" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

111TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REVIEW NO. 

09–9075 

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES 

Report and Findings 

Transmitted to the 

Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 

on December 2, 2009 

and released publicly pursuant to H. Res. 895 of the 

110th Congress as amended 

December 2009 


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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

55–500 

" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

111TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REVIEW NO. 

2009

09–9075 

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES 

Report and Findings 

Transmitted to the 

Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 

on December 2, 2009 

and released publicly pursuant to H. Res. 895 of the 

110th Congress as amended 

December 2009 


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(II) 

OFFICE OF 

CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 

BOARD 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

DAVID SKAGGS, Chair 

PORTER GOSS, Co-Chair 

YVONNE BURKE 

KAREN ENGLISH 

ALLISON HAYWARD 

JAY EAGEN 

WILLIAM FRENZEL 

ABNER MIKVA 

LEO J. WISE, Chief Counsel & Staff Director 

ELIZABETH A. HORTON, Investigative Counsel 


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REPORT 

Review No. 09–9075 

The Board of the Office of Congressional Ethics (hereafter the 

‘‘Board’’), by a vote of no less than four members, on November 20, 

2009, adopted the following report and ordered it to be transmitted 

to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the United 

States House of Representatives (hereafter the ‘‘Committee’’). 

SUBJECT: Representative Jim Moran 

NATURE OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION: In Fiscal Year 2009, 

Representative Jim Moran authored several earmarks for clients of 

PMA Group, Inc. (hereafter ‘‘PMA’’). During campaign cycles 2008 

and 2010, Representative Moran received contributions to his campaign committee and ‘‘Leadership PAC’’ from PMA’s PAC, PMA 

employees, the PACs of PMA clients for whom he authored earmarks, and the employees of those clients. 

If Representative Moran solicited or accepted contributions or 

other items of value in exchange for or because of an official act, 

or solicited or accepted contributions or other items of value in a 

manner which gave the appearance that the contributions were 

linked to an official act, then Representative Moran may have violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (Bribery), 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (Illegal Gratuities), 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (Gifts to Federal Employees), and House 

Rules and Standards of Conduct. 

RECOMMENDATION: The Board of the Office of Congressional 

Ethics recommends that the Committee on Standards of Official 

Conduct dismiss the above allegations. 

VOTES IN THE AFFIRMATIVE: 6 

VOTES IN THE NEGATIVE: 0 

MEMBER OF THE BOARD OR STAFF DESIGNATED TO 

PRESENT THIS REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT: Leo Wise, Staff Director & Chief 

Counsel. 


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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 3 

A. Summary of Allegations ....................................................................... 3 

B. Jurisdiction Statement ......................................................................... 3 

C. Procedural History ............................................................................... 3 

D. Summary of Investigative Activity ..................................................... 4 

II. THE OCE UNCOVERED NO EVIDENCE THAT REPRESENTATIVE 

MORAN REQUESTED EARMARKS FOR PMA CLIENTS IN CONNECTION WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS THAT HE RECEIVED ......................................................................................................... 6 

A. Relevant Law, Regulation, Rules, and Standards of Conduct .......... 6 

B. Earmark Process ................................................................................... 9 

C. Campaign Fundraising ......................................................................... 10 

D. Relationship with PMA ........................................................................ 10 

E. Perception of Corporate Donors .......................................................... 11 

F. Contributions Linked to Official Acts by Outside Entities ............... 12 

III. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 13 

IV. INFORMATION THE OCE WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS ................. 13 


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1 H. Res 895, 110th Cong. § 1(e) (2008) (as amended). 

2 A preliminary review is ‘‘requested’’ in writing by members of the Board of the OCE. The 

request for a preliminary review is received by the OCE on a date certain. According to H. Res. 

895 of the 110th Congress (hereafter ‘‘the Resolution’’), the timeframe for conducting a preliminary review is 30 days from the date of receipt of the Board’s request. 

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CITATIONS TO LAW 

Review No. 09–9075 

On November 20, 2009, the Board of the Office of Congressional 

Ethics (hereafter the ‘‘Board’’) adopted the following findings of fact 

and accompanying citations to law, regulations, rules and standards of conduct (in italic). The Board notes that these findings do 

not constitute a determination of whether or not a violation actually occurred. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

A. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

1. There is not substantial reason to believe that Representative 

Jim Moran solicited or accepted contributions or other items of 

value in exchange for or because of an official act, or solicited or 

accepted contributions or other items of value in a manner which 

gave the appearance that the contributions were linked to an official act. 

