value Assessment

Step 3: Vulnerability Assessment

Step 1: Threat Identification and Rating

Figure 2-1 Steps and tasks

Step 5: Consider Mitigation Options
2-2 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

To identify and prioritize a building’s critical assets is a vital step in the 

process to improve its level of protection prior to a terrorist attack. Recognizing that people are a building’s most critical asset, the process described 

throughout this step will help you to identify and prioritize those assets where 

people are most at risk and require protection.

Identifying the Layers of Defense (Task 2.1)

The layers of defense is a traditional approach in security engineering and 

use concentric circles extending out from an area or site to the building or 

asset that requires protection. They can be seen as demarcation points for 

different security strategies. Identifying the layers of defense early in the assessment process will help you to understand better the assets that require 

protection and determine your mitigation options. Figure 2-2 shows the layers 

of defense described below. 

First Layer of Defense. This involves understanding the characteristics of the 

surrounding area, including construction type, occupancies, and the nature 

and intensity of adjacent activities. It is specifically concerned with buildings, 

installations, and infrastructure outside the site perimeter. For urban areas, it 

also includes the curb lane and surrounding streets.

Second Layer of Defense. This refers to the space that exists between the 

site perimeter and the assets requiring protection. It involves the placement 

of buildings and forms in a particular site and understanding which natural 

or physical resources can provide protection. It entails the design of access 

points, parking, roadways, pedestrian walkways, natural barriers, security 

lighting, and signage. For urban areas, it refers specifically to the building 

yard.

Third Layer of Defense. This deals with the protection of the asset itself. It 

proposes to harden the structures and systems, incorporate effective HVAC 

systems and surveillance equipment, and wisely design and locate utilities and 

mechanical systems. Note that, of all blast mitigation measures, distance is the 

most effective measure because other measures vary in effectiveness and can 

be more costly. However, often it is not possible to provide adequate standoff distance. For example, sidewalks in many urban areas may be less than 10 

meters (33 feet), while appropriate stand-off may require a minimum of 25 

meters (82 feet). 

Designers should consider providing adequate stand-off distance when possible. In this case, the hardening of the building is a second choice. 
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-3

Figure 2-2 Layers of defense

Urban versus Rural

The layers of defense are not predetermined and they may vary from site to 

site and from building to building. If a particular building requiring protection is part of a campus or located in a rural, semi-rural, or urban area, a 

similar analysis may be applicable for all cases when determining the importance of the asset. However, the security elements necessary to protect the 

building can be entirely different, depending on its location. The approach 

suggests establishing different demarcation points in order to identify sound 

security strategies. The layers of defense concept proposes that each designer 

study a particular site and determine critical assets that need to be protected 

and how protection should take place. 

Figure 2-3 depicts the security elements that may be considered in an urban 

setting. It shows how the second layer of defense becomes extremely important to protect a building in an urban area. Note that the elements described 

below may require a different method of protection for a campus or a rural 

site. Major layers for an urban setting include:

❍ Curb Lane (First Layer of Defense). This area refers to the lane of the 

street closest to the sidewalk. Typically it is used for curbside parking, 

passenger drop-off, loading, and service vehicles. Curbside parking should 

not be removed unless additional stand-off distance is absolutely required 

First Layer of Defense

Entry Control Point

Perimeter (site property line

or fence)

1

Second Layer of Defense

Third Layer of Defense

3 2

1

2

3
2-4 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

for high-target buildings. When required, sidewalks can be widened to 

incorporate the area devoted to the curb lane. 

❍ Sidewalk (First Layer of Defense). This area serves as the common space 

for pedestrian interaction, moment, and activity. If possible, sidewalks 

should be left open and accessible to pedestrians and security elements 

should not interfere with the circulation. The streetscape could include 

hardened versions of parking meters, streetlights, benches, planters, and 

trash receptacles. The use of retractable bollards is a great solution when 

the width of the street does not allow the placement of security elements.

❍ Building Yard (Second Layer of Defense). This area refers to the exterior 

space between the building and the sidewalk. It consists of a grassy 

area adjacent to the building flush with the sidewalk or a planted bed 

raised above the level of the sidewalk. It also includes pedestrian entries 

and loading docks. For the building yard, security components should 

complement the building architecture and landscaping. Security elements 

should be located near the outer edge of the yard. A planter or raised 

plinth wall provides a good security barrier in this layer.

Figure 2-4 shows the layers of defense in a campus or rural/semi-rural setting 

that may be required for a campus when a particular building is considered a 

critical asset. Protection entails considering access points, parking, roadways, 

pedestrian walkways, natural and physical barriers, security lighting, and signage. Similar situations can be encountered in a campus setting or in a rural 

or semi-rural area. 
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-5

Figure 2-3 Layers of defense in a urban setting

Figure 2-4 Layers of defense when a particular building is considered a critical 

asset

Second Layer of Defense 

for a campus

First Layer of Defense 

for a campus

Second Layer of Defense 

for a campus

Highly Secured Building

First, Second, and Third 

Layers of Defense for a 

structure of interest

Building

Interior

Building Yard

Second Layer of Defense

Third Layer

 of Defense

First Layer of Defense

Sidewalk Curb

Lane

Street
2-6 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

Identifying the Critical Assets (Task 2.2)

This task involves identifying critical assets within the layers of defense 

described in Task 2.1. The purpose is to help you determine those assets essential to the minimum operation of your building, and to ensure the health 

and safety of the building and its occupants. Table 2-1 is a starting point for 

this exercise. Appendix A of this How-To Guide -- the Building Vulnerability 

Assessment Checklist -- provides detailed information regarding the vulnerability of your assets. 

Identifying Critical Assets for the First Layer of Defense. One of the first 

steps when identifying your critical assets is to understand your surrounding 

areas and how construction types, occupancies, functions, and activities 

adjacent to your asset can pose a threat or serve to protect your asset. It is essential to understand the interdependencies and distance that separate your 

building and off-site facilities. Off-site facilities can include:

❍ Landmarks and iconic buildings

❍ Law enforcement, fire departments, and hospital buildings

❍ Federal facilities

❍ Embassies

❍ Key commercial properties

❍ HazMat storage areas and chemical manufacturing plants

❍ Transportation (roads, avenues of approach, bridges, railroads, tunnels, 

airports, and ports)

❍ Telecommunications and utility services

To assess your assets, you may want to consider different scenarios. For example, a car bomb may be able to carry 200 pounds of TNT and a truck 

bomb may be able to carry 11,000 pounds of TNT. If it is possible that these 

bombs could be placed proximate to your building, you may want to determine potential damages that they could cause, as well as protective actions for 

your building. To assess potential damage, the use of Geographic Information 

Systems (GISs) can be an invaluable resource. Figures 2-5 and 2-6 depict this 

process. There are several powerful GIS systems available that can help you to 

determine your critical asset within the first layer of defense. For this How-To 

Guide, we suggest the use of HAZUS-MH, described in Figure 2-7. Note that 

the use of GIS is not required to prepare assessment studies; it is only a tool to 

facilitate the process.
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-7

Figure 2-5 Potential blast effects – 200-lb car bomb

Figure 2-6 Potential blast effects – 11,000-lb truck bomb
2-8 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

HAZUS-MH is a GIS based software developed to estimate losses from earthquakes, floods, and hurricane 

winds.

HAZUS-MH takes into account various impacts of a 

hazard event such as:

• Physical damage: damage to residential and 

commercial buildings, schools, critical facilities, 

and infrastructure

• Economic loss: lost jobs, business interruptions, 

and repair and reconstruction costs

• Social impacts: impacts to people, including requirements for shelters and medical aid 

HAZUS-MH includes the largest compilation of 

geo-reference data made available by the Federal Government at no cost. The HAZUS-MH 

provided inventory data are gathered from the 

nationally available data sources and include the 

following: 

General Building Stock includes residential, 

commercial, and industrial building types. 

HAZUS-MH groups the general building stock 

into 39 specific model building types and 33 specific occupancy classes. 

Essential Facilities include hospitals and other medical facilities, police and fire stations, 

EOCs, and schools that are often used as shelters. 

Hazardous Material Facilities include storage facilities for industrial or hazardous materials 

such as corrosives, explosives, flammable materials, radioactive materials, and toxins.

High Potential Loss Facilities include nuclear power plants, dams, levees, and military installations. 

Figure 2-7 Using HAZUS-MH to identify the criticality of assets
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-9

Transportation Lifeline Systems include the following types of infrastructure inventory data: 

• Airways – airport facilities, airport runways, heliport facilities, and heliport landing 

pads

• Highways – bridges, tunnels, and road segments

• Railways – tracks, tunnels, bridges, and facilities (railyards and depots)

• Waterways – ports (locks, seaports, harbors, dry docks, and piers) and ferries

• Bus Stations

Utility Lifeline Systems include potable water, wastewater, oil, natural gas, electric power, and 

communications systems. 

Demographics include people assets of the inventory data regarding total population; age, 

gender, and race distribution; income distribution; number of owners and renters; building 

age; and other data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau and Dun & Bradstreet. The demographic data are aggregated at the Census block or Census tract level.

The database sets in HAZUSMH are easily converted 

into visual charts, maps, and 

graphics for a given site or 

building.

Training is necessary to run 

HAZUS-MH and other GIS 

software. In case of HAZUSMH, the user must be 

familiarized with Windowsbased environments, GIS 

software (ArcGIS® 8.3), and 

data manipulation.

HAZUS-MH is a non-proprietary software that can 

be ordered at no charge at: 

http://www.fema.gov/hazus

Figure 2-7 Using HAZUS-MH to identify the criticality of assets (continued)
2-10 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

Identifying Critical Assets for the Second Layer of Defense. To identify your 

critical assets, you need to understand how important they are in terms of 

protecting people and key operations. Table 2-1 provides a nominal example 

of the components that may be of concern when establishing your critical 

asset. The elements across the top include the different threats that you may 

have identified. The column to the left provides a list of concerns related to 

your site. This process can be further expanded by consulting the Building 

Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in Appendix A. When determining your 

asset value, you may ask the following questions: 

❍ Are perimeter fences or other types of barrier controls in place? 

❍ What are the access points to the site or building? 

❍ Is there vehicle and pedestrian access control at the perimeter of the site?

❍ Does site circulation prevent high-speed approaches by vehicles?

❍ Is there a minimum setback distance between the building and parked 

vehicles?

❍ In dense, urban areas, does curb lane parking allow uncontrolled vehicles 

to park unacceptably close to a building in public rights-of-way? 

❍ What are the existing types of vehicle anti-ram devices for the site or 

building?

❍ Do existing landscape measures/features (walls, fountains, berms, etc.) 

deflect or dissipate the blast pressure?

❍ Are these devices at the property boundary or at the building?

Identifying Critical Assets for the Third Layer of Defense. When estimating 

your critical assets within the third layer of defense, you need to consider 

the structural and non-structural soundness of your building, as well as the 

possibility of mechanical, plumbing, and electrical systems continuing operations after an attack. Given the evolving nature of the terrorist threat, it is 

hard to estimate the value of your assets. For example, due to the catastrophic 

consequences of progressive collapse, evaluating the structural components 

of your building can become a high priority. Windows that are the weakest 

part of a building can become a crucial issue. Other important elements for 

blast design may include hardening of mechanical and electrical systems and 

creating appropriate redundancies. The location of air-intakes and limiting 

the access of the public to main systems can become critical for reducing potential damage from terrorist attacks. The upgrade of HVAC systems and the 

adoptions of efficient filtering systems can become a key consideration when 

establishing critical assets. 
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-11

Table 2-1 is provided to assist you in assessing your critical assets. As previously 

stated, you may also want to consult the Building Vulnerability Assessment 

Checklist provided in Appendix A to further analyze your concerns. When 

determining your critical assets for the third layer of defense, you may ask the 

following questions:

❍ What is the designed or estimated protection level of the exterior walls 

against the postulated explosive threat?

❍ Is the window system design on the exterior façade balanced to mitigate 

the hazardous effects of flying glazing following an explosive event? 

(glazing, frames, anchorage to supporting walls, etc.)

❍ Do non-window openings, such as mechanical vents and exposed 

plenums, provide the same level of protection required for the exterior 

wall?

❍ Is the incoming water supply in a secure location? Is there a secure 

alternate drinking water supply?

❍ Are the incoming air intakes in a secure location? 

❍ How much fuel is stored on the site or at the building and how long 

can this quantity support critical operations? How is it stored? How is it 

secured?

❍ Is roof access limited to authorized personnel by means of locking 

mechanisms?

❍ What are the types and level of air filtration? 

❍ Are there provisions for air monitors or sensors for CBR agents? 

Identifying the Building Core Functions and 

Infrastructure (Task 2.3)

The identification of the building core functions and infrastructure is one of 

the key elements of the assessment. These functions are the basis for the analysis 

described in this How-To Guide. The functions and infrastructure analyses 

identify the geographic distribution within the building and interdependencies 

between critical assets. Ideally, the functions should have geographic dispersion 

as well as a pre-determined recovery site or alternate work location. Similarly, 

critical infrastructure should have geographic dispersion and backup. For example, a bomb or CBR attack entering through the loading dock could impact 

the telecommunications, data, uninterruptible power supply (UPS), generator, 

and other key infrastructure systems. The core functions and infrastructure are 

described below. 
2-12 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

FIRST LAYER OF DEFENSE

Effects of off-property development have not been considered ■ ■ ■ ■

Site is within view of other occupied facilities ■

Site is adjacent to high terrain or structures ■

Site is close to adjacent dense vegetation ■

Site is not within low-lying topographic areas ■

Lack of fencing and physical barriers ■ ■ ■ ■

Lack of active monitoring for fences and entry points ■ ■ ■ ■

Insecure access roads to the site ■ ■ ■

Lack of entry control and vehicular access ■ ■ ■ ■

Lack of pull-over lanes at checkpoints to inspect vehicles ■

Ineffective straight-line vehicular access to high-risk resources ■

Insecure straight-line entry approach roads ■

Lack of distance from sidewalk to building yard ■

SECOND LAYER OF DEFENSE

Lack of distance from perimeter fence and developed areas ■ ■ ■

High-risk resources are not away from primary roads ■ ■

High-risk land uses are not considered in the interior of the site ■

Lack of sufficient stand-off ■

Lack of exclusive zone/non-exclusive zones ■

Facilities with similar threat levels have not been clustered ■ ■

Controlled access zones have not been established ■ ■ ■ ■

Site critical facilities have not been set on higher ground ■ ■

High surrounding terrain for protected area has not been established ■

Lack of earth berms used for protection or barriers ■

Lack of bodies of water used for protection or barriers ■

Lack of physical obstruction screens ■ ■

Lack of dense thorn-bearing vegetation ■

■ The symbols indicate which debilitating conditions shown in the left hand column apply to the 

types of threats indicated across the top of the chart.

Cyber Attack Vehicle BombSuicide BomberChemical (Sarin)Biological (Ricin)Others

Table 2-1: Correlation of the Layers of Defense Against Threats
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-13

Lack of vegetation screens ■ ■

Lack of landscape planting to conceal aboveground systems ■ ■

Areas that provide unwanted concealment exist ■ ■ ■

Unwanted surveillance is possible ■ ■ ■ ■

Lack of clear zone for surveillance ■ ■ ■ ■

Parking surveillance or viewing does not exist ■ ■ ■ ■

Parking is allowed near high-risk areas ■ ■ ■ ■

Parking is allowed in exclusive zone ■ ■ ■ ■

One-way circulation exists ■

Vehicular access to high-risk resources is not limited ■ ■

Lack of complexes to enhance surveillance opportunities ■ ■

Lack of building yard to place security barriers ■

Extremely narrow sidewalks that do not permit introducing security elements ■

Lack of active barriers ■

Lack of passive barriers ■

Lack of bollards ■

Anti-ram street furniture is not in use ■

Lack of protection in curbs and sidewalks ■

Lack of enhanced protection close to building entrances ■

Lack of physical security lighting ■ ■ ■ ■

Lack of discrete directional signs for high-risk buildings ■ ■ ■ ■

Lack of major routing corridors away from high-risk resources ■ ■ ■ ■

High-risk resources are not located far from vehicle parking ■ ■ ■ ■

Lack of appropriate stand-off zones ■ ■

Lack of separation between facilities ■ ■ ■ Cy ber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide Bomber Chemical (Sarin)

Biological (Ricin)Others

Table 2-1: Correlation of the Layers of Defense Against Threats (continued)

SECOND LAYER OF DEFENSE (continued)
2-14 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

Lack of separate service and delivery access ■ ■ ■

Lack of appropriate location of trash receptacles ■ ■ ■ ■

Vehicle access and closeness to facilities exists ■ ■ ■ ■

Lack of protection at culverts, sewers, and pipelines ■

Inappropriate location of loading/unloading docks ■

Lack of protection at concrete trenches, storm drains, and duct systems ■ ■ ■

Lack of check locks on manhole covers ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate signs identifying utility systems ■ ■ ■

Lack of fencing at critical utility complexes ■ ■ ■ ■

Lack of appropriate location for fuel/lube storage away from facilities ■ ■

Poor building approach in terms of avenues or streets ■ ■

THIRD LAYER OF DEFENSE

Inappropriate building configuration ■ ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate design of lobbies/foyers in terms of concealment versus access ■ ■ ■ ■

Lack of coded devices ■ ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate access to public places ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate access to private places ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate design of public stairwells ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate design of private stairwells ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate egress/ingress ■ ■ ■

Unreinforced envelope systems ■ ■

Weak bearing walls ■ ■

Weak non-bearing walls ■ ■

Inappropriate design/level of fenestration ■ ■

Unreinforced windows ■ ■

Unreinforced window frames ■ ■

Unreinforced mullions ■ ■ Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide Bomber

Chemical (Sarin)Biological (ricin)Others

Table 2-1: Correlation of the Layers of Defense Against Threats (continued)

SECOND LAYER OF DEFENSE (continued)
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-15

Inappropriate glass design ■ ■

Unreinforced doors ■ ■ ■ ■

Unreinforced door frames ■ ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate window frame and anchorage design ■ ■

Inappropriate access to roof ■ ■ ■

Lack of blast-resistant roof ■

Inappropriate location of mail room ■ ■

Inappropriate data center location/protection ■ ■ ■ ■

Underground garages ■ ■

Inappropriate location of public restrooms ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate design of loading docks ■ ■

Lack of shelter-in-place ■ ■ ■

Lack of security lighting ■ ■ ■ ■

Lack of progressive collapse considerations ■ ■

Inappropriate column spacing/redundancy ■ ■

Lack of ductile structural elements and detailing ■ ■

Inappropriate sheer reinforcement ■ ■

Lack of symmetric steel reinforcement ■ ■

Lack of appropriate steel connections/moment connections ■ ■

Lack of lateral and vertical force redundancy systems ■ ■

Inadequate redundant load paths ■ ■

Inadequate transfer girders ■ ■

Inadequate grouting and reinforcement of masonry ■ ■

Lack of reinforcement of non-bearing masonry walls ■ ■

Lack of CBR/mechanical considerations ■ ■ ■ ■ Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide Bomber Chemical (Sarin) Biological (Ricin)

Others

Table 2-1: Correlation of the Layers of Defense Against Threats (continued)

THIRD LAYER OF DEFENSE (continued)
2-16 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

Lack of air supply/return duct connections ■ ■ ■

HVAC control centers/redundant equipment ■ ■ ■ ■

HVAC/filtration ■ ■

Lack of HVAC control wiring/routing ■ ■ ■

Lack of HVAC purge capacity ■ ■

Easy access to plumbing system ■ ■

Poor method gas distribution/entry points ■ ■

Inappropriate central shaft ■ ■

Inappropriate main piping distribution ■ ■

Inappropriate gas storage tanks ■ ■

Inappropriate gas reserve supplies location ■ ■

Inappropriate electrical rooms/location/protection ■ ■

Inappropriate primary electrical wiring location/protection ■ ■

Inappropriate transformers/location/protection ■ ■

Inappropriate switchgears/location/protection ■ ■

Inappropriate distribution panels location/protection ■ ■

Inappropriate branch circuits/location/protection ■ ■

Lack of backup power/distribution ■ ■

Inappropriate fire protection ■ ■

Inappropriate fire alarm panels/location/protection ■ ■

Lack of fire alarm system/blast-resistant ■ ■

Lack of off-site redundant systems for fire alarm reporting ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate fire hydrant location ■ ■

Inappropriate smoke evacuation systems ■ ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate communications/surveillance systems ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate telephone distribution room /location/protection ■ ■ ■

Lack of non-interruptible power supply ■ ■ ■ Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide Bomber

Chemical (Sarin)Biological (Ricin)Others

Table 2-1: Correlation of the Layers of Defense and Threats (continued)

THIRD LAYER OF DEFENSE (continued)
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-17 Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide Bomber Chemical (Sarin) Biological (Ricin) Others

Inappropriate communications system wiring closets location/protection ■ ■ ■

Inappropriate communications wiring distribution ■ ■ ■

Lack of redundancy ■ ■ ■

Lack of secondary/intermediary distribution facilities ■ ■

Minimum points of presence ■ ■ ■ ■

Ineffective WAN systems ■

Ineffective LAN systems ■

Ineffective radio/wireless systems/location/protection ■ ■

Ineffective CCTV/location/protection ■ ■ ■ ■

Table 2-1: Correlation of the Layers of Defense Against Threats (continued)

THIRD LAYER OF DEFENSE (continued)

Identifying Building Core Functions

The first activity is to determine the core functions and processes necessary 

for the building to continue to operate or provide services after an attack. 

The reason for identifying core functions/processes is to focus the Assessment Team on what a building does, how it does it, and how various threats 

can affect the building. This provides more discussion and results in a better 

understanding of asset value. Factors that should be considered include:

❍ What are the building’s primary services or outputs?

❍ What critical activities take place at the building?

❍ Who are the building’s occupants and visitors?

❍ What inputs from external organizations are required for a building’s 

success?

A number of core functions have been selected for this How-To Guide and 

are included in Table 2-2.
2-18 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

Table 2-2: Building Core Functions

Building Core Functions

Administration

Engineering

Warehousing

Data Center

Food Service

Security

Housekeeping

Day Care

Identifying Building Core Infrastructure

After the core functions and processes are identified, an evaluation of 

building infrastructure should follow. To help identify and value rank infrastructure, the following should be considered, keeping in mind that the most 

vital asset for every building is its people:

❍ Identify how many people may be injured or killed during a terrorist 

attack that directly affects the infrastructure.

❍ Identify what happens to occupants if a specific asset is lost or degraded. 

(Can primary services continue?)

❍ Determine the impact on other organizational assets if the component is 

lost or can not function.

❍ Determine if critical or sensitive information is stored or handled at the 

building.

❍ Determine if backups exist for the building’s assets.

❍ Determine the availability of replacements.

❍ Determine the potential for injuries or deaths from any catastrophic 

event at the building’s assets.

❍ Identify any critical building personnel whose loss would degrade 

or seriously complicate the safety of building occupants during an 

emergency. 

❍ Determine if the building’s assets can be replaced and identify 

replacement costs if the building is lost.
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-19

❍ Identify the locations of key equipment and the impact if it is lost during a 

terrorist attack.

❍ Determine the locations of personnel work areas and systems.

❍ Identify the locations of any personnel operating “outside” a building’s 

controlled areas.

❍ Determine, in detail, the physical locations of critical support architectures:

• Communications and information technology (i.e., the flow of critical 

information)

• Utilities (e.g., facility power, water, air conditioning, etc.)

• Lines of communication that provide access to external resources and 

provide movement of people (e.g., road, rail, air transportation)

❍ Determine the location, availability, and readiness condition of emergency 

response assets, and the state of training of building staff in their use.

A number of core infrastructures have been selected for this How-To Guide. 

Table 2-3 includes the selected examples.

Table 2-3: Building Core Infrastructure

Building Core Infrastructure

Site

Architectural

Structural Systems

Envelope Systems

Utility Systems

Mechanical Systems

Plumbing and Gas Systems

Electrical Systems

Fire Alarm Systems

IT/Communications Systems

Levels of Protection

The selection of the level of protection is building-dependent. The General 

Services Administration (GSA) and DoD have developed standards and recommendations that can be applicable to buildings leased by or used to support 

Federal Government agencies. These standards and recommendations are not 

required for non-Federal buildings; however, building owners can evaluate and 

select those standards that meet their specific needs and criteria.
2-20 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

A primary concern is the protection of buildings from explosive blast and 

CBR attacks. To protect against blast, the level of protection is dependent 

upon the type of construction and the blast pressures (stand-off distance). 

The amount of explosive and the resulting blast dictate the level of protection 

required to prevent a building from collapsing or minimizing injuries and 

deaths. Levels of protection can be found in GSA PBS-P100, Facilities Standards 

for the Public Buildings Service, November 2000, Section 8.6 and USAF Installation Force Protection Guide and DoD UFC-010-01. 

The DoD prescribes minimum stand-off distances based on the required level 

of protection. Where minimum stand-off distances are met, conventional construction techniques can be used with some modifications. In cases where the 

minimum stand-off cannot be achieved, the building must be hardened to 

achieve the required level of protection. The DHS and Interagency Security 

Committee (ISC) Security Criteria (GSA was formerly responsible for this Interagency Committee) do not require or mandate specific stand-off distances. 

Rather, they provide protection performance criteria. In order to economically meet these performance standards, they present recommended stand-off 

distances for vehicles that are parked on adjacent properties and for vehicles 

that are parked on the building site (see GSA Security Criteria, Draft Revision, 

October 8, 1997, and ISC Security Design Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings 

and Major Modernization Projects, May 28, 2001). Table 2-4 presents the levels of 

protection and the recommended security measures.
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-21

Table 2-4: Levels of Protection and Recommended Security Measures*

Level** Typical Location Examples of Tenant Agencies*** Security Measures 

(based on evaluation) 

 I 10 Employees (Federal)

2,500 Square Feet

Low Volume Public Contact

Small “Store Front” Type Operation 

Local Office

District Office

Visitor Center

USDA Office

Ranger Station

Commercial Facilities

Industrial/Manufacturing 

Health Care

High Security Locks

Intercom

Peep Hole (Wide View)

Lighting with Emergency Backup Power

Controlled Utility Access 

Annual Employee Security Training

 II 11 - 150 Employees (Federal) 

2,500 - 80,000 Square Feet

Moderate Volume Public Contact

Routine Operations Similar to Private Sector 

and/or Facility Shared with Private Sector

Public Officials

Park Headquarters

Regional/State Offices

Commercial Facilities

Industrial

Manufacturing

Health Care

Entry Control Package with Closed Circuit 

Television (CCTV)

Visitor Control/Screening

Shipping/Receiving Procedures

Guard/Patrol Assessment

Intrusion Detection with Central Monitoring

CCTV Surveillance (Pan-Tilt, Zoom System)

Duress Alarm with Central Monitoring

 III 151 - 450 Employees (Federal) 

Multi-Story Facility

80,000 - 150,000 Square Feet

Moderate/High Volume Public Contact

Agency Mix:

 Law Enforcement Operations

 Court Functions

 Government Records

Inspectors General

Criminal Investigations

Regional/State Offices

GSA Field Offices

Local Schools 

Commercial Facilities

Industrial

Manufacturing

Health Care

Guard Patrol on Site

Visitor Control/Screening

Shipping/Receiving Procedures

Intrusion Detection with Central Monitoring

CCTV Surveillance (Pan-Tilt, Zoom System)

Duress Alarm with Central Monitoring

 IV >450 Employees (Federal)

Multi-Story Facility

>150,000 Square Feet

High Volume Public Contact

High-Risk Law Enforcement/Intelligence 

Agencies

District Court

Significant Buildings and Some 

Headquarters

Federal Law Enforcement Agencies

Local Schools, Universities

Commercial Facilities

Health Care

Extend Perimeter (Concrete/Steel Barriers)

24-Hour Guard Patrol

Adjacent Parking Control

Backup Power System

Hardened Parking Barriers

 V Level IV Profile and Agency/Mission Critical 

to National Security

Principal Department Headquarters Agency-Specific

* SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL FACILITIES, JUNE 28, 1995

 NOTES: ** ASSIGNMENT OF LEVELS TO BE BASED ON AN “ON-SITE” RISK ASSESSMENT/EVALUATION

 ***EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) TENANT AGENCIES FOR THIS LEVEL FACILITY
2-22 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

Establishing the levels of protection for CBR agents is more difficult to quantify because there are almost infinite agents and delivery modes that can be 

used and a CBR attack affects multiple systems. Protection against CBR attacks is focused on preventing agents from entering a building and using the 

building envelope and HVAC system to respond to an attack to isolate or contain an agent to as small a footprint as possible. 

For more information on explosive blast and CBR, you may consult DoD and 

GSA standards; the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in Appendix 

A; FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against 

Buildings; FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks; and the CDC guides for protection against CBR attack and 

filtration. 

Determining the Asset Value Rating (Task 2.4)

After building core functions and building infrastructure are analyzed, a 

value should be assigned. Table 2-5 provides a scale for selecting your asset 

value. The scale is a combination of a 7-level linguistic scale and a 10-point 

numerical scale (10 being the greater threat). To determine a value, you 

should keep in mind that asset value can be defined as the degree of debilitating impact that would be caused by the incapacity or destruction of the 

building’s assets. To determine a vulnerability rating, you should consider 

the consequences of the loss or damage of the building’s assets (e.g., loss of 

life, injuries, or total loss of primary services, core processes and functions). 

