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73–676 PDF 2012

S. Hrg. 112–549 

MANAGING INTERAGENCY NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS: ARE WE 

EFFECTIVELY SECURING NUCLEAR MATERIALS 

AROUND THE WORLD? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, 

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 14, 2012 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

NICHOLAS A. ROSSI, Minority Staff Director 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

JOYCE WARD, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL 

WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

LISA M. POWELL, Majority Staff Director 

ERIC M. TAMARKIN, Counsel 

RACHEL R. WEAVER, Minority Staff Director 

SEAN KENNEDY, Professional Staff Member 

AARON H. WOOLF, Chief Clerk 

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(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 1 

Prepared statement: 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 31 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 2012 

Hon. Thomas M. Countryman, Assistant Secretary for International Security 

and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State ............................................... 3 

Hon. Anne Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department 

of Energy ............................................................................................................... 5 

Hon. Kenneth Handelman, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Global 

Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................. 7 

Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 8 

Kenneth N. Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security ........................ 21 

Page O. Stoutland, Ph.D., Vice President, Nuclear Materials Security Program, Nuclear Threat Initiative ......................................................................... 23 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Aloise, Gene: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 58 

Countryman, Hon. Thomas M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

Handelman, Hon. Kenneth: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 

Harrington, Hon. Anne: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42 

Luongo, Kenneth N.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 84 

Stoutland, Page O.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 96 

APPENDIX 

Questions and responses for the Record from: 

Mr. Countryman ............................................................................................... 104 

Ms. Harrington ................................................................................................. 112 

Mr. Handelman ................................................................................................. 119 

Mr. Luongo ........................................................................................................ 124 

Mr. Stoutland .................................................................................................... 128 

Background .............................................................................................................. 130 

Chart referenced by Ms. Harrington ...................................................................... 138 

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(1) 

MANAGING INTERAGENCY NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS: ARE WE 

EFFECTIVELY SECURING NUCLEAR 

MATERIALS AROUND THE WORLD? 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 2012 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT

MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE,

AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senator Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Before I call this hearing to order, I just want 

to say it is so good to have all of you here. And as usual, we run 

from one event to the other, so it is good to be here almost on time. 

But thanks for being here. 

I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia to order. I want to say aloha and welcome to our guest witnesses, and thank you so much for taking the time to be here with 

us, and together we will work on trying to take care of this challenge that is facing and growing in our country. 

Today the Subcommittee will examine interagency efforts to prevent nuclear and radiological materials from falling into the wrong 

hands. Since 1999, I have chaired 10 related hearings on this subject and requested 10 Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigations, and they have been good in meeting those requests. 

The terrorist threat remains serious and the consequences of a 

nuclear or radiological terrorist attack would be catastrophic. In 

2010, President Obama stated that nuclear terrorism is the single 

biggest threat to U.S. security, short-term, medium-term, and longterm. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported 

more than 2,000 unauthorized incidents, such as illegal trade or 

movement of nuclear or radioactive material, from 1993 through 

2011. 

On Sunday, we commemorated the 1-year anniversary of Japan’s 

Fukushima nuclear tragedy. That incident highlighted the potenH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

2 

tially dire implications of failing to adequately prepare for and defend against unexpected events. 

I want to commend President Obama, the agencies represented 

here today, and the many Federal employees in those agencies for 

their commitment and hard work to bolster nuclear and radiological security. I also want to thank GAO for its diligent work, 

which has strengthened those efforts. 

In a landmark 2009 speech in Prague, the President announced 

a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material 

within 4 years. The successful 2010 Nuclear Security Summit 

(NSS) in Washington, DC, spurred progress on this aggressive 

timetable. Since the President’s speech, more than 31 nuclear 

bombs worth of material have been removed from countries around 

the world. 

Most notably, Libya’s nuclear weapons program was dismantled 

before the recent uprising began, and all highly-enriched uranium 

(HEU) has been removed from Chile, Romania, Serbia, Taiwan, 

and Turkey. I hope this progress will be accelerated when the 

President joins leaders of 52 other nations and four international 

organizations at the second Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, 

Korea, in less than 2 weeks. 

The scope of the upcoming Seoul Summit has been broadened to 

include radiological material security. I have pressed for more focus 

on radiological material security for more than a decade, and GAO 

has investigated various aspects of this issue at my request. 

In 2007, GAO reported troubling shortfalls in the security of 

high-risk radiological materials internationally, including in Russia 

and the Ukraine. Today GAO will testify to preliminary findings 

that highlight a number of egregious security weaknesses at domestic hospital and medical facilities where radiological materials 

are used and stored. These disturbing findings demonstrate the 

need to strengthen the security requirements for domestic radiological sources. 

There is a model that could be used to enhance domestic radiological security nationwide. The Department of Energy’s (DOEs) 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has worked with 

partners in my home State of Hawaii to complete security enhancements on all high priority radiological materials within the State. 

Hawaii is now safer, and I urge the Department to accelerate the 

implementation of this important program and to better coordinate 

with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to secure all highrisk sites across the country. The United States should serve as a 

model worldwide on domestic radiological security. The upcoming 

summit in Seoul provides an opportunity to focus the world’s attention on this issue. 

The Administration’s bold commitment to secure all nuclear material worldwide could be paired with a new international initiative 

to secure all high-risk radiological materials in 4 years. When the 

United States leads by example, we can make great strides to improve international safety and security. 

In addition to radiological sources, I remain concerned that Federal agencies face challenges defining and implementing a strategic 

plan for nuclear security. Agencies must prioritize the highest-risk 

materials, ensure that nuclear and radiological materials the 

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3 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Countryman appears in the appendix on page 33. 

United States supplies to allies do not become a threat, and coordinate with the IAEA. So I look forward to these discussions that we 

will be having in today’s hearing. I also hope the Administration 

witnesses identify how Congress can best support their efforts— 

through adequate funding, ratification of relevant treaties, legislation, or otherwise. 

The security of nuclear and radiological materials has been a priority during my tenure in the U.S. Senate, and I will continue focusing on this issue during my last year. 

This is a bipartisan issue that I hope all of my colleagues will 

actively pursue in the future. This is not and should not be a political issue. It is about safeguarding human life, the environment, 

and the economy. The stakes are too high for partisanship or for 

Congress and the American people to ignore it. And I look forward 

to continuing to work with you on these issues. And so I want to 

welcome our witnesses for the first panel: 

The Hon. Thomas M. Countryman, Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) at the U.S. Department of State; 

The Hon. Anne Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense 

Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration; 

The Hon. Kenneth B. Handelman, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs at the U.S. Department of 

Defense (DOD); 

And Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Mr. Aloise, it 

is good to see you testify before this Subcommittee again. 

As you know, it is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in 

all witnesses, and I would ask you to please stand and raise your 

right hand and take this oath with me. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give before this Subcommittee is the truth, 

the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I do. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. I do. 

Mr. HANDELMAN. I do. 

Mr. ALOISE. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Let it be noted for the 

record that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Before we start, I want you to know that your full written statements will be made part of the record, and I would also like to remind you to please limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes. 

Assistant Secretary Countryman, will you please proceed with 

your statement? 

TESTIMONY OF HON. THOMAS M. COUNTRYMAN,1 ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Chairman Akaka, thank you for inviting us 

here to discuss United States efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear 

materials around the globe. This mission is vital to the national seH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

4 

curity of the United States. Congressional support remains critical, 

and we deeply appreciate your personal engagement in the issue. 

In his Prague speech, President Obama laid out his vision for a 

world without nuclear weapons and free from the threat of nuclear 

terrorism. A year later, at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, participants emphasized the need for each State to take responsibility for the security of nuclear materials under its control, 

and each State made specific commitments to advance nuclear security. 

Now, to follow through, the United States has a three-tiered 

strategy to lock down or remove vulnerable nuclear materials: 

First, at the site level; second, at the country level; and, third, at 

the global level. 

At the site level, we work with other countries to minimize the 

civilian use of highly enriched uranium, to eliminate unneeded 

weapons-usable material, and to improve security at specific sites. 

Where site-level assistance is not appropriate, we cooperate at the 

country level with foreign governments to exchange best practices 

and to demonstrate the safe use of equipment. At the global level, 

we develop global initiatives through the Nuclear Security Summit 

process, the United Nations (UN), and other fora to improve nuclear security around the world. 

As we do this important work to keep Americans safe, we use tax 

dollars wisely. Through the Global Partnership (GP) against the 

Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and through the United 

Nations 1540 Committee, we encourage international partners to 

share the costs of improving security. Building this safer world and 

protecting the American people also requires that the International 

Atomic Energy Agency has the resources and authority to carry out 

its vital mission as the global focal point for nuclear cooperation. 

