IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

RUKSHAN GOONEWARDENA, 

Appellant, 

v. Case No. 5D21-1073

LT Case No. 2017-CF-1056-A

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee. 

________________________________/

Opinion filed September 23, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court

for Seminole County, 

Debra S. Nelson, Judge.

Lisa Jama Ramsey, of Ramsey Law,

PLLC, Lake Mary, for Appellant. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock 

McGuigan, Assistant Attorney 

General, Daytona Beach, for 

Appellee. 

NARDELLA, J. 

Rukshan Goonewardena appeals his conviction for attempted murder.

Of the claims he raises on appeal, only one has merit; namely, that the trial
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court erred in concluding that he was competent to stand trial. Because the 

trial court did not make an independent determination that Goonewardena 

was competent to proceed to trial, we reverse and remand for the trial court 

to make a nunc pro tunc determination of competence if possible or to hold 

a new trial if not. 

Goonewardena was charged with attempted murder after shooting the 

victim at an intersection during a fit of road rage. In the initial stages of the 

case, defense counsel requested a psychological evaluation to determine 

whether Goonewardena was competent to proceed to trial based on his

“trouble focusing” and “emotional limitations.” The trial court granted the 

request and ordered Goonewardena be evaluated by Psychological

Affiliates, Inc. Dr. Kyle Goodwin evaluated Goonewardena and in his written 

report to the court stated that the evaluation was inconclusive and that “either 

a finding of competence or incompetence would be supported.”

Due to the report’s inconclusiveness, the trial court ordered that 

Goonewardena undergo a second evaluation with a different psychological 

therapy office, Advanced Psychological Associates, Inc. Dr. Kathy Oses 

evaluated Goonewardena and concluded that he was mentally competent.

Dr. Oses submitted her report to the court, but apparently the parties did not 
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bring the report to the court’s attention because the court did not hold a 

hearing or make a finding on Goonewardena’s competency. 

In fact, Goonewardena’s competency was not addressed at all until 

more than a year after the second report was filed, when defense counsel 

unexpectedly raised the issue to the prosecutor at the trial scheduling 

conference. The parties then requested a bench conference, and the 

following exchange took place. 

STATE: [Defense counsel] brought up that in the 

(Indiscernible) around here, it doesn’t appear that a 

formal finding of competency was ever made after an 

evaluation was done.

COURT: Okay. I don’t know when the evaluation was. 

DEFENSE: Well, if you want, Your Honor, I can have it 

printed it out and we can address it [sic] jury selection 

before we begin. Your Honor could review it and— 

STATE: It says he’s competent to proceed. I mean— 

COURT: Well, if you just give me [sic] to look at—you 

don’t have it. What date was the— 

DEFENSE: It would be the older of the two. 

COURT: 17-1056. 

DEFENSE: I’m trying to get this one off your docket, 

Your Honor. 

COURT: Yes, things do eventually happen, right?

STATE: I’m just knocking on wood just to— 
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DEFENSE: I think it will get done. 

STATE: Yeah. 

DEFENSE: Everything—every single witness, every 

(Indiscernible) us, so that means we’re good. 

COURT: You may not be able to open it up. And who—

who evaluated?

STATE: I believe it was the Defense at that time. 

COURT: Was it a psychological— 

DEFENSE: It was—it was court ordered. We 

requested— 

COURT: What—oh, (Indiscernible) okay. 

DEFENSE: And the term that is used, competent to— 

COURT: Okay. 

DEFENSE: —proceed.

COURT: All right. If—we’ll go back on the record, take 

it off of the noise. 

STATE: Thank you, Judge. 

(End bench conference.)

After the bench conference, the court made the following finding with 

respect to Goonewardena’s competency:

COURT: Okay. On Mr. Goonewardena, case number 

17-CF-1056, the parties have stipulated to the report

filed by Kyle Godwin [sic] of the evaluation that was
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conducted on November 1st, 2019, and that evaluation 

says that he is competent to stand trial so—to proceed. 

So the Court will make a finding of competency to 

proceed. 

The court did not enter a written order. 

We review a trial court’s finding that a defendant is competent to stand

trial for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848, 

862 (Fla. 2011). A trial court abuses its discretion when it does not 

independently determine that a defendant is competent to stand trial. See, 

e.g., Losada v. State, 260 So. 3d 1156, 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) explains how the trial court 

should proceed when it has reasonable grounds to believe that a defendant 

may not be competent to proceed to trial. 

(b) Motion for Examination. If, at any material stage

of a criminal proceeding, the court of its own motion, or

on motion of counsel for the defendant or for the state,

has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is

not mentally competent to proceed, the court shall

immediately enter its order setting a time for a hearing

to determine the defendant’s mental condition, which

shall be held no later than 20 days after the date of the

filing of the motion, and may order the defendant to be

examined by no more than 3 experts, as needed, prior

to the date of the hearing. Attorneys for the state and

the defendant may be present at any examination

ordered by the court.

