The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

The Civil W r 

Begins

Opening Clashes, 1861
CMH Pub 75–2

Cover: Detail from Capture of Ricketts’ Battery by Sidney E. King,

courtesy of William V. Fleitz, Manassas Battlefield Park
by

Jennifer M. Murray

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2012

The Civil W r 

Begins

Opening Clashes, 1861

5

Introduction

Although over one hundred fifty years have passed since the 

start of the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues to 

matter. The forces unleashed by that war were immensely destructive because of the significant issues involved: the existence of the 

Union, the end of slavery, and the very future of the nation. The 

war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with over 

six hundred thousand killed in the course of the four-year struggle. 

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the American 

Civil War was no exception. The seeds of the conflict were sown 

in the earliest days of the republic’s founding, primarily over the 

existence of slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict can 

begin without the conscious decisions of those engaged in the 

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way to 

paper over the division of the country into two camps: one that 

was dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limit 

its spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “half slave 

and half free,” and that could not stand. 

Regardless of the factors tearing the nation asunder, the 

soldiers on each side of the struggle went to war for personal 

reasons: looking for adventure, being caught up in the passions 

and emotions of their peers, believing in the Union, favoring 

states’ rights, or even justifying the simple schoolyard dynamic 

of being convinced that they were “worth” three of the soldiers 

on the other side. Nor can we overlook the factor that some went 

to war to prove their manhood. This has been, and continues 

to be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the profession of arms. Soldiers join for many reasons but often stay in the 

fight because of their comrades and because they do not want to 

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues of national impact shrink 

to nothing in the intensely personal world of cannon shell and 

minié ball.
6 

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly and 

only culminated with the conquest of the rebellious Confederacy, 

the preservation of the Union, and the end of slavery. These 

campaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared in 

commemoration of our national sacrifices, seek to remember 

that war and honor those in the United States Army who died to 

preserve the Union and free the slaves as well as to tell the story of 

those American soldiers who fought for the Confederacy despite 

the inherently flawed nature of their cause. The Civil War was our 

greatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study and 

contemplation.

 Richard W. Stewart

 Chief Historian
7

The Civil War Begins

Opening Clashes, 1861

By the winter of 1860–1861, the United States found itself 

on the precipice of civil war. For decades, divergent views on 

slavery had led to a growing chasm in the nation and an inability 

to arrive at any sort of permanent political compromise. The 

Kansas–Nebraska Act of 1854, which stipulated that residents 

of a territory could vote to enter the Union as a slave state or 

free state, had only stoked the fires of discord, bringing open 

warfare to Kansas that threatened to spill into the neighboring 

states and territories. Then, in October 1859, one year before 

the presidential election, John Brown, financed by northern 

abolitionists, seized the Federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry in 

the slave-holding state of Virginia in an attempt to ignite a 

slave uprising. Though Federal troops quickly suppressed the 

outbreak, emotions were high on both sides as the nation went 

to the polls in November 1860. By a small electoral vote margin, 

Abraham Lincoln, a Republican from Illinois, became the 

sixteenth president of the United States. In a matter of weeks, 

the country came apart at the seams. The country continued 

to lose cohesion as the lame duck administration of President 

James Buchanan failed to control events. Meeting in Charleston 

on 20 December, South Carolina delegates voted to secede. 

Other states followed. Mississippi seceded on 9 January 1861, 

Florida on 10 January, Alabama on 11 January, Georgia on 19 

January, Louisiana on 26 January, and Texas on 1 February. 

Events continued to move quickly. On 9 February, delegates from the seceded states met in Montgomery, Alabama, 

to lay the foundation of the newly formed Confederate States 

of America. The convention chose Jefferson F. Davis, a U.S. 

senator from Mississippi, as president, and Alexander H. 

Stephens of Georgia as vice president. A Kentucky native, Davis 

graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1828, fought in 
8 

the Mexican War, and later served as secretary of war. In his 

inaugural address on 18 February, Davis said that “henceforth, 

our energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, 

and the perpetuity of the Confederacy which we have formed.” 

Strategic Setting 

Abraham Lincoln took the oath of office on 4 March 1861 in 

the shadow of the unfinished Capitol building. In his own inaugural 

address, the president declared that he had no intention of abolishing slavery in states where the institution existed. Proclaiming 

he would not initiate a war, Lincoln informed Southerners, “In your

hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine, is the 

momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you. 

You can have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors.” 

Maintaining that the Union was perpetual, Lincoln promised to 

enforce the laws as well as to “hold, occupy, and possess” Federal 

property within the seceded states. 

Despite President Lincoln’s pledge, states leaving the 

Union seized U.S. arsenals, forts, and mints. Only a few 

installations—among them Fort Sumter at Charleston, South 

Carolina; Fort Zachary Taylor in the Florida Keys; and Fort 

Pickens in Pensacola, Florida—remained in Federal hands. 

On 9 March, Lincoln convened his first cabinet meeting to 

discuss whether the forts should be abandoned. While the 

Florida forts were not in grave danger, South Carolina state 

troops had surrounded Fort Sumter. Secretary of State William 

H. Seward argued that reinforcing Sumter was not worth the 

risk of starting a war and encouraging other slave states to 

secede. Postmaster General Montgomery Blair offered the 

cabinet’s lone voice in favor of reinforcing Fort Sumter. Blair 

asserted that evacuation would weaken Lincoln’s presidency 

and give an important symbolic victory to the newly formed 

Confederacy. Hoping to buy time for pro-Union Southerners, 

Lincoln decided to maintain the garrisons rather than abandoning them or sending reinforcements.

If Lincoln temporized, it was not solely from a desire to 

avoid violence: the United States Army was not prepared for 

war. Less than 1,000 of the 16,000-man Regular Army, most 

of whom were manning coastal defenses or arsenals, were 

stationed in the eastern United States. The remaining troops, 
9

spread across six military departments west of the Mississippi 

River, were too far away to have an impact. In fact, the U.S. 

Army’s ability to move against the South declined for some 

months as key leaders left the service’s ranks. Of the 1,080 

officers on active duty at the end of 1860, 286 either resigned 

or were dismissed and entered Confederate service. Many of 

the officers casting their allegiance with the South were regimental or department commanders with years of experience 

and skill. Of the 900 U.S. Military Academy graduates who left 

the military before 1860, 114 returned to the Union Army and 

99 to the Confederate Army. In fact, the Regular Army soon 

found itself outnumbered as the South began forming wellorganized and ably officered units equipped with hundreds of 

cannon and 159,000 small arms seized from arsenals and forts 

in the seceding states. 

The winter and spring of 1861 found both sides recruiting 

and mobilizing for war. Because both sides used their state 

militias as the foundations of their armies, large numbers 

of troops were successfully fielded in a short period of time. 

Southerners created the Army of the Confederate States of 

America on 6 March. Multiple calls for one-year volunteers by 

the Confederate government soon raised the number of men 

bearing arms to one hundred-eighty-two thousand. Federal 

mobilization began on 15 April when President Lincoln called 

on the Union states to provide seventy-five thousand militiamen for three months. On 3 May he issued a proclamation 

calling into service 64,748 three-year volunteers for the Army 

and 18,000 for the Navy, bringing the aggregate force, including 

an increase in the Federal Army, to 181,461—of whom 75,000 

were serving for only three months. 

The burgeoning volunteer armies forced both Lincoln 

and Davis to appoint generals who otherwise might not have 

been qualified. Lincoln used military appointments to gain 

wider backing for the war from diverse factions. To obtain 

support from Democrats, he appointed Benjamin F. Butler and 

Daniel E. Sickles. To gain backing from German Americans, he 

commissioned Franz Sigel and Carl Schurz. Still, Lincoln was 

not lavish with these political appointments. The majority of 

the first forty volunteer units to be formed were commanded 

by regulars on active duty, U.S. Military Academy graduates, 

or those who held volunteer commissions in the Mexican War. 
10 

To lead the Confederate troops, Davis appointed eightynine generals, about half of whom were professionals. Employing 

somewhat different criteria, Davis chose generals based on personal 

relationships rather than attempting to strengthen ties with a 

particular faction. However, Davis never conferred higher responsibilities than brigade command on unproven volunteer officers.

In 1861 the geographic situation appeared to favor the 

South. Borrowing from the antebellum U.S. Army system, Davis 

divided the Confederacy into eight departments. He dispersed 

his military forces around the Confederacy’s perimeter in the 

hope that the sheer size of the new nation would work in its 

favor by making it difficult for Federal commanders to coordinate multiple thrusts into Southern territory. The Southerners 

planned to counter Federal offensives by transferring troops from 

unthreatened areas to reinforce any department under attack. A 

successful defense of Confederate borders would demonstrate 

that the new nation could protect its sovereignty, increasing its 

chances of international recognition. (See Map 1.) 

Demographics and industry, on the other hand, favored the 

North. The 1860 census revealed that 5,582,222 whites and 3,521,110 

slaves made up the population of the eleven states that would eventually secede. The remainder of the Union, including Delaware, 

Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland, numbered 21,907,405 whites 

and 432,586 slaves. As a result, the Union could call on four 

million military-age white males while the corresponding figure 

for the Confederacy was one-fourth of that number. The Union 

also had ten times the industrial capacity including almost all of 

the shipbuilding yards and foundries. Transportation capabilities 

were similarly skewed. The Confederates retained control of only 

20 percent of the estimated one thousand Mississippi River steamboats. On land the North had 22,085 miles of railroads, nearly 

three times as many as the 8,541 miles available to the Confederacy. 

These advantages were important to the North because riverboats 

and railroads were about to become key components of logistics 

and maneuver. One train car carried the equivalent of twenty 

wagonloads of military supplies while a large riverboat could 

transport enough materiel to sustain forty thousand men and 

eighteen thousand horses for two days.

The responsibility for arranging the North’s advantages into a 

coherent plan fell to Lt. Gen. Winfield S. Scott, general in chief of 

the U.S. Army. Commissioned in 1808, the 74-year-old Virginian 
11

commanded troops in battle during the War of 1812, Second 

Seminole War, and Black Hawk War, before rising to the position 

of commanding general. During the Mexican War, Scott led the 

southernmost of two American armies to victory at Cerro Gordo, 

Contreras, Churubusco, and Molino del Ray before capturing Mexico 

City. On the eve of Lincoln’s inaugural address in March 1861, Scott 

sent the president a memorandum outlining four potential courses 

of action. Only one option suggested military force. The remaining 

options were imposing an economic blockade on the South, accepting 

a diplomatic compromise, or allowing the South to secede. 

Scott’s memorandum reflected a widely held Federal assumption that Southerners had been led into secession by a phalanx 

of radicals and that a hard war strategy directed against civilians 

would be counterproductive. Accordingly, Scott’s military option 

aimed to minimize bloodshed and violence. Arguing against a 

full-scale invasion of the South, Scott proposed a two-pronged 

offensive, starting with a blockade of the Southern coastline and 

along the Mississippi River. With the seaboard and internal waterways in Union hands, Scott called for “a powerful movement” 

of sixty thousand Federal soldiers down the Mississippi River—

one column on riverboats and another by land—to divide and 

conquer the South. 

After some deliberation, Lincoln accepted portions of 

Scott’s proposal and, on 19 April, ordered the blockade of the 

Confederate coastline. Outrage emerged in Northern quarters 

at what the press called Scott’s Anaconda Plan, with its too-slow 

squeeze of the enemy states. Some journalists and politicians 

called for an immediate attack on Richmond, Virginia, a major 

city, and a quick decisive end to secession and war. The critics 

thought that one sharp battle in Virginia ought to be enough to 

snuff out the illusions of Southern nationhood. 

Operations

Fort Sumter

After voting for secession, South Carolinians prepared 

themselves for Federal attack. The state’s economic livelihood 

depended on goods passing through Charleston, a thriving 

seaport with a population of fifty thousand. In order to prevent 

Federal troops from shutting down the flow of trade, secessionists sought to take over the seacoast defenses around Charleston. 
INDIA

TERRIT

COLORADO

TERRITORY

WASHINGTO N

TERRITOR Y

DAKOTA

TERRITORY

NEBRASKA

TERRITOR Y

UTA H

TERRITORY

NEVADA

TERRITORY

NEW MEXICO

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KANSA S

OREGON

TEXAS

C A L I F O R N I A

B R I T I S H N 

M

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UNITED STATES OF AMERIC A

April–November 1861

Battle Site

The Confederate States

0 100 200 300 400

Miles

Map 1
Fort Sumter 12–13 Apr

Port Royal 7 Nov

Fort Hatteras 28–29 Aug

Bull Run 21 Jul

Ball’s Bluff 21 Oct

Rich Mountain 11 Jul

Belmont 7 Nov

Wilson’s Creek

Car 10 Aug thage

5 Jul

Fort Pickens

Washington, DC

Richmond

Montgomery

 Bahama Islands

AN

ORY

S

IOW A

OHIO

GEORGIA

KENTUCK Y

V IRGINIA

ALABAMA

T ENNESSEE

N ORTH

CAROLIN A

S OUTH

CAROLIN A

ILLINOI S

I NDIAN A

MISSOURI

ARKANSA S

CONNECTICUT

MASSACHUSETTS

MARYLAND

NEW JERSEY

DELAWAR E

PENNSYLVANI A

NEW

Y ORK

VERMONT

MAINE

NEW HAMPSHIRE

RHODE ISLAND

F L O R I D A

L O U I S I A N A

M I C H I G A N

M I S S I S S I P P I

M I N N E S O T A

WISCONSI N

O R T H A M E R I C A
14 

Fort Sumter was the most formidable of the fortifications ringing 

the city. Sited on top of an artificial island built at the mouth of 

Charleston Harbor, its five-sided brick walls towered sixty feet 

over the water. Fort Moultrie, a brick fort on Sullivan’s Island 

mounting fifty-five cannon, was located about one mile across 

the harbor from Fort Sumter. Castle Pinckney, a small masonry 

War of 1812–era fort with twenty-two cannon, stood nearly a 

mile offshore on Shutes Folly Island. A colonial-era installation, 

Fort Johnson, stood on nearby James Island (Map 2). 