We are confident that every effort is made to advance our shared 

interests in peaceful nuclear uses and security. 

With this three-tiered strategy, we have made significant 

progress in the 4-year effort to secure vulnerable nuclear materials. 

Still, the persistence of illicit trafficking, as you referred to, of 

weapons-usable nuclear materials demonstrates that efforts to consolidate materials and secure facilities are not enough. My bureau, 

ISN at the State Department, has several programs to promote this 

international capacity to detect and investigate cases of nuclear 

material outside proper control. 

First, the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) is a 

State Department-led interagency effort to develop partnerships 

with key countries to combat nuclear smuggling. 

Second, our Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP) 

works to leverage international funding to promote law enforcement cooperation and nuclear forensics cooperation. 

Third, our bureau’s Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) 

Program leads interagency efforts to build comprehensive export 

and border control systems in more than 50 partner countries. 

And, fourth, we lead the United States engagement with the 

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), a partnership of 82 nations that conduct activities to strengthen plans, policies, and interoperability on the issue of nuclear terrorism. 

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1The prepared statement of Ms. Harrington appears in the appendix on page 42. 

In terms of congressional support for the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in addition to providing us the resources we need to do this important national security job and to keep Americans safe, we also need your help to fill 

critical gaps in the international legal framework of nuclear security. In 2008, the Senate provided advice and consent unanimously 

to ratification of four nuclear security-related treaties, including 

the Nuclear Terrorism Convention. I strongly urge Congress to expeditiously enact the implementing legislation for these treaties in 

the national security interests of the American people. 

Finally, let me stress that reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism 

is a complicated task, but the interagency is working well to meet 

this challenge. My colleagues not only from Energy and Defense 

but also Justice, Homeland Security, and others, work together 

well. With your support we will continue to do all we can to protect 

the American people. Thank you, sir. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Countryman. 

And now let me call on the Hon. Anne Harrington, Deputy Administrator from the Department of Energy. Please proceed with 

your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. ANNE HARRINGTON,1 DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for this opportunity to brief the Subcommittee on the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s contribution to the international effort to secure the world’s most vulnerable nuclear material. 

Before I continue, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 

your leadership in drawing attention to the issue of nuclear and radiological security. As you have already noted, the State of Hawaii 

serves as a model for the rest of the country for how to implement 

a comprehensive radiological security program. It has been a pleasure for my staff and experts to work with the committed State, 

city, and local officials who have supported this work, and we look 

forward to continuing our partnership. 

The President’s 4-year effort is indeed unprecedented. It is led by 

the United States but with significant contributions from dozens of 

countries around the world. The White House, in close coordination 

with our interagency and international colleagues, is leading and 

implementing an impressive three-tiered strategy which Assistant 

Secretary Countryman just described. I am pleased to report that 

NNSA has made significant contributions to the U.S. Government’s 

efforts in each of these three strategic areas. 

Most of our important contributions to the 4-year effort have 

taken place at the site level. These include securing, removing, and 

disposing of high-priority nuclear materials worldwide; converting 

highly enriched uranium-fueled research reactors to low enriched 

uranium (LEU); assessing the physical security of U.S.-obligated 

material and providing security upgrades at nuclear sites; consoliH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

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dating materials to fewer, more secure sites; improving international capabilities to detect and interdict illicit nuclear and radiological materials trafficking; and promoting a culture of awareness, responsibility, and security in the countries and sites in 

which we work. 

We have made important contributions also to the national-level 

efforts, including working with partner countries on their nuclear 

security Centers of Excellence. These centers form an important 

network that will allow countries and regions to strengthen capabilities to secure facilities and to deter, detect, and interdict illicit 

trafficking of nuclear and radiological material. 

On the global level, NNSA has always been a strong supporter 

of the International Atomic Energy Agency as an important means 

of advancing our nuclear security objectives. NNSA led the 5-year 

international effort to develop and finalize the fifth revision of the 

IAEA’s nuclear security recommendations on physical protection of 

nuclear material and nuclear security. 

We also partner closely with the IAEA on training and education 

activities. We provide subject matter experts to assist the IAEA’s 

Office of Nuclear Security (ONS), and contribute to the development of the documents in IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series. 

Our interagency cooperation is also strong and very institutionalized. We participate actively in the National Security staff-led 

interagency policy committees and subcommittee meetings. 

We also have strong coordination mechanisms on an agency-toagency basis. For example, NNSA holds quarterly coordination 

meetings with our colleagues at the Department of Defense at the 

Assistant Secretary level to discuss areas of common interest, coordinate on program ideas, and do forward planning. 

Similarly, we have a trilateral coordination group on radiological 

security that includes senior-level representatives from NNSA, the 

NRC, Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI, also meeting 

on a quarterly basis to review activities. 

We share your excitement about the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. We fully expect that the leaders who participate there will 

renew their commitments to ensure that nuclear and radiological 

materials under their control are not stolen or acquired by terrorists. This means renewing their respective pledges to continue to 

evaluate the threat and improve the security as changing situations may require, and to exchange best practices and practical solutions for doing so. We would be happy to brief you after the summit has concluded on the achievements and pledges announced 

there. 

For our part, NNSA will complete a number of activities under 

the 4-year effort by the end of 2013, but our mission to secure nuclear material will extend well beyond then. 

I apologize if I have run over my time, but I want to thank you 

again for the opportunity to brief you on DOE–NNSA’s contribution 

to this international effort, and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

And now I would like to call on Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Handelman. Please proceed with your testimony. 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Handelman appears in the appendix on page 50. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. KENNETH HANDELMAN,1 PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to appear today with two close colleagues to my right and a distinguished public servant to my left to discuss the Department of Defense’s contributions to U.S. Government’s nuclear security campaign. My colleagues have given the Subcommittee a good overview 

of the administration’s strategy and diplomatic efforts related to 

the 4-year lockdown specifically and nuclear security in general. I 

would like to focus my remarks on DOD’s contribution to what is 

truly a governmentwide team effort, as well as offer a few observations about the evolution of nuclear security as a military mission. 

DOD’s contribution to the nuclear security effort being discussed 

at this hearing comes primarily through the Nunn- Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR). In my statement for the 

record, I have provided details on CTR’s activities in the former Soviet States, as well as plans to expand CTR’s nuclear security work 

to other parts of the world in coordination with the Departments 

of Energy and State. 

CTR has a long history, and your colleagues Senators Lugar and 

Nunn continue to play true leadership roles in the program’s activities. I would be remiss if I did not thank you and your House colleagues for the ongoing strong congressional support for the CTR 

program and, indeed, for all of our programs, writ large, on nuclear 

security. 

For fiscal year 2013, the President has requested $519 million for 

CTR, roughly $130 million of which would be devoted towards nuclear security-related activities. And I urge congressional support 

for this request and the entire range of nuclear security-related 

programs. 

Mr. Chairman, let me turn to the big-picture view of DOD’s nuclear security mission. Nearly everything this panel will discuss 

with you today deals with the thorny problem of how to prevent the 

bad guys from getting their hands on really bad things. As I have 

said, DOD’s principal contribution in this regard is through the 

CTR program. However, given DOD’s overall mission to defend the 

Nation, there is a whole world of separate nuclear security activities for which my agency plans, equips, and trains. These activities 

center on a scenario none of us want to confront, namely, what to 

do when we think the bad guys actually have their hands on really 

bad things. 

Our planning for this type of loose-nuke situation is evolving 

substantially, and I think it is an important backdrop to the Subcommittee’s discussions today. And I want to emphasize that the 

watch word for our new thinking for this type of loose-nuke scenario centers on integration—integration across DOD’s many components and integration across our government. 

For instance, the instability or collapse of a nuclear-armed State 

could quickly lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or materials well beyond the country of origin and involve multiple State 

and non-state actors as it moves across the globe. The U.S. military 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise appears in the appendix on page 58. 

seeks to improve our defensive posture against this type of threat, 

a process which will bear fruit regardless of how a terrorist obtains 

nuclear material. This includes enhancing the protective posture of 

the homeland; working with the intelligence community to better 

analyze and track terrorist networks and identify likely paths to 

proliferation; and improving our ability to characterize the source 

and nature of a loose-nuke threat. We can be certain that in a nuclear or other type of WMD crisis, all of these activities would be 

occurring simultaneously. Our work at DOD has focused on how 

U.S. military units would coordinate with other U.S. agencies and 

with allies and partners in the face of such a loose-nuke threat scenario. 

Of course, as with most DOD missions, we hope we never need 

to execute this one. The key is to have a layered defense against 

the loose-nuke threat. The first layer or the first line of defense is 

the group of activities that Secretaries Countryman, Harrington, 

and I are here to discuss with you today. 