The key asset for every building is its people (e.g., employees, visitors, etc.) 

and they will always be assigned the highest asset value. Tables 2-6A and 2-6B 

display a nominal example applying these ratings for an urban multi-story 

building.
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-23

Table 2-5: Asset Value Scale

Asset Value

Very High 10

Very High – Loss or damage of the building’s assets would have exceptionally grave consequences, such 

as extensive loss of life, widespread severe injuries, or total loss of primary services, core processes, and 

functions.

High 8-9

High – Loss or damage of the building’s assets would have grave consequences, such as loss of life, 

severe injuries, loss of primary services, or major loss of core processes and functions for an extended 

period of time.

Medium High 7 Medium High – Loss or damage of the building’s assets would have serious consequences, such as serious 

injuries or impairment of core processes and functions for an extended period of time.

Medium 5-6 Medium – Loss or damage of the building’s assets would have moderate to serious consequences, such as 

injuries or impairment of core functions and processes.

Medium Low 4 Medium Low – Loss or damage of the building’s assets would have moderate consequences, such as 

minor injuries or minor impairment of core functions and processes.

Low 2-3 Low – Loss or damage of the building’s assets would have minor consequences or impact, such as a slight 

impact on core functions and processes for a short period of time.

Very Low 1 Very Low – Loss or damage of the building’s assets would have negligible consequences or impact.

Table 2-6A: Nominal Example of Asset Value Rating for an Urban Multi-story Building (Building Function)

Function Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide 

Bomber

Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Administration 5 5 5 5 5

Engineering 8 8 8 8 8

Warehousing 3 3 3 3 3

Data Center 8 8 8 8 8

Food Service 2 2 2 2 2

Security 7 7 7 7 7

Housekeeping 2 2 2 2 2

Day Care 10 10 10 10 10
2-24 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

Table 2-6B: Nominal Example of Asset Value Rating for an Urban Multi-story Building (Building Infrastructure)

Infrastructure Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide 

Bomber

Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Site 4 4 4 4 4

Architectural 5 5 5 5 5

Structural Systems 8 8 8 8 8

Envelope Systems 7 7 7 7 7

Utility Systems 7 7 7 7 7

Mechanical Systems 7 7 7 7 7

Plumbing and Gas Systems 5 5 5 5 5

Electrical Systems 7 7 7 7 7

Fire Alarm Systems 9 9 9 9 9

IT/Communications Systems 8 8 8 8 8
STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT 2-25

The following additional references for blast are recommended:

U.S. Air Force, 1989, ESL-TR-87-57, Protective Construction Design Manual, Contact Airbus 

Technologies Division (AFRL/MLQ) at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, via e-mail to 

techinfo@afrl.af.mil. [Superseded by Army Technical Manual TM 5-855-1 (Air Force Pamphlet 

AFPAM 32-1147(I), Navy Manual NAVFAC P-1080, DSWA Manual DAHSCWEMAN-97), 

December 1997]

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1990, TM 5-1300, Structures to Resist Accidental Explosions, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C., (also Navy NAVFAC (Naval Facilities) P-397, Air 

Force Regulation 88-2); Contact David Hyde, U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development 

Center, 3909 Halls Ferry Road, Vicksburg, Mississippi 39180 or via e-mail to hyded@ex1.

wes.army.mil

U.S. Department of Energy, 1992, DOE/TIC 11268, A Manual for the Prediction of Blast and Fragment 

Loadings on Structures, Southwest Research Institute, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Technical Support Working Group, Terrorist Bomb Threat Stand-Off Card with Explanation of 

Use, Technical Support Working Group, Washington, D.C. http://www.tswg.gov/tswg/prods_

pubs/newBTSCPress.htm

U.S. Department of the Treasury/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 1999, Vehicle Bomb 

Explosion Hazard And Evacuation Distance Tables, Department of the Treasury, Washington, 

D.C. (Request in writing, address information available at http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/

fire-explo_pub/i54001.htm)

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1999, Terrorism in the United States.

Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Division, Washington, 

DC. http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror99.pdf

The U.S. Department of State, 2002, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001.

Biggs, John M. Introduction to Structural Dynamics. McGraw-Hill. 1964.

The Institute of Structural Engineers. The Structural Engineer’s Response to Explosive Damage. SETO, 

Ltd., 11 Upper Belgrave Street, London SW1X8BH. 1995.

Mays, G.S. and Smith, P.D. Blast Effects on Buildings: Design of Buildings to Optimize Resistance to Blast 

Loading. Thomas Telford Publications, 1 Heron Quay, London E14 4JD. 1995.

National Research Council. Protecting Buildings from Bomb Damage. National Academy Press. 1995. 
2-26 STEP 2: ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT

WORKSHEET 2-1: ASSET VALUE

Asset Value

Very High 10

High 8-9

Medium High 7

Medium 5-6

Medium Low 4

Low 2-3

Very Low 1

Worksheet 2-1 can be used to complete your risk assessment 

and will be used in conjunction with Worksheets 4-1 and 

4-2. It can be used to discuss asset value with building 

stakeholders and among the members of the Assessment 

Team. Asset value refers to a resource of value requiring 

protection. A scale (asset value) can be used to signify the 

protection that a particular asset merits. To fill out this 

table, analyze the impact of a particular threat to your 

site and/or building. Analyze core functions and building 

infrastructure components as indicated in Task 2.3. 

Function Asset Value Infrastructure Asset Value

Administration Site

Engineering Architectural

Warehousing Structural Systems

Data Center Envelope Systems

Food Service Utility Systems

Security Mechanical Systems

Housekeeping Plumbing and Gas Systems

Day Care Electrical Systems

Other Fire Alarm Systems

Other IT/Communications Systems
STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 3-1

OVERVIEW

The third step in the assessment process is to prepare a vulnerability assessment of 

your assets that can be affected by a threat (see Figure 3-1). For this document, vulnerability is defined as any weakness that can be exploited by an aggressor to make 

an asset susceptible to hazard damage. A vulnerability assessment is an indepth analysis of the building functions, systems, and site characteristics to identify building 

weaknesses and lack of redundancy, and determine mitigations or corrective actions 

that can be designed or implemented to reduce the vulnerabilities. During this step, 

you will begin the analysis of your assets based on: a) the identified threat; b) the 

criticality of your assets: and c) the level of protection you may have chosen (i.e., 

your willingness or unwillingness to accept risk). 

The vulnerability assessment process involves the following tasks:

❍ Organizing resources to prepare the assessment

❍ Evaluating the site and building

❍ Preparing a vulnerability portfolio

❍ Determining the vulnerability rating

TASKS:

3.1. Organizing resources to prepare the 

assessment

3.2. Evaluating the site and building

3.3. Preparing a vulnerability portfolio

3.4. Determining the vulnerability rating

Step 4: Risk Assessment

Step 3: Vulnerability Assessment

Step 2: Asset Value Assessment

Step 1: Threat Identification and Rating

Figure 3-1 Steps and tasks

Step 5: Consider Mitigation Options
3-2 STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 

Organizing Resources to Prepare the Assessment (Task 

3.1)

An important task during Step 3 is organizing your resources to prepare the 

assessment. This involves determining the level of the assessment you wish to 

perform and the skills of the team necessary to conduct the assessment. 

Selecting the Assessment Team

The selection of the Assessment Team is probably the most critical task in the 

threat assessment process. An assessment has been found to be most effective 

when the Team is composed of senior individuals who have a breadth and 

depth of experience and understand other disciplines and system interdependencies. The Assessment Team leader will work with the building owner and 

stakeholders to:

❍ Determine the threat rating (Step 1)

❍ Determine the asset value and level of protection (Step 2)

The Assessment Team will coordinate the preparation of an assessment 

schedule, assessment agenda, and on-site visit assessments with the building 

stakeholders. It is important to emphasize that the Assessment Team should 

be composed of professionals capable of evaluating different parts of the 

buildings and familiar with engineering, architecture and site planning. 

Other members of the team may include law-enforcement agents, first responders, and building owners and managers.

Determining the Level of the Assessment 

The level of the assessment for a given building is dependent upon a number 

of factors such as type of building, location, type of construction, number of 

occupants, economic life, and other owner specific concerns and available 

economic resources. The levels of the assessment provided in this How-To 

Guide are similar to the FEMA 310 process and provide increasing tiers of 

assessments. The underlying purpose is to provide a variable scale to meet 

benefit/cost considerations for a given building that meets the intent and 

requirements of available antiterrorism guidelines such as the DoD Minimum 

Antiterrorism Standards and the GSA Interagency Security Criteria.

Tier 1. A Tier 1 assessment is a screening phase that identifies the primary 

vulnerabilities and mitigation options, and is a “70 percent” assessment 

(see Table 3-1). A Tier 1 assessment can typically be conducted by one or 

two experienced assessment professionals in approximately 2 days with the 
STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 3-3

building owner and key staff; it involves a “quick look” at the site perimeter, 

building, core functions, infrastructure, drawings, and plans. A Tier 1 

assessment will likely be sufficient for the majority of commercial buildings 

and other non-critical facilities and infrastructure. 

Tier 2. A Tier 2 assessment is a full on-site evaluation by assessment specialists 

that provides a robust evaluation of system interdependencies, vulnerabilities, 

and mitigation options; it is a “90 percent” assessment solution (see Table 3-

2). A Tier 2 assessment typically requires three to five assessment specialists, 

can be completed in 3 to 5 days, and requires significant key building staff 

participation (e.g., providing access to all site and building areas, systems, 

and infrastructure) and an indepth review of building design documents, 

drawings, and plans. A Tier 2 assessment is likely to be sufficient for most 

high-risk buildings such as iconic commercial buildings, government facilities, 

schools, hospitals, and other designated high value infrastructure assets. 

Tier 3. A Tier 3 assessment is a detailed evaluation of the building using blast 

and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) models to determine building 

response, survivability, and recovery, and the development of mitigation 

options. A Tier 3 assessment (see Table 3-3) typically involves engineering 

and scientific experts and requires detailed design information, including 

drawings and other building information. Modeling and analysis can often 

take several days or weeks and is typically performed for high value and 

critical infrastructure assets. The Assessment Team is not defined for this tier; 

however, it could be composed of 8 to 12 people.
3-4 STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 

Table 3-1: Tier 1 - Screening Phase

Task Building Type Team Composition Duration Activity

Information 

Gathering and 

Review

Standard 

commercial office 

building

1 Site and 

Architectural

1 Security Systems 

and Operations

1 day Review technical area and general site analysis

On-site Evaluation 1 day per assessor • Complete the Critical Function and Critical 

Infrastructure matrices; perform a limited 

technical review using the Building Vulnerability 

Assessment Checklist; input site, vulnerability, and 

mitigation information into the database; write 

reports

• Prepare a verbal or PowerPoint presentation with 

key findings to review with building owners’ and 

stakeholders’ major findings 

• Receive input on the assessment process

Develop Mitigation 

Options

Typically 1 to 3 days 

per assessor

• Prepare a Preliminary Report, including findings 

and feedback from stakeholders. This report 

should include concept and cost mitigation options.

• Prepare a written Final Report that lists the 

vulnerabilities, observations, and mitigation 

options. Very rough order of magnitude cost 

estimates may be developed using standard 

unit costs for blast, CBR, and physical security 

infrastructure and equipment.

• Prepare a Vulnerability Portfolio with 

recommendations for incorporation into 

Emergency Operations, Disaster Recovery, and 

other plans or procedures
STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 3-5

Table 3-2: Tier 2 - Full On-site Evaluation

Task Building Type Team 

Composition

Duration Activity

Information 

Gathering and 

Review

High-risk or iconic 

buildings

Commercial 

buildings, 

government 

facilities, schools, 

and hospitals

Designated 

high asset value 

infrastructure

1 Site and 

Architectural 

(recommended as 

Team leader) 

1 Structural and 

Building Envelope 

1 Mechanical, 

Electrical, and 

Power Systems and 

Site Utilities

1 Landscape 

Architect 

1 IT and 

Telecommunications

1 Security Systems 

and Operations

1 day per assessor Review technical area and general site analysis collected 

during the Tier 1 assessment

On-Site Evaluation 2 to 4 days per 

assessor

• Complete the Critical Function and Critical Infrastructure 

matrices; perform a limited technical review using 

the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist; input 

site, vulnerability, and mitigation information into the 

database; write reports

• Prepare a verbal or PowerPoint presentation with 

key findings to review with building owners’ and 

stakeholders’ major findings 

• Receive input on the assessment process

Develop Mitigation 

Options

1 to 3 days per 

assessor

• Prepare a Preliminary Report, including findings and 

feedback from stakeholders. This report should include 

concept and cost mitigation options.

• Prepare a written Final Report that lists the 

vulnerabilities, observations, and mitigation options. 

Very rough order of magnitude cost estimates may be 

developed using standard unit costs for blast, CBR, and 

physical security infrastructure and equipment.

• Prepare a Vulnerability Portfolio with recommendations 

for incorporation into Emergency Operations, Disaster 

Recovery, and other plans or procedures

Table 3-3: Tier 3 - Detailed Evaluation

Building Type Team Composition Activity

High value 

and critical 

infrastructure 

assets

1 Site and Architectural - Team leader

1 Structural and Building Envelope 

1 Mechanical, Electrical, and Power 

Systems and Site Utilities 

1 IT and Telecommunications Modeler

1 Security Systems and Operations

1 Explosive Blast Modeler 

1 CBR Modeler 

1 Cost Engineer

1 Landscape Architect

• A typical Tier 3 Assessment Team will use the results of the Tier 2 assessment and 

involve modeling and analysis of the building and related systems using advanced 

blast and WMD models and applications. Blast analysis will include structural 

progressive collapse, glazing, and effects of building hardening. CBR analysis should 

evaluate the effects of the agents released externally and internally to provide the 

dispersion, duration, and exposure of the building systems and occupants. The IT 

and Telecommunications Modeler should evaluate effects on all IT systems assuming 

cascading equipment failure and long-term access denial to critical equipment, data, 

and on-site administrative capability. 

• The Tier 3 assessment will provide detailed building response, survivability, and 

recovery information used to develop enhanced and accurate costing of mitigation 

options.
3-6 STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 

Evaluating the Site and Building (Task 3.2)

Understanding the type, nature, and geographic range of threats (Step 1) 

that can occur at your site or building, as well as the associated exposure of 

your assets (Step 2) is essential to conducting a vulnerability analysis. Each 

building, even if on the same campus or the same general area, can have different priority threats and hazards. A well-prepared risk manager must be 

aware of the types of threat and hazard events that can occur, the areas and 

resources most at risk, and the potential costs and losses that could accompany a threat or hazard event. 

To prepare an effective assessment, the following activities should take place: 

1. Pre-Meeting and Preparation of a Schedule and Tentative Agenda. Before 

conducting the on-site building evaluation, a coordination meeting 

should take place. During this meeting, the type of assessment to be 

conducted, personnel availability, schedules, and outputs should be 

discussed in detail. In addition, firm timetables and an agenda for on-site 

visits should be discussed. The agenda schedule should include the sites 

to be evaluated and special areas to be protected. Worksheets 3-1 and 3-2 

have been developed to aid in this process.

2. On-Site Meeting(s). For each assessment, a preparation meeting will take 

place with key stakeholders. Upon arrival at the site or building, the Team 

should have an introduction meeting with key staff, review the available 

information, and review the vulnerability portfolio (Task 3.3). As a 

minimum, recommended building personnel attendees should include:

• Site or building owner

• Chief of engineering

• Chief of security

• Chief of IT

• Emergency manager

 Other attendees may include:

• Union or employee representatives

• Local law enforcement, fire, and EMS representatives

• State or county representatives

• Local utility, telecommunications, and services (waste, security 

services, etc.)
STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 3-7

• Administration, food services, laboratory, and other critical function 

representatives

For the assessment to be successful, building stakeholders should 

participate as key members, providing on-site access to all buildings and 

areas. In addition, they should participate in interviews, and provide 

comments on current strengths and weakness of plans and procedures, 

including facility access, personnel movement, operations and 

maintenance, and security alerts. 

3. Windshield Tour(s). After the introduction meeting, the Assessment Team 

and stakeholders should conduct a “windshield” tour or walk-around of 

the key facilities. The Assessment Team may find areas that require special 

attention and feel the need to make adjustments to the assessment agenda 

(Worksheet 3-2).

4. Assessment Background Information. After the on-site tour, the 

Assessment Team and stakeholders are ready to conduct the on-site 

assessment. Completing the matrices provided in this How-To Guide for 

conducting the threat assessment will take approximately 4 to 8 hours, 

using an interview and consensus approach around a table. During these 

discussions, the Team should prepare worksheets provided in Steps 1 and 

2. They will determine:

• Threats that are a priority concern for your site, building, and related 

infrastructure (Worksheets 1-1 and 1-2)

• The assets of your area, building or site that can be affected by a 

threat (Worksheet 2-1)

5. Review Key Documents. The Assessment Team will review or evaluate 

a number of plans, procedures, and policies. The list below provides 

some of the documents that need to be reviewed by the Team before 

conducting the assessment. How to gather this information is described in 

Steps 1 and 2.

• Prior vulnerability assessment data

• Emergency response and disaster recovery plans

• Security master plan (including detection/delay/assess)

• Security inspection results

• HazMat plans

• Policy and legal requirements
3-8 STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 

• Federal, State, and local law enforcement threat assessments

• Site plans of utility and communications systems

• Floor plans for all facilities identified as important (including those 

listed above)

• Floor plans and locations of modified and abandoned facilities

• Structural drawings of key facilities

• New project drawings for fences, security, and buildings

• Security system drawings

• Historical reports

• Local zoning ordinances

• Comprehensive plans

• Development plans

• Information on the facility systems operations capability 

• Information on agreements with the surrounding community and 

Federal agencies 

• Information on incidents within the building (i.e., misconduct 

information)

• Population statistics

• Manpower surveys

• Other documents determined by the Team to be important

6. Review Emergency Procedures. The Assessment Team and building 

stakeholders should review the security master plan, and the engineering 

operations and maintenance, emergency operations, and disaster recovery 

plans to understand the critical assets of the building and establish a 

baseline organization response and recovery capability in case of an attack 

or event. The impact of many vulnerabilities can be reduced or eliminated 

by simple changes in plans, policies, and procedures. As part of the 

screening phase review, the following areas should be considered:

• Emergency notification procedures

• Emergency evacuation procedures

• First responder access and routing

• Shelter-in-place procedures

• Designated shelter capacities and travel routes

• Off-site rally point and roll call
STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 3-9

• Emergency engineering systems shutdown (HVAC, electrical, 

information technology (IT)/telecommunications)

• Portable protective equipment (indoor air filters, sampling kits, first 

aid)

• Personal protective equipment (PPE)

• Exercise of plans 

7. Prepare the Assessment. Preparing the assessment can be as simple 

as a quick review and analysis of existing documents and a short walk 

around the site, or a more detailed in-depth review and analysis of the 

documents, plans, and other information and a thorough walk-through 

of the building, including utility spaces, basements, crawl spaces, attics, 

and vault (see Tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3). The following are recommended 

when conducting the different types of assessments. 

For Tier 1 Screening Evaluation, the analysis should include, at a 

minimum: 

• Perimeter identification

• Vehicle and pedestrian entry access control points

• Security operations function

• EOC (or function)

• Primary point of entry of utilities and telecommunications

• Critical functions

• Critical infrastructure

• Key staff

• Off-site rally point and other Emergency Management procedures 

(PPE, mass notification, etc.)

For Tier 2 On-Site Evaluation, the analysis should include, at a 

minimum:

• Tier 1 information

• Detailed inspection and route tracing of primary utilities and 

telecommunications 

• Detailed review of HVAC system and operating parameters

• Detailed review of electric power and generator capacity (life safety, 

data centers, communications, etc.)

• Detailed review of structural and envelope system (column-beam 

connections, materials, clips, glazing)
3-10 STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 

• Detailed review of Security Master Plan, Emergency Management 

Plan, other related plans and Memorandums of Understanding 

(MOU) (Continuity of Operations [COOP], Continuity of 

Government [COG], Certified Emergency Management Plan 

[CEMP], etc.)

For Tier 3, Detailed Evaluation, the analysis should include, at a 

minimum:

• Tier 2 information

• Systems interdependencies on-site and off-site (utility vaults, 

communications central office trunks, transportation nodes, logistics, 

etc.)

• Advanced blast and CBR modeling of building and systems 

(structural damage, interior and exterior plume dispersion, safe 

haven areas)

• Advanced evacuation planning and routing to include test of mass 

notification system, training, and exercises

• Advanced disaster response and recovery planning in conjunction 

with neighbors and local government

8. Data Gap Analysis. The Assessment Team may feel that the data gathered 

for on-site assessment are not enough. The Team should assess the 

following information:

• Do we know where the greatest damages may occur in the threat/

hazard areas?

• Do we know whether critical facilities will be operational after a 

threat/hazard event?

• Are there enough data to determine which assets are subject to the 

greatest potential damages?

• Are there enough data to determine whether significant elements of 

the community are vulnerable to potential threats?

• Are there enough data to determine whether certain areas of historic, 

environmental, political, or cultural significance are vulnerable to 

potential threats?

• Is there concern about a particular threat because of its severity, 

frequency, or likelihood of occurrence?

• Are additional data needed to justify the expenditure of community 

or state funds for mitigation initiatives?
STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 3-11

If the Team decides that more data will be beneficial to conduct the assessment, a determination should be made as to what type of data are needed 

and what resources are available for collecting new data. If stakeholders and 

the Team agree on collecting new data, the Team needs to prioritize areas for 

additional data collection. 

Preparing a Vulnerability Portfolio (Task 3.3)

To carry out the assessment, the Team should have a vulnerability portfolio 

available. This portfolio should include the following:

❍ Assessment agenda (Worksheet 3-2)

❍ Assessment background information (to be collected by Assessment Team 

and building owners)

❍ Threats rating (Worksheets 1-1 and 1-2)

❍ Asset value ranking worksheet (Worksheet 2-1)

❍ Key documents (plans, procedures, and policies, see Task 3.2) 

❍ Emergency procedures (baseline organization response and recovery 

capability in case of an attack or event, see Task 3.2) 

❍ Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (Appendix A)

❍ Risk assessment matrices (Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2, described in Step 4)

❍ Prioritization of observations in the checklist (Worksheet 4-3)

❍ Risk Assessment Database (if assessment is going to be automated – see 

Appendix B)

The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, the Pre-Assessment 

Screening Matrix, and the Risk Assessment Database are explained below. 

Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist. Appendix A includes the 

Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, which compiles many best practices based on technologies and scientific research to consider during the 

design of a new building or renovation of an existing building. It allows a consistent security evaluation of designs at various levels. 

The Checklist is a key tool in the preparation of the threat assessment and 

a fundamental element of your vulnerability portfolio. When performing a 
3-12 STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 

walk-through of the facility to be assessed, the Team should use the Checklist 

as a screening tool for preparing the vulnerability assessment and make observations when reviewing the questions included in the Checklist.

The Checklist is organized into 13 sections. To conduct a vulnerability assessment of a building or preliminary design, each section of the Checklist 

should be assigned to an engineer, architect, or subject matter expert who is 

knowledgeable and qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. 

Each assessor should consider the questions and guidance provided to help 

identify vulnerabilities and document results in the observations column. 

The observations made during this Step will be prioritized during Step 4. The 

observations in the Checklist should be supplemented with photographs, if 

possible. 

Risk Assessment Database. To support the building assessment process, a 

simple and easy to use Risk Assessment Database application is provided with 

this manual (see Appendix B). This database was originally developed for 

the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) through the National Institute of 

Building Sciences (NIBS). It has already been used in the assessment of over 

100 hospitals, office buildings, data centers, and other facilities across the 

United States. FEMA modified this database in order to make it easy-to-use for 

commercial buildings. The database is a stand-alone application that has functions, folders to import and display digital photos, emergency plans, digital 

floor plans, and certain HAZUS-MH products. Information retrieved from 

HAZUS-MH and existing commercial off the shelf (COTS) software such 

as Facility Condition Assessment, Work Order, Real Estate, and Space and 

Planning applications can be used in conjunction with the database for the assessment. Site, Team, and other general information is collected and inputted 

using screens. This database contains the basic information included in the 

Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist. The Risk Assessment Database is 

an integral part of this How-To Guide. 

Using the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist and the Risk Assessment Database. For all types of evaluations (Tiers 1, 2, and 3) the Building 

Vulnerability Assessment Checklist and the Risk Assessment Database can be 

used to collect and report information related to the building infrastructure. 

In practice, many assessment Team members will find it easier to use a paper 

copy of the checklist while walking the site and enter their field observations 

when back in the office. The newer tablet personal computers (PCs) can be 

used for direct data entry. Typically, each assessment Team member will be 

responsible for completing several sections of the checklist; the amount and 

detail of information that can be acquired and inputted into the checklist 
STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 3-13

will depend upon the on-site time available and the amount of information 

that is readily available versus difficult to find. For example, ideally, a full set 

of computer-aided design (CAD) drawings would be used to evaluate the 

site, architectural elements, structural features, mechanical and electrical 

systems, and security systems. However, if CAD drawings are not available, 

often the Disaster Management Office, Safety Officer, or building engineer 

will have 81⁄2 x 11 inch site and floor plans that can be used in hard copy, 

scanned, and then color coded using simple photoshop applications. If no 

plans are available, a picture of the fire evacuation plan on each floor should 

be taken.

At the end of the day, after each assessment Team member has inputted 

his or her observations into the database, the Team should meet to review 

the observations and develop the vulnerability and mitigations list. The 

vulnerabilities can be grouped by campus or site, given a priority, or by 

individual building; a vulnerability can have multiple mitigation options and 

each should have a Rough Order of Magnitude Cost for each option.

By reviewing the Critical Functions and Critical Infrastructure matrices 

and the color coded site and floor plans, the assessment Team can identify 

those functions and infrastructure that are collocated or are a single-point 

vulnerability (see Task 3.4) where multiple assets are susceptible to an 

event. A key risk reduction strategy is to build redundancy into the system 

by providing alternate means of service and places to connect temporary 

supplies for utilities and telecommunications, disperse or have alternate sites 

for key staff and functions, and have multiple means of communication for 

shelter-in-place and evacuation decisions.

Determining the Vulnerability Rating (Task 3.4)

This task involves determining a vulnerability rating that reflects the weakness of functions, systems, and sites in regard to a particular threat. Weakness 

includes the lack of redundancies that will make the building system operational after an attack. 

Redundancy Factor

A terrorist selects the weapon and tactic that will cause harm to people, destroy the infrastructure, or functionally defeat the target. The function and 

infrastructure vulnerability analysis will identify the geographic distribution 

within the building and interdependencies between critical assets. Ideally, 

the functions should have geographic dispersion as well as a recovery site or 

alternate work location. However, some critical functions and infrastructure 
3-14 STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 

do not have a backup, or will be determined to be collocated and create what 

are called single-point vulnerabilities. Identification and protection of these 

single-point vulnerabilities is a key aspect of the assessment process. Concerns 

related to common system vulnerabilities are:

❍ No redundancy

❍ Redundant systems feed into single critical node

❍ Critical components of redundant systems collocated

❍ Inadequate capacity or endurance in post-attack environment

Identification and protection of these single-point vulnerabilities will help you 

to determine a more accurate vulnerability rating for your assessment. Figure 

3-2 shows common system vulnerabilities.

Figure 3-2 Common system vulnerabilities

Scale for Vulnerability Rating

For this How-To Guide, the following scale for vulnerability has been selected. Table 3-4 provides a scale for selecting your vulnerability rating. The 

scale is a combination of a 7-level linguistic scale and a 10-point numerical 

scale (10 being the greater threat). The key elements of this scale are the 

weaknesses of your building and easiness and/or difficulties that the aggres-
STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 3-15

sors may face when wishing to generate damage to your building. Also, the loss of operations in 

case of an attack and the lack of redundancies are considered. Tables 3-5A and 3-5B display a nominal example applying these ratings for an urban multi-story building.

Table 3-4: Vulnerability Rating

Criteria

Very High 10

Very High – One or more major weaknesses have been identified that make the asset 

extremely susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. The building lacks redundancies/

physical protection and the entire building would be only functional again after a 

very long period of time after the attack.

High 8-9

High – One or more major weaknesses have been identified that make the asset 

highly susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. The building has poor redundancies/

physical protection and most parts of the building would be only functional again 

after a long period of time after the attack. 

Medium High 7

Medium High – An important weakness has been identified that makes the asset very 

susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. The building has inadequate redundancies/

physical protection and most critical functions would be only operational again after a 

long period of time after the attack. 

Medium 5-6

Medium – A weakness has been identified that makes the asset fairly susceptible 

to an aggressor or hazard. The building has insufficient redundancies/physical 

protection and most part of the building would be only functional again after a 

considerable period of time after the attack. 

Medium Low 4

Medium Low – A weakness has been identified that makes the asset somewhat 

susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. The building has incorporated a fair level 

of redundancies/physical protection and most critical functions would be only 

operational again after a considerable period of time after the attack.