The eighty-four strong U.S. Army garrison stationed at 

Fort Moultrie constituted the Federal military presence in South 

Carolina when the state seceded. The garrison’s ranking officer, 

Maj. Robert Anderson, had been in charge for little more than 

a month. President Buchanan’s secretary of war, John B. Floyd 

a Virginian with secessionist leanings, handpicked Anderson 

because he held proslavery views. Yet Anderson chose country 

over cause following South Carolina’s secession. Although 

his officers were concerned about a surprise assault on Fort 

Moultrie, Anderson refused to act without orders.

Secretary Floyd dispatched instructions to Anderson authorizing him to capitulate if confronted with overwhelming force. 

Looking from Fort Moultrie toward Fort Sumter, 1865 (Library of Congress)
15

Faced with the distasteful prospect of surrender, Anderson 

decided to evacuate Moultrie’s garrison to Fort Sumter. The 

operation took place on the night of 26 December. A detachment 

under 1st Lt. Jefferson C. Davis remained behind until the rest of 

the garrison arrived at Sumter. On completion of the clandestine 

transfer, Lieutenant Davis’ men spiked all of Moultrie’s guns, set 

fire to the carriages of fourteen 32-pounder cannon, and chopped 

down the flagpole before departing. The South Carolinians 

did not learn of the abandonment until the following day. The 

Southerners took possession of Forts Johnson and Moultrie and 

Castle Pinckney soon afterward.

On 1 March 1861, President Davis dispatched Brig. Gen. Pierre 

G. T. Beauregard to take command of the troops at Charleston. 

Fort Sumter

Battery

Fort Johnson

Castle Pinckney

Fort Moultrie

C o o p e r R i v e r

S o u t h C h a n n e l

M a i n S h i p p i n g C h a n n e l

A s h l e y R i v e r

Hog Island

Shutes Folly Island

Morris Island

Sulliva n’s Island

James Island

Moultrieville

Charleston Mount Pleasant

THE DEFENSES OF CHARLESTON 

1861

Union Fortications

0 1 2

Miles

Confederate Fortications

Map 2
16 

The general’s mission was clear: prevent reinforcements from 

reaching Sumter and, if Davis ordered, bombard the fort. From 

a prominent Creole family, Beauregard graduated second in his 

West Point class of 1838. He distinguished himself during the 

battles of Contreras and Churubusco in the Mexican War, ending 

the war with the rank of brevet major. During the secession winter 

of 1860–1861, Beauregard served as the superintendent of the U.S. 

Military Academy before being dismissed from that post. 

On 5 March, President Lincoln received a letter from 

Anderson outlining the situation at Fort Sumter. At full capacity, 

Sumter accommodated 650 men, and its three-tier artillery 

emplacements held 135 guns. Only forty-eight cannon were 

mounted, however, twenty-five were aimed at Fort Moultrie. 

Built to confront an enemy fleet, the walls facing the city were 

much weaker than those facing seaward. As a result, the South 

Carolinians were able to site their guns against the portion of 

the fort least likely to withstand incoming shot. In addition 

to the fort’s vulnerability to direct attack, the garrison did not 

have enough food to endure a prolonged siege.

Gustavus V. Fox, a private citizen and former naval 

officer, went to the White House with a proposal to resupply 

Sumter using tugboats and warships. The tugboats would tow 

launches filled with reinforcements and provisions into the 

harbor while the warships provided covering fire in the event 

of Confederate opposition. On 29 March, after several weeks 

of deliberation, President Lincoln ordered Fox to prepare the 

expedition. Simultaneously, Lincoln held another meeting in 

which all cabinet members, with the exception of Secretary 

Seward and Secretary of the Interior Caleb B. Smith, voted to 

reinforce Anderson. Instead of sending troops and military 

items, however, Lincoln decided to dispatch only nonmilitary 

provisions. 

On 7 April, Beauregard notified Anderson that because of 

the “delays and apparent vacillations” of Lincoln’s government 

concerning the evacuation of Fort Sumter, all communications 

and supply transfers from Charleston to Sumter would be immediately halted. On 11 April, Beauregard sent two aides, Col. James 

Chesnut Jr. and Capt. Stephen D. Lee, to demand Sumter’s evacuation. Anderson refused, maintaining “my sense of honor, and 

of my obligations to my Government, prevent my compliance.” 

Chesnut and Lee delivered Anderson’s reply to Beauregard, who 
17

then telegraphed it to President Davis. In response, Confederate 

Secretary of War LeRoy P. Walker ordered Beauregard not to 

“needlessly” bombard Sumter. Instead, he instructed Beauregard 

to pursue Anderson’s peaceful surrender. If, however, Anderson 

refused the terms of a peaceful evacuation or if he opened fire 

on the Confederates’ position, Walker authorized Beauregard to 

“reduce the fort.” Beauregard proceeded as instructed. He sent 

his aides back to Sumter shortly after midnight. They presented 

Anderson with a written letter from Beauregard stating, “If you 

will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort Sumter, and 

agree that in the mean time you will not use your guns against 

us unless ours shall be employed against Fort Sumter, we will 

abstain from opening fire upon you.” 

The Confederates waited while Anderson considered this 

new proposal. When the Union officer returned, Anderson 

informed Chesnut and Lee that he wanted to avoid “useless 

effusion of blood,” and if provided adequate transportation 

would evacuate Sumter by 1200 on 15 April—as long as he did 

not receive new instructions from Washington or “additional 

supplies.” Aware of the relief expedition’s imminent arrival, 

Beauregard regarded Anderson’s reply as unacceptable. Instead 

of returning to Beauregard’s headquarters, Chestnut’s negotiating party went to Fort Johnson. Shortly after 0300 on 12 April 

Chesnut and Lee sent a final message to Anderson. The message 

read, “By authority of General Beauregard, commanding the 

Provisional Forces of the Confederate States, we have the honor 

to notify you that he will open fire of his batteries on Fort 

Sumter in one hour from this time.”

Twenty minutes after the deadline expired, a single shell 

from Fort Johnson exploded over Sumter. Within minutes 

Confederate cannon and mortars sited around the harbor 

began pouring a steady fire on the Federal installation. The 

Northerners returned fire, directing a barrage against Fort 

Moultrie, as well as field works constructed on Morris and James 

Islands, but with little effect. Just after midday, the garrison 

spotted the silhouettes of several warships and steamers on the 

horizon. The flotilla, however, stayed outside the harbor rather 

than approach the beleaguered fort. 

On the morning of 13 April, a shell from Fort Moultrie 

exploded in Fort Sumter, setting the barracks on fire. 

Around 1200, the battered fort’s flagstaff was shot down. 
18 

The Confederates, believing the flag’s disappearance signified surrender, ceased fire. Louis T. Wigfall, ex-U.S. senator 

from Texas, rowed out to Sumter without Beauregard’s 

knowledge to accept Anderson’s sword, only to discover the 

garrison did not intend to capitulate. Shelling resumed when 

the Stars and Stripes reappeared. Within two hours, however, 

Wigfall persuaded Anderson to initiate a cease-fire. Lee 

and Chesnut rowed out to Sumter to discuss terms with the 

Federal commander. Shortly after 1400 on 13 April, Anderson 

informed Beauregard that he would leave the fort.

On 14 April, Anderson and the Federal troops under his 

command evacuated Fort Sumter after firing a grand salute. 

Midway through the hundred-gun salute, a powder charge 

exploded, killing Pvt. Daniel Hough and seriously wounding five 

others. Hough became the only casualty, Union or Confederate, 

killed in the fight. Beauregard waited until the Federals evacuated Sumter before entering it. As his men embarked aboard 

Fox’s waiting ships, Anderson heard the South Carolinians 

cheering as they took possession of the battered fort. The Union 

flotilla bearing Anderson’s men departed on the morning 

The interior of Fort Sumter after its evacuation by Major Anderson on 14 

April 1861 (National Archives)
19

of 15 April. After their arrival in New York, the men found 

themselves hailed as staunch defenders of the Union. Lincoln 

rewarded Anderson by promoting him to brigadier general on 

15 May 1861. 

The bombardment of Fort Sumter ignited war frenzy 

throughout the nation. Four states from the upper South seceded 

from the Union in the weeks after Fort Sumter. Virginia led the 

second wave of secession on 17 April. Arkansas seceded on 6 May, 

North Carolina on 20 May, and Tennessee joined the Confederacy 

on 8 June. Only four slave-holding states—Delaware, Maryland, 

Kentucky, and Missouri, now referred to as “border states”—

remained in the Union. Preventing the border states from seceding 

became one of Lincoln’s highest strategic priorities during the 

upcoming months.

Into Virginia—Bull Run

In May 1861 the Confederate capital moved from 

Montgomery, Alabama, to Richmond, Virginia. Richmond became 

a strategic target, not only because of its industrial capability, but 

also because of its political importance. The two capitals, separated 

by one hundred miles, now figured prominently in both sides’ 

strategies. The New York Times headlined “The Nation’s War Cry” 

and declared, “Forward to Richmond! Forward to Richmond!” 

Ultimately, Lincoln recognized that a growing segment of the 

Northern population, led by the abolitionist base of the Republican 

Party, would not stand for lengthy inaction. He ordered Federal 

armies to launch an offensive into Virginia. 

More than Richmond beckoned the Union Army. Thirty 

miles southwest of Washington, D.C., Manassas Junction, with 

its convergence of two lines—the Orange and Alexandria, and 

the Manassas Gap—held the key. The Orange and Alexandria 

line, which served as the principal north-south rail line in 

Virginia, would allow the Confederates to transfer troops from 

other regions to protect Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley. 

The Manassas Gap line connected northern Virginia with the 

westernmost region of the state. By maintaining a military 

presence in western Virginia, the Confederates would be able to 

interdict rail lines ferrying Federal troops and supplies between 

the East Coast and the Midwest. Control of the junction itself 

would allow the Confederates to shift troops swiftly between 

northern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley. 
20 

On 23 May, Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston assumed 

command of the Confederates defending the northern entrance 

to the Shenandoah Valley. His 10,600-strong command 

was known as the Army of the Shenandoah (Table 1). The 

Shenandoah warranted a sizable military presence for a couple 

of reasons. First, it served as one of the most important sources 

of food and draft animals within the Confederacy. Second, 

flanked on either side by mountain ranges, the valley offered a 

naturally protected route, well to the east of major rivers, that 

either army could use to threaten the other’s capital. As a result, 

President Davis placed a high premium on protecting the 

region. Johnston’s army also included the 1st Virginia Cavalry, 

commanded by U.S. Military Academy graduate Col. J. E. B. 

Stuart, and a separate artillery battery. 

On the day Johnston assumed command, Virginia voted 

to secede from the Union. On learning of the news, Brig. 

Gen. Thomas J. Jackson’s brigade at Harpers Ferry blockaded 

a stretch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, seizing fifty-six 

locomotives and hundreds of railcars for Confederate use. 

Jackson’s actions struck a nerve because the line served as the 

primary link connecting the Midwest states with the Northeast. 

The Federals responded on 24 May by crossing the Potomac 

River to capture Alexandria, Virginia. Although the Unionists 

did not meet opposition from Confederate troops, a civilian 

innkeeper killed Col. Elmer E. Ellsworth, the commander of 

the 11th New York. Seconds later, one of Ellsworth’s men bayoneted the civilian. Popular with the press and President Lincoln, 

the entire North mourned Colonel Ellsworth. 

The seizure of Alexandria drew a strong reaction from 

Southerners. President Davis appointed General Beauregard to 

lead the Confederate forces in northern Virginia. He arrived at 

Table 1—Confederate Army of the Shenandoah

Unit Commander Composition

1st Brigade Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson* 5 Inf rgts, 1 Arty battery 

2d Brigade Col. Francis S. Bartow 3 Inf rgts, 2 Inf bns, 1 Arty battery

3d Brigade Brig. Gen. Barnard E. Bee Jr.* 4 Inf rgts, 1 Arty battery 

4th Brigade Col. Arnold Elzey* 3 Inf rgts, 1 Inf bn, 1 Arty battery

* U.S. Military Academy Graduate
21

Manassas on 2 June to assume command of six thousand men. 

Following his arrival, General Beauregard received a steady 

stream of new regiments that swelled his fighting strength. 

In mid-June Beauregard told Davis that the time was ripe for 

concentrating all available Confederate forces at Manassas, 

destroying the Northern Army, moving on Washington, and 

achieving “an early peace by a few well-delivered blows.” Though 

finding Beauregard’s proposal “brilliant and comprehensive,” 

Davis turned him down because he did not want to expose 

the Shenandoah to Union attack. Although scornful of the 

Confederate president’s failure to approve a move northward, 

Beauregard continued to improve the Manassas defenses.

