U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

62–191 PDF 2010

S. HRG. 111–710 

CHALLENGES TO WATER AND 

SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN 

AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 23, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

JIM WEBB, Virginia Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Chungyalpa, Dekila, director for the Greater Mekong Program, World Wildlife 

Fund, Washington, DC ........................................................................................ 35 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38 

Cronin, Dr. Richard, senior associate, Stimson Center, Washington, DC .......... 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19 

Imhof, Aviva, campaigns director, International Rivers, Berkeley, CA .............. 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29 

Webb, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement ....................... 1 

Yun, Joseph, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ................................................. 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

(III)

(1) 

CHALLENGES TO WATER AND SECURITY IN 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:28 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jim Webb (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senator Webb. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WEBB. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to order. 

And let me begin by apologizing for the delay in the start of the 

hearing. We had a series of votes, the last one having just been 

called, about 2:20. So, we will move with some dispatch here to 

hear the witnesses and have the dialogue that the hearing is anticipated to bring. 

Today’s hearing will explore the critical intersection of the environment, foreign policy, and security in Southeast Asia, a nexus 

that occurs along the Mekong River. Often called ‘‘the mother of all 

rivers,’’ the Mekong originates on the Tibetan Plateau, flows nearly 

3,000 miles down through Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and 

Vietnam before emptying through the Mekong Delta into the South 

China Sea. It is the world’s 12th longest river and the center of a 

nearly 500,000-square-mile watershed across the region. 

The Lower Mekong River, in mainland Southeast Asia, is a 

source of water, food, and economic opportunity for more than 60 

million people. In this area, freshwater fisheries provide at least $2 

billion, and up to $9 billion, annually in income, and approximately 

80 percent of the animal protein consumed by the population. 

Given the vital role of the river in this region, scientists, environmentalists, and policymakers have great concerns that current 

designs to construct hydropower dams along the Mekong may disrupt the region’s balance. This hearing will examine the risks of 

this development, the environmental, economic, sovereignty, and 

security challenges these dams pose for the Mekong River, the 

challenge of managing transboundary water resources through 

multilateral cooperation, and the role that the United States can 

play in promoting this approach. 

Currently, China plans to construct more than 15 dams on the 

main stem of the Upper Mekong River, in Tibet and Yunnan provVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:37 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
2 

inces. In Yunnan, Chinese authorities are planning a cascade of 

eight large-to-mega-size dams, four of which have been completed. 

The largest of these four, the Xiaowan Dam, is the world’s highest 

compound concrete arch dam, taller than the Hoover Dam. Its reservoir will hold 15 billion cubic meters of water. For comparison, 

the Three Gorges Dam in China holds 20 billion cubic meters of 

water. 

Future dams in the Yunnan cascade will have even larger reservoirs, enabling China to regulate the waterflow to suit its needs. 

For their part, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam are planning to construct or finance the construction of up to 13 dams on 

the lower half of the river’s main stem. Compared to China’s 

Xiaowan Dam, most of these dams will be a quarter of the size, in 

terms of height and hydroelectric capacity. 

Additional dams have been planned or constructed along the 

Mekong’s tributaries. These dams are intended to generate electricity in support of growing regional energy demand. Some of the 

electricity will even be exported, particularly from Laos, which has 

voiced its goal to become the battery of Southeast Asia. 

These dams may also be used to store water, increase irrigation, 

and contribute to flood control. However, these dams will also 

affect the river’s waterflow, its fish population, and wildlife. Low 

environmental standards, and weak enforcement of those standards, may allow these dams to bring catastrophic damage to the 

river’s ecosystem. Moreover, the uncoordinated construction of 

these dams may threaten the entire region’s stability if, as projected, food production decreases and countries begin to compete for 

access to water. 

The economic benefits derived from electricity production could 

be short-lived in this case if tensions over access to transboundary 

water resources flash into greater political instability. 

Over the past year, I’ve traveled to all of the countries in mainland Southeast Asia. And during these visits, as well as here at 

home, I’ve examined water-use practices and plans for the river’s 

development. I’ve engaged numerous American and regional diplomats, policymakers, environmental engineers, and academics, all 

of whom convey the importance of the Mekong River to Southeast 

Asia’s economic sustainability and to its human security. 

In particular, the Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia, the largest body 

of freshwater in Southeast Asia, plays a critical role in the region’s 

food production system. During the wet season, when the Mekong’s 

water levels are highest, water flows from the river into the lake, 

filling it up. When water levels drop with the dry season, water 

flows reverse and the lake empties back into the river. Nowhere 

else in the world is the flow reversal or river pulse so large. 

The region’s fish species and migration patterns depend upon 

this river pulse, with fish migrating upriver as far as Yunnan province in China. The volume of fish migration in the Mekong is estimated to be 100 times larger than the volume of fish migration in 

the Pacific Northwest. 

Annual floods also naturally restore soil nutrients and purge pollutants, facilitating agricultural productivity. Consequently, Thailand and Vietnam have become the world’s leading exporters of 

rice. 

3 

The Tonle Sap River pulse, the extent of fish migration, and the 

flow of sediments into the delta are all at risk from the unchecked 

construction of hydropower dams along the Mekong River mainstream. 

With mounting evidence, experts estimate that existing and 

planned hydropower dams may block the migration of 70 percent 

of the most commercially important fish. Decreasing water flows, 

particularly in the dry season, may contribute to saltwater intrusion into the Mekong Delta and threaten freshwater rice production. 

In June, I traveled to the delta, to Can Tho, in Vietnam, where 

environmental scientists reported that, over the past 20 years, seawater has crept 20 kilometers further up into the Delta. They expect that this intrusion will worsen as upstream hydropower dams 

further restrict waterflow. 

Given the severity of these risks and their transboundary consequences, it’s vital to consider ways to address water resources 

management and the development of hydropower dams through 

multilateral cooperation. The Mekong River Commission, established in 1995 by Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, is one 

regional organization attempting this approach. 

In August 2009, I met with the Mekong River Commission in 

Laos and observed the valuable role that it plays in collecting data 

on the river, forecasting the impact of hydropower development, 

and catalyzing a regional approach to water management. 

I’m concerned, however, that the effectiveness of this organization is limited by two major factors. First is the lack of membership 

by two Upper Mekong countries, China and Burma. In fact, China 

is one of the few countries in the world that does not recognize 

riparian water rights of downstream nations. Yet, it is the gatekeeper for the Mekong River and all of the water that flows downstream from the Tibetan Plateau. 

Without China’s meaningful participation in regional river management and consideration of downstream nations, the Lower 

Mekong countries are vulnerable to China’s control over water 

flows. This concern should include China’s potential ability to hold 

back the river at its source. 

Second, the commission lacks the power to prevent environmental and economic harms that may occur when parties fail to account for regional impacts in the development of hydropower. It 

also lacks the power to hold nations liable for environmental or economic damage resulting from these developments. 

Southeast Asia is in need of a methodology, either political or 

economic, or both, that can raise environmental standards, mitigate the negative impacts of water use and development, and ultimately hold countries responsible for their actions. 

With U.S. participation, the Asian Development Bank’s financing 

of infrastructure projects presents one opportunity to influence regional environmental practices. The ADB is the only regional organization to which all Mekong countries belong. And it has played 

a significant role in funding the development of hydropower and 

electricity transmission systems throughout the region. 

Presently, this committee is developing legislation to authorize 

the U.S. capital contribution to the Asian Development Bank. This 

4 

bill also provides an opportunity to revisit the role that the ADB 

plays in Southeast Asia, particularly in financing infrastructure 

projects and in improving environmental standards. To this end, 

I’ve been working, with input from several organizations, including 

the World Wildlife Fund, the Nature Conservancy, International 

Rivers, and the Stimson Center, to develop language that would 

raise the environmental standards for hydropower dam or electricity transmission projects financed by the ADB. 

This language, if adopted, would instruct the U.S. executive 

director at the Bank to vote against financing a project if the 

Treasury decides not to certify to Congress that the process adheres to internationally recognized environmental standards, and 

that it protects the rights of individuals affected by the project, and 

reflects a multilateral approach to development along the Mekong 

River. 

I’ve shared the language under consideration with our nongovernment witnesses, and I would be interested in hearing any 

thoughts that they might have on that, and any other policy suggestions, as the hearing goes forward today. And I will look forward to working with Chairman Kerry and the committee to include some form of this language in the ADB authorization. 

United States attention to the health and well-being of the 

Mekong River in Southeast Asia can be a vital factor in facilitating 

a positive multilateral solution to the risks facing the region. Additionally, we can encourage other countries to adopt long-term approaches toward developing the Mekong River that would balance 

each nation’s economic development with the protection of the environment and the overall security of more than 60 million people. 

I’m pleased to welcome two panels today to help us examine the 

challenges facing Southeast Asia’s environment, economy, and security, and how the United States can facilitate better multilateral 

management of the Mekong River and the region’s environment. 

Our first panel, I would like to welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Yun. This is the first occasion that Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Yun has had to appear formally before the subcommittee, but we’ve had several meetings, and I have enjoyed, 

very much, working with Secretary Yun to this point. 

And I’d like, again, to congratulate you on your recent promotion. 

Previously, Deputy Assistant Secretary Yun served as the Director of the Office of Maritime Southeast Asia in the State Department. He is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service class 

of minister counselor. His overseas assignments have been in South 

Korea, Thailand, France, Indonesia, and Hong Kong. 

So, welcome, Secretary Yun. And please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH YUN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. YUN. Thank you very much, Chairman. And thank you for 

inviting me here today to discuss the importance of the Mekong 

River to the sustainable development and security of the Mekong 

Basin and key aspects of our engagement strategy on these issues 

with the Southeast Asia region. 

5 

With your permission, I would like to make brief remarks and 

submit a longer statement for the record. 

Senator WEBB. Your longer statement will be entered into the 

record at this time. And please proceed with any other comments 

you’d like to make. 

Mr. YUN. In her remarks on World Water Day this year, Secretary Clinton stated that, ‘‘Water represents one of the great diplomatic and development opportunities of our time.’’ By 2025, 

nearly two-thirds of the world population will be living under 

water-stressed conditions. Water scarcity and poor water quality 

will increase disease risks, undermine economic growth, limit food 

production, and become an increasing threat to peace and security. 

The Lower Mekong region of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and 

Vietnam is one of Asia’s most vulnerable areas to the impacts of 

climate change because of large numbers of people living in flood 

plains and low-lying coastal areas and because the people and 

economies of the region depend strongly on agriculture and ecosystem services. The region’s extraordinary biodiversity is also at 

risk from human activities and both the direct and indirect impacts 

of climate change. 

The Mekong is one of the most complex river systems in the 

world. It is the longest river in Southeast Asia, stretching over 

2,700 miles, through six countries, nearly twice the length of the 

Colorado. Its watershed supports millions of people, providing over 

$2 billion in revenue from wild fisheries alone. 

Within the lower basin are ecologically unique features that play 

crucial roles in regulating the flows of the Mekong. The Tonle Sap 

Lake, Cambodia’s most important fishery, and, below that, the 

wide reach of the Vietnam Delta, which produces about 52 percent 

of Vietnam’s rice and most of its aquaculture, fish, and shrimp 

exports. 

The people of the Mekong River Basin depend heavily on the 

river. Irrigated agriculture and fishing engage 85 percent of the 

workforce within the basin. And for most farmers, the river is critical to their survival. 

Poverty is still an enormous challenge in the region, and those 

who are dependent on the natural base of the Mekong are, of 

course, the first to suffer from any environmental damages and 

changes. 

It is also important to note that the region holds great capacity 

for growth and economic opportunity. For example, United States 

exports to Vietnam have tripled in the last 3 years, with two-way 

trade reaching nearly $16 billion in 2009. And the region has 

proved to be very resilient during the recent economic downturn. 

Economic growth results in growing energy needs, and the countries of the Mekong are increasingly turning to hydropower as a solution. Construction of dams on the Mekong River, however, may 

pose immediate and long-term threats to the food security and livelihood of the millions of people in the Lower Mekong Basin. 

The impetus behind the Mekong dam projects is the creation of 

a regional electrical grid which will facilitate the development of 

the Mekong Basin. In the future, the Mekong and its tributaries 

could support an elaborate interlocking electric power generation, 

supplying Laos, northern Thailand, parts of Cambodia, and much 

6 

of Yunnan province in China. The economic stakes for dam construction are high, and the states of the Mekong Basin are eager 

for developmental benefits they can obtain. 

On the upper stem of the Mekong, China’s eight-dam cascade in 

Yunnan province, four of which are completed, will most certainly 

disrupt some of the river’s natural function, as well as give China 

some degree of control over the timing and amount of water flows. 

During the dry season, the flows from China account for 40 percent 

of water supply in the Mekong system. During the wet months, the 

share is about 16 percent. 

In the Lower Mekong, hydropower development plans have been 

plagued by weak oversight of required environmental and social 

impact assessments. The greatest downstream ecological impact of 

regional infrastructure development will be felt at Cambodia’s 

Tonle Sap Great Lake and Vietnam’s Mekong River Delta. 

Upstream mainstem dams may degrade the Tonle Sap, affecting 

fish migration and population. The Mekong Delta of Vietnam may 

also suffer major consequences, including the loss of vital silt 

replenishment, resulting in increased saltwater intrusion and 

decreased rice production. 

The Mekong River system is already beginning to show signs of 

strain brought about by its multiple competing uses. Although 

much attention is focused on the impact of future dams, immediate 

environmental threats also exist through overuse and pollution 

from industry, wastewater, and agriculture. Effectively managing 

transboundary water is an enormous challenge, particularly for the 

regions—for the nations in the region with different levels of economic development and past animosities. 

Facing these difficulties, the Mekong River Commission has provided a framework for addressing transboundary water resources 

in the region. It has steered regional and watershed development 

since 1995, emphasizing avenues for cooperation, strategic planning, and continued dialogue. Although not a regulatory agency, 

the Mekong River Commission builds knowledge and technical 

capacity for member states of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam through providing assistance and recommendations. 

These problems are not easy, but cooperative solutions are possible. While the United States has a long history of engagement 

with the countries of Southeast Asia on a bilateral basis, there is 

an increasing awareness of the growing number of issues that transcend national boundaries. The countries of the Lower Mekong region share a variety of common interests and concerns. With those 

concerns in mind, Secretary Clinton launched the Lower Mekong 

Initiative in 2009 to help facilitate regional cooperation on the 

issues of environment, education, health, and infrastructure. This 

initiative seeks to coordinate effective responses to challenges, that 

are inherently regional in nature, through working-level visits, 

training workshops, conferences, and scientific and technological 

exchanges. 

In concert with other technical agencies of the U.S. Government, 

USAID, and the State Department are making significant investments in order to further improve our regional programming. 

USAID programs incorporate U.S. expertise into a regional plan to 

address some of the key water and development challenges these 

7 

countries face. They also foster cooperation among the countries in 

the region to work together for a common purpose. U.S. leadership 

and increased attention may have had an impact on other regional 

players. Recently, China agreed to share more of its operational 

data with the Mekong River Commission and has allowed the visit 

by the Commission officials to China’s Yunnan province to look at 

two of its four dams. Japan has also increased its involvement in 

the region, pledging $5 billion in assistance at the Japan Mekong 

summit in October 2009. 

The administration recognizes the critical need to work closely 

with the countries in Southeast Asia to foster the rational use and 

sustainable development of the river resources before lasting environmental harm has been done and before the security of the region is jeopardized by improper planning on this important waterway. We hope to advance cooperation and expertise by continuing 

to expand the Lower Mekong Initiative by developing technical 

assistance programs mobilizing a whole-of-government approach. 

We are encouraged by the progress that has been achieved in such 

a short time and, with our Mekong partners, are pursuing activities that can bring the greatest gain for the region. 

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to testify today. And 

I’m very happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yun follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH YUN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF

EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Webb and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me 

here today to discuss the importance of the Mekong River to the sustainable development and security of the Mekong Basin and key aspects of our engagement strategy on these issues with the Southeast Asia region. 

THE GLOBAL WATER AND SANITATION CHALLENGE

In her March 22, 2010, World Water Day Speech, Secretary Clinton stated that 

‘‘water represents one of the great diplomatic and development opportunities of our 

time.’’ She noted that, ‘‘It’s not every day you find an issue where effective diplomacy and development will allow you to save millions of lives, feed the hungry, empower women, advance our national security interests, protect the environment, and 

demonstrate to billions of people that the United States cares, cares about you and 

your welfare. Water is that issue.’’ 

By 2025, nearly two-thirds of the world’s population will be living under waterstressed conditions, including roughly 1.8 billion people who will face absolute water 

scarcity (a level that threatens economic development as well as human health and 

well-being). Water scarcity and poor water quality will increase disease risks, undermine economic growth, limit food production, and become an increasing threat to 

peace and security. 

More than 260 watersheds worldwide are shared by two or more countries. As 

water becomes scarce, tensions over shared resources are likely to rise—both within 

countries and among countries. Promoting joint management and using water to 

build trust and cooperation in conflict-prone regions are important tools in reducing 

the risks of future conflicts. 

The effects of climate change will only exacerbate these challenges. Perhaps the 

most profound effects of climate change will be the shrinking of glaciers and rivers. 

Water availability will change as will the likelihood of extreme floods and droughts. 

These extreme events can affect more people than all other natural disasters combined. 

The Greater Mekong subregion is one of Asia’s areas most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change because of the large numbers of people living in floodplains 

and low-lying coastal areas and because the people and economies of the region depend strongly on agriculture and ecosystem services. The region’s extraordinary biodiversity is also at risk from both the direct and indirect impacts of climate change. 

8 

As we know from our own experiences with the wetlands and marshes of large 

river systems such as the Mississippi, the management of these systems can have 

far-ranging societal and ecological impacts. Sustainable river management in the 

face of climate change is of great concern to us, as well as for those living in large 

watersheds around the world. 

To help strengthen U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia, Secretary Clinton announced the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) in July 2009 on the margins of the 

ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting. The LMI aims to engage Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam by helping build regional capacity in the areas of environment, 

health, education, and infrastructure in order to facilitate multilateral cooperation 

among the four countries on issues of mutual concern, such as the common challenge of effective water resource management 

Also in response to this challenge, Secretary Clinton has asked Under Secretary 

for Global Affairs Maria Otero and U.S. Agency for International Development 

Administrator, Rajiv Shah, to identify specific steps we can take to strengthen the 

United States capacity to respond to watershed management and climate change. 

We are also establishing a joint steering group under the leadership of Bureau of 

Oceans, Environment, and Science Assistant Secretary Kerri-Ann Jones. 

THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MEKONG SYSTEM

Hydrologically, the Mekong River is one of the most complex river systems in the 

world. It is the longest river in Southeast Asia, stretching 2,703 miles through six 

countries, nearly twice the length of the Colorado River. Its watershed supports between 65 and 80 million people, providing over $2 billion in revenue from wild fisheries alone. 

The large flows of the Mekong—nearly as large as those of the Mississippi—vary 

widely according to available precipitation. The basin has a wet season and a dry 

season. During the wet season, only about 16 percent of the flows come from China. 

During the dry season months, this share rises to 40 percent. Due to the complexity 

and extent of the Mekong system, drought and flood events rarely affect the entire 

reach equally. 

Within the Lower Basin are ecologically unique features that play crucial roles 

in regulating the flows of the Mekong: the Tonle Sap Lake, Cambodia’s most important fishery, and, below that, the wide reach of the Delta, which produces about 52 

percent of Vietnam’s rice and most of its aquaculture fish and shrimp exports. 

Located in the Cambodian floodplain, the Tonle Sap Lake is filled by the monsoon 

rains. When it overflows, it can temporarily reverse the flow of the Mekong. The 

surge in water storage in the lake is enormous, increasing from 1–2 million acrefeet 

in the dry season, to 40–60 million acre-feet in the wet season, enough to cover the 

State of New Jersey in 10 feet of water. 

The injection of nutrient-rich sediments also creates one of the world’s most productive ecosystems and the world’s largest freshwater fishery. Through this natural 

action of seasonal storage, the Tonle Sap Lake regulates the flows of the Mekong, 

moderates flood events, provides crucial flows during dry months, and prevents the 

incursion of seawater within the Delta. 