Low 2-3

Low – A minor weakness has been identified that slightly increases the susceptibility 

of the asset to an aggressor or hazard. The building has incorporated a good level 

of redundancies/physical protection and the building would be operational within a 

short period of time after an attack.

Very Low 1

Very Low – No weaknesses exist. The building has incorporated excellent 

redundancies/physical protection and the building would be operational immediately 

after an attack.
3-16 STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 

Table 3-5A: Nominal Example of Vulnerability Rating for a Specific Multi-story Building (Building Function)

Function Cyber Attack Vehicle 

Bomb

Suicide 

Bomber

Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Administration 7 7 9 9 9

Engineering 4 4 5 6 6

Warehousing 4 8 9 9 9

Data Center 5 4 3 4 4

Food Service 1 4 5 9 9

Security 5 5 10 9 9

Housekeeping 1 3 3 3 3

Day Care 3 9 9 9 9

Table 3-5B: Nominal Example of Vulnerability Rating for a Specific Multi-story Building (Building Infrastructure)

Infrastructure Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide 

Bomber

Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Site 1 7 6 4 4

Architectural 1 9 7 2 2

Structural Systems 1 10 7 2 1

Envelope Systems 1 9 7 2 1

Utility Systems 2 6 2 2 1

Mechanical Systems 1 8 5 9 9

Plumbing and Gas Systems 1 6 3 6 2

Electrical Systems 7 8 6 2 1

Fire Alarm Systems 1 6 8 2 1

IT/Communications Systems 8 6 8 2 1
STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 3-17

WORKSHEET 3-1: NOMINAL ASSESSMENT SCHEDULE

Worksheet 3-1 provides an example of a nominal assessment schedule for two buildings owned by the 

same stakeholder. It reflects a multi-day assessment with a variable number of Team members. The 

bottom of the table includes space to write key contact information. Remember that a Team can be 

contacted to perform assessments for multiple buildings.

Assessment Schedule

Location Team Members Dates Comments

Building 1

Location:

First On-Site Visit

Second On-Site Visit

Third On-Site Visit

Building 2

Location:

First On-Site Visit

Second On-Site Visit

Third On-Site Visit

Fourth On-Site Visit

Contact Information

Member Phone E-mail Comments

Main Stakeholder

Field Staff

Team Member 1

Team Member 2

Team Member 3
3-18 STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 

WORKSHEET 3-2: ASSESSMENT AGENDA

Worksheet 3-2 will help you to prepare your assessment agenda. Using the Building Vulnerability 

Assessment Checklist, the Team should propose the areas that need to be analyzed during the on-site 

visits. The proposed list will be discussed with building owners and facility managers and will be 

finalized by the Assessment Team.

Infrastructure Site and Components to be Assessed Members

Site

Architectural

Structural Systems

Envelope Systems

Utility Systems

Mechanical Systems

Plumbing and Gas Systems

Electrical Systems

Fire Alarm Systems

IT/Communications Systems
STEP 3: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 3-19

WORKSHEET 3-3: VULNERABILITY RATING

Vulnerability Rating

Very High 10

High 8-9

Medium High 7

Medium 5-6

Medium Low 4

Low 2-3

Very Low 1

Worksheet 3-1 can be used to complete your risk assessment 

and will be used in conjunction with Worksheets 4-1 and 

4-2. It can be used to discuss the vulnerability rating with 

building stakeholders and among the members of the 

Assessment Team. Vulnerability rating refers to a numerical 

value that can be assigned to building weaknesses and lack of 

redundancy.

To fill out Worksheet 3-1, analyze the impact of a particular 

threat to your site and/or building. Analyze core functions 

and building infrastructure components as indicated in Task 

2.2 of Step 2. Analyze your assets based on: a) the identified 

threat; b) the criticality of your assets: and c) a level of 

protection you may have chosen (i.e., your willingness or 

unwillingness to accept risk). When assigning a vulnerability 

rating, consider redundancy factors included in Task 3.4. 

This may increase your vulnerability rating for functions and 

infrastructure.

Function Vulnerability Infrastructure Vulnerability

Administration Site

Engineering Architectural

Warehousing Structural Systems

Data Center Envelope Systems

Food Service Utility Systems

Security Mechanical Systems

Housekeeping Plumbing and Gas Systems

Day Care Electrical Systems

Other Fire Alarm Systems

Other IT/Communications Systems

STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 

STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 4-1

OVERVIEW

The fourth step in the assessment process is to prepare a risk assessment for 

your site and building (see Figure 4-1). The risk assessment analyzes the threat, 

asset value, and vulnerability to ascertain the level of risk for each critical asset 

against each applicable threat. Inherent in this is the likelihood of the threat occurring and the consequences of the occurrence. 

The risk assessment process involves the following tasks: 

❍ Preparing the risk assessment matrices

❍ Determining the risk ratings

❍ Prioritizing observations in the Building Vulnerability Assessment 

Checklist

TASKS:

4.1. Preparing the risk assessment matrices

4.2. Determining the risk ratings

4.3 Prioritizing observations in the Building 

 Vulnerability Assessment Checklist

Step 2: Asset Value Assessment

Step 4: Risk Assessment

Step 3: Vulnerability Assessment

Step 1: Threat Identification and Rating

Figure 4-1 Steps and tasks

There are a number of methods and means to conduct a building risk 

assessment, and the steps can be accomplished in different sequences. However, they all have one common objective, which is to apply a quantitative 

assessment process that identifies those assets at highest risk and evaluate 

mitigation measures that can reduce that risk. The process selected for this 

How-To Guide is described below. 

Step 5: Consider Mitigation Options
4-2 STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 

Preparing the Risk Assessment Matrices (Task 4.1)

In order to estimate potential losses, a series of matrices have been prepared. 

The inputs for these matrices are based on the analysis performed during 

Steps 1, 2, and 3. 

To estimate risk, a number of factors need to be taken into consideration. 

The first one is to identify and rate the threats that could cause harm to a 

building and its inhabitants. Next, the value of assets and people that need 

to be protected will be identified. After threats and assets are identified, a 

vulnerability rating that identifies weaknesses that might be exploited by a terrorist or aggressor is determined. Risk can be computed using the results of 

the threat rating, asset value, and vulnerability rating.

Tables 4-1 to 4-10 can be used as a pre-assessment screening tool by the Team 

while conducting the on-site meetings with key staff members (e.g., building 

owners, security, site management, key function representatives, etc.). The 

tables should be completed by consensus judgment of the building stakeholders and Assessment Team members. The risk assessment matrices can 

provide both a quantitative score and color code to objectively and visually 

determine the functions and systems that have been determined to be at risk.

During Steps 1 and 2, you should have identified your threat rating (Worksheet 1-2), asset value (Worksheet 2-1), and vulnerability rating (Worksheet 

3-3). At this point, you should transfer these values to Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2. 

In the risk assessment matrices, the threats are listed across the top, and the 

functions and infrastructure are listed down the side to create threat-pairs. In 

general, there are two approaches to complete Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2. One 

approach is to start with all cell elements set to zero and discuss each element in detail to arrive at a consensus number. Another approach is to start 

with all cell elements equal to a numeric value (e.g., “5”) and then adjust cell 

values up or down. With either approach, the first few rows and columns will 

take the longest time to reach consensus values, but, as the group becomes 

familiar with the ratings and scales, the process converges quickly. It should 

take approximately 3 to 4 hours to complete the matrices and, during that 

time, many of the building vulnerabilities will be verbally identified and collaborated with the vulnerability portfolio and earlier building site tour.

Identifying and Determining the Threat Rating. Step 1 will help you to 

identify and come to a consensus in terms of the threat rating. After each 

threat/hazard has been identified and defined, the threat level for each 
STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 4-3

threat/hazard shall be determined. The threat rating is a subjective judgment of a terrorist threat based on existence, capability, history, intentions, 

and targeting. The threat rating is a snapshot in time, and can be influenced 

by many factors, but the given threat value will typically be the same for each 

function (going down the columns). Organizations that are dispersed in a 

campus environment may have variations in ratings. For threat rating, a scale 

from 1-10 was assigned: 10 is considered very high; 8-9 is high; 7 is medium 

high; 5-6 is medium; 4 is medium low; 2-3 is low; and 1 is very low. 

Rating the Asset Value. Step 2 will help you to determine the asset value rating 

for your site and/or building. After a building’s assets requiring protection 

have been identified, they should be assigned a value. The asset value is the 

degree of debilitating impact that would be caused by the incapacity or destruction of the building’s assets. There are a number of methods and means 

to conduct a building risk assessment, and the steps can be accomplished in 

different sequences, but the objective is to apply a quantitative assessment 

process that identifies those assets at highest risk and evaluate mitigation measures that can reduce that risk. For an asset value rating, a scale from 1-10 was 

assigned: 10 is considered very high; 8-9 is high; 7 is medium high; 5-6 is medium; 4 is medium low; 2-3 is low; and 1 is very low. 

Assessing the Vulnerability. Step 3 will help you to determine the vulnerability 

rating for your site and/or building. After your threat rating and asset value 

rating have been identified, the vulnerability rating should be determined. 

Vulnerability rating requires identifying and rating the vulnerability of each 

asset-threat pair. An indepth vulnerability assessment of a building evaluates 

specific design and architectural features, and identifies all vulnerabilities of 

the building functions and building systems. In the vulnerability rating scale 

of 1 to 10, 1 means very low or no weaknesses exist, and 10 means one or 

more major weaknesses exist to make an asset extremely susceptible to an aggressor. 

Critical Functions Asset Value. Table 4-1 depicts a portion of the site critical 

functions matrix. It lists the functions down the left side and threats across 

the top. The asset value rating is entered into the site critical functions matrix 

and begins the process of quantifying the risk elements. In general, the asset 

value for a given function is the same for all threats and the matrix helps to 

identify the primary functions in a quantitative form. The functions matrix is 

people oriented and subjective, and provides a guide to vulnerabilities and 

risks. The asset value under the engineering and administration functions is 

highlighted. For administration, a medium asset value (5) was assigned for 
4-4 STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 

all threats. For engineering, a high asset rating (8) was determined for all 

threats.

Table 4-1: Critical Functions Asset Value

Function Cyber 

Attack

Vehicle 

Bomb

Suicide 

Bomber

Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Administration

Asset Value 5 5 5 5 5

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Engineering 

Asset Value 8 8 8 8 8

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Critical Infrastructure Asset Value. Table 4-2 depicts a portion of the site critical infrastructure matrix. It lists infrastructure down the left side and threats 

across the top. In general, the asset value for a given infrastructure asset is 

the same for all threats and is usually the economic cost of replacement. The 

value can be changed to reflect intangibles such as duration of loss, loss of 

production capability, etc. The asset value rating under the site and structural 

systems is highlighted. A medium low asset value rating (4) was assigned for 

the site infrastructure threat pairs. A high asset value rating (8) was assigned 

for the structural system threat pairs.

Table 4-2: Critical Infrastructure Asset Value

Infrastructure Cyber 

Attack

Vehicle 

Bomb

Suicide 

Bomber

Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Site

Asset Value 4 4 4 4 4

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Structural Systems

Asset Value 8 8 8 8 8

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Critical Functions Threat Rating. The threat rating under the site and structural systems is highlighted in Table 4-3. A high threat rating (8) was assigned 

for a cyber attack based on known groups releasing worms and viruses; a medium low threat rating (4) was assigned for a vehicle bomb; a medium threat 
STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 4-5

rating (5) was assigned for a suicide bomber based on current intelligence on 

known groups and quantity of explosives available; and a low threat rating (2) 

was assigned for both Sarin and Ricin attacks based on current intelligence 

of prior targets and predicted use against future targets (assuming that the 

building is not the primary target, but may experience collateral damage effects). 

Table 4-3: Critical Functions Threat Rating

Function Cyber 

Attack

Vehicle 

Bomb

Suicide 

Bomber

Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Administration

Asset Value 5 5 5 5 5

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating

Engineering 

Asset Value 8 8 8 8 8

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating

Critical Infrastructure Threat Rating. The threat rating under the site and 

structural systems is highlighted in Table 4-4. A high threat rating (8) was assigned for a cyber attack based on known groups releasing worms and viruses; 

a medium low threat rating (4) was assigned for a vehicle bomb; a medium 

threat rating (5) was assigned for a suicide bomber based on current intelligence on known groups and quantity of explosives available; and a low threat 

rating (2) was assigned for both Sarin and Ricin attacks based on current intelligence of prior targets and predicted use against future targets (assuming 

that the building is not the primary target, but may experience collateral 

damage effects).

Table 4-4: Critical Infrastructure Threat Rating

Infrastructure Cyber 

Attack

Vehicle 

Bomb

Suicide 

Bomber

Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Site

Asset Value 4 4 4 4 4

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating

Structural Systems

Asset Value 8 8 8 8 8

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating
4-6 STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 

Critical Functions Vulnerability Rating. In Table 4-5, for administration, a 

medium high vulnerability rating (7) was determined for a cyber attack; a 

medium high vulnerability rating (7) was determined for a vehicle bomb; a 

high vulnerability rating (9) was assigned for a suicide bomber, and for Sarin 

and Ricin attacks because administration is located at the lobby entrance. 

For engineering, a medium vulnerability rating (7) was determined for a 

cyber attack; a medium low vulnerability rating (4) was determined for a vehicle bomb; a medium vulnerability rating (5) was determined for a suicide 

bomber; and a medium vulnerability rating (6) was determined for a Sarin or 

Ricin attack.

Table 4-5: Critical Functions Vulnerability Rating

Function Cyber 

Attack

Vehicle 

Bomb

Suicide 

Bomber

Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Administration

Asset Value 5 5 5 5 5

Threat Rating 8 4 3 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 7 7 9 9 9

Engineering

Asset Value 8 8 8 8 8

Threat Rating 8 5 6 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 7 4 5 6 6

Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Rating. In Table 4-6, a low vulnerability 

rating (1) was determined for a cyber attack because there are no internet 

devices; a medium high vulnerability rating (7) was determined for a vehicle 

bomb; a low vulnerability rating (3) was determined for a suicide bomber; a 

low vulnerability rating (2) for Sarin and Ricin attacks because there would 

be little damage impact on the site. For structural systems, a low vulnerability 

rating (1) was determined for a cyber attack; a high vulnerability rating (10) 

was determined for a vehicle bomb due to progressive collapse concerns; a 

medium vulnerability rating (6) was determined for a suicide bomber who 

could place a device next to a primary support and load bearing column; and 

a low vulnerability rating (1) was determined for a Sarin or Ricin attack because there would be little or no damage. 
STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 4-7

Table 4-6: Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Rating

Infrastructure Cyber 

Attack

Vehicle 

Bomb

Suicide 

Bomber

Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Site

Asset Value 4 4 4 4 4

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 1 7 3 2 2

Structural Systems

Asset Value 8 8 8 8 8

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 1 10 6 1 1

Determining the Risk Ratings (Task 4.2)

Risk is the potential for a loss or damage to an asset. It is measured based upon the 

value of the asset in relation to the threats and vulnerabilities associated with it. 

Risk is based on the likelihood or probability of the hazard occurring and the consequences of the occurrence. A risk assessment analyzes the threat (probability of 

occurrence), asset value (consequences of the occurrence), and vulnerabilities to 

ascertain the level of risk for each asset against each applicable threat/hazard. The 

risk assessment provides engineers and architects with a relative risk profile that defines which assets are at the greatest risk against specific threats. 

There are numerous methodologies and technologies for conducting a risk assessment. For this How-To Guide, the approach is to assemble the results of the threat 

assessment, asset value assessment, and vulnerability assessment, and determine a 

numeric value of risk for each asset and threat/hazard pair in accordance with the 

following formula:

Risk = Asset Value x Threat Rating x Vulnerability Rating

To prepare the risk estimation matrices three factors or elements of risk are considered for each function or system against each threat previously identified. 

Multiplying the values assigned to each of the three factors provides quantification of total risk. The total risk for each function or system against each threat is 

assigned a color code. The results of the risk assessment should be used to help 

prioritize which mitigation measures should be adopted, given limited resources, 

in order to achieve a desired level of protection. To determine your risk rating, 

you may use Table 4-7, which includes information on observations in the Building 

Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (Appendix A) on the total risk scale and color 

codes. A site functional pre-screening matrix is shown in Table 4-8 and a site infrastructure pre-screening matrix is shown in Table 4-9. Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2 will 

assist you in preparing and organizing the information for your risk assessment. 
4-8 STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 

Table 4-7: Total Risk Scale Color Code

Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk

Risk Factors Total 1-60 61-175 ≥ 176

Table 4-8: Site Functional Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix

Function Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide Bomber Chemical (Sarin) Biological (Ricin)

Administration 280 140 225 90 90

Asset Value 5 5 5 5 5

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 7 7 9 9 9

Engineering 448 128 200 96 96

Asset Value 8 8 8 8 8

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 7 4 5 6 6

Warehousing 168 96 135 54 54

Asset Value 3 3 3 3 3

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 7 8 9 9 9

Data Center 320 128 120 64 64

Asset Value 8 8 8 8 8

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 5 4 3 4 4

Food Service 112 32 50 36 36

Asset Value 2 2 2 2 2

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 7 4 5 9 9

Security 392 140 350 126 126

Asset Value 7 7 7 7 7

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 7 5 10 9 9

Housekeeping 112 24 30 12 12

Asset Value 2 2 2 2 2

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 7 3 3 3 3

Day Care 504 324 405 162 162

Asset Value 9 9 9 9 9

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 7 9 9 9 9
STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 4-9

Table 4-9: Site Infrastructure Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix 

Infrastructure Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide Bomber Chemical 

(Sarin)

Biological 

(Ricin)

Site 32 128 60 16 16

Asset Value 4 4 4 4 4

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 1 7 3 4 4

Architectural 40 180 175 20 20

Asset Value 5 5 5 5 5

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 1 9 7 2 2

Structural Systems 64 320 240 32 32

Asset Value 8 8 8 8 8

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 1 10 6 2 1

Envelope Systems 56 252 210 28 14

Asset Value 7 7 7 7 7

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 1 9 6 2 1

Utility Systems 112 168 70 28 14

Asset Value 7 7 7 7 7

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 2 6 2 2 1

Mechanical Systems 56 224 175 126 126

Asset Value 7 7 7 7 7

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 1 8 5 9 9

Plumbing and Gas Systems 40 120 75 60 20

Asset Value 5 5 5 5 5

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 1 6 3 6 2

Electrical Systems 392 224 210 28 14

Asset Value 7 7 7 7 7

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 7 8 6 2 1

Fire Alarm Systems 72 216 320 36 18

Asset Value 9 9 9 9 9

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 1 6 8 2 1

IT/Communications Systems 512 192 240 32 16

Asset Value 8 8 8 8 8

Threat Rating 8 4 5 2 2

Vulnerability Rating 8 6 6 2 1
4-10 STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 

Prioritizing Observations in the Building Vulnerability Assessment 

Checklist (Task 4.3)

The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist relates to building core infrastructure. During 

Task 3.3, the Assessment Team performed an on-site assessment and filled out observations in the 

Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist. (Table 4-10 provides a nominal example.) As mentioned before, the Checklist is a key tool in the preparation of the threat assessment. It is used to 

guide the assessors performing the assessment of the facility. The observations column shows the 

high priority vulnerabilities of the facility, which can be prioritized to determine most effective 

mitigation measures. Prioritization is based on the greatest vulnerabilities that can be exploited 

by the aggressors and largest risks in terms of loss of lives, building damage, and loss of operation. 

Task 4.3 is the final task of the risk assessment. It allows the assessors to rank their observed facility 

vulnerabilities and proposed remedial actions. Worksheet 4-3 will help you to perform this task. 

For more information on how to use the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, see Step 3 

and Appendix A. 

 Table 4-10: Nominal Example of Observations in the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 1. Site

Is a perimeter fence or other 

types of barrier controls in 

place?

The intent is to channel pedestrian 

traffic onto a site with multiple 

buildings through known access control 

points. For a single building, the intent 

is to have a single visitor entrance.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

The main gate entrance remains wide open for vehicle 

and pedestrian intruders. There are missing street signs 

throughout the facility. It is difficult to channel staff and 

visitors to control access points. There is only one security 

vehicles to serve the entire campus; at least two more are 

required.

 2. Architectural

2.27 Is interior glazing near highrisk areas minimized?

Is interior glazing in other 

areas shatter-resistant?

Interior glazing should be minimized 

where a threat exists and should 

be avoided in enclosures of critical 

functions next to high-risk areas.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

In the main facade, windows are not blast-resistant 

and the glass is not properly anchored to the frame. In 

case of a blast event, it is anticipated that the glass will 

break and will not remain in the frame. This could cause 

extensive injuries in case of an explosive event. 

 8. Utility Systems

8.6 Does emergency backup power 

exist for all areas within the 

building or for critical areas 

only?

How is the emergency power 

distributed?

Is the emergency power 

system independent from 

the normal electrical service, 

particularly in critical areas?

There should be no single critical node 

that allows both the normal electrical 

service and the emergency backup 

power to be affected by a single 

incident. Automatic transfer switches 

and interconnecting switchgear are the 

initial concerns.

Emergency and normal electrical 

equipment should be installed 

separately, at different locations, and 

as far apart as possible.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

There are single-point vulnerabilities to the steam and 

electricity lines. Any damage to the steam or electric lines 

would result in loss of utilities. 
STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 4-11

WORKSHEET 4-1: SITE FUNCTIONAL PRE-ASSESSMENT MATRIX

Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk

Risk Factors Total 1-60 61-175 ≥ 176

Worksheet 4-1 can be used to complete your risk assessment by determining the functions at a higher 

risk. To fill out this matrix, use the scales and color codes, provided in Steps 4.1 and 4.2 . 

Function Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide Bomber Chemical (Sarin) Biological (Ricin)

Administration

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Engineering 

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Warehousing

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Data Center

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Food Service

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Security

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Housekeeping

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Day Care

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating
4-12 STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 

WORKSHEET 4-2: SITE INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS PRE-ASSESSMENT 

MATRIX 

Worksheet 4-2 can be used to complete your risk assessment by determining the infrastructure at a 

higher risk.

Infrastructure Cyber Attack Vehicle Bomb Suicide Bomber Chemical (Sarin) Biological (Ricin) 

Site

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Architectural

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Structural Systems

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Envelope Systems

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Utility Systems

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Mechanical Systems

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Plumbing and Gas Systems

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Electrical Systems

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

Fire Alarm Systems

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating

IT/Communications Systems

Asset Value

Threat Rating

Vulnerability Rating
STEP 4: RISK ASSESSMENT 4-13

Cross Reference

FunctionsAdministrationEngineeringWarehousingData CenterFood ServiceSecurityHousekeepingDay CareInfrastructureSiteArchitecturalStructural SystemsEnvelope SystemsUtility SystemsMechanical SystemsPlumbing and Gas SystemsElectrical SystemsFire Alarm SystemsIT/Communications Systems

Observation 1

Observation 2

Observation 3

Observation 4

Observation 5

Observation 6

Observation 7

Observation 8

Ranked Observations

Observation 1

Observation 2

Observation 3

Observation 4

Observation 5

Observation 6

Observation 7

Observation 8

WORKSHEET 4-3: PRIORITIZATION OF OBSERVATIONS IN THE 

CHECKLIST

Worksheet 4-3 can help you to prioritize the observations you have made in the Building 

Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (Appendix A) during Step 3. Taking into consideration the results 

in the Site Infrastructure Pre-Assessment Matrix and following the Total Risk Scale Color Code 

(Table 4-7), fill out the bottom part of Worksheet 4-3. This table can be expanded to include more 

observations, as needed.

STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS

STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS 5-1

OVERVIEW

The fifth step in this How-To Guide is to identify and evaluate various mitigation options that are directly associated with, and responsive to, the major 

risks identified during Step 4 (see Figure 5-1). After the risk assessment process is completed, the stakeholders are frequently left with several areas where 

assets require mitigation measures and are limited by factors discussed in this 

step. Thus, decisions need to be made to focus the available resources on the 

most practical mitigation options. 

The consider mitigation options process involves the followings tasks:

❍ Identifying preliminary mitigation options

❍ Reviewing mitigation options

❍ Estimating cost

❍ Reviewing mitigation options, cost, and the layers of defense

Step 5 emphasizes mitigation measures that can reduce the destructive effects against buildings in case of a terrorist attack. During this step, you will 

examine the mitigation options from the point of view of their effectiveness, 

acceptability, and feasibility with respect to prevailing implementation conditions. The proposed procedure for examining the mitigation options is not 

meant to replace full and thorough analysis of the technical assessment; it 

is meant to help you narrow down your options and focus your attention on 

those measures that have the greatest chance of effective implementation. 

Worksheets 4-3, 5-1, and 5-2 and the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (Appendix A) should be used for the preparation of your mitigation

options. 
5-2 STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS

Step 5: Consider Mitigation Options

TASKS:

1. Identifying preliminary mitigation 

 options

2. Reviewing mitigation options

3. Estimating cost

4. Reviewing mitigation, cost, and the 

 layers of defense

Step 1: Threat Identification and Rating

Step 4: Risk Assessment

Step 2: Asset Value Assessment

Step 3: Vulnerability Assessment

Figure 5-1 Steps and tasks

In order to identify, select, and implement the most appropriate mitigation 

measures, general mitigation goals and objectives, and the merits of each 

potential mitigation measure should be examined. The building owner 

may take the final decision regarding which mitigation measures should be 

implemented. However, engineers, architects, landscape architects, and other 

technical people should be involved in this process to ensure that the results 

of the risk assessment are met with sound mitigation measures that will increase the capability of the building to resist potential terrorist attacks. 

To select, evaluate, and prioritize potential mitigation options, this How-To 

Guide has selected criteria that help to answer the following questions:

❍ Which mitigation measures are most appropriate for the types of risks 

faced by your assets?

❍ Are resources and capabilities sufficient to implement these measures and 

what additional resources might be needed?

❍ What impacts will the implementation of these measures have in areas 

surrounding your building(s) or in your community?

Identifying Preliminary Mitigation Options (Task 

5.1)

After the Assessment Team and building stakeholders know which assets are 

at greatest risk (see Step 4), they can then identify mitigation measures to re-
STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS 5-3

duce this risk. Because it is not possible to completely eliminate risk and every 

project has resource limitations, you must carefully analyze your mitigation 

options. Worksheet 5-1 and the remaining sections of Task 5.1 will help you to 

identify your preliminary mitigation options. 

Prioritized Observations from the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist

The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (Appendix A) is the main 

source for identifying mitigation options. To identify your mitigation options, you should depart from the observations made in the Checklist when 

conducting the on-site assessment (see Task 3.2) and prioritizing these observations (see Task 4.3). The remaining part of this task will help you to create a 

feasible framework for the identified observations. 

Regulatory Measures, Rehabilitation of Existing 

Structures, and Protective and Control Structures 

Parameters

Mitigation measures can be viewed from many different perspectives. In this 

How-To Guide, the emphasis is on addressing building infrastructure and 

core building functions. The purpose is to identify sound mitigation measures 

directed at reducing the effects of potential terrorist attacks on the built environment. For this task, three broad categories have been identified: 

❍ Regulatory measures

❍ Repair and strengthening of existing structures

❍ Protective and control measures

Regulatory Measures. Regulatory measures include legal and other regulatory instruments that governments use to prevent, reduce, or prepare for the 

losses associated with manmade hazard events that affect commercial buildings, which are the central topic of this How-To Guide. Examples include:

❍ Legislation that organizes and distributes responsibilities to protect a 

community from manmade threats

❍ Regulations that reduce the financial and social impact of manmade 

hazards through measures, such as insurance

❍ New or updated design and construction codes
5-4 STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS

❍ New or modified land use and zoning regulations

❍ Incentives that provide inducements for implementing mitigation 

measures 

In most cases, regulatory measures should be considered before implementing other measures because regulatory measures provide the framework 

for decision-making, organizing, and financing of mitigation actions.

Repair and Strengthening of Existing Structures. As its name implies, repair 

and strengthening deals with structural and non-structural modifications of 

existing buildings and infrastructure facilities. Although new construction 

can include protective measures to reduce the potential impact against terrorist attacks, existing buildings may be at risk because they were constructed 

without the appropriate safety measures to withstand potential terrorist 

attacks. Thus, improving the safety and structural integrity of existing buildings and infrastructure facilities is often the best way to reduce the impact of 

manmade events on such structures.

When a manmade hazard occurs, it can directly damage a target building or 

indirectly cause secondary effects in adjacent buildings. The level of damage 

is impacted by each structure’s quality of design and construction. Poorly 

engineered and constructed buildings are usually not able to resist the forces 

generated by a blast event or serve as safe havens in case of CBR attacks.

Protective and Control Measures. Unlike other mitigation measures that 

improve the resistance of buildings and infrastructure to disasters, protective 

and control measures focus on protecting structures by deflecting the destructive forces from vulnerable structures and people. 