By late June, Beauregard reorganized his command, designated as the Army of the Potomac, due largely to its increase in size 

to twenty-two thousand officers and men (Table 2). Beauregard’s 

force also included a reserve of two infantry regiments, an artillery 

battery, and a battalion of cavalry led by Brig. Gen. Theophilus 

H. Holmes; a mixed force of South Carolina infantry and cavalry 

organized into a “legion” commanded by Col. Wade Hampton III; 

and a battalion of Virginia cavalry under Maj. Julian Harrison. 

Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, a 42-year-old Ohioan from 

the 1838 West Point class, was called on to wrest control of 

General Johnston (left); General McDowell (National Archives)
22 

Manassas Junction from the Confederates. A veteran of the 

Mexican War, McDowell later returned to the U.S. Military 

Academy as an instructor of tactics. He had been serving as a 

major on General Scott’s staff when war broke out. His active 

duty status, coupled with the political influence exerted by 

fellow Ohioan and Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, 

led to McDowell receiving a promotion to brigadier general 

on 14 May 1861. Two weeks later, General McDowell assumed 

command of all Federal troops south of the Potomac, designated as the Department of Northeastern Virginia. 

Upon taking charge, McDowell organized his army of 

approximately thirty-two thousand officers and men into five 

divisions (Table 3). McDowell sought to delay engaging the 

Confederates citing the need to train his volunteer soldiers, and 

General Scott agreed. Northern sentiment, nevertheless, called 

for an offensive in what many naively believed would be the 

first, and only, battle of the war. President Lincoln responded 

to the demands for action by prodding his generals into battle. 

The new president expressed his own opinion on the need to 

provide the Army with more training by telling McDowell, 

“You are green, it is true; but they are green also; you are all 

green alike.”

Table 2—Confederate Army of the Potomac

Unit Commander Composition

1st Brigade Brig. Gen. Milledge L. Bonham 6 Inf rgts, 1 Cav rgt,

2 Arty batteries

2d Brigade Brig. Gen. Richard S. Ewell* 3 Inf rgts, 1 Cav bn,

1 Arty battery 

3d Brigade Brig. Gen. David R. Jones* 3 Inf rgts, 1 Cav troop,

1 Arty section

4th Brigade Brig. Gen. James E. Longstreet* 5 Inf rgts, 1 Cav troop,

1 Arty section

5th Brigade Col. Philip St. George Cocke* 4 Inf rgts, 1 Inf bn, 1 Cav troop,

2 Arty batteries

6th Brigade Col. Jubal A. Early* 3 Inf rgts, 1 Arty battery

7th Brigade Col. Nathan G. “Shanks” 

Evans*

1 Inf rgt, 1 Inf bn, 2 Cav troops,

1 Arty battery

* U.S. Military Academy graduate
23

As McDowell’s forces were assembling in and around 

Washington, two other Union armies were preparing to conduct 

offensive operations against the northern Shenandoah Valley. 

Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson’s Union Army of the Shenandoah 

had orders to retake Harpers Ferry. A native of Ireland, the 

69-year-old Patterson had served in the U.S. Army during 

the War of 1812 and Mexican War. When Confederate troops 

under General Johnston captured Harpers Ferry, they not 

only seized the Federal arsenal but also severed the Baltimore 

and Ohio Railroad. Once the danger of Maryland joining the 

Confederacy diminished, General Scott ordered Patterson to 

turn his attention to opening the line running through Harpers 

Ferry. 

When Patterson’s 17,000-man force approached on 13 June, 

the Confederates abandoned Harpers Ferry after destroying 

the empty arsenal, railroad, and all public buildings. However, 

it took several days before Patterson decided to push a single 

division across the Potomac to occupy the desolated town. In 

the meantime, Scott changed his mind about the thrust of the 

upcoming campaign. Rather than operate on the periphery 

of Virginia, Scott placed greater emphasis on threatening 

Richmond while protecting Washington. As a result, Scott 

Table 3—Union Army Department of Northeastern Virginia

Unit Commander Composition

1st Division Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler*

3 Bdes (Sherman, Richardson, 

Keyes) w/4 Inf rgts; 1 Bde 

(Schenck) w/3 Inf rgts; 4 Arty 

batteries

2d Division Col. David Hunter*

1 Bde (Burnside) w/4 Inf rgts;

1 Bde (Porter) w/3 Inf rgts,

1 Inf bn, 1 Marine bn, 1 Cav bn;

2 Arty batteries

3d Division Col. Samuel P. Heintzelman*

3 Bdes (Franklin, Willcox, and 

Howard) ea w/4 Inf rgts;

2 Arty batteries

4th Division Brig. Gen. Theodore Runyon 8 Inf rgts

5th Division Col. Dixon S. Miles* 2 Bdes ea w/4 Inf rgts;

3 Arty batteries

* U.S. Military Academy graduate
24 

ordered the regulars under Patterson’s command to march at 

once to Washington. 

Deprived of his best-trained troops, Patterson was reluctant to face the Confederates in open battle. After pulling out 

of Harpers Ferry on 18 June, Patterson moved to Williamsport, 

a small town on the northern bank of the Potomac near 

Hagerstown, Maryland. On 2 July, Patterson once more crossed 

the Potomac into Virginia after brushing aside a Confederate 

force guarding the ford at Falling Waters. The Federals marched 

eight miles the following day until they reached Martinsburg, 

where Patterson ordered his army to hold in place. 

Farther to the west, Union troops under Maj. Gen. George 

B. McClellan were deployed to safeguard the railroad junction at 

Grafton, Virginia. In mid-June, McClellan had ordered his troops 

southward to interdict the vital Parkersburg-Staunton Turnpike. 

Confederates under Brig. Gen. Robert S. Garnett reacted by establishing defensive positions at Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill, while 

also planning a flanking movement along the Wheeling branch of 

the turnpike to threaten Grafton. A standoff ensued for several 

weeks as both sides prepared to attack. McClellan struck first on 

11 July, defeating the Confederates at Rich Mountain and forcing 

them to retreat from Laurel Hill. General Garnett died two days 

later in a skirmish at Corrick’s Ford.

On 15 July, Patterson pushed his command south from 

Martinsburg and halted at Bunker Hill, nine miles north of 

Winchester. This movement was intended to shift Richmond’s attention away from events taking place to the east. On the following day, 

McDowell moved on Manassas Junction. Shortly after midnight, 

Johnston received dispatches directing him to move to Manassas 

as soon as possible. Before Johnston could reinforce Beauregard, 

he had to evade Patterson. On 18 July, he ordered Colonel Stuart 

to deploy his 1st Virginia Cavalry to screen the army’s movement 

through Ashby’s Gap to Piedmont, where the infantry would be 

sent to Manassas via the railroad with Jackson’s brigade in the lead. 

The Confederate cavalry and artillery units marched via the road 

network to Manassas. The thirteen thousand troops under Patterson 

advanced so slowly on Winchester that Johnston not only found it 

possible to begin moving eastward without Federal interference, 

but he also had time to form a fifth brigade, commanded by U.S. 

Military Academy graduate Brig. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, using 

five recently arrived regiments (Map 3). 
25

Afternoon

21 Jul

20 Jul

Morning

21 Jul

B e a u r e g a r d J o h n s t o n F r o m

S h e n a n d o a h Va l l e y

M c D o w e l l ’s M a i n E f f o rt

21 Jul

Diversion

21 Jul

ords F

ob Pr

de

18

Ju

l

16–20 Jul

Union

Concentration

Catharp ni Cr

You n g 's

Br

Bull Run

Cub

R

u

n

Broad Run

 M A N A S S A S G A P R R

O R A N G E A N D A LEX A N D R I A R R

U N FI N IS H E D R R

Stone Bridge

Henry

Robinson

to Washington

to Aldie

WARR E N TON TU R N PIK E

Sudley Springs

New Market

Groveton

Centreville

Manassas Junction

Gainesville

Hay Market

16–21 July 1861

B AT TLE OF BULL RUN

Axis of Union MovementAxis of Confederate MovementMajor EngagementHigh Ground Above 500 Feet

Miles

1 2 1 0

Map 3
26 

Awaiting reinforcements from Johnston in the Shenandoah 

Valley and troops from Richmond, Beauregard assumed a 

defensive position along Bull Run, a small stream north of 

Manassas Junction. Covering eight miles, Beauregard defended 

an area from Union Mills Ford to the Stone Bridge, where he 

positioned six brigades to protect the multiple crossings of 

Bull Run. Ewell held the far right flank at Union Mills Ford, 

to Ewell’s left was Brig. Gen. David R. Jones at McLean’s Ford, 

Brig. Gen. James E. Longstreet defended Blackburn’s Ford, 

Brig. Gen. Milledge L. Bonham covered Mitchell’s Ford, and 

Col. Philip St. George Cocke held the crossing at Ball’s Ford. 

Col. Nathan G. “Shanks” Evans defended the Stone Bridge at 

the far left of the Confederate line on the Warrenton Turnpike. 

Beauregard placed Col. Jubal A. Early’s brigade in reserve equidistant between McLean’s, Blackburn’s, and Mitchell’s fords. 

At 0900 on 18 July, the lead elements of McDowell’s army 

arrived at Centreville. Receiving extra rations of food and 

supplies, soldiers eagerly looked forward to seeing combat in 

the opening battle of the war. Pvt. Elisha Hunt Rhodes of the 

2d Rhode Island stated, “We shall probably have the chance 

to pay our southern brethren a visit upon the sacred soil of 

Virginia very soon. Well I hope we shall be successful and give 

the Rebels a good pounding.” While waiting for the remainder 

of his army to come up and to plan for an offensive, McDowell 

searched for an undefended crossing of Bull Run. Finding 

that the Confederates occupied a position south of Bull Run, 

McDowell ordered Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler’s 1st Division to 

conduct a reconnaissance on the Confederate right flank but 

not to initiate an engagement. When Tyler reached Blackburn’s 

Ford, he reported observing an artillery battery but “no great 

body of troops.” In fact, unbeknownst to Tyler, Longstreet’s 

brigade held a defensive position at the ford. Tyler ordered 

his artillery forward, followed by skirmishers from Col. Israel 

B. Richardson’s brigade and the 1st Massachusetts. When 

Longstreet’s artillery responded to the Union demonstration, 

Tyler sent in more men from Richardson’s brigade. 

By 1600 the demonstration had ended. Tyler sustained 

eighty-three casualties in the firefight, while the defenders lost 

sixty-eight. In his report on the engagement, based on statements made by two prisoners, Longstreet estimated his opponent’s losses at “nine hundred to two thousand.” As a result, 
27

Beauregard felt the clash brought “special prestige” to his 

troops while damaging the morale of the newly recruited Union 

forces. Once McDowell learned of the fight at Blackburn’s Ford, 

he was furious with Tyler because he had disobeyed orders not 

to initiate an engagement. McDowell’s public rebuke of Tyler, 

however, had the effect of squelching initiative throughout the 

Federal command.

After finding no success at Blackburn’s Ford, McDowell 

now planned to envelop the Confederate left flank. Maj. 

John G. Barnard, McDowell’s chief engineer, explored the 

potential crossings of Bull Run upstream from Blackburn’s 

Ford. Because the Stone Bridge constituted the most obvious 

crossing, McDowell believed it would be heavily defended. 

Barnard found two potential alternates: Poplar Ford, one mile 

north of the Stone Bridge, and Sudley Ford, two miles north 

of the bridge. After scouting the routes over a two-day period, 

Barnard assured McDowell that Sudley Ford, unguarded by 

the Confederates, would serve as a viable point to envelop the 

Confederate flank.

Settling on Sudley Ford, McDowell devised a plan to cross 

Bull Run and smash the Confederate left flank. McDowell 

planned to set three divisions in motion to accomplish this 

objective. The attack would begin with a demonstration against 

the Stone Bridge by Tyler’s division. As Tyler’s men conducted a 

feint against the Confederates defending the bridge, Col. Samuel 

P. Heintzelman’s and Col. David Hunter’s divisions would cross 

Bull Run at Poplar Ford and Sudley Ford, respectively. Once 

across Bull Run, Heintzelman’s and Hunter’s forces, numbering 

thirteen thousand, would move south along the ManassasSudley Road to assault Beauregard’s left flank. McDowell also 

planned for diversions at Mitchell’s Ford and Blackburn’s Ford, 

south of the Stone Bridge, to pin down the remainder of the 

Confederate forces while the flanking operation took place. 

The Union forces were to cross Bull Run just after dawn on 21 

July. 

As Major Barnard searched for a way to outflank the 

Confederate position, General Beauregard designed his own 

plan to attack McDowell. Beauregard assumed that General 

Johnston would march part of his command overland from 

Winchester through Ashby’s Gap to Aldie, where it would be 

in a position to fall on McDowell’s right flank. Anticipating a 
28 

strong Federal reaction to Johnston’s appearance, Beauregard 

planned to launch his own assault across Bull Run to strike 

McDowell’s force in the rear, thus catching the Federals 

between two Confederate armies. In anticipation of the assault, 

Beauregard began shifting brigades south of the Stone Bridge. 

General Jackson and his Virginians arrived on the evening of 

19 July, bringing word that Johnston’s army intended to travel 

by train to Manassas rather than marching to Aldie. Jackson’s 

report had no effect on Beauregard’s chosen course of action. 

Beauregard continued to reposition forces until only two 

brigades, Cocke and Evans, remained north of Ball’s Ford. The 

remaining eight brigades, including Jackson, Bee, and Bartow, 

were clustered between Manassas Junction and McLean’s Ford. 