The Mekong Delta supports about half of Vietnam’s total production of rice and 

provides food security for its population. Vietnam is one of the world’s richest agricultural regions, the second-largest exporter of rice worldwide, and the world’s seventh-largest consumer of rice. The Mekong River and its tributaries are crucial to 

rice production in Vietnam. A total of 12 provinces constitute the Mekong Delta, 

containing 17 million people, 80 percent of whom are engaged in rice cultivation. 

According to the United Nations Development Program in Vietnam and Vietnam’s 

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the rice industry is under serious 

threat due to the 2010 heat wave, climate change, and upstream Mekong River 

development. 

STRONG RIPARIAN DEPENDENCE ON THE MEKONG

The inhabitants of the Mekong River Basin depend heavily on the river. Irrigated 

agriculture and fishing engage 85 percent of the workforce within the Basin, and 

for most farmers the river is critical to their survival. Many farmers rely on fishing 

to supplement their incomes and provide nourishment. In every Mekong country 

fish are the most important source of animal protein; for many, the principal source 

of protein in their diet. Poverty still challenges the region, and those who are heavily dependent on the natural resource of the Mekong are the first to suffer from any 

environmental changes. 

It is important to note that, while the region is still home to over 20 million people living in poverty, it also holds great capacity for growth and economic opporVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:37 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
9 

tunity. For example, U.S. exports to Vietnam have tripled in the last 3 years, with 

two-way trade reaching nearly $16 billion in 2009. Regional economic growth in 

2009 was 6 percent; proving the region’s economy to be very resilient during the recent economic downturn. 

HYDROPOWER PLANS

One result of increased development is that the countries of the Mekong Basin 

are increasingly turning to hydropower as a solution to their growing energy needs. 

Construction of dams on the Mekong River may pose immediate and long-term 

threats to the food security and livelihoods of tens of millions of people in the Lower 

Mekong Basin. However, awareness of these threats is rising rapidly due to the confluence of an extended drought this year and a concerted push by interested parties, 

including the United States through the Lower Mekong Initiative, to highlight the 

possible adverse affects of dam construction. 

The impetus behind the Mekong dam projects is the creation of a regional electrical grid that will facilitate the development of the Mekong Basin. In the future, 

the Mekong and its tributaries could support an elaborate, interlocking electric 

power generation grid supplying Laos, northern Thailand, parts of Cambodia, and 

much of Yunnan province in China. The economic stakes for dam construction are 

high, and the states of the Mekong Basin are eager for the developmental benefits 

they can obtain. 

All dams have an impact on the flow and natural ecology of rivers and streams, 

but in certain cases the developmental and environmental tradeoffs in terms of electric power and navigation can be justified. In the case of the 11 mainstream dams 

planned by Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand on the lower half of the river, disruption 

of the food security of 60 million people who depend on the river could be among 

the serious consequences resulting from damming the Mekong River. A single misplaced dam on the lower Mekong could block the path of migratory fish species that 

supply up to 80 percent of animal protein in the local diet. A reduction in freshwater 

flows caused by poorly designed dams could also increase the salinity of the river 

water, thus adversely affecting the rice crop. 

The ambitious plans for investment in infrastructure should be grounded in a 

comprehensive analysis of where these investments would provide the highest return and what their hydrological impact would be. In the Lower Mekong region 

there is generally little analysis of soil and water quality, or other constraints to 

food production, when river modification is being considered. Often hydropower development plans have been plagued by weak oversight of required environmental 

and social impact assessments. 

On the upper stem of the Mekong, China’s eight-dam cascade in Yunnan province, 

four of which are completed, will certainly disrupt some of the river’s natural functions as well as give China some degree of control over the timing and amount of 

river flows. But the greatest downstream ecological impact may be caused by downstream infrastructure development and would be felt in Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Great 

Lake and Vietnam’s Mekong River Delta. Mainstem dams, including two planned 

by Cambodia itself, may degrade the Tonle Sap, and the Delta may also suffer major 

consequences due to the loss of vital silt replenishment. 

Hydropower remains a valuable energy resource, so long as the cost-benefit tradeoffs are fully understood and responsibly addressed. Many development projects 

must weigh the tradeoffs between the opportunities presented by new economic infrastructure—such as roads, bridges, and dams—and the full impacts to ecology and 

local livelihoods. The sale of electricity generated by dams provides a source of foreign revenue for countries with few existing alternative options for economic growth, 

but this may be unsustainable and comes with potentially significant environmental 

and social costs. 

SYSTEM UNDER STRESS

The Mekong River system is already beginning to show signs of strain brought 

about by multiple competing uses. Although much attention has focused on the impact of future dams, more immediate environmental threats exist through overuse 

and pollution from industry, wastewater, and agriculture. 

Maintaining water quality in the Mekong is key to sustaining the health and productivity of the populations dependent on it. High salinity levels are prevalent in 

the Delta, mostly during the dry months as diminished flows of the Mekong are unable to push back against seawater incursions. Moreover, agricultural runoff, municipal wastewater, industrial effluent, and sulphate-rich soils have resulted in elevated levels of acidity and eutrophication of the Lower Mekong watershed. 

10 

The Lower Mekong countries have recently started to address the issue of water 

pollution, but the region is plagued by lagging enforcement and monitoring. Upstream sources of water pollution, as well as domestic wastewater continue to 

degrade the health of the river. Certain municipalities, for example, discharge the 

majority of their untreated sewage directly into the river. 

While the state of the Mekong environmental system is threatened by existing 

pollution and future development, the few completed monitoring studies have found 

that the effect of pollution on Mekong fisheries has been limited thus far. While the 

current impact of development along the Mekong is also limited, future threats to 

fisheries, water quality, and human health are most likely to come from human 

interference in the form of dams, increased transportation, additional habitat destruction from land-use changes, and continued water pollution. 

The State Department has provided some small grants to a network of universities in the region to study the levels of pollution in the river. This effort has enhanced collaboration among research institutions within the four nations in the 

Mekong Basin. More studies are needed to fully understand development’s effects 

on the Mekong’s fragile biodiversity and to strengthen nascent research partnerships. 

Beyond the impact of human activities in the watershed affecting the Mekong 

River Basin, climate change will undoubtedly add to the list of challenges. Changing 

rainfall patterns, glacial melting, and greater hydrological variability may increase 

the likelihood of floods and droughts. Given an average elevation of around five feet, 

sea-level rise poses a grave threat to the Vietnam Delta. 

LOCAL POLITICS AND WATER POLITICS

Shared water issues among the Mekong countries are managed through a series 

of overlapping legal and institutional arrangements, such as navigation agreements. 

Effectively managing transboundary water is a significant challenge, particularly for 

riparian nations with different levels of economic development and past animosities. 

Facing these difficulties, the Mekong River Commission has steered regional watershed development since 1995, emphasizing avenues for cooperation, strategic planning, and continued dialogue. 

Under the 1995 Mekong Agreement signed by the Governments of Cambodia, 

Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) has provided 

a framework for addressing transboundary water resources in the region. Its structure has allowed for needed flexibility and resiliency as hydrologic and economic realities shift. Major foreign donors to the MRC include Germany, Australia, Sweden, 

and Denmark. 

Since 1995, the MRC has widened its scope. While remaining a forum for cooperative discussions, it has moved from large-scale basin planning to include small-scale 

resource development and the establishment of a knowledge base in lower basin hydrology. Although not a regulatory agency, the Mekong River Commission builds 

knowledge and technical capacity for member states through providing assistance 

and recommendations. 

In the future, the MRC will be forced to address difficult issues of water allocation 

and basin management. Hydropower development and analysis of water flows during the dry season must be discussed to craft adequate cooperative solutions. Responses to floods or droughts require strengthened communication between riparian 

countries. These problems are not easy, but cooperative solutions are possible. 

In response to these challenges, Secretary Clinton launched the Lower Mekong 

Initiative (LMI) in 2009 to help address regional issues, with a particular focus on 

the environment, health, education, and infrastructure. The LMI seeks to facilitate 

effective, coordinated responses to challenges that are inherently regional in nature 

through working level visits, training workshops, conferences, and scientific and 

technological exchanges. 

U.S. leadership and increased attention on the LMI has had an impact on how 

other regional players view these issues. Recently, China agreed to share more of 

its operational data with the Mekong River Commission and has allowed a visit by 

Mekong River Commission officials to China’s Yunnan province to look at two of the 

four dams. Japan has also increased its involvement in the region, pledging $5 billion in assistance at the Japan-Mekong summit last October. 

U.S. POLICY REGARDING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER SECURITY ISSUES

The unfortunate reality is that there will always be disputes over water. Our involvement includes emphasis on building solutions that consider the environment 

and climate change, health, education, infrastructure, and economic growth. 

Through our support of multinational solutions, we hope to foster an environment 

11 

that will preempt instability and minimize the potential for violent conflict. In analyzing the potential for conflict, we look at factors that are driving tensions, as well 

as factors that can defuse tensions. 

In the Mekong region we see only a few factors with the potential to contribute 

to conflict. Those factors are unilateral development of upstream infrastructure, bilateral development of downstream infrastructure, changing environmental conditions, and historical tensions in relations between Mekong countries. These instigating factors are to a large extent countered by some important mitigating factors. 

First, the Mekong countries recognize that they need to act in concert in the stewardship of the Basin. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other donors are 

helping to foster this collaboration. In addition, the MRC is a regional institution 

which has recently made significant strides and includes representation and support 

from each of the Basin countries. While much needs to be done to ensure the institution can effectively advance sound water resources management across the Basin, 

it provides a solid foundation for regional assessment, planning, and discussion. In 

our view, the MRC’s existence greatly minimizes the likelihood of violent conflict 

among the Mekong states. 

While the United States has a long history of engagement with the countries of 

Southeast Asia on a bilateral basis, there is an increasing awareness of the growing 

number of issues that transcend national boundaries. The countries of the Lower 

Mekong region share a variety of common concerns, including transboundary water 

management, infectious diseases, and vulnerability to climate change. Our Lower 

Mekong Initiative seeks to support a common regional understanding of these issues 

and to facilitate an effective, coordinated response. 

In order to build regional capacity and cooperation, the State Department is working with other U.S. Government partners to develop innovative programs under the 

auspices of the LMI. ‘‘Forecast Mekong,’’ a computerized decisionmaking tool the 

U.S. Geological Survey is developing with State Department support, will provide 

policymakers in the Mekong countries with the information they need to make good 

decisions on managing the Mekong waterways, including predicted effects of hydropower dams on water flow. This information will be made available on the Internet 

so that scientists and researchers, based in the region and around the world, can 

also access the data and the analysis capability. Also created under the auspices of 

the LMI is a ‘‘sister-river partnership’’ between the Mekong River Commission and 

the Mississippi River Commission that will help to build the capacity of the Mekong 

River Commission and to support its efforts to incorporate water-related concerns 

into regional decisionmaking. 

USAID is also working to strengthen the capacity of the Lower Mekong countries 

to assess the environmental impacts of hydropower development at both the project 

and basin levels. Through the Asia Development Bank (ADB) and Greater Mekong 

Sub-Region Initiative, USAID will support partnerships between the countries to 

conduct Strategic Environmental Assessments for hydropower projects. In addition, 

USAID, in partnership with ADB, MRC, and the Worldwide Fund for Nature, has 

developed a sustainable hydropower development assessment tool, which will soon 

be piloted in various sub-basins within the watershed. 

The United States has an important role to play here. We can inform regional policy and decisionmaking, build local capacity, and promote sustainable development 

by sharing advanced science and technology capabilities. Our goal in this area is not 

to determine the outcome of these discussions, but to give policymakers the tools 

they need to make informed decisions about development of the river. 

Finally, in concert with other technical agencies of the U.S. Government, USAID, 

and the State Department are making significant investments in the health, environment, and education sectors. In addition to existing bilateral activities, we are 

further developing our regional programming as well. I would like to highlight the 

Secretary’s announcement of $3 million from USAID for the study of climate change 

impacts on the Mekong Basin. Let me share a rough sketch of what we hope to accomplish with this money. 

USAID will support the development of a regional adaptation strategy across the 

Lower Mekong. It will engage local institutions and conduct studies to assess 

vulnerabilities of the ecosystem as well as hold dialogues with a variety of stakeholders to gain support for a regional approach. Further into the program, we look 

to implement pilot projects and build platforms for sharing of information. Through 

an integrated and regional approach we will be able to build local and national government capacity for long-term planning founded on sound science and advanced 

technology. 

These programs incorporate U.S. expertise into a regional plan to address some 

of the key water and development challenges these countries face. They also foster 

12 

cooperation among the countries in the region to work together for a common purpose. 

Conclusion 

The administration recognizes the critical need to work closely with the countries 

in Southeast Asia to foster the rational use and sustainable development of Mekong 

River resources before irreparable environmental harm has been done and before 

the security of the region is jeopardized by improper planning and exploitation of 

this important waterway. Mekong countries, including to some extent China, have 

realized the importance of united action by establishing the Mekong River Commission. We hope to advance cooperation and expertise by creating the Lower Mekong 

Initiative and developing technical assistance programs. 

Building upon existing programs, we have mobilized a whole-of-government approach to our engagement in the Lower Mekong Initiative. We are sensitive to the 

needs and priorities of our Mekong partners and are pursuing activities that can 

bring the greatest gains for the region. We are encouraged by the progress that has 

been achieved in such a short time and look forward to planning the Third Lower 

Mekong Ministerial Meeting to continue the discussion to protect the Mekong River. 

Thank you for extending this opportunity to me to testify today on this pressing 

and vitally important issue. I am happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Secretary Yun. 

I would like to ask you a few questions here. First of all, speaking of the Lower Mekong Initiative, you mentioned that the United 

States is contributing $3 million to a program examining the impact of climate change on water resources and food security. In 

fact, I was reminded of this contribution several times when I was 

in Vietnam in July. I am, at the same time, kind of curious about 

how much is being invested in areas where we can get a more immediate improvement. 

In page 5 of your testimony, you mention a number of items that 

are similar to the areas that I have been attempting to get some 

attention to: the notion of the difficulty of upriver dams, which is 

a main purpose of this hearing, which affect riverflow downstream, 

much among other issues; the impact of growing population on pollution in the rivers; the lack of pollution standards—in fact, during 

my Vietnam trip, I was told that only 30 percent of the wastewater 

being put back into the river has been treated; and also, the increasing industrialization along the river, and the emissions that 

come from those facilities. What are we doing, in terms of the 

Lower Mekong Initiative, to assist in resolving those problems? 

Mr. YUN. Thank you. We have, this year, in FY 2010—we will 

spend—this is our assistance to four Lower Mekong region—$219 

million in assistance. I mean, that includes every assistance we 

have. A large part of that is—the biggest share of that goes to Vietnam. And I think that comes—to Vietnam—comes to about $90 

million. And then next we have Cambodia, at about $72 million. 

And then, of course, smaller sums for Laos and Thailand. 

Within that amount, the biggest amount is spent on public 

health programs. And I would emphasize two types of public health 

programs. One, we’ve done a lot in terms of PEPFAR, the HIV/ 

AIDS program. And second one is the emerging and infectious diseases. And I think that’s the area we’ll be looking, in the future, 

to expand on. That’s the area—we’ve recently had a conference 

among Lower Mekong countries, and that’s the area we’ll be looking to expand. 

Let me just say a word about Lower Mekong Initiative. This—— 

Senator WEBB. Mr. Secretary, if I may. 

Mr. YUN. Yes. 

13 

Senator WEBB. How much of that money is being spent on the 

Mekong River? 

Mr. YUN. It is very small. It is a program that has just gotten 

underway last year. And as you know, our budget cycle typically 

takes 2 years. And we are now making the budget for FY12. In the 

meantime, we want to get whatever resources we can. And right 

now, as you mentioned, $2 to $3 million is devoted. And mostly, 

that will be for technical exchanges—doing conferences, bring experts over, and so on. 

Senator WEBB. But, that money—let’s get our facts straight 

here—that money, according to testimony, is principally being 

spent to examine the impact of climate change. Is that correct? 

Mr. YUN. It’s not only for climate change. We have also some 

money which will do—I don’t know whether we’ve briefed you on 

Forecast Mekong, for example. That’s a program, with the U.S. 

Geological Survey, in which we are trying to do a simulation model 

of water levels in Mekong. And so, some of that money was spent 

on that. And so, at the moment, I would say the budget for LMI 

is pretty much ad hoc. And we need devoted money. And this is 

what we are trying to work at. 

We’ve had two LMI ministerials over the past 12 months, and 

we’re going to have another one at the end of October. And before 

committing money to it, we would like to have some structure. And 

let me just describe to you the kind of structure we want to have. 

We want to have full working groups within LMI: education, 

public health, environment and climate change, and, last, on infrastructure. Within this working group, we would have projects. And 

so, the simple answer to your question is, money issues, we believe, 

should come after there has been some serious work done—what 

kind of project is necessary. So, that’s where we are. 

Senator WEBB. So, if we’re defining the objectives that could best 

be met with the relatively small amount of money that we have, 

in addressing the issues of the Mekong River itself, and you had 

$3 million, would you put it in climate change, or would you put 

it in wastewater treatment, or—what would you do? 

Mr. YUN. It’s kind of too small to put it any ways, but we want 

to use that money to get the working groups going, to have good 

degree of consultations and studies done so that we know, when 

the bigger money that we will be asking for—we’ll know what to 

do with that. 

Senator WEBB. Let me just—— 

Mr. YUN. We think of this as a long-term commitment, and we 

want to come back to—you know, to Congress, over and over again, 

and seek devoted funding. That’s what we aim to do. 

Senator WEBB. But, at the same time, my observation is that, 

having visited Can Tho and discussed these issues with people 

down there, when they’re getting a certain amount of money for climate change, which is rather hard to get your arms around, and 

they have issues of pollution standards, effluence into the river, 

those sorts of things, let me encourage you to include those in your 

objectives. 

Mr. YUN. Thank you. We will. 

Senator WEBB. And, if I may, I have just another question on the 

Lower Mekong Initiative. Are you planning discussions to engage 

14 

countries, bilaterally and multilaterally, on the risks that are associated with these hydropower projects? 

Mr. YUN. Most of our engagement on Mekong sites, so far, has 

happened with the Mekong River Commission. We, again, do give 

a little bit of assistance to Mekong River Commission. And we also 

work with a couple of large donor countries—Australia and Denmark, principally. And most of our engagement has been on that 

front. 

We also have talked with Chinese, on occasions, on water usage 

in general, and also on Southeast Asia. So, we do engage China as 

well as Mekong River Commission. 

Senator WEBB. As you know, China, which has about 20 percent 

of the Mekong River’s water resources, is not a member of the 

Mekong River Commission. It also, as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, does not recognize downstream riparian water rights. 

And I was really gratified to see, recently, just over the past month 

or so, after we, in our country, began discussing this issue a little 

more openly, that China has been willing to share some data on 

the construction in Yunnan. And the dam projects in Tibet still remain a mystery. But, what do you think they need to do in order 

to demonstrate that they’re acting responsibly, in terms of their 

obligations in the region? 

Mr. YUN. I think they need to have a serious dialogue with downstream countries regarding, especially, the effects of the dams 

they’re building, on waterflow. And so far, that has not taken place. 

We welcome, of course, China recently sharing some data, but it’s 

not the whole set. And, you know, essentially, we want them to 

share not only part of the current—I think they’re only sharing 

data—daily waterflow during wet season. We want them to share, 

during dry season, what happens. We also want them to share historical data. And it’s really only looking through historical data 

you’re going to get the trend. It’s not—it’s no good—I wouldn’t say 

it’s no good; it’s some help. But, having the current data only is 

just a slice of the picture. 

But, more than that, we would want them to be part of any kind 

of organization that takes place in that region, in terms of discussing overall effects, in terms of fisheries, in terms of the environment, and what this true cost and benefits are, so that people 

in the region can make the decision, based on true cost-benefit 

analysis. 

Senator WEBB. China is very reluctant, particularly in this region, to engage in multilateral dialogue. Do you see any movement 

on that front with respect to these issues? 

Mr. YUN. I think we have to encourage them. Mr. Chairman, you 

and I have recently discussed the issues of South China Sea, for 

example. And I think this is another example in which United 

States interests may not be directly involved, or we have no real 

presence there, in terms of sharing borders, but, at the same time, 

regional stability requires we look a little bit beyond and engage 

China and the neighboring states into a sustainable dialogue. It 

can be in a multilateral forum. I mean, there are lots of existing 

mechanisms. 