Ideally, a potential terrorist attack is prevented or pre-empted through intelligence measures. If the attack does occur, physical security measures combine 

with operational forces (e.g., surveillance, guards, and sensors) to provide 

layers of defense that delay and/or thwart the attack (for more information, see Task 2.1). Deception may be used to make the facility appear to be 

a more protected or lower-risk facility than it actually is, thereby making it a 

less attractive target. Deception can also be used to misdirect the attacker to a 

portion of the facility that is non-critical. As a last resort, structural hardening 

is provided to save lives and facilitate evacuation and rescue by preventing 

building collapse and limiting flying debris. 

Because of the interrelationship between physical and operational security 

measures, it is imperative for the owner and security professional to define, 

early in the design process, what extent of operational security is planned for 

various threat levels. If properly implemented, physical security measures will 

contribute toward the goals listed below in prioritized order.
STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS 5-5

• Preventing an attack. By making it more difficult to implement some of 

the more obvious attack scenarios (such as a parked car in the street) 

or making the target appear to be of low value in terms of the amount 

of sensation that would be generated if it were attacked, the would-be 

attacker may become discouraged from targeting the building. On the 

other hand, it may not be advantageous to make the facility too obviously 

protected or not protected, because this may provide an incentive to 

attack the building. 

• Delaying the attack. If an attack is initiated, properly designed landscape 

or architectural features can delay its execution by making it more 

difficult for the attacker to reach the intended target. This will give the 

security forces and authorities time to mobilize and possibly stop the 

attack before it is executed. This is done by creating a buffer zone between 

the publicly accessible areas and the vital areas of the facility by means 

of an obstacle course, a serpentine path, or a division of functions within 

the facility. Alternatively, through effective design, the attacker could be 

enticed to a non-critical part of the facility, thereby delaying the attack. 

• Mitigating the effects of the attack. If these precautions are implemented 

and the attack still takes place, structural protection efforts will serve to 

control the extent and consequences of damage. In the context of the 

overall security provided to the building, structural protection is a last 

resort that only becomes effective after all other efforts to stop the attack 

have failed. In the event of an attack, the benefits of enhancements to lifesafety systems may be realized in lives saved. 

The goal of the assessment process is to achieve the level of protection sought through implementation 

of mitigation measures in the building design. These measures may reduce risk by deterring, detecting, 

denying, or devaluing the potential threat element prior to or during execution of an enemy attack. The 

Department of Homeland Security uses the following methodology to achieve this purpose.

Deter: The process of making the target inaccessible or difficult to defeat with the weapon or tactic 

selected. It is usually accomplished at the site perimeter using highly visible electronic security systems, 

fencing, barriers, lighting, and security personnel and in the building by securing access with locks and 

electronic monitoring devices.

Detect: The process of using intelligence sharing and security services response to monitor and identify 

the threat before it penetrates the site perimeter or building access points.

Deny: The process of minimizing or delaying the degree of site or building infrastructure damage or 

loss of life or protecting assets by designing or using infrastructure and equipment designed to withstand 

blast and chemical, biological, or radiological effects.

Devalue: The process of making the site or building of little to no value or consequence, from the 

terrorists’ perspective, such that an attack on the facility would not yield their desired result.
5-6 STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS

Reviewing Mitigation Options (Task 5.2)

At this point, you should have identified a preliminary list of mitigation 

options. These options should have been grouped under the regulatory, rehabilitation, and protective and control framework for blast and CBR. The 

remaining sections of Task 5.2 provide a set of criteria to help you to narrow 

down the mitigation options identified during Task 5.1. Worksheet 5-2 will 

help you to analyze further your mitigation options in order to select those 

that are more feasible to be implemented. The selected criteria include the 

following: 

Available Political Support

Political support involves examining the proposed mitigation options by 

seeking the opinions of local and State elected officials, as well as the community as a whole. Most communities have learned that success of mitigation 

efforts hinges on political- and community-wide support. Building an effective political constituency for implementation of mitigation measures in 

most cases requires time and patience. However, some mitigation options will 

garner such support more easily than others.

Community Acceptance

Community acceptance cannot be viewed separately from the need for 

political support for the proposed mitigation options. Both are necessary 

preconditions for their successful implementation. In many cases, community-wide campaigns are necessary to explain the risks, the reasons for, and 

the expected benefits from the proposed measures. 

Cost 

Although the implementation of mitigation measures hinges on political 

commitment and technical capacity, it also depends heavily on the costs involved. After identifying your mitigation measures in Task 5.1, you will have 

some idea of the cost involved and opportunities for implementation. 

Benefit 

When implementing a mitigation measure, it is important to consider that 

the benefit of implementing the option outweighs the cost. After identifying 

your mitigation measures in Task 5.1, you will have some idea of the benefits 

that may result from implementing your mitigation measures. 
STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS 5-7

Available Financial Resources

As you begin Task 5.2, it is important to have some knowledge of the available resources for implementing mitigation options. The Team should discuss 

this issue with the site and building owners because the amount of financial 

resources may define the type of mitigation options to be adopted. The Team 

should also discuss any Federal and State programs available for financing 

large-scale mitigation measures.

Legal Authority

Without the appropriate legal authority, a mitigation action cannot lawfully 

be undertaken. You will need to determine whether the building owner has 

the legal authority to implement the selected mitigation options or whether it 

is necessary to wait for new laws or regulations. For example, creating standoff distances in urban areas can be against zoning ordinances and building 

set-back requirements.

Adversely Affected Population

While implementing your mitigation measures to solve problems related to 

blast and CBR resistance, you may want to consider that some segments of the 

population may be adversely affected. For example, the construction of barriers and bollards can inhibit the number of tourists visiting a particular city 

and might affect the community and the hospitality sector.

Adverse Effects on the Already Built Environment

Some mitigation measures may have a negative effect on the already built 

environment. When selecting mitigation measures, the following should be 

strictly scrutinized:

• Effects on traffic/vehicular mobility

• Effects on pedestrian mobility

• Effects on ingress and egress to the building

• Effects on other building operations

• Effects on aesthetics

• Potential interference with first responders
5-8 STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS

Impact on the Environment

When considering mitigation options, it is important to consider whether 

the recommended mitigation options will have a negative effect on 

environmental assets such as threatened and endangered species, wetlands, 

and other protected natural resources.

Technical Capacity

Some mitigation measures require highly skilled and specialized engineering 

expertise for implementation. Although experts can be hired on a short-term 

basis, the technical complexity of some mitigation solutions may require the 

expertise for long-term maintenance. It is therefore necessary to examine the 

technical capacities of all stakeholders and identify key technical expertise 

needed for each proposed mitigation option. If adequate technical capabilities are available for proposed mitigation measures, you should rank them 

higher on your priority list.

Funding for Maintenance and Operations

When considering the implementation of your mitigation options, you 

should be sure that funding is available for maintenance and operations.

Ease and Speed of Implementation

Different mitigation measures require different kinds of authority for their 

implementation. The Team must identify public authorities and responsible 

agencies for implementing mitigation measures and must examine their rules 

and regulations. The Team must identify all legislative problem areas and 

institutional obstacles as well as the incentives that can facilitate mitigation 

and implementation. The Team will have to balance the desirability of the 

mitigation measure against the community’s rules and regulations in order to 

decide which takes precedence. 

Timeframe and Urgency

Some mitigation measures require immediate implementation due to their 

nature (i.e., repetitive security breaches), political desire (i.e., platform 

project), or social perception (i.e., recent damage and disaster) of the risk. 

These perceptions can be the drivers to determining the timeframe for implementation of your mitigation options.

Short-term Solutions/Benefits

When considering your mitigation options, you may want to evaluate your 

short-term solutions (i.e., mitigation options that will solve a particular 
STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS 5-9

problem temporarily, but may require additional funding in the future for 

follow-on projects). A short-term solution can be quickly accomplished and 

can demonstrate immediate progress in satisfying your community needs. 

Long-term Solutions/Benefits

When considering your mitigation options, you may want to evaluate your 

long-term solutions (i.e., mitigation options that cannot be funded immediately, but will solve the problem permanently in the future when funds are 

available). A long-term solution can be more cost-effective in the long run 

that a short-term one. 

Estimating Cost (Task 5.3)

The initial construction cost of protection has two components: fixed and 

variable. Fixed costs include such items as security hardware and space requirements. These costs do not depend on the level of an attack (i.e., it costs 

the same to keep a truck away from a building regardless of whether the truck 

contains 500 or 5,000 pounds of TNT). Blast protection, on the other hand, 

is a variable cost. It depends on the threat level, which is a function of the explosive charge weight and the stand-off distance. Building designers have no 

control over the amount of explosives used, but are able to change the level 

of protection by defining an appropriate stand-off distance, adopting hardening measures for their buildings, and providing sacrificial spaces that can 

be affected by terrorist attacks, but, at the same time, can protect people and 

critical building functions and infrastructure. 

The optimal stand-off distance is determined by defining the total cost of 

protection as the sum of the cost of protection (construction cost) and the 

cost of stand-off (land cost). These two costs are considered as a function of 

the stand-off for a given explosive charge weight. The cost of protection is 

assumed to be proportional to the peak reflected pressure at the building 

envelope while the cost of land is proportional to the square of the stand-off 

distance. The optimal level of protection is the one that minimizes the sum of 

these costs. 

If additional land is not available to move the secured perimeter farther 

from the building, the required floor area of the building can be distributed among additional floors. As the number of floors is increased, the 

footprint decreases, providing an increased stand-off distance. By balancing 

the increasing cost of the structure (due to the added floors) and the corresponding decrease in protection cost (due to added stand-off), it is possible to 

find the optimal number of floors to minimize the cost of protection. 
5-10 STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS

These methods for establishing the best stand-off distance are generally used 

for the maximum credible explosive charge. If the cost of protection for 

this charge weight is not within the budgetary constraints, the design charge 

weight must be modified. A study can be conducted to determine the largest 

explosive yield and corresponding level of protection that can be incorporated into the building, given the available budget. 

Although it is difficult to assign costs to different upgrade measures because 

they vary, based on the site-specific design, some generalizations can be made 

(see Figure 5-2). Below is a list of enhancements arranged in order from least 

expensive to most expensive:

❍ Hardening of unsecured areas

❍ Measures to prevent progressive collapse 

❍ Exterior window and wall enhancements

Figure 5-2 Cost considerations Incremental Cost of Protection ($)

20 50 limit

Standoff (ft)

High to

Catastrophic High to Moderate

Moderate Moderate to Low

Total Protection Cost

(hardening + land + perimeter)

Other, mailroom, loading dock, lobby

Progressive

collapse

Windows and walls

Frame

Cost of land + 

perimeter protection

Not to Scale

Cost of hardening

RISK
STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS 5-11

Life-Cycle Costs

Life-cycle costs need to be considered as well. For example, if it is decided 

that two guarded entrances will be provided, one for visitors and one for employees, they may cost more during the life of the building than a single well 

designed entrance serving everyone. Also, maintenance costs may need to be 

considered. For instance, the initial costs for a CBR detection system may be 

modest, but the maintenance costs are high. Finally, if the rentable square 

footage is reduced as a result of incorporating robustness into the building, 

this may have a large impact on the life-cycle costs.

NIST PUBLICATIONS

For more information on life-cycle cost, see: NISTIR 7025, Applications of LifeCycle Cost Analysis to Homeland Security Issues in Constructed Facilities: A Case 

Study, and NISTIR 7073, Cost-Effective Responses to Terrorist Risks in Constructed 

Facilities.

For more information on setting priorities, see: NIST GCR 04-865, Best Practices 

for Project Security, and NIST GCR 04-871, Risk Analysis for Extreme Events: 

Economic Incentives for Reducing Future Losses.

Electronic copies of these reports are available at www.bfrl.nist.gov/oae/oae.html.

Setting Priorities

If the costs associated with mitigating manmade hazards are too high, there 

are three approaches available that can be used in combination: (1) reduce 

the design threat, (2) increase the level of protection, or (3) accept the risk. 

In some cases, the owner may decide to prioritize enhancements, based on 

their effectiveness in saving lives and reducing injuries. For instance, measures against progressive collapse are perhaps the most effective actions that 

can be implemented to save lives and should be considered above any other 

upgrades. Laminated glass is perhaps the single most effective measure to 

reduce extensive non-fatal injuries. If the cost is still considered too great, 

and the risk is high because of the location or the high-profile nature of the 

building, then the best option may be to consider building an unobtrusive 

facility in a lower-risk area instead. In some cases (e.g., financial institutions 

with trading floors), business interruption costs are so high they outweigh all 

other concerns. In such a case, the most cost-effective solution may be to provide a redundant facility. 

Early consideration of manmade hazards will significantly reduce the overall 

cost of protection and increase the inherent protection level provided to the 

building. If protection measures are considered as an afterthought or not 
5-12 STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS

considered until the design is nearly complete, the cost is likely to be greater, 

because more areas will need to be structurally hardened. An awareness of 

the threat of manmade hazards from the beginning of a project also helps the 

Team to determine early in the process what the priorities are for the facility. 

For instance, if extensive teak paneling of interior areas visible from the exterior is desired by the architect for the architectural expression of the building, 

but the cost exceeds that of protective measures, then a decision needs to be 

made regarding the priorities of the project. Including protective measures 

as part of the discussion regarding trade-offs early in the design process often 

helps to clarify such issues. 

Applicability of Benefit/Cost to Terrorist Threats

When prioritizing hazard mitigation alternatives, a benefit/cost analysis is 

generally conducted for each proposed action. A benefit/cost analysis involves calculating the costs of the mitigation measure and weighing them 

against the intended benefits, frequently expressed as losses avoided. However, applying benefit/cost analysis to terrorist threats can be challenging due 

to the following three main factors (for more information on this subject, see 

FEMA 386-7, Integrating Human-Caused Hazards Into Mitigation Planning):

The probability of an attack or frequency is not known. The frequency factor 

is much more complex in the case of manmade hazards than for natural hazards. Although it is possible to estimate how often many natural disasters will 

occur (i.e., a structure located in the 100-year floodplain is considered to have 

a 1 percent chance of being flooded in any given year), it is very difficult to 

quantify the likelihood of a terrorist attack or technological disaster. Quantitative methods to estimate these probabilities are being developed, but have not 

yet been refined to the point where they can be used to determine incident 

probability on a facility-by-facility basis. The Assessment Team may use a qualitative approach based on threat and vulnerability considerations to estimate 

the relative likelihood of an attack or accident rather than the precise frequency. Such an approach is necessarily subjective, but can be combined with 

quantitative estimates of cost-effectiveness (the cost of an action compared to 

the value of the lives and property it saves in a worst-case scenario) to help illustrate the overall risk reduction achieved by a particular mitigation action. 

The deterrence rate may not be known. The deterrence or preventive value 

of a measure cannot be calculated if the number of incidents it averts is not 

known. Deterrence in the case of terrorism may also have a secondary impact 

in that, after a potential target is hardened, a terrorist may turn to a less protected facility, changing the likelihood of an attack for both targets. 
STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS 5-13

The lifespan of the action may be difficult to quantify. The lifespan of a mitigation action presents another problem when carrying out a benefit/cost analysis for terrorism and technological 

hazards. Future benefits are generally calculated for a natural hazard mitigation action in part by 

estimating the number of times the action will perform successfully over the course of its useful 

life. However, some protective actions may be damaged or destroyed in a single manmade attack 

or accident. For example, blast-resistant window film may have performed to 100 percent effectiveness by preventing injuries from flying glass, but it may still need replacement after one “use.” 

Other actions, such as a building setback, cannot be “destroyed” or “used up” per se. This is in contrast to many natural hazard mitigation actions, where the effectiveness and life span of a structural 

retrofit or land use policy are easily understood and their value over time is quantifiable.

Improving the Accuracy of your Cost Estimates

To improve the accuracy of your cost estimates, consult the Building Vulnerability Assessment 

Checklist in Appendix A. The Checklist follows the Construction Specifications Institute (CSI) 

format and cost estimates for infrastructure and equipment can be developed using industry 

standard applications and processes. Costing of mitigation options of physical security systems, 

blast-resistant materials and fixtures, and CBR protective sensors and devices is an emerging practice. A companion text to Appendix A is the RS Means Building Security; Strategies and Costs, 

which provides both a manual and an electronic costing approach.

Risk Assessment Database

The Risk Assessment Database provides a simple cost field for each mitigation option and cost 

summary reporting capability. Appendix B provides an extensive explanation on the subject. 

Mitigation, Cost, and the Layers of Defense (Task 5.4)

A general spectrum of site mitigation measures ranging from the least protection, cost, and 

effort to the greatest protection, cost, and effort are provided in Figures 5-3 and 5-4. These 

mitigation measures have been arranged by layers of defense (second and third layers), following the principle that the layers of defense create a succeeding number of security layers 

more difficult to penetrate. The underlying purpose of this task is to provide you with examples of mitigation measures for each layer and give you a broad idea on the potential 

correlation between protection and cost.
5-14 STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS

• Place trash receptacles as far away from the building as possible.

• Remove any dense vegetation that may screen covert activity.

• Use thorn-bearing plant materials to create natural barriers. 

• Identify all critical resources in the area (fire and police stations, hospitals, etc.).

• Identify all potentially hazardous facilities in the area (nuclear plants, chemical labs, etc.). 

• Use temporary passive barriers to eliminate straight-line vehicular access to high-risk buildings.

• Use vehicles as temporary physical barriers during elevated threat conditions.

• Make proper use of signs for traffic control, building entry control, etc. Minimize signs identifying highrisk areas. 

• Introduce traffic calming techniques, including raised crosswalks, speed humps and speed tables, 

pavement treatments, bulbouts, and traffic circles. 

• Identify, secure, and control access to all utility services to the building. 

• Limit and control access to all crawl spaces, utility tunnels, and other means of under building access to 

prevent the planting of explosives.

• Utilize Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to assess adjacent land use.

• Provide open space inside the fence along the perimeter.

• Locate fuel storage tanks at least 100 feet from all buildings. 

• Block sight lines through building orientation, landscaping, screening, and landforms.

• Use temporary and procedural measures to restrict parking and increase stand-off. 

• Locate and consolidate high-risk land uses in the interior of the site. 

• Select and design barriers based on threat levels. 

• Maintain as much stand-off distance as possible from potential vehicle bombs. 

• Separate redundant utility systems. 

• Conduct periodic water testing to detect waterborne contaminants. 

• Enclose the perimeter of the site. Create a single controlled entrance for vehicles (entry control point).

• Establish law enforcement or security force presence.

• Install quick connects for portable utility backup systems.

• Install security lighting. 

• Install closed circuit television cameras.

• Mount all equipment to resist forces in any direction. 

• Include security and protection measures in the calculation of land area requirements.

• Design and construct parking to provide adequate stand-off for vehicle bombs.

• Position buildings to permit occupants and security personnel to monitor the site.

• Do not site the building adjacent to potential threats or hazards.

• Locate critical building components away from the main entrance, vehicle circulation, parking, or 

maintenance area. Harden as appropriate.

• Provide a site-wide public address system and emergency call boxes at readily identified locations.

• Prohibit parking beneath or within a building. 

• Design and construct access points at an angle to oncoming streets.

• Designate entry points for commercial and delivery vehicles away from high-risk areas.

• In urban areas with minimum stand-off, push the perimeter out to the edge of the sidewalk by means 

of bollards, planters, and other obstacles. In extreme cases, push the line farther outward by restricting 

or eliminating parking along the curb, eliminating loading zones, or through street closings. For this 

measure, you need to work with your local officials.

• Provide intrusion detection sensors for all utility services to the building.

• Provide redundant utility systems to support security, life safety, and rescue functions.

• Conceal and/or harden incoming utility systems. 

Figure 5-3 Mitigation options for the second layer of defense
STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS 5-15

• Install active vehicle crash barriers. Ensure that exterior doors into inhabited areas open outward. 

Ensure emergency exit doors only facilitate exiting.

• Secure roof access hatches from the interior. Prevent public access to building roofs.

• Restrict access to building operation systems.

• Conduct periodic training of HVAC operations and maintenance staff.

• Evaluate HVAC control options. 

• Install empty conduits for future security control equipment during initial construction or major 

renovation.

• Do not mount plumbing, electrical fixtures, or utility lines on the inside of exterior walls.

• Minimize interior glazing near high-risk areas.

• Establish emergency plans, policies, and procedures.

• Establish written plans for evacuation and sheltering in place.

• Illuminate building access points.

• Restrict access to building information.

• Secure HVAC intakes and mechanical rooms.

• Limit the number of doors used for normal entry/egress.

• Lock all utility access openings.

• Provide emergency power for emergency lighting in restrooms, egress routes, and any meeting room 

without windows.

• Install an internal public address system.

• Stagger interior doors and offset interior and exterior doors.

• Eliminate hiding places.

• Install a second and separate telephone service.

• Install radio telemetry distributed antennas throughout the facility.

• Use a badge identification system for building access.

• Install a CCTV surveillance system.

• Install an electronic security alarm system.

• Install rapid response and isolation features into HVAC systems.

• Use interior barriers to differentiate levels of security.

• Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack.

• Install call buttons at key public contact areas.

• Install emergency and normal electric equipment at different locations.

• Avoid exposed structural elements.

• Reinforce foyer walls.

• Use architectural features to deny contact with exposed primary vertical load members.

• Isolate lobbies, mailrooms, loading docks, and storage areas.

• Locate stairwells remotely. Do not discharge stairs into lobbies, parking, or loading areas.

• Elevate HVAC fresh-air intakes.

• Create ”shelter-in-place” rooms or areas.

• Separate HVAC zones. Eliminate leaks and increase building air tightness.

Figure 5-4 Mitigation options for the third layer of defense
5-16 STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS

Figure 5-4 Mitigation options for the third layer of defense (continued)

• Install blast-resistant doors or steel doors with steel frames. 

• Physically separate unsecured areas from the main building.

• Install HVAC exhausting and purging systems.

• Connect interior non-load bearing walls to structure with non-rigid connections.

• Use structural design techniques to resist progressive collapse.

• Treat exterior shear walls as primary structures.

• Orient glazing perpendicular to the primary façade facing uncontrolled vehicle approaches.

• Use reinforced concrete wall systems in lieu of masonry or curtain walls.

• Ensure active fire system is protected from single-point failure in case of a blast event.

• Install a Backup Control Center (BCC).

• Avoid eaves and overhangs or harden to withstand blast effects.

• Establish ground floor elevation 4 feet above grade.

• Avoid re-entrant corners on the building exterior.
STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS 5-17

Prioritized Observations

 Blast Regulatory Measures CBR Regulatory Measures Blast Repair and Strengthening of Existing Structures CBR Repair and Strengthening of Existing Structures Blast Protection and Control Measures CBR Protection and Control Measures

Worksheet 5-1 will help to identify your 

preliminary mitigation options. 

After you have prioritized your 

observations (Task 5.1), proceed to 

rank them. Using the first part of the 

Worksheet (Prioritized Observations) 

indicate if these observations merit 

a regulatory, rehabilitation, and/or 

protective measure and if they directed 

at blast or CBR.

Using the second (Preliminary 

Mitigation Options for Blast) and 

third (Preliminary Mitigation Options 

for CBR) parts of the Worksheet, 

determine mitigation options that 

address the main concerns included 

in your observations and provided 

parameters. 

Observation 1

Observation 2

Observation 3

Observation 4

Observation 5

Observation 6

Observation 7

Observation 8

Preliminary Mitigation Options for Blast

Mitigation 1

Mitigation 2

Mitigation 3

Mitigation 4

Preliminary Mitigation Options for CBR

Mitigation 5

Mitigation 6

Mitigation 7

Mitigation 8

WORKSHEET 5-1: PRELIMINARY MITIGATION OPTIONS
5-18 STEP 5: CONSIDER MITIGATION OPTIONS Available Political Support Community Acceptance Cost Benefit Available Financial Resources Legal Authority Adverse Effects on the Already Built Environment Adversely Affected Population Environmental Impact Technical Capacity Funding for Maintenance and Operations Ease and Speed of Implementation Timeframe and Urgency Short-Term Solutions/Benefits Long-Term Solutions/Benefits Others

Mitigation 1

Mitigation 2

Mitigation 3

Mitigation 4

Mitigation 5

Mitigation 6

Mitigation 7

Short List of Mitigation Options for Blast

Option 1

Option 2

Option 3

Short List of Mitigation Options for CBR

Option 1

WORKSHEET 5-2: PRELIMINARY MITIGATION OPTIONS

Worksheet 5-2 will help you to identify a short list of mitigation options. Bring forward preliminary 

mitigation options from Worksheet 5-1 and review them against the list of criteria provided in the 

upper part of the worksheet. The selected criteria are described in Task 5.2. Mark with a plus “+” 

or a minus “-” as to whether your preliminary mitigation options have positive or negative impact. 

The lower portion of the worksheet is reserved for writing a short list of options as a result of the 

former exercise.
APPENDIX A: BUILDING VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST

APPENDIX A A-1

The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist is based on the checklist developed by the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and is part of FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 

Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. This Checklist will help you to prepare your Threat Assessment 

because it allows a consistent security evaluation of designs at various levels. The Checklist can 

be used as a screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability assessment and supports the 

preparation of all steps in this How-To Guide. 

The Checklist is organized into 13 sections: 1) site, 2) architectural, 3 ) structural systems, 4) 

building envelope, 5) utility systems, 6) mechanical systems, 7) plumbing and gas systems, 8) 

electrical systems, 9) fire alam sysems, 10) communications and information technology (IT) 

systems, 11) equipment operations and maintenance, 12) security systems, and 13) security 

master plan. To conduct a vulnerability assessment of a building or preliminary design, each 

section of the Checklist should be assigned to an engineer, architect, or subject matter expert 

who is knowledgeable and qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Each assessor 

should consider the questions and guidance provided to help identify vulnerabilities and 

document results in the observations column. If assessing an existing building, vulnerabilities 

can also be documented with photographs, if possible. The results of the 13 assessments should 

be integrated into a master vulnerability assessment and provide a basis for determining 

vulnerability ratings during the assessment process. 

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 1 Site

1.1 What major structures surround 

the facility (site or building(s))?

What critical infrastructure, 

government, military, or recreation 

facilities are in the local area that 

impact transportation, utilities, 

and collateral damage (attack at 

this facility impacting the other 

major structures or attack on the 

major structures impacting this 

facility)?

What are the adjacent land uses 

immediately outside the perimeter 

of this facility (site or building(s))?

Critical infrastructure to consider includes:

Telecommunications infrastructure

Facilities for broadcast TV, cable TV; cellular networks; 

newspaper offices, production, and distribution; radio 

stations; satellite base stations; telephone trunking and 

switching stations, including critical cable routes and 

major rights-of-way

Electric power systems

Power plants, especially nuclear facilities; transmission 

and distribution system components; fuel distribution, 

delivery, and storage

Gas and oil facilities

Hazardous material facilities, oil/gas pipelines, and 

storage facilities
A-2 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 1 Site

Do future development plans 

change these land uses outside 

the facility (site or building (s)) 

perimeter? 

Although this question bridges 

threat and vulnerability, the threat 

is the manmade hazard that can 

occur (likelihood and impact) and 

the vulnerability is the proximity of 

the hazard to the building(s) being 

assessed. Thus, a chemical plant 

release may be a threat/hazard, but 

vulnerability changes if the plant is 1 

mile upwind for the prevailing winds 

versus 10 miles away and downwind. 

Similarly, a terrorist attack upon an 

adjacent building may impact the 

building(s) being assessed. The Murrah 

Federal Building in Oklahoma City was 

not the only building to have severe 

damage caused by the explosion of the 

Ryder rental truck bomb.

Banking and finance institutions

Financial institutions (banks, credit unions) and the 

business district; note schedule business/financial district 

may follow; armored car services

Transportation networks

Airports: carriers, flight paths, and airport layout; 

location of air traffic control towers, runways, passenger 

terminals, and parking areas

Bus Stations

Pipelines: oil; gas

Trains/Subways: rails and lines, railheads/rail yards, 

interchanges, tunnels, and cargo/passenger terminals; 

note hazardous material transported

Traffic: interstate highways/roads/tunnels/bridges 

carrying large volumes; points of congestion; note time 

of day and day of week

Trucking: hazardous materials cargo loading/unloading 

facilities; truck terminals, weigh stations, and rest areas

Waterways: dams; levees; berths and ports for cruise 

ships, ferries, roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, and 

container ships; international (foreign) flagged vessels 

(and cargo)

Water supply systems

Pipelines and process/treatment facilities, dams for 

water collection; wastewater treatment 

Government services

Federal/state/local government offices – post offices, 

law enforcement stations, fire/rescue, town/city hall, 

local mayor’s/governor’s residences, judicial offices 

and courts, military installations (include type-Active, 

Reserves, National Guard)

Emergency services

Backup facilities, communications centers, Emergency 

Operations Centers (EOCs), fire/Emergency Medical 

Service (EMS) facilities, Emergency Medical Center 

(EMCs), law enforcement facilities
APPENDIX A A-3

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 1 Site

The following are not critical infrastructure, but have 

potential collateral damage to consider: 

Agricultural facilities: chemical distribution, storage, and 

application sites; crop spraying services; farms and ranches; 

food processing, storage, and distribution facilities

Commercial/manufacturing/industrial facilities: 

apartment buildings; business/corporate centers; chemical 

plants (especially those with Section 302 Extremely 

Hazardous Substances); factories; fuel production, 

distribution, and storage facilities; hotels and convention 

centers; industrial plants; raw material production, 

distribution, and storage facilities; research facilities and 

laboratories; shipping, warehousing, transfer, and logistical 

centers

Events and attractions: festivals and celebrations; openair markets; parades; rallies, demonstrations, and marches; 

religious services; scenic tours; theme parks

Health care system components: family planning 

clinics; health department offices; hospitals; radiological 

material and medical waste transportation, storage, and 

disposal; research facilities and laboratories, walk-in clinics

Political or symbolically significant sites: embassies, 

consulates, landmarks, monuments, political party and special 

interest groups offices, religious sites

Public/private institutions: academic institutions, 

cultural centers, libraries, museums, research facilities and 

laboratories, schools

Recreation facilities: auditoriums, casinos, concert halls 

and pavilions, parks, restaurants and clubs (frequented 

by potential target populations), sports arenas, stadiums, 

theaters, malls, and special interest group facilities; note 

congestion dates and times for shopping centers

 eferences: FEMA 386-7, FEMA SLG 101, 

DOJ NCJ181200

1.2 Does the terrain place the building in 

a depression or low area?