The new arrivals raised the number of Confederates opposing 

McDowell to almost thirty thousand troops.

General Johnston arrived at 1200 on 20 July. Johnston, 

senior in rank to Beauregard, assumed command of all 

Confederate forces at Manassas. Although Johnston’s arrival 

rendered Beauregard’s plans moot, Beauregard continued to 

press for an immediate attack against McDowell. Johnston, who 

mistakenly believed Patterson would follow him to Manassas 

Junction, approved Beauregard’s proposal to attack McDowell 

before the two Federal armies joined. Johnston, who had not 

slept since 17 July, asked Beauregard to put together a draft 

plan while he rested. Beauregard delivered the plan to Johnston 

at 0400 on 21 July. Although Johnston agreed with the proposal, 

he suggested one modification. Rather than participating in 

the main assault, Johnston wanted Bee’s and Jackson’s brigades 

retained in a central location as a reserve in case the Federals 

launched a counterattack against Beauregard’s left flank. 

Beauregard agreed to the suggestion, adding Colonel Hampton’s 

legion to the reserve on his own initiative. Mounted couriers 

bearing orders to the attacking brigades left the Confederate 

headquarters a short while afterward.

The Federals, however, had already stolen a march on 

Beauregard and Johnston. At 0230 on 21 July, the three Federal 

divisions began marching out of their camps near Centreville. 

Leading the procession, Tyler’s forces reached the high ground 

opposite the Stone Bridge at 0500. Tyler committed Brig. 

Gen. Robert C. Schenck’s brigade to the diversionary mission, 

leaving Col. William T. Sherman’s and Col. Erasmus D. Keyes’ 
29

brigades in place near Blackburn’s Ford. Tyler ordered the firing 

of a 30-pounder Parrott rifle to signal the beginning of the 

demonstration to Hunter and Heintzelman. Evans’ brigade held 

the Confederate position at the Stone Bridge. Approximately 

eleven hundred men, including Col. John B. E. Sloan’s 4th 

South Carolina, Maj. Chatham Roberdeau Wheat’s 1st Special 

Battalion Louisiana Volunteers, two guns from the Lynchburg 

Artillery, and two troops of cavalry, made up the defending 

force. Evans deployed his command in a line behind the crest 

of Van Pelt Hill, named for property owner Alexander Van Pelt, 

thereby concealing his position from the Union force’s view. 

In addition to the troops arrayed behind Van Pelt Hill, Evans 

deployed Wheat’s battalion near a ford just north of the Stone 

Bridge and two companies of South Carolinians on both sides 

of the bridge itself.

When Tyler’s artillery opened its cannonade, Evans directed 

his gunners not to return fire. After an hour of “brisk fire,” 

Evans realized that the movement on his front did not constitute a deliberate assault but a mere demonstration. Colonel 

Evans kept his main body under cover, relying on skirmishers 

to reply to the Federal fire. Disconcerted by reports indicating 

Looking south across the ruins of the Stone Bridge over Bull Run. The Van Pelt 

farm is located on the high ground to the upper right. (National Archives)
30 

the Confederates were offering little resistance, McDowell set 

up a temporary headquarters on Warrenton Turnpike where 

he could keep a close eye on events taking place south of the 

flanking movement. 

Capt. Edward P. Alexander, manning a signal station on 

Wilcoxen’s Hill, noticed Federal infantry and artillery moving 

eight miles to the north about 0830. He sent a message to Evans, 

“Look out on your left. You are turned.” Leaving the South 

Carolinians nearest the bridge in place, Evans ordered the 

remainder of his brigade, nearly nine hundred men, to establish 

a defensive position farther to the west. Fortune favored Evans 

as the advancing Federals were delayed by unexpected obstacles. Burnside’s men, for example, found a narrow path instead 

of a trafficable road. Moving in halting fashion, the Federal 

column required three more hours than originally allotted to 

reach Sudley Ford. To make matters worse, the guide leading 

Heintzelman’s 3d Division could not locate Poplar Ford. As a 

result, Heintzelman fell in behind Hunter as the latter moved 

toward Sudley Ford. Instead of entering the fight with two 

divisions advancing abreast, the Federals were attacking in a 

column of divisions on a single brigade front.

The problems encountered by Burnside and Heintzelman 

allowed Evans to reposition his forces in a wooded ravine 

below the crest of Matthews Hill by 0920. Evans positioned his 

supporting artillery to the south of his battle line, with 2d Lt. 

Lincoln C. Leftwich’s 6-pounder located near the ManassasSudley Road and Warrenton Turnpike intersection and 1st 

Lt. George S. Davidson’s 6-pounder deployed north of the 

Robinson house on Henry Hill. The two cavalry troops were 

assembled on either flank of Leftwich’s cannon. The redeployment, although timely, produced the first of several incidents of 

mistaken identity during the battle when the 4th South Carolina 

opened fire on Wheat’s battalion as both units marched toward 

Matthews Hill (Map 4).

At 0930, Burnside’s men, led by two companies of skirmishers, passed over the crest of Matthews Hill. They could 

see Wheat’s battalion and a company of the 4th South Carolina 

firing at each other. The skirmishers announced their presence 

with a volley directed at the Louisianans. The gunfire spurred 

Burnside to order forward Capt. William H. Reynolds’ battery 

of six 13-pound James rifles. Reynolds, taking position behind 
31

Ba rtow

Bee

Evan s

Imboden

Leftwich Davidson

Bu rn side

Sherman

Keyes

Reynolds

Grifn

Porte r

B u l l R u n

oY n u g s’ B r a n c h

W A

R R

E N

T O N T U R N

P I

K E

M A N A S S A S - S U D L E Y

R O A D

Dogan house

Stone house

Robinson house

 Van Pelt house

L. Carter house

Matthews house

Henry house

Stone

Bridge

Matthews Hill

Henry Hill

Situation at Late Morning

BAT TLE OF BULL RUN

Matthews Hill

21 July 1861

Contour Interval 10 feet

0 250 500

Yards

Infantry UnitArtillery

Map 4
32 

the crest, opened fire on the Confederate guns located to the 

south. Company F, 2d Rhode Island, joined the skirmishers as 

Wheat organized a counterattack against the Federals. Wheat’s 

men scrambled toward the crest only to encounter a volley from 

three companies of Rhode Islanders. Wheat’s troops retreated, 

reorganized themselves, and launched a second assault that 

proved a greater success. The Federal skirmishers fell back on 

the main body of the 2d Rhode Island. From the top of the hill, 

Wheat’s men glimpsed the rest of Burnside’s brigade forming 

into a battle line. 

The entire Union brigade did not move forward because 

Colonel Hunter restricted the number of troops Burnside could 

commit. The Federal brigade commander settled on sending 

the 2d Rhode Island into the fight. As the Rhode Islanders 

struggled with Wheat for control of Matthews Hill, Hunter’s 

trailing brigade under Col. Andrew Porter arrived. Hunter 

directed Porter to take his brigade on a wide westward swing 

to occupy the adjacent Dogan Ridge. Porter’s move to the 

west would take several hours, leaving the fight in Burnside’s 

hands for the time being. Moments later, Hunter received a 

neck wound that led to him passing command to Burnside. 

Burnside exercised his new found authority by feeding more 

troops into the immediate fight. When he attempted to deploy 

the 71st New York and 2d New Hampshire, however, both regiments had great difficulty forming up. Burnside then sent his 

reserve, the 1st Rhode Island, to assist Reynolds and the 2d 

Rhode Island. The 1st Rhode Island advanced to a point where 

it covered the left flank of the 2d Rhode Island. The New York 

and New Hampshire regiments, after sorting themselves out, 

joined the Rhode Islanders about thirty minutes later. 

Confederate resistance, coupled with Northern command 

and control difficulties, allowed Evans to check the Federal 

advance for ninety minutes. As more Union troops arrived, it 

became increasingly difficult for the Confederates to hold off 

Burnside. Spotting Capt. John D. Imboden’s four-gun battery 

unlimbering on Henry Hill, Evans rode off to seek assistance. 

He discovered four regiments from the brigades of General 

Bee and Colonel Bartow deployed nearby. Evans urged Bee to 

send him reinforcements. Leaving the 7th Georgia behind to 

secure Henry Hill, Bee and Bartow led three regiments, plus 

two companies of the 11th Mississippi, to Matthews Hill. 
33

Burnside’s brigade now faced more than twenty-eight hundred 

Confederate defenders. 

The fighting on Matthews Hill grew fiercer as both sides 

committed additional troops. Bartow deployed the 8th Georgia 

on the right flank where it began to inflict casualties on the 

71st New York. In an effort to counter the new Confederate 

threat to his left flank, Burnside positioned a battalion of U.S. 

regulars, commanded by Maj. George Sykes, to support the New 

Yorkers. The regulars were soon joined by the 1st Minnesota. 

By this time, Colonel Porter’s brigade arrived on Dogan Ridge. 

By extending Burnside’s line across the Manassas-Sudley 

Road, Porter’s brigade found itself in a position to envelop 

the Confederate left. At the same time, McDowell’s orders for 

Tyler’s command to cross Bull Run were also being executed. 

Tyler directed Sherman to lead his 3,400-man brigade across 

a ford located north of the Stone Bridge to a position on the 

left flank of Burnside. Colonel Keyes’ brigade followed behind 

Sherman. The appearance of Sherman on Van Pelt Hill alerted 

Evans to the emerging threat on his right flank. 

With both flanks threatened and little prospect of reinforcements, Evans, Bee, and Bartow had little choice but to 

retreat. The disorganized remnants from all three Confederate 

brigades fell back across the Warrenton Turnpike and Young’s 

Branch toward the reverse slope of Henry Hill. Burnside used 

the respite to pull his battered brigade back as Col. William 

B. Franklin’s command took up position on Matthews Hill. 

Meanwhile, Sherman continued moving west until he reached 

a point just north of Matthews Hill where he halted behind 

Porter and Franklin. Keyes’ brigade took up a position between 

Matthews Hill and Van Pelt Hill as it awaited further orders.

Beauregard and Johnston abandoned thoughts of an 

offensive against Centreville as the sound of battle to the 

north continued. Beauregard sent orders to Ewell, Jones, and 

Longstreet to “make a strong demonstration” between Union 

Mills and Blackburn’s Ford while he began shifting other 

brigades northward. The Hampton Legion, in the process of 

detraining at Manassas Junction, received orders to support 

Evans, Bee, and Bartow. Once the new orders were issued, 

Johnston and Beauregard rode to Henry Hill. They arrived in 

time to witness the Hampton Legion cover the Confederate 

retreat from Matthews Hill. 
34 

Fortunately for the defenders, Jackson had repositioned 

his brigade on Henry Hill on his own initiative. General 

Beauregard originally sent Jackson’s command to the Stone 

Bridge, where Evans’ command had been deployed. Instead of 

remaining there, Jackson marched his brigade to Henry Hill, 

where he met a frantic General Bee, who stated that the Federal 

troops were pushing the Southern forces back. From a tactical 

standpoint, Henry Hill offered an expansive vista relatively 

devoid of vegetation, except a tree line on the south slope. A 

modest frame house once owned by Dr. Isaac Henry stood 

there. A few hundred yards to the east was the Robinson house, 

owned by a free black farmer. 

Soon after arriving, Jackson encountered Captain Imboden 

moving his guns to the rear. Jackson directed Imboden to join 

the batteries he had already positioned near the Robinson 

house. With the addition of Imboden’s cannon, the fire support 

available to Jackson increased to thirteen guns. The Confederate 

gunners obtained a measure of protection by positioning their 

cannon just behind the crest of the hill. Jackson deployed his 

regiments near the Robinson house along a tree line on the 

reverse slope. He positioned two regiments, the 4th and 27th 

Virginia, behind the artillery. Next he located the 5th Virginia 

to the right of the guns. Finally, the 2d Virginia was positioned 

to the immediate left of the artillery line and the 33d Virginia 

on the far left. By placing his men on the slope facing away 

from the Federals, their dispositions were concealed. Jackson 

also ordered Colonel Stuart’s cavalry to secure his left flank. 

The Union high command took little concerted action 

following the Confederate rout from Matthews Hill. Cautious 

in exploiting his victory, McDowell used this opportunity to 

regroup. Although McDowell issued no orders, some Federal 

commanders decided on their own to press the fight. When 

the 27th New York of Porter’s brigade arrived on the field, an 

unknown officer ordered it to follow the retreating Southerners. 

Without stopping to rearrange their formation, the New Yorkers 

plunged down Matthews Hill toward a stone farmhouse at the 

base of Henry Hill. Imboden ordered his cannon to fire on the 

Federals, causing the New Yorkers to shift to the left to escape 

the incoming shells. The commander of the 27th New York 

then spotted a gray-clad regiment approaching from the southeast. Riding out to meet the newcomers, Col. Henry W. Slocum 
35

shouted, “What regiment are you?” The query prompted the 

unknown unit, which proved to be the Hampton Legion, to 

unleash a volley after unfurling its colors. The New Yorkers and 

South Carolinians began trading shots, with the latter gaining 

the upper hand. The Northerners fell back several hundred yards 

before resuming a long-range exchange with Hampton’s troops.

Col. William W. Averell, who assumed brigade command 

on Porter’s wounding, exercised the initiative to send a larger 

force against Henry Hill. Averell ordered the 8th and 14th New 

York to take the high ground occupied by Jackson’s artillery. 