Mr. Chairman, the nuclear security mission area has enjoyed the 

broad bipartisan support that it deserves, as you observed in your 

opening remarks. We all thank Congress for that confidence and 

look forward to your questions today. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Handelman. 

And now I would like to call on Mr. Aloise. Would you please proceed with your statement? 

TESTIMONY OF GENE ALOISE,1 DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. ALOISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here 

today to discuss our work that directly relates to the goals of the 

upcoming Nuclear Security Summit. Specifically, my testimony will 

focus on two of our recently issued reports. The first is on the strategy for supporting the President’s goal of securing all vulnerable 

nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. The second is on U.S. 

agencies’ ability to track and evaluate the security of U.S. nuclear 

material transferred to foreign countries. And I will also discuss 

our ongoing work on Federal efforts to secure radiological sources 

in U.S. hospitals and medical facilities. 

Regarding the President’s 4-year initiative, a little more than a 

year ago we reported that the strategy approved by the National 

Security Council (NSC) for the initiative was vague and lacked details regarding how the initiative would be implemented. Specifically, the administration’s strategy did not identify vulnerable nuclear material sites, which agencies and programs would be responsible for each site, and the potential challenges in securing nuclear 

material around the world. The strategy also lacked details on cost 

and time frames to accomplish this difficult but worthwhile work. 

We recommended that NSC lead and coordinate a plan for implementing the initiative with details in several areas, including identifying those countries where nuclear materials are thought to be 

poorly secured. 

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In September of last year, we reported on an issue that could impact the 4-year goal of securing nuclear materials. We reported 

that United States efforts to secure nuclear materials worldwide 

would be difficult because U.S. agencies do not systematically track 

the location of nuclear material that the United States has transferred to other countries under nuclear cooperation agreements. 

Specifically, DOE and NRC do not have a comprehensive current 

inventory of U.S. nuclear material, including weapon-usable material, located overseas. In 1993, NRC and other agencies, at the direction of Congress, tried to develop an inventory, but were only 

able to verify the location of 1,160 kilograms out of 17,500 kilograms of HEU remaining overseas, and no estimates have been developed since. 

In addition, even though partner countries are required to guarantee the physical protection of U.S. nuclear material, U.S. agencies do not have access rights allowing them to systematically assess the security of this material. U.S. interagency teams found 

that countries they could visit only met security guidelines set by 

the IAEA about half the time. We made several recommendations 

to improve oversight and accountability, including recommending 

the development of an inventory of U.S. nuclear material overseas. 

Now, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in addition to nuclear 

materials, this year’s summit plans to address the security of radiological sources. The nuclear material in these radiological sources 

could be used to make a dirty bomb. Therefore, it is essential that 

devices containing radiological sources be secured from theft or 

sabotage. 

Based on preliminary results from our ongoing work that we are 

doing at your request, Mr. Chairman, we found that NRC’s security 

controls for hospitals and medical facilities may not go far enough 

to protect these highly radioactive materials. As a result, we are 

finding that hospitals and other medical facilities are implementing 

the security controls in a variety of ways, some better than others, 

leaving some facilities more vulnerable to theft or sabotage than 

others. 

According to NNSA, there are about 1,500 hospitals and medical 

buildings in the United States that contain high-risk radiological 

sources, with a cumulative total of about 22 million curies of radioactive material. DOE’s Domestic Material Protection Program provides hospitals with security upgrades to the devices that contain 

high-activity radiological sources, such as gamma knives and blood 

irradiators. It also provides training for hospital personnel and 

local law enforcement on how to protect themselves and their communities when responding to an incident involving highly radioactive materials. 

Mr. Chairman, during the course of our work, my team and I 

have visited numerous medical facilities and observed instances 

where equipment containing extremely high curie amounts of some 

of the most dangerous radiological material were highly vulnerable 

to theft or sabotage. For example, in one hospital we visited, the 

door to the room housing a blood irradiator with 1,500 curies of Cesium-137 had a combination lock on the door, but the combination 

to the lock was written in pencil on the door frame for everyone 

to see. 

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We also saw equipment containing high-risk sources that should 

have been secured, but instead were on pallets with wheels and 

close to areas of public access. In our view, it would not be very 

hard for someone to steal these devices. My full statement contains 

other examples from our visits. 

NNSA is doing a commendable job in securing these high-risk radiological sources, but some facilities considered high risk by law 

enforcement officials have declined NNSA’s assistance, which is 

voluntary, including hospitals in cities thought to be attractive terrorist targets. We are continuing to perform our work in this area 

of high national security importance and plan to issue our full report later this year. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Director Aloise. 

Mr. Countryman, the summit process has done an excellent job 

of focusing the international community’s attention on the problem 

of nuclear material security. What do you hope to achieve at the 

upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 

speak only in the most general terms about the summit meeting 

in Seoul because we anticipate that President Obama and other 

international partners will make a number of announcements, and 

I would not want to preview those and take away the opportunity 

to do that. But since the purpose of the summit is to review and 

build upon the commitments that we made collectively and that nations made individually at the Washington Summit 2 years ago, I 

think there will be both a significant record of accomplishments to 

list as well as renewed and updated and improved commitments by 

participants. And in the particular structure of the summit where 

the presidents and prime ministers have an opportunity to discuss 

things in a less formal structure than many other summit meetings, I think they will have a very frank conversation about the remaining challenges that we have around the world. 

I hope that you can accept this very general characterization of 

our expectations. 

Senator AKAKA. Yes, well, thank you very much. 

Let me further ask you, after the 2014 summit in the Netherlands is completed, what is the future of the summit process? And 

how do we continue the international emphasis on preventing nuclear terrorism? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, sir. The summit is a unique process in that having this very dramatic development, the largest 

gathering of presidents and prime ministers ever to come to Washington for the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, was intended explicitly to have that dramatic effect of focusing both public attention 

and governments’ attention on commitments that they could make 

to improve nuclear security in each country and globally. And it 

had that effect. I think that a number of countries responded to the 

uniqueness of the summit by making those commitments and by 

following them up over the last 2 years. 

It was never the intent to create a new international organization or a permanent process, but as to whether there would be still 

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11 

another summit after 2014, I would prefer not to speculate on that, 

but to let the leaders discuss it in Seoul. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, it has grown over the years, and now as 

you point out, there are 50-plus partners in this, and it is certainly 

getting some attention. 

My next question is to the witnesses from State, DOE, and DOD. 

Despite considerable progress, it seems likely that at the end of the 

Administration’s 4-year effort, all of the vulnerable nuclear material worldwide will not be secured. Please discuss whether you anticipate there will be countries and facilities that you likely will not 

be able to address during the 4 years, the reasons why, and what 

contingency plans are in place to revise or extend this particular 

initiative. Mr. Countryman. 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Again, we have always understood the 4-year 

effort to be a focused international effort, not a uniquely U.S. effort. It requires the commitments not just of our government, all 

of our agencies working together, and an important expenditure of 

resources, but a similar effort and a similar commitment on the 

part of our partners around the world. 

We believe that the progress report that will be discussed in 

Seoul 2 weeks from now will show significant progress, and we believe that it will refocus us on the most important areas that we 

still have to address, some of the places where the physical or the 

political challenge may have been greater. 

We have always assumed that there will be continuing work to 

do after the 4-year time frame. As long as nuclear materials exist, 

we will have the same need to set the best possible example in the 

United States of securing those materials and of sharing that capability for protection without other countries, motivating them to do 

the same. 

I would not want to predict now which particular spot in the 

world will turn out to be the most difficult place to secure nuclear 

materials. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Ms. Harrington. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. I would agree with Assistant Secretary Countryman. The 4-year effort was aimed at securing a prioritized list 

of materials that was considered to be the most vulnerable. It does 

not imply that it captures everything. We know that the job will 

continue following 2013, that there will be more to do. 

We also are looking forward into a global nuclear economy which, 

despite the incidents at Fukushima, will continue to expand in 

terms of use of nuclear power and uranium commerce. 

So those things are all on our minds as we consider next steps, 

and as Mr. Countryman said, these are things that will be considered by the leaders when they convene in Seoul, and I think we 

all sit here fully expecting that we will get new direction and a new 

sense of energy out of that Summit. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Mr. Handelman. 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, the three of us have a colleague, a very senior colleague, on the national security staff who 

describes the 4-year lockdown effort as ‘‘a sprint within a marathon.’’ I am a career civil servant. I have been doing this for a number of years. The United States attention to nuclear security did 

not start with the 4-year lockdown. It is not going to end at the 

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end of 4 years. What I think is particularly significant about this 

sort of frame of reference that the President has set up is that he 

has devoted his personal attention and a lot of time to this effort. 