B. JURISDICTION STATEMENT

2. The allegations that were the subject of this review concern 

Representative Jim Moran, a Member of the United States House 

of Representatives from the 8th District of Virginia. The Resolution 

the United States House of Representatives adopted creating the 

Office of Congressional Ethics (hereafter the ‘‘OCE’’) directs that, 

‘‘[n]o review shall be undertaken . . . by the board of any alleged 

violation that occurred before the date of adoption of this resolution.’’ 1 The House adopted this Resolution on March 11, 2008. Because the conduct under review occurred after March 11, 2008, review by the Board is in accordance with the Resolution. 

C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

3. The OCE received a written request for preliminary review in 

this matter signed by at least two members of the Board on July 

6, 2009. The preliminary review commended on that date.2 The 

preliminary review was scheduled to end on August 5, 2009. 

4. At least three members of the Board voted to initiate a second-phase review in this matter on August 5, 2009. The secondVerDate Mar 15 2010 00:45 Sep 05, 2012 Jkt 055500 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\55500.XXX 55500

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3 According to the Resolution, the Board must vote (as opposed to make a written authorization) on whether to conduct a second-phase review in a matter before the expiration of the 30- 

day preliminary review. If the Board votes for a second-phase, the second-phase commences the 

day after the preliminary review ends. 4 According to the Resolution, the Board must vote on whether to conduct a second-phase review in a matter before the expiration of the 30-day preliminary review. If the Board votes for 

a second-phase, the second-phase begins when the preliminary review ends. The second-phase 

review does not begin on the date of the Board vote. 5The 14-day extension expires after the 45-day second-phase review ends. The 14-day extension does not begin on the date of the Board vote. 

phase review commenced on August 6, 2009.3 The second-phase review was scheduled to end on September 20, 2009.4

5. The Board voted to extend the 45-day second-phase review by 

an additional 14 days on September 17, 2009, as provided for under 

the Resolution. Following the extension, the second-phase review 

was scheduled to end on October 5, 2009.5

6. The Board voted to refer the matter to the Committee on 

Standards of Official Conduct for dismissal and adopted these findings on November 20, 2009. 

7. The report and its findings in this matter were transmitted to 

the Committee on Standards for Official Conduct on December 2, 

2009. 

D. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

8. Due to the nature of the allegations in this review, the OCE’s 

investigation required the collection of information from a number 

of sources. 

9. The OCE reviewed publically available records of campaign 

contributions to the campaign committees of Members of the House 

Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (hereafter ‘‘Defense Subcommittee’’) from recipients of earmarks during the 2008 and 2010 

campaign cycles. The review included campaign contributions to 

the leadership political action committees (hereafter ‘‘PACs’’), if 

any, of these Members. 

10. Specifically, the OCE reviewed campaign contributions to 

these Members from donors that were affiliated with the lobbying 

firm of Paul Magliocchetti and Associates Group, Inc. (hereafter 

‘‘PMA’’), i.e., contributions from the PMA PAC, PMA employees, the 

PACs of corporate clients of PMA (hereafter ‘‘PMA clients’’) and 

employees of PMA clients. 

11. The OCE also reviewed campaign contributions to Members 

of the Defense Subcommittee from PACs of non-PMA clients, and 

employees of non-PMA clients. 

12. Beyond Members of the Defense Subcommittee, the investigation included a review of campaign contributions from PMA clients and non-PMA clients to Representatives who are not on the 

Defense Subcommittee, but authored defense earmarks for PMA 

clients and non-PMA clients. 

13. The OCE requested information from forty PMA clients that 

received earmarks from Members of the Defense Subcommittee for 

fiscal years 2008 to 2010. 

14. All of the PMA clients that the OCE contacted cooperated 

with the investigation, except for two. 

15. Aeroflex and Kimball and Associates are the only PMA client 

that refused to cooperate with the investigation. 


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16. Thirty-eight PMA clients and Representatives’ offices produced documents totaling approximately 200,000 pages. These 

PMA clients also made witnesses available for interviews upon request of the OCE. 

17. Based on the information discovered during the review of the 

produced documents, the OCE interviewed twenty-six individual 

PMA client witnesses. 