We have, for example, there is the ASEAN mechanism, there is 

the Mekong River Commission mechanism. As you mentioned, 

15 

there is also the Asian Development Bank mechanism. But, beyond 

that, I think we need to, you know, be more engaged in the region 

with China and the neighboring states. 

Senator WEBB. I would agree with that comment, and I appreciate your saying it. As I’ve said many times, the United States is 

a vital ingredient in maintaining regional balance. And, even as 

you point out, we do not have geographical boundaries in this area. 

We certainly can provide, sort of, facilitation in order to encourage 

multilateral cooperation. And, quite frankly, if American dollars 

are going into these projects, we can decline to invest in projects 

that are clearly harmful to environmental concerns. 

Thank you very much, Secretary Yun. I know we’ll be seeing you 

many times more in this subcommittee, and we appreciate your 

testimony. 

Mr. YUN. Thank you very much. 

Senator WEBB. The second panel today, I’d like to welcome three 

experts who’ve made notable efforts to document the risks facing 

the Mekong River and consider solutions to these challenges. 

Dr. Richard Cronin is a senior associate at the Stimson Center, 

where he has directed the Southeast Asia Program since 2006. Dr. 

Cronin joined the Stimson Center after a long career with the Congressional Research Service. He received his Ph.D. from Syracuse 

University, his master’s and bachelor’s degree from the University 

of Houston. He is a veteran of the Vietnam war. Earlier this year, 

Dr. Cronin published a report entitled ‘‘Mekong Tipping Point: 

Hydropower Dams, Human Security, and Regional Stability,’’ in 

which he analyzed the development of hydropower dams along the 

Mekong River, and the regional impacts of this activity. 

Welcome again to this subcommittee, Dr. Cronin. 

Ms. Aviva Imhof directs the Southeast Asia and Latin American 

programs at International Rivers. In her position, Ms. Imhof works 

with regional international partners to investigate hydropower 

projects, disseminate information, and provide technical, legal, and 

campaign assistance. Prior to this, Ms. Imhof directed the International River’s Mekong program for 7 years. She was the lead 

organizer of Rivers for Life, the second international meeting of 

Dam-Affected People and their Allies, a conference in 2003 that 

brought together 300 people from 62 countries in Thailand. She has 

also written extensively on the efforts to halt destructive river 

development projects in Southeast Asia. 

And welcome, Ms. Imhof. 

Our third witness is Ms. Dekila Chungyalpa, from the World 

Wildlife Federation. She is the U.S. director for the Greater 

Mekong Program and has led WWF’s efforts on the Mekong region 

since 2005. 

In July, WWF released a study, entitled ‘‘River of Giants: Giant 

Fish of the Mekong,’’ which profiles four giant fish species living 

in the Mekong that rank among the world’s largest freshwater fish. 

Ms. Chungyalpa also leads WWF’s activities on the river basin climate change adaptation and sustainable solutions for hydropower. 

Previously, she worked for 5 years with the WWF in the eastern 

Himalayas and has extensive experience working with local communities. Ms. Chungyalpa speaks five languages: Sikkimese, 

Tibetan, Hindi, Nepali, and English. 

16 

I thank all of you for being here today. And we will begin with 

Dr. Cronin. 

Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD CRONIN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

THE STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. CRONIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate this opportunity to offer my perspectives on these 

urgent issues regarding water insecurity in Southeast Asia. 

I’ve organized my written statement so as to respond specifically 

to the five questions that you posed. But, in this few minutes’ time 

I have, I would like to—— 

Senator WEBB. Let me say, by the way, because I should have 

said it before, that your full statements will be entered into the 

record—— 

Dr. CRONIN. I thank you. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. At the beginning of each of your testimony. And you’re welcome to take whatever time you like to 

make your points orally. 

Dr. CRONIN. Thanks very much. I appreciate that. 

My colleagues, in their statements, have already provided really 

eloquent and well-informed coverage of the human environmental 

tragedy that is unfolding. I will use my few minutes here to address two things. First—two points—one is the risks of both Chinese and proposed Lower Mekong projects the region’s hard-won 

peace, stability, and the longer term prospects for sustainable 

development. Second, I will also address the Lower Mekong Initiative, which you’ve already been discussing with Mr. Yun. 

The character and the impact of the 8 or more large-to-mega 

dams that China is building on the upper half of the river, and the 

dams—now 11 dams and one other water project—proposed for the 

lower river—lower half of the river in Southeast Asia by—primarily 

by Cambodia and Laos, are different but of equally negative impact. And again, in the written statement—and I’m sure you’ll hear 

from my colleagues—China’s dam cascade in Yunnan will have different impacts, as opposed to those of the Lower Mekong dams. 

China, basically, is going to change the hydrology of the river in 

a very serious way, and hold back silt in its dams, that is necessary 

to replenish fields and rebuild the Mekong Delta every year after 

the dry season. And the Lower Mekong dams, to put it briefly, will 

block the migration of wild fisheries—and we’re talking fish—we’re 

talking about fish worth about $9 billion as they work to—their 

way through the economy, and which constitute anywhere from 40 

to 80 percent of the protein in diets of some 60 million people as 

you’ve already mentioned in your remarks. 

From a regional peace and security perspective, the worst aspect 

of China’s Yunnan cascades is capability of the two biggest reservoirs, one of which is already filling—the Xiaowan dam—to regulate flow of water from Yunnan to the Lower Mekong. China plans 

to use this storage to put as much as 40 percent or more water into 

the river during the dry season in order to keep its smaller, but 

still large, dams running year-round—that is, its three dams below 

Xiaowan—and to support navigation of large cargo boats between 

southern Yunnan and Luang Prabang, Laos. 

17 

Augmenting the dry-season flow can be—in years of drought— 

can be a positive benefit, but the amount of water that China plans 

to release in the dry season will reduce the normal extremes of wet 

and dry in the river that give it its great productivity, and particularly of aquatic life and agriculture. So, some water in the dry season, if it’s unusually dry, will help, but that’s not what China has 

in mind. China wants to put more water in the river every dry season. And during the dry season, China is the most important 

source of water in the river. 

Even more troubling are the political and geopolitical ramifications. If Laos and Cambodia go ahead with their plans for damming the middle and lower reaches of the river, they will make 

themselves dependent on China to release water, from the Xiaowan 

Dam and this other even larger dam it’s building, in the right 

quantity and at the right time to keep the dams operating downstream for several months of the year during the dry season. So, 

they’re—Laos and Cambodia—setting themselves up, if they build 

these dams, to be totally dependent on China during the dry season, for most of those dams to keep operating. 

Equally or more troubling, China has, thus far, refused to countenance making cooperative water management part of the agenda 

of the Asian Development Bank-led Greater Mekong subregion, 

known as GMS. The GMS originally started with 11 ‘‘flagship programs,’’ they called them, but most of the money is going to build 

roads and bridges in the regional power grid that you referenced 

earlier. And China will not allow the river to be part of that discussion. So, we already have the MRC with the four Lower Mekong 

countries, and China is not a part of that. And then we have the 

GMS, where China is a part, as well as Burma—or Myanmar, as 

you wish—but won’t let the water issue be discussed. 

So, you made some comments in your statement about what we 

should be doing at the ADB. And I think that’s one of the areas 

that the—where the United States should be using its influence. 

Mr. Chairman, the Obama administration has made the Mekong 

Basin the focal point of its professed engagement with Southeast 

Asia and ASEAN, and not a moment too soon. 

All of the Lower Mekong countries understand the geopolitical 

nature of the U.S. initiative; and, to varying degrees, they all welcome it. Because of the wider context of enhanced United States 

engagement with ASEAN, the LMI has been welcomed by most 

other Southeast Asian countries, due to concern about China’s hegemonic potential, both in mainland Southeast Asia and the South 

China Sea. 

One serious weakness of the LMI, at present, and one that you’ve 

already addressed in your questions to Deputy Secretary Yun, is 

that the initiative originated in the Bureau of Asian Pacific Affairs. 

It’s a foreign policy initiative not backed by much in the way of coordination or funding. Its programmatic pillars of health, education, climate change, and infrastructure were developed—were 

really developed on an ad hoc basis. And one of the problems right 

now—and you raised this issue is that the infrastructure pillar is 

empty. And the reason it’s empty, I think, is that there are no programs to be rebranded under the LMI. So, the infrastructure side 

is where, if we’re going to put more money into this initiative, it 

18 

ought to be—on the river itself, on the hydrological issues, and the, 

you know, the future of fisheries and food security and human 

security and the Mekong Delta. 

This, however—infrastructure actually is an area where the 

United States should be providing, and could be providing, technology and capacity-building, especially in modeling, river monitoring, and full-scope cost-benefit analysis of proposed dams and 

other infrastructure programs. I think, again, Deputy Secretary 

Yun alluded to us moving in this direction. But, I don’t think—I 

don’t sense that that’s going to come fast enough to have an impact 

on a river which really is at a tipping point. 

Thus, the most urgent need is planning and coordination, especially for getting adequate funding in place for fiscal year 2012. I 

agree entirely with your legislative initiative on the ADB authorization. The United States should be leveraging its influence and 

voting power on the boards of directors of not only the ADB, but 

also to the World Bank, to get them to partner with the United 

States in supporting specific LMI programs or program objectives. 

In other words, it doesn’t have to be the LMI, exactly, but if we 

can get—leverage our influence to get them involved in this issue, 

that would be a great benefit. 

Neither the ADB nor the World Bank can get directly involved 

in construction—constructing mainstream dams on the Mekong, because their extreme environmental and socioeconomic impacts are 

too severe to pass muster with the Bank’s own criteria. The risk, 

though, is that, as in the case of Laos’ recently completed and controversial Nam Theun 2 Dam on a major tributary, the Bank 

should not participate in funding the project. Let me clarify what 

I’m saying here. There’s a risk that the banks will jump in, to be 

relevant, and put money into environmental mitigation—if it’s possible—relocation and alternate livelihoods for dams that it cannot 

otherwise support under its own principles. This is a slippery slope. 

They started on this slope at Nam Theun 2. And I think a big mistake for the banks to—in the interest of, perhaps, being relevant 

to the countries in the region—to get involved in these secondary 

aspects to mitigate or environmental damage or relocate people and 

give them—help them get new livelihoods. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States should not, cannot, 

and does not, seek to compete with China for infrastructure assistance or obstruct the growing economic integration of ASEAN countries into China’s production chain. We haven’t been involved in 

that business for a long time; that is, infrastructure—heavy infrastructure. That said, however, provided that infrastructure 

projects, excluding these mainstream dams, and activities are not 

exploitative or environmentally destructive, the expansion of trade 

investment ties between China, its Mekong and ASEAN neighbors 

can be a win-win situation for all. Unfortunately, at present, this 

is far from the case. What we can do, and have already accomplished to a surprising extent, is to use our expanded engagement 

in the region, as I would put it, to ‘‘keep China honest.’’ You 

alluded already to the—and as did Deputy Secretary Yun—to the 

fact that China has become a bit more responsive to its neighbors’ 

concerns; for instance, about what’s going on in Yunnan, how much 

water was being released—whether it was filling or spilling—the 

19 

Xiaowan Dam, during the last drought. But, there’s no transparency there. And that needs to change. 

And more broadly, American reengagement with Southeast Asia, 

and our firmer stance regarding China’s growing assertiveness in 

the South China Sea, have predictably been criticized by Beijing, 

sometimes in angry language. But, the main observable effect, to 

date, has not been an increase in regional tensions, but, rather, to 

cause Beijing to pay noticeably more attention to the concerns, 

fears, and interests of its neighbors. U.S. friends and allies in 

Southeast Asia welcome this trend, and they want more of it. This 

is a major achievement, and one that needs a strong and constructive followup by the administration and by the Congress. 

In conclusion, rather than creating regional nervousness, the initial impact of American reengagement in the Mekong, and the 

wider Southeast Asia region, has been working to the benefit of 

peace and stability, as intended. Now is not the time to rest on 

these still tentative laurels. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cronin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD P. CRONIN, DIRECTOR, SOUTHEAST ASIA

PROGRAM, STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to offer my perspectives on the urgent issues regarding Water and Security in Southeast Asia. I have organized my 

statement so as to respond specifically to the five broad questions you posed as well 

as offering some additional observations that I think are relevant to your objectives 

in organizing this hearing. 

Comparatively speaking, 30 percent of the world’s fresh water is in Asia but it 

is very unevenly distributed. The South of China is well-watered but the north and 

west are extremely dry, as is Central Asia. Southeast Asia generally has ample 

water resources but with two important caveats: First, most of the region’s rainfall 

occurs during the monsoon or wet season, which can be unreliable. Second, in the 

Mekong Basin a large portion of water available during the dry season comes from 

the spring and summer melting of the winter snowcap in Tibet. Nonetheless, the 

adaptation of flora and fauna to the extremes of wet and dry are the main reasons 

for the river’s rich bounty and they are gravely threatened by hydropower dams, especially on the main stream and major tributaries. The conditions have made the 

Greater Mekong Region Subregion (GMS) a major wet rice growing region, with 

Thailand and Vietnam the world’s first and second rice exporters. 

Government policies and standards in Southeast Asia that address population 

growth, pollution, and industrial activity, and the impact on the region’s water use 

and management. 

To answer the first question you posed, most but not all Southeast Asian governments have generally done a better job of reducing population growth rates than 

protecting their forests from rampant destruction and rivers, estuaries, and other 

water resources from pollution and the unsustainable use of ground water. Most 

large coastal cities in Southeast Asia are sinking from the depletion of their 

aquifers, even as the threat of rising sea levels and exceptionally severe storms 

caused by climate change are beginning to be felt. Jakarta, Bangkok, Manila, Hanoi 

and Ho Chi Minh City are frequently flooded even by storms of common and predictable strength. 

Unsustainable population growth remains an underlying cause of environmental 

degradation as well as political instability in some parts of the Mekong Basin, especially in upland areas which already are suffering from excessive exploitation. The 

comparatively youthfulness of most of the Mekong country populations ensures considerable growth momentum for some time after fertility rates decline to replacement level. 

In Mekong Southeast Asia the population of Laos was growing at an estimated 

2.73 percent per year as of 2007, with a very young age structure—41.2 percent of 

the population aged 14 years and under. Cambodia is growing more slowly at 1.73 

percent per year, but Cambodians 14 and under still account for 34 percent of the 

population. The relevant figures for Vietnam are 1.04 percent growth and 26.3 perVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:37 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
20 

cent of the population at 14 or under. The Thai population is growing at well under 

1 percent per year and only 21 percent of the population is 14 years or younger. 

Myanmar’s growth rate has fallen from 2.5 percent in the mid-1970s to below 1.0 

percent in 2008, no doubt due in part to the dim economic prospects for a population 

with a comparatively high level of literacy but forced to live under the misrule of 

the military junta. 

Because of the still largely young populations of the Lower Mekong countries— 

besides Thailand—demographers estimate that the population of the Mekong Basin 

will increase from 73 million at present to about 120 million by 2025, an increase 

of 65 percent. Moreover, some areas are growing far more rapidly and 

unsustainably. For instance, the population around Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Great 

Lake is growing three times faster than the rest of the Cambodian population. Incomes of people living around and even on the Tonle Sap not surprisingly are onethird of those of Phnom Penh and poverty is four times as high. Certainly rapid population growth is a major factor in poverty but so are development policies that 

unsustainable exploit the resources of the poorest citizens for the benefit of more 

politically important urbanites. 

As often pointed by Southeast Asians, the United States, Europe, and other parts 

of the more developed world equally abused their resources until they were almost 

gone. The problem is that this historically factual argument glosses over some important differences between the industrial states of the northern hemisphere with 

developing Asia and Africa that are critically important. Europe long ago dammed 

all of its major rivers but the process took place over a couple of hundred years and 

occurred simultaneously with industrialization. The United States took a century to 

exploit the resources of a rich but comparatively lightly populated continent. The 

Native Americans paid a terrible price, of course, but until the closing of the frontier 

in the late 19th century Americans could always move on to somewhere else after 

local resources were exhausted. Today New England is more forested than in the 

early 19th century, but mainly because the whole basis of the economy has changed. 

In contrast, the Greater Mekong River Basin (GMS), which some call ‘‘Asia’s Last 

Frontier,’’ offers no new rich western lands and some important natural resources 

such as timber that once seemed inexhaustible have been rapidly depleted, mainly 

by illegal cutting. Nor do many of the poorest Southeast Asian countries have the 

realistic potential for the kind of rapid industrialization that took place in Europe, 

North America and Northeast Asia to absorb people who lose their lands, fisheries, 

and livelihoods. In other words, the relentless expropriation of shared community 

water resources is not likely to have the same kind of positive outcome for the 60 

million or so Lao, Cambodians, and Vietnamese (in the Mekong Delta) who will 

loose their livelihoods and food sources. These days, forests are destroyed as much 

to make way for rubber and palm oil plantations as for the timber. For maximum 

efficiency, these operations seek to minimize employment, and in the case of Chinese investments, labor is imported directly from China and the workers live in selfcontained camps. 

Hydropower development is even more detached from future employment opportunities and higher living standards. For a variety of reasons, starting with geography 

and inappropriate economic policies, industrialization and services industries are 

not likely to spring up to create new livelihoods for most of those displaced by the 

dams. The record thus far of relocating, compensating, and providing new lands and 

occupations of those displaced by hydropower dam projects gives no cause for optimism. Especially because of the particularly devastating impact of mainstream 

dams on fisheries and existing agriculture, the most likely consequence will be the 

spontaneous migration to cities, in some cases across borders, with the attendant 

social ills of increased squalor, crime and trafficking in drugs and human beings. 

The political, environmental, sovereignty and regional security impact of China’s 

water use and hydropower development along the upper Mekong River, and China’s 

in regional water resources management. 

The most important aspect of the Mekong in terms of water and security—both 

national and human—is that the river is a transboundary resource shared by six 

countries: China which controls the source and upper half of the river, and five 

downstream Southeast Asian countries—Burma/Myanmar, Laos, Thailand Cambodia, and Vietnam. 

China’s ongoing construction of a massive cascade of eight or more dams on the 

Upper Mekong in Yunnan and plans by Laos and Cambodia for 11 dams on the 

lower half of the River’s mainstream epitomize the skewed nature of what passes 

for ‘‘development’’ in Chinese minds as well as in some quarters of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank and the African Development Bank. Of course 

large to mega-sized dams generate much-needed electricity for cities and industries 

21 

and which tends to boost overall GDP growth, but at a huge cost to those who lose 

their forests, fisheries, and farms. 

Dams on the main stem of any river are highly destructive of its core hydrology 

and the existing ‘‘environmental services’’ such as aquatic life and clean water for 

agriculture and drinking. The case of the Mekong River Basin is at the extreme end 

of the developmentenvironment dilemma. The Mekong is one of the most productive 

river basins in the world in terms of fish and agriculture, second only to the Amazon, which is 12 times its size. 

Both upstream and downstream dam proposals have different impacts on the River’s hydrology, ecology, morphology, and human security. I will begin by discussing 

China’s hydropower development program in Yunnan Province, in the far southwest 

of the country. 

CHINA’S YUNNAN CASCADE

The character and impact of the eight or more large to mega dams that China 

is building on the upper half of the river, which China calls the Lancang Jiang 

(‘‘Turbulent River’’) and the dams proposed for the lower half of the river in Southeast Asia are different in important respects. 

The main environmental impact of China’s dams will be to capture much of the 

silt that flows down from the Tibetan Plateau with the spring snowmelt and late 

summer monsoon rains, thereby depriving downstream farmers of the annual nutrient renewal of their fields and denying the Mekong Delta that replenishment of silt 

necessary to keep the South China Sea at bay. China’s Yunnan Cascade will also 

shift the timing of the seasonal monsoon ‘‘flood pulse’’ that triggers the spawning 

migration of many fish species. 

Worst of all, the reservoirs of China’s two biggest dams in the Yunnan cascade, 

the Xiaowan Dam that began filling last fall or winter and the Naozhadu Dam, now 

under construction, can hold 15 and 22 billion cubic meters of water respectively. 

