1 The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 06-2331

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Western District of Missouri. * Theotis Young, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 13, 2007 Filed: May 3, 2007

___________ Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. In this direct criminal appeal of his 30-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), Theotis Young challenges the district court's 1 determination that one of his prior convictions is a “crime of violence” within the mean ing of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Upon de novo review, see United States v. Bockes , 447 F.3d 1090, 1092 (8th Cir. 2006), we affirm.-2- Young pleaded guilty, without a plea agreem ent, to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had a prior Missouri c onviction for the felony offense of tampering in the first degree, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.080.1(2) (2000). At sentencing, the court admitted into eviden ce the guilty-plea petition for the tampering offense, in which Young admitted that he ha d knowingly, and in concert with others, operated an automobile without the owner’s consent. The district court imposed the 30-month sentence for the instant felon-in -possession offense ba sed in part on the court’s characterization of Young’s tampering conviction as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4), as defi ned in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).

In United States v. Johnson , 417 F.3d 990, 997 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied , 127 S. Ct. 285 (2006), we held that the Missouri offense of tampering by operation of a vehicle, in violation of section 569.080. 1(2), is a “violent felony” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Johnsongoverns our analysis in this case. See id. at 996 (statutory definition of violent felony is in terchangeable with Gu idelines definition of crime of violence). Young seeks to avoid Johnsonby arguing that it should be limited to circumstances in which the defendant is shown to have actually operated the vehicle. Young asserts that, because he acted in concert with others, no evidence indicates that he actually drove the car underlying his offense, and his conduct could have been consistent with mere possession. We do not read Johnsonas so limiting. The Johnson case drew no distinction between so lo and group crimes, and rightly so, because such a distinction would be incons istent with the general principle that a person convicted as an accomplice is guilty of the same underlying offense as the principal. See United States v. Baca-Valenzuela , 118 F.3d 1223, 1232 (8th Cir. 1997) (there is no separate offense for accomplice liability).
Thus, Johnson is dispositive, and although Young contends that Johnsonis wrongly decided because it conflic ts with Leocal v. Ashcroft , 543 U.S. 1 (2004), and the decisions of our sister ci rcuits, we are not, sitting as a panel, at liberty to overrule2 We note that the majority in Johnson specifically declined to be guided by Leocal , explaining that Leocal addressed the definition of crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). See Johnson , 417 F.3d at 996 n.4. In addition, given our clear precedent, Young’s reliance on decisions of our sister circuits is misplaced. See United States v. Auginash , 266 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 2001). -3- Johnson . See Jackson v. Ault , 452 F.3d 734, 736 (8th Cir. 2006) (only en banc court can overturn panel decision), cert. denied , 127 S. Ct. 946 (2007). 2
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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