18. In addition, the OCE interviewed six witnesses who were formerly employed as lobbyists with PMA during the 2008 and 2010 

campaign cycles. 

19. In sum, the OCE requested and received documentary, and 

in some cases testimonial, information from the following sources: 

(1) 21st Century Systems, Inc.; 

(2) AAR Composites; 

(3) Advanced Acoustic Concepts; 

(4) Advanced Concepts & Technologies Intl.; 

(5) Aircraft Interior Products; 

(6) Applied Global Technologies; 

(7) Argon ST; 

(8) Boeing Corporation; 

(9) Carnegie Mellon University; 

(10) Coda Octopus Group; 

(11) Concurrent Technologies Corporation; 

(12) Conemaugh Health Systems; 

(13) Cryptek; 

(14) DDL OMNI Engineering; 

(15) DRS Technologies; 

(16) EM Solutions; 

(17) General Atomics; 

(18) General Dynamics; 

(19) Goodrich Corporation; 

(20) Innovative Concepts, Inc.; 

(21) ITT Corporation; 

(22) Lockheed Martin Corporation; 

(23) MobilVox; 

(24) NuVant Systems, Inc.; 

(25) Optimal Solutions & Technologies; 

(26) Parametric Technology Corporation; 

(27) Planning Systems Inc.; 

(28) Profile Systems; 

(29) Prologic, Inc.; 

(30) QTL Biosystems; 

(31) RaySat Antenna Systems; 

(32) Rockwell Collins; 

(33) Samueli Institute; 

(34) Sierra Nevada Corporation; 

(35) Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.; 

(36) Teledyne Controls; 

(37) Windber Research Institute; 

(38) Xunlight Corporation; 

(39) Vice President, 21st Century Systems, Inc.; 

(40) Chief Administrative Officer, 21st Century Systems, 

Inc.; 


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(41) Vice President for Communications, 21st Century Systems, Inc.; 

(42) PAC Treasurer, 21st Century Systems, Inc.; 

(43) General Manager, AAR Composites; 

(44) Chief Operating Officer, AAR Composites; 

(45) Chief Executive Officer, Applied Global Technologies; 

(46) Vice President, Applied Global Technologies; 

(47) PAC Treasurer, DRS Technologies; 

(48) President, DRS Technologies; 

(49) Chief Operating Officers, Optimal Solutions & Technologies; 

(50) Chief Executive Officer, Optimal Solutions & Technologies; 

(51) Director, Optimal Solutions & Technologies; 

(52) CEO, Samueli Institute; 

(53) Vice President, Sierra Nevada Corporation; 

(54) Congressional Affairs Director, Sierra Nevada Corporation; 

(55) Assistant to Business Development Director, Teledyne 

Continental Motors, Inc.; 

(56) Business Development Director, Teledyne Continental 

Motors, Inc.; 

(57) PAC Treasurer, Teledyne Controls; 

(58) General Manager, Teledyne Controls; 

(59) Vice President, Teledyne Controls; 

(60) Director of Contracts, Teledyne Controls; 

(61) Contract Administrator, Teledyne Controls; 

(62) Legislative Affairs Director, Teledyne Controls; 

(63) Associate General Counsel, Teledyne Controls; 

(64) President, Teledyne Controls; 

(65) PMA Lobbyist 1; 

(66) PMA Lobbyist 2; 

(67) PMA Lobbyist 3; 

(68) PMA Lobbyist 4; 

(69) PMA Lobbyist 5; 

(70) PMA Lobbyist 6; 

(71) Representative Jim Moran; 

(72) Representative Moran’s Former Military Legislative Analyst; 

(73) Finance Director for Moran for Congress and Representative Moran’s Virginia Leadership PAC. 

II. THE OCE UNCOVERED NO EVIDENCE THAT REPRESENTATIVE MORAN REQUESTED EARMARKS FOR PMA CLIENTS IN CONNECTION WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 

THAT HE RECEIVED 

A. RELEVANT LAW, REGULATION, RULES, AND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

20. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)—Bribery of public officials and witnesses 

‘‘(b) Whoever— 

(2) being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, 

accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: 


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6 House Ethics Manual (2008) at 79. See also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 

U.S. 398, 404 (1999). 7Memorandum of the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Recommendations for disposition of the complaint filed against Representative DeLay. Accessed online on June 24, 2009 

at http://ethics.house.gov/Investigations/Default.aspx?Section=18. 8 Id. 9 Id. 10 House Ethics Manual (2008) at 147. 11Memorandum of the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Recommendations for disposition of the complaint filed against Representative DeLay. Accessed online on June 24, 2009 

at http://ethics.house.gov/Investigations/Default.aspx?Section=18. 