Depressions or low areas can trap heavy vapors, inhibit 

natural decontamination by prevailing winds, and reduce the 

effectiveness of in-place sheltering.

Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide
A-4 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 1 Site

1.3 In dense, urban areas, does curb lane 

parking allow uncontrolled vehicles 

to park unacceptably close to a 

building in public rights-of-way?

Where distance from the building to the nearest curb provides 

insufficient setback, restrict parking in the curb lane. For 

typical city streets, this may require negotiating to close the 

curb lane. Setback is common terminology for the distance 

between a building and its associated roadway or parking. 

It is analogous to stand-off between a vehicle bomb and the 

building. The benefit per foot of increased stand-off between a 

potential vehicle bomb and a building is very high when close 

to a building and decreases rapidly as the distance increases. 

Note that the July 1, 1994, Americans with Disabilities 

Act Standards for Accessible Design states that required 

handicapped parking shall be located on the shortest accessible 

route of travel from adjacent parking to an accessible entrance.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.4 Is a perimeter fence or other types of 

barrier controls in place?

The intent is to channel pedestrian traffic onto a site with 

multiple buildings through known access control points. For a 

single building, the intent is to have a single visitor entrance.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.5 What are the site access points to 

the site or building?

The goal is to have at least two access points – one for 

passenger vehicles and one for delivery trucks due to the 

different procedures needed for each. Having two access points 

also helps if one of the access points becomes unusable, then 

traffic can be routed through the other access point.

Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

1.6 Is vehicle traffic separated from 

pedestrian traffic on the site?

Pedestrian access should not be endangered by car traffic. 

Pedestrian access, especially from public transportation, should 

not cross vehicle traffic if possible.

References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

1.7 Is there vehicle and pedestrian access 

control at the perimeter of the site?

Vehicle and pedestrian access control and inspection should 

occur as far from facilities as possible (preferably at the site 

perimeter) with the ability to regulate the flow of people and 

vehicles one at a time.

Control on-site parking with identification checks, security 

personnel, and access control systems.

Reference: FEMA 386-7 
APPENDIX A A-5

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 1 Site

1.8 Is there space for inspection at the 

curb line or outside the protected 

perimeter?

What is the minimum distance 

from the inspection location to the 

building?

Design features for the vehicular inspection point include: 

vehicle arrest devices that prevent vehicles from leaving the 

vehicular inspection area and prevent tailgating.

If screening space cannot be provided, consider other design 

features such as: hardening and alternative location for vehicle 

search/inspection.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

1.9 Is there any potential access to the 

site or building through utility paths 

or water runoff?

Eliminate potential site access through utility tunnels, corridors, 

manholes, stormwater runoff culverts, etc. Ensure covers to 

these access points are secured.

Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

1.10 What are the existing types of 

vehicle anti-ram devices for the site 

or building?

Are these devices at the property 

boundary or at the building?

Passive barriers include bollards, walls, hardened fences (steel 

cable interlaced), trenches, ponds/basins, concrete planters, 

street furniture, plantings, trees, sculptures, and fountains. 

Active barriers include pop-up bollards, swing arm gates, and 

rotating plates and drums, etc.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.11 What is the anti-ram buffer zone 

stand-off distance from the building 

to unscreened vehicles or parking?

If the recommended distance for the postulated threat is not 

available, consider reducing the stand-off required through 

structural hardening or manufacturing additional stand-off 

through barriers and parking restrictions. Also, consider 

relocation of vulnerable functions within the building, or to a 

more hazard-resistant building. More stand-off should be used 

for unscreened vehicles than for screened vehicles that have 

been searched.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.12 Are perimeter barriers capable of 

stopping vehicles?

Will the vehicle barriers at the 

perimeter and building maintain 

access for emergency responders, 

including large fire apparatus?

Anti-ram protection may be provided by adequately designed: 

bollards, street furniture, sculpture, landscaping, walls, and 

fences. The anti-ram protection must be able to stop the threat 

vehicle size (weight) at the speed attainable by that vehicle at 

impact. If the anti-ram protection cannot absorb the desired 

kinetic energy, consider adding speed controls (serpentines 

or speed bumps) to limit the speed at impact. If the resultant 

speed is still too great, the anti-ram protection should be 

improved.

References: Military Handbook 1013/14 and 

GSA PBS P-100
A-6 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 1 Site

1.13 Does site circulation prevent highspeed approaches by vehicles?

The intent is to use site circulation to minimize vehicle speeds 

and eliminate direct approaches to structures.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.14 Are there offsetting vehicle entrances 

from the direction of a vehicle’s 

approach to force a reduction of 

speed?

Single or double 90-degree turns effectively reduce vehicle 

approach speed.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.15 Is there a minimum setback distance 

between the building and parked 

vehicles?

Adjacent public parking should be directed to more distant or 

better-protected areas, segregated from employee parking 

and away from the building. Some publications use the term 

setback in lieu of the term stand-off.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.16 Does adjacent surface parking on 

site maintain a minimum stand-off 

distance?

The specific stand-off distance needed is based upon the design 

basis threat bomb size and the building construction. For initial 

screening, consider using 25 meters (82 feet) as a minimum, 

with more distance needed for unreinforced masonry or 

wooden walls.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.17 Do standalone, aboveground parking 

garages provide adequate visibility 

across as well as into and out of the 

parking garage?

Pedestrian paths should be planned to concentrate activity to 

the extent possible.

Limiting vehicular entry/exits to a minimum number of 

locations is beneficial.

Stair tower and elevator lobby design should be as open as 

code permits. Stair and/or elevator waiting areas should be as 

open to the exterior and/or the parking areas as possible and 

well lighted. Impact-resistant, laminated glass for stair towers 

and elevators is a way to provide visual openness.

Potential hiding places below stairs should be closed off; nooks 

and crannies should be avoided, and dead-end parking areas 

should be eliminated.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.18 Are garage or service area entrances 

for employee-permitted vehicles 

protected by suitable anti-ram 

devices?

Coordinate this protection with 

other anti-ram devices, such as on 

the perimeter or property boundary 

to avoid duplication of arresting 

capability.

Control internal building parking, underground parking 

garages, and access to service areas and loading docks in this 

manner with proper access control, or eliminate the parking 

altogether.

The anti-ram device must be capable of arresting a vehicle 

of the designated threat size at the speed attainable at the 

location.
APPENDIX A A-7

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 1 Site

1.19 Do site landscaping and street 

furniture provide hiding places?

Minimize concealment opportunities by keeping landscape 

plantings (hedges, shrubbery, and large plants with heavy 

ground cover) and street furniture (bus shelters, benches, 

trash receptacles, mailboxes, newspaper vending machines) 

away from the building to permit observation of intruders and 

prevent hiding of packages.

If mail or express boxes are used, the size of the openings 

should be restricted to prohibit the insertion of packages.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.20 Is the site lighting adequate from 

a security perspective in roadway 

access and parking areas?

Security protection can be successfully addressed through 

adequate lighting. The type and design of lighting, including 

illumination levels, is critical. Illuminating Engineering Society 

of North America (IESNA) guidelines can be used. The site 

lighting should be coordinated with the CCTV system.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.21 Are line-of-sight perspectives from 

outside the secured boundary to 

the building and on the property 

along pedestrian and vehicle routes 

integrated with landscaping and 

green space?

The goal is to prevent the observation of critical assets 

by persons outside the secure boundary of the site. For 

individual buildings in an urban environment, this could mean 

appropriate window treatments or no windows for portions of 

the building.

Once on the site, the concern is to ensure observation by 

a general workforce aware of any pedestrians or vehicles 

outside normal circulation routes or attempting to approach the 

building unobserved.

Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

1.22 Do signs provide control of vehicles 

and people?

The signage should be simple and have the necessary level 

of clarity. However, signs that identify sensitive areas should 

generally not be provided.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.23 Are all existing fire hydrants on the 

site accessible?

Just as vehicle access points to the site must be able to transit 

emergency vehicles, so too must the emergency vehicles have 

access to the buildings and, in the case of fire trucks, the fire 

hydrants. Thus, security considerations must accommodate 

emergency response requirements.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100
A-8 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 2 Architectural

2.1 Does the site and architectural design 

incorporate strategies from a Crime 

Prevention Through Environmental 

Design (CPTED) perspective?

The focus of CPTED is on creating defensible space by 

employing:

1. Natural access controls:

– Design streets, sidewalks, and building entrances to clearly 

indicate public routes and direct people away from private/

restricted areas

– Discourage access to private areas with structural elements 

and limit access (no cut-through streets)

– Loading zones should be separate from public parking

2. Natural surveillance:

– Design that maximizes visibility of people, parking areas, 

and building entrances; doors and windows that look out on 

to streets and parking areas

– Shrubbery under 2 feet in height for visibility

– Lower branches of existing trees kept at least 10 feet off 

the ground

– Pedestrian-friendly sidewalks and streets to control 

pedestrian and vehicle circulation

– Adequate nighttime lighting, especially at exterior doorways

3. Territorial reinforcement:

– Design that defines property lines

– Design that distinguishes private/restricted spaces from 

public spaces using separation, landscape plantings; 

pavement designs (pathway and roadway placement); 

gateway treatments at lobbies, corridors, and door 

placement; walls, barriers, signage, lighting, and “CPTED” 

fences

– “Traffic-calming” devices for vehicle speed control

4. Target hardening:

– Prohibit entry or access: window locks, deadbolts for doors, 

interior door hinges

– Access control (building and employee/visitor parking) and 

intrusion detection systems

5. Closed circuit television cameras:

– Prevent crime and influence positive behavior, while 

enhancing the intended uses of space. In other words, 

design that eliminates or reduces criminal behavior and at 

the same time encourages people to “keep an eye out” for 

each other.

References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7
APPENDIX A A-9

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 2 Architectural

2.2 Is it a mixed-tenant building? Separate high-risk tenants from low-risk tenants and from 

publicly accessible areas. Mixed uses may be accommodated 

through such means as separating entryways, controlling 

access, and hardening shared partitions, as well as through 

special security operational countermeasures.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.3 Are pedestrian paths planned 

to concentrate activity to aid in 

detection?

Site planning and landscape design can provide natural 

surveillance by concentrating pedestrian activity, limiting 

entrances/exits, and eliminating concealment opportunities. 

Also, prevent pedestrian access to parking areas other than via 

established entrances.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.4 Are there trash receptacles and 

mailboxes in close proximity to the 

building that can be used to hide 

explosive devices?

The size of the trash receptacles and mailbox openings should 

be restricted to prohibit insertion of packages. Street furniture, 

such as newspaper vending machines, should be kept sufficient 

distance (10 meters or 33 feet) from the building, or brought 

inside to a secure area.

References: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide and DoD 

UCF 4-010-01

2.5 Do entrances avoid significant 

queuing?

If queuing will occur within the building footprint, the area 

should be enclosed in blast-resistant construction. If queuing is 

expected outside the building, a rain cover should be provided. 

For manpower and equipment requirements, collocate or 

combine staff and visitor entrances.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.6 Does security screening cover all 

public and private areas?

Are public and private activities 

separated?

Are public toilets, service spaces, or 

access to stairs or elevators located 

in any non-secure areas, including the 

queuing area before screening at the 

public entrance?

Retail activities should be prohibited in non-secured areas. 

However, the Public Building Cooperative Use Act of 1976 

encourages retail and mixed uses to create open and inviting 

buildings. Consider separating entryways, controlling access, 

hardening shared partitions, and special security operational 

countermeasures.

References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7
A-10 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 2 Architectural

2.7 Is access control provided through 

main entrance points for employees 

and visitors?

(lobby receptionist, sign-in, staff escorts, issue 

of visitor badges, checking forms of personal 

identification, electronic access control systems)

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

2.8 Is access to private and public space 

or restricted area space clearly 

defined through the design of the 

space, signage, use of electronic 

security devices, etc.?

Finishes and signage should be designed for visual simplicity.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

2.9 Is access to elevators distinguished 

as to those that are designated only 

for employees and visitors?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

2.10 Do public and employee entrances 

include space for possible future 

installation of access control and 

screening equipment?

These include walk-through metal detectors and x-ray devices, 

identification check, electronic access card, search stations, and 

turnstiles.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.11 Do foyers have reinforced concrete 

walls and offset interior and exterior 

doors from each other?

Consider for exterior entrances to the building or to access 

critical areas within the building if explosive blast hazard must 

be mitigated.

Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-853 

2.12 Do doors and walls along the line of 

security screening meet requirements 

of UL752 “Standard for Safety: 

Bullet-Resisting Equipment”?

If the postulated threat in designing entrance access control 

includes rifles, pistols, or shotguns, then the screening area 

should have bullet-resistance to protect security personnel and 

uninvolved bystanders. Glass, if present, should also be bulletresistant.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.13 Do circulation routes have 

unobstructed views of people 

approaching controlled access points?

This applies to building entrances and to critical areas within 

the building.

References: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide and DoD 

UFC 4-010-01
APPENDIX A A-11

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 2 Architectural

2.14 Is roof access limited to authorized 

personnel by means of locking 

mechanisms?

References: GSA PBS-P100 and CDC/NIOSH, 

Pub 2002-139

2.15 Are critical assets (people, activities, 

building systems and components) 

located close to any main entrance, 

vehicle circulation, parking, 

maintenance area, loading dock, or 

interior parking?

Are the critical building systems and 

components hardened?

Critical building components include: Emergency generator 

including fuel systems, day tank, fire sprinkler, and water 

supply; Normal fuel storage; Main switchgear; Telephone 

distribution and main switchgear; Fire pumps; Building 

control centers; Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) systems 

controlling critical functions; Main refrigeration and ventilation 

systems if critical to building operation; Elevator machinery 

and controls; Shafts for stairs, elevators, and utilities; Critical 

distribution feeders for emergency power. Evacuation and 

rescue require emergency systems to remain operational 

during a disaster and they should be located away from 

potential attack locations. Primary and backup systems should 

be separated to reduce the risk of both being impacted by a 

single incident if collocated. Utility systems should be located at 

least 50 feet from loading docks, front entrances, and parking 

areas.

One way to harden critical building systems and components is to 

enclose them within hardened walls, floors, and ceilings. Do not 

place them near high-risk areas where they can receive collateral 

damage.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.16 Are high-value or critical assets 

located as far into the interior of the 

building as possible and separated 

from the public areas of the building?

Critical assets, such as people and activities, are more 

vulnerable to hazards when on an exterior building wall or 

adjacent to uncontrolled public areas inside the building.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.17 Is high visitor activity away from 

critical assets?

High-risk activities should also be separated from low-risk 

activities. Also, visitor activities should be separated from daily 

activities.

Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

2.18 Are critical assets located in spaces 

that are occupied 24 hours per day?

Are assets located in areas where 

they are visible to more than one 

person?

Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide
A-12 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 2 Architectural

Loading docks should be designed to keep vehicles from 

driving into or parking under the building. If loading 

docks are in close proximity to critical equipment, 

consider hardening the equipment and service against 

explosive blast. Consider a 50-foot separation distance in 

all directions.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

The mailroom should be located at the perimeter of the 

building with an outside wall or window designed for 

pressure relief.

By separating the mailroom and the loading dock, the 

collateral damage of an incident at one has less impact 

upon the other. However, this may be the preferred 

mailroom location.

Off-site screening stations or a separate delivery 

processing building on site may be cost-effective, 

particularly if several buildings may share one mailroom. 

A separate delivery processing building reduces risk and 

simplifies protection measures.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Screening of all deliveries to the building, including U.S. 

mail, commercial package delivery services, delivery of 

office supplies, etc.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Areas of refuge can be safe havens, shelters, or protected 

spaces for use during specified hazards.

Reference: FEMA 386-7

Consider designing stairs so that they discharge into areas 

other than lobbies, parking, or loading docks.

Maintaining positive pressure from a clean source of air 

(may require special filtering) aids in egress by keeping 

smoke, heat, toxic fumes, etc,. out of the stairway. 

Pressurize exit stairways in accordance with the National 

Model Building Code.

References: GSA PBS-P100 and CDC/NIOSH, 

Pub 2002-139

2.19 Are loading docks and receiving 

and shipping areas separated 

in any direction from utility 

rooms, utility mains, and service 

entrances, including electrical, 

telephone/data, fire detection/

alarm systems, fire suppression 

water mains, cooling and heating 

mains, etc.?

2.20 Are mailrooms located away 

from building main entrances, 

areas containing critical services, 

utilities, distribution systems, and 

important assets?

Is the mailroom located near the 

loading dock?

2.21 Does the mailroom have adequate 

space available for equipment 

to examine incoming packages 

and for an explosive disposal 

container?

2.22 Are areas of refuge identified, 

with special consideration given to 

egress?

2.23 Are stairwells required for 

emergency egress located as 

remotely as possible from highrisk areas where blast events 

might occur?

Are stairways maintained with 

positive pressure or are there 

other smoke control systems?
APPENDIX A A-13

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 2 Architectural

2.24 Are enclosures for emergency egress 

hardened to limit the extent of 

debris that might otherwise impede 

safe passage and reduce the flow of 

evacuees? 

Egress pathways should be hardened and discharge into safe 

areas.

Reference: FEMA 386-7

2.25 Do interior barriers differentiate 

level of security within a building?

Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

2.26 Are emergency systems located 

away from high-risk areas?

The intent is to keep the emergency systems out of harm’s way, 

such that one incident does not take out all capability – both 

the regular systems and their backups.

Reference: FEMA 386-7

2.27 Is interior glazing near high-risk 

areas minimized?

Is interior glazing in other areas 

shatter-resistant?

Interior glazing should be minimized where a threat exists and 

should be avoided in enclosures of critical functions next to 

high-risk areas.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.28 Are ceiling and lighting systems 

designed to remain in place during 

hazard events?

When an explosive blast shatters a window, the blast wave 

enters the interior space, putting structural and non-structural 

building components under loads not considered in standard 

building codes. It has been shown that connection criteria for 

these systems in high seismic activity areas resulted in much 

less falling debris that could injure building occupants.

Mount all overhead utilities and other fixtures weighing 14 

kilograms (31 pounds) or more to minimize the likelihood 

that they will fall and injure building occupants. Design 

all equipment mountings to resist forces of 0.5 times 

the equipment weight in any direction and 1.5 times the 

equipment weight in the downward direction. This standard 

does not preclude the need to design equipment mountings for 

forces required by other criteria, such as seismic standards.

Reference: DoD UCF 4-101-01
A-14 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 3 Structural Systems 

3.1 What type of construction?

What type of concrete and 

reinforcing steel?

What type of steel?

What type of foundation?

The type of construction provides an indication of the 

robustness to abnormal loading and load reversals. A 

reinforced concrete moment-resisting frame provides greater 

ductility and redundancy than a flat-slab or flat-plate 

construction. The ductility of steel frame with metal deck 

depends on the connection details and pre-tensioned or posttensioned construction provides little capacity for abnormal 

loading patterns and load reversals. The resistance of loadbearing wall structures varies to a great extent, depending 

on whether the walls are reinforced or un-reinforced. A rapid 

screening process developed by FEMA for assessing structural 

hazards identifies the following types of construction with 

a structural score ranging from 1.0 to 8.5. A higher score 

indicates a greater capacity to sustain load reversals.

Wood buildings of all types - 4.5 to 8.5

Steel moment-resisting frames - 3.5 to 4.5

Braced steel frames - 2.5 to 3.0

Light metal buildings - 5.5 to 6.5

Steel frames with cast-in-place concrete 

shear walls - 3.5 to 4.5

Steel frames with unreinforced masonry 

infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0

Concrete moment-resisting frames - 2.0 to 4.0

Concrete shear wall buildings - 3.0 to 4.0

Concrete frames with unreinforced masonry 

infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0

Tilt-up buildings - 2.0 to 3.5

Precast concrete frame buildings - 1.5 to 2.5

Reinforced masonry - 3.0 to 4.0

Unreinforced masonry - 1.0 to 2.5

References: FEMA 154 and Physical Security Assessment for the 

Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

3.2 Do the reinforced concrete 

structures contain symmetric steel 

reinforcement (positive and negative 

faces) in all floor slabs, roof slabs, 

walls, beams, and girders that may 

be subjected to rebound, uplift, and 

suction pressures?

Reference: GSA PBS-P100
APPENDIX A A-15

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 3 Structural Systems 

Do the lap splices fully develop the 

capacity of the reinforcement?

Are lap splices and other 

discontinuities staggered?

Do the connections possess ductile 

details?

Is special shear reinforcement, 

including ties and stirrups, available 

to allow large post-elastic behavior?

3.3 Are the steel frame connections 

moment connections?

Is the column spacing minimized so 

that reasonably sized members will 

resist the design loads and increase 

the redundancy of the system?

What are the floor-to-floor heights?

A practical upper level for column spacing is generally 30 

feet. Unless there is an overriding architectural requirement, a 

practical limit for floor-to-floor heights is generally less than or 

equal to 16 feet.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.4 Are critical elements vulnerable to 

failure?

The priority for upgrades should be based on the relative 

importance of structural or non-structural elements that are 

essential to mitigating the extent of collapse and minimizing 

injury and damage.

Primary Structural Elements provide the essential parts of the 

building’s resistance to catastrophic blast loads and progressive 

collapse. These include columns, girders, roof beams, and the 

main lateral resistance system.

Secondary Structural Elements consist of all other load-bearing 

members, such as floor beams, slabs, etc.

Primary Non-Structural Elements consist of elements (including 

their attachments) that are essential for life safety systems 

or elements that can cause substantial injury if failure occurs, 

including ceilings or heavy suspended mechanical units.

Secondary Non-Structural Elements consist of all elements not 

covered in primary non-structural elements, such as partitions, 

furniture, and light fixtures.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100
A-16 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 3 Structural Systems 

3.5 Will the structure suffer an 

unacceptable level of damage 

resulting from the postulated threat 

(blast loading or weapon impact)? 

The extent of damage to the structure and exterior wall 

systems from the bomb threat may be related to a protection 

level. The following is for new buildings: 

Level of Protection Below Antiterrorism 

Standards – Severe damage. Frame collapse/massive 

destruction. Little left standing. Doors and windows fail and 

result in lethal hazards. Majority of personnel suffer fatalities.

Very Low Level Protection – Heavy damage. Onset 

of structural collapse. Major deformation of primary and 

secondary structural members, but progressive collapse is 

unlikely. Collapse of non-structural elements. Glazing will 

break and is likely to be propelled into the building, resulting 

in serious glazing fragment injuries, but fragments will be 

reduced. Doors may be propelled into rooms, presenting 

serious hazards. Majority of personnel suffer serious injuries. 

There are likely to be a limited number (10 percent to 25 

percent) of fatalities.

Low Level of Protection – Moderate damage, 

unrepairable. Major deformation of non-structural elements 

and secondary structural members and minor deformation 

of primary structural members, but progressive collapse is 

unlikely. Glazing will break, but fall within 1 meter of the wall 

or otherwise not present a significant fragment hazard. Doors 

may fail, but they will rebound out of their frames, presenting 

minimal hazards. Majority of personnel suffer significant 

injuries. There may be a few (<10 percent) fatalities.

Medium Level Protection – Minor damage, repairable. 

Minor deformations of non-structural elements and secondary 

structural members and no permanent deformation in primary 

structural members. Glazing will break, but will remain in 

the window frame. Doors will stay in frames, but will not be 

reusable. Some minor injuries, but fatalities are unlikely.

High Level Protection – Minimal damage, repairable. No 

permanent deformation of primary and secondary structural 

members or non-structural elements. Glazing will not break. 

Doors will be reusable. Only superficial injuries are likely.

Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01

3.6 Is the structure vulnerable to 

progressive collapse?

Is the building capable of sustaining 

the removal of a column for one 

floor above grade at the building 

perimeter without progressive 

collapse?

In the event of an internal explosion 

in an uncontrolled public ground 

floor area, does the design prevent 

progressive collapse due to the loss of 

one primary column?

Design to mitigate progressive collapse is an independent 

analysis to determine a system’s ability to resist structural 

collapse upon the loss of a major structural element or the 

system’s ability to resist the loss of a major structural element. 

Design to mitigate progressive collapse may be based on the 

methods outlined in ASCE 7-98 (now 7-02). Designers may 

apply static and/or dynamic methods of analysis to meet this 

requirement and ultimate load capacities may be assumed 

in the analyses. Combine structural upgrades for retrofits to 

existing buildings, such as seismic and progressive collapse, 

into a single project due to the economic synergies and other 

cross benefits. Existing facilities may be retrofitted to withstand 

the design level threat or to accept the loss of a column for 

one floor above grade at the building perimeter without 

progressive collapse. Note that collapse of floors or roof must 

not be permitted.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100
APPENDIX A A-17

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 3 Structural Systems 

Do architectural or structural 

features provide a minimum 6-inch 

stand-off to the internal columns 

(primary vertical load carrying 

members)?

Are the columns in the unscreened 

internal spaces designed for an 

unbraced length equal to two floors, 

or three floors where there are two 

levels of parking?

3.7 Are there adequate redundant load 

paths in the structure?

Special consideration should be given to materials that have 

inherent ductility and that are better able to respond to load 

reversals, such as cast in place reinforced concrete, reinforced 

masonry, and steel construction.

Careful detailing is required for material such as pre-stressed 

concrete, pre-cast concrete, and masonry to adequately 

respond to the design loads. Primary vertical load carrying 

members should be protected where parking is inside a facility 

and the building superstructure is supported by the parking 

structure.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.8 Are there transfer girders supported 

by columns within unscreened public 

spaces or at the exterior of the 

building?

Transfer girders allow discontinuities in columns between the 

roof and foundation. This design has inherent difficulty in 

transferring load to redundant paths upon loss of a column or 

the girder. Transfer beams and girders that, if lost, may cause 

progressive collapse are highly discouraged.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.9 What is the grouting and 

reinforcement of masonry (brick 

and/or concrete masonry unit 

(CMU)) exterior walls?

Avoid unreinforced masonry exterior walls. Reinforcement can 

run the range of light to heavy, depending upon the stand-off 

distance available and postulated design threat.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 recommends fully grouted and 

reinforced CMU construction where CMU is selected.
A-18 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 3 Structural Systems 

Reference: DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for 

Buildings states “Unreinforced masonry walls are prohibited 

for the exterior walls of new buildings. A minimum of 0.05 

percent vertical reinforcement with a maximum spacing of 

1200 mm (48 in) will be provided. For existing buildings, 

implement mitigating measures to provide an equivalent level 

of protection.” [This is light reinforcement and based upon the 

recommended stand-off distance for the situation.] 

3.10 Will the loading dock design limit 

damage to adjacent areas and vent 

explosive force to the exterior of the 

building?

Design the floor of the loading dock for blast resistance if the 

area below is occupied or contains critical utilities.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.11 Are mailrooms, where packages are 

received and opened for inspection, 

and unscreened retail spaces 

designed to mitigate the effects of a 

blast on primary vertical or lateral 

bracing members?

Where mailrooms and unscreened retail spaces are located in 

occupied areas or adjacent to critical utilities, walls, ceilings, 

and floors, they should be blast- and fragment- resistant.

Methods to facilitate the venting of explosive forces and 

gases from the interior spaces to the outside of the structure 

may include blow-out panels and window system designs that 

provide protection from blast pressure applied to the outside, 

but that readily fail and vent if exposed to blast pressure on 

the inside.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

4 Building Envelope

4.1 What is the designed or estimated 

protection level of the exterior walls 

against the postulated explosive 

threat?

The performance of the façade varies to a great extent on the 

materials. Different construction includes brick or stone with 

block backup, steel stud walls, precast panels, or curtain wall 

with glass, stone, or metal panel elements.

Shear walls that are essential to the lateral and vertical 

load bearing system and that also function as exterior walls 

should be considered primary structures and should resist the 

actual blast loads predicted from the threats specified. Where 

exterior walls are not designed for the full design loads, special 

consideration should be given to construction types that reduce 

the potential for injury.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100
APPENDIX A A-19

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 4 Building Envelope

4.2 Is there less than a 40 percent 

fenestration opening per structural 

bay?

Is the window system design on 

the exterior façade balanced to 

mitigate the hazardous effects of 

flying glazing following an explosive 

event? (glazing, frames, anchorage 

to supporting walls, etc.)