That is pretty unique between the Prague speech and two summits—or three summits, which would occur—I am not going to presume the results of the election. That is pretty unprecedented in 

terms of a world leader’s personal attention to this issue. 

So as my colleagues have said, wherever we are at the end of 4 

years, it will be a substantial accomplishment, but our jobs will not 

have ended in this regard. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Countryman, I know you are going to have to leave, but let 

me ask you a question. Your testimony notes the importance of implementing legislation for four key treaties that are important 

United States commitments to enhance the tools to fight international terrorism and WMD proliferation. In 2008, the Senate 

unanimously provided its advice and consent to ratification of all 

four treaties. However, the implementing legislation needed to formally ratify these treaties is still, I think, languishing here. 

What are the road blocks to congressional approval of this implementing legislation? 

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Senator. I am certain you do not 

want me to do an analysis of the congressional process. All I can 

say is that the Bush Administration first submitted a draft of the 

implementing legislation. The Obama Administration has submitted essentially the same text. We know that there is support 

not just from our predecessors in a previous administration who 

have made clear that this should move forward. We know there is 

support of both parties in both Houses. And I also know that these 

are somewhat complex legal issues when you need to amend the 

U.S. Code to provide for a new category of criminal offense, as 

these treaties would oblige us to do. 

I do not have any advice for you today, sir, on how to overcome 

that. I would only want to emphasize that we ask for rapid action 

on these in the interests of the national security of the United 

States. We believe it gives our law enforcement community new, 

significant avenues by which to investigate and prevent the risk of 

nuclear terrorism in the United States, and that matters to our national security. It has the added advantage of providing the kind 

of example to the rest of the world in terms of completing ratification that we always seek to provide and that the United States has 

traditionally been a leader in. 

So there are many good reasons to do it. I do not assume that 

the obstacles are huge, but I cannot give you an analysis of what 

is happening outside the drafting process. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your response. 

The next question is to any of the Executive Branch witnesses. 

This is to whoever has this type of responsibility. Nuclear materials in the hands of rogue or unstable nations are a particular 

threat. The consequences could have been dire if we had not dismantled the Libyan nuclear weapons program before the chaos 

leading up to the revolution began there. 

I would like to give you an opportunity to discuss the Libya initiative as well as its broader implications. 

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13 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, the Libya case is really an important example, and it is certainly one where it is an illustration 

of a successful coming together of like-minded allies to work with 

a partner country that was in the frame of mind to make some 

changes. 

I think certainly where my Department is in terms of the implications of another Libya or indeed if a nuclear possessor State does 

not give up its nuclear materials in an orderly manner, our attitude is we are never really going to be able to predict with certainty how materials, be they weapons or radiological materials, 

might wind up in the hands of terrorists or somehow not be in positive custody of a competent authority. So very briefly, let me describe sort of a framework that we are using for planning, along 

with our interagency partners. 

The proposition is that intelligence or information is always 

going to be incomplete on a loose nuke. We will be extremely lucky 

if we get a hold of information or intelligence that pinpoints a warhead or material and, we are able to do perhaps what our military 

forces do best or our diplomats do best. We are not planning for 

that. That is too good a scenario. 

So the notion is that there is going to be a zone, indeterminate, 

that we would refer to as the ‘‘source zone.’’ It is coming from someplace, and you can pinpoint perhaps a region of the world. Then 

there is a transit zone. It is obvious what that would be, the different routes that terrorists or others might take to transport material. And then there is a target zone, and it seems that the 

United States is always somebody’s target. There might be others 

as well. 

So from a military planning perspective, the issue is: What does 

a commander, one of our regional commanders, need to think about 

if he happens to be responsible for U.S. military forces in the 

source zone, the transit zone, or the target zone? And there are 

lists of activities that—some are common for each of those three 

zones, and some are very different. All of them involve different 

partnerships with other U.S. agencies. 

What we realized is that because of the likelihood that we will 

have incomplete intelligence, these lists of activities that we will 

have to be doing in each of these zones is probably going to be happening simultaneously. 

So I guess our perspective on the Libya situation is that was a 

success and we should continue to be working with other governments to achieve continued success. But as is typical for DOD’s 

mission, we are sort of planning for a worse kind of situation and 

how we would work with our interagency partners to deal with it. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. If I could add to what Mr. Handelman just 

said, Libya, of course, was one of the six countries cleaned out of 

HEU since the Prague speech, and it was not a simple affair. It 

took a great deal of concerted effort, diplomatically led by the State 

Department, but also with pressure from Russia, the involvement 

of the IAEA, when Colonel Gaddafi decided he would hesitate a little bit before giving up his final material. And it was only because 

we all worked together both across agencies and across nations 

that we were able to accomplish this task. 

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14 

I think in terms of an object lesson, we need to take our opportunities when we find them and be able to have the flexibility and 

the nimbleness, which is not necessarily something the U.S. Government is always known for, to be able to react quickly and move 

into a situation, remove material, stabilize a situation, and accomplish our security tasks. 

We sometimes have challenges in that regard. Sometimes there 

are legislative requirements for concurrence from the State Department or coordination elsewhere. We are working on these issues 

right now across the agencies. I do not think it requires any help 

from Congress. It requires a bit of creativity on our side. But we 

are looking ahead at exactly that kind of situation where all of us 

will have to come together, work quickly, and be highly effective. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. Harrington. My next 

question is for all of you. Ken Luongo, who is President of the Partnership for Global Security, has raised concerns that this budget is 

inadequate to meet the nuclear threat to American and international security and could undermine the 4-year nuclear security 

agenda. Others likely will argue that we cannot fully fund the 

President’s request. 

Please respond to Mr. Luongo’s view that more funding is needed 

and address what effect less funding would have on our ability to 

effectively secure vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials. 

Ms. Harrington. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. I notice that Mr. Handelman is letting me take 

this question first. Thank you. 

If you look at budget projections that were presented several 

years ago for where we would be in the 2013–14 space, they are 

quite different from where we are right now. But that is very much 

a reflection of fiscal realities in the United States. The Budget Control Act governs what our limits are going to be. The Budget Committees are very constrained overall. And so across the government, every agency, every program is looking at how it can continue to meet mission goals, but with less resources. 

We are no exception, and we are confident that the 2013 budget 

as presented will allow us to continue to meet our 4-year goals. 

That does not mean that it is only the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) program, but we have to maintain the funding in 

other programs that are also part of this overall effort. There are 

at least four different program areas that support the 4-year effort 

in my office. 

So we have done our best to balance across those programs, to 

make some tough decisions, but we believe they were the right decisions to be able to carry this effort forward. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Mr. Handelman. 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Harrington I 

think used the word ‘‘balance’’ three times in her answer, and I 

think that is the key point. The Federal deficit is a national security issue. All of us have multiple responsibilities, and we just have 

to balance one against the other when it comes time to building a 

budget. 

I will note that the program that I described where DOD makes 

its primary contribution to the U.S. Government’s overall nuclear 

security effort, the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, over the past 3 

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15 

years has seen between a 20- and a 25-percent increase in the 

budget that we have requested, and Congress has supported it. So 

for our part of the contribution, I think we are appropriately funded right now. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for that. 

Mr. Aloise, as you know, the upcoming summit in Seoul will 

focus in part on radiological security. I was alarmed by your testimony about unsecured radiological materials in hospitals and medical facilities. A terrorist determined to build a dirty bomb seems 

unlikely to go through the trouble of smuggling radiological material into the United States if they can get it here. 

What can the Administration and the Congress do to address 

this problem? 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, you are correct, Mr. Chairman. There is plenty 

of the material here. It does not have to be smuggled into the 

United States. 

We looked at NRC’s increased controls governing the security of 

radiological sources at hospitals and medical facilities over radiological materials, and basically I think we are coming to the conclusion that they are too broadly written and need to be tightened. A 

lot of the personnel we visited in these hospitals and medical facilities needed more guidance on how to better secure these radiological sources. They also needed better training regarding the security of radiological sources. They are trained in the health services. 

NNSA has a commendable program to lock down these sources. 

I think it needs and deserves continued congressional support. 

Senator AKAKA. I was surprised to learn and was, of course, concerned about the problem. Is it that we need to set up programs 

that can help them learn how to take care of these materials? 

Mr. ALOISE. Right. 

Senator AKAKA. And that was the point I thought that was interesting, that many of them do not know how to handle it. 

Mr. ALOISE. That is correct, yes. 