This is more than one season’s annual flow of the upper half of the river and it will 

give China the ability to regulate the river from Yunnan to the South China Sea. 

China plans to use this storage to put as much as 40 percent or more water into 

the river during the dry season in order to keep the smaller (but still quite large) 

dams running year-round and support navigation for large cargo boats between 

southern Yunnan and Luang Prabang, Laos, and for yet unrevealed plans for irrigation and possibly other water diversion schemes. 

These plans to regulate the river to support navigation and changing power demands are extremely destructive environmentally and ecologically. Ever since construction was begun on the first dam at Manwan, which came on line in 2003, very 

erratic river flows have scoured river banks and destroyed dry season vegetable gardens, and even drowned villagers on river banks in northern Laos who were caught 

unawares by fast rising water from dam operations. Manwan, it should be pointed 

out, has only 1⁄15th the storage capacity of the Xiaowan Dam upstream. To be clear 

no more water can come down the river than can pass through the Manwan Dam’s 

flood gates at a given time, but the whole point of building Xiaowan as a giant cistern is to keep Manwan and two other smaller dams operating year round. 

Even more troubling, are the potential political and geopolitical ramifications of 

China’s Yunnan cascade. Many citizens and even officials in the downstream countries blamed China for the last dry season extreme drought, the worst in 50 years. 

The drought was only broken when the monsoon rains returned this summer. China 

protested that it was also suffering from the same drought, but because it provided 

no data about the operation of its dam it was never certain whether the Chinese 

dams were spilling, filling, or passing along as much water as entered the reservoirs 

upstream. 

TROUBLING DEPENDENCY

Even in ‘‘normal’’ years the dry-season flow of the Lower Mekong is too meager 

to generate hydropower. In many places you could walk most of the way from Vientiane, Laos to the Thai side of the river. If Laos and Cambodia in particular go 

ahead with their plans for damming the middle and lower reaches of the river they 

will make themselves dependent on China to release water from the Xiaowan Dam 

in the right quantity and at the right time to keep the turbines running for several 

months of the year. 

Some officials from those countries have expressed confidence that China would 

never withhold water for any prolonged period for the practical reason that it needs 

to keep enough water flowing to keep its own southernmost dams generating power 

during the dry season. There are at least a couple of flaws with this theory. First, 

at times of prolonged drought China may not have enough water in the reservoir 

22 

to keep its own dams operating. This appears to have been what happened in the 

recent dry season, though in this case China had only begun to fill the Xiaowan 

Dam during the preceding rainy season. 

In addition, in view of predictions that climate change will continue to cause the 

retreat of glaciers and the shrinking of the winter snowcap in Tibet, China may give 

higher priority in the future to storing water than producing power. Moreover, 

China is already considering the diversion of some Mekong water to the Yangtze 

River to make up for water it plans to redistribute from that river to the Yellow 

River in the bone dry North. The risk that China will engage in ‘‘water nationalism’’ 

is a real one, and a strong reason for not building Lower Mekong dams. 

The challenges of proposed dam construction along the Lower Mekong River, and the 

impact on the region’s environment, food security, sovereignty, and economic development. 

The Lower Mekong is very different than most other important rivers of the world 

in that some 60 million people depend directly on, or indirectly, on its almost unparalleled bounty of fish and annual load of silt that replenishes otherwise nutrientdeficient soil. This food resource is not only of vital importance to local livelihoods, 

but the rice produced with the Mekong’s waters in Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam’s Mekong Delta is important to the global rice market. The people who depend 

on the river badly need to improve their standards of living and nutrition, but destroying the natural functions of the river is not the way to do this. Rather, the 

river and its bounty of fish and agricultural production have to remain the base of 

the Mekong counties’ economic pyramid. Already hundreds of dams are operating, 

under construction, or planned for tributaries in the mountains of Laos, Vietnam’s 

Central Highlands, and the higher elevations of Thailand and Cambodia. 

The true cost-benefit ratio of many of these projects have been questionable, but 

they are of a different order altogether than dams on the mainstream that, if carried 

out as planned, would turn 90 percent of the lower half of the river into a series 

of nine or more slow moving lakes, connected by stretches of fast moving but highly 

variable channels and cascades that cannot support life. 

The effectiveness of existing regional mechanisms for managing water resources in 

Southeast Asia and options for improving regional water resources management. 

The current incarnation of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) was created in 

1995 when four of the lower Mekong countries signed The Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin. This agreement established norms for water use, flow maintenance, environmental protection, 

and areas of cooperation, to name a few. It eventually led to the establishment of 

four institutional goals for the MRC: To promote and support coordinated, sustainable, and propoor development; to enhance effective regional cooperation; to 

strengthen basinwide environmental monitoring and impact assessment; to 

strengthen the Integrated Water Resources Management capacity and knowledge 

base of the MRC bodies, National Mekong Committees, Line Agencies, and other 

stakeholders. 

The Mekong River Commission provides a valuable scientific research resource 

and an institutional structure for cooperative water management for the four Lower 

Mekong countries. Unfortunately, the MRC mechanism has made little real progress 

toward the goal of fostering cooperation. There still are no enforceable rules and 

MRC countries seem unlikely to adopt them under current circumstances. Moreover, 

the MRC is ultimately an advisory body, with no independent legal authority to coordinate, plan, or oversee projects—under the current situation, these remain sovereign prerogatives. 

Because of a long term lack of trust among the Lower Mekong countries, concerns 

about sovereignty and the high priority given to the exploitation of ‘‘national’’ resources for development, one country’s interests often are almost inevitably in conflict with those of its neighbors or the region as a whole. Moreover, the goal of truly 

cooperative, equitable, and sustainable use of the Mekong is largely moot as long 

as China, along with Burma/Myanmar, has declined to join the MRC. Beijing refuses to share either significant information about its dams or the data that it used 

in or derived from its own environmental and hydrological studies. Even more troubling, China thus has refused to countenance making cooperative water management of the ADB-led Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) cooperative development 

program. Instead the GMS has focused on crisscrossing the Mekong Basin with 

roads, bridges, and even a regional electric power grid, without including the river 

that gives the region its name. 

The United States policy toward water resources management in Southeast Asia, 

particularly along the Mekong River, existing U.S. Government efforts to promote imVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:37 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
23 

proved water resources management; and options for the United States to play a 

more constructive role in addressing these challenges. 

Mr. Chairman, the Obama administration has made the Mekong Basin the focal 

point of its professed reengagement with Southeast Asia and ASEAN, and not a moment too soon. Of course the United States never really left the region, especially 

in regard to our military capabilities and engagement in East Asia and the Pacific, 

but it has been widely accepted that especially after 9/11 the United States was distracted, and tended to make antiterrorism cooperation the focal point of its regional 

engagement. An effort to rebalance U.S. engagement was begun late in the second 

George W. Bush administration, but the Obama administration has greatly expanded the policy qualitatively, and has begun to mobilize additional budget resources to expand our involvement more substantively. We have a long way to go 

and need to mobilize the resources, expertise, and capabilities of a wide variety of 

departments and agencies as well as leverage our important positions on the boards 

of the ADB and World Bank. 

LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE (LMI)

With the approval of the four MRC countries Secretary of State signaled U.S. reengagement with the region by signing a Letter of Intent (LOI) for cooperation with 

the CEO of the Mekong River Commission, Jeremy Bird, at the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting which was hosted by Thailand at Phuket in July 2009. Initially the concept involved a sister river partnership between the MRC and the U.S. 

Mississippi River Commission. What the State Department now calls the Lower 

Mekong Initiative (LMI) has great potential but some important ongoing limitations. 

All of the Lower Mekong countries understand the geopolitical nature of the U.S. 

initiative, most especially China, and to varying degrees and the exception of China, 

they all welcome it in varying degrees. Because of the wider context of enhanced 

U.S. engagement with ASEAN, the LMI has also been welcomed by most Southeast 

Asian countries, all of whom worry about China’s hegemonic potential both in mainland Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. 

For the same reasons the administration’s decision to approve the ASEAN Treaty 

of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and apply for membership in the East Asian Summit (EAS) have also been widely applauded, as has Secretary of State Clinton’s declaration at this years ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Hanoi that we have important interests in the South China Sea and that our position on the maritime territorial disputes is that boundaries of 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ’s) 

should be anchored on the shore. Effectively, the Obama administration has aligned 

itself with the principles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and against 

China’s claim to most of the South China Sea on the basis of a historical presence. 

One important limitation of the LMI at present is that the initiative originated 

in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. This was a foreign policy initiative 

not backed by much in the way of programs or funding. Though it was intended 

to cover the areas of health, education, climate change, and infrastructure, the main 

agency involved besides the State Department was the U.S. Geological Survey, 

which had already initiated the Mississippi-Mekong Partnership with Vietnam’s 

Can Tho University. 

The substance of the LMI shows the strengths and weaknesses of the American 

governmental structure. On the one hand, many departments and agencies have already been involved in activities that support the LMI objectives, especially muchneeded human capacity-building and education. On the other hand, these activities 

still are not coordinated in any meaningful way. Moreover, in the absence of strong 

coordination, too much depends on the individual enthusiasm and leadership of government officials to generate ad hoc cooperation. Officials come and go, and senior 

bureaucrats have strong influence over department and agency priorities and often 

legislative mandates for much of their budgets. 

Mainly by rebranding existing USG efforts the State Department identified by the 

latest count about $200 million for FY 2010, mainly in the form of environmentclimate change, health, and education and training. Some other activities already 

underway show the wide array of support the administration and Congress could 

generate through a concerted approach. For instance, the Corps of Engineers, presumably under its own international agenda, has brought senior officials from the 

Lower Mekong countries and possibly China to visit Columbia River dams, where 

they had the opportunity to learn first hand about the high cost and limited success 

of fish ladders and other means to move salmon around dams that block their 

spawning runs. Corps representatives have even participated in MRC ‘‘stakeholder 

consultation’’ meetings to explain that fish ladders and ‘‘fish ways’’ are not practical 

on the Mekong River. 

24 

USAID has ongoing programs on climate change adaptation. The Education 

Department and the Center for Disease Control have long had programs in the LMI 

countries. 

Recently a colleague and I have even participated in programs on mainstream 

hydropower issues for Mekong country officials and NGOs under the State Department’s International Visitor Program. 

Infrastructure remains a blank space in the four LMI pillars, probably because 

there were no existing programs that could be rebranded. This is an area where the 

United States could be providing technology and capacity-building, especially in the 

modeling, river monitoring, and full scope cost-benefit analysis of proposed dam and 

other infrastructure programs. Nonetheless, Secretary of State Clinton has repeatedly emphasized her concern about Mekong fisheries, food and human security and 

the future of the Mekong Delta. 

On the technology side, the Commercial Service of the U.S. Commerce Department and the EX–IM Bank can help promote relevant U.S. technology, including 

sensing technology for river flows, changes in silt loads, and pollutants, as well as 

alternative energy like efficient gas-fired thermal power plants. 

Both Thailand and Vietnam are already exploring the possibility of acquiring 

U.S.-designed third generation nuclear power plants, namely Westinghouse’s Passive Core Cooling Systems (PCCS) which are not dependent on large amounts of 

river water. The technology is licensed to a South Korean company but Westinghouse still supplies important reactor and control components. Obviously there are 

a host of issues about nuclear power, starting with proliferation risks and safe spent 

fuel disposal, but increasingly even environmentalists are coming around to the 

view that modern nuclear power could be preferable to coal and other thermal 

power. Solar and wind power also have considerable potential in Southeast Asia but 

China is likely to emerge more competitive than the United States in these areas 

of applied technology. 

URGENT NEED FOR PLANNING AND COORDINATION

The most urgent need is planning and coordination, especially for getting adequate funding in place for FY 2012. I’m not sure where these functions should be 

located, whether in the State Department or elsewhere. At present the EAP Bureau 

has neither the staff nor the funding to accomplish this task. USAID would be a 

possibility, but only with a designated program and adequate staff and funding. 

Putting the coordination responsibility might—and I emphasize might—also make 

sense because USAID operates under the general policy direction of the State 

Department. 

Many departments and agencies could give more substance to the LMI, and in 

fact many of them are already involved in some way with the Mekong River Commission and individual governments. An inclusive list could include, in alphabetical 

order: The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Army Corps of 

Engineers, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the USDA and its 

National Institute of Food and Agriculture and Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), 

Departments of Commerce, Education, and Energy, Export-Import Bank (EX-IM), 

U.S. Geological Survey, Health and Human Services (HHS), and the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 

The United States should also be leveraging its influence and voting power on the 

boards of directors of the ADB and World Bank to jointly support specific LMI programs or program objectives. Both banks have been putting the mantle of poverty 

reduction over projects that may ultimately impoverish more people than they help. 

In my view and that of many other observers, it’s past time for the United States 

to push harder for projects that aim to raise the incomes and improve the lives and 

health of the poorest and the most natural resource-dependent populations where 

they live. 

At the same time, the United States Executive Directors to the Banks should be 

instructed to oppose egregious hydropower projects, especially mainstream dams 

which do not meet World Bank and World Commission on Dams criteria. Neither 

the ADB nor the World Bank can get directly involved in constructing mainstream 

dams on the Mekong because their extremely environmental and socioeconomic impacts are too severe to pass muster with the Banks’ own criteria. 

‘‘KEEP CHINA HONEST’’ 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States should not, cannot and does not seek 

to compete with China for infrastructure assistance or obstruct the growing economic integration of the ASEAN countries into China’s production chain. We haven’t 

been involved in infrastructure development assistance for decades and are not likeVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:37 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
25 

ly to become so in the future. For better or worse—mainly for the worse—most of 

these dam projects are being carried out by commercial developers and commercial 

or state-owned banks. That said, however, provided that infrastructure projects and 

activities are not exploitative or environmentally destructive, the expansion of trade 

and investment ties between China and its Mekong and ASEAN neighbors can be 

a ‘‘win-win’’ situation for all. Unfortunately, at present this is far from the case. 

What we can do—and have already accomplished to a surprising extent—is to use 

our expanded engagement with the region to ‘‘keep China honest.’’ U.S. naval and 

other military power combined with our still potent ‘‘soft power’’—political, economic, and cultural—still counts for enough to influence our friends and worry 

China. 

Interestingly, while a few observers from Southeast Asia have worried that the 

region could be caught in the middle of a growing United States-China rivalry, most 

regional leaders and observers welcome the asymmetrical balancing role that the 

U.S. provides. While American reengagement with Southeast Asia and our firmer 

stance regarding China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea have predictably been criticized by Beijing, some times in angry language, the main observable effect to date has not been an increase in regional tension. Rather, the most 

important effect has been to cause Beijing to pay noticeably more attention to the 

concerns, fears and interests of its neighbors. This is a major achievement and one 

that needs a strong and constructive followup by the administration and Congress. 

In conclusion, rather than creating regional nervousness, the initial impact of 

American reengagement in the Mekong and the wider Southeast Asia region has 

been working to the benefit of peace and stability, as intended. Now is not the time 

to rest on these still tentative laurels. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for giving me this opportunity to share my views with 

the committee. I will be glad to answer as best I can any questions you may have, 

either orally now or in writing later. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Dr. Cronin. I fully agree with the 

final statement that you made. I was very gratified to see China 

beginning to move forward with some cooperation here, although it 

has, as I mentioned earlier, been extremely hesitant to deal with 

sovereignty issues; and this is a sovereignty issue—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Yes. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. It’s a water sovereignty issue on— 

other than on a bilateral basis. So, there is some room for hope 

there. 

And, Ms. Imhof, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF AVIVA IMHOF, CAMPAIGNS DIRECTOR, 

INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, BERKELEY, CA 

Ms. IMHOF. Thank you, and good afternoon. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before 

you today on the risks to the Mekong River Basin. 

My organization, International Rivers, and I, personally, have 

been involved in monitoring hydropower developments along the 

Mekong River for the past 15 years. We’ve documented the impacts 

of existing dams and advocated for the rights of the 60 million people who depend on the Lower Mekong River for their livelihoods. 

And in a region, as you can imagine, that is riddled with nondemocratic governments, it’s not an easy task. 

As we’ve already heard, the Mekong River is one of the world’s 

great river basins. And we’ve heard about the importance of fisheries to people’s livelihoods, and the importance of fish migrations, 

and the fact that dams block the migration fish, and the enormous 

impacts that that will have on the ecosystem and livelihoods. 

We’ve also heard about China’s plans to build a cascade—or, 

they’re currently building the cascade of eight dams on the Upper 

Mekong. So, I won’t talk about that. 

26 

What I will talk about is that—you know, I want to go through 

a little bit about the dam plans for the region, first, and then the 

impacts that that will have. 

Laos, which contributes about a third of the Mekong’s flow, is undergoing a dam-building boom. The government’s signed deals with 

foreign investors to build more than 50 dams on Mekong tributaries, mostly for sale of power to Thailand and Vietnam. Laos is 

also considering 10 projects on the Mekong mainstream. Right now, 

it sells power from eight projects to Thailand. And we’ve spent a 

long time documenting the impact of these projects—they’re all on 

Mekong tributaries—the impacts to people’s livelihoods. And over 

100,000 people right now are suffering the impacts from existing 

dams on Mekong tributaries in Laos and have not been adequately 

compensated for their losses. Sometimes, it’s been 10 years that 

people have been suffering impacts and haven’t been compensated. 

And a number of these projects have been funded by the Asian 

Development Bank. So, it’s very timely that you’re introducing legislation to deal with the issue of Asian Development Bank-funded 

dams. 

And one of the big concerns, of course, is that, with all these tributary projects that are already having an impact on people’s livelihoods—these are smaller projects than the mainstream dams—if 

Laos can’t even ensure that these projects have adequate mitigation and compensation mechanisms for affected communities, then 

how on earth are we going to deal with this—these massive mainstream dam projects that will have even greater impacts? 

Vietnam also has plans to build up to 48 new dams by 2025, 

many of which are already under construction. And, here again, we 

find that dam cascades are being built on two major Mekong tributaries, the Se San and the Srepok, the impacts of which are being 

experienced by more than 55,000 villages living downstream in 

Cambodia who, today, have not received compensation for their 

losses. 

Cambodia has also committed to an extensive domestic hydropower development program, mostly financed with the support of 

the Chinese Government, and they’re considering two dams, also 

on the Mekong mainstream in Cambodia. 

And meanwhile, in Thailand, where there is more political space, 

Thailand has faced such huge opposition to dam construction in the 

past that it’s basically looking to import electricity from neighboring countries, rather than to build more dams in its own territory, because it knows it would face too much opposition. 

So, I want to now discuss the regional planning and policy context and how this affects water resources development in the 

Mekong Basin. As this committee would be aware, and as you are 

aware, the Mekong region’s political context is challenging, with a 

number unaccountable and undemocratic regimes. While, on paper, 

some of the national laws regarding water resources development 

in the region are progressive, there is a great gap between policy 

and practice. And I believe you also noted this in your opening 

statement. 

In Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, hydroconcessions, including 

those on the Mekong mainstream, seem to be given out to any 

interested developer on a first-come-first-served basis without any 

27 

attention paid to basin development planning processes or the reputation of the company involved. Even where laws are strong— 

even where strong laws are in place on paper, they’re often not followed in practice. Like environmental impact assessments are often 

not released before a dam is given an approval for construction in 

violation of domestic laws. And weaknesses in government capacity 

in Laos and Cambodia particularly exacerbate the problems with 

regulation and enforcement. 

And this week, institutional and regulatory framework has been 

compounded by changes to the regional investment environment for 

hydropower development. Today, energy construction companies 

from China, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia are developing, 

funding, and building large dams. Thai and Chinese companies and 

financial institutions, such as Thai EXIM and China Eximbank, 

are becoming particularly prominent in developing and funding 

hydropower projects in the region, as are Thai and Chinese private 

banks. And these new actors are yet to adopt any international social and environmental standards in their operations, which leads 

to poor planning processes and even poorer project outcomes. 