Do the glazing systems with a 1⁄2-inch 

(3⁄4-inch is better) bite contain an 

application of structural silicone?

Is the glazing laminated or is it 

protected with an anti-shatter 

(fragment retention) film?

If an anti-shatter film is used, is it 

a minimum of a 7-mil thick film, or 

specially manufactured 4-mil thick 

film?

The performance of the glass will similarly depend on the 

materials. Glazing may be single pane or double pane, 

monolithic or laminated, annealed, heat strengthened or fully 

tempered.

The percent fenestration is a balance between protection 

level, cost, the architectural look of the building within 

its surroundings, and building codes. One goal is to keep 

fenestration to below 40 percent of the building envelope 

vertical surface area, but the process must balance differing 

requirements. A blast engineer may prefer no windows; an 

architect may favor window curtain walls; building codes 

require so much fenestration per square footage of floor area; 

fire codes require a prescribed window opening area if the 

window is a designated escape route; and the building owner 

has cost concerns.

Ideally, an owner would want 100 percent of the glazed area 

to provide the design protection level against the postulated 

explosive threat (design basis threat– weapon size at the 

expected stand-off distance). However, economics and 

geometry may allow 80 percent to 90 percent due to the 

statistical differences in the manufacturing process for glass 

or the angle of incidence of the blast wave upon upper story 

windows (4th floor and higher).

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

4.3 Do the walls, anchorage, and 

window framing fully develop the 

capacity of the glazing material 

selected?

Are the walls capable of 

withstanding the dynamic reactions 

from the windows?

Will the anchorage remain attached 

to the walls of the building during an 

explosive event without failure?

Is the façade connected to backup 

block or to the structural frame?

Are non-bearing masonry walls 

reinforced?

Government produced and sponsored computer programs 

coupled with test data and recognized dynamic structural 

analysis techniques may be used to determine whether the 

glazing either survives the specified threats or the post damage 

performance of the glazing protects the occupants. A breakage 

probability no higher than 750 breaks per 1,000 may be used 

when calculating loads to frames and anchorage.

The intent is to ensure the building envelope provides relatively 

equal protection against the postulated explosive threat for 

the walls and window systems for the safety of the occupants, 

especially in rooms with exterior walls.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

4.4 Does the building contain ballistic 

glazing?

Glass-clad polycarbonate or laminated polycarbonate are two 

types of acceptable glazing material.
A-20 APPENDIX A

s

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 4 Building Envelope 

Does the ballistic glazing meet the 

requirements of UL 752 BulletResistant Glazing?

Does the building contain securityglazing?

Does the security-glazing meet the 

requirements of ASTM F1233 or 

UL 972, Burglary Resistant Glazing 

Material?

Do the window assemblies containing 

forced entry resistant glazing 

(excluding the glazing) meet the 

requirements of ASTM F 588?

If windows are upgraded to bullet-resistant, burglar-resistant, 

or forced entry-resistant, ensure that doors, ceilings, and 

floors, as applicable, can resist the same for the areas of 

concern.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

4.5 Do non-window openings, such 

as mechanical vents and exposed 

plenums, provide the same level 

of protection required for the 

exterior wall?

n-filling of blast over-pressures must be considered through 

non-window openings such that structural members and all 

mechanical system mountings and attachments should resist 

these interior fill pressures.

These non-window openings should also be as secure as the 

rest of the building envelope against forced entry.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

 5 Utility Systems

5.1 What is the source of domestic 

water? (utility, municipal, wells, 

lake, river, storage tank)

Is there a secure alternate 

drinking water supply?

Domestic water is critical for continued building operation. 

Although bottled water can satisfy requirements for drinking 

water and minimal sanitation, domestic water meets 

many other needs – flushing toilets, building heating and 

cooling system operation, cooling of emergency generators, 

humidification, etc.

Reference: FEMA 386-7

5.2 Are there multiple entry points for 

the water supply?

If the building or site has only one source of water entering at 

one location, the entry point should be secure.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

5.3 Is the incoming water supply in a 

secure location?

Ensure that only authorized personnel have access to the water 

supply and its components.

Reference: FEMA 386-7

5.4 Does the building or site have storage 

capacity for domestic water?

How many gallons of storage 

capacity are available and how long 

will it allow operations to continue?

Operational facilities will require reliance on adequate domestic 

water supply. Storage capacity can meet short-term needs and 

use water trucks to replenish for extended outages.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities.
APPENDIX A A-21

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 5 Utility Systems

5.5 What is the source of water for the 

fire suppression system? 

(local utility company lines, storage 

tanks with utility company backup, 

lake, or river)

Are there alternate water supplies 

for fire suppression?

The fire suppression system water may be supplied from the 

domestic water or it may have a separate source, separate 

storage, or nonpotable alternate sources.

For a site with multiple buildings, the concern is that the supply 

should be adequate to fight the worst case situation according 

to the fire codes. Recent major construction may change that 

requirement.

Reference: FEMA 386-7

5.6 Is the fire suppression system 

adequate, code-compliant, and 

protected (secure location)?

Standpipes, water supply control valves, and other system 

components should be secure or supervised.

Reference: FEMA 386-7

5.7 Do the sprinkler/standpipe interior 

controls (risers) have fire- and blastresistant separation?

Are the sprinkler and standpipe 

connections adequate and redundant?

Are there fire hydrant and water 

supply connections near the 

sprinkler/standpipe connections?

The incoming fire protection water line should be encased, 

buried, or located 50 feet from high-risk areas. The interior 

mains should be looped and sectionalized.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

5.8 Are there redundant fire water pumps 

(e.g., one electric, one diesel)?

Are the pumps located apart from 

each other?

Collocating fire water pumps puts them at risk for a single 

incident to disable the fire suppression system.

References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

5.9 Are sewer systems accessible?

Are they protected or secured?

Sanitary and stormwater sewers should be protected from 

unauthorized access. The main concerns are backup or flooding 

into the building, causing a health risk, shorting out electrical 

equipment, and loss of building use.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.10 What fuel supplies do the building 

rely upon for critical operation?

Typically, natural gas, propane, or fuel oil are required for 

continued operation.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
A-22 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 5 Utility Systems

5.11 How much fuel is stored on the site 

or at the building and how long 

can this quantity support critical 

operations?

How is it stored?

How is it secured?

Fuel storage protection is essential for continued operation.

Main fuel storage should be located away from loading docks, 

entrances, and parking. Access should be restricted and 

protected (e.g., locks on caps and seals).

References: GSA PBS-P100 and Physical Security Assessment for 

the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.12 Where is the fuel supply obtained?

How is it delivered?

The supply of fuel is dependent on the reliability of the 

supplier.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.13 Are there alternate sources of fuel?

Can alternate fuels be used?

Critical functions may be served by alternate methods if 

normal fuel supply is interrupted.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.14 What is the normal source of 

electrical service for the site or 

building?

Utilities are the general source unless co-generation or a 

private energy provider is available.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.15 Is there a redundant electrical service 

source?

Can the site or buildings be fed from 

more than one utility substation?

The utility may have only one source of power from a single 

substation. There may be only single feeders from the main 

substation.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.16 How many service entry points 

does the site or building have for 

electricity?

Electrical supply at one location creates a vulnerable situation 

unless an alternate source is available.

Ensure disconnecting requirements according to NFPA 70 

(National Fire Protection Association, National Electric Code) 

are met for multiple service entrances.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.17 Is the incoming electric service to the 

building secure?

Typically, the service entrance is a locked room, inaccessible to 

the public.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
APPENDIX A A-23

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

5 Utility Systems

5.18 What provisions for emergency 

power exist? What systems receive 

emergency power and have capacity 

requirements been tested?

Is the emergency power collocated 

with the commercial electric service?

Is there an exterior connection for 

emergency power?

Besides installed generators to supply emergency power, 

portable generators or rental generators available under 

emergency contract can be quickly connected to a building with 

an exterior quick disconnect already installed.

Testing under actual loading and operational conditions ensures 

the critical systems requiring emergency power receive it with a 

high assurance of reliability.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

5.19 By what means do the main 

telephone and data communications 

interface the site or building?

Typically, communication ducts or other conduits are available. 

Overhead service is more identifiable and vulnerable.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.20 Are there multiple or redundant 

locations for the telephone and 

communications service?

Secure locations of communications wiring entry to the site or 

building are required.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.21 Does the fire alarm system require 

communication with external 

sources?

By what method is the alarm signal 

sent to the responding agency: 

telephone, radio, etc.?

Is there an intermediary alarm 

monitoring center?

Typically, the local fire department responds to an alarm that 

sounds at the station or is transmitted over phone lines by an 

auto dialer.

An intermediary control center for fire, security, and/or 

building system alarms may receive the initial notification at 

an on-site or off-site location. This center may then determine 

the necessary response and inform the responding agency.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.22 Are utility lifelines aboveground, 

underground, or direct buried?

Utility lifelines (water, power, communications, etc.) can be 

protected by concealing, burying, or encasing.

References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7
A-24 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 6 Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR)

6.1 Where are the air intakes and 

exhaust louvers for the building? 

(low, high, or midpoint of the 

building structure)

Are the intakes and exhausts 

accessible to the public?

Air intakes should be located on the roof or as high as possible. 

Otherwise secure within CPTED-compliant fencing or enclosure. 

The fencing or enclosure should have a sloped roof to prevent 

the throwing of anything into the enclosure near the intakes.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 states that air intakes should be on 

the fourth floor or higher and, on buildings with three floors or 

less, they should be on the roof or as high as practical. Locating 

intakes high on a wall is preferred over a roof location.

Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 states that, for all new inhabited 

buildings covered by this document, all air intakes should be 

located at least 3 meters (10 feet) above the ground.

Reference: CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 states: “An extension 

height of 12 feet (3.7 m) will place the intake out of reach of 

individuals without some assistance. Also, the entrance to the 

intake should be covered with a sloped metal mesh to reduce 

the threat of objects being tossed into the intake. A minimum 

slope of 45° is generally adequate. Extension height should 

be increased where existing platforms or building features 

(i.e., loading docks, retaining walls) might provide access to the 

outdoor air intakes”.

Reference: LBNL PUB-51959: Exhausts are also a concer n 

during an outdoor release, especially if exhaust fans are not in 

continuous operation, due to wind effects and chimney effects (air 

movement due to differential temperature). 

6.2 Is roof access limited to authorized 

personnel by means of locking 

mechanisms?

Is access to mechanical areas 

similarly controlled?

Roofs are like entrances to the building and are like mechanical 

rooms when HVAC is installed. Adjacent structures or landscaping 

should not allow access to the roof.

References: GSA PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139, and 

LBNL Pub 51959

6.3 Are there multiple air intake 

locations?

Single air intakes may feed several air handling units. Indicate 

if the air intakes are localized or separated. Installing lowleakage dampers is one way to provide the system separation 

when necessary.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

6.4 What are the types of air filtration? 

Include the efficiency and number of 

filter modules for 

MERV – Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value

HEPA – High Efficiency Particulate Air
APPENDIX A A-25

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

6 Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR)

each of the main air handling 

systems?

Is there any collective protection for 

chemical, biological, and radiological 

contamination designed into the 

building?

Activated charcoal for gases

Ultraviolet C for biologicals

Consider mix of approaches for optimum protection and costeffectiveness.

Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

6.5 Is there space for larger filter 

assemblies on critical air handling 

systems?

Air handling units serving critical functions during continued 

operation may be retrofitted to provide enhanced protection 

during emergencies. However, upgraded filtration may have 

negative effects upon the overall air handling system operation, 

such as increased pressure drop.

Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

6.6 Are there μprovisions for air 

monitors or sensors for chemical or 

biological agents?

Duct mounted sensors are usuallly found in limited cases in 

laboratory areas. Sensors generally have a limited spectrum of 

high reliability and are costly. Many different technologies are 

undergoing research to provide capability. 

Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

6.7 By what method are air intakes 

and exhausts closed when not 

operational?

Motorized (low-leakage, fast-acting) dampers are the 

preferred method for closure with fail-safe to the closed 

position so as to support in-place sheltering.

References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.8 How are air handling systems zoned?

What areas and functions do each 

of the primary air handling systems 

serve?

Understanding the critical areas of the building that must 

continue functioning focuses security and hazard mitigation 

measures.

Applying HVAC zones that isolate lobbies, mailrooms, loading 

docks, and other entry and storage areas from the rest of the 

building HVAC zones and maintaining negative pressure within 

these areas will contain CBR releases. Identify common return 

systems that service more than one zone, effectively making a 

large single zone.

Conversely, emergency egress routes should receive positive 

pressurization to ensure contamination does not hinder egress. 

Consider filtering of the pressurization air.

References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.9 Are there large central air handling 

units or are there multiple units 

serving separate zones?

Independent units can continue to operate if damage occurs to 

limited areas of the building.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
A-26 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

6 Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR) 

6.10 Are there any redundancies in the air 

handling system?

Can critical areas be served from 

other units if a major system is 

disabled?

Redundancy reduces the security measures required compared 

to a non-redundant situation.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

6.11 Is the air supply to critical areas 

compartmentalized?

Similarly, are the critical areas or the 

building as a whole, considered tight 

with little or no leakage?

During chemical, biological, and radiological situations, the 

intent is to either keep the contamination localized in the 

critical area or prevent its entry into other critical, non-critical, 

or public areas. Systems can be cross-connected through 

building openings (doorways, ceilings, partial wall), ductwork 

leakage, or pressure differences in air handling system. In 

standard practice, there is almost always some air carried 

between ventilation zones by pressure imbalances, due to 

elevator piston action, chimney effect, and wind effects.

Smoke testing of the air supply to critical areas may be 

necessary.

Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.12 Are supply, return, and exhaust air 

systems for critical areas secure?

Are all supply and return ducts 

completely connected to their grilles 

and registers and secure?

Is the return air not ducted?

The air systems to critical areas should be inaccessible to the 

public, especially if the ductwork runs through the public areas 

of the building. It is also more secure to have a ducted air 

handling system versus sharing hallways and plenums above 

drop ceilings for return air. Non-ducted systems provide greater 

opportunity for introducing contaminants.

Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.13 What is the method of temperature 

and humidity control?

Is it localized or centralized?

Central systems can range from monitoring only to full control. 

Local control may be available to override central operation.

Of greatest concern are systems needed before, during, and 

after an incident that may be unavailable due to temperature 

and humidity exceeding operational limits (e.g., main 

telephone switch room).

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 

Framework 1.1

6.14 Where are the building automation 

control centers and cabinets located?

Access to any component of the building automation and 

control system could compromise the functioning of the system, 

increasing vulnerability to a hazard or precluding their proper 

operation during a hazard incident.
APPENDIX A A-27

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

6 Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR)

Are they in secure areas?

How is the control wiring routed?

The HVAC and exhaust system controls should be in a secure 

area that allows rapid shutdown or other activation based upon 

location and type of attack.

References: FEMA 386-7, DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 

Framework 1.1 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.15 Does the control of air handling 

systems support plans for sheltering 

in place or other protective 

approach?

The micro-meteorological effects of buildings and terrain can 

alter travel and duration of chemical agents and hazardous 

material releases. Shielding in the form of sheltering in place 

can protect people and property from harmful effects.

To support in-place sheltering, the air handling systems require 

the ability for authorized personnel to rapidly turn off all 

systems. However, if the system is properly filtered, then keeping 

the system operating will provide protection as long as the air 

handling system does not distribute an internal release to other 

portions of the building.

Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

6.16 Are there any smoke evacuation 

systems installed?

Does it have purge capability?

For an internal blast, a smoke removal system may be 

essential, particularly in large, open spaces. The equipment 

should be located away from high-risk areas, the system 

controls and wiring should be protected, and it should be 

connected to emergency power. This exhaust capability can be 

built into areas with significant risk on internal events, such as 

lobbies, loading docks, and mailrooms. Consider filtering of the 

exhaust to capture CBR contaminants.

References: GSA PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139, and 

LBNL Pub 51959

6.17 Where is roof-mounted equipment 

located on the roof? (near perimeter, 

at center of roof)

Roof-mounted equipment should be kept away from the 

building perimeter.

Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-853

6.18 Are fire dampers installed at all fire 

barriers?

Are all dampers functional and seal 

well when closed?

All dampers (fire, smoke, outdoor air, return air, bypass) must 

be functional for proper protection within the building during 

an incident.

Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

6.19 Do fire walls and fire doors maintain 

their integrity?

The tightness of the building (both exterior, by weatherization 

to seal cracks around doors and windows, and internal, by zone 

ducting, fire walls, fire stops, and fire doors) provides energy 

conservation benefits and functional benefits during a CBR 

incident.

Reference: LBNL Pub 51959
A-28 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

6 Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR) 

6.20 Do elevators have recall capability 

and elevator emergency message 

capability?

Although a life-safety code and fire response requirement, the 

control of elevators also has benefit during a CBR incident. 

The elevators generate a piston effect, causing pressure 

differentials in the elevator shaft and associated floors that can 

force contamination to flow up or down. 

Reference: LBNL Pub 51959

6.21 Is access to building information 

restricted?

Information on building operations, schematics, procedures, 

plans, and specifications should be strictly controlled and 

available only to authorized personnel.

References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.22 Does the HVAC maintenance staff 

have the proper training, procedures, 

and preventive maintenance 

schedule to ensure CBR equipment is 

functional?

Functional equipment must interface with operational 

procedures in an emergency plan to ensure the equipment is 

properly operated to provide the protection desired.

The HVAC system can be operated in different ways, depending 

upon an external or internal release and where in the building 

an internal release occurs. Thus maintenance and security staff 

must have the training to properly operate the HVAC system 

under different circumstances, even if the procedure is to turn 

off all air movement equipment. 

Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

 7 Plumbing and Gas Systems

7.1 What is the method of water 

distribution?

Central shaft locations for piping are more vulnerable than 

multiple riser locations.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.2 What is the method of gas 

distribution? (heating, cooking, 

medical, process)

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.3 Is there redundancy to the main 

piping distribution?

Looping of piping and use of section valves provide 

redundancies in the event sections of the system are damaged.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
APPENDIX A A-29

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

7 Plumbing and Gas Systems 

7.4 What is the method of heating 

domestic water?

What fuel(s) is used?

Single source of hot water with one fuel source is more 

vulnerable than multiple sources and multiple fuel types. 

Domestic hot water availability is an operational concern for 

many building occupancies.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.5 Where are gas storage tanks 

located? (heating, cooking, medical, 

process)

How are they piped to the 

distribution system? (above or below 

ground)

The concern is that the tanks and piping could be vulnerable to 

a moving vehicle or a bomb blast either directly or by collateral 

damage due to proximity to a higher-risk area.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.6 Are there reserve supplies of critical 

gases?

Localized gas cylinders could be available in the event of 

damage to the central tank system.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

 8 Electrical Systems

8.1 Are there any transformers or 

switchgears located outside the 

building or accessible from the 

building exterior?

Are they vulnerable to public access?

Are they secured?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

8.2 What is the extent of the external 

building lighting in utility and service 

areas and at normal entryways used 

by the building occupants?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

8.3 How are the electrical rooms secured 

and where are they located relative 

to other higher-risk areas, starting 

with the main electrical distribution 

room at the service entrance?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
A-30 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

8 Electrical Systems

8.4 Are critical electrical systems 

collocated with other building 

systems?

Are critical electrical systems located 

in areas outside of secured electrical 

areas?

Is security system wiring located 

separately from electrical and other 

service systems?

Collocation concerns include rooms, ceilings, raceways, 

conduits, panels, and risers.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

8.5 How are electrical distribution panels 

serving branch circuits secured or are 

they in secure locations?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

8.6 Does emergency backup power exist 

for all areas within the building or 

for critical areas only?

How is the emergency power 

distributed?

Is the emergency power system 

independent from the normal 

electrical service, particularly in 

critical areas?

There should be no single critical node that allows both the 

normal electrical service and the emergency backup power to 

be affected by a single incident. Automatic transfer switches 

and interconnecting switchgear are the initial concerns.

Emergency and normal electrical equipment should be installed 

separately, at different locations, and as far apart as possible.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

8.7 How is the primary electrical system 

wiring distributed?

Is it collocated with other major 

utilities?

Is there redundancy of distribution to 

critical areas?

Central utility shafts may be subject to damage, especially if 

there is only one for the building.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
APPENDIX A A-31

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

9 Fire Alarm Systems

9.1 Is the building fire alarm system 

centralized or localized?

How are alarms made known, both 

locally and centrally?

Are critical documents and control 

systems located in a secure yet 

accessible location?

Fire alarm systems must first warn building occupants to 

evacuate for life safety. Then they must inform the responding 

agency to dispatch fire equipment and personnel.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

9.2 Where are the fire alarm panels 

located?

Do they allow access to unauthorized 

personnel?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

9.3 Is the fire alarm system standalone 

or integrated with other functions 

such as security and environmental 

or building management systems?

What is the interface?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

9.4 Do key fire alarm system 

components have fire- and blastresistant separation?

This is especially necessary for the fire command center or fire 

alarm control center. The concern is to similarly protect critical 

components as described in Items 2.19, 5.7, and 10.3.

9.5 Is there redundant off-premises fire 

alarm reporting?

Fire alarms can ring at a fire station, at an intermediary alarm 

monitoring center, or autodial someone else. See Items 5.21 

and 10.5.

 10 Communications and IT Systems

10.1 Where is the main telephone 

distribution room and where is it in 

relation to higher-risk areas?

Is the main telephone distribution 

room secure?

One can expect to find voice, data, signal, and alarm systems 

to be routed through the main telephone distribution room.

Reference: FEMA 386-7
A-32 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

10 Communications and IT Systems

10.2 Does the telephone system have an 

uninterruptible power supply (UPS)?

What is its type, power rating, and 

operational duration under load, and 

location? (battery, on-line, filtered)

Many telephone systems are now computerized and need a 

UPS to ensure reliability during power fluctuations. The UPS is 

also needed to await any emergency power coming on line or 

allow orderly shutdown.

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.3 Where are communication systems 

wiring closets located? (voice, data, 

signal, alarm)

Are they collocated with other 

utilities?

Are they in secure areas?

Concern is to have separation distance from other utilities and 

higher-risk areas to avoid collateral damage.

Security approaches on the closets include door alarms, closed 

circuit television, swipe cards, or other logging notifications to 

ensure only authorized personnel have access to these closets.

Reference: FEMA 386-7

10.4 How is the communications system 

wiring distributed? (secure chases 

and risers, accessible public areas)

The intent is to prevent tampering with the systems.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

10.5 Are there redundant communications 

systems available?

Critical areas should be supplied with multiple or redundant 

means of communications. Power outage phones can provide 

redundancy as they connect directly to the local commercial 

telephone switch off site and not through the building 

telephone switch in the main telephone distribution room.

A base radio communication system with antenna can be installed 

in stairwells, and portable sets distributed to floors.

References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

10.6 Where are the main distribution 

facility, data centers, routers, 

firewalls, and servers located and 

are they secure?

Where are the secondary and/or 

intermediate distribution facilities 

and are they secure?

Concern is collateral damage from manmade hazards and 

redundancy of critical functions.

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.7 What type and where are the Wide 

Area Network (WAN) connections?

Critical facilities should have two Minimum-Points-of-Presence( 

MPOPs) where the telephone company’s outside cable 

terminates inside the building. It is functionally a service 

entrance connection that demarcates where the telephone 

company’s property stops and the building owner’s property 

begins. The MPOPs should not be collocated and they should 

connect to different telephone company central offices so 

that the loss of one cable or central office does not reduce 

capability.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
APPENDIX A A-33

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

10 Communications and IT Systems

10.8 What are the type, power rating, 

and location of the uninterruptible 

power supply? (battery, on-line, filtered)

Are the UPS also connected to 

emergency power?

Consider that UPS should be found at all computerized points 

from the main distribution facility to individual data closets and 

at critical personal computers/terminals.

Critical LAN sections should also be on backup power.

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.9 What type of Local Area Network 

(LAN) cabling and physical topology 

is used? 

(Category (Cat) 5, Gigabit Ethernet, 

Ethernet, Token Ring) 

The physical topology of a network is the way in which the 

cables and computers are connected to each other. The main 

types of physical topologies are:

Bus (single radial where any damage on the bus affects the 

whole system, but especially all portions downstream)

Star (several computes are connected to a hub and many hubs 

can be in the network – the hubs can be critical nodes, but the 

other hubs continue to function if one fails)

Ring (a bus with a continuous connection - least used, but can 

tolerate some damage because if the ring fails at a single point 

it can be rerouted much like a looped electric or water system)

The configuration and the availability of surplus cable or spare 

capacity on individual cables can reduce vulnerability to hazard 

incidents.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

10.10 For installed radio/wireless systems, 

what are their types and where are 

they located?

(radio frequency (RF), high frequency (HF), 

very high frequency (VHF), medium wave 

(MW))

Depending upon the function of the wireless system, it could 

be susceptible to accidental or intended jamming or collateral 

damage.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

10.11 Do the Information Technology 

(IT - computer) systems meet 

requirements of confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability?

Ensure access to terminals and equipment for authorized 

personnel only and ensure system up-time to meet operational 

needs.

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
A-34 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

10 Communications and IT Systems

10.12 Where is the disaster recovery/

mirroring site?

A site with suitable equipment that allows continuation of 

operations or that mirrors (operates in parallel to) the existing 

operation is beneficial if equipment is lost during a natural or 

manmade disaster. The need is based upon the criticality of the 

operation and how quickly replacement equipment can be put 

in place and operated.

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.13 Where is the backup tape/file 

storage site and what is the type of 

safe environment?

(safe, vault, underground)

Is there redundant refrigeration in 

the site?

If equipment is lost, data are most likely lost, too. Backups are 

needed to continue operations at the disaster recovery site or 

when equipment can be delivered and installed.

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.14 Are there any satellite 

communications (SATCOM) links?

(location, power, UPS, emergency power, 

spare capacity/capability)

SATCOM links can serve as redundant communications for voice 

and data if configured to support required capability after a 

hazard incident. 

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.15 Is there a mass notification system 

that reaches all building occupants?

(public address, pager, cell phone, computer 

override, etc.)

Will one or more of these systems be 

operational under hazard conditions? 

(UPS, emergency power) 

Depending upon building size, a mass notification system will 

provide warning and alert information, along with actions to 

take before and after an incident if there is redundancy and 

power.

Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01

10.16 Do control centers and their 

designated alternate locations have 

equivalent or reduced capability for 

voice, data, mass notification, etc.?

(emergency operations, security, fire 

alarms, building automation)

Do the alternate locations also have 

access to backup systems, including 

emergency power?

Reference: GSA PBS-P100
APPENDIX A A-35

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

11 Equipment Operations and Maintenance

11.1 Are there composite drawings 

indicating location and capacities of 

major systems and are they current? 

(electrical, mechanical, and fire protection; 

and date of last update)

Do updated operations and 

maintenance (O&M) manuals exist?

Within critical infrastructure protection at the building level, the 

current configuration and capacity of all critical systems must 

be understood to ensure they meet emergency needs. Manuals 

must also be current to ensure operations and maintenance 

keeps these systems properly functioning. The system must 

function during an emergency unless directly affected by the 

hazard incident.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

11.2 Have critical air systems been 

rebalanced?

If so, when and how often?

Although the system may function, it must be tested 

periodically to ensure it is performing as designed. Balancing is 

also critical after initial construction to set equipment to proper 

performance per the design.

Rebalancing may only occur during renovation.

Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

11.3 Is air pressurization monitored 

regularly?

Some areas require positive or negative pressure to function 

properly. Pressurization is critical in a hazardous environment 

or emergency situation.

Measuring pressure drop across filters is an indication when 

filters should be changed, but also may indicate that low 

pressures are developing downstream and could result in loss 

of expected protection.

Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

11.4 Does the building have a 

policy or procedure for periodic 

recommissioning of major 

Mechanical/Electrical/Plumbing (M/

E/P) systems?

Recommissioning involves testing and balancing of systems to 

ascertain their capability to perform as described.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

11.5 Is there an adequate O&M program, 

including training of facilities 

management staff?

If O&M of critical systems is done with in-house personnel, 

management must know what needs to be done and the 

workforce must have the necessary training to ensure systems 

reliability.

Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

11.6 What maintenance and service 

agreements exist for M/E/P 

systems?

When an in-house facility maintenance work force does not 

exist or does not have the capability to perform the work, 

maintenance and service contracts are the alternative to ensure 

critical systems will work under all conditions. The facility 

management staff requires the same knowledge to oversee 

these contracts as if the work was being done by in-house 

personnel.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
A-36 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 11 Equipment Operations and Maintenance

11.7 Are backup power systems 

periodically tested under load?

Loading should be at or above maximum connected load to 

ensure available capacity and automatic sensors should be 

tested at least once per year.

Periodically (once a year as a minimum) check the duration of 

capacity of backup systems by running them for the expected 

emergency duration or estimating operational duration 

through fuel consumption, water consumption, or voltage loss.

Reference: FEMA 386-7

11.8 Is stairway and exit sign lighting 

operational?

The maintenance program for stairway and exit sign lighting 

(all egress lighting) should ensure functioning under normal 

and emergency power conditions.