(A) being influenced in the performance of any official 

act. . . .’’ 

21. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)—Illegal Gratuities 

‘‘(c) Whoever— 

(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty— 

(B) being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or 

agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally for 

or because of any official act performed or to be performed 

by such official or person. . . .’’ 

22. ‘‘An illegal gratuity . . . may constitute merely a reward for 

some future act that the public official will take (and may have already determined to take), or for a past act that he has already 

taken.’’ 6

23. House Rules and Standards of Conduct 

‘‘[T]he scope of the House standards of conduct in this area 

is broader than that of the criminal bribery statute . . . the 

House standards of conduct generally preclude any link between the solicitation or receipt of a contribution and a specific 

official action.’’ 7

‘‘Put another way, there are fundraising activities that do not 

violate any criminal statute but well may violate House standards of conduct.’’ 8

‘‘[T]here are certain proffered campaign contributions that 

must be declined, and certain fundraising opportunities that 

must be forgone, solely because they create an appearance of improper conduct.’’ 9

‘‘[N]o solicitation of a campaign or political contribution may 

be linked to an action taken or to be taken by a Member or employee in his or her official capacity.’’ 10 In addition, a Member 

may not accept any contribution that is linked with any specific 

official action taken or to be taken by that Member.’’ 11

‘‘It is probably not wrong for the campaign managers of a legislator . . . to request contributions from those for whom the 

legislator has done appreciable favors, but this should never be 

presented as a payment for the services rendered. Moreover, the 

possibility of such a contribution should never be suggested by 

the legislator or his staff as the time the favor is done. Furthermore, a decent interval of time should be allowed to lapse so 

that neither party will feel that there is a close connection between the two acts. The Standards Committee has long advised 

Members and staff that they should always exercise caution to 


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12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Id. at 151 (citing Code of Ethics for Government Service, ¶ 5). 15 Id. at 151 (citing Code of Ethics for Government Service, ¶10). 

avoid even the appearance that solicitations of campaign contributions are connected in any way with an action taken or to 

be taken in their official capacity.’’ 12

‘‘[A] Member should not sponsor or participate in any solicitation that offers donors any special access to the Member in the 

Member’s official capacity.’’ 13

‘‘[G]overnment officials should ‘never discriminate unfairly by 

the dispensing of special favors or privileges to anyone, whether 

for remuneration or not.’ ’’ 14

‘‘ ‘[P]ublic office is a public trust,’ and the public has a right 

to expect House Members and staff to exercise impartial judgment in performing their duties.’’ 15

24. 5 U.S.C. § 7353—Gifts to Federal Employees 

‘‘(a) Except as permitted by subsection (b), no Member of Congress . . . shall solicit or accept anything of value from a person— 

(1) seeking official action from, doing business with . . . the 

individual’s employing entity; or 

(2) whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the individual’s official duties. 

(b)(1) Each supervising ethics office is authorized to issue 

rules or regulations implementing the provisions of this section 

and providing reasonable exceptions as may be appropriate. 

(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), a Member, officer, or 

employee may accept a gift pursuant to rules and regulations established by such individual’s supervising ethics office pursuant to paragraph (1) 

(B) No gift may be accepted pursuant to subparagraph 

(A) in return for being influenced in the performance of an 

official act.’’ 

25. House Ethics Manual—Soliciting Campaign and Political 

Contributions 

While the federal gift statute (5 U.S.C. § 7353) broadly restricts the ability of House Members and staff to solicit things 

of value from virtually anyone, even when no personal benefit 

to the solicitor is involved, legislative materials concerning the 

statute state that it does not apply to the solicitation of political 

contributions. Consistent with those materials, the Standards 

Committee has long taken the position that the restrictions on 

solicitation set forth in that statute do not apply to political solicitations. However, in soliciting campaign or political contributions, Members and staff are subject to a number of other 

restrictions, as follows. 