I want to focus now specifically on plans for the Lower Mekong 

mainstream. As we’ve heard, there are plans for a cascade of 12 

large dams on the Mekong River’s mainstream, and most of the 

power would be sent to Thailand and Vietnam. In total, the dams 

would transform two-thirds of the length of the Lower Mekong 

River into a series of reservoirs that would require the resettlement 

of at least 88,000 people. And in order to assess the implications 

that this cascade would have on the Mekong River’s ecology and 

economy, the Mekong River Commission commissioned a Strategic 

Environmental Assessment of the proposed mainstream dams. Conducted over a period of 15 months, the SEA team has just delivered 

its final report to the Mekong Secretariat. And this really is the 

first-ever comprehensive, cumulative impact assessment of dam 

construction on the Mekong mainstream, so it’s a very significant 

report. And what the SEA does is, it highlights the significant environmental, social, and economic impacts that the dams are expected to have, while also warning of the skewed cost-benefit distribution likely to occur. 

The SEA warns that the decision to move forward with just one 

dam alone would result in permanent and irreversible changes to 

the Mekong River ecosystem. The projects, as a whole, would 

impact more than 40 million people, an incredible number of people, who rely on the Mekong River for their livelihoods and food 

security. 

Just a few of the impacts mentioned in the SEA’s impact assessment report: Through blocking fish migration routes and changing 

the water quality and quantity of water, the dams would cause 

fishery losses of between 700,000 and 1.4 million tons each year, 

which is estimated to be worth between around $500 million and 

$1 billion. In turn, the livelihoods and food security of millions of 

people would be impacted, and there’s a consensus amongst fisheries scientists in the region that these impacts cannot be mitigated. There’s no technology available to mitigate these impacts to 

fisheries. 

28 

The dams would also impact the immense biodiversity of the 

Mekong River. Important critically endangered species, such as the 

Irrawaddy dolphin and the giant Mekong catfish, would likely be 

driven to extinction. The dams would flood key biodiversity zones, 

national protected areas, and Ramsar wetlands sites, impacting 

terrestrial and aquatic habitat for fauna and flora. And more than 

half of the Mekong’s riverbank gardens would be inundated by 

the dams and damaged by daily water fluctuations. This would 

result in lost income generation of between $18 and $57 million, 

while also affecting food security by reducing household vegetable 

consumption. 

And finally, as we’ve heard a little bit, today the reduction of 

sediment flow in the Mekong River would have serious consequences for Cambodia’s flood plains and great lakes system, 

along with the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. And, of course, these impacts would be compounded by climate change, as well. 

The SEA team also finds that the economic benefits of the 

projects would accrue mostly to the private developers and contractors building the projects, and that the projects would actually 

have relatively little impact on power supply for Thailand and Vietnam, the two major consumers of electricity. So, basically, as we 

can see, the projects would have a massive impact and then 

wouldn’t actually even add much, in terms of meeting regional energy needs. 

These findings have led the SEA team to recommend that all decisions on Mekong mainstream dams be deferred for a period of 10 

years, and that this period of time be used to examine alternative 

nondam options for generating electricity from the Mekong mainstream, as well as to improve the understanding of the river basin’s 

ecology and potential impacts of the projects. 

So, the question now facing the region’s governments and the 

Mekong River Commission is whether they will adopt the recommendations of the SEA. And unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the 

writing on the wall is not good. We’ve heard, from some sources, 

that the MRC, because it doesn’t like the conclusions of the SEA, 

is attempting to distance itself from the SEA recommendations and 

to move forward with some of the dams. 

And, very significantly, just yesterday it was announced that the 

Government of Laos has submitted official notification to the MRC 

for the Xayaburi Dam on the Mekong mainstream, which would be 

the first dam that’s being proposed to be built on the Mekong 

mainstream. And this will trigger the MRC’s consultation process 

with regional governments. And they’re expecting a decision to be 

made within 6 months. The MRC is likely to allow this consultation process to go forward, despite the fact that the SEA report 

hasn’t yet been released publicly, hasn’t been translated into regional languages or considered by regional governments, nor has 

its finding been incorporated into the Xayaburi EIA. 

So, to allow the Xayaburi consultation to go forward without considering the findings of the SEA would be like getting a diagnosis 

of cancer and then ignoring it. Mr. Chairman, this must not be allowed to happen. 

Which brings me to the final part of my presentation, which is, 

What can the United States do to avert disaster on the Mekong? 

29 

As a first step, the U.S. State Department, in its role as a donor 

to the Mekong River Commission and to regional governments, 

should push for the SEA report to be publicly released and endorsed by the MRC and member countries before any consultation 

process on an individual dam, like Xayaburi, be initiated. The 

United States should help push for the SEA’s recommendations to 

be followed, which means deferring decisions on mainstream dams 

for at least 10 years. The United States could offer the assistance 

of the U.S. Geological Survey in generating more comprehensive 

data sets on the river’s hydrology, ecology, sediment flows and 

water quality, and ensuring that this information is released in the 

public domain. The U.S. State Department should continue to voice 

its concerns over the security risks these dams pose, and continue 

its work in highlighting the importance of regional food security 

and the role that fisheries plays in the region. 

Finally, we believe that, through providing support and training 

for better energy planning processes, such as integrated resources 

planning, which is a technique used by a lot of U.S. utilities, coupled with technical assistance and startup funds for investment 

and energy efficiency and clean, renewable energy sources, the 

United States could play an instrumental role in pushing for a 

clean energy future for the Mekong region, allowing the Mekong 

River Basin to be preserved for future generations. 

Chairman Webb, thank you again for the opportunity to contribute to this important debate. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Imhof follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AVIVA IMHOF CAMPAIGNS DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL

RIVERS, BERKELEY, CA 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe and members of the committee. Thank you for the 

opportunity to testify before you today on the risks to the Mekong River Basin and 

its inhabitants from the construction of large dams. 

My organization, International Rivers, and I personally, have been involved in 

monitoring hydropower developments along the Mekong River for the past 15 years, 

documenting the impacts of existing dams built in the Basin and advocating for the 

rights of the 60 million people who depend on the lower Mekong River Basin for 

their livelihoods. In a region that is riddled with nondemocratic governments, this 

is no easy task. 

The Mekong River is one of the world’s great river basins. The river still flows 

freely for most of its length; until recently the region’s years of war and instability 

had protected the river from massive dam construction. 

Seventy different ethnic groups live in the Mekong Basin and their livelihoods 

and cultures are intimately connected with the river’s natural cycles. The river 

boasts one of the world’s most diverse and productive inland fisheries, in some areas 

supplying the people of the region with up to 80 percent of their protein needs. 

Whether it’s the Tonle Sap or Great Lake of Cambodia—the country’s fish basket— 

or the tropical wetlands of the Mekong Delta—the rice bowl of Vietnam—the river 

sustains the people and ecosystems of the region. 

The Mekong River is second in biodiversity only to the Amazon, home to up to 

an estimated 1,500 different species of fish. By comparison, the Mississippi River 

in the United States—also recognized for its high biodiversity—has only 241 fish 

species. Included amongst the Mekong’s aquatic biodiversity are such emblematic 

and threatened species as the Mekong Giant Catfish—a species that grows up to 

9 feet in length and weighs up to 600 lbs—the endangered Irrawaddy freshwater 

dolphin, and the world’s largest freshwater fish, the giant freshwater stingray. The 

Mekong’s fisheries are highly migratory—at least a third of Mekong fish species migrate between the mainstream and its tributaries, including 70 percent of the commercial fish catch. Migrations are timed to coincide with the Mekong’s annual monsoon pulse. 

The Mekong supports the world’s largest inland fishery, with approximately 2.6 

million tonnes harvested annually from the Lower Mekong Basin. By some estiVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:37 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
30 

mates, this amounts to close to 20 percent of the world’s freshwater fish yield. At 

first catch, the Mekong’s wild-capture fisheries have an estimated value of US$2– 

3 billion. By the time fish-based products have been transported, processed, and 

marketed to the final consumer, the fish are estimated to be worth between US$5.6 

and $9.4 billion. In comparison, although the Mississippi River is nearly as long as 

the Mekong, its commercial fishing generates only 0.1 percent of the Mekong’s firstcatch fish value. The revenues generated from wild-capture fisheries and fish trade 

make a significant contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of each 

Mekong country. Eight percent of Lao’s GDP and 16 percent of Cambodia’s GDP can 

be traced to fisheries. 

FOOD SECURITY

Fish are extremely important to food security in the Mekong Basin. Fish consumption in mainland Southeast Asia far exceeds most other places in the world. 

Per year, the average person in the Lower Mekong Basin eats 56.6 kilograms of 

freshwater fish products. This is over two times the average total fish consumption 

in Europe and America. In every Mekong country fish are the most important 

source of animal protein. Although the amount of animal protein from fish varies— 

from an average of 60 percent in Vietnam to as high as 79 percent in some Cambodian villages and 78 percent in the Khong district of Lao—it is well-established 

that fish protein is important to food security throughout the region. Fish are also 

an essential source of vitamins and minerals, helping to ward off the nutritional deficiencies that are sadly still too common. 

Fisheries are not the only important food source provided for by the Mekong. The 

Mekong River also supports a productive agricultural sector. The deposition of rich 

alluvial silt on the floodplains during the wet season allows for highly productive 

floodplain agriculture. The Mekong Delta in Vietnam—one of the most densely populated areas on Earth, and one of the most productive, is known as the rice bowl 

of Vietnam. The Delta produces upward of 16 million metric tonnes of rice annually, 

enough to feed about 77 million Vietnamese for a year. The Delta also supports 

highly productive shrimp farms, orchards and market gardens. Floodplains throughout the Mekong Basin allow for highly productive wet season rice farming with a 

minimum of artificial fertilizer or pesticides. In addition, many Mekong residents 

grow vegetables on the riverbanks in the dry season, which are an important source 

of income and food. 

MEKONG UNDER THREAT

Yet this beautiful, dynamic and thriving river system is under threat. China is 

building a cascade of eight dams on the Upper Mekong in Yunnan province. Four 

of these projects have already been completed, and at least two more are under construction. The projects are being developed without any consultation with downstream countries and without any publicly available studies on their potential downstream impacts. Limited environmental impact assessments have only recently been 

made available within China for some of these projects, although only after the 

dams have now been built, and there has been no comprehensive assessment of the 

cumulative impacts of these projects on the ecology and hydrology of the Mekong 

River in downstream countries. 

Academics have linked changes to the Mekong River’s daily hydrology and sediment load since the early 1990s to the operation of the Upper Mekong dam cascade. 

Since the mid-1990s, communities downstream in Northern Thailand, Burma, and 

Laos have suffered from a loss of fish and aquatic plant resources, which have impacted local economies and livelihoods; and since the second project, Dachaoshan, 

was completed in 2003, local people have been reporting a 50-percent decline in fish 

catch. They also report serious erosion downstream and significant fluctuations in 

river levels caused by dam operation. These impacts will be magnified greatly as 

the larger projects in the cascade are completed and their reservoirs filled. The 

upper Mekong dams will store water in the wet season for release in the dry season, 

causing significant changes to the lower Mekong’s flow regime, and impounding crucial sediment that will no longer flow downstream to fertilize the floodplains. 

But China is not the only country with massive dam plans. Laos, which contributes about a third of the Mekong’s flow, is undergoing a dam-building boom. In its 

bid to become ‘‘the battery of Southeast Asia,’’ the government has signed deals with 

foreign investors to build more than 50 dams on Mekong tributaries, and is considering 10 projects on the Mekong mainstream. Power from these projects would be 

sold to neighboring Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Laos already sells power to 

Thailand from eight hydropower projects. While not all of the proposed projects for 

Laos will move forward, those that do will have serious impacts on the health of 

31 

the river ecosystem and the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Laotians who 

depend on rivers for fish, agriculture, water supply, transportation and other 

aspects of their lives. 

Vietnam also has plans to build up to 48 new dams by 2025, many of which are 

already under construction. Dam cascades are being built on two major Mekong 

tributaries, the Se San and Srepok Rivers, the impacts of which are being experienced by ethnic minorities living in Vietnam and by Cambodian villagers living 

downstream. Vietnam has paid no compensation to the tens of thousands of Cambodians living downstream who have been affected by the Yali Falls Dam and four 

other projects on the Se San River. Approximately 55,000 people have suffered from 

daily erratic water fluctuations, widespread flooding, illness due to poor water quality, loss of riverbank gardens, and diminished fish stocks. Dam-induced flooding has 

killed at least 39 people. While the downstream impacts were acknowledged by the 

Vietnamese Government in 2000, there has been little progress in addressing these 

impacts. 

Cambodia has also committed to an extensive domestic hydropower development 

program, financed with the support of the Chinese Government and facilitated 

through the technical expertise of Chinese construction companies. To date, deals 

have been reached on five major hydroelectric projects outside of the Mekong basin, 

and at least 9 dams in the Mekong Basin are being studied. In justifying its hydropower program, the Cambodian Government claims it is trying to balance the need 

for environmental and social protections against the need for electricity to support 

its economic development. Civil society groups in Cambodia, however, have expressed concern over the loss of Cambodia’s natural heritage and questioned the approval process, which has been conducted behind closed doors without the participation of local communities and other concerned stakeholders. 

Thailand, meanwhile, has faced such huge opposition to dam construction within 

its borders that it is looking to import electricity from neighboring countries rather 

than face the inevitable battles that would occur were it to propose additional dams 

in Thai territory. 

THE REGIONAL PLANNING AND POLICY CONTEXT

I want to now discuss the regional planning and policy context and how this affects water resources development in the Mekong Basin. As this committee would 

be aware, the Mekong region’s political context is rather challenging. Laos and Vietnam are still ruled by one-party Communist regimes. Thailand’s democracy has 

been under repeated attack the past few years, and Cambodia, while theoretically 

a democracy, has been ruled by Hun Sen for the past 25 years. Burma, meanwhile, 

continues to suffer under the rule of a military dictatorship. 

The Mekong River Commission (MRC) is a river basin management organization 

directed by the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. Significantly, China is not a member of the MRC. Today the agency survives on international donor aid from the World Bank, Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, 

Japan, Sweden, and the United States, amongst others. The MRC has struggled 

over the years to define its role in managing the Mekong Basin since it has no real 

decisionmaking authority over government development plans, and since the 1995 

Mekong Agreement, which acts as the organization’s Constitution, does not allow 

any government or entity to veto another government’s plans for development on its 

portion of the river. Therefore, the MRC’s role has been relegated to one of coordination amongst member countries, as well as conducting important research and data 

management activities. In recent years, the member governments have been pushing for the MRC to take on more of a role as a river basin development organization, 

rather than a river basin management organization, with serious consequences for 

how the organization is responding to plans for regional developments. I will come 

back to the MRC below. 

While on paper some of the national laws regarding water resources development 

in the region are somewhat progressive, influenced by donor agencies such as the 

World Bank and Asian Development Bank, there is a great gap between policy and 

practice. 

In Laos, where the lion’s share of dams are being planned, laws and policies surrounding hydropower development have improved over the past few years, but the 

country still lacks an overall planning process for hydropower development. Hydro 

concessions, including those on the Mekong mainstream, seem to be given out to any 

interested developer on a first-come, first-served basis, with little apparent concern 

for basin planning processes or the reputation of the company involved. 

Many Lao laws, regulations and policies contain important provisions to ensure 

participation, consultation, information disclosure, compensation and resettlement 

32 

with livelihood restoration for affected communities. However, in practice, these provisions are often not followed, or are implemented on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis 

depending on the will, expertise and resources of the environmental and social consultants and the dam developer. The government’s environmental regulator, the 

Water Resources and Environment Agency, lacks the authority, staff and resources 

to comprehensively review the significant number of proposed hydro projects and 

monitor them during construction and operation to ensure compliance with Lao laws 

and regulations. Decisions about whether or not to proceed with a project appear 

to be made exclusively the Ministry of Energy and Mines and the Ministry of Planning and Investment. 

The situation is similar for Cambodia. While Cambodia on paper has a number 

of strong laws that should safeguard the environment and ensure adequate protection for affected communities, in practice their effectiveness is limited due to inadequate resources and, on occasion, institutional disincentive. Enforcement of Cambodia’s laws is very weak. For example, even though Cambodian law requires an 

EIA to be completed for a dam project before approval, in reality a few dams have 

recently been approved apparently without an EIA. Cambodia still lacks any law 

governing resettlement of populations. And the endorsement by senior Cambodian 

politicians of extensive hydropower development plans has signaled to the government’s bureaucracy that these projects should be pushed through. 

A similar situation exists in Vietnam, where the Ministry of Industry and Trade 

makes decisions on projects before the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) has appraised their environmental and social impacts and mitigation plans. The Vice Minister of MONRE, Nguyen Thai Lai, was recently quoted in 

the Saigon Times as stating that ‘‘In reality, our current appraisal procedures face 

many obstacles, because investors only send their project documents to MONRE for 

appraisal after they were already approved by the Ministry of Industry and Trade. 

. . . Mitigation plans may either be neglected or poorly presented.’’ For example, 

in the case of the massive Son La Hydropower Project being built in the North of 

the country, which is displacing more than 91,000 people, the final approval of the 

project’s EIA occurred in 2007 while formal construction started in 2005. 

Civil society groups and energy analysts have also questioned Thailand and Vietnam’s power development plans, which heavily promote the development of new 

large-scale electricity generation plants, such as fossil-fuel fired power stations and 

hydropower dams, and that are increasingly locking the region into a centralized 

electricity supply model. They claim that future electricity demands are overestimated, and that the potential that investment in energy efficiency measures, renewable energy, and decentralized energy options could play are downplayed, especially 

in the more industrialized cities of Thailand and Vietnam. They argue that existing 

plans mostly serve the interests of the state-owned electricity utilities, energy companies, and the construction industry, rather than the needs of the regions’ electricity consumers. 

The weak institutional and regulatory framework in the region has been compounded by changes to the regional financial investment environment for hydropower development. Traditional actors in supporting energy development in the region such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank are becoming increasingly marginalized and instead, energy and construction companies from Vietnam, 

China, Thailand, and Malaysia are developing, funding, and building large dams. 

Armed with the support of private banks from their own countries and the promise 

of government guarantees through their export-import banks, these dambuilders are 

fast displacing the western corporations and multilateral banks that previously 

dominated the region’s hydro scene. 

Thai and Chinese companies and financial institutions are becoming particularly 

prominent in developing hydropower projects in the region. While the Thai Exim 

Bank is an increasingly keen supporter of hydropower projects in the region, it does 

not have an environmental policy and its activities are generally unaccountable to 

civil society. Thai Exim Bank has not yet adopted the Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits, agreed upon by OECD countries, 

which outlines environmental and social standards for export credit agencies. Thai 

commercial banks are also willing financiers of major energy projects, but none have 

yet signed up to the Equator Principles, a set of voluntary environmental and social 

standards that have been adopted by more than 60 private banks around the world. 

The China Export-Import Bank, China’s official export credit agency, is also becoming an important player in the Mekong region, as are a number of China’s major 

State Owned Enterprises, often with the Bank’s financial backing. China Exim is 

closely aligned with the strategic overseas interests of China’s Government, on 

whose behalf it may offer concessional loans and export credits, especially in implementing China’s ‘‘Going Out’’ policy. For example, Chinese companies are involved 

33 

in developing four of the proposed Mekong Mainstream Dams: three in Laos and 

one in Cambodia, and Chinese companies are developing a series of hydropower 

projects on tributaries in Cambodia and Laos. 

Most of these new actors are yet to adopt international social and environmental 

standards in their operations, leading to poor planning processes and project outcomes. 

MEKONG MAINSTREAM DAMS

I now want to focus specifically on the plans for dams on the Lower Mekong Mainstream. Until now, the lower Mekong mainstream has remained free-flowing, one 

of the last great river basins of the world to be relatively unaffected by massive 

dams and diversions. Yet since mid-2006, Thai, Malaysian, Vietnamese, Russian, 

and Chinese companies have been preparing detailed studies for a cascade of 12 

large hydropower dams on the Mekong River’s mainstream. Eight of the dam sites 

are in Laos, two are in Cambodia, and two are on the Thai-Lao border. Most of the 

power generated would be sent to energy-hungry cities in Thailand and Vietnam. 

In total, the dams would turn about half of the river between Northern Laos and 

Central Cambodia into reservoirs that, according to official estimates, would require 

the resettlement of at least 88,000 people. 

