J-S52026-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEREMIAH DELAUN SPOTTS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1760 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 4, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0003724-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 9, 2018

Jeremiah Delaun Spotts appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

on October 4, 2017. Spotts contends that the Commonwealth presented

insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for flight to avoid apprehension.1

We affirm.

The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. Pennsylvania 

State Trooper Nicholas D. Long testified that on March 6, 2016, he requested 

for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Spotts for charges stemming from an 

incident that occurred three days beforehand. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 

Trial, 7/17/17, at 8-10. A summons for Spotts’ attendance at a preliminary

hearing on those charges was sent by certified mail to Spotts’ home address.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5126(a).
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Id. at 11-13. The summons advised Spotts that his failure to appear at the 

preliminary hearing could result in the issuance of a bench warrant:

If you fail to appear for the preliminary hearing on the date and 

at the time and place specified above, the case will proceed in 

your absence. If the case is held for court, a request for a bench 

warrant against you will be transmitted to the Court of Common 

Pleas. In addition, if you fail to appear without cause at any 

proceeding for which your presence is required, including trial, 

your absence may be deemed a waiver of your right to be present, 

and the proceeding, including the trial, may be conducted in your 

absence.

Summons for Criminal Case, dated 3/29/16. Spotts received the summons on 

April 1, 2016, and signed a notification of receipt. N.T. at 16. 

The preliminary hearing was scheduled for April 27, 2016. Id. at 14. 

Spotts failed to appear at the hearing and the trial court issued a bench 

warrant, as the summons had warned. Id. at 17.

Pennsylvania State Trooper Michael A. Schatzmann testified that on May 

8, 2016, while on duty, he drove by Spotts’ house and noticed him walking 

through his yard. Id. at 19. Trooper Schatzmann was in the area because 

there was an active warrant for Spotts’ arrest and the Pennsylvania State 

Police “were checking various locations to locate [Spotts].” Id. at 22. When 

he saw Spotts, Trooper Schatzmann pointed his flashlight in Spotts’ direction. 

Id. Spotts stopped and Trooper Schatzmann stated, “State Police.” Id. After 

hearing this, Spotts ran. Id. Eventually, Trooper Schatzmann caught up with

Spotts and arrested him pursuant to the active bench warrant. Id. at 26. The 

Commonwealth charged him with flight to avoid apprehension and a jury 
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found him guilty. The trial court imposed a sentence of two years’ probation. 

This timely appeal followed. 

Spotts raises one issue for our review: “Whether the evidence presented 

at trial was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict on the charge of Flight to 

Avoid Apprehension, 18 [Pa.C.S.A.] 5126(a)?” Spotts’ Br. at 4. 

When reviewing a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

view the facts in the most favorable light “to the verdict winner giving the 

prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). A 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law over which our 

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Crawley, 924 A.2d 612, 614 (Pa. 2007). Evidence is 

sufficient to sustain a conviction where it supports each element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751.

Here, Spotts contends that the evidence was insufficient because “there 

was no evidence presented that Mr. Spotts knew there was a warrant for his 

arrest . . . .” Spott’s Br. at 8. He contrasts the facts of this case with those of 

Commonwealth v. Steffy, 36 A.3d 1109 (Pa.Super. 2012). In that case, this 

Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for 

flight to avoid apprehension because the Commonwealth presented testimony

that Steffy fled when he was told that there was an outstanding warrant for 

his arrest. Steffy, 36 A.3d at 1112. Spotts claims that unlike Steffy, there 
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was no evidence that he knew there was a warrant for his arrest. See Spotts’ 

Br. at 8. 

We disagree. There was ample circumstantial evidence that he knew of 

the outstanding warrant. “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 

416 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation omitted). Flight to avoid apprehension is 

defined by the Pennsylvania Crimes Code as: 

(a) Offense defined. -- A person who willfully conceals himself 

or moves or travels within or outside this Commonwealth 

with the intent to avoid apprehension, trial or punishment 

commits a felony of the third degree when the crime which 

he has been charged with or has been convicted of is a 

felony and commits a misdemeanor of the second degree 

when the crime which he has been charged with or has been 

convicted of is a misdemeanor.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5126(a).

Here, Spotts received a summons warning that if he did not appear at 

his preliminary hearing, a bench warrant would be issued for his arrest. He 

failed to appear at the hearing and, as promised, the court issued a warrant. 

Less than two weeks later, Spotts ran when Trooper Schatzmann approached 

him and identified himself as the “State Police.” These facts, viewed in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, were sufficient to prove, beyond 

a reasonable doubt, that Spotts “move[d] or travel[ed]” with the intent of

avoiding trial for his original offense. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5126. Thus, we affirm 

the judgment of sentence.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/9/2018