In this case, the trial court had reasonable grounds to believe that 

Goonewardena was not competent to proceed; otherwise, the court would 
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not have ordered Goonewardena to undergo a psychological evaluation on 

his mental competence. See Flaherty v. State, 266 So. 3d 1187, 1188 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2019) (“When a trial court orders an evaluation, it suggests there 

are reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent.”); Reynolds 

v. State, 177 So. 3d 296, 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“Here, the trial court

apparently had reasonable grounds to believe that Appellant was not 

competent to proceed because the court appointed an expert to evaluate 

Appellant.”). 

Although our Supreme Court has emphasized that trial courts should 

follow the specific procedures outlined in Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 

3.210–3.212, which concern a criminal defendant’s competence to proceed 

in a case, it has also explained that the hearing requirement of Rule 3.210(b) 

can be waived. See Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 678 (Fla. 2014)

(“[W]here the parties and the judge agree, the trial court may decide the issue 

of competency on the basis of the written reports alone.” (quoting Fowler v. 

State, 255 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1971))); Jones v. State, 125 So. 3d 982, 

984 (Fla. 2013) (holding Rule 3.212 was satisfied when trial court based 

finding of competence on defense’s two expert competency evaluations 

without conducting competency hearing); Fowler, 255 So. 3d at 515 (“Our 

decision [that the trial court erred by not setting a hearing to determine the
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defendant’s competence] is not to be construed as making the hearing 

requirement non-waivable.”). What cannot be waived, however, is a 

defendant’s right to have the trial court make an independent, legal 

determination that he is competent to proceed once his competency has 

been called into question. See, e.g., Dougherty, 149 So. 3d at 676–78 

(tracing duty to make independent determination of competency to 

defendant’s right to fair trial); Zern v. State, 191 So. 3d 962, 965 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2016) (stating that “an independent competency finding is a dueprocess right”). 

Accordingly, a trial court commits reversible error when it does not 

make an independent determination that a defendant is competent to stand 

trial. See, e.g., Zern, 191 So. 3d at 965 (“Because an independent 

competency finding is a due-process right that cannot be waived once a 

reason for a competency hearing has surfaced, the trial court fundamentally 

err[s] in failing to make such a finding.”). The trial court’s duty to make an 

independent determination is not absolved when the parties stipulate to a 

defendant’s competence and the psychological evaluations conclude that he 

is. See Dougherty, 149 So. 3d at 678 (“Even in a situation where all the 

experts opine that a defendant is competent, the trial court could presumably 

disagree based on other evidence such as the defendant’s courtroom 
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behavior or attorney representations.”); Jones, 125 So. 3d at 984 (holding 

parties cannot stipulate that a defendant is competent). 

In this case, the trial court did not make an independent determination 

that Goonewardena was competent to proceed to trial. In its oral ruling, the 

trial court based its finding of competency on only two things: (1) the 

stipulation of the parties; and (2) the (mistaken) belief that the report of 

Goonewardena’s first evaluation concluded that he was competent. The 

record does not demonstrate that the trial court reviewed the two reports it 

ordered at the time it ruled or in anticipation of ruling. This is made clear by 

the trial court’s mischaracterization of the first report, which mimics what 

counsel told the trial court. Further, the trial court made no mention of the 

second report, and there is no other evidence in the record to suggest it was 

ever reviewed. Also missing from the record are any observations by the 

trial court which would suggest that the trial court made an independent 

determination. 

When a trial court fails to make an independent determination that a 

defendant is competent for trial after his competency has been called into 

question, the proper remedy is usually to reverse and remand for a new trial. 

Dougherty, 149 So. 3d at 678–79. However, our Supreme Court has 

recognized that the trial court need not hold a new trial if it can retroactively 
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determine a defendant’s competency. Id. at 679. Such a determination is 

“inherently difficult” but can be accomplished “where ‘there are a sufficient 

number of expert and lay witnesses who have examined or observed the 

defendant contemporaneous with trial available to offer pertinent evidence 

at a retrospective hearing.’” Id. (quoting Mason v. State, 489 So. 2d 734, 737 

(Fla. 1986)). Consequently, when this Court has reversed a trial court for 

making an erroneous finding of competence, we have instructed the lower 

court to conduct a nunc pro tunc determination of competence if possible 

and to hold a new trial if not. Yancy v. State, 280 So. 3d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2019); Bynum v. State, 247 So. 3d 601, 604 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018). 

Therefore, because the trial court in this case abused its discretion by 

not making an independent determination that Goonewardena was 

competent to proceed to trial, we reverse and remand for a nunc pro tunc 

determination of competence. To the extent such a determination cannot be 

made, we remand for a new trial. 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

COHEN and WOZNIAK, JJ., concur.