In order to assess the implications that this cascade of dams would have on the 

Mekong River’s ecology and economy, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) commissioned a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of the proposed mainstream 

dams. Conducted over a period of 15 months, the SEA team has just delivered its 

final report to the MRC Secretariat. The Assessment was carried out by an Australian consulting company, the International Centre for Environmental Management, and comprised a series of studies, intensive program of consultations, and detailed expert analysis of the issues associated with developing hydropower on the 

Mekong mainstream. As such, the Strategic Environmental Assessment represents 

the first ever comprehensive cumulative impact assessment of dam construction on 

the Mekong mainstream, helping to provide a broader understanding of the costs 

and benefits involved with building mainstream dams. 

The SEA highlights the significant environmental, economic and social impacts 

the dams are expected to have, while also warning of skewed cost benefit distribution likely to occur. The SEA warns that the decision to move forward with just one 

dam alone would result in permanent and irreversible changes to the sustainability 

of the river system’s productivity, which in turn would impact millions of people 

who rely on a healthy river for their livelihood and food security. 

The following are some of the key impacts mentioned in the SEA’s Impact Assessment: 

Altering the Flow and Nature of the River: The dams would transform 66 percent 

percent of the length of the Lower Mekong into a series of stagnant reservoirs and 

sections of rapidly fluctuating water flows downstream of the dams. These changes 

would irreversibly change the natural flow of the river. 

Impacts to Fisheries and Food Security: The dams would block vital fish migration 

routes, disrupt flood pulses, reduce wetlands, and change habitat necessary for the 

Mekong fisheries. These changes would result in significant fishery losses of between 700,000 to 1.4 million tonnes, which is estimated to be worth between 

US$476 million and US$956 million. In turn, the livelihoods and food security of 

millions of people would be impacted, with Cambodia expected to suffer the most. 

No mitigation technology currently exists which could effectively mitigate the impacts to the Mekong fisheries. Reservoir fisheries would also not be able to compensate for the loss of capture fisheries and would produce at best one-tenth of the 

lost capture fisheries production. 

Threats to Aquatic Biodiversity: Through changes to the river’s morphology, flow 

and aquatic habitat, the immense biodiversity of the Mekong River would be at risk. 

More than half of the recorded fish species in some zones would be lost. In addition, 

important iconic and critically endangered species, such as the Irrawaddy dolphin 

and the giant Mekong catfish, would likely be driven to extinction. 

Terrestrial System Changes: The Mekong dams would have a major impact on terrestrial ecosystems and agriculture due to areas of inundation. Nearly half of the 

Lower Mekong River’s land and forested areas is located in recognized Key Biodiversity Zones, as well as in National Protected Area and Ramsar sites. The dams will 

inundate important wetlands and river channel areas and impact terrestrial habitat 

for fauna and flora. Transmission lines and access roads would further alter the 

landscape. 

Lost Riverbank Gardening: More than half of the Mekong’s riverbank gardens 

would be inundated by the Mekong dams and damaged by daily water fluctuations. 

34 

This would result in lost income generation of between US$18 million to US$57 million, while also reducing household vegetable consumption. The households that 

would be hardest hit are those located in Northern Laos. 

Mekong Delta Instability: The reduction of sediment flow in the Mekong River 

would have serious consequences on the transport of important nutrients which help 

to fertilize Cambodia’s floodplains and Tonle Sap or Great Lake system, along with 

the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. These impacts in turn would affect the stability of 

the Mekong Delta through impacts to inland and coastal fisheries, increased saline 

intrusion, reduced agricultural productivity, and destabilizing the river channels 

and coastline of the Mekong Delta. 

Livelihood, Culture and People: The livelihoods and food security of more than 40 

million people who depend on the Mekong River’s rich fisheries would be undermined through the construction of the Mekong Mainstream Dams. Furthermore, impacts to agricultural land, compounded with climate change impacts, could further 

reduce food security in the region. By changing traditional ways of living, the dams 

could lead to increased poverty and difficulty in meeting the Millennium Development Goals. 

What is of even greater surprise is the findings of the SEA team that the economic benefits of the projects would accrue mostly to the private developers and 

contractors building the projects, and that the projects would have relatively little 

impact on power supply for Thailand and Vietnam, the two major consumers of the 

electricity from these projects. They would have only a minor impact on electricity 

prices for Thailand and Vietnam and would generate the equivalent 1 year’s demand growth for the lower Mekong Basin. Taken in this context, the tradeoffs are 

enormous in the proposition to dam the mainstream, since the impacts would be 

massive, and yet the projects themselves would not contribute significantly to the 

region’s energy security. 

The SEA concludes that the mainstream dams have the potential to create international tensions within the lower Mekong Basin due to the extensive impacts from 

the scheme, that many of the risks from the dams cannot be mitigated at this time, 

that there still remain critical gaps in understanding about the river ecosystem, 

that there are many substantial gaps in governance in the region, and that the governments lack capacities in personnel and skills to manage the projects. These findings lead the SEA team to recommend that decisions on mainstream dams be deferred for 10 years, and that this period of time be used to examine alternative 

nondam options for generating electricity from the Mekong Mainstream, as well as 

to improve the understanding of the river basin’s ecology and potential impacts of 

the projects in order to make a decision about whether the tradeoffs are manageable 

or not. 

The question now facing the region’s governments and the Mekong River Commission Secretariat is whether they will adopt the recommendations of the SEA. Unfortunately, the writing on the wall is not good. While the SEA final report was delivered to the Commission in August, it has yet to be released to the public. We have 

heard from some sources that the MRC—because it does not like its conclusions— 

is attempting to distance itself from the SEA recommendations and to move forward 

with some of the dams. 

Indicative of the lukewarm response of the MRC to the report is that the latest 

draft of the Basin Development Plan, the main planning instrument developed by 

the MRC to coordinate river basin developments. The plan’s latest draft makes little 

mention of the Strategic Environmental Assessment, and instead recommends that 

the six dams planned for the cascade north of Vientiane go forward. This strategy 

(along with the other options) is now being discussed among the four Mekong governments and an agreement should be made by the end of the year. The MRC is 

also pushing for the regional approval process to begin on the planned Xayaburi 

dam on the Mekong mainstream in northern Laos, which is the project at the most 

advanced stage of planning. The Xayaburi dam would displace thousands of people 

in Laos, disrupt an important fish migration route and cause the extinction of the 

critically endangered Mekong giant catfish by destroying one of their last natural 

spawning habitats. The MRC is pushing for the decisionmaking process on this first 

dam to start soon, despite the fact that the SEA report hasn’t yet been released, 

considered by regional governments, nor incorporated into the Xayaburi EIA. 

Mr. Chairman, and Senators, this must not be allowed to happen. 

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

This brings me to the final part of my presentation: what can the United States 

do to avert disaster on the Mekong? 

35 

As a first step, the U.S. State Department, in its role as a donor to the Mekong 

River Commission and to the regional governments, should push for the SEA report 

to be publicly released and endorsed by the MRC and member countries. The U.S. 

should help push for wide dissemination and public consultations to take place within the region around the SEA, ensuring that the needs and views of riparian communities are considered. The U.S. should also push for the SEA’s recommendations 

to be followed, which means deferring decisions on mainstream dams for at least 

10 years until the findings and recommendations provided by the SEA are adequately considered and implemented and informed decisionmaking can be guaranteed. 

The United States could contribute to this informed decisionmaking through offering the assistance of the U.S. Geological Survey in generating more comprehensive 

datasets on the river’s hydrology, ecology, sediment flows and water quality, and ensuring that this information is released in the public domain. 

The U.S. State Department should also continue to voice its concerns over the security risks these dams pose, and continue its work in highlighting the importance 

of regional food security and the important role fisheries plays in the region. 

We understand that through the Lower Mekong Initiative, the U.S. plans to spend 

around $22 million in 2010 on environment programs in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, 

and Vietnam. Some of this money will be allocated for the new ‘‘sister-river’’ partnership which was established between the Mekong River Commission and the Mississippi River Commission on May 12, 2010. This partnership aims to improve the 

management of transboundary water resources, learning from experiences in the 

Mississippi River Basin. Money will also be allocated for the initiative’s work on climate change, which is looking at developing regional strategies to address the impact of climate change on water resources, food security, and livelihood. Yet beyond 

this, very little is known about what the State Department is planning to do with 

its Lower Mekong Initiative and Mississippi-Mekong River Partnerhsip. We would 

appreciate the Foreign Relations Committee’s help in pushing the State Department 

to be more transparent about their engagement with the Lower Mekong countries 

and consult with NGOs in the U.S. and the region. 

Finally, we believe that the U.S. Government could play an instrumental role in 

providing technical assistance and support for the development of sustainable energy options for the region. Through providing support and training for better energy planning processes such as integrated resources planning and strengthening 

electricity regulators, coupled with technical assistance and startup funds for investment in energy efficiency and clean renewable energy sources, the United States 

could play an important role in pushing for a clean energy future for the Mekong 

region, allowing the Mekong River Basin to be preserved to allow for the security 

and continuity of future generations. 

Chairmen Webb, thank you again for the opportunity to contribute to this important debate. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, for your testimony, Ms. 

Imhof. 

And welcome, Ms. Chungyalpa. 

STATEMENT OF DEKILA CHUNGYALPA, DIRECTOR FOR THE 

GREATER MEKONG PROGRAM, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. CHUNGYALPA. Thank you, Chairman Webb, Ranking Member 

Inhofe, and members of the subcommittee, for having me testify 

today. 

My name is Dekila Chungyalpa, and I’m the director of the 

Greater Mekong Program for the World Wildlife Fund. 

For almost 50 years, WWF has been working to protect nature 

all over the world. Today, we are the largest international conservation organization, with presence in over 100 countries. 

WWF has been working in the Mekong for almost three decades. 

The region is a treasure trove of biodiversity. Over 1,000 new species were discovered between 1997 and 2007—one decade alone. 

The Mekong River is the second most biodiverse river in the world, 

with over 1,300 species of fish. It is home to four of the top giant 

36 

freshwater species; among them, the giant Mekong catfish, known 

to be as long as 9 feet. 

The Mekong is the world’s largest inland fisheries, accounting for up to 25 percent of global freshwater catch, worth up to $7 billion 

annually. It provides livelihoods for at least 60 million people, and 

is the main source of protein for the majority of people living in 

this basin. This river is not simply a waterway. Its unique combination of waterflow, sediment, nutrients, fish species, and 

connectivity are what make it so spectacular. It is a living ecosystem, and it is still healthy and intact, compared to most of the 

large rivers in the world. 

However, this may not be the case for long. A combination of 

large-scale hydropower in the Mekong mainstem, climate change 

impacts, especially in the delta, and watershed degradation, are all 

making the region much more vulnerable to environmental, economic, and, ultimately, political insecurity. The most urgent threat, 

as you’ve heard, that the Mekong River faces is that of large-scale 

hydropower in its lower mainstem. 

As you noted, yourself, Senator, in the Upper Mekong, China has 

completed building the Xiaowan Dam, which has 10 times the reservoir capacity than its three existing dams—that is, 10 cubic kilometers, one—if you can just imagine it, 10 cubic kilometers—and 

is in the process of building an even larger reservoir. This, of 

course, gives China significant leverage over the Lower Mekong 

countries. 

In the Lower Mekong, there are currently 11 dams in different 

planning stages of development on the mainstem, with one in 

Sayabouly, as my colleague just mentioned, in northern Laos, 

which, just yesterday, was notified to the Mekong River Commission by the Lao Government. This is the first time the process 

of notification will actually be enacted by the Mekong River 

Commission. 

Almost 50 percent of the fish species in the Mekong are migratory and travel long distances to spawn. Dams on the mainstem 

would prevent them from doing so. One dam alone on the 

mainstem, such as Sayabouly, would cause the extinction of many 

wild populations, including the Mekong giant catfish. 

The Vietnam portion of the Mekong Delta is home to 17 million 

people and contributes more than 50 percent of Vietnam’s staple 

food crops. Reduction of sediment trapped by dams upstream would 

mean the delta’s nutrients are no longer able to be replenished, 

threatening the very source of the country’s wealth and security. 

WWF is not antidam. We recognize the aspiration of greater 

Mekong subregion governments to follow the growth strategies that 

were also followed by the United States and other developed nations. We advocate for energy from sustainable hydropower plants 

placed on suitable tributaries of the Mekong River. In collaboration 

with the Asian Development Bank and the Mekong River Commission, and with support from USAID’s own ECO-Asia program, we 

are currently developing a basinwide sustainability assessment tool 

that identifies tributaries that are most important, in terms of fish 

migration routes in the Mekong. 

WWF has also identified 70 financial institutions that have invested in Mekong hydropower projects. These include five major 

37 

U.S. institutions: JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, State Street, Dimensional Fund Advisors, and Fidelity Group. Coincidentally, tomorrow 

in Bangkok, WWF, along with—Oxfam, Proparco, and the World 

Bank, are hosting a Hydropower Financing summit. It will explore 

the risks of hydropower financing on the Mekong mainstem. We 

have 30 confirmed participants from the banking sector, including 

Morgan Stanley. WWF hopes the summit will initiate a basinwide 

dialogue on sustainable hydropower planning and placement on the 

Mekong mainstem. 

I’d like to talk about two other related challenges. The Mekong 

Delta is one of the world’s three most vulnerable deltas to climate 

change. Current projections state that the most likely outcome is 

a 1-meter rise in sea level by the end of this century. That would 

submerge one-third of the Mekong Delta. Adding dams to this 

equation limits the Delta from replenishing itself, just as sea-level 

rise begins to eat away at the coast and saline intrusion destroys 

productive lands. 

Already we are witnessing erratic changes in flood patterns. 

Without significant steps to alter the course we are on, cross-border 

migration, breakdowns of roads and infrastructure, and the resulting humanitarian challenges, could create major security issues in 

the region. 

The governments are fully aware of the potential for conflict 

caused by climate change. It is not uncommon for them to send 

military representatives to regional workshops on climate change. 

I was in New York City yesterday to meet with the Thai Minister 

of the Environment, His Excellency Suwit Khunkitti. He asked us 

to meet with him to discuss new solutions for environmental problems in the region. He said ‘‘If we lose the forests, our water source 

is broken. If we lose our water, our lifecycle is broken. If our life 

cycle is broken, our economies and our communities are broken. If 

we lose our forests, we lose everything.’’ 

The foundation of the Mekong River is its watersheds. It is the 

forests that regulate the supply of waters to rivers, that absorb carbon, that buffer the region from climate change, and that harbor 

important biodiversity. Deforestation continues unabated in many 

parts of the region. Without a regional mandate and shared vision 

of sustainable development for the Mekong region, these combined 

challenges will undermine the well-being of the people and the 

development aspirations of the Mekong countries. 

His Excellency has raised a new idea. He would like the region 

to consider a Mekong Forest Commission, an agreement among the 

Lower Mekong countries to protect, conserve, and use commonly 

identified forests and critical watersheds in a sustainable manner, 

and is willing to champion this idea among his peers. 

Recent U.S. engagement has had a very positive impact on the 

Mekong region, not least of which is a renewed will to work on 

freshwater issues on a regional scale. A significant inspiration for 

this has been the two visits made by Secretary Clinton. Furthermore, the United States has demonstrated its long-term commitment to the region’s stability through the State Department’s 

Lower Mekong Initiative. The U.S. Government can continue to 

create long-term security in the Mekong region and call for a moratorium on the approval of mainstem dams to carry out a full 

38 

assessment of the risks from such development, including the 

Sayabouly Dam in Laos. 

The U.S. Government should advocate the Mekong River Commission procedure that includes notification, prior consultation, and 

agreement, and, most importantly, monitor the procedure to ensure 

that a rigorous and transparent assessment is made, using all 

available scientific and expert analysis of the impacts of this particular dam. 

The U.S. Government can support the full recognition and endorsement of the 1995 agreement of the Mekong River Commission 

and bolster its authority to better manage and preserve the 

Mekong’s water resources. We ask that the U.S. Government 

encourage a fair and meaningful dialogue with China. 

The Prime Ministers of the Lower Mekong countries have recently formally invited China and Myanmar to join the MRC. We 

are given to understand that Myanmar will actually accept the invitation. However, China has yet to respond. However, if the freshwater biodiversity fisheries and future of the Mekong River are to 

be sustained, a whole-of-basin approach must be attempted. As one 

of the largest global donors to multilateral development banks, the 

U.S. Government can demand that they take a whole-of-basin 

approach on hydropower, especially given their own mandate for 

poverty reduction and the importance of a free-flowing Mekong to 

millions of people. 

The U.S. Government can also promote green science-based solutions. The Lower Mekong Initiative has developed a modeling system for climate change, called ‘‘Forecast Mekong.’’ It helps the 

Vietnamese Government analyze adaptation to sea-level rise, and 

emphasizes sustainable solutions rather than stopgap measures, 

such as building more dikes and walls. The U.S. Government 

should continue to do so, but, more importantly, invest in and 

provide incentives for environmentally sound infrastructure 

development. 

And finally, we ask that the U.S. Government call for a regional 

agreement on sustainable use and development of natural resources in the Mekong region. Harnessing the political will demonstrated by His Excellency Khun Suwit through a Mekong Forestry Commission may be just the right place to begin. 

Chairman Webb, thank you once again for having me testify 

today. 

For more details on any of these points, please refer to my written testimony. 

WWF strongly urges the U.S. Government to continue to play an 

empowering role in the region and to support ecosystem-based 

approaches for a climate-resilient and free-flowing Mekong River. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chungyalpa follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEKILA CHUNGYALPA, DIRECTOR, GREATER MEKONG

PROGRAM, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, WASHINGTON, DC 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Webb, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for having me testify today on the challenges to water resources and security in Southeast Asia. My name is Dekila Chungyalpa, and I am Director of the 

Greater Mekong Program of the World Wildlife Fund. 

39 

1The GMS comprises Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Yunnan province 

in China. 2The Equator Principles refer to a financial industry benchmark for determining, assessing 

and managing social and environmental risk in project financing. 

For nearly 50 years, WWF has been protecting the future of nature. Today we are 

the largest international conservation organization in the world. Our unique way of 

working combines a global reach with a foundation in science, involves action at 

every level from local to global, and ensures the delivery of innovative solutions that 

meet the needs of both people and nature. We currently sponsor conservation programs in more than 100 countries, thanks to the support of 1.2 million members 

in the Unites States and more than 5 million members worldwide. 

Using the best available scientific knowledge and advancing that knowledge 

where we can, WWF works to preserve the diversity and abundance of life on Earth 

and the health of ecological systems. We do this by protecting natural areas and 

wild populations of plants and animals, promoting sustainable approaches to the 

use of renewable natural resources, and promoting more efficient use of resources 

and energy while maximizing the reduction of pollution. WWF is committed to reversing the degradation of our planet’s natural environment and to building a future 

in which human needs are met in harmony with nature. 

The six countries flanking the Mekong River are often grouped together and are 

collectively known as the Greater Mekong Subregion 1 (GMS). WWF has been 

present in the GMS countries (with the exception of Myanmar) for 30 years, working closely with all levels of government, as well as communities, development agencies and the private sector. This work has included not only traditional conservation 

issues, but has broadened the organisation’s scope of work to include sustainable development. Given the significance of hydropower development to the region’s ecosystems and natural resources, WWF is also an active member of the International 

Hydropower Association and the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum. The 

Forum is developing a Sustainability Assessment Protocol, a tool to measure and 

guide performance in the hydropower sector. Its membership includes, among 

others, bilateral and multilateral development agencies and the Equator Principles 2

Financial Institutions Group. 

THE MEKONG AND ITS RESOURCES

WWF–US has identified the Greater Mekong Subregion as one of 19 global priority places where we have chosen to focus our conservation efforts. This vast region 

contains irreplaceable treasures ranging from communities with rich cultural heritages to unique wildlife in spectacular natural landscapes. The region is home to almost 100 distinct ethnic groups that are heavily dependent on the river and its natural resources for protein as well as livelihoods. It is also habitat to extraordinary 

biodiversity, including large mammals such as the Indochinese tiger, the Asian elephant, and the last remaining populations of the Irrawaddy dolphin. 

The region is defined by the Mekong River—the longest river in Southeast Asia. 