A Contribution linked to an Official Action May Not Be Accepted 

. . . no solicitation of a campaign or political contribution 

may be linked to any action taken or to be taken by a Member 

or employee in his or her official capacity. 

In a similar vein, a Member or employee may not accept any 

contribution that the donor links to any official action that the 


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16 Rule 9 of the OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF INVESTIGA- TIONS 11 (2009) provides that ‘‘[t]he Board shall refer a matter to the Standards Committee for 

further review if it determines there is a substantial reason to believe the allegation based on 

all the information then known to the Board.’’ 17Memorandum of Interview of Representative James Moran, October 5, 2009, (‘‘Moran MOI’’) 

(Exhinit 1 at ¶ 8). 18Memorandum of Interview of Representative Moran’s former Military Legislative Assistant, 

October 5, 2009, (‘‘Former MLA MOI’’) (Exhibit 2 at ¶ 25). 19Moran MOI (Exhinit 1 at ¶ 4). 20 Id. at ¶ 2. 21 Id. at ¶ 8. 22Former MLA MOI, (Exhibit 2 at ¶ 9). 23 Id. at ¶ 25. 24 Id. at ¶ 26. 25 Id. 26 Id. 

Member or employee has taken, or is being asked to take. In 

this respect, a campaign or political contribution is treated like 

any other gift, and acceptance of a contribution in these circumstances may implicate a provision of the federal gift statute 

(5 U.S.C. § 7353) or the criminal statutes on bribery and illegal 

gratuities. 

26. Based on the facts collected by the OCE, the Board concludes 

there is not substantial reason to believe the allegations that are 

the subject of this review.16

B. EARMARK PROCESS

27. Representative Jim Moran represents the 8th Congressional 

District of Virginia. 

28. Representative Moran is a Member of the House Committee 

on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense. 

29. The process for handling Representative Moran’s requests for 

earmarks for the Subcommittee on Defense is initially managed by 

his Congressional office staff.17 Representative Moran’s former 

Military Legislative Assistant reviewed all earmark requests prior 

to his departure in July of 2009.18 However, Representative Moran 

made the ultimate decision as to which funding requests were submitted to the Subcommittee.19

30. Because the Pentagon in located in Representative Moran’s 

district, his office received a significant number of funding requests.20 Representative Moran informed the OCE staff that he reviewed roughly 300–500 requests and only 60 or so of that number 

ultimately received funding.21

31. Representative Moran’s former Military Legislative Analyst 

met with the companies’ representatives and lobbyists to discuss 

potential funding requests.22 Based on the information presented 

in the meetings, Representative Moran’s former Military Legislative Analyst would assess whether each request met Representative Moran’s criteria for funding which included: the success of any 

past projects; whether the Department of Defense was interested in 

the project; and how many jobs the project would bring to the Congressman’s district.23 He would then create a list of potential funding requests for Representative Moran’s review.24

32. Representative Moran would review the list of potential earmark requests, making changes to both the order of the requests 

and, at times, the requested dollar amounts.25 The list was then 

submitted to the Subcommittee.26


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27 Contribution amounts are derived from reports filed with the Federal Election Commission 

by Moran for Congress and Virginia Leadership PAC. 28 Memorandum of Representative Moran’s Finance Director, October 5, 2009, (‘‘Finance Director MOI’’) (Exhibit 3 at ¶ 2). 29 Id. at ¶ 3. 30 Id. at ¶ 6. 31 Id. at ¶ 9. 32Moran MOI (Exhibit 1 at ¶ 13). 33 Id. 34Moran MOI (Exhibit 1 at ¶ 17). 35 Id. 36 Id. 37 Id. 

C. CAMPAIGN FUNDRAISING

33. During the time period of the 2008 and 2010 campaign cy- cles, Representative Moran accepted approximately $180,200 in 

campaign contributions from PMA’s PAC and employees and from 

the PAC and employees of PMA clients.27

34. Representative Moran’s fundraising is handled by the Finance Director for the Congressman’s campaign committees, Moran 

for Congress and Virginia Leadership PAC. The Finance Director 

has held that position with both entities for the past twelve 

years.28

35. The Finance Director develops a yearly budget for the campaign committee and PAC and arranges the campaign’s fundraising 

schedule which includes receptions, breakfasts and a theater 

night.29 In addition, various individuals host fundraising dinners in 

their homes or other events such as wine tastings or athletic 

events.30

36. Fundraising correspondence is sent out to donor lists the 

campaign has received from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, donor lists purchased from the ‘‘Washington Rep 