Expect building codes to be updated as emergency egress 

lighting is moved from upper walls and over doorways to floor 

level as heat and smoke drive occupants to crawl along the 

floor to get out of the building. Signs and lights mounted high 

have limited or no benefit when obscured.

Reference: FEMA 386-7

 12 Security Systems

Perimeter Systems

12.1 Are black/white or color CCTV 

(closed circuit television) cameras 

used?

Are they monitored and recorded 24 

hours/7 days a week? By whom?

Are they analog or digital by design? 

 

What are the number of fixed, 

wireless, and pan-tilt-zoom cameras 

used?

Who are the manufacturers of the 

CCTV cameras?

What is the age of the CCTV cameras 

in use? 

Security technology is frequently considered to complement or 

supplement security personnel forces and to provide a wider 

area of coverage. Typically, these physical security elements 

provide the first line of defense in deterring, detecting, and 

responding to threats and reducing vulnerabilities. They must 

be viewed as an integral component of the overall security 

program. Their design, engineering, installation, operation, 

and management must be able to meet daily security 

challenges from a cost-effective and efficiency perspective. 

During and after an incident, the system, or its backups, 

should be functional per the planned design.

Consider color CCTV cameras to view and record activity at the 

perimeter of the building, particularly at primary entrances 

and exits. A mix of monochrome cameras should be considered 

for areas that lack adequate illumination for color cameras.

Reference: GSA PBS P-100
APPENDIX A A-37

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 12 Security Systems

12.2 Are the cameras programmed to 

respond automatically to perimeter 

building alarm events?

Do they have built-in video motion 

capabilities?

The efficiency of monitoring multiple screens decreases as the 

number of screens increases. Tying the alarm system or motion 

sensors to a CCTV camera and a monitoring screen improves 

the man-machine interface by drawing attention to a specific 

screen and its associated camera. Adjustment may be required 

after installation due to initial false alarms, usually caused by 

wind or small animals.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.3 What type of camera housings are 

used and are they environmental in 

design to protect against exposure to 

heat and cold weather elements?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.4 Are panic/duress alarm buttons 

or sensors used, where are they 

located, and are they hardwired or 

portable?

Call buttons should be provided at key public contact areas and 

as needed in offices of managers and directors, in garages and 

parking lots, and other high-risk locations by assessment.

Reference: GSA PBS P-100

12.5 Are intercom call boxes used in 

parking areas or along the building 

perimeter?

See Item 12.4.

12.6 What is the transmission media used 

to transmit camera video signals: 

fiber, wire line, telephone wire, 

coaxial, wireless? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.7 Who monitors the CCTV system? Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
A-38 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 12 Security Systems

12.8 What is the quality of video images 

both during the day and hours of 

darkness?

Are infrared camera illuminators 

used? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.9 Are the perimeter cameras supported 

by an uninterruptible power supply, 

battery, or building emergency 

power?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.10 What type of exterior Intrusion 

Detection System (IDS) sensors are 

used? (electromagnetic; fiber optic; active 

infrared; bistatic microwave; seismic; 

photoelectric; ground; fence; glass break 

(vibration/shock); single, double, and rollup door magnetic contacts or switches)

Consider balanced magnetic contact switch sets for all exterior 

doors, including overhead/roll-up doors, and review roof 

intrusion detection.

Consider glass break sensors for windows up to scalable 

heights.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

12.11 Is a global positioning system (GPS) 

used to monitor vehicles and asset 

movements?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

 Interior Security

12.12 Are black/white or color CCTV 

cameras used?

Are they monitored and recorded 24 

hours/7 days a week? By whom?

Are they analog or digital by design?

What are the number of fixed, 

wireless, and pan-tilt-zoom cameras 

used?

Who are the manufacturers of the 

CCTV cameras?

What is the age of the CCTV cameras 

in use? 

See Item 12.1.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
APPENDIX A A-39

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 12 Security Systems

12.13 Are the cameras programmed to 

respond automatically to interior 

building alarm events?

Do they have built-in video motion 

capabilities?

The efficiency of monitoring multiple screens decreases as the 

number of screens increases. Tying the alarm system or motion 

sensors to a CCTV camera and a monitoring screen improves 

the man-machine interface by drawing attention to a specific 

screen and its associated camera.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.14 What type of camera housings 

are used and are they designed 

to protect against exposure or 

tampering?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.15 Do the camera lenses used have 

the proper specifications, especially 

distance viewing and clarity?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.16 What is the transmission media used 

to transmit camera video signals: 

fiber, wire line, telephone wire, 

coaxial, wireless?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.17 Are the interior camera video images 

of good visual and recording quality?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.18 Are the interior cameras supported 

by an uninterruptible power 

supply source, battery, or building 

emergency power? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.19 What are the first costs and 

maintenance costs associated with 

the interior cameras?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.20 What type of security access control 

system is used?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
A-40 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 12 Security Systems

Are the devices used for physical 

security also used (integrated) with 

security computer networks (e.g., in 

place of or in combination with user 

ID and system passwords)?

12.21 What type of access control 

transmission media is used to 

transmit access control system 

signals (same as defined for CCTV 

cameras)?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.22 What is the backup power supply 

source for the access control 

systems? (battery, uninterruptible power 

supply) 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.23 What access control system 

equipment is used?

How old are the systems and what 

are the related first and maintenance 

service costs? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.24 Are panic/duress alarm sensors 

used?

Where are they located?

Are they hardwired or portable?

Call buttons should be provided at key public contact areas and 

as needed in offices of managers and directors, in garages and 

parking lots, and other high-risk locations by assessment.

Reference: GSA PBS P-100

12.25 Are intercom call-boxes or a building 

intercom system used throughout the 

building?

See Item 12.24.

12.26 Are magnetometers (metal detectors) 

and x-ray equipment used? 

At what locations within the 

building?

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
APPENDIX A A-41

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 12 Security Systems

12.27 What type of interior IDS sensors are 

used: electromagnetic; fiber optic; 

active infrared-motion detector; 

photoelectric; glass break (vibration/

shock); single, double, and roll-up 

door magnetic contacts or switches?

Consider magnetic reed switches for interior doors and 

openings.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

12.28 Are mechanical, electrical, gas, power 

supply, radiological material storage, 

voice/data telecommunication system 

nodes, security system panels, 

elevator and critical system panels, 

and other sensitive rooms continuously 

locked, under electronic security, CCTV 

camera, and intrusion alarm systems 

surveillance?

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

12.29 What types of locking hardware are 

used throughout the building?

Are manual and electromagnetic 

cipher, keypad, pushbutton, panic 

bar, door strikes, and related 

hardware and software used?

As a minimum, electric utility closets, mechanical rooms, and 

telephone closets should be secured.

The mailroom should also be secured, allowing only authorized 

personnel into the area where mail is screened and sorted. 

Separate the public access area from the screening area for the 

postulated mailroom threats.

All security locking arrangements on doors used for egress 

must comply with NFPA 101, Life Safety Code.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

12.30 Are any potentially hazardous 

chemicals, combustible, or toxic 

materials stored on site in non-secure 

and non-monitored areas? 

The storage, use, and handling locations should also be kept 

away from other activities. 

The concern is that an intruder need not bring the material into 

the building if it is already there and accessible.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.31 What security controls are in place 

to handle the processing of mail and 

protect against potential biological, 

explosive, or other threatening 

exposures?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
A-42 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 12 Security Systems

12.32 Is there a designated security control 

room and console in place to monitor 

security, fire alarm, and other 

building systems?

Is there a backup control center 

designated and equipped?

Is there off-site 24-hour monitoring 

of intrusion detection systems?

Monitoring can be done at an off-site facility, at an on-site 

monitoring center during normal duty hours, or at a 24-hour 

on-site monitoring center.

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

12.33 Is the security console and control 

room adequate in size and does it 

provide room for expansion?

Does it have adequate environment 

controls (e.g., a/c, lighting, heating, 

air circulation, backup power)?

Is it ergonomically designed?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.34 Is the location of the security 

room in a secure area with limited, 

controlled, and restricted access 

controls in place?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.35 What are the means by which 

facility and security personnel can 

communicate with one another (e.g., 

portable radio, pager, cell phone, 

personal data assistants (PDAs))?

What problems have been 

experienced with these and other 

electronic security systems?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.36 Is there a computerized security 

incident reporting system used to 

prepare reports and track security 

incident trends and patterns?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.37 Does the current security force 

have access to a computerized guard 

tour system? 

This system allows for the systematic performance of guard 

patrols with validation indicators built in. The system notes 

stations/locations checked or missed, dates and times of such 

patrols, and who conducted them on what shifts. Management 

reports can be produced for recordkeeping and manpower 

analysis purposes.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
APPENDIX A A-43

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 12 Security Systems

12.38 Are vaults or safes in the building?

Where are they located?

Basic structural design requires an understanding of where 

heavy concentrations of floor loading may occur so as to 

strengthen the floor and structural framing to handle this 

downward load. Security design also needs this information 

to analyze how this concentrated load affects upward and 

downward loadings under blast conditions and its impact upon 

progressive collapse. Location is important because safes can 

be moved by blast so that they should be located away from 

people and away from exterior windows.

Vaults, on the other hand, require construction above the 

building requirements with thick masonry walls and steel 

reinforcement. A vault can provide protection in many 

instances due to its robust construction.

Safes and vaults may also require security sensors and 

equipment, depending upon the level of protection and 

defensive layers needed.

Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-85

Security System Documents

12.39 Have security system as-built 

drawings been generated and are 

they ready for review? 

Drawings are critical to the consideration and operation 

of security technologies, including its overall design and 

engineering processes. These historical reference documents 

outline system specifications and layout security devices used, 

as well as their application, location, and connectivity. They are 

a critical resource tool for troubleshooting system problems, 

and replacing and adding other security system hardware and 

software products. Such documents are an integral component 

to new and retrofit construction projects.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.40 Have security system design and 

drawing standards been developed?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.41 Are security equipment selection 

criteria defined? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
A-44 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 12 Security Systems

12.42 What contingency plans have 

been developed or are in place to 

deal with security control center 

redundancy and backup operations?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.43 Have security system construction 

specification documents been 

prepared and standardized?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.44 Do all security system documents 

include current as-built drawings?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.45 Have qualifications been determined 

for security consultants, system 

designers/engineers, installation 

vendors, and contractors? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.46 Are security systems decentralized, 

centralized, or integrated?

Do they operate over an existing IT 

network or are they a standalone 

method of operation? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.47 What security systems manuals are 

available?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.48 What maintenance or service 

agreements exist for security 

systems?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
APPENDIX A A-45

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

 13 Security Master Plan

13.1 Does a written security plan exist for 

this site or building?

When was the initial security plan 

written and last revised?

Who is responsible for preparing and 

reviewing the security plan?

The development and implementation of a security master 

plan provides a roadmap that outlines the strategic direction 

and vision, operational, managerial, and technological mission, 

goals, and objectives of the organization’s security program.

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 

Framework 1.1

13.2 Has the security plan been 

communicated and disseminated 

to key management personnel and 

departments?

The security plan should be part of the building design so that 

the construction or renovation of the structure integrates with 

the security procedures to be used during daily operations.

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.3 Has the security plan been 

benchmarked or compared against 

related organizations and operational 

entities?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.4 Has the security plan ever been 

tested and evaluated from a benefit/

cost and operational efficiency and 

effectiveness perspective?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.5 Does the security plan define 

mission, vision, and short- and longterm security program goals and 

objectives?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.6 Are threats/hazards, vulnerabilities, 

and risks adequately defined 

and security countermeasures 

addressed and prioritized relevant 

to their criticality and probability of 

occurrence?

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 

Framework 1.1

13.7 Has a security implementation 

schedule been established to address 

recommended security solutions?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
A-46 APPENDIX A

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

13 Security Master Plan

13.8 Have security operating and capital 

budgets been addressed, approved, 

and established to support the plan?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.9 What regulatory or industry 

guidelines/standards were followed 

in the preparation of the security 

plan?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.10 Does the security plan address 

existing security conditions from 

an administrative, operational, 

managerial, and technical security 

systems perspective?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.11 Does the security plan address 

the protection of people, property, 

assets, and information?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.12 Does the security plan address the 

following major components: access 

control, surveillance, response, 

building hardening, and protection 

against CBR and cyber-network 

attacks?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.13 Has the level of risk been identified 

and communicated in the security 

plan through the performance of a 

physical security assessment?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.14 When was the last security 

assessment performed?

Who performed the security risk 

assessment?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Facilities
APPENDIX A A-47

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations

13 Security Master Plan

13.15 Are the following areas of security 

analysis addressed in the security 

master plan? 

Asset Analysis: Does the security plan 

identify and prioritize the assets to be 

protected in accordance to their location, 

control, current value, and replacement 

value?

Threat Analysis: Does the security 

plan address potential threats; causes of 

potential harm in the form of death, injury, 

destruction, disclosure, interruption of 

operations, or denial of services?

(possible criminal acts [documented and 

review of police/security incident reports] 

associated with forced entry, bombs, 

ballistic assault, biochemical and related 

terrorist tactics, attacks against utility 

systems infrastructure and buildings)

Vulnerability Analysis: Does the 

security plan address other areas associated 

with the site or building and its operations 

that can be taken advantage of to carry out 

a threat?

(architectural design and construction of 

new and existing buildings, technological 

support systems [e.g., heating, air 

conditioning, power, lighting and security 

systems, etc.] and operational procedures, 

policies, and controls)

Risk Analysis: Does the security plan 

address the findings from the asset, threat/

hazard, and vulnerability analyses in order 

to develop, recommend, and consider 

implementation of appropriate security 

countermeasures?

This process is the input to the building design and what 

mitigation measures will be included in the facility project to 

reduce risk and increase safety of the building and people.

Reference: USA TM 5-853, Security Engineering
A-48 APPENDIX A

*Sources: 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(CDC/NIOSH)

Publication No. 2002-139, Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or 

Radiological Attacks, May 2002

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

FEMA 154, Rapid Visual Screening of Buildings for Seismic Hazards: A Handbook, 1988 (also, Applied Technology Council 

(ATC-21) by same name)

FEMA 386-7, Integrating Human-Caused Hazards Into Mitigation Planning, September 2002

SLG 101, Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning, Chapter 6, Attachment G, Terrorism, April 2001

General Services Administration (GSA)

PBS – P100, Facilities Standards for Public Buildings Service, 

November 2002

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL)

LBNL PUB-51959, Protecting Buildings from a Biological or Chemical Attack: Actions to Take Before or During a Release, 

January 10, 2003

U.S. Air Force (USAF)

Installation Force Protection Guide, 1997

U.S. Army (USA)

Technical Manuals (TM) 5-853-1/-2/-3/-4, Security Engineering, May 12, 1994

U.S. Department of Commerce, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (DOC CIAO)

Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1, October 1998

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)

Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC), UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, July 31, 2002

U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)

National Criminal Justice (NCJ) NCJ181200, Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program, 

Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit, May 15, 2000

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)

Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities, Recommendations of the National Institute 

of Building Sciences Task Group to the Department of Veterans Affairs, 6 September 2002
APPENDIX B1: RISK ASSESSMENT DATABASE

APPENDIX B1 B-1

ASSESSOR’S USER GUIDE*

Introduction ...................................................................................................................B-3

Before the Assessment: Getting Ready to Use the Assessors’ Version of the Risk AssessmenDatabase .....................................................................................................................B-4

Main Menu ...................................................................................................................B-5

Assessment Team .............................................................................................B-6

Points of Contact ..............................................................................................B-7

GIS Portfolio .....................................................................................................B-8

Miscellaneous Files ..........................................................................................B-9

Critical Functions Matrix ................................................................................................B-10

Critical Functions Rollup ................................................................................B-11

Critical Infrastructure Matrix .........................................................................................B-12

Critical Infrastructure Rollup .........................................................................B-13

Observations and Recommendations/Remediations for the Vulnerability Assessment 

Checklist Sections .........................................................................................................B-14

Select File ....................................................................................................................B-15

Importing Data from Other Databases ...........................................................................B-16

Importing Observation and Recommendation/Remediation Data .............B-16

Observation Details from the REMOTE Database .....................................B-17

Importing Vulnerability and Recommendation/Remediation Data .............B-18 

Assessment Vulnerabilities from the REMOTE Database ............................B-19

Assessment Main Page .................................................................................................B-20

Executive Summary .........................................................................................B-20

Vulnerabilities .................................................................................................B-21

Remediations ......................................................................................B-22

After the Assessment: Giving Data to the Database Administrator ..................................B-23 

*© National Institute of Building Sciences 2004
B-2 APPENDIX B1

Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this 

publication and application do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. 

Additionally, neither FEMA or any of its employees makes any warrantee, 

expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the 

accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, product, or process 

included in this publication and application. Users of information from this 

publication and application assume all liability arising from such use.
APPENDIX B1 B-3

INTRODUCTION

To support the building assessment process, this easy to use Risk Assessment 

Database application is provided with FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To 

Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. The Risk Assessment Database is a standalone application that is both a collection tool and 

a management tool. Assessors can use the tool to assist in the systematic collection, storage, and reporting of assessment data. It has functions, folders, 

and displays to import and display threat matrices, digital photos, cost data, 

emergency plans, and certain Geographic Information System (GIS) products 

as part of the record of assessment. Managers can use the application to store, 

search, and analyze data collected from multiple assessments. 

The Risk Assessment Database is initially installed on a desktop computer at 

an organization’s headquarters. This database, referred to in this User Guide 

as the Manager’s Database, becomes the main access and storage point for 

future assessment data. When an organization wants to conduct an assessment of a site or series of sites, a database administrator uses the application 

to produce a small temporary database, called the Assessor’s Database, on a 

CD. Into this Assessor’s Database are placed references, site plans, GIS portfolios, and other site-specific data that are known about the assessment site 

or are developed during the pre-assessment phase. This Assessor’s Database 

is given to the Assessment Team and is loaded on one or more of their assessment computers (usually laptop computers). The Assessment Team then 

conducts their assessment and records information in the Assessor’s Database. 

At the end of the assessment, the Assessment Team combines their data into 

one database and passes the files back to the database administrator. The administrator then loads the data into the Manager’s Database for printing and 

analysis. 

After initially installing the application, access to that Risk Assessment 

Database becomes restricted to only those designated users who have been assigned permission to access to the database by their administrator. Also, data 

can be viewed by all authorized users of the database, but changes to the data 

can only be made by those granted permission. All access permission questions should be directed to the database administrator of your organization. 

The following are the hardware and software requirements for the Risk Assessment Database:

 Pentium® 4 or equivalent processor 

 Windows XP 

 MS Access® 2002

 256 MB of RAM recommended for all components
B-4 APPENDIX B1

BEFORE THE ASSESSMENT: GETTING READY TO USE 

THE ASSESSOR’S VERSION OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT 

DATABASE

From your database administrator, the user should receive a folder named 

FEMA_452dB_Assessor containing the database application (3 files), assessment site(s) folder(s), which contain the folders,

and an application shortcut with the icon or .

❍ The FEMA_452dB_Assessor folder must be copied to the C:\ drive; the 

database application is dependent on the folder being downloaded to this 

location on the computer.

❍ The application shortcut should be copied to the desktop.

❍ When the user double clicks the application shortcut, the user receives a 

logon prompt:

❍ The user should log on using the user name and password provided by 

the database administrator.

❍ After logging in, the user will get the Main Menu for Assessors.
APPENDIX B1 B-5

MAIN MENU

1. This is a drop down list of assessment sites. An assessment site must be 

selected before any of the other buttons can be used. 

2. The Site Information button opens the Site Information report. This is 

not filled out by the on-site Assessor; it is usually completed during the 

assessment preparation period. If not pre-loaded, information can be 

collected and turned in to the Manager for inclusion after the on-site visit.

3. The Strategic Site Plan button opens the Strategic Site Plan in Microsoft 

Excel, if it is available. This is not filled out by the on-site Assessor; it is 

usually completed during the assessment preparation period. If not preloaded, information can be collected and turned in to the Manager for 

inclusion after the on-site visit.

4. The Site Assessment Team button opens the Assessment Main Page to 

the tab with information for the team that performed the assessment 

(Assessment Team). 

5. The Site Points of Contact button opens the Assessment Main Page to the 

tab with the contact information for the assessment site points of contact 

(Points of Contact). 

6. The Critical Function Matrix button opens the Critical Functions Matrix
B-6 APPENDIX B1

form, and the Critical Infrastructures Matrix button opens the Critical 

Infrastructures Matrix form.

7. The Vulnerability Assessment Checklist buttons open a form that allows 

the user to input observations, recommendations/remediations, and 

vulnerability categorizations to the database for each checklist section. 

(Observations and Recommendations/Remediations for Vulnerability 

Assessment Checklist Questions).

8. The Site Executive Summary button opens the Assessment Main Page to the 

tab with the Executive Summary.

9. The Site Vulnerabilities button opens the Assessment Main Page to the tab 

with the Vulnerabilities for that assessment.

10. The Import Checklist button opens the Select File screen, which allows 

the main user to connect to another user’s data for import.

Assessment Team

This form allows the user to enter information about Assessment Team members.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The Add New Team Member button allows for the creation of a new 

Assessment Team member for the assessment site designated in the upper 

left portion of this form. 
APPENDIX B1 B-7

Points of Contact

This form allows the user to enter information about points of contact (POC) 

at the assessment site.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected. 

2. The Add New POC button allows for the creation of a new contact for the 

assessment site designated in the upper left portion of this form. 

3. The Delete POC button allows the removal of the selected contact from 

the database.

4. The Add New POC and Duplicate button allows the creation of a new 

contact and duplicates the information in light blue in order to minimize 

data entry efforts.
B-8 APPENDIX B1

GIS Portfolio

This form enables the user to see GIS images associated with the assessment 

site if developed during the pre-assessment period. These images are not 

entered by the on-site Assessor; the form is usually completed during the assessment preparation period. If not pre-loaded, information can be collected 

and turned in to the Manager for inclusion after the on-site visit.

1. The Load GIS button loads GIS images to the designated frames.

2. The 2 arrow button allows for navigation through pages of 5 GIS images, 

either to the previous 5 images or to the next 5 images.

3. Clicking on any of the GIS images will open the image in the Photo Zoom

window, which displays the image larger, and the image can be printed 

individually in this window.
APPENDIX B1 B-9

Miscellaneous Files

This form enables the user to see if files related to the assessment are available to view. (If developed during the pre-assessment period.) These images 

are not entered by the on-site Assessor; they are usually completed during 

the assessment preparation period. If not pre-loaded, information can be collected and turned in to the Manager for inclusion after the on-site visit.

The form displays a list of the files available and allows the user to open and 

view the files.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. Double-clicking any of the file names will open the associated file 

(examples of possible files to pre-load for the assessors include references, 

a GIS portfolio in PDF format, and/or past assessment reports). 

3. The File Description field allows for descriptions to be typed in about each 

of the file names in the record.
B-10 APPENDIX B1

CRITICAL FUNCTIONS MATRIX

This form records and numerically displays the results of analysis performed 

during the assessment. The matrix lists Critical Functions down the left side 

and threats across the top to create Threat-pairs. For each Threat-pair, a 

numeric value, on a 1-10 scale, is recorded for a threat rating, an asset value 

rating, and a vulnerability rating. The methodology for determining the ratings is found in FEMA 452. 

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The Rollup button opens a window that summarizes all of the risk columns 

into one easy to read form called Critical Functions Rollup.

3. These fields are where values (1-10) are typed in for each of the Threatpairs. The Risk Column is automatically generated and color coded. 
APPENDIX B1 B-11

Critical Functions Rollup 

This form displays a summary of the final numeric risk value of each Threatpair in the Critical Functions Matrix.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
B-12 APPENDIX B1

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE MATRIX

This form records and numerically displays the results of analysis performed 

during the assessment. The matrix lists Critical Infrastructure down the left 

side and threats across the top to create Threat-pairs. For each Threat-pair, a 

numeric value, on a 1-10 scale, is recorded for a threat rating, an asset value 

rating, and a vulnerability rating. The methodology for determining the ratings is found in FEMA 452. 

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The Rollup button opens a window that summarizes all of the risk columns 

into one easy to read called Critical Infrastructure Rollup.

3. These fields are where values (1-10) are typed in for each of the threats to 

a critical infrastructure.
APPENDIX B1 B-13

Critical Infrastructure Rollup

This form is used to view the risk of threats for the specified critical infrastructure.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
B-14 APPENDIX B1

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS/

REMEDIATIONS FOR THE VULNERABILITY 

ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST SECTIONS

This form allows the user to enter observations and recommendations/remediations for each of the vulnerability assessment checklist questions.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. These fields are where observations and recommendations/remediations 

are entered by the user.

3. This checkbox is selected if the observation is a vulnerability; the 

observations and recommendations/remediations are copied to the 

Vulnerabilities page. 
APPENDIX B1 B-15

SELECT FILE 

If assessment data are collected and recorded on more than one computer, 

this form allows the “main user” to connect to another user’s database, and 

import the other user’s data. Note: the threat matrices cannot be imported, 

so it is important for the “main user” to have the threat matrices data in their 

database. 

1. The Browse button allows the user to search for and select another 

database to connect to. (Note: The database to connect to will have 

“Data” in its name, not “Application.”)

2. The Import button allows the user to connect the database selected in 1.

Once a connection is made, this window will pop up. Simply click the OK

button to make the data available for viewing or copying.
B-16 APPENDIX B1

IMPORTING DATA FROM OTHER DATABASES

After a database connection has been made (see Select File), the user can 

start importing another user’s data.

Importing Observation and Recommendation/

Remediation Data

Once connected to another database, the Main Menu screen will appear the 

same. Clicking on any of the Vulnerability Assessment Checklist buttons will 

supply this window with a new Open Remote Data button added to the screen.

1. The Open Remote Data button will make the additional data available and 

open the Observation Details from REMOTE Database screen.
APPENDIX B1 B-17

Observation Details from the REMOTE Database

This form displays the remote data and allows the Main User to choose which 

data to import. 

1. This checkbox allows the user to select individual records to be imported.

2. The Select All button selects all of the records. 

3. These checkboxes are options for copying another user’s data. The Copy 

and OVERWRITE checkbox will overwrite the data in the user’s database; 

the Copy and APPEND checkbox will add the other user’s data to the data 

existing in the user’s database.

4. The Update Local Copy button is the final step and copies the data into the 

main user’s database
B-18 APPENDIX B1

Importing Vulnerability and Recommendation/

Remediation Data

Once connected to another database, the Main Menu screen will appear the 

same. Clicking on the Site Vulnerabilities button will supply this window with a 

new Open Remote Data button added to the screen.

1. The Open Remote Data button will make the additional data available and 

open the Observation Details from REMOTE Database screen.
APPENDIX B1 B-19

Assessment Vulnerabilities from the REMOTE Database

This form displays the remote data and allows the main user to choose which 

data to import.

1. This checkbox allows the user to select individual records to be imported.

2. The Select All button selects all the records. 

3. The Update Local Copy button is the final step and copies the data into the 

main user’s database.
B-20 APPENDIX B1

ASSESSMENT MAIN PAGE

Executive Summary

This form allows the user to enter an Executive Summary for the assessment 

site report. 

1. The first tab is the Executive Summary input form for the site selected in 

the drop down list on the Main Menu. 

2. This information is the first three paragraphs of the final assessment 

report and usually contains broad over arching information. Individual 

details are usually listed later in the vulnerability section of the report. 

3. The page also allows users to navigate to other forms in the database 

without having to return to the main screen as follows:
APPENDIX B1 B-21

Vulnerabilities

This form allows the user to enter additional information on the vulnerabilities and recommendations/remediations observed while performing 

the assessment. The form is linked to the Observations and Recommendation/Remediation form. Observations that were previously identified and 

“checked” as a vulnerability are automatically loaded into this form. These 

vulnerabilities should now be furthered analyzed and assigned a priority, a location, and a remediation cost estimate. (Note: Priority and Building Number 

are required.) 

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The Project Status/Cost button opens the Remediations form.
B-22 APPENDIX B1

Remediations

This form allows the user to enter any remediation information related to an 

observed vulnerability, including date, cost, and comments.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. This date field can be filled in by the user to keep the remediation cost 

records up to date.

3. Enter the cost for the remediation into this field to keep the remediation 

records up to date.

4. Enter any comments for the remediation in this field.
APPENDIX B1 B-23

AFTER THE ASSESSMENT: GIVING DATA TO THE 

DATABASE ADMINISTRATOR

All of the assessment data should be in one database, the “main user’s.”

1. Once the database is complete, make sure all of the files are in the 

proper folder locations for each of the assessment site folders in the 

FEMA_452dB_Assessor folder. (Photos in the Photos folder, digital floor 

plans (such as CADD) in the Site_and_Floorplans folder, and emergency 

management plans in the Emergency_Plans folder.)

2. Provide the database administrator with a database file containing the 

word “Data,” the Photos folder, the Site_and_Floorplans folder, and the 

Emergency_Plans folder. 