It unites 320 million people as it flows over 4,000 kilometres starting in the TibetanQinghai plateau, through China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam 

into the South China Sea. It also nurtures and sustains an extraordinary level of 

freshwater biodiversity and endemism. The Mekong River basin provides habitat for 

at least 1,300 species of fish, including four of the top 10 giant freshwater species 

of the world: Mekong giant catfish (Pangasianodon gigas), giant pangasius (dogeating catfish) (Pangasius sanitwongsei), giant barb (Catlocarpio siamensis), and the 

giant freshwater stingray (Himantura chaophraya). By length, the Mekong is the 

world’s richest waterway for freshwater biodiversity, fostering far more species per 

unit area than even the Amazon. 

The geomorphology of the Mekong is varied; from reservoirs of frozen water in its 

source area, to low depths and stretches marked with rocks and boulders, to enormous rapids and deep pools toward the end. At least 170 deepwater pools can be 

found in Cambodia and Laos alone, with the deepest measuring 80m in depth. In 

the dry season, when the Mekong often recedes and fish habitats on the floodplain 

disappear, deep pools play a crucial role, providing refuges for many of the Greater 

Mekong’s fish species to feed and grow in. Moreover, the river’s annual floods and 

flow patterns carry much needed sediments to sustain the agricultural productivity 

downstream. 

At least 150 of the river’s fish species are migratory, and 50 of these are commercially important in the Mekong, particularly in the Tonle Sap, which provides up 

to 75 percent of Cambodia’s inland fisheries. The Lower Mekong basin provides food 

security and livelihoods to over 60 million people, and fish is the main source of proVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:37 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
40 

3Mekong River Commission. 2010 ‘‘State of the Basin Report: 2010.’’ Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, Lao PDR. 4Mekong River Commission. 2010 ‘‘State of the Basin Report: 2010.’’ Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, Lao PDR. 

tein for these inhabitants, ranging from 42–51 kg per person per year 3. It is estimated that approximately 2.8 million tons of fish and other aquatic animals are consumed each year, and an estimated 1.1 million tonnes of aquaculture products are 

exported, making the Mekong the largest inland fishery in the world. Mekong fisheries yield 3.9 million tonnes per year, accounting for 19–25 percent of inland 

catches worldwide and worth between $3.9 billion and $7.0 billion.4 The fisheries 

are heavily dependent on wild capture: aquaculture accounts for only 10–12 percent 

of production and it, too, depends on wild fish for feed. Preserving natural variations 

in river hydrology is important for sustaining high fish diversity; natural flood 

pulses are often what trigger fish to migrate to spawning habitats, migrating between distant habitats. 

A REGION ON THE MOVE

Of the six countries that comprise the GMS, three of these—China, Vietnam, and 

Thailand—are rapidly growing economies, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar lag 

far behind in relative economic terms. The GMS is one of the fastest growing regions in the world, and the demand for energy, particularly in China, Thailand, and 

Vietnam is expanding. Rapid industrialization is pushing the development of hydropower in the Mekong Basin, including the proposed main-stem dams. In addition 

to fueling the fastest growing countries, hydropower development is seen as an avenue for poverty alleviation for Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. The challenge facing 

the GMS governments is clear: they must sustain economic growth while simultaneously ensuring that the Mekong and its ecosystems remain healthy. 

The GMS initially was designed as a trade agreement facilitated by the Asian 

Development Bank, in order to strengthen connectivity and cross-border trade, and 

to integrate national markets. As such, it is really a grid of transport networks, 

often referred to as ‘‘economic corridors.’’ 

The GMS Strategic Plan as it was originally conceived consists of 305 planned 

projects worth $31 billion, broken down as follows: 

• Roads and bridges—$7.6 billion 

• Railways—$13.2 billion 

• Ports and navigation—$2.6 billion 

• Airports—$84 million 

• Electricity grid—$338 million 

• Gas pipelines—$1.3 billion 

• Power stations—$4.8 billion 

• Telecommunications—$29 million 

• Tourism—$446 million 

• Livelihood projects—$44 million 

• Industrial estates—$1.0 billion 

While not directly mentioning hydropower, GMS clearly prioritizes development 

of a regional electricity grid and infrastructure that will move this forward. Given 

that the GMS is one of the fastest growing regions in the world, there is a correlating increase in the demand for energy. This demand for energy should be met 

with clean energy that does not aggravate climate change nor threaten the unique 

ecosystems and livelihoods of the GMS. Potential alternatives to mainstream dams 

should be explored, including carefully considered tributary dams, or other forms of 

renewable energy such as wind power or solar power. 

Currently, in the Upper Mekong, China has just completed building the Xiawan 

dam, which has a larger reservoir capacity (10 km3) 10 times more than its three 

existing dams—Manwan, Dashwan, and Jinghong, (which add up to less than 1 

km3) and is in the process of building an even larger reservoir (12 km3). This gives 

China significant leverage over the Lower Mekong countries. For example, China 

will be able to increase the mean monthly flow to Laos by 20 percent in March, the 

driest month of the year. However, these reservoirs are being built to produce cheap 

and reliable electricity for the Chinese market, and not to help agriculture, navigation or floods in the lower Mekong. 

41 

GROWING THREATS TO THE MEKONG

Hydropower 

While hydropower development has potential economic and greenhouse gas reduction benefits, it also brings about enormous costs. Hydropower dams fundamentally 

alter the river ecosystem, often with negative impacts to livelihoods and biodiversity. Each subsequent hydropower dam further diminishes the river’s ability to naturally adapt to ecosystem impacts. The clock is ticking; there are currently 11 dams 

in different planning stages of development on the Lower Mekong main stem, with 

one in Sayabouly, northern Laos, on the verge of being notified to the MRC Joint 

Committee by the Government of Laos. Hydropower threatens to impact the Mekong 

and its ecosystems in three main ways: 

(i) Delta stability: The Vietnam portion of the Mekong delta is home to 17 million 

people, contributes more than 50 percent of Vietnam’s staple food crops and is the 

source for 60 percent of fish production in Vietnam. This region provides food for 

40 million people and contributes 27 percent of Vietnam’s GDP. Given that more 

than 22 percent of Vietnam’s population is located in the Mekong Delta, the spillover effects of hydropower development will be even larger. Reduction of sediment 

trapped by dams would mean that the delta’s nutrients are no longer being replenished, threatening the very source of the country’s wealth and security. Furthermore, this would increase the vulnerability of the delta, limiting its ability to replenish itself and making it more susceptible to sea-level rise and saline intrusion. 

(ii) Fish diversity: In September 2008, a team of fish migration experts organized 

by the Mekong River Commission concluded that there is no evidence that fish passage facilities currently used on dams in other large tropical rivers can cope with 

the massive fish migrations and high species biodiversity found in the Mekong. The 

technologies used on high dams in North America and Europe were developed for 

a very limited number of species (5 to 8). In contrast, there are 150 migrant fish 

species in the Mekong, and biomasses are 100 times greater. 

(iii) Livelihoods: There are at least 50 commercially important migratory fish species in the Mekong River, representing 70 percent of the total catch. Over 75 percent 

of rural households in the Lower Mekong Basin are involved in fisheries, both for 

their own consumption and for sale. Any impact on the ecological balance of the 

river also threatens the sustainability of these aquatic resources that millions of 

people depend on. Dams in the main stem would impede migration of fish and other 

aquatic animals, potentially reducing productivity of the fishery by as much as 60 

percent and compromising the livelihoods of millions of people. 

Climate Change 

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has identified the Mekong Delta 

as one of the three most vulnerable deltas on the planet to climate change impacts. 

These impacts include sea-level rise, saline intrusion and more severe storms, which 

erode the coastline and undermine coastal ecosystems. Main-stem dams will block 

the sediment that builds the delta and with it the nutrients that feed the delta’s 

immense. As sediment is trapped by dams, the reduction in the amount reaching 

the river mouth will decrease the capacity of the delta to replenish itself, making 

it even more vulnerable to sea-level rise, saline intrusion and erosion. With nearly 

a quarter of Vietnam’s population located in the Mekong Delta, the combined impacts of the proposed main-stem dams and climate change will pose significant social and economic challenges to that country in coming years. 

The Mekong River is first and foremost an ecosystem. Anything done to impede 

its natural flow will also prevent it and the surrounding basin from adapting naturally to expected climate change impacts, including changes to average temperatures, water availability from precipitation and runoff, and sea level. Changes in 

temperature can affect rates of growth and reproduction for individual species and 

can also change species distribution and ecosystem processes such as nutrient cycling. WWF holds that climate change impacts will accelerate the extinction of some 

species given the high rate of endemism and habitat fragmentation found in the 

Mekong basin. 

Changes in the seasonal flow pattern in the Mekong River basin will strongly influence future species composition and ecosystem productivity. Changes in temperature and precipitation in the basin may also affect the very nature of the region’s 

wetlands—vital aquatic systems that are used for rice cultivation and freshwater 

fisheries and help to mitigate floods and erosion. Sea-level rise will have significant 

negative impacts in the Mekong Delta region because of the delta’s high population 

density, which is supported by productive wetlands and estuaries that are in turn 

maintained by naturally fluctuating water levels and input of fresh water from the 

river. These upstream inputs of freshwater deliver much-needed nutrients and sediVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:37 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
42 

5Mekong River Commission. 2010 ‘‘State of the Basin Report: 2010.’’ Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, Lao PDR. 6 Institute of Strategy and Policy on Natural Resources and Environment (Viet Nam) 2009 

‘‘Vietnam Assessment Report on Climate Change (VARCC).’’ 

ments, which are critical for wetland soils to accumulate and prevent plants from 

being inundated.5 Sea-level rise and saltwater intrusion threaten to upset this natural balance and undermine the Delta ecosystem. 

The anticipated human consequences of unmitigated climate change on the 

Mekong are hard to imagine. Projections across the Mekong basin show an array 

of climate change effects, including a potential sea-level rise of a meter by the end 

of the century. If unaddressed, a 1-meter rise in sea level could submerge more than 

a third of the Mekong delta, home for 17 million people and source of nearly half 

of Viet Nam’s rice.6 Already, we are witnessing erratic changes in flood patterns in 

the Mekong Delta. Combined with sea-level rise, we can anticipate further breakdowns of roads and other infrastructure, leading to the increasing likelihood of economic and social instability. Even the more modest predictions of how the region 

and its communities, ecosystems and economies may be altered suggest that, without significant steps to reverse course, the humanitarian impacts of accelerating climate change in the Mekong are likely to present new security challenges for both 

GMS countries and the international community in the 21st century. 

GEOPOLITICS IN THE GMS

The Mekong countries are often seen as a cohesive bloc, largely due to the Greater 

Mekong Subregion (GMS). In realpolitik terms however, the GMS consists of nations that are very diverse culturally and that navigate strong bilateral tensions, 

as in the case of Thailand and Cambodia. The droughts experienced in 2010, and 

the subsequent assertions by Thailand that these may have been caused by dams 

on the Upper Mekong, have made it clear that lower Mekong countries are waking 

up to the decisions made by their Chinese neighbours to the north and are increasingly willing to take them to task. At the same time, Thailand and Vietnam have 

not acknowledged their own power development plans, which substantially rely on 

centralized hydropower development. In the context of this kind of political gridlock, 

it is not surprising that while the GMS has a designated Working Group on the 

Environment, it has so far not been successful in mainstreaming regional-level 

environmental planning and design into GMS’s core business of economic growth 

and trade. 

Other regional forums exist, such as the Mekong River Commission, but it is 

handicapped by the fact that despite being an intergovernmental body created to 

promote sustainable management of the Mekong River, it is effectively limited to 

decisions made by the four lower Mekong governments through the Joint Committee 

and Council. China is so far only a dialogue partner and Myanmar is not included, 

thus leaving no constructive platform for dialogue on regionwide water use and 

management issues. 

In the past year, Vietnam and Cambodia have grown increasingly aware of the 

disproportionate burden that they will face as downstream nations if any of the 

Lower Mekong dams go forward. Not coincidentally, both countries share a history 

marked with famine, mass migration, and food insecurity. Add in the potential for 

political conflicts due to climate change impact scenarios in the regions, and it becomes clear why lower military departments from the lower Mekong governments 

have been known to attend WWF meetings and consult with us on water resource 

management and climate change. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: A SUSTAINABLE COURSE FOR THE MEKONG BASIN

The decision to construct a dam on the main stem of the Mekong River will have 

permanent consequences and should be very carefully considered. In 1995, the four 

Lower Mekong countries signed an agreement that committed them to the sustainable development of the Mekong River. The proposed mainstream dams challenge 

this commitment. Prior to hydropower development, a comprehensive assessment of 

the full economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits in the Mekong Basin 

should be conducted. Approval of any of the main stem dams should be delayed 

until completion of this study. In addition, WWF offers the following specific recommendations for a way forward: 

(1) A 10-year delay in the approval of the mainstream dams would allow for a 

comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of their construction and operation. 

43 

(2) The 1995 agreement of the Mekong River Commission should be fully recognized and endorsed, in particular the procedures for notification, prior consultation 

and agreement. 

(3) In collaboration with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Mekong 

River Commission (MRC), WWF is testing Environmental Considerations for Sustainable Hydropower Development (ECSHD) in Sesan, Sekong, and Srepok tributary 

rivers in Cambodia. The project objective is to build a set of interventions into existing planning processes that will help move the Mekong countries towards adopting 

an agreed framework for sustainable hydropower development. The most recent advancement includes a river-basin-wide sustainability tool (R–SAT) developed in collaboration between ADB, MRC, WWF and support from USAID via EcoAsia. Merely 

developing the tool however does not mean it will be implemented. Therefore, promoting and financing similar approaches and the application of such tools is crucial. 

(4) One alternative to mainstream dams is tributary dams. These need to be considered as more feasible alternatives based on careful selection criteria and methodology. To ensure the overall ecological integrity of the Mekong Basin, some tributaries will need to remain free flowing to preserve the values of connectivity of the 

river from headwaters to the sea and to allow for migrant fish to continue to breed 

and support the livelihoods of local communities. WWF’s Greater Mekong Program 

is using GIS-based tools to select free-flowing tributary candidates, and we promote 

the concept of free-flowing rivers to decision makers in these specific sub-basins. 

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS PROMOTED BY WWF

WWF offers the following general recommendations for sustainable development 

in the GMS: 

Take an ecosystem-based approach 

Confronting climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. How do 

we address such an overwhelming issue and where do we start? There has been 

much analysis and discussion, but few practical solutions are being proposed at the 

local level to help communities, the private sector, policymakers and planners to 

provide ecosystems the opportunity to adapt to a changing climate. 

A resilient ecosystem has the ability to withstand threats and systemic shocks 

and can renew and restore itself even if degraded. The best example is that of mangrove forests and coastal wetlands in India, which were able to absorb the floodwaters during the 2004 Asian tsunami. Unfortunately, restoration and preservation 

of coastal wetlands is one of the few established and well-known adaptation strategies. In the case of freshwater ecosystems, there is an urgent need to understand 

how to build both ecosystem and social resiliency and to identify adaptation strategies at a site level. 

WWF is learning in our various project sites that ecosystems will not react in a 

gradual manner to climate change impacts but will instead react rapidly and at 

multiple scales. To complicate this further, the speed at which these impacts are 

taking place is outstripping most public sector thinking, which consists of reflexive 

and short-sighted reactions, such as the call for sea walls and other inappropriate 

structural investments that are already appearing in the Mekong Delta. The challenge therefore lies in convincing existing national and regional institutions to adopt 

environmental and social resilience-building strategies across all economic sectors 

and political boundaries. 

Engage the Finance Sector 

In 2009, WWF Greater Mekong Programme commissioned a report to investigate 

sources of funding that would allow the proposed dams to be constructed on the 

main stem. This study identified 12 project companies set to construct dams on the 

lower Mekong main stem and 70 financial institutions that invested in the different 

stages of the feasibility study of these projects. For practical purposes, this list of 

financial institutions was then narrowed down to 28 banks: 

Financial institution Country of origin CSR policy 

Equator 

principles 

adopted 

Signatory 

to UNEPFI 

and/or PRI 

Specific 

policy on 

dams 

Agricultural Bank of China ....................... China ................................. No No No No 

Bank of Ayudhya ....................................... Thailand ............................ No No No No 

Bank of China ........................................... China ................................. Yes No No No 

Bank of Communications ......................... China ................................. Yes No No No 

Barclays ..................................................... United Kingdom ................. Yes Yes Yes No 

China Galaxy Securities ............................ China ................................. No No No No 

CIMB Bank ................................................ Malaysia ............................ No No No No 

44 

Financial institution Country of origin CSR policy 

Equator 

principles 

adopted 

Signatory 

to UNEPFI 

and/or PRI 

Specific 

policy on 

dams 

Guotai Junan Securities ............................ China ................................. No No No No 

HSBC ......................................................... United Kingdom ................. Yes Yes Yes Yes 

Industrial & Commercial Bank of China .. China ................................. Yes No No No 

JPMorgan ................................................... United States .................... Yes Yes Yes No 

Morgan Stanley ......................................... United States .................... Yes Yes No No 

State Street ............................................... United States .................... Yes No Yes No 

Dimensional Fund Advisors ...................... United States .................... No No No No 

Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ ................... Japan ................................. Yes Yes Yes No 

Sumitomo Mitsui Banking ......................... Japan ................................. Yes Yes Yes No 

Calyon (part of Credit Agricole) ............... France ................................ Yes Yes No No 

KBC Bank .................................................. Belgium ............................. Yes Yes No No 

OCBC Bank ................................................ Singapore .......................... Yes No No No 

UBS ............................................................ Switzerland ........................ Yes Yes Yes No 

Standard Chartered ................................... United Kingdom ................. Yes Yes Yes Yes 

ANZ ............................................................ Australia-New Zealand ...... Yes Yes Yes No 

ADB ............................................................ ............................................ ................. ............... ............... .................

EXIM .......................................................... China ................................. Yes No No No 

CRBC ......................................................... China ................................. Not Known No No Not Known 

AmBank ..................................................... Malaysia ............................ Not Known No No No 

Fidelity Group ............................................ United States .................... Yes No No No 

RHB Bank .................................................. Malaysia ............................ Not Known No No No 

WWF is currently hosting a Sustainable Hydropower Financing Conference, taking place on the 23rd and 24th of September 2010 in Bangkok, in order to facilitate 

open discussion of sustainable investment practices on the Mekong main stem. We 

have 30 confirmed participants from the banking sector involved in funding, insuring, or supporting the Mekong main stem dams, including Morgan Stanley. 

The conference has three objectives: 

1. To convince banks to finance sustainable hydropower projects in the Mekong. 

The summit incorporates a long-term approach by providing a solution—Sustainability Assessment Protocol, and the Environmental Considerations in Sustainable 

Hydropower Development—that financial institutions can use only to finance sustainable projects that are beneficial to the economy and people with minimal impacts on the environment. 

2. To build partnerships with key institutions in the financing sector, an essential 

and integral part of any investment project. WWF offers the summit as a solutionoriented event instead of what has usually been a charged dialogue between banks 

and NGOs. WWF hopes that financing institutions will continue to work with WWF 

in other infrastructure or investment project. There is an opportunity to create 

synergies between WWF and the financial institutions with respect to expertise, 

strength, and experience with sustainable development. 

3. To identify a bank to lead the charge in sustainable investing in the region. 

Often tokened as a ‘‘lead arranger,’’ such an institution could help WWF to reach 

its peers, and provide a good example of the benefits of sustainable investments. 

While some banks invited to the summit have had long histories of commitment to 

environmentally responsible financing, there are others who have not traditionally 

stood up for these types of issues. The summit is an opportunity to promote this 

practice and help those institutions interested in leading investment in sustainable 

hydropower development to become the champions. 

Engage the Private Sector 

WWF is working across the Mekong region with key industry water users, led by 

the Coca Cola Company, to help develop a task force to explore water stewardship 

issues and the role of the private sector in wise water use, particular given the impacts of climate change in the delta where many of these industries are based. This 

will consist of a multi-sector network that can jointly share the latest science and 

information, apply appropriate adaptation strategies within their markets, and invest in sustainable resilience building for local communities, businesses and ecosystems In addition this group will also explore innovative financial mechanisms for 

adaptation and water conservation to safeguard future water supply for biodiversity 

and livelihoods. 