book’’, and to lists of individuals who have previously attended 

events or made contributions to the campaign in the past.31

37. Representative Moran also spends two to three afternoons 

per week making phone calls to individuals who have previously 

contributed to his campaign.32

38. Representative Moran fundraises for his campaign throughout the year in order to raise approximately $600,000 to $1,000,000 

in a given cycle.33

39. Representative Moran told the OCE that he did not know 

who made donations or what amounts were made to his campaign 

and that he did not want to know.34 He further stated that he did 

not believe that having such information was appropriate.35 He explained that he did not want to abstain from a vote because he was 

notified of a contribution.36 He stated that after 19 years, his votes 

are reasonably predictable and that contributions make no difference in his voting decisions.37

D. RELATIONSHIP WITH PMA

40. During the time period of the 2008 and 2010 campaign cycles, 13 corporate clients of PMA were awarded earmarks requested by Representative Moran. 

41. The PMA clients that received earmarks during this period 

are: 

(a) Argon ST Inc., (Requested, $6,200,000) 


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38 H.R. 3222, Pub. L. 110–116 (2008); H.R. 2638, Pub. L. 110–329 (2009); and H.R. 3326, 111 

Cong. (2009). 39 Id. at ¶ 10. 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Id. 43 Id. at ¶ 12. 44Former MLA MOI, (Exhibit 2 at ¶ 17). 45 Id. at ¶ 17, 18. 46 Id. at ¶ 22. 47 Century Systems, Inc. Proposed CY 2008 Congressional Campaign Contributions (Exhibit 

4). 48Moran MOI (Exhibit 1 at ¶ 15). 

(b) Planning Systems, Inc., (Requested, $4,700,000) 

(c) MobilVox, (Requested, $4,200,000) 

(d) General Dynamics, (Requested, $4,000,000) 

(e) ITT Corp., (Requested, $3,200,000) 

(f) Samueli Institute, (Requested, $3,000,000) 

(g) DDL OMNI Engineering, LLC, (Requested, $2,000,000) 

(h) EM Solutions, (Requested, $2,000,000) 

(i) Artis, LLC, (Requested, $1,600,000) 

(j) Innovative Concepts, Inc., (Requested, $1,600,000) 

(k) Prologic, Inc., (Requested, $1,600,000) 

(l) RaySat Antenna Systems, (Requested, $800,000) 

(m) Rockwell Collins, (Requested, $400,000) 38

42. Representative Moran informed the OCE staff that he knew 

Mr. Paul Magliocchetti and several of the people that worked for 

PMA.39 However, he did not have frequent contact with Mr. 

Magliocchetti or PMA.40 He further stated that he saw Mr. 

Magliocchetti at fundraisers but said that he did not know him socially.41 He dealt with Mark Magliocchetti on occasion but most 

interaction with PMA employees occurred through his staff.42

43. Representative Moran stated that PMA knew the appropriations process, and that they knew what the military was looking 

for and the benefit that could be derived from certain projects.43

44. Representative Moran’s former Military Legislative Analyst 

informed the OCE staff that he dealt most frequently with John 

Veltri or Julie Giardino at PMA.44 He stated that he met with 

eight to twelve PMA clients in a given cycle and that less than 

three-quarters but more than one-half of those clients received 

funding.45 He further explained that PMA’s clients’ project proposals were good in that they had support from the Pentagon, they 

were easy to understand, and had identifiable military benefit.46

E. PERCEPTION OF CORPORATE DONORS

45. There is evidence that some of the commercial entities seeking earmarks from Representative Moran believe that a political 

donation to him has an impact on his decision to author an earmark for that donor.47

46. However, Representative Moran credibly articulated a process that separates his legislative activities from campaign fundraising activities. Representative Moran achieves this separation 

by eliminating his and his legislative staff’s exposure to information from the campaign’s fundraising operation.48 Similarly, since 

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49Finance Director MOI (Exhibit 3 at ¶15). 50Moran MOI (Exhibit 1 at ¶ 17). 51 Century Systems, Inc. Proposed CY 2008 Congressional Campaign Contributions (Exhibit 

4). 

ties.49 As result, neither the campaign nor Representative Moran’s 

legislative staff is aware of what the other is doing. 