APPENDIX B2: RISK ASSESSMENT DATABASE

APPENDIX B2 B-1

DATABASE ADMINISTRATOR’S USER GUIDE*

Microsoft Access Experience ............................................................................................B-3

Before Using the Database ..............................................................................................B-3 

Database Specifics .................................................................................B-3

Files to be Integrated into the Database – Assessment Supporting Materials .........................................................................................................B-4

Beginning to Use the Database ........................................................................................B-5

Security ..................................................................................................B-6

Administrative Functions .................................................................................................B-7

Load ‘Miscellaneous’ Files ....................................................................B-8

Assessment Locations ............................................................................B-9

Loading Photos and GIS Images .....................................................................................B-10

Assessor’s Database .....................................................................................................B-12

Creating an Assessor Database ............................................................B-12

Preparation: Assessment Supporting Information .............................B-12

Working in the Front End .............................................................B-13

Working in the Back End .............................................................B-14

Providing an Assessor with the Database Application .......................B-15

Importing the Assessor Data into the Main Database .......................B-15

Linked Table Manager ...................................................................................................B-16

*© National Institute Of Building Sciences 2004
B-2 APPENDIX B2

Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this 

publication and application do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. 

Additionally, neither FEMA or any of its employees makes any warrantee, 

expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the 

accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, product, or process 

included in this publication and application. Users of information from this 

publication and application assume all liability arising from such use.
APPENDIX B2 B-3

MICROSOFT ACCESS EXPERIENCE

It is highly recommended that the database administrator is an intermediate 

to advanced Microsoft Access user. 

For up to date information about Microsoft Access, the software webpage is: 

http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/FX010857911033.aspx.

BEFORE USING THE DATABASE 

Database Specifics

The database application is composed of various files, including a Microsoft 

Access front end database (FEMA452_Application_v1.mde), a back end database (FEMA452_Data.mde), a workgroup file (FEMA452wg.mdw), a shortcut 

to the database (FEMA 452 Database), a shortcut to the back end of the database (Master Data), a Microsoft Word Document (FEMA452dB_UserGuide.

doc), and a Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet (ThreatMatrix.xls) for the Master 

Database. An assessor database front end and front end shortcut are provided (FEMA452db_App_Assessor_v1.mde and FEMA 452 Assessor Database,

respectively). Also, a short cut to the workgroup file (Workgroup), to change 

passwords and add users is provided.

The following are the hardware and software requirements for the Risk Assessment Database:

 Pentium® 4 or equivalent processor 

 Windows XP 

 MS Access® 2002

 256 MB of RAM recommended for all components
B-4 APPENDIX B2

The database application files are set to run on the C: drive, in the FEMA_

452dB folder. Similarly, the assessor database is set to run on the C: drive, 

in the FEMA_45dB_Assessor folder. The database applications have a specific file structure that has to be adhered to for the database to function 

properly, regardless of location on the computer. 

Note: AssessmentSite1 and AssessmentSite2 are just example folders, and 

these will be replaced by assessment site folders created by the database administrator.

Files to be Integrated into the Database – 

Assessment Supporting Materials

Assessment support materials that can be integrated into this database include:

❍ Emergency plans,

❍ GIS materials – an Adobe PDF format portfolio, high and low 

resolution images (both high and low resolution images MUST have 

the same name, but with the low resolution image ending in “_lr”),
APPENDIX B2 B-5

❍ Photos,

❍ Site plans and floor plans (CAD, Image), and

❍ Strategic site plan (Microsoft Excel spreadsheet).

All of these materials MUST be placed in the correct folders for the database 

application to be able to utilize them properly. See the following table for supporting material placement:

All of these folders need to be utilized in the created Assessment Site folder, 

which is named while creating a new assessment location.

BEGINNING TO USE THE DATABASE

During Installation, a shortcut was placed on the desktop, “FEMA 452 

Database.” Double click the shortcut, and log on with the username “Administrator,” with password administrator. 

The Main Menu will open:

Supporting Material

Emergency plans - any format

GIS materials - PDF

GIS materials - high resolution jpegs

GIS materials - low resolution jpegs

Photos - jpegs

Site plans and floor plans (CAD, Image) - any format

Strategic site plan - Microsoft Excel spreadsheet

Folder

Emergency_Plans

GIS_Portfolio

High_Res

Low_Res

Photos

Site_Plans_and_Floorplans

Strategic_Site_Plan
B-6 APPENDIX B2

Security

Three user groups have been created, Admins, Full Data Users, and Read 

Only Users. Be sure to assign “Administrator” a different password after initial 

logon.

Admins has full access to the database. The Administrative Functions button will 

only be visible for users in the Administrator group. Two users have been created in this group, Administrator and Assessor. Both have initial passwords of 

“Administrator” and “Assessor,” respectively.

Full Data Users can view and update data. The created user “Editor” has an 

initial password of “Editor.”

Reader can only view data. The created user “Reader” has an initial password 

of “Reader.”

Add users as necessary using the Workgroup short cut provided.
APPENDIX B2 B-7

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

From the Main Menu, click the Administrative Functions button, and the Administrative Functions Menu will open: 
B-8 APPENDIX B2

Load ‘Miscellaneous’ Files

This form allows the administrator to load files, including the GIS Portfolio 

PDF, emergency plans, and site plans/floor plans, so database users can access these files. These files must be in the correct location. See Assessment 

Supporting Materials.
APPENDIX B2 B-9

Assessment Locations

This form is where the database administrator can add new assessment locations and add questions and matrices to each of the assessment locations.

1. The New Assessment Location button opens a form for the input of a new 

assessment location.

2. The New Assessment for: (Organization Name) button opens a form 

Assessment Information:

This form must be completed to create a new assessment. It is important to 

enter all of the information on this form correctly, as the database application 

uses the fields Assessment Folder Name and Strategic Site Plan File Name as 

“pointers,” to access Assessment Supporting Information. 
B-10 APPENDIX B2

LOADING PHOTOS AND GIS IMAGES

The Administrator Group is the only group that has the permissions required 

to load photos and GIS images. To load the photos and GIS images into the 

database application:

1. Go to the Main Menu, and click on the Assessments button, which will 

open the List of Assessments page:

2. Click on either the Photos or the GIS Portfolio button (both circled in 

previous image), both of which will open the Assessment Main Page:
APPENDIX B2 B-11

3. Click on the Photo Spreadsheet or the GIS Portfolio Spreadsheet button (both 

circled in previous image), both of which will open a new form: 

Photo Spreadsheet or the GIS Portfolio Spreadsheet

4. Add photos and/or GIS images by clicking either the Add Photos button 

or the Add GIS Images button.
B-12 APPENDIX B2

ASSESSOR’S DATABASE

The CD includes a folder containing the assessor front end database 

(FEMA_452db_App_Assessor_v1.mde). To make this application function, 

the administrator will have to provide the assessor with a backend database, 

FEMA452dB_Data.mde and Assessment Supporting Information.

Creating an Assessor Database

An assessor database can be created following these steps:

Preparation: Assessment Supporting Information

1. Create an assessment site folder (it can be named anything as long as it is 

referenced properly when completing Assessment Information in step 4), 

and populate all of the Assessment Supporting Information folders with 

desired files. Be sure to keep the following file structure:

2. Copy and paste all of the assessment site folders to the C:\FEMA_452dB_

Assessor folder.
APPENDIX B2 B-13

Working in the Front End

1. Open the FEMA452dB_application_v1.mde, logging on as an 

Administrator.

2. Create a logon account for the assessor (if one is not created already).

3. Create (an) assessment location(s) using the New Assessment Location

function on the Assessment Locations form.

4. Create (a) new assessment(s) using the New Assessment for: (Organization 

just created) button function on the Assessment Locations form.

5. Load any miscellaneous files that may support the assessment.

6. Load any photos or GIS images that may have been taken or created for 

the assessment. 

7. A default photo for the assessment, which will appear on the Assessments 

Main Page in the assessor’s database, may be selected using the drop 

down menu located on the Assessment Main Page:

8. Close the database.
B-14 APPENDIX B2

Working in the Back End

Only step 1 is necessary if this is the first assessment to go to the field, there is 

only one assessment, or if there is only one group of assessments

1. Copy the FEMA452dB_Data.mde and FEMA452wg.mdw file, and paste it 

in the C:\FEMA_452dB_Assessor folder.

The purpose of the following steps is to safeguard any sensitive material that 

may have been collected on previous assessments. After completing these 

steps, assessors will only be able to access information provided to them.

2. Open the FEMA452dB_Data.mde file by double clicking on the 

Assessor Data shortcut and logging on as the administrator, to open the 

Administrative Functions Menu:

3. Click the Create Field Database button to open the Assessments to Send to 

the Field form:
APPENDIX B2 B-15

4. For any sites you want to send to the field, click the corresponding boxes 

for the site in the “Send To Field” column.

5. Click the Create button. (This is a destructive process – all of the 

assessment locations that are not marked will be completely deleted from 

the database.)

6. Compact and repair the database (Tools ➝ Database Utilities ➝ Compact 

and Repair Database...).

7. Close the database.

Providing an Assessor with the Database 

Application

The assessor needs the FEMA_452dB_Assessor folder in its entirety (database 

front-end, database back-end, workgroup file, assessment supporting materials) and the FEMA 452 Assessor Database shortcut. Be sure to provide the 

assessor with their logon name and password (without any security changes, 

this will be “Editor” and “Editor,” respectively.

Burn this folder and files to a CD, put it on a USB drive, or post them on a ftp 

site to which the assessor has access.

Importing the Assessor Data into the Main Database

1. Open the FEMA452dB_Data.mde file using the Assessor Data shortcut and 

Administrator logon.

2. Link the following back-end tables to the FEMA452_Data.mde database 

the assessor provided using the Linked Table Manager.

• tblAssessmentPeople1, 

• tblAssessmentVulnerabilities1, 

• tblBuildings1, 

• tblCFMatrix1, 

• tblCIMatrix1, 

• tblExecutiveSummary1, 

• tblObservations1, and 

• tblPeople1. 
B-16 APPENDIX B2

3. Compact and repair database (Tools ➝ Database Utilities➝ Compact and 

Repair Database...).

4. From the Administrative Main Menu, click the Import Data From Field

button to get the Import Assessments form:

5. Make sure the record you want to import from the assessor’s database is 

selected in both the Master Database and the Remote Database.

6. Click the Import Assessment ID (#) (from red to blue) button and click OK

for all options for all assessment location data you want to import. 

7. Compact and repair database (Tools ➝ Database Utilities ➝ Compact and 

Repair Database...).

8. Close the database.

LINKED TABLE MANAGER

The Linked Table Manager is utilized to link the back end database to an assessor database when importing data from the field. 

The Linked Table Manager is accessed on the toolbar:
APPENDIX B3 : RISK ASSESSMENT DATABASE

APPENDIX B3 B-1

MANAGER’S USER GUIDE*

Introduction ...................................................................................................................B-3

Before Using the Database: Access to the Manager’s Version of the Risk Assessment 

Database ......................................................................................................................B-4

Main Menu ....................................................................................................................B-5

List of Assessments ........................................................................................................B-6

Assessment Main Page ...................................................................................................B-8

Executive Summary ..........................................................................................B-8

Vulnerabilities ...................................................................................................B-9

 Remediations ............................................................................................B-10

Points of Contact ...........................................................................................B-11

Assessment Team ........................................................................................... B-12 

Photos ..............................................................................................................B-13 

Gis Portfolio ....................................................................................................B-14

Miscellaneous Files .........................................................................................B-15

Assessment Checklists ...................................................................................................B-16

Critical Functions Matrix ................................................................................................B-17 

Critical Functions Rollup ................................................................................B-18

Critical Infrastructure Matrix .........................................................................................B-19

Critical Infrastructure Rollup .........................................................................B-20

Site Assessments Reports Menu ....................................................................................B-21

Keyword Search Reports Menu ......................................................................................B-22

Observations and Recommendations/Remediations for Assessment 

Checklist ..........................................................................................................B-23

Vulnerabilities and Recommendations/Remediations ................................B-24

Assessment Checklist Question Details ...........................................................................B-25

All Observations and Recommendations/Remediations for This 

Question ..........................................................................................................B-26
B-2 APPENDIX B3

Printing Reports and Accompanying Materials ................................................................B-27

Printing Assessment Sections Completed by Assessors .................................B-27

Printing Photos, GIS Portfolio, Floor Plans, Emergency Plans, and Other 

Related Documents ........................................................................................B-29

Printing Photos ..................................................................................B-29

 Printing GIS Portfolio, Floor Plans, Emergency Plans, and Related 

Documents .........................................................................................B-31

*© National Institute Of Building Sciences 2004

Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this 

publication and application do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. 

Additionally, neither FEMA or any of its employees makes any warrantee, 

expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the 

accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, product, or process 

included in this publication and application. Users of information from this 

publication and application assume all liability arising from such use.
APPENDIX B3 B-3

INTRODUCTION

To support the building assessment process, this easy to use Risk Assessment 

Database application is provided with FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To 

Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. The Risk Assessment Database is a standalone application that is both a collection tool and 

a management tool. Assessors can use the tool to assist in the systematic collection, storage, and reporting of assessment data. It has functions, folders, 

and displays to import and display threat matrices, digital photos, cost data, 

emergency plans, and certain Geographic Information System (GIS) products 

as part of the record of assessment. Managers can use the application to store, 

search, and analyze data collected from multiple assessments. 

The Risk Assessment Database is initially installed on a desktop computer at 

an organization’s headquarters. This database, referred to in this User Guide 

as the Manager Database, becomes the main access and storage point for 

future assessment data. When an organization wants to conduct an assessment of a site or series of sites, a database administrator uses the application 

to produce a small temporary database, called the Assessor’s Database, on a 

CD. Into this Assessor’s Database are placed references, site plans, GIS portfolios, and other site-specific data that are known about the assessment site 

or are developed during the pre-assessment phase. This Assessor’s Database 

is given to the assessment team and is loaded on one or more of their assessment computers (usually laptop computers). The Assessment Team then 

conducts their assessment and records information in the Assessor’s Database. 

At the end of the assessment, the Assessment Team combines their data into 

one database and passes the files back to the database administrator. The administrator then loads the data into the Manager’s Database for printing and 

analysis. 

After initially installing the application, access to that Risk Assessment 

Database becomes restricted to only those designated users who have been assigned permission to access to the database by their administrator. Also, data 

can be viewed by all authorized users of the database, but changes to the data 

can only be made by those granted permission. All access permission questions should be directed to the database administrator of your organization. 

The following are the hardware and software requirements for the Risk Assessment Database:

 Pentium® 4 or equivalent processor 

 Windows XP 

 MS Access® 2002

 256 MB of RAM recommended for all components
B-4 APPENDIX B3

BEFORE USING THE DATABASE: ACCESS TO THE MANAGER’S 

VERSION OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT DATABASE

From your database administrator, the user should receive an application shortcut with the icon 

❍ The application shortcut should be copied to the desktop. When the user double clicks the 

application shortcut, the user receives a logon screen

The user should log on using the user name and password provided by the database 

administrator.

❍ After logging on, the user will get the Main Menu.
APPENDIX B3 B-5

MAIN MENU

On startup, the Risk Assessment Database Main Menu displays two areas to 

navigate within the program. Select the Assessments button to view the risk assessment related information.

1. The Assessment button opens the List of Assessments form and all 

functionality included.

2. The Vulnerability Assessment Checklist button opens the Assessment 

Checklist Question Details form and all the functionality included.
B-6 APPENDIX B3

LIST OF ASSESSMENTS

1. Assessment Location field allows for manual entry of full or partial station 

name for search.

2. Assessment Type field is a drop down menu to search for assessment type: 

Tier 1, 2, or 3.

3. Search button performs search based on criteria entered into the fields 

described above.

4. Clear (show all records) button will allow all sites to be seen again.

5. These buttons (Executive Summary, Vulnerabilities, Points of Contact, 

Assessment Team, Photos, GIS Portfolio, and Miscellaneous Files) open the 

Assessment Main Page. 

6. The Assessment Checklist button opens the Assessment Checklist form.

7. The Critical Function button opens the Critical Functions Matrix form.

8. The Critical Infrastructure button opens the Critical Infrastructure Matrix

form.
APPENDIX B3 B-7

9. The Strategic Site Plan button opens the Strategic Site Plan in Microsoft Excel.

10. The Site Reports button opens the Site Assessments Report page.

11. The Other Reports button opens the Keyword Search Reports Menu.

12. The Help button opens a window telling the user to press F1 for help. By pressing F1, this User 

Guide will open on your computer.

13. The Close button simply closes the List of Assessments page and returns to the Main Menu.

14. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
B-8 APPENDIX B3

ASSESSMENT MAIN PAGE

Executive Summary

This form allows the user to enter an Executive Summary for the assessment 

site report.

1. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will show 

the Executive Summary entered by the Assessment Team. 

2. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will 

show the various Vulnerabilities for facilities at the designated site for that 

particular assessment. 

3. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will show 

the contact Information for the site points of contact (Points of Contact). 

4. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will show 

the contact information for the team that performed the assessment 

(Assessment Team). 

5. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will show 

the Photos collected during the assessment (Photos). 

6. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will show 

the GIS Portfolio for the assessment site (GIS Portfolio). 

7. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will 

show any other files that may be associated with the assessment site 

(Miscellaneous Files). 
APPENDIX B3 B-9

Vulnerabilities

This form allows the user to view vulnerabilities and recommendations/remediations observed while performing the assessment. Note: Priority and 

Building Number are required. 

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The Vulnerability Status/Cost button opens the Remediations form and 

allows you to record cost data associated with the remediation of the 

selected vulnerability.
B-10 APPENDIX B3

Remediations

This form allows the user to record cost data associated with the remediation 

of the selected vulnerability. The total cost of entries is reflected in other 

forms containing cost references. 

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. This field can be filled in by the user to track entries.

3. Enter the cost for the remediation into this field to keep the remediation 

records up to date.

4. Enter any comments for the remediation in this field.
APPENDIX B3 B-11

Points of Contact

This form allows the user to view information about points of contact at the 

assessment site.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected. 

2. The Add New POC button allows for the creation of a new contact for the 

assessment site designated in the upper left portion of this form. 

3. The Delete POC: (CONTACT NAME) button allows the removal of the 

selected contact from the database.

4. The Add New POC and Duplicate button allows the creation of a new 

contact and duplicates the information in light blue in order to minimize 

data entry efforts.
B-12 APPENDIX B3

Assessment Team

This form allows the user to view information about Assessment Team members.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The Add New Team Member button allows for the creation of a new 

Assessment Team member for the assessment site designated in the upper 

left portion of this form. 
APPENDIX B3 B-13

Photos

The user is able to see the photos associated with the assessment site on this 

form.

1. The Load Photos button loads photos into the designated frames.

2. The 2 arrow buttons allow for navigation through pages of 5 photos, 

either to the previous 5 photos or to the next 5 photos.

3. Clicking on any of the photos will open the photo in the Photo Zoom

window, which displays the photo larger, and photos can be printed 

individually in this window.
B-14 APPENDIX B3

GIS Portfolio

The user is able to see all GIS images associated with the assessment site on 

this form.

1. The Load GIS button loads GIS images to the designated frames.

2. The 2 arrow buttons allow for navigation through pages of 5 GIS images, 

either to the previous 5 images or to the next 5 images.

3. Clicking on any of the GIS images will open the image in the Photo Zoom

window, which displays the image larger, and images can be printed 

individually in this window.
APPENDIX B3 B-15

Miscellaneous Files

This form enables the user to see files related to the assessment that are available to view. The user can also open these files from this form. 

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. Double-clicking in any of the filenames will open the associated 

file. (Examples of possible files to pre-load for the assessors include 

references, a GIS portfolio in PDF format, and/or past assessment 

reports.) 

3. The File Description field allows for descriptions to be typed in about each 

of the file names in the record. 
B-16 APPENDIX B3

ASSESSMENT CHECKLISTS

This form shows an abbreviated entry for each of the questions under the category selected in the row of tabs under the assessment information section at 

the top of this form.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The View All Site Observations button allows the user to view all of 

the assessment checklist data (observations and recommendations/

remediations) for the selected section tab.

3. The View All Site Vulnerability Assessment Questions button allows the user to 

view all of the assessment checklist questions for the selected section tab.

4. These tabs represent a section in the assessment checklist. The user 

can select any of the tabs and have access to the assessment data in that 

section.
APPENDIX B3 B-17

CRITICAL FUNCTIONS MATRIX

This form records and numerically displays the results of analysis performed 

during the assessment. The matrix lists Critical Functions down the left side 

and threats across the top to create Threat-pairs. For each Threat-pair, a 

numeric value, on a 1-10 scale, is recorded for a threat rating, an asset value 

rating, and a vulnerability rating. The methodology for determining the ratings is found in FEMA 452. 

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The Rollup button opens a window that summarizes all of the risk columns 

into one easy to read form called Critical Functions Rollup.
B-18 APPENDIX B3

Critical Functions Rollup 

This form displays a summary of the final numeric risk value of each Threatpair in the Critical Functions Matrix.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
APPENDIX B3 B-19

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE MATRIX

This form records and numerically displays the results of analysis performed 

during the assessment. The matrix lists Critical Infrastructure down the left 

side and threats across the top to create Threat-pairs. For each Threat-pair, a 

numeric value, on a 1-10 scale, is recorded for a threat rating, an asset value 

rating, and a vulnerability rating. The methodology for determining the ratings is found in FEMA 452. 

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The Rollup button opens a window that summarizes all of the risk columns 

into one easy to read form called Critical Infrastructure Rollup.
B-20 APPENDIX B3

Critical Infrastructure Rollup

This form displays a summary of the final numeric risk value of each Threatpair in the Critical Infrastructure Matrix.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
APPENDIX B3 B-21

SITE ASSESSMENT REPORTS MENU

This menu is displayed when selecting the Site Reports button on the List of 

Assessments main form. From this location, the user can print any of the 

automated reports for the assessment specified at the top of the menu (the selected record on the List of Assessments for when the Site Reports button was 

depressed).

1. The Summary Sheet button produces the Site Summary Sheet report.

2. The Executive Summary button produces the Executive Summary report.

3. The Site Assessment Team button produces the report listing the 

information for the individual assessors responsible for that particular 

assessment.

4. The Vulnerabilities button opens the produces the Vulnerabilities and 

Recommendations/Remediations report.

5. The Threat Matrix button will perform an automated process that opens 

an Microsoft document and then populates the information for both the 

Critical Functions Matrix and the Critical Infrastructure Matrix.

6. The Site Points of Contact button produces the Site Point of Contacts

report.

7. The Observations and Comments button creates the Assessment 

Observations and Comments report.
B-22 APPENDIX B3

KEYWORD SEARCH REPORTS MENU

This menu appears after the user selects the Other Reports button at the 

bottom of the List of Assessments form.

1. The Search Observations and Recommendations/Remediations button opens 

the Observations and Recommendations/Remediations for Assessment 

Checklist form.

2. The Search Vulnerabilities and Recommendations/Remediations button opens 

the Vulnerabilities and Recommendations/Remediations form.

Note: these reports search the entire database and are not limited to the assessment 

the user is currently viewing.
APPENDIX B3 B-23

Observations and Recommendations/Remediations 

for the Assessment Checklist

This form is used to search all the observations and recommendations/remediations for all the assessment sites.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The fields in the green box allow the user to search for and display only 

the observations and recommendations/remediations of interest. 

3. The Search button performs search based on criteria entered into the 

fields described above.

4. The Clear (show all records) button will allow all sites to be seen again.

5. The Print View, Sort by Site button will create a report of the search results 

sorted by site name.

6. The Print View, Sort by Checklist # button will create a report of the search 

results sorted by the question number.
B-24 APPENDIX B3

Vulnerabilities and Recommendations/Remediations

This form is used to search all the vulnerabilities and recommendations/remediations for all the assessment sites.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The fields in the green query box allow the user to search for and display 

only the vulnerabilities and recommendations/remediations of interest.

3. The Search button performs search based on criteria entered into the 

fields described above.

4. The Clear (show all records) button will allow all sites to be seen again.

5. The Print View Vulnerabilities button will create a report of the Search

results.
APPENDIX B3 B-25

ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST QUESTION DETAILS

This form shows all of the vulnerability assessment checklist questions in the 

database.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The green query bar allows the user quick access to the assessment 

questions by utilizing a drop down menu to select the question numbers 

or section header. There are also manually entered search forms for 

Question or Guidance by searching for keywords entered.

3. The Search button performs search based on criteria entered into the 

fields described above.

4. The Clear (show all records) button will allow all sites to be seen again.

5. The View Questions/Observations button opens the All Observations and 

Comments for This Question for the selected question. 
B-26 APPENDIX B3

All Observations and Recommendations/

Remediations for This Question

This form provides the user with all database entries for the question selected 

in the Assessment Checklist Question Details form when the View Questions/

Observations button was selected. It displays the questions, guidance, and comments at the top of the form. The bottom of the form displays all information 

entered for that specific question number.

1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

2. The View Observations button creates a report of all entries in the database 

for the designated question.

3. Double clicking on the View Observations or Recommendation/Remediation

fields will open a form that allows the user to change the assessment data 

for the record.
APPENDIX B3 B-27

PRINTING REPORTS AND ACCOMPANYING MATERIALS

Printing Assessment Sections Completed by 

Assessors

1. Open the database, and click on the Assessments button.

2. The List of Assessments window will open. Place the arrow on the left 

next to the desired assessment site. Click on the Site Reports button. 
B-28 APPENDIX B3

3. The Site Assessment Reports Menu window will appear for the selected 

assessment site. 

a. Clicking on the Summary Sheet, Executive Summary, Site Assessment Team, 

Vulnerabilities, Threat Matrix, Site Points of Contact, or Observations and 

Comments button will produce an onscreen report, which can then be 

printed for a hard copy of that section. 

b. The sections that are normally used in an assessment report are the 

Executive Summary, Site Assessment Team, Vulnerabilities, Threat Matrix, and 

Site Points of Contact. 

c. The Threat Matrix button will produce a formatted Microsoft Excel Book 

with values. 

d . To print both matrices (Functions and Infrastructure), go to File ➝ Print 

(in Excel), and be sure to select “Entire workbook” before clicking “OK”.

4. Print desired sections.

5. Close the Site Assessment Reports Menu to return to the List of 

Assessments window. 
APPENDIX B3 B-29

Printing Photos, GIS Portfolio, Floor Plans, 

Emergency Plans, and Other Related Documents

Printing Photos

1. On the List of Assessments window, click the Photos button.

2. The Assessment Main Page window will open, and the Photos tab will be 

open. Click Load Photos to display the photos.
B-30 APPENDIX B3

3. To open a photo for printing, double click on the thumbnail for the 

desired photo, and a Photo Zoom window will open:

4. Close the Photo Zoom window and the Assessment Main Page window to 

return to the List of Assessments window. 
APPENDIX B3 B-31

Printing GIS Portfolio, Floor Plans, Emergency Plans, and Related 

Documents

1. On the List of Assessments window, click the Miscellaneous Files button.

2. The Assessment Main Page window will open, and the Miscellaneous Files

tab with those files loaded in the assessment will be displayed. This may 

be blank if no files were collected. For the User Guide we have listed 4 file 

examples:
B-32 APPENDIX B3

3. To open the desired files, double click the File Name of the desired file.

Note: The desired files are designated by Folder Type. GIS Portfolios, Floor 

Plans, Emergency Plans, and the other reports will each have a designated 

Folder Type. Also, each file will open with a program external to the database. It is 

necessary that the program be installed on the computer to open the desired file.

• The GIS Portfolio, if part of the assessment, will have a Folder Type 

of GIS Portfolio Full PDF. The file will open with Adobe Acrobat.

(Download at: http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/

readstep2.html)

• The Floor Plans will have a Folder Type of Site Plan/Floor Plan. 

These files will generally open with any AutoCAD viewer/reader 

(DWG), such as Volo View. 

• The Emergency Plans will have a Folder Type of Emergency Plan. 

These files will generally open with Microsoft Word. 

4. Print each file from the program it opens in. 
APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APPENDIX C C-1

B

BCC Backup Control Center

C

CAD computer-aided design

CBR chemical, biological, or radiological

CCTV closed-circuit television

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CEMP Certified Emergency Management Plan

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COG Continuity of Government

COOP Continuity of Operations

COTS Commercial off the Shelf

CSI Construction Specifications Institute 

D

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DoD Department of Defense

E

EMS Emergency Management Services

EOC Emergency Operations Center 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency
C-2 APPENDIX C

F

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

G

GIS Geographic Information System

GSA General Services Administration

H

HazMat hazardous material

HEMP High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse

HPM High Power Microwave

HSO Homeland Security Office

HSOC Homeland Security Operations Center

HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning

I

IA/IP Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection

IP/TCP Internet Protocol/Transmission Control Protocol

ISC Interagency Security Committee

IT information technology

J

JRIES Joint Regional Information Exchange System
APPENDIX C C-B

L

LAN local area network

LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee

M

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

N

NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Command

NIBS National Institute of Building Sciences

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

P

PC personal computer

PPE personal protective equipment

psi pounds per square inch

RDD radiological dispersal device

S

SBU Sensitive-but-Unclassified

SERC State Emergency Response Commission
C-4 APPENDIX C

T

TIC Toxic Industrial Compound

TNT trinitrotoluene

TTIC Terrorist Threat Integration Center

U

UPS uninterruptible power supply

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

V

VA Department of Veterans Affairs 

VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol

W

WWAN wide area network

WMD weapons of mass destruction