Senator AKAKA. And so my question was, what can we do to help 

this situation across the country? 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, again, if NRC could tighten up their increased 

controls, provide more training to health physicists and health providers who are working in this area and, frankly, expand NNSA’s 

efforts to lock down these sources would be the most effective thing 

we could do right now, because medical equipment in these facilities is essential for providing health care. Providing this health 

care is the primary function of hospital personnel. They are not 

thinking security as their first priority. So we need a culture 

change that recognizes the importance of these facilities and this 

equipment, but also recognizes that the equipment has to be secured. Ultimately the licensee who holds these radiological sources 

is responsible for ensuring their security. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Ms. Harrington, do you agree with GAO’s assessment that U.S. 

medical facilities with radiological sources are vulnerable to theft 

or sabotage? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. We know through our program experience and 

what we have seen along with GAO in various of these facilities 

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that there is substantial room for improvement. Having discussions 

like this, you bringing attention to this issue, I think is extremely 

helpful. Just as we work on developing security cultures in other 

countries, we need to work on the same kind of security culture in 

our country, particularly on this radiological issue. So I agree that 

there is certainly more that we can do. 

Senator AKAKA. Are you aware of any actual incidents of potential theft or sabotage of radiological sources in U.S. medical facilities in the last several years? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. There are some examples, but they would not 

be something I could discuss here. 

Senator AKAKA. Fine. Thank you. 

Ms. Harrington, GAO cites two impediments to your ability to secure all domestic radiological sources: Your programs are voluntary, and the costs to maintain security upgrades may be too 

burdensome for some hospitals and medical facilities. 

Do you agree with that assessment? And what steps can be 

taken to advance your work to secure radiological sources? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I think there are a number of 

things that can be done. Again, having a broader conversation on 

the need to pay attention to security, introducing training, as Mr. 

Aloise said, for people in the health profession, including that as 

part of their education, that this needs to be an issue that is integrated into how they perform their daily work. 

Because we do not have a national requirement, as Mr. Aloise 

said, the NRC regulations are what they are, so we offer this as 

a voluntary program. We actually have excellent cooperation with 

the NRC, which often will reach out to facilities and recommend 

that they work with us. So it is not that the NRC is not trying to 

help. They really are trying to do, I think, a good job in promoting 

this kind of work. 

Similarly, as we look forward, if we have this broader discussion 

and get hospitals and medical facilities and clinics and so forth to 

think about security as they are designing their programs, then it 

becomes something that is simply part of the conversation and 

probably less expensive than putting security on top of a facility 

that already exists. 

So I think, again, broadening the conversation and engaging in 

more community-based discussions is very good. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Let me ask GAO, Mr. Aloise, whether you have any comments 

on the questions I just asked of Ms. Harrington. 

Mr. ALOISE. I would just add that many of the security 

vulnerabilities we observed on our visits were in facilities that were 

under NRC’s increased controls. Many of the law enforcement officials we talked to said that the NRC’s increased controls were better than nothing, but that would not stop someone who wanted to 

get their hands on those sources. That is why NNSA’s program is 

so important, because the upgrades we witnessed that NNSA put 

in were very impressive. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for those responses. 

I would like to ask the next question to DOE and DOD. In 2010, 

GAO raised concerns that although your agencies had individual 

strategic plans, there was no overarching interagency strategy to 

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meet the 4-year goal. GAO recommended that the National Security Council lead the development of a strategic plan that includes 

details about vulnerable foreign nuclear sites, planned activities at 

each location, agency responsibilities, potential challenges and 

strategies for overcoming them, and cost and timeline estimates. 

What is the status of an interagency strategic plan? And I want 

to commend you folks for using an interagency process in your 

work. Thank you. 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will start off. I think—well, let 

me answer directly. The status of interagency planning is that it 

is intense. I think there is a challenge perhaps in how one defines 

strategic plan. I must say just an executive branch manager, I 

think we need to be left some flexibility to how we establish 

metrics of success and budgets and targets for our own programs. 

Is there a telephone book-sized product, labeled ‘‘Strategy’’ with all 

of the things that one might include some of the things that you 

have referenced? No. Does the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program have a telephone book-sized product that sets targets and 

identifies the impediments to achieving our goals? Sure, it does. 

And so does Ms. Harrington, and we see a huge amount of each 

other, often at the Old Executive Office Building, or as Ms. Harrington described, in some of our, I will call them, ‘‘bilateral agency 

coordination meetings,’’ where we are trading notes and synchronizing what these plans are. 

I personally reflect on what the state of planning is today and 

what it was when I first got involved in the nuclear security business around 2001, and I will tell you, back then we tried our best 

in Washington. What we always knew is that if we were working 

on nuclear security projects or, indeed, any kind of weapons of 

mass destruction nonproliferation project overseas, we could always 

rely on the embassy country teams to deconflict if we just missed 

a beat here in Washington and, for example, the State Department 

and DOD were spending money to address the same nuclear security type of threat in a particular country. My confidence at the 

time in the embassy country team was much higher than my confidence in the interagency process to get it right from the start here 

in Washington at headquarters. Today my confidence is equal, both 

from where we do our original planning and targeting and budgeting here in Washington, but it is still great to have the safety net 

of our great State Department colleagues out in the field who actually have to work with the implementers, who are there to just 

double-check and make sure that we are not double-tapping on a 

project or that we are not missing something. 

Senator AKAKA. Any further comment, Ms. Harrington. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, let me add to that. Each one 

of these efforts is unique. There are diplomatic, technical, logistical, 

and financing dimensions for each one of these that have to be separately developed, negotiated, concluded. In some cases, there are 

contracts that have to be executed. So there is no cookie-cutter approach that we can apply. We have basic goals that we want to 

achieve with each one, but I think it is a real demonstration of success of how closely we have worked, and how successful, that we 

have this chart1 here, which is our set of goals for vulnerable material removals. And all of the green is what we have accomplished. 

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18 

1The chart referenced by Ms. Harrington appears in the appendix on page 138. 

The yellow is currently in process, and between now and 2013, our 

goal is to complete the white. 

So I think this visually demonstrates that the process that we 

have in place is actually working quite well. Sometimes, however, 

there are things that are extremely disruptive to being able to implement even the best plan. 

We found, for example, that in 2011, when we had a whole series 

of continuing resolutions (CRs), we actually could not put enough 

money together to actually place the contracts that were needed in 

order to manufacture the replacement fuel or secure logistic support and so forth, and we experienced a fair amount of slippage, 

which we have been making up, but there are external factors that 

play extremely heavily on these kinds of operations. 

And so to the extent that we can be precise, we are. To the extent that we can predict when a foreign partner’s government may 

change very quickly, those are things that we have to basically step 

back from, recalibrate, work with our State and Defense colleagues, 

and then figure out how to go forward most effectively. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you for your responses. 

Let me ask this question to Ms. Harrington and ask GAO also 

to respond to this. In 2011, GAO reported that the United States 

is not able to account for most U.S. nuclear materials sent overseas 

as part of civilian nuclear cooperation agreements. This included 

significant amounts of weapons-usable material. GAO noted that 

these agreements often do not provide U.S. agencies with the right 

to access nuclear materials in order to verify that materials are secure. We rely on other countries to safeguard them. 

Do new nuclear cooperation agreements guarantee U.S. agencies 

will have access to United States supplied nuclear materials? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is probably 

going to be an interesting conversation between Mr. Aloise and me 

because, as you probably are aware, DOE, the State Department, 

and NRC had a quite different view from GAO’s in terms of this 

report, and I think all three agencies provided fairly strong responses to GAO’s conclusions. 

We believe that working together with the NRC and the State 

Department and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), 

that our bilateral assessments to visit foreign facilities and assess 

the status of U.S.-obligated materials provides us a good basis to 

keep track of those materials. We do follow the IAEA Physical Security Guidelines, and the IAEA also provides its own safeguard inspections of facilities. So we, I think, feel quite comfortable that the 

system that is in place actually is adequate. 

In terms of accounting, the Nuclear Materials Management and 

Safeguard System serves as our central repository and database for 

our inventories. It has existed since material first started being 

sent outside the United States, and that in combination with the 

IAEA safeguards program give us a sense of confidence that we do 

have a good picture of the status of our materials. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Mr. Aloise. 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, as you might guess, I have a different perspective on that. From 1994 to 2010, the United States, the interagency 

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teams—made 55 visits overseas to check on the physical security 

of U.S. nuclear material, and about half of those visits found that 

countries did not meet IAEA physical security guidelines. 

Much of this information is a black hole. We do not know where 

the material is, how well it is being secured, and we have made 

visits over there, and I visited some of those countries myself and 

saw some situations which urgently needed upgrading. 