When the two regiments reached the Warrenton Turnpike, they 

were diverted to the left, toward the Hampton Legion, by an 

unidentified staff officer. As the Unionists marched along the 

turnpike, they were showered with shells by the Confederate 

guns on Henry Hill. Both New York regiments broke after 

withstanding a few minutes of punishment. The appearance of 

more Federal infantry, however brief, persuaded the Hampton 

Legion to pull back to Henry Hill.

General Tyler now decided to launch a coordinated 

assault against Henry Hill. At 1230, Tyler ordered Keyes to ford 

Young’s Branch to seize the Confederate cannon visible near the 

Robinson house. Leaving behind two regiments as a reserve, 

the Federal brigade commander ordered the 2d Maine and 3d 

Connecticut up the grassy slope toward the Robinson house. 

The Union advance inadvertently flanked Bee’s 7th Georgia and 

the Hampton Legion, now positioned on the extreme right of 

Jackson’s line. The unexpected attack triggered a mass exodus 

of panicked Georgians and South Carolinians heading for the 

rear. Their sudden departure exposed the 5th Virginia, which 

exchanged volleys with the Northerners rather than retreat. The 

fire grew so intense that Keyes decided to withdraw. After pulling 

back from Henry Hill, Keyes turned his attention eastward to 

securing the Stone Bridge in the hopes of opening up the turnpike 

for Schenck’s brigade. Schenck, remembering McDowell’s rebuke 

to Tyler from the previous day, remained on the far bank of Bull 

Run.

Upon learning that four of the flanking column’s five brigades 

had crossed Bull Run, McDowell issued orders to resume the 

offensive. Along with Tyler’s two brigades, in theory, this gave 

McDowell a striking force of eighteen thousand troops. Burnside’s 

brigade, however, remained behind while its regiments replenished 
36 

their ammunition. McDowell also ordered Maj. William F. Barry, 

his chief of artillery, to reposition two batteries one thousand yards 

forward onto the western spur of Henry Hill. Barry selected the 

two batteries on Dogan Ridge—Capt. James B. Ricketts’ Battery 

I, 1st Artillery (six 10-pound Parrott rifles), and Capt. Charles 

Griffin’s Battery D, 5th Artillery (four 10-pound Parrott rifles and 

two 12-pound howitzers)—for the task. Both Ricketts and Griffin 

protested the orders to advance without waiting for infantry 

support. Ricketts noted, “I saw at a glance that I was going into 

great peril for my horses and men.” Leaving behind an inoperable 

cannon belonging to Griffin, both batteries whipped their teams 

forward at a gallop. Griffin’s five guns unlimbered just north of 

Henry house while Ricketts established his battery on Griffin’s 

right.

The shift from Dogan Ridge to Henry Hill placed Griffin 

and Ricketts well within range of Confederate artillery near the 

Robinson house. Jackson’s thirteen cannon began dueling with 

the eleven Federal guns near Henry house. A mere 350 yards 

separated the opposing cannon. For over thirty minutes, the 

Confederate and Union batteries traded shells. The Southern 

guns were difficult to hit because they were placed just behind 

the crest. On the other hand, the Union gun crews were exposed 

on an open hilltop. Many Federal shells overshot their targets 

while the Southern gunners inflicted casualties on the men and 

horses of both Union batteries. 

After ordering Griffin and Ricketts forward, Barry sought 

to provide them with infantry support. The Marine battalion 

and 14th New York from Averell’s brigade were told to support 

Griffin. During the movement to Henry Hill, however, the 

Federal infantry was showered with Confederate shells. The 

New Yorkers, after braving the gauntlet of Confederate fire, 

formed a line of battle behind Griffin’s cannon. The marines 

attracted such a storm of incoming fire that they broke three 

times before streaming off the battlefield in disarray. Barry 

then sent the 1st Minnesota and the 11th New York forward 

in support of Ricketts. In an effort to avoid some of the shells 

directed at Ricketts, the 11th New York occupied a position 

behind and slightly south of the battery. The Minnesotans fell 

in on the right flank of the New York regiment. 

The 11th New York soon encountered soldiers from the 33d 

Virginia, commanded by Col. Arthur C. Cummings, positioned 
37

on Jackson’s left flank. Viewing the Virginians, who were wearing 

civilian clothes, the Federal troops were unsure of their allegiance. 

To complicate matters further, in the rush to mobilize troops, 

Federal units were not uniformly dressed in blue; soldiers in the 

11th New York, for instance, were dressed in colorful Zouave 

uniforms, which were also worn by some Confederate units. The 

Virginians clarified the matter by opening a deadly volley on the 

New Yorkers. Unnerved by the nearness of the enemy and the 

loss of their regimental commander, the New Yorkers headed 

for the rear. The Minnesotans lasted a bit longer, trading volleys 

with the Confederates before retiring in good order to a nearby 

wooded area.

The scene was now set for the arrival of Confederate cavalry 

on the field of battle. Colonel Stuart’s 1st Virginia Cavalry 

spent the morning reconnoitering Bull Run before taking 

position behind the battle line to await orders. After waiting 

until midafternoon for an opportunity to enter the battle, 

Stuart received orders to take his regiment where “the action 

was hottest.” Stuart arrived with two companies of horsemen 

as the New Yorkers and Minnesotans were retreating. As he 

prepared to charge, Stuart paused for a moment to determine 

if the retreating soldiers were Confederates. The answer came 

in a few seconds when the Stars and Stripes were observed at 

the head of the column. Stuart ordered his men to charge the 

Union force. While the charge shattered the 11th New York’s 

formation, the Southern cavalry lost eighteen horses and 

twenty-nine men in return. After the mounted unit retired, 

the 1st Minnesota continued marching to a point four hundred 

yards behind its original position.

Unable to make much progress in the ongoing artillery 

duel, Griffin moved a section of two pieces into position to the 

right of Ricketts’ battery. By doing so, Griffin hoped to enfilade 

the line of Confederate guns confronting Ricketts and the rest 

of his battery. However, the move also served to place Griffin’s 

men within two hundred yards of the 33d Virginia. No sooner 

had Griffin assumed his new position than he noticed a line of 

infantry forming up to his right front. Major Barry rode up as 

Griffin’s gunners were preparing to open fire on the unknown 

unit. Barry ordered Griffin to hold his fire. Before the Unionists 

could identify the body of troops, the Confederates blasted the 

pair of cannon with a point-blank volley. While several Federals 
38 

were hit, their horses positioned just to the rear suffered even 

more. The surviving artillerymen departed, leaving the section 

unmanned and immobilized. At the same time, the remainder 

of Griffin’s battery began withdrawing from its position north 

of Henry house. 

The Confederates did not have long to enjoy their victory. 

Coming under pressure from the 14th New York and resurgent elements of the 1st Minnesota, the 33d Virginia fell back 

through the 2d Virginia, which also began to retreat. The 

jubilant Federals surged past the recaptured cannon until they 

received a blast of canister from the opposing Confederate 

guns. Some of the attackers retreated a short distance while 

others attempted, without success, to haul away Griffin’s abandoned cannon. 

In response to the situation confronting Colonel 

Cummings, General Jackson ordered the 4th and 27th Virginia 

to counterattack the advancing Federals. Both Virginia regiments, supported by the 49th Virginia Battalion, 2d Mississippi, 

and 6th North Carolina, a late arriving element of Bee’s brigade, 

advanced on Ricketts’ battery. The Federal artillerists poured 

canister into the attacking ranks but were compelled to abandon 

their guns. While defending his guns, Ricketts was wounded in 

General Bee (left); General Jackson

(National Archives)
39

the thigh and taken prisoner. Although the Federals were able 

to draw off some caissons and limbers, the Virginians captured 

all six Parrott rifles. 

Soon after the counterattack started, the 6th North 

Carolina found itself confronted by a detachment from the 14th 

New York guarding Griffin’s recaptured cannon. After driving 

off the New Yorkers and seizing the guns for a second time, the 

North Carolinians continued northward. A bullet soon felled 

the North Carolina regiment’s commander, precipitating its 

retreat back to the start line. The other attacking Confederate 

units found themselves confronted by the 1st Michigan of 

Col. Orlando B. Willcox’s brigade, supported by the 5th and 

11th Massachusetts from Franklin’s brigade. Although the 5th 

Massachusetts broke after coming under heavy fire, the 11th 

Massachusetts, clad in gray uniforms, succeeded in retaking 

Ricketts’ battery. The Federal onslaught also succeeded in 

forcing back the 4th and 27th Virginia, along with the 49th 

Virginia Battalion. 

General Bee, still occupied with re-forming his shattered 

brigade, realized that Jackson needed help. Bee pointed up the 

hill toward Jackson while delivering one of the most well-known 

exclamations recorded during the Civil War: “Look, men, there 

is Jackson standing like a stone wall! Let us determine to die 

here, and we will conquer! Follow me!” The name “Stonewall” 

Jackson and the nickname of the “Stonewall” Brigade were 

born. Trailing behind Bee, the 4th Alabama began moving up 

the reverse slope of Henry Hill.

General Beauregard, unwilling to cede control of Henry 

Hill, ordered yet another counterattack. Under Beauregard’s 

personal direction, Colonel Hampton’s South Carolina Legion, 

flanked by the 5th Virginia, lunged toward the silent Federal 

guns. General Bee, at the head of the 4th Alabama, and Colonel 

Bartow, leading the 7th Georgia, also participated in the 

counterattack. The Confederate assault drove back the 11th 

Massachusetts, although at some cost. The latest Southern 

effort resulted in the deaths of Bee and Bartow. Bee was the 

highest-ranking officer to die in the battle. The Confederates 

remained on Henry Hill as the Federals fell back across the 

Manassas-Sudley Road. (See Map 5.)

By 1500, the Federal situation had become increasingly 

desperate. McDowell deployed about half of his army to the 
(Remnants)

Evans

B e e

Bartow

Hampton

Legion

27 a V

7 Ga

3 3 Va

9 4 Va

Va 2 

Va 4 5 Va

Stuart

J

a

c

k

s o n e y e s K

11 NY

1 Minn

Sherman

Howard

Porter

Grifn

Ricketts

Marines

B u l l R u n

oY n u g s’ B ar n c h Stone Bridge

C H I N N R I D G E Henry Hill

W A

R R E N T O N T U R N P I K E

M A N A S S A S - S U D L E Y

R O A D

Dogan house

Stone house

Robinson

house

Lewis house

 Van Pelt house

Henry house

Situation at 1430–1500

BAT TLE OF BULL RUN

Henry Hill

21 July 1861

Contour Interval 10 feet

0 250 500

Yards

Map 5
41

fight on Matthews Hill and Henry Hill but failed to reinforce 

the initial success by committing more troops. In the attempt 

to strengthen his position, McDowell sent in Sherman’s and 

Howard’s brigades. Moving his men down the Manassas-Sudley 

Road and across the Warrenton Turnpike, Sherman filed into 

the melee taking place on Henry Hill. The Federal assault 

began like previous efforts, with a single regiment, rather 

than an entire brigade, making the attack. The 13th New York 

marched partway up the hill where it became embroiled in a 

firefight with the Hampton Legion. Sherman then ordered the 

gray-clad 2d Wisconsin forward. Mistaken for Confederates 

by other Union troops, the regiment retreated after taking fire 

from both front and rear. A third regiment from Sherman’s 

brigade, the 79th New York, reached Henry house before 

being repulsed. Sherman then ordered a fourth attack. Under 

cover of two cannon the 69th New York, joined by the 38th 

New York on its right, charged up the corpse-strewn slope. In 

the ensuing struggle, the 69th secured Ricketts’ cannon, but 

its triumph proved short-lived, for within moments the 8th 

and 18th Virginia recaptured the guns for the final time. The 

Confederates had finally secured Henry Hill after two hours of 

heavy fighting. 

The two Virginia regiments, drawn from Cocke’s brigade, 

represented the first of thousands of fresh Confederate troops 

heading into the fight. General Johnston, having abandoned 

the original plan to attack Centreville, methodically stripped 

the Southern Bull Run defenses of men and cannon. As each 

new Southern regiment arrived at Henry Hill, the tactical 

momentum swung further in favor of the defenders. McDowell, 

on the other hand, did not have a similar source of fresh 

reserves. Six of seven available Federal brigades had taken part 

in the fight for Henry Hill. The seventh brigade, commanded 

by Howard, did not make its appearance until sometime after 

1500. By that point, McDowell sought to shift the fight west 

of Henry Hill. McDowell ordered Howard to envelop the 

Confederate left after securing Chinn Ridge. 

Howard approached Chinn Ridge as Johnston dispatched 

seventeen hundred men from Col. Arnold Elzey brigade, 

led by General Smith, to occupy the same piece of ground. 

Elzey’s brigade, which detrained at Manassas Junction around 

1600, represented the last of the reinforcements from the 
42 

Shenandoah Valley. The 2d and 8th South Carolina were the first 

Confederates to spot the Federals moving onto Chinn Ridge, 

which ignited a firefight between the opposing sides. Smith 

soon received support from Colonel Early’s brigade, which had 

been positioned at Blackburn’s Ford, and from Colonel Stuart’s 

cavalry. Firing rapidly into Howard’s advancing brigade, these 

Confederates halted the Federal attack. When Howard ordered 

his command to fall back several hundred yards to reorganize, 

his subordinates misinterpreted the directive as an order to 

retreat. The Federal brigade disintegrated after a Confederate 

battery opened fire on Howard’s men at 500-yards range. 