47. Representative Moran explained to the OCE that he operates 

his campaign and Congressional office in this manner to prevent 

even the appearance that his legislative acts are influenced by contributions to their campaign or PAC.50 One risk associated with 

this is the possibility of an appearance of a conflict of interest if, 

out of ignorance, the Member’s campaign accepts a contribution 

near in time to a legislative act that has an impact on the individual or entity making the contribution. This potential for an appearance of a conflict may explain why companies requesting an 

earmark appear to think that a contribution to the respective campaign or PAC affects the ultimate receipt of an earmark. The 

House Ethics Manual is unclear as to what obligations, if any, are 

placed on a Member to discourage or disabuse an entity of that impression. 

F. CONTRIBUTIONS LINKED TO OFFICIAL ACTS BY OUTSIDE ENTITIES

48. In several instances, the OCE uncovered evidence that commercial entities seeking earmarks from Members of Congress appear to have linked contributions to Members’ campaigns and/or 

PACs to specific legislative acts.51 These documents were internal 

to the companies and there is no evidence they were shared with 

Members. 

49. The federal gift statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7353, prohibits the solicitation or acceptance of anything of value from a person seeking official action from or doing business with the House, or from someone whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of a Member’s, officer’s or staff member’s 

official duties. The statute also provides that the Committee on 

Standards of Official Conduct may enact reasonable exceptions to 

the prohibition. According to the Ethics Manual, the Standards 

Committee has long taken the position that the restrictions on solicitation set forth in the statute do not apply to political solicitations. However, Members and staff are subject to a number of other 

restrictions regarding the solicitation of campaign or political contributions under the rules of the House. 

50. Under House rules, a Member or employee may not accept 

any contribution that the donor links to any official action that the 

Member or employee has taken, or is being asked to take. If a donor’s contribution is linked to any official action, it is treated like 

any other gift and may be subject as such to the federal gift statute 

and the criminal statutes on bribery and illegal gratuities. 

51. The Board notes that the examples provided in the Ethics 

Manual of instances where a Member may be in violation of the 

House’s rule against accepting a contribution linked to an official 

action are all instances in which the Member has some degree of 

knowledge of the link. As a result, it stands to reason that it is unlikely a violation of the rule could occur unless and until a Member 

is aware of the link and does nothing to remedy the situation. 


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52. The Board finds nothing in the factual record to indicate the 

Member was aware that the donor linked the contribution to an official act. As such, the Board concludes there is not a substantial 

reason to believe that a violation of either 5 U.S.C. § 7353 or the 

applicable House rules occurred. However once the Member becomes aware of the link, if the matter is not remedied by either by 

the Member or by formal advice from the Standards Committee declaring the contribution acceptable, then a violation may occur. 

III. CONCLUSION 

53. For these reasons, the Board recommends that the Standards Committee dismiss the above described allegations concerning 

Representative Moran. 

IV. INFORMATION THE OCE WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS 

54. In every instance, the OCE asked the recipient of an OCE 

request for information to identify any information they withheld 

and the reason for doing so. However, absent the authority to subpoena the evidence in possession of the witness, it is impossible for 

the OCE to verify if information was withheld, but not documented. 

55. In some instances, documents were redacted or specific information was not provided. For instance, DRS Technologies provided 

evidence responsive to the OCE’s Request for Information but indicated they would not provide any information regarding their ‘‘Legislative Strategy.’’ 

56. In at least one instance, the OCE had reason to believe a 

witness withheld information requested, but did not comply with 

the OCE’s request that they identify what was being withheld. Specifically, Boeing Corporation represented that they had fully cooperated. However, the Boeing Corporation indicated that they had 

no electronic mail responsive to the OCE’s Request for Information. 

The OCE then received, from another source, electronic mail to and 

from PMA Client 8 that were in fact responsive to OCE’s request. 

57. The Board also notes that while the OCE was able to interview six former employees of PMA that provided general information on PMA and its business practices, many remaining former 

employees refused to consent to interviews. In addition, the OCE 

was unable to obtain any evidence within PMA’s possession. 

58. The Board makes the recommendation contained in this referral based on the factual record before it. Given its recommendation to dismiss, the Board does not recommend the issuance of subpoenas, but recognizes that the Committee on Standards of Official 

Conduct may determine otherwise. 


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