So we think the status quo in this area is not good enough. We 

think more effort needs to be made to develop an inventory of 

where this material is. I know it is a delicate dance with our foreign partners who hold the material. However everybody needs to 

understand that physical security guidelines should be followed 

and our material needs to be protected. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you, and let me ask a final question 

to this panel, and particularly to DOE and DOD. Well, let me put 

it this way. This question is for any of you that want to respond. 

Many agencies face difficulties recruiting and retaining highskilled employees, particularly in fields requiring specialized technical, scientific, language, or other training. An increasing number 

of Federal employees are retiring, further complicating this challenge on personnel. 

What actions are you taking to address recruitment and retention challenges in your nuclear security workforces? Ms. Harrington. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. That, Mr. Chairman, is an excellent question 

and an issue that occupies our minds often. Ensuring the future security of the country is as important to us as the current security, 

and making sure that we have the right people to step into our 

shoes when we all retire is essential. 

We approach this in a number of different ways. I left in our office a nonproliferation graduate fellow who works with us. We usually have 20 or more of them who are recruited every year. Young 

professionals who are interested in following a career, who come 

into our offices, get security clearances, work side by side with us, 

travel with us, and many of them end up as part of our nuclear 

security family, either in the Department of Energy, some in the 

Department of State. I already lost one to you this year, Ken, who 

is now working permanently with the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency. 

We also have within our laboratories a very good pipeline of fellows and young scientists, and, similarly, with our research and development office, we have a new university laboratory consortium 

which allows a large group of U.S. universities to work directly 

with Department of Energy laboratories and allows our laboratories to work directly with university faculties. It is a very exciting 

program. We think it will give us a long pipeline into the future. 

But we do think about this issue a great deal. Not only for us, but 

also for other countries that are suffering through the same kind 

of retirement bubble that we are experiencing in the United States. 

We are not unique in this respect, and we have interesting conversations with our Russian colleagues, for example, who are looking at similar issues. 

Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Mr. Handelman. 

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Mr. HANDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is an excellent question. I 

think my response is not going to be completely satisfying because 

I come from a policy organization, so we are not people typically 

who can do mathematics in public. We can think big thoughts and 

spell-check them. 

If it makes you feel any better, I will tell you that every time I 

am with colleagues at NNSA or, even more important, out at the 

laboratories, the issue of recapitalization of our physical scientific 

base is—those discussions are never ended without a similar discussion about the recapitalization of the intellectual base. So the 

people who can do math in public, I can attest, are thinking about 

it very carefully. 

I will tell you that in my organization, because of Secretary 

Gates’ efficiencies program, right now we are in a hiring freeze, but 

I like to think that we—well, when we are not in a hiring freeze, 

I like to think that we do need good policy thinkers to pair up with 

the technical experts, and for whatever it is worth, the people that 

we have been recruiting, who had been applying to our jobs before 

the hiring freeze was imposed, were absolutely stupendous. I mean, 

I could not compete with them. 

I will embarrass a close colleague in my organization, Dr. Jason 

Hamm, who is sitting right behind me, who is a great example of 

a person who is actually a Ph.D. experimental physicist, who is in 

the policy world, and I get to take credit for his good work. 

So from a policy perspective, as retirements go forward, I am actually pretty confident in DOD that we are able to keep that 

human capital pipeline flowing. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

Would you like to make any comments, Mr. Aloise. 

Mr. ALOISE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. In a few months, we will have 

a report to you that we are doing at your request looking at the 

challenges NNSA is facing in hiring, in keeping people in the areas 

such as nuclear weapons. People do not graduate college as 

weaponeers. It takes years for them to become smart on nuclear 

weapons. So that report will lay out the challenges and what 

NNSA is doing to address those challenges. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, I want to thank you very much. Your responses have been valuable, and it will certainly help us in our further discussions and trying to deal with the challenges that we will 

be facing on these issues. 

I want to thank you so much for what you are doing, and you 

have been responsive to us, and we are all working together to 

make it better for our country. So thank you very much to the first 

panel. 

Now I would like to call the second panel to the table here. 

[Pause.] 

I want to welcome Mr. Kenneth Luongo, President of the Partnership for Global Security, and Dr. Page O. Stoutland, Vice President of the Nuclear Materials Security Program at the Nuclear 

Threat Initiative. 

As you know, it is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in 

all witnesses, so I ask you to please rise and raise your right 

hands. Do you solemnly swear that the statement you are about to 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Luongo appears in the appendix on page 84. 

give the Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 

but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. LUONGO. I do. 

Mr. STOUTLAND. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Let it be noted for the 

record that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Before we start, again, I want to remind you that your full statements will be included in the record, and we ask you to please limit 

your oral remarks to 5 minutes. 

Mr. Luongo, will you please proceed with your statement? 

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH N. LUONGO,1 PRESIDENT, 

PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL SECURITY 

Mr. LUONGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the invitation to testify today, and thank you for holding this hearing. I 

think it is a very important subject. 

The Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 was unprecedented, and 

it was a successful event where the participants agreed to a communique that highlighted many issues of global importance and, in 

particular, endorsed the President’s goal of securing all vulnerable 

nuclear materials in 4 years. As you noted, a second summit is in 

Seoul later this month, and then the next one is in the Netherlands. 

I think that the summit process has been important for a variety 

of different reasons, including setting some new precedents. One is 

that the pursuit of improved nuclear material security does not 

need to be universal all the time. It can be selectively multilateral, 

which is essentially what the Nuclear Security Summit is. It does 

not include all nations. 

Another important precedent is that it seeks to achieve goals 

within specific time frames, and I think that some of that has happened and some of it has not happened, which I will talk about a 

little bit more. 

There are developments that have essentially further solidified 

the current regime, but not allowed new policies and strategies to 

be introduced to supplement today’s system to address nuclear terrorism. And I think a good precedent is that each summit should 

build on the previous one to introduce some new ideas and some 

new thoughts. 

My expectation for the upcoming Seoul summit is that it should 

build on the foundation of the Washington summit and then create 

an improved governance structure for nuclear material security. 

And it should focus on three things: It should be comprehensive; 

it should help standardize the way we do this across borders; and 

it should be accountable. If this policy evolution can be initiated, 

then I think it will significantly strengthen the nuclear security regime in the future. 

The current nuclear material security regime is essentially a 

patchwork that is primarily designed and controlled by national 

agencies and actors. It includes very little transparency. International obligations are largely voluntary, with no uniformity of security regulations or procedures. And what is needed is a conH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

22 

fidence-building architecture that allows for comprehensive and 

clear but flexible standards. 

You were kind enough to mention my criticism of the budget. 

Thank you. I really think that the budget is a serious problem. It 

has never been commensurate with the President’s vision or the 

goals that he set out in the Prague speech, and this year’s budget 

in particular I think is very problematic, and both as it relates to 

the Second Line of Defense (SLD) and as it relates to the GTRI 

program. 

As your line of questioning in the first session indicated, there 

is much more that we could do on radiological security, and we 

really should do it. It is very important. 

On the Second Line of Defense program, I would just make one 

comparison. In the United States domestically, in New York City 

in particular, we have installed about 6,000 radiation monitors 

around New York City. Around the rest of the world, we have only 

installed about 2,000 for all of the rest of the globe. And yet the 

program is being cut by a very substantial margin this year, and 

I think it does not make any sense. And I think that the justification for that cut has never been made clear, and I think it should 

be. 

The President’s goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials 

in 4 years, as Gene mentioned, has never been very well defined. 

I think it is a mistake that we in the outside world never pushed 

for a specific definition. The definition that we received today, 

which is that it was the protection of high-priority materials as opposed to all vulnerable nuclear materials, is not completely consistent with what the President said. 

I think that between now and 2020 a bolder agenda should be 

pursued, and I think that part of that bolder agenda should be the 

elevation and prioritization of radiological source security. There is 

a serious problem with radiological materials around the world, 

and one initiative that the Congress could enact, should they so decide, is radiological zones of security around the world. 

I would just say that another item that would be useful is to 

unify the current regime under a nuclear material security framework. There is precedent for it in the environmental area, and the 

Convention on Nuclear Safety also has precedent that could be 

used. 

In general, I would say that the Congress should provide leadership on nuclear security by ensuring adequate budgets, by authorizing and funding these radiological security zones, by supporting 

a dialog among international regulators and nuclear facility security personnel, and then, finally, by encouraging the administration 

to focus on the need to improve nuclear security governance and to 

explore the value of this framework agreement that I mentioned. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Luongo. 

Mr. Stoutland, would you please proceed with your statement? 

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23 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Stoutland appears in the appendix on page 96. 