The unexpected collapse of Howard’s brigade forced 

McDowell to admit he had lost the battle for Manassas Junction. 

McDowell ordered Major Sykes’ battalion of regulars—the only 

force he considered reliable at this stage of the battle—to cover 

a retreat by the entire army. At the same time, Johnston ordered 

a battalion of cavalry, along with Capt. Delaware Kemper’s 

Alexandria Light Artillery Battery, to pursue the withdrawing 

Unionists. About two miles east of Bull Run, the tiny Confederate 

force caught up with the Federal army. Kemper directed one of 

his cannon to fire a shot at a crowd of wagons and troops crossing 

Cub Run Bridge. The bursting shell, which overturned a wagon to 

block the bridge, led to wholesale panic among the Northerners. 

One modern historian noted, “Frenzied soldiers detoured around 

the bridge in wild confusion. Men splashed through the creek and 

climbed the steep muddy bank on the opposite side. Equipment 

became entangled, much of which the troops tossed aside.” Unable 

to pass over the bridge, the Federals abandoned fourteen artillery 

pieces and dozens of wagons, caissons, and limbers. 

Despite the blocked bridge, most of the surviving Federals 

were able to withdraw to a defensive position at Centreville by 

sunset. Shortly after 1600, Major Barnard sent a telegraph to 

the capital: “The day is lost. Save Washington and the remnants 

of this army. . . . The routed troops will not reform.” As the roar 

of the artillery fell silent, President Davis arrived at the battlefield. He rode toward Sudley Ford where he found Johnston and 

received the details of the day’s fight. Near midnight on 21 July, 

Davis sent a dispatch to Richmond: “Night has closed upon a 

hard-fought field. Our forces have won a glorious victory.”

On 4 August, General McDowell submitted his official report 

on the engagement. In the document, McDowell maintained that 
43

his troops fought bravely but were defeated because well-rested 

Confederate forces were defending familiar ground while tired 

Federal troops were engaged “out on the open fields.” In the wake 

of the embarrassing rout, President Lincoln began searching for 

a replacement for McDowell. Though the Confederates defeated 

their opponents in the first major battle on Virginia’s native soil, 

they were not able to capitalize on their victory because of their 

own disorganization and exhaustion. Despite a lingering belief 

that the victory had proven incomplete, Beauregard and Johnston 

succeeded in defending Manassas Junction and protecting 

Richmond. 

The war’s first battle foreshadowed the carnage to come. 

Combined losses reached nearly five thousand men. McDowell 

reported a loss of 2,896, including 460 killed, 1,124 wounded, 

and 1,312 captured or missing. The 1,982 Confederate losses 

included 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, and 13 missing. The 

Confederates also captured 27 artillery pieces, 500 rifles, 

500,000 rounds of ammunition, numerous limbers and wagons, 

and a significant amount of military stores. Capt. James B. Fry, 

acting assistant adjutant general for McDowell, summarized 

the mood of the country after the U.S. Army’s large-scale 

baptism of fire, “The first martial effervescence of the country 

was over. . . . The South triumphant and confident; the North 

disappointed but determined.” 

The Fight for Missouri

In the period before and following Bull Run, both sides 

sought to bring uncommitted border states into the fold without 

appearing as the aggressor. When pro-Southern Marylanders 

attacked a Massachusetts regiment passing through Baltimore 

on 19 April, the incident provided Lincoln with sufficient pretext 

to send Northern troops into the state. With Maryland secure, 

Federal forces occupied neighboring Delaware. Kentucky, 

however, steadfastly maintained its neutrality in the wake of 

the events taking place in Maryland and Delaware. Pro-Union 

Kentuckians tried to persuade Federal military commanders 

not to invade the state in an effort to preempt a similar move by 

the Confederates. 

The lack of similar restraint by both sides, however, 

resulted in a state of armed conflict within Missouri. At the 

time of South Carolina’s secession, Missouri’s pro-Southern 
44 

governor, Claiborne F. Jackson, attempted to maintain a 

veneer of neutrality. Despite Governor Jackson’s preferences, 

the majority of delegates attending a special state secession 

convention voted to remain in the Union. While the governor 

remained bound by that decision, he believed public opinion 

would shift in favor of secession. Missouri Unionists rallied 

under the leadership of U.S. Congressman Francis P. Blair Jr. 

Chief among Blair’s military supporters was Capt. Nathaniel 

Lyon, a Regular Army officer responsible for securing the St. 

Louis arsenal. A Connecticut native, Lyon graduated from the 

U.S. Military Academy in 1841. Lyon fought in the Seminole 

and Mexican Wars, spent a tour of duty in California, and had 

been stationed in neighboring Kansas during the turbulent 

1850s. 

In response to Governor Jackson’s support of prosecessionist groups, the Lincoln administration authorized Lyon to 

begin mustering Missouri Unionists on 18 April. Meanwhile, 

Governor Jackson wrote President Davis asking for cannon 

captured at the Baton Rouge arsenal to be secretly shipped 

to Missouri. Citing the Militia Act of 1858, Jackson also 

summoned the pro-Southern state militia to assemble at St. 

Louis for its annual training. On 10 May 1861, Lyon preempted 

the governor’s attempt to muster a prosecessionist military force 

by seizing Camp Jackson, a militia bivouac situated six miles 

outside of St. Louis. Lacking a suitable enclosure to hold the 

seven hundred prisoners, Lyon decided to issue them paroles 

at the Federal arsenal. As the group moved into St. Louis, a 

mob of secessionists lined the streets and taunted Lyon’s men. 

In the midst of the harassment and pelting of rocks and bottles, 

someone within the crowd opened fire. Lyon’s troops returned 

fire. Two of Lyon’s men were killed in the exchange, as well 

as three captive secessionists and twenty-eight citizens. The 

proslavery press in Missouri immediately labeled the incident 

as the “Camp Jackson Massacre.” 

The day after the clash between Lyon’s troops and the 

prosecessionist mob, the legislature established the Missouri 

State Guard. Responsible to the governor and loyal to the 

state, these troops were not mustered into service as part 

of the Confederate armies, although some transferred to 

Confederate units later that fall. Governor Jackson appointed 

Sterling Price to the rank of major general to command the 
45

State Guard. A Virginia native, Price fought in the Mexican 

War and later served as Missouri governor from 1852 until 

1856. Although Price began forming “divisions” consisting 

of a mix of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, a pervasive lack 

of weapons and equipment hampered his efforts to turn his 

command into a viable military force.

On 11 June, Lyon and Blair met with Jackson and Price at 

the governor’s suite at the Planter’s House hotel in St. Louis. 

Lyon, recently promoted to brigadier general, informed Jackson 

and Price that he would not acquiesce on any issue of Federal 

authority in Missouri. The meeting reached a climax when 

Lyon declared, “Rather than concede to the State of Missouri 

for one single instant the right to dictate to my government in 

any manner however important, I would see you, and you, and 

you, and every man, woman, and child in the state, dead and 

buried!” Accepting Lyon’s message as a preemptive declaration 

of war, Governor Jackson called for fifty thousand volunteers to 

defend the state.

Making good on his word, Lyon initiated a campaign to 

capture Jefferson City, the state capital, and to break up Price’s 

“hostile organizations.” Learning of Lyon’s intentions to move 

on the capital, Governor Jackson abandoned Jefferson City on 

13 June after ordering the State Guard to organize at Boonville, a 

small town on the Missouri River to the northwest. Accompanied 

by seventeen hundred men, Lyon marched into Jefferson City 

two days later and raised the Union flag above the abandoned 

capitol building. Leaving three companies to hold Jefferson 

City, Lyon embarked the remainder on steamboats. Just prior to 

Lyon’s arrival, Price left Boonville to join the remainder of his 

forces assembling at Lexington. 

Lyon marched to Boonville after landing below the town 

on 17 June, where he engaged the State Guard troops under the 

command of Col. John S. Marmaduke. The Union forces routed 

their opponents in a brief clash that produced fewer than a 

hundred casualties for both sides. Having gained control of 

the Missouri River and thwarted Governor Jackson’s efforts to 

bring the state into the Confederacy, Lyon now sought a decisive 

victory over the Missouri State Guard. Receiving reinforcements from Kansas and Iowa, Lyon’s army numbered nearly 

twenty-four hundred. His forces moved out from Boonville on 

3 July to seek out Price’s command in southwestern Missouri.
46 

Meanwhile, Price also strengthened his army. He retained 

command of the Missouri State Guard, which consisted of 

seventy-one hundred troops organized into five “divisions” (a 

term denoting the congressional district where soldiers were 

recruited and not the size of the command) and a separate 

cavalry regiment. Reinforcements from outside Missouri 

arrived in the form of a 2,200-man contingent of Arkansas State 

Troops under Brig. Gen. Nicholas B. Pearce and a 2,700-strong 

Confederate brigade led by Brig. Gen. Benjamin McCulloch. 

The former consisted of three infantry regiments, nearly four 

hundred cavalrymen, and two artillery batteries while the latter 

possessed two regiments of Arkansas mounted infantry, an 

infantry regiment apiece from Louisiana and Arkansas, and a 

combined south Kansas–Texas cavalry regiment. All told, the 

“Western Army,” as termed by McCulloch, consisted of twelve 

thousand troops (including two thousand unarmed Missouri 

State Guard members) and fifteen cannon. 

Although Price contributed the majority of the troops, 

Arkansas and Missouri placed their units under McCulloch’s 

command, a role that he accepted with reluctance. Recognizing 

that Missouri’s internal politics demanded Price play a major 

role in the upcoming campaign, McCulloch consulted with 

the Missourian on all matters of strategy. Although the duo 

quarreled over many issues of varying importance, Price and 

McCulloch agreed their first priority would be to reestablish 

a prosecessionist government in the state and destroy Lyon’s 

Unionist forces. 

The first clash between Lyon and Price took place on 5 July 

when a 1,100-man Federal force led by Colonel Sigel encountered 4,000 state guardsmen under Brig. Gen. James S. Rains. 

After receiving information of nearby enemy troops from proUnion citizens, Sigel planned to attack the secessionists in their 

encampment at Lamar, Missouri. After a 22-mile forced march 

on 4 July, Sigel’s troops bedded down for the night at Carthage, 

a small community eighteen miles south of Lamar. Alerted by 

a clash between a Confederate commissary detail and Federal 

pickets, Rains opted to launch an attack against Carthage the 

following morning. In the meantime, Sigel broke camp prior to 

dawn on 5 July heading for Lamar.

The Federal column reached a point five miles north of 

Carthage when it encountered Confederate cavalry. Outnumbered 
47

by the Unionists, the Southern horsemen gained time for Rains 

by forcing Sigel to form a line of battle before falling back. When a 

local guide brought news of Rains’ presence, Sigel decided to fight 

rather than retreat. The battle began at 0830 when the Federal 

cannon opened fire, eliciting a prompt reply from the opposing 

Confederate batteries. The 45-minute exchange produced much 

confusion and few casualties. The contest ended when Rains 

deployed his cavalry against Sigel’s flanks, forcing him to retreat to 

avoid being surrounded. Dividing his command into two sections, 

Sigel’s men moved in alternating rearward bounds to safety as the 

poorly coordinated Confederate pursuit faltered. Federal casualties totaled eighteen killed, fifty-three wounded and five missing, 

while incomplete State Guard reports placed Confederate losses 

at twelve killed, sixty-four wounded, and one missing.

Not to be deterred, Lyon prepared for a larger push into 

southwestern Missouri. Based on his belief that Price had not yet 

linked up with McCulloch, Lyon wanted to destroy the Southerners 

before they united. Though his forces lacked the supplies for a 

prolonged campaign, Lyon led four brigades totaling fifty-five 

hundred officers and men south from Springfield. He left behind 

twelve hundred troops—two companies of the 1st U.S. Cavalry, 

General Lyon (left); Colonel Sigel, pictured here as General

(National Archives)
48 

a Missouri Union Home Guard regiment, and two cannon—to 

secure Springfield. On 2 August, Lyon’s forces assaulted advance 

elements of the Confederate force at Dug Springs. Although the 

Union attack triggered the precipitate flight of three thousand 

Missouri state guardsmen, Lyon ordered a retreat on learning 

other Confederate forces were nearby. Rather than pursue Lyon, 

the Southerners settled into an encampment along a two-mile 

front of the valley of Wilson’s Creek. 

Though recognizing his inferiority in numbers, Lyon 

decided to launch a spoiling attack before the Confederates 

attacked Springfield. At a commander’s meeting on 8 August, 

Lyon proposed to march to Wilson’s Creek with the entire army. 

Colonel Sigel suggested that the Union forces should be divided 

into two columns, one under his command and the other 

under Lyon. By splitting into two columns, Sigel explained, 

Lyon’s troops could launch simultaneous strikes from different 

directions against the Confederates. Although Lyon rejected 

the proposal at first, by the following day he directed Sigel’s 

brigade to move along a circuitous southern route against 

the Confederate position while Lyon attacked from the north 

with the remainder of the Union force. By agreeing to Sigel’s 

proposal, Lyon changed his original plan of buying enough 

time for his army to escape to defeating the combined forces of 

McCulloch and Price. 