45 

Engage the Public Sector 

There is an urgent need for an integrated regional approach to natural resource 

management at policy and operational levels. The ongoing GEF 5 reforms offer an 

opportunity and could provide the resources required to make this happen. The 

countries of the region are willing take the bold step to commit a percentage of their 

GEF national allocations to a regional ecosystem based adaptation approach. We 

hope that such a strong regional signal demonstrates the lower Mekong governments’ commitment to maintain the region’s resilience for the benefit of its people, 

economies and biodiversity. Program components would include: 

• Regionally integrated spatial planning that incorporates biodiversity conservation and climate change, applied for the sustainable management of priority 

landscapes in the GMS; 

• Maintenance and restoration of critical ecosystems and the services they provide in selected test sites in priority landscapes by; 

• Incentives to effectively manage biodiversity and carbon values to strengthen 

adaptation capacity in priority landscapes developed and tested; 

• National and regional capacities improved for cooperation and coordination for 

ecosystems management and sustainable development; 

• A discussion at the administrative level of the lower Mekong governments on 

sustainable hydropower and the need for a free flowing Mekong main stem. 

AN IDEAL ROLE FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

The last 2 years have shown tremendous changes in the GMS, not least of which 

is a renewed will to work on a regional scale. A significant inspiration for this has 

been the two visits made by Secretary Clinton to the region. Furthermore, the U.S. 

Administration has substantiated its long-term commitment to the region’s stability 

through The Lower Mekong Initiative; a partnership between the U.S. State Department and the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam to enhance 

cooperation on environment, health, education, and infrastructure development. In 

particular, two science-based approaches that are beneficial are: 

—The sister river partnership between the Mekong River Commission and the Mississippi River Commission allows the sharing of expertise and best practices in 

areas such as climate change adaptation; flood and drought management; hydropower and impact assessment, water demand and food security; and water resource management. 

—The establishment of the Delta Research and Global Observation Network 

(DRAGON), and a new interactive, modeling system called Forecast Mekong. 

This initiative creates the possibility of a strengthened lower Mekong bloc that 

is invested in regional win-win strategies rather than short term national interests 

that are unsustainable in the long run. Advancing similar relationships, as the 

United States has done with Vietnam, in the other lower Mekong countries will help 

make this a reality. 

Other ways that the U.S. Government could continue to strengthen these governments and to create long-term security in the Mekong region include: 

• Call for regional cooperation on data gathering, analysis, and sharing: Hydropower is a regional issue. Regional measures must be put in place to ensure 

that the ecological products and services upon which the development of this 

region depends are not degraded or irreversibly lost, which requires a regional 

approach to cost-benefit analyses. There are still large gaps in knowledge in the 

region. For example, what is the value of environmental flows and ecosystem 

services provided by the Mekong River in monetary terms? Encouraging this 

kind of data analysis and sharing among all the six countries is crucial. This 

would also invite a stronger influence from academic institutions and civil society on policy and decision making processes. 

• Promote green science-based solutions: The U.S. State Department led Lower 

Mekong Initiative has developed a new interactive modeling system for climate 

change impacts called Forecast Mekong. It will help the Vietnamese Government better understand and adapt to sea-level rise, emphasizing sustainable solutions rather than stop-gap measures such as building more dykes and walls. 

By promoting these types of science-based approaches, the US Government can 

further the development of green technological solutions in the Mekong region. 

• Support strengthened governance and accountability with the Mekong River 

Commission: The U.S. Government can support the full recognition and endorsement of the 1995 agreement of the Mekong River Commission; in particular the procedures for notification, prior consultation and agreement for hydropower dam development. More specifically, a moratorium on the approval of 

46 

mainstream dams should be established to allow the full assessment of the risks 

from this development. 

• Encourage a meaningful dialogue with China: Recently, the four Prime Ministers of the Lower Mekong countries took part in the Mekong River Commission Summit to celebrate its 15th anniversary, giving the MRC a much higher 

profile than in the past. China was formally asked to join the MRC by the Cambodia government. It remains to be seen if they will. However, if the freshwater 

biodiversity, fisheries, and future of the Mekong River are to be sustained, a 

whole-of-basin and even-handed approach on hydropower must be attempted. 

• Call on multilateral development banks to take a whole-of-basin approach on hydropower: While the multilateral banks wield less influence than they did in the 

past, they are still very important to less powerful governments in the region. 

It behooves them to take cumulative impacts of hydropower development into 

consideration, particularly for the Mekong River basin, where poverty reduction 

strategies must begin with the well-being of the river. A critical place to start 

is with the mainstreaming of sustainable development planning in all subdivisions and in particular, the promotion of alternative green energy over that of 

main-stem hydropower development. 

As one of the largest global donors to multilateral development banks, the 

U.S. Government can call on them to mainstream what their ‘‘environmental 

arms’’ develop and recommend. Often times, conflicting mandates within different subdivisions of the same institution are the bottlenecks to implementing 

innovative environmental solutions and integrating a whole-of-basin approach 

to development. 

• Call for a regional agreement on climate change resiliency: Climate change will 

profoundly affect the Mekong River’s biodiversity, water resources, and economy, all of which in turn will impact its people. National governments can only 

respond to climate change at a local level. Given that the impacts of climate 

change will be transboundary and has significant implications for security, a regionally coordinated response to climate change will be most effective. Guiding 

a regional climate adaptation agreement that builds resiliency for ecosystems, 

natural resources, biodiversity and most importantly, local communities, would 

bring a more peaceful and sustainable future for the Mekong region. One possible opportunity is the current Global Environment Facility (known as GEF V), 

which allows for a transboundary approach on protecting the Mekong region’s 

most unique ability to provide for its people; the environmental services provided by the Mekong River and its watersheds. 

CONCLUSION

Chairman Webb, thank you once more for the opportunity to offer my comments 

on the importance of recognizing the Mekong River as one ecosystem. Taking this 

whole-of-basin approach emphasizes the critical need to protect the Mekong River’s 

ecological functions, of which the free-flowing nature of its main stem is most important, for a peaceful sustainable future of the Mekong region. WWF strongly urges 

the U.S. Government to continue to play an empowering role in the region and to 

support ecosystem based approaches for improving climate change resilience for the 

entire Mekong River basin. 

47 

48 

Senator WEBB. Well, thank you. 

And thank all of you for your testimony today, both written and 

oral, and that will be considered by our staff in great detail after 

this hearing is over. We appreciate the time that you’ve taken to 

come here and be with us today. 

The first thing I would just say, after listening to you, is that it 

is profoundly disturbing in its implications that—on a lot of different levels—environmentally, politically, culturally, strategically—in terms of this region, that we are not paying enough attention to this issue. 

And actually, Ms. Chungyalpa, when I was listening to you, one 

of the thoughts that went through my mind when you were talking 

about the enthusiasm on the climate change issue is, it’s easy to 

get people to talk about climate change in the region, because 

there’s no sovereignty dispute. You don’t have to think about encroachment by another country, or the sorts of issues that are 

involved when we have to address the hydropower situation. The 

immediate reality of what could be happening with these—the construction of these dams, however, is extremely dangerous to the 

continuity of the region as it’s existed for thousands of years. And 

it takes a little bit more of a push to get people in the region to 

discuss this issue. 

I know when I was in Vietnam in July, I found a real hesitation 

among even government officials to discuss this part of the problem, because it does go into the need for governments and the business sector to truly engage in coming up with some sort of a potential structure in which to address the problem. 

And it’s one of our real challenges. One of the reasons I wanted 

to hold this hearing was to look at how do we help create an awareness of the immediacy, in terms of the seriousness of this problem? 

Quite frankly, the responsibility of the players, government, and 

business alike, who are more shortsighted and need to be addressing this is a way they perhaps don’t want to. 

Let me start with this. And I’d like to hear all three of your 

thoughts. We have been working on this amendment, which we 

shared with you, that would go to ADB funding and, at the same 

time, as all of you have mentioned, in one form or another, there 

are other formulas that are taking place right now in order to 

finance these projects. There were several mentions of that. And 

China, particularly, is starting to finance its own construction. We 

saw, just a couple of days ago, China offered a $4.2-billion interestfree loan to Burma for mass hydropower projects: road construction, infrastructure, et cetera. So, how much good can we do with 

this amendment? How much can we affect the process? And what 

are your thoughts for, perhaps, other ways that we could go about 

it? 

And, Dr. Cronin, if you would? 

Dr. CRONIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Well, I think the first thing is to raise the issue. And frankly, it 

won’t be well—your amendment won’t be that well received in 

Manila, at least by a lot of people in the Bank. But, it’s essential 

to get a dialogue started on this. And there is an immediacy that 

needs to be addressed. 

49 

One of the issues that concerns me is that if we—if the countries 

go ahead with these dams, you’re talking about a 10- or 15-, even 

20-year period when the river will be disturbed as the dams are 

built. And there is no one, you know, organizing or coordinating, 

or even strategizing, that I can see, about how to deal with the gap 

between when livelihoods are destroyed and food supplies are destroyed and when the benefits of electricity start to kick in. And 

so, that’s an issue. 

And I mentioned—with regard to the ADB, I mentioned that 

there is a slippery slope of them getting involved in sort of being 

the little guy behind the elephants in the parade with a scooper— 

pooper-scooper—to clean up, if you will, after the damage is being 

done. And so, I would like to see us particularly weigh in on that 

issue and make sure—you know, that the dam—the Bank not go 

down that path. 

But, how to change the minds of the countries, and how to actually influence the Bank, is difficult. And in addition, as you just 

mentioned, the Banks are no longer central to this. I mean, this is 

all so-called ‘‘public/private’’ financing. Essentially, they’re all commercial opportunities. And there’s plenty of money around, apparently, to carry these projects out. 

But—so, the urgent issue remains, I think, to find ways to help 

the governments understand the consequences of what they’re 

starting—what they’re trying to—planning to do. And I think the 

ADB has a role—has an important role in that. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Dr. CRONIN. Thank you. 

Senator WEBB. Ms. Imhof. 

Ms. IMHOF. Thank you. Very good questions, of course, that 

you’re raising. 

You know, China is now actually the world’s largest dam-builder 

and funder. We have been collecting data on how many projects it’s 

funding and building globally. And I’ve actually lost count, but it’s 

probably—at the last count, I believe it was over 140 dam projects, 

around the world, that China was involved in. So, it is a very significant challenge. 

I think—with the amendment that you’ve proposed, I think it’s 

a very good amendment, in very strong language, and I think it’s 

very important, because the ADB has been kind of the main supporter of hydropower development in the region until recently. And 

one thing that we are concerned about is, with a lot of the focus 

on the Mekong mainstream dams, that there will be a greater push 

for dam projects on tributaries of the Mekong. And we even, here 

at WWF, you know, advocating for some tributary development. 

And our experience with tributary projects, as I mentioned before, 

that they are also extremely damaging and should definitely be 

assessed on a case-by-case basis. 

So, I think that the amendment is an important signal. I would 

recommend that it apply to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. 

And the other thing that’s important about it is, it refers to 

transmission infrastructure. And actually, the ADB is proposing to 

finance a transmission line in southern Laos that would enable a 

whole slew of tributary projects in southern Laos to go forward 

50 

that currently aren’t going forward because they don’t have transmission infrastructure. So, I think it’s an important signal that the 

U.S. Government is concerned about the transmission infrastructure that allows these projects to go forward. 

I think it would be really important for yourself and the committee to also push Treasury to actually implement the—sorry—to 

actually pressure the ADB and World Bank to implement and 

adopt the kind of policy reforms that you refer to in the amendment—so, things like implementation of the World Commission on 

Dam Standards—because what we do know from experience—I 

mean, as you know, Treasury hates these sorts of mandated votes, 

because they say that it reduces their authority. I think that where 

it can be important is if Congress is really pushing Treasury to 

push for meaningful reform—policy reform at the institution, along 

the lines of what is in the U.S. legislation. So, I would really encourage you to press for that. 

In terms of what can be done about China, I think there has to 

be ongoing dialogue about Chinese financing overseas and China 

Export-Import Bank. I don’t know if the U.S. Ex-Im Bank could 

play some kind of role in encouraging the China Eximbank to sign 

up to the common approaches adopted by the OECD on environmental and social impact assessment, lending in their operations. 

That might be one other role that the United States could play in 

encouraging China Exim to adopt international standards in its operations, and the same for Thai EXIM Bank, as well. And Thai 

EXIM, until now, has been very much neglected and kind of out of 

the loop, in terms of, you know, the international export credit 

agency community and looking at its standards of the projects it’s 

financing. 

Senator WEBB. Great insights. Thank you. 

Ms. Chungyalpa. 

Ms. CHUNGYALPA. Chairman, first, I’d like to respond by talking 

about climate change in the context of hydropower. Hydropower is 

often used as an example what green energy means. And we’re 

really concerned, especially because it is posited in the Mekong as 

a solution rather than a big threat, in the context of climate 

change. So, climate change cannot be kept out of that dialogue, precisely for that reason. 

The other thing that we’re very aware of is that climate change, 

in some sense, gives us an opportunity to talk about issues that 

most governments are unwilling to talk about publicly, and that 

includes hydropower. It actually allows us to indirectly bring up 

hydropower in—at very high levels, to make the point that if you 

actually dam the river, you are going to be basically creating maladaptation on the river, in the long term. 

Finally, as the U.S. Government has invested in the long term 

in sustainable development for this region, and if we are to save 

the river from hydropower, but then lose it to climate change, it is 

going to be a wasted investment. And I think that might be the 

broader context for climate change, and WWF’s position on it. 

In terms of the ADB in particular, we applaud the language on 

the Asian Development Bank that was shared with us. The reality 

of the situation is, it’s always about the economy. And in the case 

of the ADB, it’s the economic arms that always win the battle over 

51 

the environmental arms. What we have learned, sometimes in difficult situations, is that the Asian Development Bank might have 

arms that are willing to work on environmental sustainable solutions, might actually develop very innovative technological solutions, but, at the end of the day, they are going to be ignored by 

the other subdivisions of the Asian Development Bank. And maybe 

the most important role that the U.S. Government can play is to 

actually ask for mainstreaming of environmental sustainability, not 

just so it’s side language in the Asian Development Bank’s mandate, but actually mainstreamed within the mandate, especially 

when you consider that the mandate is about poverty reduction, 

not just in terms of large economic wins, but also at a household 

level. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Ms. Imhof, you stated, in your testimony, that studies have 

shown that the planned dams would not contribute greatly to the 

region’s energy security; they would have little impact on regional 

energy prices, and only generate the equivalent of 1 year’s demand 

for growth. What other energy alternatives would you suggest? 

Ms. IMHOF. Thank you. I mean, the first thing is to look at the 

potential for expanding investment in energy efficiency, because 

there’s huge potential. I mean, Thailand already has an energy efficiency program, but there is still huge potential for energy savings. 

And California is a great model of an entity. The State of California has managed to keep its power demand growth stagnant 

over the past 30 years, because of investments in energy efficiency. 

And the same goes for Vietnam, which doesn’t have a strong energy efficiency program right now. And this is an area where I 

think there could be very good technology transfer between the 

United States and the regional countries. 

One of the other issues is that Thailand—energy analysts have 

shown that Thailand—the Electricity Generating Authority of 

Thailand, the main electric utility, has consistently overestimated 

power demand, so there is consistently a surplus of power in the 

Thai system. And this has been documented over, I believe, 10 or 

15 years. So, there’s an issue of where EGAT consistently says, 

‘‘We need more power. We need more power.’’ And we sign—EGAT 

signs these agreements and then ends up—you know, the demand 

growth doesn’t meet it. There’s also been studies showing that 

there’s significant potential for repowering of existing plants, so 

generating more electricity from existing plants. There’s biomass 

potential from rice husks. And then there’s, you know, renewable 

technologies. There’s not a lot of wind potential in Thailand, but 

there’s certainly solar potential, as well. So, there is definitely 

potential there. 

The biggest issue is really the kind of political and economic interests that are driving these sorts of projects. And there’s very 

strong—for example, the developer of the Xayaburi Dam project, a 

Thai company called CH. Karnchang, has very strong political 

interconnections with the Thai Government and is a very large 

Thai construction company. So, there’s more political interests that 

are driving—and economic interests—that are driving the development of these projects, rather than actually the demand for power. 

52 

I mean, there’s still no study out there that actually says that this 

power is necessary to meet the region’s energy needs. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Dr. Cronin, in your written statement, you mentioned that China 

is already considering the diversion of some Mekong water to the 

Yangtze River to replenish water sent north—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Yes, sir. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. As part of the south-to-north diversion project. Where are they on this? And do we see that this is 

a serious plan? Because it certainly does go into what you would 

call water sovereignty—— 

Dr. CRONIN. Right. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. If they’re taking water that historically would be going downstream, and diverting it to another place 

inside their own country. 

Dr. CRONIN. Yes. Well, thank you. As in all things regarding 

Chinese decisionmaking on these kinds of sensitive political—geopolitical issues, they don’t show their hand. These are rumors—and 

there’s substance to them—that they are considering these projects. 

How far along they are is a big question. But, I think, in the longer 

term, the stark reality is that China does not have enough water. 

And, of course, China’s going to try to transport—they’re building 

canals to transport water over 1,700 kilometers, from the Yangtze 

River to the Yellow River, which is now running dry at the mouth 

during unusually dry seasons. And there’s no way that China can 

keep growing the way it’s growing and using water the way it’s 

using it without resorting, ultimately, to some kind of water sovereignty—‘‘water nationalism’’ I would call it. 

So, the Indians are also very worried about projects—the plans 

that China has at least discussed or as—there is information about 

plans that China wants to dam the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra River in—I think it’s in Tibet, actually. And the same kind 

of story, that if they bleed water away from the Brahmaputra River 

for their own use, then you’ve got the whole Bay of Bengal issue, 

for both India and Bangladesh. 

Senator WEBB. The question occurred to me—Is there an international forum in which downstream riparian water rights could be 

considered with sort of decisional authority? 

Dr. CRONIN. Unfortunately, no. And one of the problems with 

water rights is that, traditionally, countries that agree to negotiate 

over water rights and to—and countries that respect upstream/ 

downstream rights, are talking about dividing shares of water: 

How much do you get, how much do we get? A good example is the 

Indus River Agreement between India and Pakistan. Essentially, 

they took five rivers and said to Pakistan, ‘‘You get two, and India, 

you get three.’’ And that’s been a rather lasting agreement. 

But, the key issue with the Mekong is what we call the ‘‘flood 

pulse.’’ That is the flood pulse is necessary for the aquatic life of 

the Mekong, as we know it now, and these extremes of wet and 

dry. And so, if the monsoon flood pulse is broken or, for instance, 

if the river is contained and the pulse effect is lessened, then you 

don’t have the same amount of water going into the Tonle Sap 

Great Lake. When the—you know, the water comes roaring down 

the Mekong, and when it gets to about Phnom Penh, the river 

53 

divides, and there’s obstructions—the river can’t take all the water, 

and so it backs up into the Tonle Sap Great Lake. And so, that’s 

almost like a lung, you know, the expansion and contraction of that 

great lake is the—as they say, the nursery of Mekong fish. And so, 

you can’t—if you interrupt the flood pulse that’s a huge problem. 

But, there’s no international law, that I know of, no regime that 

would, in fact, address an issue like the flood pulse. In other words, 

you have six countries sharing the same river, and any one country 

disrupts the river, there’s an impact on everybody. And it’s like 

the—almost like the prisoner’s dilemma, you know—problem, 

where one person—if they all cooperate, they all benefit. If they 

don’t cooperate, everyone loses. 

Senator WEBB. Well, I thank all of you for your information, and 

analysis and advice. As I said, the implications of this are profound 

and have an immediacy to them. I think this hearing will help 

bring greater awareness, here and in other places, of the immediate seriousness of this problem. Hopefully we can move forward 

to some sort of a structure in which we can start having an impact 

on these issues. And I have to say, Ms. Chungyalpa, when I tell 

my brother that there’s a 9-foot catfish in the Mekong River, he’ll 

be on the next plane with his rod and reel. [Laughter.] 

Ms. CHUNGYALPA. It is on the verge of extinction. He must hurry. 

Senator WEBB. Do this before the next couple of years, right? 

But, thanks again for taking the time to come and help educate 

us. We will continue to see if we can’t help raise the awareness of 

this issue. 

Thank you. 

This hearing’s closed. 

[Whereupon, at 4:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