TESTIMONY OF PAGE O. STOUTLAND,1 PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT, 

NUCLEAR MATERIALS SECURITY PROGRAM, NUCLEAR 

THREAT INITIATIVE 

Mr. STOUTLAND. Thank you, Chairman Akaka. My name is Page 

Stoutland. I am the Vice President for Nuclear Materials Security 

at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization founded and co- chaired by former Senator 

Sam Nunn and CNN founder Ted Turner. Over the last 10 years, 

we have worked to strengthen material security around the world 

in a range of projects and are trying to catalyze governments to do 

more in this area. 

My remarks today will focus primarily on the urgent need for 

leaders to reach a global consensus on priorities for nuclear materials security and on steps the international community and individual countries can take. 

Because there is no baseline assessment of nuclear materials security conditions around the world, we recently developed a firstof-its-kind Nuclear Materials Security Index that scores 32 countries that have what we call ‘‘weapons-usable nuclear materials’’ on 

their nuclear materials security conditions, and also an additional 

144 countries that have small amounts or none of these materials 

but could be used as safe havens or staging grounds. 

Our hope is that this index will serve as a much-needed basis for 

a dialog on security priorities and can be used as a baseline against 

which progress can be measured. 

In developing the index, we found that governments generally 

are more aware of the threat posed by nuclear materials and the 

urgent need to strengthen security and also are more engaged in 

this effort. That was the good news, and it was due, at least in 

part, to the 2010 summit. 

We also, however, confirmed that there is currently no global 

consensus on what steps matter most to achieve security. There is 

no agreed international system or globally accepted practices for 

regulating the production of, use of, and security requirements for 

weapons-usable nuclear materials. And, further, there is deliberate 

lack of transparency about security measures that makes it impossible to hold States accountable for their security responsibilities. 

Briefly, we also believe that the nuclear terrorism threat remains 

high. There are currently thousands of tons of nuclear materials in 

the world, and many of those are not well secured. That is why all 

countries with weapons-usable material have a responsibility to secure them and to make sure that their materials are not at risk 

of theft or diversion, and that is why we, NTI, working with the 

Economist Intelligence Unit, undertook the development of this 

index. Detailed information is available at www.ntiindex.org. 

Let me make one important point. The index is not merely a rating system. It is not meant to be used to congratulate some and 

chastise others. Rather, it is designed to be used as a resource and 

a tool for all countries and international organizations as we make 

the world a safer place. 

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24 

Let me briefly summarize some of our key recommendations that 

get to your question as to are we effectively securing nuclear materials around the world. 

An overarching recommendation is that all States must work together to build a system for tracking, protecting, and managing nuclear materials in a way that builds confidence that each State is 

fulfilling its obligation. 

Specifically, we recommend establishing an international dialog 

on the priorities for materials security. Such a global consensus 

does not yet exist, and the Nuclear Security Summit or some other 

process would be a good place to start to build a common framework for action. 

Second, we must benchmark progress and hold States accountable for security. Over the past 20 years, there has been progress 

on securing and eliminating materials, but we must track progress 

around the globe over time, and it is critical that governments provide declarations of their weapons-usable nuclear materials as well 

as the current status of their nuclear materials security conditions. 

Third, it is important to build appropriate transparency to increase international confidence. We understand, of course, that 

many details about security for sites where materials are stored 

are—and should be—protected. But other information, such as the 

general approaches to materials security and broad descriptions of 

materials security regulations and holdings, could be made public 

and could greatly enhance international confidence in a country’s 

security conditions. 

Individually, countries can do more as well. The United States 

ranked 13th among countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials in our index. That rating was affected, in part, by the quantity of materials and number of sites where they are stored. If the 

quantities and sites were not included, the United States would 

rank second, indicating high scores in other areas. But in the future, the United States could improve its leadership and its ranking by ratifying the relevant international agreements that are critical in this area. 

We are encouraged by reactions to our new index, by progress on 

the President’s goal of eliminating all materials, and by ongoing attention. But today it is imperative that the Congress continue to 

support these critical programs and continue to support United 

States leadership in this area. We strongly urge the Senate to complete ratification steps on the 2005 Amendment to the Convention 

on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the 

International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 

Terrorism (ICSANT). Doing so would set a powerful example for 

the world and reinforce the United States’ leadership in this area. 

Again, great progress has been made on nuclear security. We 

welcome the United States leadership provided by the summit, and 

we are optimistic about continued progress. The index can help inform that process and serve as a valuable tool to help all of us better secure and protect some of the world’s deadliest materials. 

I would like to take the opportunity again to thank you and this 

Subcommittee for this work, and I am happy to answer any questions you might have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Dr. Stoutland. 

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25 

Mr. Luongo, your testimony recommends that we devote greater 

attention and resources to securing high-risk radiological materials 

worldwide, and I agree with you on that. You provide recommendations for expanding NNSA’s radiological security work both domestically and abroad. 

Please elaborate on these recommendations, as well as any observations you may have regarding GAO’s findings on the serious 

vulnerabilities at domestic hospitals. 

Mr. LUONGO. Well, I have two reactions, Mr. Chairman. The first 

is that I think NNSA is doing a great job on radiological with the 

money that they have, but the money is not adequate for the mission. And I think the second reaction I have is that what GAO 

found is a function of the fact that there is not enough of an effort 

in hospitals to secure radiological materials. 

I was struck—there is a study from the Congressional Research 

Service (CRS) on radiological terrorism, and I have been working 

in this field for a long time, but I have to tell you, the person that 

wrote that report came to something that I was at and held up a 

vial of Cesium-137 and said this is what it would take to have a 

radiological incident that had the scope of radioactivity dispersal 

that he had in his report, which would have gone from the White 

House up beyond Capitol Hill, and that capsule was as big as my 

thumb. 

It is a very serious problem because we have hundreds of thousands of these sources around the world. The most high intensity 

of them are less than the average source, and most of them are 

found in hospitals and food irradiation facilities and things like 

that. 

So I think an initiative that—as a high priority for the United 

States—is to secure all high-intensity radiological materials in hospitals and other public locations would be a great initiative between now and the next summit in 2014 in the Netherlands. And 

I think it is something that the United States could spearhead, and 

I do not think it is going to cost that much. I think to do the job 

in the United States alone would be something less than $200 million. But I think it is an important initiative, and it has been undervalued. The President never mentioned it in Prague, but I do 

think it is something—now that the 4-year goal is coming to an 

end, it is something that we need over the next 2 years or next 4 

years a much more intense effort on this issue. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for that response. 

Dr. Page Stoutland, I applaud NTI’s useful Nuclear Materials Security Index. One factor you analyzed was the level of political stability in each country with weapons-usable nuclear materials. As 

the recent unrest in the Middle East makes clear, this can change 

rapidly. 

How does political instability undermine nuclear materials security? And how can we best prepare for it? 

Mr. STOUTLAND. Thank you very much for that very important 

and interesting question. When we created the index, we tried to 

create a very holistic framework, if you will, that included the full 

range of things that we thought could affect a country’s materials 

security conditions. And as you highlighted, it included political 

stability; it also included levels of corruption. 

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26 

And as challenging as those things are to evaluate—and I should 

point out that we depended on the Economist Intelligence Unit, 

which is part of the Economist Group and has a long history of 

evaluating these things—we thought it was important to couple the 

conversation of materials security to political stability, because I 

think as we have seen just over the last few years, both in Libya 

and the Middle East, and even in North Korea where there has 

been a recent change, those changes introduce a whole set of uncertainties that are very unpredictable; and yet they must be considered as we think about securing materials in each of these countries. 

So you then ask the question, well, what can we do about that 

beforehand to better deal with it given the potential uncertainties 

and yet the potential seriousness of this. I think there are several 

things that can be done. Probably the most important would be to 

remove and eliminate materials from as many countries as possible 

so that as we saw in Libya, the situation was very different since 

the materials had been removed beforehand. And so the potential 

for political stability I think should motivate us to do even more 

in that regard. 

Second, I think we should make sure that the materials are as 

secure as possible, and so for countries where they have either high 

levels of corruption or political instability, or in many cases both, 

those countries, I think, need to go the extra mile, so to speak, to 

show the international community that their materials are under 

very effective control and would remain so, even in changes of government or other dangerous situations. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Stoutland, your testimony states that to effectively track, protect, and manage nuclear materials, the IAEA 

would need to be significantly strengthened or a new international 

entity created. Your testimony provides specific recommendations 

for desirable outcomes, but does not address how to strengthen the 

IAEA itself. 

What recommendations do you have for building the IAEA’s capacity to achieve these goals? 