Ignoring an approaching rainstorm, Lyon’s army broke 

camp on 9 August at 1830. Blankets were wrapped around 

cannon and wagon wheels to deaden their sound. Union cavalry 

troopers with the mission of intercepting any prosecessionist 

civilian or Southern soldier preceded both columns. Lyon’s 

column consisted of forty-three hundred men from Iowa, 

Kansas, and Missouri while Sigel’s eleven hundred soldiers were 

all Missourians. After marching five miles west of Springfield 

before turning south across the prairie, Lyon’s column reached 

its objective about 0100. He instructed his men to rest for 

several hours before launching the attack. By daybreak, Sigel’s 

command had also reached a position where it could see the 

Confederate camps (Map 6). 

McCulloch and Price’s original plan called for an early 

morning attack on Springfield with four converging columns 

that would envelop Lyon’s forces. While the Confederates 

had planned to break camp at 2100 the previous evening, 
49

HQ McCulloch

HQ Lyon

Price

1 Kan

Ark Troops

Sigel

2 Kan

1 US

2 Mo 1 Mo

5 Mo 3 Mo(-)

Retreat

Retreat

Totten 1 Iowa

Wilson’s Creek

Wilson’s Creek

Skegg’s Branch

corneld

corneld

Oak Hill

ford

stubble eld

E.B.Short

Ray

Manley

Sharp

Dixon

Gibson’s Mill

BATTLE OF WILSON’S CREEK

10 August 1861

0 1

Mile

Infantry Unit

Cavalry Unit

Artillery

Map 6
50 

McCulloch postponed the march due to torrential rains and 

thunderstorms. The Southerners, who started breaking camp 

in preparation for the attack, decided against reestablishing a 

security screen on receiving word of the postponement. Not 

until just after daybreak on the morning of 10 August, did Price 

belatedly receive information from some frightened teamsters 

that Union troops were nearing Wilson’s Creek. 

Responding to the reports of nearby Union troops, a 

300-man regiment of cavalry under Col. Dewitt C. Hunter rode 

out to encounter Lyon’s vanguard north of a prominent wooded 

ridge known as Oak Hill. Arraying his horsemen across Oak 

Hill’s northernmost spur, Hunter sent back word to Col. James 

Cawthorn, commander of the cavalry brigade belonging to the 

8th Missouri State Guard Division. The appearance of Hunter’s 

troops brought the Federals to a temporary halt, buying time 

for Cawthorn to raise the alarm. Although his leading regiments encountered enemy cavalry, Lyon realized his sunrise 

attack had caught the Southerners by surprise. Just before 0500, 

Lyon ordered his artillery to open fire on Hunter’s dismounted 

troopers. The Union general then instructed his lead brigade to 

seize Oak Hill. 

As Hunter retreated under pressure from the advancing 

Federals, his men joined Cawthorn’s 900-man brigade on Oak 

Hill. Lyon’s 1st Kansas and 1st Missouri regiments soon forced 

the Southern horsemen from the wooded crest of the hill. 

Six cannon from Capt. James Totten’s company of the 2d U.S. 

Artillery were then placed between the two regiments. The 1st 

Iowa, along with a battalion apiece of regular infantry and the 

2d Missouri, took up positions on the left. A company of the 2d 

Kansas and the remainder of the 2d Missouri moved up on the 

right (western) flank. Lyon retained the bulk of the 2d Kansas 

as a reserve. The Union position on Oak Hill formed a shallow 

arc from the northwest through Totten’s battery before bending 

back to the northeast after crossing Wilson’s Creek. Looking 

far to the south and east, the Union troops could see furious 

activity erupting within the Confederate and Arkansas State 

Troops camps. The appearance of Federal troops on Oak Hill 

also spurred at least one Confederate battery into opening fire 

on the now visible attackers.

News of the unexpected appearance of Union troops 

reached McCulloch and Price as they discussed the attack on 
51

Springfield over breakfast at Price’s headquarters. The first 

messenger brought news that the Federals were “approaching 

with twenty thousand men and 100 piece of artillery.” A second 

courier announced that the main body of Lyon’s army had 

arrived at Wilson’s Creek. McCulloch ordered Price to deploy 

his Missouri State Guard, camped along the base of Oak Hill’s 

southern slopes, to repel Lyon’s assault. 

Price soon found himself struggling to rally Cawthorn’s 

unit while attempting to assemble his infantry and artillery. 

Located out of sight of the crest behind a dense belt of trees, 

Price’s men formed into a line of battle without suffering serious 

losses to incoming fire. As the Missourians were assembling, 

McCulloch deployed two regiments from his brigade to turn 

back a battalion-size force of regulars attempting to advance 

east of Wilson’s Creek. McCulloch’s success allowed Price to 

concentrate against Lyon’s force on Oak Hill without having to 

worry about his flanks. 

Meanwhile, Sigel positioned his force to assault the 

Confederates from the rear. As Sigel heard the sounds of 

muskets from Oak Hill at 0530, he ordered his artillery to 

open fire on McCulloch’s brigade encamped to the south 

of the Missouri State Guard. The bursting shells caught the 

Southerners—including two thousand unarmed Missourians 

and dozens of camp followers—completely unaware. Hundreds 

of men ran in every direction as the Federal shells exploded in 

their midst. Capitalizing on the artillery barrage, the 3d and 5th 

Missouri, supported by a company of dragoons, advanced along 

the western bank of Wilson’s Creek. The dragoons took almost 

one hundred prisoners during the attack. As one modern battle 

account noted, the Federal brigade commander “had moved a 

great distance in almost complete secrecy, opening his surprise 

attack at exactly the moment intended. The effect upon the 

enemy had been devastating. . . . But the ability of the Federals 

to exploit such remarkable success would depend on what Sigel 

did next.” 

By 0630, Price launched a counterattack designed to 

regain control of Oak Hill. At the same time, General Lyon 

ordered the 1st Missouri and part of the 1st Kansas to resume 

their southward advance. The two forces collided halfway 

down the southern slope of Oak Hill. The simultaneous 

assaults degenerated into a lengthy short-range firefight amid 
52 

thick trees and brush. The impasse broke when two misoriented Missouri State Guard units accidentally outflanked the 

opposing battle line. When the 1st Missouri shifted to face 

this new threat, it came under fire from several directions. 

The 1st Kansas also found itself under renewed attack, which 

pushed the Federals back to the crest. This success allowed 

Price to regain the initiative, forcing Lyon on the defensive for 

the remainder of the battle. Lyon responded by committing 

his reserve, the 2d Kansas, a move that succeeded in halting 

the Confederates. 

With the situation on Oak Hill stabilized, McCulloch 

headed south to organize a counterstroke against Sigel’s troops. 

After observing the Union force for some time, McCulloch 

noticed the terrain dipped sharply in front of the Federal 

battery supporting Sigel’s brigade. While the Union cannon 

could fire on distant targets, sloping ground prevented the 

guns from engaging Southern forces to their immediate front. 

In addition to the poor field of fire, only an understrength 

battalion from 3d Missouri supported the Federal gunners. The 

remainder of Sigel’s brigade deployed along a road intersection 

located to the rear of the battery. As a result, the crews of four 

Union guns and 250 infantrymen found themselves opposing 

a Confederate counterattack originating from the low ground 

south of McCulloch’s abandoned camp. 

McCulloch took personal command of the impending 

assault on Sigel. Leading several companies of Louisiana infantry, 

McCulloch encountered some skirmishers a short distance in 

advance of the Federal battery. After firing a few shots, the 

Federals fell back on their main body. The skirmishers reported 

to Sigel that they had seen Lyon’s men advancing toward their 

position. Sigel responded by instructing his artillery to remain 

silent until positive target identification could be made. Moving 

through the low ground, the Louisianans emerged directly in 

front of the Federal cannon. The Northern gunners opened 

fire but missed. The discharge of the Federal cannon, however, 

drew counterbattery fire from Southern guns. Two of the 

Union guns replied to this incoming fire as the Missouri State 

Guard launched its own attack against Sigel’s force. With the 

Federals diverted by this new threat, the Louisianans swarmed 

up to the edge of the plateau, unleashing a point-blank volley 

at the opposing artillerymen and their support. Although 
53

Sigel exposed himself “recklessly” while attempting to rally his 

command, within moments his entire brigade fragmented into 

small knots of running soldiers, despite the fact that the brigade 

outnumbered the Southerners three to one. The fight ended in 

a Southern victory by 0845.

About 0900, having assembled thirty-five hundred men 

and ten artillery pieces on Oak Hill, Lyon stood ready to 

receive another counterattack. Price’s Missouri State Guard did 

not disappoint him. A Southern battle line emerged in front of 

the Union defenders a second time, igniting a fierce exchange 

of fire. While directing his men on the front line, a bullet hit 

Lyon’s calf, causing him to temporarily leave the field to receive 

medical treatment. Back on the field, Lyon was hit a second 

time when a bullet grazed the side of his head. At this point, 

the confusion of battle resulted in the 1st Iowa pulling back, 

leaving a gap in the Federal line. Determined to continue the 

fight, Lyon returned to the field leading the Iowa men back into 

the fray. Moments later, a bullet hit Lyon in the chest. Although 

he lingered on for several hours, Lyon became the first Union 

general officer to die in the Civil War.

Price struggled to coordinate the movements of his troops 

as the fighting continued. Sensing his men were beginning 

to falter, Price requested assistance from McCulloch. When a 

mounted charge by Texas and Arkansas cavalry scattered some 

opposing Federal infantry, Price used that respite to order his 

men to fall back. Maj. Samuel D. Sturgis, the senior Regular 

Army officer present, assumed command after the mortal 

wounding of Lyon. After routing Sigel, McCulloch concentrated his efforts on aiding Price at Oak Hill. The Arkansas 

State Troops, which remained unengaged up to this point, now 

moved to assist the Missourians. Their arrival added about one 

thousand fresh troops to the Confederate assault force. The 

combined Southern forces launched a third attack against Oak 

Hill. Lacking news from Sigel, Major Sturgis gave the order to 

retreat after holding off the Confederate attack for about an 

hour. Starting at 1200, the Federal troops began withdrawing 

to Springfield. Their exhausted opponents did not pursue. The 

battle of Wilson’s Creek had ended. Lyon lost 258 men killed, 

873 wounded, and 186 missing, representing 25 percent of 

his force. Twelve percent of McCulloch’s force, including 277 

killed, 945 wounded, and 10 missing, also fell. With the Federal 
54 

forces in disarray, McCulloch and Price were now able to move 

freely throughout western Missouri. 

From Belmont to Port Royal

As Federal and Confederate armies both struggled for 

control of Missouri, the Union Navy set about enforcing 

the blockade announced by President Lincoln. The Federal 

admirals divided their forces patrolling the Atlantic into the 

North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadrons, with their 

operational boundary aligned with the border between the 

North and South Carolina coastline. Two additional squadrons, designated as East Gulf and West Gulf, patrolled the Gulf 

of Mexico. However, the Federal warships sailing along the 

Atlantic coast were limited to operating out of Hampton Roads, 

Virginia, and Key West, Florida. These bases were hundreds 

of miles from key Confederate ports such as Charleston, 

Savannah, and New Orleans. As a result, Federal warships spent 

as much time sailing to their assigned areas of operation as they 

did on patrol. In addition, the Carolina and Georgia coastlines 

were filled with dozens of minor inlets and natural harbors that 

provided safe haven to blockade runners. The Unionists would 

have to expand their fleet significantly in order to watch over 

major Confederate ports and long stretches of enemy coastline. 

The increase in the size of the Northern fleet would, in turn, 

require more extensive base facilities. 

Rather than improve existing bases, an ad hoc strategy 

board convened in July 1861 by Secretary of the Navy Gideon 

Welles recommended the seizure of bases in Confederate territory. This approach offered two advantages. First, the acquisition of new bases reduced the number of harbors available to 

Southern blockade runners, and second, by occupying bases in 

Confederate territory, the Federals would gain coaling and repair 

facilities much closer to major Southern ports. With bases closer 

to their patrol areas, Northern naval vessels could remain on 

station longer. The Navy, however, lacked the ground forces to 

seize these bases. In early August, General Butler, commander of 

the Federal garrison at Fort Monroe, Virginia, solved the Navy’s 

problem by volunteering Army troops and supplies to support 

the Navy’s initial assault on the Southern coastline. 

Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, the easternmost point in the 

Confederacy, lay within sight of the Gulf Stream, which moves 
55

along the Atlantic coast at a speed of three knots. Merchant 

ships sailing between northern ports and the Caribbean would 

reduce the time of their homeward journeys by following the 

stream northward. For months Southern raiders, either privateers or state-owned vessels, had been lurking inside the Outer 

Banks near Cape Hatteras, protected from both the weather 

and from Federal men-of-war, until unsuspecting merchant 

ships appeared. Watchers stationed at the Hatteras lighthouse 

had been signaling the raiders, who then dashed out to seize the 

merchant vessels before Federal warships could react. 

In response, Secretary Welles designated the Outer Banks 

as the initial operational objective for the Federal Navy, and 

Federal forces prepared for the war’s first joint Army and Navy 

operation. General Butler assembled 880 troops drawn from 

the New York “Naval Brigade,” 9th and 20th New York, and 

the 2d U.S. Artillery to assist the Navy in capturing Hatteras. 

The naval component, commanded by Flag Officer Silas H. 

Stringham, consisted of three gunboats, one revenue cutter, and 

four larger warships. Stringham’s flotilla, accompanied by a pair 

of transports carrying Butler’s forces and a tugboat, departed 

from Hampton Roads on 26 August. The Federal ships arrived 

off Cape Hatteras on the following day. 

To protect the Outer Banks from Federal attack, the state 

of North Carolina built fortifications overlooking its four 

main inlets—Beaufort, Ocracoke, Hatteras, and Oregon—deep 

enough for ocean-going vessels to enter the Albemarle and 

Pamlico sounds. The North Carolinians began constructing 

Fort Hatteras in late May, followed by Fort Clark in mid-July, to 

protect the Hatteras Inlet. Fort Hatteras, sited on the seaward 

face of Hatteras Island, defended the Atlantic approaches while 

Fort Clark, located about a half mile to the southeast, defended 

the sound and the landward side of Fort Hatteras. Fort Hatteras 

mounted eight of twenty planned cannon, only four of which 

faced seaward, while Fort Clark possessed five of seven planned 

pieces. Six companies from Col. William F. Martin’s 7th North 

Carolina Volunteers garrisoned both forts.

The battle opened early in the morning of 28 August with 

the Federal vessels bombarding Fort Clark. As the fleet shifted 

course to the northeast, the warships began pummeling Fort 

Hatteras. Eschewing tactics developed during the age of sail, 

Flag Officer Stringham ordered his steam-powered warships to 
56 

keep moving during the bombardment. After passing Hatteras, 

the warships continued east before sailing in a long continuous 

loop ending with a northerly approach toward the inlet. The 

Confederates found hitting moving targets at long range very 

difficult. In addition, the fuses for the Southern ammunition 

proved faulty, causing the shells to explode before reaching the 

circling ships.

The Federals were not always so fortunate. When Butler 

attempted to send a force ashore, rough surf capsized several 

small boats. Stringham called off the landing attempt, leaving 

the few soldiers ashore to their own devices for the time 

being. The Confederates, however, did not attempt to launch 

a counterattack against the small group of bedraggled Federals 

huddling near the beach. At 1300 after expending all available ammunition, the garrison of Fort Clark withdrew to Fort 

Hatteras. The Union landing party hastened to seek shelter 

inside the abandoned fortification. 

During the night of 28–29 August, the Southerners received 

reinforcements from nearby Fort Ocracoke. Flag Officer Samuel 

Barron, Southern commander of the coastal defenses of North 

Carolina, arrived at Fort Hatteras and assumed command from 

Colonel Martin. Expecting more reinforcements from New Bern, 

Barron opted to hold Fort Hatteras. The next morning the Federal 

gunships reopened fire on Fort Hatteras from more than two 

miles offshore. During the bombardment, additional troops from 

the 9th and 20th New York were put ashore near Fort Clark. A 

light fieldpiece that landed with Federal reinforcements repelled 

attempts by Confederate steamers to ferry more troops to Fort 

Hatteras. After enduring a constant barrage of shells “bursting 

over and in the fort every few seconds,” Barron consulted with 

his officers who all agreed further resistance would prove futile. 

Butler’s terms were unconditional; he demanded the garrison’s 

“full capitulation.” Barron accepted, surrendering Fort Hatteras 

and 715 men. The Confederates also lost one thousand rifles, 

thirty cannon, and considerable supplies. 

The capture of Forts Clark and Hatteras brought the North 

a much-needed boost soon after McDowell’s defeat at Bull 

Run. Offering a “Congratulatory Order,” one Federal officer 

commented, “This gallant affair will not fail to stimulate the 

regulars and volunteers to greater exertions to prepare themselves for future and greater achievements.” 
57

Northern euphoria resulting from the capture of the 

Hatteras forts lasted barely seven weeks. On 21 October, a force 

of Union troops under Col. Edward D. Baker, a serving U.S. 

senator from Oregon commanding a brigade of Pennsylvanians, 

crossed the Potomac approximately thirty-five miles north 

of Washington. Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone, the division 

commander, ordered Colonel Baker to send a small force across 

the river to attack a Confederate camp reported near Ball’s 

Bluff. While the 400-man raiding party crossed undetected, 

the Federals retreated in the face of a surprise attack launched 

by a group of Confederates. Both sides sent in reinforcements, 

which led to a prolonged firefight lasting until late afternoon. 

Colonel Baker, who joined his men after the engagement began, 

died when a Confederate soldier shot him with a pistol. News of 

Baker’s death produced a panicky retreat to the Potomac, where 

dozens of Federals were shot or drowned while recrossing the 

river. 

Of the 1,720 Union soldiers at Ball’s Bluff, 49 were killed, 

158 wounded, 553 taken prisoner, and 161 missing and 

presumed drowned. On the Confederate side, 1,709 participated 

in the fighting, with 36 killed, 117 wounded, and 2 captured. 

The lopsided outcome of the battle, when coupled with Baker’s 

death, resulted in the creation of the United States Congress 

Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. The committee’s first order of business involved a cross-examination of all 

officers involved in the Ball’s Bluff affair, a process that led to 

the imprisonment of General Stone on unsubstantiated charges 

of criminal incompetence. 

Having gained control of a base on Hatteras Island for use 

by the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, the Union Navy 

looked to secure a similar base for the South Atlantic Blockading 

Squadron. To kick off the campaign, Flag Officer Samuel Du Pont 

launched an attack on Port Royal, South Carolina. Part of a string 

of islands located midway between Savannah and Charleston, 

Port Royal was not only a heavily trafficked harbor, but also a vital 

economic and slave-trading center. In late October, Du Pont’s 

expedition of seventy-four vessels carrying twelve thousand men 

departed from Hampton Roads. 

On the morning of 7 November, the Federal offensive 

against Port Royal began. Two Confederate fortifications, Forts 

Beauregard and Walker, protected the entrance to the harbor. 
58 

Like Stringham, Du Pont divided his fleet into two parallel 

columns to maintain a continual fire on both Confederate 

forts. Shortly after the bombardment began, the USS Mohican

dropped anchor after discovering a position from which it 

could enfilade Fort Walker without fear of return fire. Several 

other ships followed suit, countering Du Pont’s tactical plan. 

The anchored ships inflicted heavy damage on Fort Walker, 

forcing its occupants to flee by late afternoon. The garrison of 

Fort Beauregard slipped away after noticing that Walker’s guns 

had fallen silent. Port Royal was in Federal hands. 

While the Federal Navy secured enclaves along the southern 

coastline, little action occurred between the opposing armies in 

the east. In early September, however, Confederate forces under 

Maj. Gen. Leonidas K. Polk launched an unsanctioned invasion 

of Kentucky, opening the way for Federal soldiers under Brig. 

Gen. Ulysses S. Grant to occupy Paducah. The Federals soon 

gained the upper hand by committing more troops than were 

available to the Southerners. After consolidating his position 

in Kentucky, Grant initiated a campaign against Confederate 

forces in southeastern Missouri. On 5 November, Grant learned 

that Confederate forces from Columbus, Kentucky, had crossed 

the Mississippi River into Missouri near the small town of 

Belmont. Learning the Confederates were building a fort near 

Belmont, Grant decided to move his forces downriver aboard 

two steamers to destroy the enemy camp.

At 0800 on 7 November, Grant’s five regiments, totaling just 

over three thousand men, disembarked from a point roughly 

three miles above Belmont. Just north of Belmont, Confederate 

pickets opened fire on Grant’s men. More Southerners joined 

the fight as the Federals continued advancing toward the camp. 

Around 1400, the defenses collapsed when the Confederate 

commander, Brig. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, ordered an ill-timed 

counterattack. Grant’s men pursued the disorganized enemy to 

Camp Johnston, where they captured several cannon and spiked 

others. Confederate reinforcements from Kentucky arrived via 

steamboat a short while later, forcing Grant to conduct a fighting 

withdrawal to his waiting transports. Though the battle contributed little to the overall strategic situation, one historian later 

noted, “The discovery of an audacious general who would go 

looking for a fight downriver delighted Lincoln. Belmont brought 

Grant’s name forward at a time of reorganization of the army.” 
59

By the fall of 1861, especially after the Federal defeat at 

Bull Run, hopes for a short war were shattered. To command 

the growing Union Army, the president sought the services 

of the victor at Rich Mountain in July, General McClellan. 

McClellan had established himself as a man of competent abilities. Born into an elite Philadelphia family, McClellan enrolled 

in the University of Pennsylvania at the age of thirteen. In 1842, 

at age fifteen, McClellan entered the U.S. Military Academy 

after receiving special permission to attend because he did not 

meet the minimum age requirement. A dedicated and diligent 

student, McClellan graduated in 1846, ranking second in his 

class of fifty-nine cadets. He received a commission as a second 

lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. McClellan experienced 

his baptism of fire during the Mexican War at the battles of 

Churubusco and Chapultepec. In 1858, McClellan resigned his 

commission to embark on a railroading career. After receiving 

a major general’s commission in the Regular Army, McClellan 

assumed command of Federal forces within the Department 

of the Ohio one month after the Fort Sumter bombardment. 

At age thirty-four, McClellan outranked everyone in the U.S. 

Army except General Scott. 

After the demoralizing defeat at Bull Run, President Lincoln 

summoned McClellan to Washington to assume command of an 

army composed of new three-year recruits. McClellan arrived 

on 26 July and began to organize the newly designated Army 

of the Potomac. A rivalry soon developed between McClellan 

and Scott, whom McClellan privately referred to as the “old 

general.” McClellan diligently worked to build his army while 

simultaneously minimizing Scott’s influence. On 1 November, 

Scott offered his resignation, which Lincoln accepted. Later 

that day the president appointed McClellan as general in chief 

of the Union Army. When Lincoln cautioned McClellan of the 

strains of occupying both the general-in-chief position as well 

as commander of the Army of the Potomac, the general replied, 

“I can do it all.”

Through the remainder of 1861, McClellan trained the 

Army of the Potomac while it held a defensive line outside 

of Manassas. Recruits continued to fill the Northern ranks 

until his army numbered one hundred-twenty thousand men 

by October. With a Union Army now twice the size of the 

Confederate forces in Manassas, public figures in the North 
60 

again pressed for an offensive. McClellan resisted their calls, 

believing instead, as he methodically prepared his troops for 

battle, that he controlled the “destinies of this great country.” 

Yet at the end of 1861, all remained quiet along the Potomac. 

Analysis

The opening phase of the Civil War witnessed two significant strategic miscalculations by the Confederacy. First, the 

South precipitated armed conflict when it would have been 

better served by postponing a war in order to build up its industrial base and war-making capabilities using goods flowing into 

blockade-free ports. Invading Kentucky was also a mistake. The 

state declared for the Union, undermining the South’s strategic 

position by opening up pathways for Federal troops to move 

down the Mississippi River or march overland into Tennessee. 

On the positive side, Southern forces performed well on the 

battlefield. Anticipating that one decisive engagement in the east 

would end the war, Lincoln and many Northerners clamored for 

an early offensive into Virginia. The Confederate victory at Bull 

Run on 21 July ended Northern expectations for a short war. 

The Union defeat also forced Lincoln to re–evaluate his military 

leadership and led to McClellan’s appointment to command the 

newly renamed Army of the Potomac. The ascension of General 

McClellan to the dual positions of commander of the Army of 

the Potomac and general-in-chief took place as opportunities for 

military operations in the east ended with the onset of winter.

Meanwhile, Union armies suffered mixed results on farflung battlefields west of Virginia. On 10 August, Southern 

troops gained control of western Missouri when McCulloch and 

Price defeated Lyon at Wilson’s Creek. Grant’s raid on Belmont 

in early November began shifting the strategic initiative in the 

west back to the Union forces, although some Northerners 

characterized it as a defeat. The battle also brought an offensiveminded commander to the attention of the Northern public 

and political leadership. Although neither Wilson’s Creek 

nor Belmont ended well for the Union, Lincoln’s generals did 

succeed in preventing Missouri from joining the Confederacy. 

By the end of December 1861, approximately 325,000 

Confederate soldiers were arrayed against 527,000 Union troops. 

Despite early military reverses, the Lincoln administration did 
61

not concede the Confederacy’s right to exist. In fact, Northern 

military leaders were planning to launch multiple offensives into 

Southern territory as soon as the weather favored combat operations, including another invasion of Virginia with the aim of 

capturing Richmond. As Federal forces grew more experienced 

and competent, they would gain key victories in 1862 that helped 

to shape the outcome of the Civil War.
62 

The Author

Jennifer M. Murray received her Ph.D. in history from 

Auburn University. She worked as a historian for the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense Historical Office and is currently an 

assistant professor at the University of Virginia’s College at Wise.
63

Further Readings

Beatie, Russel H. Army of the Potomac: Birth of Command, 

November 1860–September 1861, Vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Da 

Capo Press, 2002.

Carbone, John S. The Civil War in Coastal North Carolina. Raleigh: 

North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, 2006.

Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major 

Campaign of the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 

University Press, 1977.

Goodheart, Adam. 1861: The Civil War Awakening. New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 2011.

Hennessy, John. The First Battle of Manassas: An End to Innocence, 

July 18–21, 1861. Lynchburg, Va.: H. E. Howard, 1989.

Hinze, David C., and Karen Farnham. The Battle of Carthage: 

Border War in Southwest Missouri, July 5, 1861. Campbell, 

Calif.: Savas Publishing, 1997.

Hughes, Nathaniel C. Jr. The Battle of Belmont: Grant Strikes South.

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991.

Klein, Maury. Days of Defiance: Sumter, Secession, and the Coming 

of the Civil War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997.

Piston, William Garrett, and Richard W. Hatcher III. Wilson’s 

Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who 

Fought It. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Stoker, Donald. The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War.

New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
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