Mr. STOUTLAND. Thank you for your question. This is actually 

one of the areas where we have received many questions after the 

index has come out, and, in fact, there is even a short section in 

the index that talks specifically to the role of the IAEA, because 

what we have found is that many people who are interested in this 

area do not understand that the role of the IAEA is currently restricted to civilian nuclear materials. And, of course, the vast quantity of nuclear materials are in nuclear weapons programs around 

the world. And so the mandate of the IAEA would have to be dramatically expanded to include military materials to accomplish 

such a thing, and obviously, that is something that would be very 

difficult to do and take a very long period of time. 

Second, there is just the resource issue. The IAEA is currently 

underresourced to do many of the jobs that it has been asked to 

do, in fact, and so that is something else that would have to be addressed. 

So in the meantime, we have proposed that it is critical that an 

international discussion be initiated, first of all, on what the priorities are, and our index has offered a framework for discussion that 

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we can use to start to consider in a very specific way what the priorities are. And as we do that, I think we then have to consider 

what such a system might look like and what its governance might 

be. But those things, I think, are some time in the future as we 

start to sort this out. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, let me ask Mr. Luongo the same questions, 

what recommendations you may have for building the IAEA’s capacity to achieve these goals. 

Mr. LUONGO. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would say that, first and foremost, the IAEA after September 11, 2001 created an Office of Nuclear Security. It is under Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security, 

and the problem with that office is not that it is not good. It is that 

it is underresourced significantly, and there is a challenge in the 

IAEA in balancing how different parts of their mission get money. 

So most of the money that goes to the Nuclear Security Office 

comes from voluntary contributions from individual countries. I 

think their budget is somewhere around $25 or $30 million a year. 

I think they could do more, provide more assistance to countries, 

if they had more money and more specialists that could go out and 

evaluate the security in individual countries. That is one specific 

thing that I think would be very helpful. 

Reforming the IAEA so that it has a mandate that is greater 

than what it is now or that is more mandatory than what it does 

now I think is going to be extremely difficult because in nuclear security, what it does is it makes recommendations, and it will do assessments, but it cannot enforce them. And the issue, I think, that 

Page mentioned and others in the first panel mentioned is that we 

do not have uniformity of implementation of the security recommendations. The recommendations are all very good, but we do 

not know how they are implemented in a lot of countries, and there 

is no requirement that they be implemented uniformly. 

So I think trying to get a uniform baseline would be extremely 

useful, and that is something that the IAEA could contribute to. 

But the enforcement and the transparency of how the implementation occurs is a key issue, and I think that is not something that 

the membership in the IAEA would ever allow in the short term, 

but it is a long-term goal. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for that response. 

Dr. Stoutland, as you know, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea received the lowest scores in your security index. Please discuss why 

they received such low scores and to what extent their lack of 

transparency about their nuclear materials contributed. 

Mr. STOUTLAND. Yes, thank you for your question. I think, first, 

one of the key messages coming out of our index is that, independent of where countries rank, there is more that all of us can 

do to improve our security conditions. That said, I think the countries you mentioned have a lot of room for improvement, so to 

speak. We have found that some of these countries do not fully participate in all of the international legal arrangements. Many of 

these countries have very challenging societal factors, be they political stability or corruption. Many of them have capacity issues just 

in terms of an ability to implement the guidelines that may have 

been promulgated by the IAEA as an example. 

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28 

And so these countries have a lot of challenges in front of them, 

and I think you have mentioned the transparency issue. One of the 

key things in our index which differentiates it from some other 

projects is that we included the role of transparency because we 

thought it was critical that not only did countries have good materials security conditions but, in addition, that they can assure others that they have good security conditions. And so that issue featured prominently in several countries, and I think there are specific things that those countries can do. 

Some have commented in reviewing our index, ‘‘Isn’t it at odds 

with security to have too much transparency?’’ And we are very 

clear to say that we are not asking for transparency on the specific 

security measures that might be in place at a site. Those, of course, 

should be appropriately protected. Rather, we are asking for some 

fairly general things related to having a country have its regulations be public, by making public declarations about materials 

quantities and overall security practices. That could go a long ways 

to assuring the international community that they, in fact, have 

their material security under good control. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. Luongo, you support GAO’s recommendation to compile an 

inventory of U.S. nuclear materials overseas, and you heard the 

discussion during the first panel of that issue. Would you like to 

comment on the issue and the agency witnesses’ testimony? 

Mr. LUONGO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. On the one hand, I have a certain amount of sympathy for the NNSA and other agencies that 

have to go out and try to verify where this United States-origin 

material is because a lot of it was delivered years and years and 

years ago, and the level of scrutiny was not as intense as it is 

today. 

That being said, I think that getting the most accurate record of 

where nuclear material is and who owns it is extremely important, 

and there is this whole new field of science called ‘‘forensics,’’ so if 

there is a nuclear incident, you can identify what country that material came from. 

I would hate to see United States-origin material used in a nuclear terrorist incident, and I think that stronger efforts should be 

made to try and identify where this material is. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

To both of you, it took over a decade to publish revised IAEA recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear materials and 

facilities. Achieving international consensus often takes quite some 

time, as you know. 

What more can be done to make sure we have international nuclear security mechanisms that respond quickly enough to evolving 

security needs? Mr. Luongo. 

Mr. LUONGO. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the challenge that we have in the international community is that when 

you are seeking unanimity in support of something, you end up 

with the lowest common denominator because it is always watered 

down by countries that are least interested in making progress on 

the issue. 

So I think in a way the Nuclear Security Summit process, even 

though it has not tackled the really difficult issues that we are 

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talking about today, has created this precedent for selective 

multilateralism where I think leaders could emerge and put in 

place, agree among themselves to be more transparent, to agree to 

a common standard for nuclear materials security, to submit their 

materials to peer review with confidentiality. 

I think leadership among some key nations—and those nations 

I consider to be the United States, South Korea, Japan, and others—would be an extremely positive example that others could follow. The example that we have in the environmental area for fluorocarbons, for example, is that not all countries agreed on protecting the ozone layer at the beginning, but ultimately many more 

came on board after the initiative was begun and the agreement 

was put in place. 

So I think we need to start with leaders, and then I think we 

will gather followers. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. STOUTLAND. If I could just make a quick comment and largely second what Kenneth said, with perhaps an anecdote. As we finished the index, we had many people come to us and say, well, why 

didn’t the IAEA or some other international organization do such 

a thing, because it is in many ways obvious that we want some sort 

of framework and be able to track progress. And the answer we received was that it would be either impossible or it would take a 

very long period of time for an international organization that operates by consensus to do something that in principle is actually 

quite straightforward. 

So we went ahead and did it. As we did it, we tried to—a key 

part of our project was to have a fairly small international panel 

so that at least we achieved some level of international consensus 

on the framework and then, of course, offered it for broader comment. But I think the notion of putting forward something that is 

a nucleus around which people can gather and start to achieve 

some consensus and hopefully some momentum is a good one. I 

think the summit is a good example of that, and there are others 

where we can start to build consensus perhaps by starting with 

small groups. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. I would say that would 

be my last question to you, and I want to thank you so much. Your 

responses have been valuable, and it will help us move forward 

with the security initiatives that we certainly want to strengthen, 

not only in our country but abroad as well. And you have been 

helpful in doing that, so I want to thank you so much for being 

part of this hearing today. 

The President’s 4-year effort and the upcoming Nuclear Security 

Summit in Seoul have put a much-needed international spotlight 

on nuclear materials security. This renewed focus has led to significant achievements in securing nuclear materials abroad. However, 

many challenges remain, and our Nation is alarmingly vulnerable. 

GAO’s testimony today regarding unsecured radiological materials 

in hospitals and other medical facilities nationwide should serve as 

a wakeup call to these facilities as well as to our Federal agencies 

and Federal regulators. 

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I look forward to working with the Administration and my Senate colleagues in continuing the critical effort to promote nuclear 

and radiological materials security worldwide. 

I will keep the hearing record open for 2 weeks for additional 

statements or questions other members may have. 

Again, thank you for your responses here and for being part of 

this. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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73676.071
102 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.072
103 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.073
104 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.074
105 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.075
106 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.076
107 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.077
108 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.078
109 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.079
110 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.080
111 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.081
112 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.082
113 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.083
114 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.084
115 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.085
116 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.086
117 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.087
118 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.088
119 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.089
120 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.090
121 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.091
122 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.092
123 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.093
124 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.094
125 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.095
126 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.096
127 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.097
128 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.098
129 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.099
130 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.100
131 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.101
132 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.102
133 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.103
134 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.104
135 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.105
136 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.106
137 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.107
138 

Æ 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73676.108